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Home , Assad Shoman, Belize, Jamaica, Said Musa

TO BE OR NOT TO BE : ,

BELIZE AND THE THIRD

TONY THORNDIKE

Department of International Relations and Politics North Staffordshire Polytechnic STOKE-ON-TRENT ST4 2DE .

Paper presented to the Sixth Annual Studies Association Conference, St. Thomas, US , May 1981. Maybe what I did wrong was to challenge the power of the Western economic structure ... and for this I will remain unrepentant and unreconstructed.

So said to the world in the aftermath of the spectacular electoral defeat of his Peoples National Party (PNP) government in 1980. But whether the electorate voted specifically against his persuasive and eloquent pursuit of the cause of reform and development in the Third World, aided and abetted by some of his PNP colleagues, rather than on straight bread-and-butter issues as food, commodity and utility shortages, violence and high prices,is at best highly controversial. At the very least there is a substantial argument, based on personal observation and interviews in the run--upto the poll, that the latter was clearly the most predominant factor. Similarly, the electorate of Jamaica's nearest Commonwealth Caribbean neighbour, , also voted (in November 1979), against all the poll forecasts!2kor anew government, that of George Price's Peoples United Party (PUP). A major part of the PUP platform was, besides the overriding striving and advocacy for a secure , identification with Third World issues and solidarity: not only with the aims of the several movements and institutions involved with their expression,and the working toward their eventual resolution in the world at large and in and the Caribbean in particular,but also support for regional revolutionary regimes in and . Yet public perception outside Belize would riot readily associate that territory as being involved and committed. The hypothesis of this paper is two-fold. First, that in the two Commonwealth Caribbean states chosen for comparative analysis because of the apparent discrepancy over their commitment to Third World perceptions and concerns, the two electorates responded affirmatively to the call to continue such commitment. It is suggested that it is far more useful to compare the form and direction in which such ------commitment has taken, and why, rather than to contrast degrees of commitment as expressed, for instance, in public statements by the political elite, employing content analysis or similar methodology. After all, resources, perceptions and geographic position will obviously effect the degree of conmitment. It will also be strongly influenced by the of leadership and the personality of the leader concerned. Policies are identified with personalities the world over but particularly so in the Caribbean even though the personalities themselves may not wish it so. However much it may be deplored, including by such as C.L.R. James to whom "the method of thinking about personalities and politics is the abiding curse of politics",(3) it remains a fact. Indeed, Manley has been popularly characterised as the "Caribbean Nyerere". (4) Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that the degree of commitment of individual Third World states to Third World aspirations is comnensurate with its resources, including that of leadership and its style and preferences, and its sub-regional, regional and international per- ceptions;and that that in turn dictates the form and direction of the commitment. Put in this way, the commitment of Belize is as important to itself as that of Jamaica, even though its manifestation is different in scope, range and method. One important caveat remains to be mentioned with regard to this part of the hypothesis. The fact that Belize has not obtained formal independence in contrast to Jamaica is not -the basis for comparison, although it has naturally to be taken into account. In fact, its anomalous position has had contradictory consequences: on one hand, it has obviously restricted freedom of action in defence and foreign affairs, the two most important areas of reserved powers held by the British after the internal self-government constitution was granted in 1964,(traditionally the shortlived precursor to independence under the British scheme), in view of the Guatemalan threat. On the other, within this unsatisfactory situation the Belizean political process has not only matured considerably but, consequent upon the internationalisation of the dispute, has led to the clarification and exposition of positive positions on many international issues. The second part of the hypothesis follows logically: that commitment to Third World values and aspirations is expressed by -all Third World states, even, albeit mutely, selectively and occasionally by such as or to cover up excesses of corruption and brutality by those such as and Amin's . They do so in their different ways and as opportunities or necessities dictate, especially in relation to the indiyidual concrete economic and geographical circumstances in which they find themselves. It is by no means essential for there to be a simultaneous commitment to socialist doctrine or any of its variants, although all Third World governments would wish to be characterised as

