Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development

SLPB-002-19 June 2019

Spectrum Management and

EXPERT REPORT OF CHRISTIAN M. DIPPON, Ph.D. On Behalf of Communications Inc.

Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

August 2, 2019 Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 4 I. QUALIFICATIONS...... 9 II. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT...... 11 III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...... 12 IV. RESPONSES TO ISED’S QUESTIONS Q1A THROUGH Q1E ...... 17 A. Recommendations with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1A ...... 17 B. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1B ...... 18 C. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1C (If a set-aside is to be applied) ...... 19 D. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1D (If a set-aside is to be applied) ...... 20 E. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1E (If a set-aside is to be applied) ...... 21 V. A COMPETITIVE MARKET DOES NOT REQUIRE PROCOMPETITIVE MEASURES ...... 21 A. ISED Ignores the Analyses that Demonstrate the Competitiveness of the Canadian Mobile Wireless Market ...... 22 B. Regional Providers Do Not Offer Up To a 33 Percent Price Discount ...... 27 C. Regional Providers Do Not Require Preferential Treatment ...... 30 D. There Is No Measurable Risk that Regional Providers Cannot Acquire Spectrum ...... 33 E. The Bureau’s Provincial Price Comparison Is Incorrect ...... 34 VI. ISED’S PROPOSAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES ...... 37 A. International 5G Spectrum Deployment Does Not Use Set-Asides ...... 38 B. Not All Set-Asides Are the Same ...... 39 VII. THE CONTINUED USE OF SET-ASIDES WILL CONTINUE TO HARM CANADIAN CONSUMERS ...... 41 A. Market Forces Serve Canadian Consumers the Best ...... 42 B. Set-Asides Have Harmed Canadian Consumers ...... 42 C. Set-Asides Only Benefit the Recipients ...... 48 VIII. AN ECONOMICALLY SUSTAINABLE WAY FORWARD OMITS SET-ASIDES ...... 53 A. If ISED Wants a Procompetitive Measure, then Spectrum Caps Are More Appropriate than Set-Asides ...... 54 B. If ISED Decides to Use Set-Asides despite the Economic Evidence, It Must Revise the Eligibility Criteria ...... 56 C. If Set-Asides Are Used Despite the Economic Evidence, Eligible Bidders Must Not Be Permitted to Bid on Non-Set-Aside Spectrum ...... 57

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D. A Shorter Resale Moratorium Benefits the Public Interest ...... 58 APPENDIX A: CURRICULUM VITAE OF CHRISTIAN M. DIPPON, PH.D...... 60 APPENDIX B: DIPPON WALL/NORDICITY CRITICISM ...... 72 APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL PRICE DIFFERENCE TABLES ...... 73

List of Figures

Figure 1: Crandall Technology Deployment Comparison ...... 25 Figure 2: OpenSignal Average Download Speeds ...... 26 Figure 3: Crandall Network Investment Comparison ...... 27 Figure 4: Coverage Spectrum Prices (2008 to present) ...... 44 Figure 5: Capacity Spectrum Prices (2008 to present) ...... 45

List of Tables

Table 1: Spectrum Holdings by Service Area and Provider in MHz (as of August 1, 2019) ...... 32 Table 2: International Best Practices in 5G Spectrum Allocation July 2019 ...... 38 Table 3: Number of Bands Sold at Very High Prices (outliers or extreme outliers) ...... 46 Table 4: 600 MHz Auction Final Results (in CAD) ...... 52 Table 5: 2500 MHz Auction Final Results (in CAD) ...... 53

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Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, Ph.D.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES1. ISED is seeking comments on its policy proposal and licensing framework for spectrum in

the 3500 MHz band. As part of its proposal, ISED is recommending what it calls “pro-

competitive measures,” that is, reserving a portion of the available spectrum (set-asides)

for bidders that are not nationwide mobile wireless providers and limiting the amount of

spectrum (spectrum caps) that a provider can hold. TELUS asked me to review ISED’s

proposal, including its supporting rationale, and to respond to ISED’s questions with

respect to the proposed “pro-competitive measures.”

ES2. My overall findings and recommendations are as follows.

. ISED must refrain from set-asides and instead rely on market forces. The relevant market is competitive. Canada is home to some of the most advanced networks in the world and its retail prices are consistently below the international benchmark. It does not require the preferential treatment of a select group of bidders. Moreover, set-asides harm consumers and offer them no benefits. This recommendation is consistent with international best practices. Of 64 5G auctions, 40 rely on market forces, 20 employ spectrum caps, and only four use set-asides to generate market entry. No international regulator uses set-asides in the way ISED proposes to use this regulatory tool.

. If ISED does implement a procompetitive measure, it must use spectrum caps. Spectrum caps protect all mobile wireless service providers in the post-auction market and have a minimal distortionary effect on competition. This recommendation is consistent with international best practices.

. If ISED does implement set-asides, it must revise its eligibility rules and use a provincial (not nationwide) market share threshold of 10 percent. This recommendation aligns the eligibility rules with ISED’s prior findings and the findings

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of the Competition Bureau and the CRTC. Additionally, it must prohibit set-aside bidders from bidding on the open spectrum. This revision prevents the bidders on set-aside licenses from artificially increasing the prices of the open spectrum.

ES3. The mobile wireless market in Canada requires no procompetitive measures. Canadian

mobile wireless providers deploy new technology faster than providers do in the United

States and the European Union, and Canada is home to some of the fastest mobile wireless

networks in the world mostly because Canadian providers invest far more in their networks

than their European peers. Intervening in this high performing market will result in the

exact opposite of what ISED’s term “pro-competitive measures” implies. These measures

distort competition and the resulting high spectrum prices artificially increase the cost of

providing mobile wireless services. This, in turn, deprives Canadians from additional

innovation and cost savings and jeopardizes Canada’s world leading position.

ES4. International best practices expose ISED’s proposal as an outlier. Of 64 5G auctions, 40

rely on market forces, 20 employ spectrum caps, and only four use set-asides to generate

market entry. Aligning the proposal with its international peers requires refraining from

set-asides and relying on market forces instead. If ISED identifies a specific competition

risk in the post-auction market, the international experience finds spectrum caps more

appropriate.

ES5. If ISED decides to use set-asides, it must revise the eligibility rules in at least two ways.

First, it must revise its market share threshold of 10 percent from a nationwide market to a

provincial market, which is consistent with previous assessments that the market is

provincial and addresses the stark market share imbalances across provinces. Second, it

must prohibit set-aside eligible bidders from bidding on the non-set-aside spectrum

licenses. Absent these important revisions, ISED’s policy will subsidize some of Canada’s NERA Economic Consulting Page 5 of 87

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largest telecommunications companies like Shaw and Quebecor at the expense of Canadian

consumers.

ES6. Three explanations seem to be at the forefront of ISED’s proposal. First, ISED

misunderstands the competitive environment in Canada because it has been misled by the

limited, unscientific studies that it relies on while ignoring those studies, including its own

previous assessment, that accurately describe the fiercely competitive environment.

. ISED’s proposal does not align with the market evidence that finds Canada’s mobile wireless networks deploy new technologies faster than providers do in the European Union and the United States, offer the third (OpenSignal) or second (Ookla) fastest download speeds in the world, and invest far more in the subscriber experience (approximately USD 110 per connection) than providers in the European Union (approximately USD 40 per connection).

. ISED ignores evidence showing that Canadian prices are at or below the international benchmark, and it ignores previous independent economic expert reports that examined the market and found it competitive.

. ISED’s proposal contradicts its own findings that previous auctions have given “all current and potential wireless service providers with multiple opportunities to access additional spectrum in the licence areas to meet their spectrum needs.”

. ISED relies on price ranking reports from Wall/Nordicity despite expert evidence demonstrating that these studies are unscientific and include mathematical errors.

. ISED relies on a 2017 Competition Bureau study that alleges a “strong” regional competitor reduces the prices charged by the nationwide providers despite marketplace evidence and competition theory that refute this claim. Moreover, the evidence in that particular study was part of the approval process of a merger (Bell-MTS).

ES7. Second, ISED’s proposal ignores what its peers have done when allocating the same

spectrum. Regulators in most other countries have implemented or plan to implement

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auctions without ISED’s proposed procompetitive measures. When regulators have opted

for a procompetitive measure that measure is most often has been spectrum caps and almost

never set-asides.

. Of 27 completed 5G auctions, 13 relied on market forces, 12 had spectrum caps, and two had set-asides.

