TO BE OR NOT TO BE : JAMAICA, BELIZE AND THE THIRD WORLD TONY THORNDIKE Department of International Relations and Politics North Staffordshire Polytechnic STOKE-ON-TRENT ST4 2DE England. Paper presented to the Sixth Annual Caribbean Studies Association Conference, St. Thomas, US Virgin Islands, May 1981. Maybe what I did wrong was to challenge the power of the Western economic structure ... and for this I will remain unrepentant and unreconstructed. So said Michael Manley to the world in the aftermath of the spectacular electoral defeat of his Peoples National Party (PNP) government in October 1980. But whether the electorate voted specifically against his persuasive and eloquent pursuit of the cause of reform and development in the Third World, aided and abetted by some of his PNP colleagues, rather than on straight bread-and-butter issues as food, commodity and utility shortages, violence and high prices,is at best highly controversial. At the very least there is a substantial argument, based on personal observation and interviews in the run--upto the poll, that the latter was clearly the most predominant factor. Similarly, the electorate of Jamaica's nearest Commonwealth Caribbean neighbour, Belize, also voted (in November 1979), against all the poll forecasts!2kor anew government, that of George Price's Peoples United Party (PUP). A major part of the PUP platform was, besides the overriding striving and advocacy for a secure independence, identification with Third World issues and solidarity: not only with the aims of the several movements and institutions involved with their expression,and the working toward their eventual resolution in the world at large and in Central America and the Caribbean in particular,but also support for regional revolutionary regimes in Nicaragua and Grenada. Yet public perception outside Belize would riot readily associate that territory as being involved and committed. The hypothesis of this paper is two-fold. First, that in the two Commonwealth Caribbean states chosen for comparative analysis because of the apparent discrepancy over their commitment to Third World perceptions and concerns, the two electorates responded affirmatively to the call to continue such commitment. It is suggested that it is far more useful to compare the form and direction in which such --- ---- - --- -- commitment has taken, and why, rather than to contrast degrees of commitment as expressed, for instance, in public statements by the political elite, employing content analysis or similar methodology. After all, resources, perceptions and geographic position will obviously effect the degree of conmitment. It will also be strongly influenced by the style of leadership and the personality of the leader concerned. Policies are identified with personalities the world over but particularly so in the Caribbean even though the personalities themselves may not wish it so. However much it may be deplored, including by such as C.L.R. James to whom "the method of thinking about personalities and politics is the abiding curse of West Indies politics",(3) it remains a fact. Indeed, Manley has been popularly characterised as the "Caribbean Nyerere". (4) Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that the degree of commitment of individual Third World states to Third World aspirations is comnensurate with its resources, including that of leadership and its style and preferences, and its sub-regional, regional and international per- ceptions;and that that in turn dictates the form and direction of the commitment. Put in this way, the commitment of Belize is as important to itself as that of Jamaica, even though its manifestation is different in scope, range and method. One important caveat remains to be mentioned with regard to this part of the hypothesis. The fact that Belize has not obtained formal independence in contrast to Jamaica is not -the basis for comparison, although it has naturally to be taken into account. In fact, its anomalous position has had contradictory consequences: on one hand, it has obviously restricted freedom of action in defence and foreign affairs, the two most important areas of reserved powers held by the British after the internal self-government constitution was granted in 1964,(traditionally the shortlived precursor to independence under the British scheme), in view of the Guatemalan threat. On the other, within this unsatisfactory situation the Belizean political process has not only matured considerably but, consequent upon the internationalisation of the dispute, has led to the clarification and exposition of positive positions on many international issues. The second part of the hypothesis follows logically: that commitment to Third World values and aspirations is expressed by -all Third World states, even, albeit mutely, selectively and occasionally by such as Chile or to cover up excesses of corruption and brutality by those such as Haiti and Amin's Uganda. They do so in their different ways and as opportunities permit or necessities dictate, especially in relation to the indiyidual concrete economic and geographical circumstances in which they find themselves. It is by no means essential for there to be a simultaneous commitment to socialist doctrine or any of its variants, although all Third World governments would wish to be characterised as I I progressive", whatever the interpretation. With the obvious exception of Cuba, Latin American countries have not often been perceived as being wholly Third World in their attitudes: the very words "Afro-Asian bloc" sums it up. But this is a grave mistake. The first initiatives for the establishment of the Group of 77 in 1961, concerned with the economic problems of underdevelopment, emanated largely from Latin America and in particular, from Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch, the first secretary-general of ECLA and later of UNCTAD. As one American cornentator has rightly said of the 1950s, In ECLA, under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, the Latin American states began to formulate a doctrine for development at considerable variance to what was widely accepted in the North. (5) Latin Americans were also responsible for the development of the concept of dependencia, now an accepted part of the vocabulary of international politics. On the political front in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), their presence is less conspicuous. But they also represent what Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley called at the NAM summit in Havana "the greatest potential for the expansion of our mwement. 1, (61 He was right: since 1964 the Latin OAS states have discussed matters of common concern, both economic and political, especially prior to UNCTAD meetings. Subsequently establishing a Special Comission for Latin American Coordination (CELLA) in 1969, they successfully pressurised for UNCTAD 3 to be held in Santiago, Chile. Disputes with the US grew, especially involving Peru and Chile, at least up to the violent overthrow of the Allende regime. These developments have been significant to the new English-speaking members of the OAS and others such as Belize. Despite problems, what Bhoutros-Ghali called "sociological solidarity"(7) between the British and Hispanic-based cultures is emerging, and taking such concrete forms as oil financing arrangements and support for Belizean independence. What are the major issues with which Third world(*) countries are concerned? Several are readily identifiable: anti-imperialism and neo-colonialist dependency problems; anti-racialism; economic development on the basis of a New International Economic Order; non-alignment and the right to seek to judge issues on their merits rather than in response to the pressures of power; social reconstruction following the impact of colonialism, its preferences and prejudices; and a search for an individual national identity as well as a unity of the deprived. Of course, not all Third World states feel equally strongly about each and every one of these issues and others, nor do they express their feelings about all or any consistently. Also, their commitment to all or any may be manifested on a regional rather than an international basis. Given Belize's particular circumstances it is not surprising that it relates much more specifically to Central American and Caribbean political situations than does Jamaica, with its wider hemispheric and international perspectives. These differences in emphasis and direction may go a little way to explain why Third World consciousness and establishment of positions has taken a long time to emerge - for many Latin American countries, for well over a century - and the experience of Jamaica and Belize is no exception. It is part and parcel of the decolonisation process, by which is meant not only the formal transfer of sovereignty but economic, social and cultural changes, on an increasingly structural basis, necessary to enhance political autonomy. Carl Stone has usefully outlined three stages of decolonisation, the last of which only concerns us. ... the apprenticeship of the emergent political elite in parliamentary government; the attainment of independence accompanied by illusions of Netropolitan benevolence; and the disillusioment of the experience of neo-colonialism which has induced more radical nationalist policies. (9) The slow pace of this process was mirrored by the slow emergence of such Third World institutions as the NAM and the Group of 77 (10) which, although they have "quite specific, loosely structured, but functional corporeal (bodies) ... a