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Factional Clashes-Commencement of Israeli Withdrawal- Related Developments

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Factional Clashes-Commencement of Israeli Withdrawal- Related Developments Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 31, June, 1985 Lebanon, Page 33683 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Factional clashes-Commencement of Israeli withdrawal- Related developments Summary and key dates Attempts to extend security plan (December 1984-January 1985). Factional clashes in and around Beirut (December 1984-May 1985). Bomb attack on home of Hezbollah leader (March 8, 1985). Hijacking incidents (February). Economic crisis (1984–85). Kidnapping incidents (January-May 1985). Breakdown of Israeli- Lebanese withdrawal talks (Jan. 22). Implementation of three- stage Israeli withdrawal plan (January-June). Attacks by Lebanese guerrillas on Israeli and SLA forces (January-May). Renewal of UNIFIL mandate (April 17). Imposition of Israeli‘iron fist’ policy in southern Lebanon (February). Israeli air- strikes against Palestinian bases (January-April). Anti-government rebellion by elements of Lebanese Forces (March). Defeat of Christian forces around Sidon (March and April). Resignation of Mr Karami (April 17). The Israeli government, having failed to reach agreement with the Lebanese government on a co-ordinated withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country, decided in January 1985 on a unilateral three-stage withdrawal, the first two parts of which were completed by mid-April, while the last Israeli forces were officially reported to have left Lebanon on June 6 (the third anniversary of the 1982 invasion). The process was accompanied by a violent cycle of attacks on troops of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) by the (mainly Shia Moslem) National Resistance; and (ii) reprisal raids by the Israelis on Shia villages in southern Lebanon. These raids frequently led to confrontations between the IDF and units of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, which had been stationed in designated areas of the south since 1978). As the Israelis withdrew, it was revealed that they intended to reserve the right of re-entry into a ‘security zone’ extending between three and six miles north of the border to be patrolled by units of the Israeli-backed (mainly Christian) SouthLebanon Army (SLA) militia. Elsewhere in Lebanon, central government authority was increasingly weakened during the first five months of 1985 by further factional fighting. This consisted principally of (i) clashes between Christian and Moslem militias across the ‘Green Line’ dividing the two communities in Beirut, the capital; (ii) the defeat by an alliance of Druse, Moslem and Palestinian forces of attacks by the Christian Phalangist Lebanese Forces militia outside Sidon; and (iii) an assault by the Shia Amal militia against Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, aimed at preventing the re-emergence of a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) military presence in the area. [Details of this Shia-Palestinian conflict will be covered in a forthcoming article.] The renewed fighting led to the resignation in late April of the Prime Minister, Mr Rashid Karami, although after talks with Syrian leaders he subsequently agreed to remain in office in a caretaker capacity. [For the background to Syrian involvement in Lebanon, see page 33366-67.] As factional clashes continued in and around the capital, the government took steps to extend the ‘security plan’ (providing for the disengagement of rival militias and their replacement by Army units-see pages 33366-67). In the northern port city of Tripoli, the last provisions of a peace agreement concluded inSeptember between rival Sunni and Alawite Moslem militias were successfully implemented on Dec. 18 when units of the Army's second brigade moved into the city. Barricades were removed, and militiamen withdrew from the streets. The question of extending Army control south of the capital was discussed during talks between President Amin Gemayel and President Assad of Syria in Damascus at the end of December. As a preliminary to this extension, Lebanese police travelled unmolested along the coast road as far as Damour on Jan. 2[see page 31920]. They were followed by Army units, which also moved into the Kharroub region inland from the coast between Beirut and Damour, some two weeks later. A car bomb which exploded outside a school in the Druse village of Ras al-Metn on Dec. 21, killing five people, provoked shelling exchanges between Phalangist and Druse gunners. A Druse-owned bank in west Beirut was damaged in a bomb attack on Jan. 11, 1985, and on Jan. 18 two children were killed when a car bomb exploded in a playground in a Shia district. Earlier, on Jan. 8, the deputy commander of the French observation forces (stationed in Beirut since March 1984-see page33059) was shot dead at a crossing point on the Green Line. In protest against the continuing lack of security in Beirut, Dr Selim Hoss, the (Sunni Moslem) Minister of Labour and Education, announced his resignation on Jan. 26. He had recently criticized the Army and security chiefs for failing to clamp down on militia activity in the area, and had demanded that they should resign if they were unable to enforce the security plan. Dr Hoss withdrew his resignation on Jan. 28 after pleas for him to remain in the Cabinet had been made by Mr Karami and Mr Abdel Halim Khaddam, a Syrian Vice-President who regularly played a major role in discussions on Lebanon's future. At a press conference the following day, Dr Hoss said that the Cabinet had failed to operate as a ‘national unity’ government and that its members had continued to encourage confessional disputes. A car bomb planted outside a mosque in Tripoli exploded on Feb. 1, killing 12 people. Three banks in west Beirut were the targets of bomb attacks onFeb. 