. Of 37 upcoming 5G auctions, 27 will rely on market forces, eight will use a spectrum cap, and two will have set-asides.

. In the four countries (United States, Italy, Czech Republic, and Belgium) that had or plan to have the auctions with set-asides, the set-asides were or will be exclusively for companies not already in the market. The regulators in those countries selected this measure to address specific concerns in their countries and the spectrum band at auction.

ES8. Third, ISED’s proposal fails to consider that implementing set-asides has negative public

interest repercussions and only benefits those companies that purchase set-aside spectrum

licenses. ISED chose to ignore many findings.

. The evidence from prior Canadian auctions that found set-asides create a double tax for nationwide providers—a tax that these providers must pass on to consumers, thereby increasing the competitive equilibrium price.

. The findings in the economic literature that high spectrum prices deprive bidders from funding network buildouts, thereby the result is harmful to consumers.

. The international auction data that finds Canada home to the most expensive spectrum auctions in the world, which providers must pass on to consumers, thereby increasing the competitive equilibrium price.

. The spectrum deployment data that reveal significant delays in the deployment of set- aside spectrum, thereby depriving Canadians from the use of the spectrum.

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. The market transaction data that reveals set-aside eligible winners enjoying a massive financial windfall from purchasing the spectrum at steep discounts and then selling it in the open market at prices that ensure annualized returns that outstrip the NASDAQ by over 50 percent.

. The marketplace evidence demonstrating regional providers never intended to serve all Canadians, especially those living in rural communities where the business case might be less favorable.

. The market evidence demonstrating regional providers tend not to overlap in service areas, thereby enabling them to purchase set-aside spectrum at or near reserve prices.

ES9. The economically sustainable way forward omits set-asides and at most employs a

spectrum cap that protects all market participants in the post-auction market. However, if

ISED decides to implement set-asides, it must revise its nationwide 10 percent market share

threshold requirement to a provincial 10 percent market share threshold. This revision will

remedy:

. the incorrect expectation that regional providers intend to serve the entire nation; and

. the provincial market share imbalance, for instance, Sasktel has a 62 percent share of the province and is eligible to bid on set-asides, whereas Rogers with a provincial share of 5 percent is not.

ES10. ISED’s proposal with its “pro-competitive measures” jeopardizes the efficient allocation

of 3500 MHz spectrum and, in turn, Canada’s participation in the deployment of 5G

services—a technology upgrade that many expect will lead to a fourth industrial revolution.

A simple policy fix that avoids set-asides can avoid this unnecessary risk.

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I. QUALIFICATIONS

1. My name is Christian M. Dippon. I am an economist and Managing Director at NERA

Economic Consulting (NERA) where I chair NERA’s Global Energy, Environment,

Communications, and Infrastructure (EECI) Practice. NERA provides expert economic

and financial analysis for firms and government bodies on a wide variety of issues.

Founded in 1961, NERA serves clients from more than 25 offices across North America,

Europe, and Asia. My business address is 1255 23rd Street NW, Suite 600, Washington,

DC 20037.

2. I hold a Ph.D. in Economics from Curtin University (Perth, Australia), an M.A. in

Economics from the University of California, and a B.A. with honors in Business

Administration from California State University. I have specialized in telecommunications

economics for over 23 years, especially in wireline, wireless, cable, and emerging

technologies. I serve on NERA’s Board of Directors, the Board of Directors of the

International Telecommunications Society (ITS), and I am a member of the Federal

Communications Bar Association (FCBA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the

American Economics Association (AEA). I have authored and edited several books as well

as book chapters in anthologies and have written numerous articles on telecommunications

competition and strategies. I also frequently lecture in these areas at industry conferences,

continuing education programs for lawyers, and universities. National and international

newspapers and magazines, including the Financial Times, Business Week, Forbes, the

Chicago Tribune, and the Sydney Morning Herald, have cited my work.

3. My experience in communications and media includes assessing the competitive impact of

mergers and acquisitions, the need (or lack thereof) for state and federal regulatory

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intervention and reform, the industry impact of competition policy, reviews of alleged

anticompetitive conduct, the analysis of economic damages in complex business disputes,

and the allocation of radio spectrum. I also have assessed the level of competition in the

communications sector of several countries and consulted on cases involving industry

standards.

4. I have testified on communications matters before the U.S. Federal Communications

Commission (FCC), the International Trade Commission (ITC), U.S. federal and state

courts, domestic and international arbitration panels, international competition and

regulatory authorities, and numerous U.S. state regulatory commissions. In Canada, I have

testified before the Superior Court of Justice; the Superior Court, Province of

Quebec, District of Montreal; the Supreme Court of , Vancouver Registry;

the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC); and

Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED).

5. Relevant to this consultation, I have been studying the competitive dynamics and retail

price levels of mobile wireless services in Canada for over a decade and am intimately

familiar with the studies that ISED relies upon in its recommendation to extend preferential

treatment to bidders in the auction that are not nationwide mobile wireless service

providers.1 I have analyzed the impact of the set-aside licenses on bidding strategies and

winning bid prices in the 2008 AWS auction, consulted on the policy framework for the

600 MHz auction, and submitted an expert report in response to ISED’s consultation on

1 See Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band, SLPB-002-19, June 2019 (hereinafter Consultation 3500 MHz Auction).

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revisions to the 3500 MHz band.2 This body of work afforded me clear insight into the

consumer benefits (of which there are none) of set-asides. Appendix A of this report

contains my curriculum vitae.

II. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

6. This report was prepared at the request of TELUS Communications Inc. (TELUS) in

response to ISED’s Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in

the 3500 MHz Band dated June 2019.3 TELUS has requested that I review and respond to

ISED’s understanding of the status of competition in the mobile wireless sector in Canada

and its resultant recommendation of spectrum set-asides and spectrum aggregation limits

(e.g., spectrum caps). Specifically, TELUS asked me to examine ISED’s questions Q1A

through Q1E using my training and experience as a telecommunications economist and my

extensive experience in analyzing the competitive dynamics of the Canadian mobile

wireless sector.

7. The structure of this report is as follows. Section III provides a summary of my findings

that highlight the inefficiencies associated with the proposed spectrum set-asides. My

responses to ISED’s questions Q1A through Q1E are in Section IV. Section V responds to

2 See Christian Michael Dippon, “Regulatory Policy Goals and Spectrum Auction Design: Lessons from the Canadian AWS Auction,” NERA Economic Consulting, July 14, 2009 (hereinafter Dippon 2008 AWS Auction Report); see also Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Consultation on a Technical, Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 600 MHz Band, SLPB-005-17, August 2017, “Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, PhD on Behalf of TELUS Communications Inc.,” October 2, 2017 (hereinafter Dippon Expert Report in 2017 on 600 MHz Band), and “Reply Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, PhD on Behalf of TELUS Communications Inc.,” November 3, 2017 (hereinafter Dippon Reply Expert Report in 2017 on 600 MHz Band); Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Consultation on Revisions to the 3500 MHz Band to Accommodate Flexible Use and Preliminary Consultation on Changes to the 3800 MHz Band, Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, Ph.D. On Behalf of TELUS Communications Inc., SLPB-004-18, June 2018 (hereinafter Dippon 2018 Expert Report in 3500 MHz Band). 3 See Consultation 3500 MHz Auction. NERA Economic Consulting Page 11 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

ISED’s reliance on several unscientific and incorrect studies to justify its proposal of

preferential treatment for a random group of bidders. Section VI demonstrates that ISED’s

proposed policy and licensing framework is at odds with international best practices.

Section VII explains that implementing the proposed policy will be harmful to Canadian

consumers and will only enrich the bidders that benefit from this policy. In Section VIII, I

offer an economically sustainable way forward that offers the competitive protections

sought by ISED.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

8. ISED must refrain from using set-asides in the upcoming auction for the 3500 MHz band,

much as its international peers did. Instead, it must rely on the same market forces that

resulted in Canadians having access to some of the world’s most advanced mobile wireless

networks and services. If ISED decides to use a procompetitive measure, a spectrum cap

is economically superior to set-asides and is consistent with international best practices. If

ISED decides to implement set-asides, it must revise its eligibility rule that includes a 10

percent nationwide market share. Instead, it should base eligibility on a 10 percent

provincial market share.

