Barbula and Old Baldy, March 1953: Colombia’S Heaviest Combat in Korea

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Barbula and Old Baldy, March 1953: Colombia’S Heaviest Combat in Korea Barbula and Old Baldy, March 1953: Colombia’s Heaviest Combat in Korea by Charles H. Briscoe Colombia provided an infantry bat- ment. The Eighth Army commander, U.S. General James talion and a frigate to serve with the United Nations A. Van Fleet, concluded that “continued pursuit of the Command in Korea from 1951–1955. It was enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most the only Latin American country to pro- profitable employment of UN troops . was to establish vide forces.1 The Batallón Colombia bravely a defense line (Line Kansas) on the nearest command- fought the Communist Chinese in numer- ing terrain north of Parallel 38, and from there push for- ous engagements in 1951 and 1952, earning ward in limited advances to accomplish the maximum a U.S. Presidential Unit Citation during destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum dan- the Kumsong Offensive. However, it was ger to the integrity of the UN forces.”4 the heavy fighting in March 1953, while That meant Line Kansas was to be fortified in depth. the peace talks were in progress, that truly Hasty field fortifications would be constructed along the tested the mettle of the South Americans. This article will focus on the two most 24 US X significant actions of the Batallón Colombia Pyonggang X 6K 2K X 24 US in Korea, Operation BARBULA and the X X 2K X I X IX 25 US X POLAR fight for Old Baldy. In a period of ten days, X X IX X X the Colombians suffered 114 killed, 141 NOMAD X wounded, and 38 missing in action, the 2 Iron Triangle UN Service equivalent of two rifle companies. The Medal purpose of this article is to place those two battles in proper context in order to Kumhwa WYOMING show how earlier success in Operation Chorwon BARBULA created conditions that con- tributed later to a controversial loss. U.S. Presi- This study is relevant because the Kore- dential Unit an War was key to the development of a Citation g professional Colombian armed force and n a P u G was a benchmark in the social and politi- X k h - X a n I X IX I cal transformation of the country. Because X X IX 24 US Hwachon X XX Colombia was the only Latin American Boundary Change Reservoir Eff. 28 Aug 1951 2 US country to support the principles of interna- New Old tional, collective security in Korea, the Batal- X 2 US X 6K 2K X 2 US X lón Colombia and its naval frigates became 6K “showcase” elements for their military ser- KANSAS XX CT DT vices, the nation, and the Americas.3 When N XXX CS DS the Batallón Colombia reached the front lines IX 2 US on 1 August 1951, the war was a stalemate. XX Chunchon The UN objective in Korea had shifted XXX Colombia’s from military victory to a political settle- IX “Rampant Lion of the Infan- Friendly Situation—August 1951 highlighting Lines Kansas, try” insignia Wyoming, Nomad, and Polar. Vol. 2 No. 4 15 31st Infantry 24th Infantry 21st Infantry IX Corps shoulder 7th Infantry I Corps shoulder Regiment Division shoulder Regiment patch Division shoulder patch (Polar Bears) patch (Gimlets) patch Distinctive Unit Distinctive Insignia Unit Insignia Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division until October 1954), the Colombians would defend the MLR and con- duct patrols and raids between the lines until the armi- stice on 27 July 1953. However, while peace talks were ongoing at Panmunjom, the Chinese launched a major offensive in the spring of 1953, to capture several UN outposts on dominant terrain that overlooked the MLR.6 When the 7th Infantry Division returned to the MLR the end of February 1953, it had been reassigned from the IX Corps to the I Corps sector. The Batallón Colombia was operationally ready. The battalion’s intense integrated training of 201 replacements from the 8th contingent was Colombian positions on the main line of resistance while key to Colonel William B. Kern awarding it a top perfor- attached to the 24th Infantry Division near Chup’a-ri over- mance during regimental maneuvers in late November looking the Kumsong Valley, 1951. 