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(Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 27, June, 1981 Lebanon, Israel, Lebanon, Page 30917 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved

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(Formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 27, June, 1981 Lebanon, Israel, Lebanon, Page 30917 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 27, June, 1981 Lebanon, Israel, Lebanon, Page 30917 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Syrian Plans to redeploy ADF - National Reconciliation Efforts Notwithstanding the imposition of a ceasefire in southern Lebanon in the latter part of 1979 [see 30093 A] and numerous diplomatic efforts to find a lasting peaceful settlement there, the situation in the south of the country remained critical throughout 1980 and the first three months of 1981. Moreover, in April-May 1981further serious tension developed in Israeli-Syrian relations over Lebanon (details of which will be given in a later article). The period to March 1981 was characterized in particular by (i) numerous Israeli air, land and sea attacks on positions held by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as part of Israel's policy of pre-emptive strikes against guerrillas (which, it claimed, had reduced Palestinian raids against Israeli targets by 52 per cent in 1980 compared with 1979); (ii) frequent exchanges between on the one hand Israel and its rightist Christian allies in the area immediately to the north of the Israel-Lebanon border (commanded by Maj. SaadHaddad--see below) and on the other Palestinian and leftist forces; and (iii) increasing harassment of soldiers serving with the 6,000-man United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by all groups involved in the area, but in particular by the forces of Maj. Haddad (described by the UN as the "de facto" forces). Israel's mounting involvement in southern Lebanon provoked several aerial battles with Syrians serving with the Arab deterrent force in Lebanon (ADF, comprising some 23,000 Syrians since the withdrawal of other troop-contributing countries in 1978-79--see page 30005), and in December 1980 led to the first ground battle between Israelis and Syrians in Lebanon. [See also pages 30096 and 30098 for earlier aerial battles between the two countries.] Another consequence of the deteriorating situation in the south was the development of a serious rift between the Shia Moslem community and the Palestinians which had earlier been allies. As shown on the accompanying map, an enclave had been established along the full length of Lebanon's southern border, covering an area of 500 square miles and containing a population of around 100,000 Christians and Shia Moslems. Effective control of this enclave was exercised by Maj. Haddad, a Christian, who had in April 1979 proclaimed it an independent free Lebanese state [see page 30094], and who commanded a force of some 1,300 full-time soldiers and 800 civil guardsmen equipped and supported byIsrael. Israel however rejected allegations, made in particular by the UN force and the LebaneseGovernment, that it had established positions within the enclave and that it had considerable influence over the activities of Maj. Haddad and his militia. Most of the area north of this enclave up to the Litani river was under the control of UNIFIL (which had been deployed in southern Lebanon in 1978 following an incursion by Israel but which had been prevented by that country from occupying positions right up to the border--see 29646 A), although an important area to the west and north of Marjayoun remained outside its control; there was also a Palestinian guerrilla presence in the UN zone, notably to the east of Tyre (itself outside the UN-held area), where there were several refugee camps. The area of southern Lebanon beyond the Litani river was largely inhabited by Palestinians and other leftist groups, while a number of Syrian ADF soldiers were also deployed in the area (Israel having made clear that it would not accept a Syrian presence south of the river). In central and northern Lebanon the ADF was largely successful in maintaining peace between Moslems and Christians, but intra-Christian feuding persisted, being particularly serious in July 1980 when the Phalangist Party launched an offensive against the National Liberal Party (its former ally in the Lebanese Front) and established political control over much of the Christian-dominated area to the north and north-east of Beirut [see map on this page]; there were also frequent clashes between rival Moslem groups involving in particular the pro-Iranian Shia community and Palestinian and other leftist groups supporting Iraq, this rift being exacerbated by the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. Moreover the ADF itself (which in early 1980 redeployed some of its soldiers within Lebanon) clashed on a number of occasions with hardline Christian groups who accused the Syrian peace- keeping force of being an occupying army. Throughout this period the Lebanese Government (headed until July 1980 by Dr Selim Hoss) had no control over the Christian-held border area in the very south of the country and very little authority over