9. There are three compelling reasons why ISED’s proposal of set-asides is inconsistent with

sound public policymaking. First, Canadian mobile wireless providers operate in a

competitive market and offer some of the most advanced services in the world. In such a

market, competitive forces are the best consumer protection tool. Implementing set-asides

will distort competition and ultimately will harm Canadian consumers. Second, the set-

aside proposal is inconsistent with international best practices in modern economies that

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typically refrain from set-asides. In the rare instances where international regulators used

set-asides, they were for entirely different purposes than the one envisioned in ISED’s

proposal. Third, Canadian spectrum auctions have used set-asides for the last decade, and

during this entire time it has become obvious that set-asides only benefit those providers

receiving the set-aside spectrum, not Canadian consumers. Set-asides create artificial

spectrum shortages that unnecessarily increase retail prices. In short, set-asides solve no

market problem and result in consumer harm. Therefore, ISED should not require set-

asides in the upcoming 3500 MHz auction.

10. The root cause for ISED’s faulty policy recommendation is:

(1) an incorrect understanding of the state of competition of the mobile wireless market in Canada based on two studies known to be deeply flawed and worthless from an economic perspective;

(2) a failure to adhere to international best practices; and

(3) a failure to examine the efficacy of its past set-aside policies and the ultimate results.

11. ISED must not rely on economically unsound studies when making critical decisions that

affect all of Canada. The state of competition in the Canadian mobile wireless market is

strong—it does not need ISED’s interference. Studies other than the two that ISED relies

upon have proven the relevant market to be competitive, making it clear that set-asides are

not needed and neither are any other measures that extend preferential treatment to a select

group of bidders. Specifically:

. ISED incorrectly relies on price comparison studies that it commissioned from Wall Communications Inc. (Wall) and NGL Nordicity Group Ltd. (Nordicity). The most recent study found that regional providers offer prices up to 33 percent lower than the nationwide providers do. This is false—this percentage is the result of poorly designed

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studies and incorrect data interpretation. These studies are apples-to-oranges comparisons with numerous mathematical errors. I have documented in detail the flaws of the Wall/Nordicity studies,4 and ISED is aware of these flaws. However, ISED apparently decided to ignore this relevant information, and it continues to insist that the methodology employed in the studies remain unchanged year after year. Ignoring the available evidence is not constructive policymaking and ultimately hurts Canadian consumers.

. Several other unscientific studies plague Canadian policymaking as proponents often cite them absent any sound economic backup. One of these studies is a simplistic price ranking exercise conducted by Finnish management consultancy Rewheel.5 This and similar studies must not shape the Canadian policy debate. At a minimum, policymakers must understand their simplifications, flaws, and errors because unreservedly relying on them can lead to misleading results and bad policy decisions.

. A study conducted by the Competition Bureau that allegedly found lower prices when there is a “strong” regional provider alongside the three nationwide providers has also caused ISED to make some erroneous assumptions. Market evidence clearly refutes this untrue claim because there are no meaningful price differences in provinces with a strong regional provider.

. ISED also ignores several independent studies that found the market to be competitive. Although ISED is aware of these studies, it has apparently chosen to ignore them.

. Multiple industry reports that find Canadian providers deploy new mobile technology at a faster pace than providers in the EU and the USA do, offer some of the fastest networks in the world, and invest far more in its subscribers than its peers in the EU.

4 See, Christian M. Dippon, Ph.D., “An Accurate Price Comparison of Communications Services in Canada and Select Jurisdictions,” NERA Economic Consulting, October 19, 2018 (hereinafter Dippon Price Comparison). 5 See, Christian M. Dippon, Ph.D., “Oversimplified and Misleading International Price Comparisons Must Not Guide Policy and Regulatory Decisions, A Critical Review of Rewheel’s Digital Fuel Monitor Reports,” March 13, 2019. NERA Economic Consulting Page 14 of 87

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12. ISED also ignores international best practices that show ISED’s proposal to fall far outside

the norm. Only four of the 64 recent and planned 5G auctions in 30 OECD countries

(excluding Canada) included set-asides, and each country that did use set-asides had unique

circumstances, none of which apply to Canada. The majority of OECD countries employ

spectrum caps that protect all bidders (rather than a select group) from spectrum hoarding.

ISED must align its policy and licensing framework for the 3500 MHz band with other

countries. In doing so, ISED will ensure that Canada does not fall behind in deploying 5G

services to Canadian subscribers and that it does not delay what the World Economic

Forum describes as “the fourth industrial revolution.”6

13. ISED also ignores the market evidence generated by set-asides and the deployment

strategies pursued by regional providers. ISED implemented a set-aside policy in the 2008

AWS-1 auction, the 2015 AWS-3 auction, and the 2019 600 MHz auction. Yet, with over

10 years since extending significant preferential treatment (combined with the CRTC’s

policy of cost-based wholesale domestic roaming), the regional providers have failed to

expand nationwide. The set-aside policy has proven ineffective in the presence of market

forces, and there is no reason to believe that the outcome will be any different in the

upcoming auction. In fact, ISED arrived at the same conclusion even before the 600 MHz

auction when it stated:

… recent spectrum assignments in the 700 MHz, AWS-3, AWS-4 and 2500 MHz bands have provided all current and potential wireless service

6 Klaus Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond,” World Economic Forum, January 14, 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means- and-how-to-respond/.

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providers with multiple opportunities to access additional spectrum in the licence areas to meet their spectrum needs.7

14. Set-asides are not only superfluous and ineffective; they are harmful. Set-asides have

harmed Canadians because they distort competition and greatly increase spectrum costs

leading to increased mobile wireless prices. Set-asides and other auction features have also

led to delays in the usage of spectrum, further harming consumers. The beneficiaries of the

spectrum set-asides are the providers that acquire it at artificially low prices and then resell

it in the open market reaping huge profits. In fact, because regional providers’ service

territories generally do not overlap, the set-aside policy effectively ensures that they obtain

licenses at reserve prices, whereas other (open) licenses increase in price because of the

artificial additional scarcity created by set-asides. More important, the mobile service

providers eligible for set-asides already have extensive spectrum holdings in the limited

regions in which they operate, and they have extensive corporate resources. There is no

evidence that they need set-aside protection to compete adequately with nationwide

providers in the acquisition of spectrum.

15. An economically sustainable way forward would use spectrum caps and refrain from using

set-asides or any other measure that extends preferential treatment to a select group of

bidders. Notwithstanding, if ISED decides to implement set-asides, it must revise the

eligibility requirements from a nationwide 10 percent market share threshold to a

provincial 10 percent market share threshold. There is no economic support for the use of

the old 10 percent nationwide subscriber market share rule to qualify for set-asides.

Regional providers will never exceed this market share because they have elected not to

7 Government of Canada, “Transfer of Spectrum Licences to and Xplornet Communications Inc. from MTS Inc.,” Transfer Decision, February 15, 2017 (emphasis added). NERA Economic Consulting Page 16 of 87

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serve the entire nation. Furthermore, they have significant market share positions—

frequently far more than 10 percent—in the provinces they serve. ISED also must prevent

bidders eligible for set-aside spectrum from bidding on open spectrum. As previous set-

aside auctions have shown, set-aside bidders bid on open spectrum to drive up the price for

the open spectrum.

IV. RESPONSES TO ISED’S QUESTIONS Q1A THROUGH Q1E

16. In the following, I provide my recommendations to ISED with respect to questions Q1A

through Q1F.

A. Recommendations with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1A

17. Q1A: ISED is seeking comments on its proposal to implement pro-competitive measures

in the 3500 MHz auction.

18. Answer: The Canadian market requires no procompetitive measures. I recommend that

ISED refrains from all procompetitive measures in the 3500 MHz auction based on the

following findings:

. Per ISED’s own statement, recent spectrum auctions “have provided all current and potential wireless service providers with multiple opportunities to access additional spectrum in the license areas to meet their spectrum demand.”8

. ISED’s proposal solves no competition problem because the market is competitive. In a competitive market, market forces ensure the efficient allocation of resources and protect the consumers’ interests.

8 Government of Canada, “Transfer of Spectrum Licences to Bell Canada and Xplornet Communications Inc. from MTS Inc.,” Transfer Decision, February 15, 2017. NERA Economic Consulting Page 17 of 87

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. ISED’s proposal assumes competitive problems where none exists. It rests on a superficial and incorrect understanding of the state of competition in the mobile wireless market in Canada.

. The specific proposed procompetitive measures are at odds with international best practices. Set-asides are rarely used, and if they are, regulators use them for newcomers only and expect them to solve a specific issue in a specific band. There are no known newcomers in the present auction, no need for such, and the measures solve no specific issue.