I I progressive", whatever the interpretation. With the obvious exception of , American countries have not often been perceived as being wholly Third World in their attitudes: the very words "Afro-Asian bloc" sums it up. But this is a grave mistake. The first initiatives for the establishment of the in 1961, concerned with the economic problems of underdevelopment, emanated largely from and in particular, from Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch, the first secretary-general of ECLA and later of UNCTAD. As one American cornentator has rightly said of the 1950s,

In ECLA, under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, the Latin American states began to formulate a doctrine for development at considerable variance to what was widely accepted in the North. (5)

Latin were also responsible for the development of the concept of dependencia, now an accepted part of the vocabulary of international politics. On the political front in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), their presence is less conspicuous. But they also represent what Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley called at the NAM summit in "the greatest potential for the expansion of our mwement. 1, (61 He was right: since 1964 the Latin OAS states have discussed matters of common concern, both economic and political, especially prior to UNCTAD meetings. Subsequently establishing a Special Comission for Latin American Coordination (CELLA) in 1969, they successfully pressurised for UNCTAD 3 to be held in Santiago, Chile. Disputes with the US grew, especially involving and Chile, at least up to the violent overthrow of the Allende regime. These developments have been significant to the new English-speaking members of the OAS and others such as Belize. Despite problems, what Bhoutros-Ghali called "sociological solidarity"(7) between the British and -based cultures is emerging, and taking such concrete forms as oil financing arrangements and support for Belizean independence. What are the major issues with which Third world(*) countries are concerned? Several are readily identifiable: anti- and neo-colonialist dependency problems; anti-racialism; economic development on the basis of a New International Economic Order; non-alignment and the right to seek to judge issues on their merits rather than in response to the pressures of power; social reconstruction following the impact of , its preferences and prejudices; and a search for an individual national identity as well as a unity of the deprived. Of course, not all Third World states feel equally strongly about each and every one of these issues and others, nor do they express their feelings about all or any consistently. Also, their commitment to all or any may be manifested on a regional rather than an international basis. Given Belize's particular circumstances it is not surprising that it relates much more specifically to Central American and Caribbean political situations than does Jamaica, with its wider hemispheric and international perspectives. These differences in emphasis and direction may go a little way to explain why Third World consciousness and establishment of positions has taken a long time to emerge - for many Latin American countries, for well over a century - and the experience of Jamaica and Belize is no exception. It is part and parcel of the decolonisation process, by which is meant not only the formal transfer of sovereignty but economic, social and cultural changes, on an increasingly structural basis, necessary to enhance political autonomy. Carl Stone has usefully outlined three stages of decolonisation, the last of which only concerns us. ... the apprenticeship of the emergent political elite in parliamentary government; the attainment of independence accompanied by illusions of Netropolitan benevolence; and the disillusioment of the experience of neo-colonialism which has induced more radical nationalist policies. (9)

The slow pace of this process was mirrored by the slow emergence of such Third World institutions as the NAM and the Group of 77 (10) which, although they have "quite specific, loosely structured, but functional corporeal (bodies) ... a significant history and very probably an extensive future", (11) they suffer from a diversity of specific needs attitudes and ideologies amongst their members which, once the rhetoric has been peeled away, are often only too apparent. Jamaica's identification with these concerns did not begin with the accession of the PNP to power in 1972. The previous (JLP) administration under Prime Minister , with pressure from its influential associated trade union grouping, particularly from 1968 onwards, made its opinions clearly known and heard on several issues, notably on Southern , the diplomatic recognition of Cuba (I2) and, regionally, the secession of and the further fragmentation of the Caribbean. (I3) But the JLP tradition against regional cooperation on an institutionalised basis, sterning from its former leader Bustamante's criticism of the Federation of the West Indies culminating in his relentless pressure in the notorious referendum campaign in 1961 to exclude Jamaica, was apparent with its constant undermining of CARIFTA and discouragement of any enlargement. (I4' Manley, however, was to view the encouragement of regional integration as part and parcel of what he perceived as Jamaica's pivotal position as a Third World country. What was required, he recorded, was

a tough minded recognition that national survival, like business survival, is a matter of margins and that regionalism can provide the framework in which internal markets are increased, external bargaining power enhanced and international recognition maximised.(l5)