other areas, the numerous militia groups of the contending factions including as many as 30 private armies within the Moslem community alone. Moreover, the Lebanese President, Mr Elias Sarkis, was unsuccessful in his efforts to draw up a national pact with all-round acceptance, involving inter alia the formation of a government of national reconciliation and the redeployment of the reconstituted Lebanese Army throughout the country; although a new Government was formed in October 1980 by Mr Chafiq al-Wazzan, observers saw no prospect of it being any more effective than the outgoing administration. In early 1980 Syria unilaterally declared its intention to redeploy its soldiers serving with the ADF inLebanon, moving them from their existing positions throughout the country (including Beirut where 10,000-12,000 had policed the "green line" roughly dividing the Christian and Moslem sectors of the capital) and concentrating them in parts of the Bekaa valley near the border with Syria and in other areas east of Beirut. (The ADF mandate, originally granted in March 1978 and subsequently successively extended, was further extended for six-month periods on Jan. 26, 1980, and again on July 26, 1980.) By early February as many as 4,000 Syrian troops were reported to have been transferred from coastal positions south of Beirut, and this development prompted Dr Hoss to hold urgent talks with President Assad of Syria in Damascus onFeb. 4, in the course of which he succeeded in securing a guarantee that the proposed withdrawal from Beirut would be postponed until Lebanese authorities had "time to fill any vacuum which might arise". In a statement made in Beirut following these talks Dr Hoss stressed that the Syrian decision was "irrevocable" but that President Assad had given his assurances that the withdrawal from Beirut "does not mean that Syria will abandon the tasks which the ADF primarily entered Lebanon to implement, the foremost of which are maintaining the unity of Lebanon-its territory, its people and its institutions-and preserving the security situation". President Assad also held talks during this period with the PLO leader, Mr Yassir Arafat, who visited Damascus and other Arab capitals to express his strong opposition to the Syrian evacuation of the southern coastal area and to its proposed withdrawal from the capital. Following further discussions between Lebanese leaders and parties affected by the Syrian plans for redeployment, the Lebanese Cabinet on Feb. 6, 1980, announced its decision to replace the Syrian ADF troops in key positions by the Lebanese Army (with some 22,00 men), the main points of this decision being as follows: (1) To authorize the Lebanese Army to make the necessary immediate arrangements to fill any security vacuum at any point on the confrontation lines, in vital public utilities and in all the state's departments and establishments; (2) To reject any armed presence in any Lebanese areas other than the legitimate forces, namely theLebanese Army, the ADF and the internal security forces; (3) To request the commands of the Lebanese Army, the ADF and the internal security forces to draw up a comprehensive security plan aimed at tightening the control of the legitimate authority in all Lebanese areas. (4) (The PLO rejected point of the decision, claiming that it "ignored the legitimacy of the Palestinian presence, recognized by bilateral agreements and in resolutions of all the Arab summit meetings".) On March 7, 1980 (following the arrangement of a further postponement on Feb. 13), some 2,000 Syriantroops withdrew from positions on the outskirts of predominantly Christian east Beirut, where LebaneseArmy units took over without incident. However, the Army was unable to assume overall responsibility for security in Beirut, where in the western sector several thousand Syrians continued to police major roads. Parts of west Beirut were, moreover, under the control of leftist and Palestinian forces, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) having by late 1979 become officially integrated into the ADF. Earlier, in Sidon (Saida), left-wing Moslem militia forces of the (Nasserite) Mourabitoun had on Feb. 10 taken over most government buildings and offices after the evacuation by the Syrians. The deployment of the Lebanese Army had been opposed by many left-wing militia groups who protested that it was biased in favour of the Christians (the Army Commander, Maj.-Gen. Victor Khoury--see page 28733-being repeatedly accused of fighting on the side of the Christians in the civil war), while the Syrians also were known to doubt its impartiality and were reluctant to allow the Christians-and ultimately the Israelis-to consolidate their power in Lebanon through the Army. Western press reports suggested a variety of reasons for the Syrian decision to announce its intention to redeploy its forces. In particular, Syria was thought to be anxious to terminate its role as "policeman" inLebanon, and to hope that its proposal to withdraw from Beirut and other important areas would compel theLebanese to assume responsibility for their own security and bring about a national reconciliation agreement between the various contending factions.
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