. ISED’s proposal extends significant financial windfalls to already well-funded telecommunications companies that require no government aid to acquire spectrum.

. The last decade of repeated use of set-asides demonstrates that this measure offers no benefits to Canadian consumers as regional providers have no intention of deploying service nationwide, including to Canada’s rural communities. Instead, history shows that the alleged procompetitive tool has served as an excellent financial investment instrument for those providers that benefitted from them.

. The empirical evidence suggests that Canadian consumers pay higher prices than they would in a world where spectrum prices were lower.

B. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1B

19. Q1B: ISED is seeking comments on the use of a set-aside, an in-band spectrum cap, or a

combination of both, including the amount of spectrum that should be applied for the use

of a set-aside, and/or the amount of spectrum that should be subject to an in-band spectrum

cap. Provide supporting rationale for your responses.

20. Answer: If ISED decides to implement a procompetitive measure, it must use spectrum

caps in lieu of set-asides. The rationale for my recommendation is as follows:

. Spectrum caps align with international best practices whereas set-asides do not.

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. Spectrum caps have significantly fewer downsides than set-asides. Spectrum caps protect all market participants and thus distort the market minimally relative to set- asides that extend a competitive advantage to a select group of market participants and thus significantly distort the competitive outcome.

. Spectrum caps do not introduce artificial scarcity in the allocation process of the 3500 MHz band. In contrast, set-asides decrease the supply of spectrum to non-eligible bidders and expose it to fake bidding where eligible bidders bid on the open spectrum for the sole reason to increase the non-eligible bidders’ costs.

. Applying spectrum caps instead of set-asides in the 3500 MHz auction is consistent with ISED’s decision to apply spectrum caps (rather than set-asides) in the 700 MHz and 2500 MHz auctions.

. The international evidence indicates that the preferred spectrum cap for mid-band 5G spectrum is approximately 100 MHz.

C. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1C (If a set-aside is to be applied)

21. Q1C: ISED is seeking comments on its proposal to limit the eligibility criteria to bid on

set-aside spectrum licences to those registered with the CRTC as facilities-based

providers* that are not National Mobile Service Providers, and that are actively providing

commercial services to the general public in the relevant Tier 2 service

area of interest, effective as of the date of application to participate in the 3500 MHz

auction.

22. Answer: If ISED insists on set-aside licenses, it must revise the eligibility criteria with

respect to its exclusion of nationwide mobile wireless service providers only. Specifically,

ISED must revise the market definition in its nationwide 10 percent market share threshold

requirement to a provincial market share threshold. The revised market share threshold

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should read, “Companies with 10 percent or more of provincial subscriber market share.”

The rationale for my recommendation is as follows:

. Regional providers do not intend to serve the national market. Hence, the 10 percent rule is ineffective (as regional providers will never exceed the threshold), and it does not reflect market realities.

. The Competition Bureau has previously opined that mobile wireless providers compete at the provincial not nationwide level.

. ISED’s other eligibility requirements are at the provincial level (e.g., bidders must be active in the Tier 2 of interest, whereas a Tier 2 area is generally at the provincial level) and thus the market share requirement must be at the provincial level.

. A nationwide market share threshold omits the significant market share variations at the provincial level. It is counterintuitive to allow Sasktel with a provincial market share of over 61.8 percent to bid on set-asides in (the Tier 2 of interest) and to preclude others in the same province with a far smaller market share to acquire set-aside spectrum.

D. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1D (If a set-aside is to be applied)

23. Q1D: ISED is seeking comments on its proposal that any set-aside licences acquired by

set-aside-eligible bidders would not be transferable to set-aside-ineligible entities for the

first five years of the licence term.

24. Answer: A shorter resale prohibition period is economically superior to a longer period.

The rationale for my recommendation is as follows:

. The benefits from a resale moratorium are minimal at best. The AWS-1 auction has demonstrated that even a five-year resale restriction has generated several instances in which a (regional) licensee failed to deploy the spectrum and resold it at the expiration of the resale ban period.

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. The social costs of delaying a spectrum resale are significant as consumers are deprived from the use of the scare spectrum resource.

E. Recommendation with Respect to ISED’s Question Q1E (If a set-aside is to be applied)

25. Q1E: ISED is seeking proposals for other eligibility criteria along with supporting

rationale.

26. Answer: Please see response to question Q1C. In addition, absent the definition of a

specific and verifiable competition problem, proper eligibility criteria cannot be derived.

In line with international best practices, ISED must tailor its procompetitive measures and

relatedly its eligibility requirements to a specific problem in the allocation of the 3500 MHz

spectrum and refrain from using a generic eligibility rule.

V. A COMPETITIVE MARKET DOES NOT REQUIRE PROCOMPETITIVE MEASURES

27. As my initial 2018 3500 MHz transition consultation report explains, ISED must allocate

the spectrum in the most efficient and competitively neutral manner.9 I also explain that the

market is competitive, thus these objectives do not require procompetitive measures.10

Quite simply, a competitive market does not require procompetitive measures and applying

them does not improve competition but provides preferential treatment to a group of

bidders at the expense of consumers.

28. ISED does not respond to these and similar findings but lists four reasons why it believes

that preferential treatment is necessary. First, ISED cites to a price comparison report it

9 See Dippon 2018 Expert Report in 3500 MHz Band, ¶ 14. 10 Ibid, ¶ 21. NERA Economic Consulting Page 21 of 87

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commissions annually from Wall or Nordicity that in 2018 reportedly found, “on average,

regional mobile service providers offer prices up to 33% lower than the national

incumbents.”11 Second, ISED refers to the auction as a “key opportunity to further support

the competitiveness of the regional service providers by ensuring that they will have an

opportunity to acquire spectrum….”12 Third, ISED opines, “There is a risk that competition

in the post auction marketplace could suffer without measures to facilitate regional service

providers’ and WISP’s access to spectrum.”13 Fourth, ISED cites the Competition Bureau’s

finding that prices are lower in “the presence of a strong regional provider.”14 As explained

in the following, these justifications are inadequate and mostly inappropriate when

establishing a need for preferential treatment, and ISED completely ignores several other

studies that found the market to be competitive.

A. ISED Ignores the Analyses that Demonstrate the Competitiveness of the Canadian Mobile Wireless Market

29. Several studies are relevant to ISED’s consultation that the Department does not cite in its

proposal for procompetitive measures. Reviewing and incorporating these studies is

important, particularly given the serious shortfalls of the studies that ISED did include in

its consideration.

30. First, as part of my review of the Wall/Nordicity studies (see Appendix B), I prepared an

alternative study that corrects for their omission of key plan attributes, the complete

11 See Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶ 26. 12 Ibid, ¶ 27. 13 Ibid, ¶ 28. 14 Ibid.

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oversight of network qualities, and the absence of country-specific characteristics. 15 I

compared Canadian prices at both the country level and the region level.16 In both cases, I

found that around 80 percent of the forecasted prices were below the international

benchmark, and only about 20 percent were above the international benchmark.17 These

results refute the claims of Wall/Nordicity, the Competition Bureau, and other studies that

incorrectly claim that Canada’s prices are above the international norm.18 I presented my

study to ISED along with the database used to conduct the analysis.

31. Second, a study conducted by Dr. Jeffrey Eisenach in 2014 concluded that Canada’s

“mobile wireless services are robustly competitive and that additional wholesale regulation

would almost certainly harm – and in any case, would not improve – consumer welfare.”19

The same principle applies to ISED’s proposed preferential treatment. In the presence of a

competitive market, these measures “would almost certainly harm – and in any case, would

not improve – consumer welfare.”20 Dr. Eisenach based these findings on factors such as

voice minutes of use, data traffic per connection, revenue per subscriber as well as

investment and network quality reflected in part in smartphone adoption.

15 See Dippon Price Comparison, p. 27. 16 I used cities operating as proxies for the region, for example, for Ontario and Regina for Saskatchewan. 17 Dippon Price Comparison, pp. 34–35. 18 See Christian Dippon, “Oversimplified and Misleading International Price Comparisons Must Not Guide Policy and Regulatory Decisions,” March 13, 2019, NERA Economic Consulting, available for download at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420803. 19 Before the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Expert Report of Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Ph.D. On Behalf of TELUS Communications Company, CRTC 2014-76, Review of Wholesale Mobile Wireless Services, May 15, 2014, ¶ 6 (hereinafter Eisenach 2014). 20 Ibid.