Four specific advantages existed, in his view, all of which underline his essential radicalism and his conception du monde: firstly, it would meet an urgent need for all countries in the region to "develop techniques for handling trade and other relations with the outside world on the basis of a common policy"; secondly, the increased negotiating strength which could be achieved by handling major foreign capital interests, like the companies, on a common basis; thirdly, it would provide a base from which to enter the mainstream of Third World politics; and fourthly, there were the intangible benefits offered by the psychological boost which regional integration would give to the security and dignity of the Commonwealth Caribbean as a whole and, by inference, others. (16) His general outlook was clear and it was not new to those who knew him. Son of ex-Prime Minister (1955-62), he had returned in the early 1950s from higher at the London School of Economics where he had met many of the future African political elite. Soon actively involved in trade union and PNP affairs, he became a Senator in 1962, a member of the in 1967 and PNP leader in 1969. Describing himself as

an internationalist in perception, a democratic socialist by persuasion, a member of the Non- Aligned Movement by commitment and a member of the Third World by circumstance,(l7) he rapidly assumed an active role in both Third World fora and in other international gatherings, notably the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, backed by several colleagues. Elsewhere, other members of his administration furthered the activist image of Jamaica: Foreign Minister P.J. Patterson, for example, was outstanding in his adept leadership of the ACP group in the Lome negotiations with the EEC. His election defeat, and the scale of it,(I8) was both a personal humiliation and a shock to the world community as a whole. Although a highly detailed analysis of the election need not concern us here, the question must be asked: was it due to his Third World commitment and his championing of the cause of the less developed? He and the PNP lost because of economic chaos and shortages, even of the barest necessities, violence and , itself partly caused by successive devaluations. The problem facing the analyst is that much of this became to be associated in much of the public mind with democratic socialism which was proclaimed as the guiding ideology of the PNP by Manley in 1974. Inasmuch as this related to his Third World activism and his increasingly close links with Cuba, it must be considered to be an essential ingredient. Its espousal certainly exacerbated the rift between the PNP and JLP, up to then largely personalist. Besides presenting the electorate with a genuine , alternative for the first time since the late 1940s it remwed the PNP from the category of "typical" West Indian political party as outlined by Ayearst some twenty years earlier, i.e., loosely organised with only lip-service paid to socialism, stressing nationalism and national identity instead, primarily at election times. (19) As will be suggested, the public associated democratic socialism with shortages and sacrifices and with an apparent disturbingly close involvement by Cuba in local domestic politics: to that extent and that alone, they expressed an opinion about the form and direction of Jamaica's diplomacy add espousal of Third World concerns, rather than about the princiyle of commitment as such. Jamaica was too exposed to the whims and winds of imperialism and everybody, even notable figures in the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica,(20) knew it. The timing of ~anley's announcement in 1974 was not random. Jamaica had suffered severely by the oil crisis and, despite a temporary boom in bauxite, the trade deficit soared. Although Manley had always sincerely believed in socialism,(21) the rhetoric was useful to demand sacrifices from those better financially placed in order to alleviate the very real hardship of the masses. In other words, it permitted the goverment to demand sacrifices in the name of building a socialist society. In this sense, socialism - not religion - became an opiate, offering, not a better life, but a more acceptable means of coercing people into accepting bitter necessity. Therefore, it was not socialism which brought defeat but the sacrifices suffered in its name. The sacrifices were small up to 1976 when Manley's charisma and energetic campaigning won him such a decisive victory in the socalled "Heavy Manners" election, despite a State of Emergency occasioned by widespread violence and assassinations. As the world recession deepened, so making his attempts at social experiments more and more difficult, progressive deterioration followed. With each sacrifice the spectre of imperialism and allegation of "destabilisation", perceived as orchestrated by Washington,was blamed, although at the same time US aid was anxiously solicited. Even before the election some of his most ardent pro-radical colleagues admitted the "extreme" anti-capitalist and pro-Third World statements had done too much harm to Jamaica. The large-scale desertion of the highly vocal professional middle classes and capital did nothing to ease the problem posed by the need to allocate 552 of foreign exchange earnings to loan-servicing. This had catastrophic effects so far as the unemployed and low wage earners were concerned. (22) But even the pro-JLP media felt it necessary to reproduce in full Manley's speech to the NAM Havana summit in 1979. (23) It also reported with approval his strong stance against the then newly elected British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, at the Commonwealth Leaders Lusaka conference, who favoured the "Muzorewa option" in . (24) Manley's commitment and involvement in Third World affairs naturally involved working with Cuba. His personal friendship with, and admiration of, Fidel Castro became wellknown. This was made plain at the Havana summit . The forces committed to the struggle against imperialism are stronger today than ever before. We believe that this is so because our hemisphere has had a Movement and a Man: a catalyst and a rock: and the Movement is the Cuban Revolution and the Man is Fidel Castro. (25)

