Aces & Aerial Victories, US Air Force in Southeast Asia 1965-1973
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I11 Combat Narratives 1972 - 1973 (Far le8) A WAFRF-I01 reconnaisance pilot photographed Following the USAF victories on 14 February one of rhe Norrh Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles in fight. 1968, there was an intemption in shootdowns that (Lefr) North Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles were lasted more than 4 years.* The next USAF aerial launched from sites such as this one near Haiphong. victory over a MIG did not come until 21 February 1972. Numerous changes took place during this period, e.g., the election of President Richard M. Nixon, the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces from South Vietnam, and a renewed em- phasis on turning over responsibility for conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese armed forces. North Vietnam used this breathing spell to im- prove and strengthen its air defenses with the mat- erial assistance of the Soviet Union and Communist China. Additional AAA and SAM sites appeared at strategic points, particularly in Quang Binh Prov- ince. New airfields were also constructed, and cov- erage of North Vietnam ground control intercept radars was extended southward. American com- manders noted that MIG aircraft airborne below 20” North latitude increased from a daily average of five flights in late 1971 to an average of 10 per day early in 1972. By March 1972 the North Vietnamese fighter inventory included 93 MIG-2l’s, 33 MIG- 19’s. and 120 MIG-15’s and -17’s-although prob- *The hiatus, as noted in the previous chapter, followed Presi- dent Johnson’s 31 March 1968 decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th parallel and to invite North Viet- nam to begin peace negotiations. Seven months later the Presi- -dent ordered an end of all bombing north of the DMZ in hopes of bringing about an end to all hostilities. 83 A WAFPhantom falls prey to a North Vietnamese SAM. a4 ably no more than 190 of these aircraft were combat was aircraft commander and 1st Lt. Roger C. Locher ready. was his weapon systems officer in an F-4D flying By early 1972 North Vietnam had what was gen- MIGCAP. They were from the 555th TFS, which erally recognized as one of the best, if not the best, formerly had been a part of the 8th TFW but was air defense system in the world. Its strongest fea- now a part of the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance tures were excellent radar integration, the Soviet- Wing. built SA-2 surface-to-air missile, and the MIG-2 1 “Red Crown called out bandits (MIG’s) at our aircraft. And an intangible advantage was the fact 060” position and proceeded to vector us on an that this defense system operated over its own home- intercept,” recalls Maj. Lodge. He adds further: land. The enemy air defense system, therefore, had I descended to minimum en route altitude, and an impressive array of firepower from ground level at approximately 13232 [2123 local] my WSO to 19 miles in the air. Further, its MIG-21’s could detected and locked on a target at the posi- be vectored by radar with split-second timing against tion Red Crown was calling Bandit. U.S. strike and support forces. It was no secret that The target was level at zero azimuth and the North Vietnamese could determine the structure closing, with the combined velocity of both of American strike forces soon after the U.S. aircraft aircraft in excess of 900 knots. I fired three left the ground. AIM-~E’s, the first at approximately 11 nautical American forces had the advantage of special miles, the second at 8 nautical miles and the third chaff-dispensing flights which helped to degrade the at 6 nautical miles. The first missile appeared to enemy’s SAM and AAA gunlaying radars. This de- guide and track level, and detonated in a small gradation was further supplemented by EB-66 elec- explosion. The second missile guided in a similar tronic jamming, U.S. Navy jamming, and jamming manner and detonated with another small explo- pods installed on all strike aircraft. In the Gulf of sion, followed immediately by a large explosion Tonkin the U.S. Navy operated an early warning in the same area. This secondary explosion was of radar ship nicknamed Red Crown (officially desig- a different nature than the two missile detonations nated: Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone and appeared like a large POL [petroleum, oil and Ship), while the U.S. Air Force had an airborne lubricants] explosion with a fireball. The third counterpart, coded Disco, to provide forces with missile started guiding in a corkscrew manner and MIG warnings. Red Crown