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32. Dr. Eisenach also accounted for operating conditions, for example, the number of wireless

connections per square kilometer and the number of mobile connections by carrier. Dr.

Eisenach further explains that regulatory intervention requires a two-pronged test:

(1) A market failure must exist which prevents competitive forces from maximizing consumer welfare in the usual, well-understood ways. That is, the market must exhibit some form of market power, externality, or other imperfection that causes the quantity and/or quality of output to deviate from the economically efficient level. (2) It must be possible to design and implement, in the real world, a form of regulatory intervention that will, on , improve market performance and enhance consumer welfare.21

Dr. Eisenach’s recommendation is relevant to the present consultation. ISED must establish

that market failure has occurred and weigh the pros and cons of its available regulatory

tools, ultimately recommending one that promises a net market performance improvement.

The above discussion demonstrates that the selected studies that ISED considered are

insufficient and frequently incorrect in demonstrating market failure. Further, ISED’s

consultation gives no indication that it considered the trade-offs of continued market

intervention, continued preferential treatment of a select group of bidders, and set-asides.

33. Third, Dr. Robert Crandall in a recent study concluded, “the Canadian mobile wireless

sector is competitive with most of the competitive focus on the delivery of high-speed data

services.”22 He further noted that with 5G deployment beginning it “is important that the

regulatory environment continue to induce high levels of network investment.”23 Again,

there is no indication that ISED considered this evidence. If it did, it would necessarily

have concluded that procompetitive measures are superfluous at best.

21 Ibid, ¶ 7 (notes omitted). 22 Before the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57, Review of mobile wireless services, “An Analysis of the Performance of the Canadian Mobile Wireless Industry,” Expert Report of Robert W. Crandall On behalf of TELUS Communications, Inc., May 15, 2019 (Crandall Report), ¶ ES1. 23 Ibid, ¶ ES2. NERA Economic Consulting Page 24 of 87

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34. Fourth, the competitiveness of the mobile wireless market in Canada is further reflected by

the fact that Canada is home to some of the most advanced networks in the world. For

instance, as explained by Dr. Crandall, “Canada has moved much more rapidly to deploy

4G than has the average European country. Europe has only recently approached Canada

in terms of 4G availability.”24 Figure 1 is a reproduction of Dr. Crandall’s finding.

Figure 1: Crandall Technology Deployment Comparison

120% 4G LTE Coverage, 2012-18

99% 99% 99% 99% 97% 98% 97%98% 98%97% 98% 100% 96% 95% 89% 89% 89%

81% 80% 78%

67%

59% 60%

40% 31%

20%

0% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Canada United States EU

Source: Crandall Report.

35. Similarly, as shown in Figure 2, OpenSignal finds Canada among the leaders in terms of

average download speeds.

24 Crandall Report, p. 12. NERA Economic Consulting Page 25 of 87

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Figure 2: OpenSignal Average Download Speeds

Source: OpenSignal, “The State of Mobile Network Experience, Benchmarking mobile on the eve of the 5G revolution,” May 2019.

36. Canada’s leading market performance is the result of its providers’ equally leading

investment efforts. As reported by Dr. Crandall and reproduced in Figure 3, “Canadian

carriers continue to invest more heavily than their EU counterparts….”25

25 Crandall Report, p. 17. NERA Economic Consulting Page 26 of 87

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Figure 3: Crandall Network Investment Comparison

Wireless Capital Expenditures per Connection 120

United 100 States

80 Canada 60

U.S. Dollars U.S. 40 EU

20

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 0 2009

Source: Crandall Report.

37. Speedtest (Ookla), which measures mobile download speeds, also ranked Canada in March

2019 as second fastest in the world.26 Within Canada, the three nationwide providers also

rank at the top with all three exhibiting excellent quality across a number of metrics such

as average download speed and latency, and they generally outperform the regional

providers.27

38. The characteristics of the Canadian mobile wireless market are consistent with those of a

competitive market and inconsistent with the narrow and incorrect studies that ISED

considered in its proposal.

B. Regional Providers Do Not Offer Up To a 33 Percent Price Discount

39. There are several reasons why Wall’s claimed up to a 33 percent price discount from

regional providers is incorrect. First, the 2018 Wall Study and the previous annual editions

26 Ookla, “Mobile Average Download,” March 2018, https://www.speedtest.net/global-index. 27 OpenSignal, “Mobile Network Experience Report, Canada,” February 2019, https://www.opensignal.com/reports/2019/02/canada/mobile-network-experience. NERA Economic Consulting Page 27 of 87

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are conceptually deeply flawed, and they should not serve as the basis for reaching

conclusions about market performance, let alone policymaking that directly affects the

deployment of 5G services.

40. The 2018 Wall Study and the previous annual editions (some prepared by Nordicity) have

never been subject to public scrutiny. The only comprehensive review is one that I

conducted on the 2017 version of that report. My review revealed that the design of the

study is deficient and Nordicity incorrectly interpreted the data. Both the Wall Study and

the Nordicity Study ignore important differences in plans, such as varying monthly data,

voice, and SMS allowances as well as quality of service and mobile upload/download

speeds, and both studies treat plans by regional providers as though they were identical in

all aspects with those of nationwide providers, which they are not.

41. The apples-to-oranges comparison in these studies is meaningless because it attributes all

price differences to higher price levels (thus causing the reader to incorrectly conclude that

there is a lack of competition) rather than different (e.g., richer, higher quality) service

plans. In fact, by Nordicity’s own admission, these studies are subject to numerous

limitations.28 I also showed, “A properly designed and executed study methodology finds

that prices for communications service in Canada are cheaper than the prices foreign

providers would charge in Canada for the same plans.”29 Because of the relevancy of my

analysis of the Wall/Nordicity report in the present consultation, I am attaching the report

detailing my findings as Appendix B to the present report. As part of that report (and unlike

Wall/Nordicity), I made my full database available for review.

28 See, NGL Nordicity Group Ltd., “2017 Price Comparison Study of Telecommunications Services in Canada and Select Foreign Jurisdictions,” March 22, 2016, p. 12 29 See, Dippon Price Comparison, Executive Summary. NERA Economic Consulting Page 28 of 87

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42. Second, the up to a 33 percent price discount claim is misleading because it refers to one

basket level (Level 4) only and ignores the fact that for other levels (e.g., Level 5)

nationwide providers are cheaper than regional providers in a number of instances (

and Saskatchewan).30 It is also noteworthy that Wall has not released its data even though

it is from public sources, so no one can verify this study.

43. Third, comparing the prices of regional providers to the prices of nationwide providers is

meaningless because, among other things, Wall fails to consider that a subscriber to a

regional provider might incur additional charges through domestic roaming fees whereas

subscribers to nationwide networks do not have these fees. Thus, a monthly recurring

charge (MRC) by a regional provider that is 33 percent lower (even assuming its existence)

does not necessarily imply that the subscriber pays less per month because it omits potential

roaming charges that the subscriber may incur when traveling outside the regional

provider’s service area. It also ignores many other differences between nationwide and

regional providers, including network quality aspects such as mobile upload and download

speeds.

44. It is critical that ISED not base its policy decisions on this flawed study. Rather, evidence-

based policymaking that considers all relevant studies is the only way to ensure Canadian

consumers have efficient and competitively neutral distribution of the 5G spectrum.

30 Wall Communications Inc., “Price Comparisons of Wireline, Wireless and Internet Services in Canada and with Foreign Jurisdictions,” 2018 Edition, August 29, 2018, p. 23, Table 3.

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C. Regional Providers Do Not Require Preferential Treatment

45. ISED’s second justification for preferential treatment (so-called “pro-competitive

measures”) is its intention to ensure that regional providers “have an opportunity to acquire

spectrum.” 31 Proper policymaking requires the formulation of a solution that when

implemented increases social welfare. 32 However, marketplace evidence indicates that

even without preferential treatment a regional provider has the opportunity to acquire

spectrum. For instance, in the recent 600 MHz auction, there were nine set-aside eligible

bidders and seven acquired set-aside spectrum licenses. Among those seven bidders, by far

the greatest beneficiaries of set-asides were Freedom and Videotron. In fact, the two

companies accounted for 92 percent of the set-aside spectrum revenue. However, Shaw

Communications, a company with a market capitalization of CAD 13.6 billion, owns

Freedom.33 Similarly, Quebecor Media Inc. with a market capitalization of over CAD 8.1

billion owns Videotron.34 These companies clearly do not require government assistance

to acquire spectrum.