The political rather than the commercial link was obvious: after all, there are no bauxite refining facilities in Cuba; both produce : both have restrictions on imports: and high prices for Jamaican manufactured goods would not appeal to foreign currency starved Cubans. But it was not his admiration for Castro and the Cuban Revolution which became the issue so much as what he termed "principled relations" seemed to involve. Despite relentless JLP pressure, the majority welcomed the assistance provided by Cuban medical technicians, dam engineers, builders and teachers. Rather, it was the overt political activity of the Cuban Ambassador Ulysses Estrada and his public denunciation of the JLP which shocked the electorate. Ironically, it was US Ambassador Vincent DeRoulet who began the trend of deep involvement in local politics with the exertion of his undoubted influence among the business class or orchestrate support for Manley and the PNP in 1972. (26) He was later declared persona non grata just as incoming Prime Minister Seaga would have done to Estrada had he not chosen himself to leave the island 24 hours after the result was declared. Seaga, although perceiving his victory as a "blow against communism", warned that "radicalism, Marxism and communism" that had "infected" Jamaica would no longer be tolerated. But he reasserted Jamaica's nonalignment ("but not a non-alignment tied to the coat-tails of one foreign power") would continue as would its commitment to a "positive Caribbean policy" of integration. Diplomatic relations with Cuba would also be fully maintained as defitted a near neighbour with whom many "natural links" existed, but on a "more correct basis". (27) His and Foreign Minister Shearer, on whose trade union links he heavily relies, positively affirmed these aims. In other words, although Jamaica's voice as a Third World spokesman will no longer be heard so stridently and clearly in world fora, the commitment will remain but its direction qualified by a consciousness that economic reconstruction is a first priority both for domestic reasons and to provide a firm basis for future further thrusts of Jamaican diplomacy. Whereas Manley enjoyed an international, Third World and regional reputation (and continues to do so) and had published his political philosophy, all of which was reflected in Jamaican diplomacy, the voice of Belize and of its political leaders appears relatively insignificant. But set against its particular constitutional, geographic and economic environment, there has been a considerable degree of activity in certain directions. Among the most important specific factors to be taken into account are the search for a secure independence; the fragile economic and demographic base; the dominance of foreign owned corporations, especially the Belize Estate and Produce Company, and Tate and Lyle; ethnic divisions between Creole, and Maya 1ndian;and the contrasting pulls from two cultural poles, the Commonwealth Caribbean and Hispanic Central America. Premier George Price, self-effacing, shy, ascetic and a devout Catholic, is now an "old man" of Caribbean politics having been in continuous power since 1954. His role in the founding of Peoples' Committee and the later PUP, and the Belizean nationalist movement generally, dates from the ill-executed devaluation of the Belizean by the British in 1949. From that time he searched not only for a Belizean identity out of its various ethnic strands, resting as it does in a "cultural shatterzone", (28) but for the material advancement of its peoples and the attainment of a secure independence. His espousal of a Latin American orientation for Belize - his party has always enjoyed substantial support from the rural and Mayas rather than the West Indian, largely urban, Creoles (29)- has for long been compromised. Until relatively recently, many Latin American states supported the Guatemalan claim and looked askance at "Belice". Their political doubts of a radical English-speaking (at least officially) nation in their midst whose boundaries were suspect appeared to be substantiated economically by a ECLA report in 1968 to the effect that Belize's undeveloped primary producing economy was too different from the relatively more industrialised, inter-dependent economies of the neighbouring republics and that membership of the Central American Common Market (CACM), a cause dear to Price's heart, would only be detrimental to its economy. (30) In Grant's words, the ECLA Secretariat's report

brought home to Price the cruel fact that a fondness for the country's Latin connection could not alone sustain initiatives towards closer links between Belize and Central America. (31)