was more effective then straightened out. No detonation was ob- along coastal and Disco in inland areas. served for the third missile. We had no more Notwithstanding the standdown in North Viet- AIM-7’s left, and broke off and egressed at low nam, B-52 strikes continued in Laos, and USAF altitude. fighters flew combat air patrols and escort flights. Two other ME-21’s then attempted to pursue Early in 1972, MIG’s began increasingly to pene- us. We were low, over 500 knots computed trate Laos to try to check these strikes, but USAF airspeed, and the MIG’s broke off after about a F4’s were on hand to greet them. So for a brief 30-nautical mile chase and continued to drop period of time during the inactivity over North Viet- back. Another F-4 was flying radar trail during nam, the Fa’s engaged MIG’s in air-to-air combat the entire flight and was about 5,000 feet higher over Laos. than us on the final attack. This MIG engagement ushered in the final phase of aerial warfare that continued to the end of South- Victories over Laos east Asia hostilities in 1973. A week later, the 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron The first U.S. Air Force aerial victory in 4 years added another MIG-2 1 to its expanding list of aerial and, more significantly, the first at night took place victories. Lt. Col. Joseph W. Kittinger, Jr., flying on 21 February 1972 over northeast Laos, about 90 F-4D MIGCAP with 1st Lt. Leigh A. Hodgdon in miles southwest of Hanoi. Maj. Robert A. Lodge the rear seat, emerged victors in an air battle. Their 85 F-4D was accompanied by another crewed by Maj. R. Carroll and Capt. David L. Hams. Before taking off for their MIGCAP in northern Laos, they had been briefed to anticipate enemy I diversionary flights which sought to lure unsuspect- ing Fa’s into a hazardous environment. American fighter pilots were well aware that the North Viet- namese monitored all radio conversations between U.S. air defense agencies and airborne fighters and used such information to their advantage. About 2000 hours on the night of 1 March Kittinger’s flight took up a MIGCAP position in northeastern Laos. Disco soon advised the flight that MIG’s were air- borne in the area and vectored the Phantoms to make contact. Kittinger’s report of the engagement fol- lows: Col. Kininger survived his captivity as a prisoner of war. He is At approximately 18 miles the system broke shown greeting the home-coming crowd upon his return on 28 lock but it was quickly reacquired. A slow left March 1973. turn ensued to keep the dot centered. Altitudes were slowly increased from 8,200 feet to 11,500 feet. The Vc on the scope was extremely difficult was due to return home. Kittinger thus became a to interpret; however, it appeared that we were not prisoner of war. Earlier in his Air Force career, he really overtaking the target, so the outboard tanks had gained recognition as “the first man in space” were dropped. Heading of the aircraft changed to when he ascended in a small gondola under a huge approximately 360” at time of firing. At approxi- balloon to 96,000 feet on 2 June 1957. He eclipsed mately 6 miles the “in-range” light illuminated, his own record on 16 August 1960 by rising to followed by an increase in the ASE circle. Trigger 102,800 feet and then returning to earth by was squeezed and crew felt a thump as the missile parachute. was ejected; however, missile motor did not ig- A new aspect was added to the air war in South- nite. The trigger was squeezed again and held for east Asia on 30 March 1972, when the North Viet- approximately 3 seconds; however, missile did namese formally invaded the south. They quickly not fire. Trigger was squeezed again and missile moved through the demilitarized zone into Quang #3 fired. The missile made a small correction to Tri Province. In response to the NVN offensive, the left then back to the right and guided straight American air resources were ordered to active inter- away. The pilot maintained the dot centered. diction of MIG’s in North Vietnam. That same day Approximately 5 to 6 seconds after launch, there was one aerial victory. detonation was observed. Almost simultaneously, Captains Frederick S. Olmsted, Jr., aircraft com- two enemy missiles were observed coming from mander, and Gerald R. Volloy, weapon systems the vicinity of the detonation. Evasive action pre- officer, were pulling FAD alert duty at Udom late in vented more thorough observations of detonation. the day when they were scrambled to take up an The flight turned to a heading of 210”, maintained orbit near the Laotian border. About 20 minutes 9,000 feet, airspeed 500 knots, and egressed the after reaching their orbit point, Red Crown called a ma.