46. Additionally, Xplornet, which has been operational since 2004, accounted for 4 percent of

the set-aside revenue in the 600 MHz auction. This provider likely does not lack an

opportunity to acquire 5G spectrum. The company is a well-established operator using “a

31 See Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶ 27. 32 See, e.g., Kevin B. Smith and Christopher W. Latimer, The Public Policy Theory Primer (New York: Westview Press, 2009), 101–103. 33 Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SJR/B:CN (accessed July 14, 2019). 34 Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/QBR/A:CN (accessed July 14, 2019).

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hybrid fixed wireless and satellite network” to offer voice and data communications

services.35 It already holds at least 50 MHz of 3500 MHz spectrum “in most Tier 4 areas.”36

47. SaskTel also does not require government assistance in acquiring 5G spectrum because it

had a market share of 61.8 percent in its service territory in 2017 and has not expanded

beyond its provincial footprint since its foundation in 1908.37

48. No competitive or other hurdles exist that would prevent regional providers from acquiring

the necessary spectrum to deploy 5G services, thus ISED’s concern does not substantiate

the use of preferential treatment. In fact, the data speaks for itself and shows that regional

providers can and have been able to acquire spectrum, even in auctions where there were

no set-asides. Table 1 indicates that as of July 2016 regional providers held over 10 percent

of the spectrum in the areas in which they compete. This does not account for the 600 MHz

spectrum acquired by the regional providers in 2019. , which is not listed in the

table, has indicated that it “own[ed] 12% of the active spectrum holdings available in

Northern Ontario market” as of the end of September 2017.38

35 See Xplornet, “Welcome to Our Investor Relations Information,” https://www.xplornet.com/about/investor-relations/; see also Xplornet, “Learn more about Xplornet and rural internet in Canada,” https://www.xplornet.com/about/. 36 Consultation on Revisions to the 3500 MHz Band to Accommodate Flexible Use and Preliminary Consultation on Changes to the 3800 MHz Band, Comments of Xplornet Communications Inc., July 12, 2018, ¶ 31. 37 See CRTC, “Communications Monitoring Report,” Retail Mobile Sector, Open Data, 2018, Table 6.6; see also Sasktel, “Sasktel History,” https://www.sasktel.com/about-us/company-info/vision-mission-and-values/history- site/ (accessed July 26, 2019). 38 Consultation on a Technical, Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 600 MHz Band, “Comments of Tbaytel,” SLPB-005-17, October 2, 2017, ¶ 6. NERA Economic Consulting Page 31 of 87

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Table 1: Spectrum Holdings by Service Area and Provider in MHz (as of August 1, 2019) Service Area Bell Rogers TELUS Videotron SaskTel Wind Other Total

NL 212 242 120 0 0 0 90 125 788 Share of MHz 27% 31% 15% 0% 0% 0% 11% 16% 100% NS & PEI 194 244 124 0 0 0 110 124 797 Share of MHz 24% 31% 16% 0% 0% 0% 14% 16% 100% NB 198 248 116 0 0 0 110 163 836 Share of MHz 24% 30% 14% 0% 0% 0% 13% 19% 100% Eastern QC 154 232 196 134 0 0 0 86 803 Share of MHz 19% 29% 24% 17% 0% 0% 0% 11% 100% Southern QC 156 240 202 133 0 0 0 67 799 Share of MHz 20% 30% 25% 17% 0% 0% 0% 8% 100% Northern QC 162 193 102 150 0 0 0 176 784 Share of MHz 21% 25% 13% 19% 0% 0% 0% 22% 100% Eastern ON 155 237 198 93 0 30 0 110 823 Share of MHz 19% 29% 24% 11% 0% 4% 0% 13% 100% Southern ON 214 280 128 0 0 105 0 69 796 Share of MHz 27% 35% 16% 0% 0% 13% 0% 9% 100% Northern ON 217 243 139 0 0 0 58 177 834 Share of MHz 26% 29% 17% 0% 0% 0% 7% 21% 100% MB 176 230 213 0 0 0 0 180 800 Share of MHz 22% 29% 27% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 100% SK 49 196 201 0 220 0 0 132 797 Share of MHz 6% 25% 25% 0% 28% 0% 0% 17% 100% AB 133 244 219 0 0 115 2 114 828 Share of MHz 16% 29% 26% 0% 0% 14% 0% 14% 100% BC 145 256 208 0 0 107 0 70 787 Share of MHz 18% 33% 26% 0% 0% 14% 0% 9% 100% Note: Results for the northern territories are not shown. “Other” includes Tbaytel and Xplornet. Source: Government of Canada, National Holdings for Commercial Mobile Spectrum Licenses, current as of August 1, 2019.

49. The companies’ own statements also indicate no shortage of spectrum. For example,

Shaw/Freedom has repeatedly assured its investors that a lack of spectrum does not hinder

its deployment plans. For instance, in a June 2016 investor call, Shaw stated that it has a

“decent advanced spectrum position.” 39 With respect to 700 MHz, Shaw assessed it

holdings as being in “good shape” and added that given its strong holdings in 700 MHz,

39 TD Securities Telecom & Media Forum, , Management Discussion Section, June 14, 2017, p. 2 (hereinafter TD Forum).

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“the 600 megahertz addition to that is a relatively small addition.”40 As a company with

significant financial resources, its annual report states, “Shaw is one of the largest providers

of residential communications services in Canada.”41 Furthermore, overall the company

had revenues of CAD 5.2 billion in 2018.42 Shaw does not have to rely on set-asides, even

stating it is “prepared to pay a fair price whatever the fair price is….”43

50. Similarly, Quebecor/Videotron statements do not indicate spectrum constraints.

Quebecor/Videotron notes that with the four 30 MHz AWS band licenses acquired in 2015,

“the possibilities of network expansion are vast” and with its acquisition of 600 MHz

spectrum in 2019 “Videotron is strongly positioned for the next technological revolution.”44

51. The last decade of spectrum auctions in Canada demonstrates that regional providers have

been able to acquire spectrum (even without set-asides), have ample spectrum to compete,

and are well funded and thus independently able to acquire more spectrum if so desired.

D. There Is No Measurable Risk that Regional Providers Cannot Acquire Spectrum

52. ISED’s third justification for preferential treatment is its perceived “risk that competition

in the post-auction marketplace could suffer without measures to facilitate regional service

providers’ and WISP’s access to spectrum.”45 ISED does not quantify this risk, and because

regional providers do not require preferential treatment there is no risk that competition in

the post-auction market would suffer without such measures. Additionally, ISED

40 Ibid. p. 3 41 Shaw Communications Inc., 2018 Annual Report, p. 6. Shaw’s fiscal year runs through August. 42 Ibid, p. 8. 43 TD Forum, p. 3. 44 See, Quebecor, “Address by Pierre Dion, President and Chief Executive Officer Quebecor, Quebecor Annual Meeting, May 7, 2015, p. 5; Quebecor, Address by Pierre Karl Péladeau, President and CEO, Quebecor Annual General Meeting, May 9, 2019, p. 4. 45 Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶ 28. NERA Economic Consulting Page 33 of 87

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incorrectly assumes that absent regional providers the market is not sufficiently

competitive. As discussed in the following two sections, there is ample evidence (and no

credible evidence to the contrary) that the market has been and is competitive.

E. The Bureau’s Provincial Price Comparison Is Incorrect

53. Further, to support its proposal to extend preferential treatment to regional providers, ISED

also cites to a study by the Competition Bureau that reportedly found the presence of a

strong regional competitor forces nationwide providers to charge lower prices. ISED

concludes from this that nationwide mobile wireless service providers “likely have the

means and incentive to prevent other service providers from acquiring spectrum licenses

in an open auction.”46

54. There are several reasons why ISED’s reliance on the Bureau’s 2017 study cannot and

should not serve as input to the policy and licensing framework for spectrum in the 3500

MHz band. First, the Competition Bureau warned that its “findings, as reflected in this

Position Statement, are not findings of fact or law that have been tested before a tribunal

or court. Further, the contents of this Position Statement do not indicate findings of

unlawful conduct by any party.”47 Thus, by the Bureau’s own admission, it did not design

the study to draw competitive conclusions, let alone to affect the design of the 3500 MHz

auction.