By contrast, he has been forced to recognise the territory's military and economic dependence on Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean respectively, the eastward links once regarded as unacceptable. The first approach to the Fourth Conference of the Heads of Commonwealth Caribbean governments in 1967 was eventually followed by full membership of CARIFTA in 1971 and subsequently of CARICOM, the economic justification being that Belize's agro-industry would provide member governments with their beef and cereals. Instead of that being fulfilled, Belize did receive consistent and active support for its struggle for independence. The internationalisation of the dispute between and Belize by the Commonwealth Caribbean was matched by Price's own activities. Strenuous efforts were made through personal visits to exploit a growing disenchantment by several Central American states with Guatemala's opposition to the formation of an effective common front against the dominant US-owned multinational companies, a gesture which was to later yield positive results. To allow Belize the necessary legal powers as a to join in CARIFTA's activities, Britain amended the constitution through new Letters Patent giving the Premier or his delegate responsibility for external affairs in certain circumstances. Psychologically and legally boosted, a dynamic foreign policy emerged. In late 1973, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Lindberg Rogers, flew to Algiers to solicit support on the eve of the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State; earlier, the Eighth Conference of the Heads of Government in the Caribbean called for a Scheme of Mutual Defence against External Aggression at their meeting in . While Belize was not the only Caribbean territory on their minds, Price put great importance on this "show of solidarity" which would, in his opinion, help to influence world public opinion in Belize's favour. (32) Within the Commonwealth nexus, tixpressions of support intensified with further resolutions at the next Heads of Government meeting in St. Lucia, and then at the Prime Ministers' Conferences in Kingston and London in 1975 and 1977 respectively. At both of these, secure defence agreements were called for, to which Britain felt unable to make a specific reply, (33) with either a Commonwealth or a UN military guarantee as an alternative if Britain felt it to be practicable. It should be noted, en passant, that no Commonwealth state actually offered to help provide such a guarantee, and, that in the case of the UN, there is no provision in its Charter for this. By contrast, Cuba did in 1978. Further widening of the circle of allies was rapid, beginning with the 16th Session of ECLA held in in 1974, which Belize attended. This was followed by support from Cuba, following a visit there by Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley. Later, at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Nations at Lima, Peru, Guatemala was not only denied even observer status, but the cause of Belizean independence was adopted as a matter of policy. (34) Again on the 'Third Worldt front, representatives of Belize were invited by Mrs. Bandaranaide to attend the conference of Heads of State of Governments of Non-Aligned Countries in during 1976. Accorded a special status, the delegation's participation was successful in that a resolution pledging unconditional support for Belize was passed. (35) Guatemala was to lose the support of first, its CACM partners and then of Latin America and later its consistent backers, the USA and Israel, in the UN. Barbados opened the UN campaign in 1968 in the form of a complaint that the General Assembly was not giving the Belizean question proper attention. (36) Later, when the Security Council met in City, in March 1973, Belize's new partners took the opportunity to strongly criticise Guatemala (37' and back in New York, Guatemala'k claim to the Committee of 24 that Belize had "never been a colony" but was "a territory illegally occupied" was overwhelmingly rejected. There followed over the years a series of pro-Belizean resolutions until ultimately, in 1980, Guatemala was the only dissenting voice, C38) Not surprisingly, Guatemala was ultimately persuaded by this combination of UN pressure and Third World solidarity amounting to almost a moral collective security system to enter into substantive negotiations with Britain and Belize. After several false starts, an eventual agreement was reached in London in March 1981, although it was greeted by a serious outbreak of violence largely in inspired by the bitterly anti-Price United Democratic Party (UDP), a loose coalition still dominated by ex-PUP dissidents. The internationalisation of the dispute has been related in some detail as it radicalised Price, made necessary the incorporation of new leaders, who happened to be socialists, to help press home the attack, and exacerbated the ethnic and class divisions in the country to an unprecedented degree. Inevitably, these have led to a strong expression of support for Third World, specifically Caribbean and Latin American, objectives, just as strong relatively speaking and in their own way, as that of the far more politically sophisticated and economically developed Jamaica. Price's radicalism has, as suggested above, grown with the inter- nationalisation of the dispute and the reaction of the upper class white Creoles. Once a laissez-faire capitalist, he made socialism a dirty word: in 1950 he referred to "Communism, Nazism, Fasci'sm, Socialism and British Colonialism" as "chickens of the same brood". (39) vision was one of attracting foreign, specifically US, capital, but all that happened was that the tax holidays and open market in land offered led to massive land ownership by US corporations, to the extent that less than 7% of Belizean land holdings over 100 are owned by , and less than 9% of all freehold land. (40) Socialism seemed more attractive and he took into his cabinet two highly educated and avowed socialists, and . Shoman's influence in policy making grew rapidly and was soon accused by the LTDP publicly and other PUP ministers privately of being "corm~funist" and pro-Cuban, to the extend that he was forced to resign prior to the 1979 election. His clear support, with that of Price, over Panama's right to sovereignty over the Canal, of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, of the NJM in Grenada, of Manley in Jamaica as well as to the more general Third World concerns was clear, sincere and unequivocal. In the event the UDP electoral challenge failed to materialise and one of Price's first acts after victory was to reappoint Shoman as his closest aide. After the election, both Price and Shoman (and occasionally, Musa) have paid visits to Nicaragua and Grenada to make plain Belizean support for their causes. (41) The combination of electoral victory and the Guatemalan agreement is more than a milestone in Belizean affairs: with independence envisaged for late 1981:~~)it marks a new internal situation. Previously,

