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Interpreting Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Pessimism University of Southampton Research Repository ePrints Soton Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination http://eprints.soton.ac.uk UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON FACULTY OF HUMANITIES Department of Philosophy Schopenhauer’s Pessimism by David Woods Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy July 2014 i UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON ABSTRACT FACULTY OF HUMANITIES Philosophy Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy SCHOPENHAUER’S PESSIMISM David Woods In this thesis I offer an interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimism. I argue against interpreting Schopenhauer’s pessimism as if it were merely a matter of temperament, and I resist the urge to find a single standard argument for pessimism in Schopenhauer’s work. Instead, I treat Schopenhauer’s pessimism as inherently variegated, composed of several distinct but interrelated pessimistic positions, each of which is supported by its own argument. I begin by examining Schopenhauer’s famous argument that willing necessitates suffering, which I defend against the misrepresentative interpretation advocated by Ivan Soll. I also offer a metaphysical reading of Schopenhauer’s claim that no amount happiness can compensate for the mere fact of suffering, based upon his negative conception of happiness. I proceed by analysing Schopenhauer’s criticisms of two prominent optimists, Leibniz and Rousseau. I attempt to salvage something of Schopenhauer’s counterargument against Leibniz that this is the worse of all possible worlds, and I also examine Schopenhauer’s claim that the optimistic metaphysics of a priori rationalistic philosophy cannot cope with the evidence of meaningless suffering. In the case of Rousseau, I interpret Schopenhauer’s brief objection to Rousseau’s assumption of original goodness, by means of an examination of Schopenhauer’s conception of the contrary doctrine, original sin. Next I consider the metaphysics of Schopenhauer’s account of eternal justice. After defending it against a number of objections, I argue that the nature of his version of eternal justice, which he admits constitutes a justification for suffering, does not conflict with the fact that he so strongly condemns Leibniz’s and Rousseau’s optimistic justifications for suffering. Finally I assess whether and to what extent Schopenhauer’s ethics of salvation are either pessimistic or optimistic. I conclude that the mere fact that salvation is possible is not necessarily a cause for optimism, but that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation is made partly optimistic by the higher form of cognition that he describes as part of it. I also argue that Schopenhauer’s views on the essentially mystical nature of the state of salvation ultimately commit him to being neither positively optimistic nor positively pessimistic about salvation. I conclude overall with some brief remarks about the meaning of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and how in spite of its diverse nature, it is able to lay down a singular challenge to all future philosophers concerned with the question of suffering. iii Contents Declaration of Authorship ..................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ ix Abbreviations of Schopenhauer’s Works ............................................................................... xi Introduction: The Merry Pessimist ........................................................................................ 15 Chapter I: Interpreting Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Pessimism ....................................... 23 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 23 2. The half-empty glass ...................................................................................................................... 23 3. The search for a standard argument ............................................................................................ 26 3. Schopenhauer’s philosophy of pessimism .................................................................................. 30 4. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 40 Chapter II: Willing and Suffering ........................................................................................... 41 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 41 2. The life of suffering ....................................................................................................................... 41 3. The will as essence ......................................................................................................................... 45 4. The life of willing ........................................................................................................................... 48 5. Suffering and happiness ................................................................................................................ 64 6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 75 Chapter III: Against Leibniz’s Optimism—Theodicy, the Worst of All Possible Worlds, and the Remainder Problem ......................................................................................................... 77 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 77 2. Leibniz’s best of all possible worlds ............................................................................................ 78 3. Schopenhauer’s Leibniz ................................................................................................................. 83 4. The worst of all possible worlds .................................................................................................. 90 5. The remainder problem ................................................................................................................. 99 6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 110 Chapter IV: Against Rousseau’s Optimism—Original Goodness and Original Sin ........... 113 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 113 2. Original goodness and the origins of evil ................................................................................. 114 3. Original sin .................................................................................................................................... 120 4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 140 Chapter V: Eternal Justice .................................................................................................... 141 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 141 2. The metaphysics of eternal justice ............................................................................................. 141 v 3. Problems and solutions ................................................................................................................ 146 4. Eternal justice as a justification for suffering ........................................................................... 159 5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 167 Chapter VI: Optimism and Pessimism in Schopenhauer’s Ethics of Salvation .................. 169 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 169 2. Stoicism and the failure of eudaemonism ................................................................................. 170 3. Negation of the will-to-life .......................................................................................................... 178 4. Salvation as optimistic or pessimistic ......................................................................................... 189 5. Salvation as neither optimistic nor pessimistic ......................................................................... 195 6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................
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