55. Second, the study has not been made available to the public (not even in redacted form),

which prevents a proper peer review of the data, methodology, and results. Thus, it is

46 Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶ 28. 47 Government of Canada, “Competition Bureau statement regarding Bell’s acquisition of MTS,” February 15, 2017, p. 6 (hereinafter Bell-MTS Merger Statement). NERA Economic Consulting Page 34 of 87

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unknown (even possibly to ISED) to what extent prices are allegedly higher in provinces

without regional competition, what constitutes a strong (versus not strong) regional

provider, and to which plans or subset of plans these alleged price differences apply.

Absent this understanding, it is unclear what problem preferential treatment it is supposed

to resolve. It is also impossible to examine whether the measures were effective in solving

said problem.

56. Third, the study was part of a market consolidation approved by the relevant authorities

(albeit with remedies). In February 2017, ISED approved the transfer of mobile spectrum

licenses from MTS to Bell Canada and Xplornet. In explaining its rational for the approval,

ISED stated:

The Department notes that recent spectrum assignments in the 700 MHz, AWS-3, AWS-4 and 2500 MHz bands have provided all current and potential wireless service providers with multiple opportunities to access additional spectrum in the licence areas to meet their spectrum needs.

With Bell purchasing MTS in , the transfer of MTS’ spectrum licences will result in an increase to Bell and Xplornet’s commercial mobile spectrum holdings and provide an opportunity for increased competition in rural Manitoba. Given the extent and diversity of the commercial mobile spectrum holdings of competing wireless service providers within the province of Manitoba, alongside spectrum that is not yet deployed, the Department has determined that the requested Licence Transfer will not have a detrimental impact on the ability of competitors to provide services in Manitoba.48

Presumably, these facts and remedies addressed any Bureau concerns in approving the

merger.

57. Fourth, the study dates to 2017. For the Bureau’s claim of “coordinated behavior among

Bell, TELUS, and Rogers” to hold, it must not only demonstrate the pervasiveness of the

48 Government of Canada, “Transfer of Spectrum Licences to Bell Canada and Xplornet Communications Inc. from MTS Inc.,” Transfer Decision, February 15, 2017. NERA Economic Consulting Page 35 of 87

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alleged price differences but also that they have persisted since the study. Both

requirements are easy to verify by examining current marketplace evidence. As Appendix

C shows, the Bureau’s claim is inconsistent with marketplace evidence as of July 1, 2019.49

Specifically, the three nationwide providers each charge different prices for prepaid plans,

whereas none of them varies its prepaid prices by province. Similarly, Rogers’ standard

postpaid plans (which all offer unlimited data but different speed limits for varying

quantities of data) exhibit no price differences between British Columbia, Ontario, and

Quebec. This finding directly refutes the Bureau’s claim because it deems Videotron a

“strong regional competitor,” yet Rogers charges identical prices in Quebec, British

Columbia, and Ontario. Rogers does charge slightly lower prices in Saskatchewan. Rogers’

basic postpaid plans also do not show patterns consistent with coordinated behavior.

Although they vary by province, there is no correlation between these variations and the

presence of a “strong” regional competitor (as per the Bureau’s definition). For instance,

Rogers offers a basic plan in Ontario with no data, 150 nationwide minutes, and 50 SMS

messages for $25.00. In Quebec, it charges $30.00 for a plan with no data, 100 nationwide

minutes, and unlimited SMS messages. TELUS also charges identical prices for its “no

overage” plans in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, which once again refutes the

Bureau’s claim. TELUS does charge slightly lower prices in Saskatchewan. Bell, on the

other hand, generally charges different prices by province. However, the different pricing

strategies and price levels pursued by the three nationwide providers clearly refute a claim

of coordinated behavior and a conclusion that a strong regional competitor causes lower

prices.

49 The mobile wireless market is dynamic and as such plan prices and other plan attributes change regularly. NERA Economic Consulting Page 36 of 87

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58. Additionally, coordinated behavior cannot be inferred from a simple comparison of prices

because it does not account for varying supply and demand conditions across provinces.

With no evidence of coordinated behavior and no evidence that regional competitors

materially affect prices, there is no need for ISED to extend preferential treatment to these

providers in the upcoming 3500 MHz auction.50

VI. ISED’S PROPOSAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES

59. As ISED correctly notes, “Aligning the 3500 MHz band with global standards will allow

Canadians to obtain competitively priced consumer devices and network equipment.”51

Aligning its proposed policy with Canada’s international peers would also be beneficial for

the policy and licensing framework for 5G bands because all agencies allocating spectrum

presumably are supposed to allocate the scarce resource in the most efficient manner. Thus,

examining the presence or absence of procompetitive measures in other 5G auctions could

provide valuable guidance to ISED in deriving an appropriate policy and licensing

framework for spectrum in the 3500 MHz band. In fact, ISED already appears to have

examined the frameworks for 5G auctions in Australia, Ireland, and the United States,

noting that all these countries imposed a procompetitive measure. However, ISED’s

characterization of the alleged risks of competition in the post-auction marketplace omits

important details that when accounted for indicate an entirely different international best

practice than the practice described by ISED in its consultation. I will address this

50 From provider websites (accessed July 1, 2019). 51 Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶ 27. NERA Economic Consulting Page 37 of 87

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international best practice as well as describe the market circumstances in the few instances

where international regulators decided to reserve spectrum.

A. International 5G Spectrum Deployment Does Not Use Set-Asides

60. At the time of the writing of this report, 27 5G auctions have been completed in the

European, North American, and Asian OECD countries with another 37 5G auctions

scheduled, excluding Canada from the counts.52 Table 2 summarizes the results and reveals

that ISED’s proposal for set-asides is an exception from the international norm. Table 2

shows that in most instances regulators decided to rely on market forces in the allocation

of spectrum. In some instances, following international best practices, these countries

employed spectrum caps and only in rare instances did they implement a set-aside

provision.

Table 2: International Best Practices in 5G Spectrum Allocation July 2019

Total Number of Actual Auctions 27 Actual Set Asides 2 7.4% Actual Spectrum Caps 12 44.4% No Intervention 13 48.1%

Total Number of Upcoming Auctions 37 Upcoming Set Asides 2 5.4% Upcoming Spectrum Caps 8 21.6% No Intervention 27 73.0%

Source: TeleGeography GlobalComms Database; Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications, “Impact study of 26 June 2018 regarding a fourth mobile network operator on the Belgian mobile market,” June 26, 2018; Czech Telecommunications Office, “5G Auction in the Czech Republic – Information for Investors/Spectrum in the 700 MHz and 3400–3600 MHz bands will be auctioned in 2019,” Feb. 25, 2019; FCC, Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings; Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 6133 (8) (2014).

52 Depending on the geography, 5G auctions are those for 600 MHz, 700 MHz, 3.4 to 3.8 GHz, 24 GHz, and 28 GHz bands. The results do not include Japan because it does not auction spectrum. NERA Economic Consulting Page 38 of 87

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61. Specifically, in only two out of the 27 actual auctions (7.4 percent), regulators decided in

favor of a set-aside, whereas in 12 of the 27 instances (44.4 percent) regulators found that

a spectrum cap adequately protects competition in the post-auction marketplace. There are

37 upcoming auctions. Two of these (5.4 percent) are expected to have set-asides and eight

(21.6 percent) are expected to have spectrum caps. Thus, most regulators use spectrum caps

for the efficient allocation of 5G spectrum and most avoid set-asides.

B. Not All Set-Asides Are the Same

62. In the four countries where regulators used set-asides, they served a different purpose than

the set-asides proposed by ISED. In addition to Italy, Belgium, and the Czech Republic,

the only other European, North American, and Asian OECD country that used set-asides

for 5G spectrum is the United States in its 600 MHz auction. As the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) explained, the set-aside was occasioned by the fact

that the Incentive Auction:

represents the last opportunity in the foreseeable future for providers to acquire licenses for below-1-GHz spectrum at auction. Two nationwide providers, AT&T and Verizon Wireless, hold approximately 73 percent of all suitable and available below-1-GHz spectrum. Given the importance of multiple providers, including rural and regional providers, having access to below-1-GHz spectrum for deployment and competition, we conclude that a clear mobile spectrum holdings policy for the Incentive Auction is necessary to increase access opportunities to the 600 MHz Band. We find that it is appropriate to adopt a market-based spectrum reserve for entities that do not currently hold a significant amount of below-1-GHz spectrum.53

53 FCC, Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings; Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 6133 (8) (2014), ¶ 153 (notes omitted).