No failure has been as damaging to Price's cause as his inability to bring Belize to the independence promised in 1964. The other compromises with his original vision can to a large extent be seen as a byproduct of the greater compromise whereby Price has been forced to rely for his country's continued existence on the military power of the nation he once castigated. The years of waiting, far from increasing the expectation, have soured the vision and produced a situation in which now the majority of people appear content, even desirous, of remaining under the British military umbrella. (43)

The post-London settlement riots must be seen in that context. The long period of "dead end" has left its mark: even a radical periodical was moved to observe that there existed "an incredible lack of commitment of a majority of the people to an early independence'' (44) and implied a substantial support for the party of dependency and the British link, the UDP .(45) The strength of this sentiment was shown in the 1979 electoral result, the UDP claiming 46.8% of the votes cast, with 51.82 going to the PUP. Nonetheless, just as the Jamaican electorate voted for bread-and- butter issues (literally as well as figuratively) rather than on Jamaica's Third World commitment, so that of Belize affirmed that it would, on balance, rather see itself and their country identified with the same commitments and the process of decolonisation and nation building. It is not therefore a case of "to be" or "not to be" committed at whatever level of international discussion and action, but of "how" and ''to what extent". No Third World state and their populations, whatever their prevailing ideology or governmental structure can afford not to be inyolved in the issues that crucially concern their development, let alone ignore them. Notes

1. Caribbean Contact, November 1980, p.16.

See, for instance, The Guardian (London), November 18, 1980 and New York Times, November 16, 1980.

C.L.R. James, Party Politics in the West Indies (San Juan, Trinidad: Vedic Enterprises Ltd., 1962), p.37.

The Guardian, November 9, 1980.

C.L. Robertson, "The Creation of UNCTAD", in R.W. Cox (ed.) International Organisation (London: Macmillan, 19691, p.262. P. Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana. Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of their Significance for the Global Political System (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), p.52.