1952, and again in February 1953.7 Operation BARBULA forward slopes of Line Wyoming [Combat Outpost Line placed the Colombians back into the ground war. (COPL)] to blunt enemy assaults and delay them before On 10 March 1953, Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruíz they reached Kansas, the main line of resistance (MLR). Novoa, third commander of the Batallón Colombia, sent C Having trained to fight offensively, the Batallón Colombia Company (-), commanded by Captain Gustavo Acevedo, would primarily defend. Only limited attacks would be to attack two enemy strong points on Hill 180. They were conducted against the Chinese forces.5 Attached to two about five hundred meters in front of the 31st Infantry different U.S. divisions (21st Infantry Regiment, 24th sector. These two strong points screened the Chinese Infantry Division until late January 1952; then to 31st MLR five hundred meters to the rear. After the two Yokkok-chon 223 Old Baldy 347 200 275 Ik-kaemug 200 CCF MLR 177 B A Togun-gol C Colombia Operation BARBULA N 200 Elevations in meters Sidamak 0 .5 Miles 31(US) 32(US) 0 .5 KM Captain Jorgé Robledo Pulido briefed Operation BARBULA Operation BARBULA (10 March 1953) (right to left) to General Mark W. Clark (UN Command), General Maxwell D. Taylor (Eighth U.S. Army), Colonel William B. Kern (31st Infantry), Lieutenant General Paul W. Kendall (I Corps), and Major General Wayne C. Smith (7th Infantry Division) with a sand table terrain model. 16 Veritas 31st Infantry 24th Infantry 21st Infantry IX Corps shoulder 7th Infantry I Corps shoulder Regiment Division shoulder Regiment patch Division shoulder patch (Polar Bears) patch (Gimlets) patch Distinctive Unit Distinctive Insignia Unit Insignia Colombian platoons crossed a narrow valley, the ele- ment commanded by Second Lieutenant Andrade was to attack Strong Point A. Simultaneously, Second Lieu- Batallón Colombia defensive positions on the reverse slope tenant Miguel Piñeros Grimaldi and his platoon were to of the Main Line of Resistance. assault Strong Point B. Intelligence estimates were that both strong points were defended by infantry platoons. tack was blocked, but the enemy stayed within small- In the early morning darkness, the two Colombian pla- arms range and directed heavy machinegun fire on the toons managed to get within fifty meters of their objec- strong points. At 0950 hours, LTC Ruíz Novoa ordered tives undetected. 8 the immediate withdrawal of both platoons. Lieuten- Then, at 0700 hours, the platoons simultaneously ant Piñeros Grimaldi pulled his platoon back, but 2LT charged the strong points with fixed bayonets. The Andrade had radio problems and kept his platoon in courageous Colombian infantrymen jumped into the place. Observing that some Colombians were withdraw- trenches throwing hand grenades. Bloody hand-to-hand ing, the Chinese concentrated their fire on Andrade’s fighting ensued as more Chinese rushed out of bunkers platoon. As their casualties mounted, 2LT Andrade was and fighting positions. Numbers of Colombian wound- wounded. Litter bearers had been reduced to crawling ed quickly exceeded the capacity of litter bearers. The among the wounded and dead. CPT Acevedo requested Korean Service Corps personnel brought along to carry that his third platoon be sent to retrieve the wounded the wounded fled when the attacks began. After an hour and dead.10 of intense fighting, it became deathly quiet as the dawn Under heavy enemy fire the third platoon led by arrived.9 Second Lieutenant Luís A. Bernal (Silver Star, 21 June Observing the fights with binoculars, CPT Acevedo 1952) rushed forward to begin a search and rescue. By spotted two Chinese platoons rushing toward Hill 180. 1100 hours, most of the casualties had been evacuated to He quickly called in artillery support. The counterat- an emergency aid station on the MLR. Operation BAR- The Eighth Army Front The West Sector XXXX Hill CCF 23 380 31 March 1953 Sibyon-ni Eighth Army Main Line of Resistance XXXX Enemy Front Line Order of Battle CCF 47 Elevation in Meters T-Bone Arrowhead 0 100 500 1000 and above 0 10 Miles Old 0 10 KM Baldy Yesong R. Porkchop XXXX Hill CCF 47 Hill 179 Big Nori Little Nori Outpost Kelly Little Gibralter ROK 1 xx 7 The Hook Detroit xx Reno 2 ROK 1 XXXX Carson CCF 46(+) Vegas Hill Hill 101 Kaesong 58 Bunker Hill Hill 67 Hedy Panmunjom Hill 90 1 Mar xx Imjin River 2 Unarmed Korean Service Corps personnel carrying hot The Eighth Army Front 31 March 1953 showing the Old food to the Combat Outpost Line. Baldy, Porkchop Hill, and T-Bone outposts. Vol. 2 No. 4 17 Initial Fights for Old Baldy (June–September 1952) When the 6 June 1952 assault to ity fuses) when enemy attackers drew fall of 1952—savagely contested, seem- seize Hill 266 was halted by enemy fire, close. The outposts were ringed with ingly endless struggles for just another the 45th Infantry Division artillery fired varieties of barbed-wire obstacles. Land hill along the MLR.3 another 500 rounds on the Communist mines were placed in enemy avenues defenders. The second heavy bombard- of approach and covered by automatic ment enabled A Company, 180th Infantry weapons. Signalmen laid wire to adja- Regiment to finally seize control of Old cent posts and back to the MLR. Kore- Baldy shortly after midnight on 7 June an Service Corps personnel brought in 1952. The adjacent outpost on Porkchop stockpiles of ammunition. The block- Hill (Hill 255) had also been captured ing force unit behind the MLR had the after an intense fifty-five minute fight.
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