2, responsibility for which was claimed by the militant Shia group, Al Jihad al-Islami[see page 33368], a spokesman for whom said it was the work of the group's ‘Brigade for Protecting the Poor’. Other car bombs exploded in Beirut and Tripoli on Feb. 10. Street fighting in west Beirut broke out on Feb. 23 between Amal and armed members of Hezbollah (‘Party of God’), a fundamentalist Shia group with ties to the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini[see pages 32645; 32889; 33062; 33369]. The clashes apparently occurred after Hezbollah members had accused Amal of negotiating with the Israelis. A car bomb exploded on March 8 outside the west Beirut home of Shaikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the leader of Hezbollah, killing at least 60 people and wounding over 200. Shaikh Fadlallah, who escaped unharmed from the attack, accused ‘Israel and its allies’ of responsibility. Reports appearing in Western newspapers in mid-May quoted ‘informed (US) sources’ as stating that a covert operation by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to launch pre-emptive ‘counter-terrorist’ strikes against groups believed to be planning attacks on US interests in Lebanon, had been dismantled immediately after the bombing. The reports claimed that the attack had been perpetrated by a Lebanese unit trained and supplied by the CIA, although it was stressed that it had been carried out without the CIA's knowledge or authorization. US officials had however earlier speculated that Hezbollah had been involved in attacks on US personnel[see pages 33368-69; 32645]. The plan for CIA-backed ‘counter-terrorist’ activity had been approved by President Reagan in late 1984, according to the reports, following which briefings had been given to the House of Representatives and Senate intelligence committees. Subsequent reports quoted an (unnamed) officer of the Lebanese state intelligence as claiming that his organization had carried out the bombing and that it had received the prior approval of the CIA. An inquiry into the allegations was ordered on March 16 by Mr Nabi Berri, leader of Amal, in his capacity as Minister of Justice. A Cyprus Airways airliner was seized on the ground at Beirut airport on Feb. 7 by two gunmen who held the crew hostage while demanding the release of two hijackers in prison in Cyprus. They later surrendered to Amal militiamen who had surrounded the aircraft. An airport security guard demanding promotion and pay increases for himself and his colleagues seized control of an aircraft as it was preparing for take-off on Feb. 23. In the confusion that resulted from the crew attempting to evacute the passengers down the escape chutes, one passenger was killed as he fell through the open door on to the tarmac. The aircraft flew to Cyprus and back, after which the hijacker agreed to an offer by the chief national security officer to set up a committee to investigate his grievances. The hijacker was not arrested, and airport workers subsequently went on strike in support of his demands. The continuing violence in Beirut, which resulted in a flight of capital and skilled labour from the country, contributed to a steadily worsening economic situation. [For economic performance during 1984,see pages 33369-70.] The balance-of-payments deficit at the end of 1984 stood at US$ 1,500 million, while inflation over the year amounted to 35 per cent. Unemployment continued to be at a high level, with over 25 per cent of the country's workforce affected at the start of 1985. The value of the Lebanese pound against the US dollar was cut by nearly half during the first five months of 1985, from $ 1.00= £ 8.92 at the end of 1984 to $1.00= £ 16.13 in late May 1985. A particularly sharp fall occurred in late January, shortly after the new governor of the central bank, Dr Edmond Naim, had taken office. The fall was temporarily arrested after commercial banks suspended foreign exchange transactions on Jan. 25 and subsequently agreed on unspecified measures to curb currency speculation. Some optimism was generated in early February by speculation that Saudi Arabia would agree to provide substantial financial aid for Lebanon's foreign reserves ($ 620,000,000 at the end of 1984) following a meeting between President Gemayel and Mr Rafiq al-Hariri, a Saudi businessman and unofficial diplomat who had major business interests in Lebanon.
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