B. Bhoutros-Ghali, contribution a L'Etude Des Ententes Regionales (Paris, 1949), quoted in R. Yalem, Regionalism and Morld Order (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p.18.

No attempt is made in this study to further divide the less developed territories of the world into "Newly Industrialising Countries" of which Jamaica may tentatively be considered a possible member, the socalled "Fourth World" of those who haven't reached this stage such as Belize and the unfortunate "Fifth World", or unkindly named "basket cases", the only example in the Caribbean being, in the author's opinion, Haiti.

C. Stone, Perspectives on Decolonisation: A Comparative Content Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches in Jamaica and Trinidad (Mona: ISER, UWI, dup., n.d.), p.1. See C. Geldart and P. Lyon, "The Group of 77: A Perspective View1', International Affairs (London), Vo1.57, No.1 (Winter 1980-81). -Ibid., p.101. It was Shearer's JLP government which led the way out of the OAS diplomatic boycott of Cuba by establishing, in the first instance, relations at consulate level in 1970. "Anguilla: the Anatomy of Decolonisation", New World Quarterly, Vol.lV; No.1 (1967), p.26.

A.J. Payne, The Politics of the , 1961-79. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp.140-41. M. Manley, "Overcoming Insularity in Jamaica", Foreign Affairs, Vo1.49, No.1 (1970), p.106. -Ibid., p.107; 110. M. Manley, The Politics of Affirmation (London: Third Uorld Foundation Monograph 1, 19791, p.6. On a 75.7% turnout, the JLP won 57.7% of the voGto the-PNPTs 42.3% and 51 of the 60 seats in the to the PNP1s 9. In 1976, the turnout was 85% and the positions were reversed: 56.8% of the votes went to the PNP (47 seats) and 43.2% (13 seats) to the JLP.

M. Ayearst, "A Note on Some Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties", Social and Economic Studies, Vo1.3, No.2 (1954) p.189.

Informationfmm interviews with PSOJ personalities, Kingston, .

"I have always been on the Left and I will die there: I am also a Democrat": M. Manley, reported in The Guardian, December 14 1976.

For instance, by Hugh Small, the last PNP Minister. The Guardian, October 1, 1980.

Daily Gleaner, 9, 1979.

Ibid., July 21, 1979. -Ibid., September 9, 1979. C. Stone, "Democracy in Danger", Daily Gleaner, , 1980.

Caribbean Contact, op.cit.

C.H. Grant, The Making of Modern Belize (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.14.

Alma H. Young, Ethnic Conflict, Partisanship and Radical Politics in Belize (unpub. paper presented to the third CSA conference, Santiago de 10s Caballeros, , 1978), pp.4-7.

Economic Commission for Latin America, Possibilities of Economic Cooperation between British (Belize) and Central America, December 1968 (E/CN. 12/809/Rev. 1).

Grant, op.cit., p.315.

Sunday Advocate News (Barbados), July 1, 1973.

H.C. Debates, July 13, 1977.

GAOR, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/10217.

The New Belize, Vol.lV, No.4 (December 1976)

UN Plenary Session, 1702nd. meeting, October 22, 1968.

GAOR, A/AC.109/L.112OY p.10.

Insight (London), December 1980, p.1.

Assad Shoman, "The Birth of the Nationalist Movement in Belize, 1950-1954", RISRA, Occasional Paper No.] (1979), p.43. 40. The Belize Issue (London: Latin America Bureau, 1978), p.50.

41. The New Belize, Vol.lX, No.11 (December 1979).

42. Insight, April 1981, p.1. The "London Agreement" between Belize and Guatemala was signed on March 11 1981 and the Belizean Constitutional Conference was from April 6 to 12. A referendum in Belize was to be arranged over the terms of the London agreement.

43. P.D. Ashdown, Some Thoughts on the Career of (unpub. paper presented to the SCS conference, High Leigh, Hertfordshire, England, April 1979), p.8.

44. Gombay, February 1979, p.17. 45. Alma H. Young, 1 Leaders and Followers in Belize and Barbados (unpub. paper presented to the Fifth CSA Conference, Curacao, May 1980), pp.17-18.