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Lebanese Cabinet Votes to Accept Pact on Pullout Page 1 93 of 220 DOCUMENTS The New York Times May 15, 1983, Sunday, Late City Final Edition LEBANESE CABINET VOTES TO ACCEPT PACT ON PULLOUT BYLINE: By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, Special to the New York Times SECTION: Section 1; Part 1; Page 1, Column 6; Foreign Desk LENGTH: 948 words DATELINE: BEIRUT, Lebanon, May 14 Despite Syrian objections, President Amin Gemayel's Cabinet today unanimously approved the American-sponsored withdrawal agreement with Israel, a Cabinet statement said. The 10-member Cabinet also empowered Lebanon's chief negotiator with Israel, Antoine Fattal, to sign the accord as soon as a date and a place have been scheduled, the statement added. No date for the signing has been decided, but it is expected sometime next week. (In Washington, a State Department spokesman described the Lebanese Cabinet's approval of the accord as ''a constructive step in the ongoing process directed towards the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon.'') Negotiators to Meet Today Israeli, Lebanese and American negotiators are to meet in the Israeli resort town of Netanya on Sunday to iron out any last-minute questions of language in the agreement - which is being published in Arabic, Hebrew, English and French - and to set a time for the ceremonial signing, according to Lebanese negotiators. Israel and Lebanon began their withdrawal negotiations last December. They came to an agreement eight days ago after two weeks of shuttling between Beirut and Jerusalem by Secretary of State George P. Shultz. With the agreement now formally approved, Lebanon has begun a diplomatic effort designed to win the backing of the majority of the Arab countries and to isolate Syria, which declared its opposition Friday to the accord. Arab Leaders to Be Briefed Foreign Minister Elie Salem of Lebanon summoned Arab ambassadors today to give them copies of the agreement, and other Cabinet ministers prepared to travel to Arab capitals on Sunday to brief heads of state. President Gemayel telephoned President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, a key opinion-shaper among the more radical Arab governments, to win him over to the accord. Algeria is expected to make its position known in the next few days. A senior Lebanese official said Lebanon believed it already had either the active or passive support of all the Arab countries except Syria, Southern Yemen and Libya, which says it will break diplomatic relations with Lebanon if it signs the agreement. There is quiet satisfaction among President Gemayel's foreign policy advisers that for the first time in eight years the Page 2 LEBANESE CABINET VOTES TO ACCEPT PACT ON PULLOUT The New York Times May 15, 1983, Sunday, Late City Final Edition Lebanese seem to be outmaneuvering the Syrians diplomatically. 'Lebanon Is Acting' ''For once it is Lebanon which is acting and Syria which is reacting,'' an aide to Mr. Gemayel said. Although they feel they have handled the Syrians as well as they could, Lebanese officials realize that unless Damascus can be persuaded to withdraw its estimated 40,000 troops from Lebanon, the Israeli withdrawal agreement will not be put into effect. Mr. Gemayel is known to feel that if the Syrians do not undertake any violent action against Lebanon in the next few days, such as shelling East Beirut, as they are suspected of having done in the Christian-Druse fighting in the last two weeks, it may be a signal of a softening by Syria. A team of Lebanese officials is expected to go to Damascus in the coming week to sound out the Syrians about opening negotiations, Government sources said. Syria Encourages Opposition The Syrians, however, have encouraged domestic Lebanese opposition to the agreement. Soon before the Cabinet spokesman announced the Government's formal approval of the accord, Syrian-backed Lebanese opponents of the agreement met in Syrian-controlled northern Lebanon to organize national opposition to the accord. The state-run Beirut radio said former President Suleiman Franjieh; former Prime Minister Rashid Karami; Walid Jumblat, a Druse leader; George Hawi, head of the Lebanese Communist Party, and Assem Kanso, head of the pro-Syrian faction of the Lebanese Baath Party, held a meeting today at Mr. Franjieh's villa in the northern village of Zgharta. The meeting brought together an unusual group of warlords and leftist politicians, united by their opposition to the agreement and the fact that they all either live in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon or depend on Syria for political support. The Beirut radio reported that Mr. Karami said after the meeting that the group had rejected the agreement with Israel and had prepared a statement that it would deliver to an envoy of President Gemayel who is expected to go to Zgharta on Monday. Widespread Backing Seen The opposition group is seen by Lebanese officials as a Syrian creation that neither has nor is likely to gain much grass-roots support in Lebanon, where, judging from editorials in the daily press, there is widespread backing for the agreement with Israel. The Speaker of the 99-member Lebanese Parliament, Kamal al-Assad, said today that he would call the assembly into session Monday, when the Government is expected to make a statement on the accord. He indicated that it was still not clear whether the Government would ask Parliament to endorse the accord formally or simply tell Parliament of its contents. For a week there has been behind-the-scenes wrangling between Moslem political figures in the country over whether to present the withdrawal agreement to Parliament. Many were uncomfortable with the prospect of being asked to approve the accord in the face of Syria's opposition. Technically, Parliament's approval is not needed for the President to authorize the document's signature, but some Cabinet ministers, particularly Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazzan, were understood to want a parliamentary stamp of approval to spread responsibility for the agreement and make it difficult for Syria to argue that the Gemayel Page 3 LEBANESE CABINET VOTES TO ACCEPT PACT ON PULLOUT The New York Times May 15, 1983, Sunday, Late City Final Edition Government does not have national support on the accord. LANGUAGE: ENGLISH Copyright 1983 The New York Times Company.
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