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63. Based on their holdings, the eligible providers included both nationwide providers (T-

Mobile and Sprint) as well regional and rural providers.54 Thus, the FCC’s reasoning for

set-aside spectrum is far removed from ISED’s intention of providing preferential

treatment to companies that are well funded, have held incumbent status for at least 10

years, and have no intention of expanding beyond their current footprint.

64. In October 2018, the Italian Authority for Communications Guarantees (AGCOM)

auctioned 60 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz range, reserving two paired 5 MHz blocks

for a new entrant. AGCOM based its decision on the unique characteristics of this spectrum

band as well as its interest in promoting a new facilities-based entrant. Specifically,

according to AGCOM, the 700 MHz band is particularly suitable for mobile radio coverage

including indoor coverage due to frequency propagation characteristics. Therefore, the

regulator determined that this band would be an important asset for new entrants especially

if their business plans provide for a large-scale development of services.55

65. In its upcoming auction, the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommunications (BIPT)

reserved 5 MHz of the 30 MHz in the 700 MHz band for a new (fourth) provider. In arriving

at its policy decision, the BIPT considered not market shares but the existing providers’

current spectrum holdings. Specifically, the BIPT explains:

Spectrum is reserved only at 700 MHz for the new player. The reason behind this is that each of the three MNOs has acquired 10 MHz in the 800 MHz band, while the fourth player can no longer acquire anything in the 800 MHz band. This means that one of the lots for the three remaining

54 See Dan Meyer, “T-Mobile US, Dish, Comcast dominate 600 MHz incentive auction, Verizon a no-show,” rcrwireless.com, April 13, 2017. 55 Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (AGCOM), “Resolution No. 231/18/Cons*: Assignment Procedures and Rules for the Use of the Frequencies Available in the 694-790 MHz, 3600-3800 MHz and 26.5-27.5 GHz Bands for Terrestrial Systems of Electronic Communications in Order to Favor the Transition to 5G Technology, Under the Law 27 December 2017, N. 205,” May 8, 2018, ¶ 106.

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players will be limited to 5 MHz, while the other two lots will consist of 10 MHz.56

Thus, the Belgian regulator intended for the set-asides to solve a specific spectrum

imbalance problem, that is, the inability of a new entrant to acquire alternative low band

spectrum.

66. The Czech Telecommunication Office’s (CTU) policy and licensing framework for

spectrum in the 700 MHz band includes, among other things, a 2x10 MHz block “for new

entrants.”57 The CTU explains the purpose of the set-aside as follows:

The spectrum reservation is intended to ensure that a new entrant as well as current market players will be able to obtain sufficient amount of spectrum to provide full scale of mobile services.58

67. The FCC, like AGCOM, the CTU, and the BIPT, addressed specific spectrum imbalances

unique to their country and specific spectrum bands.

VII. THE CONTINUED USE OF SET-ASIDES WILL CONTINUE TO HARM CANADIAN CONSUMERS

68. The Canadian mobile wireless market is competitive and does not require regulatory

intervention through the preferential treatment of certain bidders in the upcoming auction.

Prior to imposing procompetitive measures, ISED must carefully examine the downsides,

or side effects, of set-asides. If ISED fails to account for these side effects, its policy and

licensing framework for this auction will not yield net market performance improvement.

Simply put, a policy that rests on the speculation that set-asides will improve competition

56 Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications, “Impact study of 26 June 2018 regarding a fourth mobile network operator on the Belgian mobile market,” June 26, 2018, ¶ 95, http:/www.bipt.be. 57 Czech Telecommunications Office, “5G Auction in the Czech Republic – Information for Investors/Spectrum in the 700 MHz and 3400–3600 MHz bands will be auctioned in 2019,” February 25, 2019, https://www.ctu.eu/notice-prepartion-tender-right-use-radio-frequencies-700mhz-band-and-related-steps. 58 Ibid. NERA Economic Consulting Page 41 of 87

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can do more harm to consumers than good. This chapter discusses the cost-benefit analysis

necessary to respond to ISED’s inquiries and unequivocally shows that set-asides are

harmful to Canadian consumers.

A. Market Forces Serve Canadian Consumers the Best

69. A necessary but not sufficient condition for regulatory intervention, particularly set-asides,

is the presence of a competitive problem. As demonstrated above, such a problem does not

exist in Canada that has a competitive market. Regulators and economists widely agree that

competitive markets deliver higher allocative efficiency (i.e., optimal resource allocation)

than regulation can. Thus, the analysis should stop here because set-asides can never be a

procompetitive measure in a competitive market.

B. Set-Asides Have Harmed Canadian Consumers

70. ISED began using set-asides in the 2008 AWS-1 auction in which it reserved 40 percent of

the spectrum to entrants. A post-auction examination of the bidding strategies pursued by

these entrants revealed that the set-asides significantly increased the prices of the non-set-

aside (open) spectrum. As I explained in my 2008 review of that auction:

From a theoretical perspective, the set-aside provision in the Canadian AWS auction resulted in a double tax for the incumbents. First, set-asides decrease the supply of spectrum available to incumbents …. Second, as implemented in Canada, the set-aside provision artificially raised the demand for spectrum because the entrants were allowed to place bids on unrestricted spectrum with no intention of buying, but with the objective of increasing the prices the incumbents would have to pay.59

59 Dippon 2008 AWS Auction Report, p. 4. NERA Economic Consulting Page 42 of 87

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71. I cited the rich literature on set-asides, including a paper by Crandall and Ingraham that

concluded, “the end result of the [1996 US] C-Block auction was that the number of the

designated entities with winning bids could finance neither these purchases nor the

subsequent costs of building out their networks.’”60 A similar outcome occurred in Canada.

After a failed attempt at restructuring, , one of the entrants in the AWS-1 auction,

was acquired in 2015 by Rogers.61 Similarly, Public Mobile, another entrant from that

particular auction, entered the market in 2010 and was acquired by TELUS three years

later.62

72. I also warned that set-asides would negatively affect prices. Specifically, I explained:

… excessively high spectrum prices can negatively affect competition, prices, service deployment, and quality of service. This risk is particularly pronounced in Canada where all winning parties, including the entrants, appear to have grossly overpaid in the recent AWS auction. As such, this particular auction design has the potential to harm the very policy objectives that Industry Canada strives to achieve, particularly if used again for future Canadian spectrum auctions.63

73. The problem of excessive spectrum prices is particularly pronounced in Canada. This is

illustrated in Figure 4 for coverage spectrum.

60 Ibid, p. 25. 61 See Christine Dobby, “Court approves Mobilicity sale to Rogers for $465 million,” The Globe and Mail, June 23, 2015, updated May 15, 2018. 62 See Howard Solomon, “Public Mobile swallowed by Telus in face of competition,” itworldcanada.com, October 23, 2013. 63 Dippon 2008 AWS Auction Report, p. 20. NERA Economic Consulting Page 43 of 87

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Figure 4: Coverage Spectrum Prices (2008 to present)

Note: Coverage spectrum bands include 600 MHz, 700 MHz, 800 MHz, 850 MHz, and 900 MHz. Award prices are converted to USD using the annual average financial exchange rate at the time of the award as reported by the World Bank. Prices include annual fees (discounted at 8%) and adjusted to a standard 15- year license duration (using an 8% discount rate). Prices are also adjusted for inflation to 2019 prices using U.S. CPI data as reported by the BLS. Source: NERA.

Comparing Canadian spectrum prices (as measured by USD per MHz-Pop) to the prices

paid by international mobile wireless providers reveals that Canadian auctions for both

coverage spectrum (bands below 1 GHz) and capacity spectrum (bands 1 GHz and above)

have repeatedly ranked among the highest in the world. Figure 5 illustrates capacity

spectrum.

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Figure 5: Capacity Spectrum Prices (2008 to present)

Note: Capacity spectrum bands include 1500 MHz, 1800 MHz, PCS, AWS, 2100 MHz, 2300 MHz, 2500 MHz, and 3500 MHz. Award prices are converted to USD using the annual average financial exchange rate at the time of the award as reported by the World Bank. Prices include annual fees (discounted at 8%) and adjusted to a 15-year license duration (using an 8% discount rate). Prices are also adjusted for inflation to 2019 prices using US CPI data as reported by the BLS. The 2006 AWS auction in the United States, which came in at $0.65 per MHz/Pop, is omitted from this figure. Source: NERA.

74. Table 3 demonstrates that Canada had one auction in the six outliers for coverage spectrum

and three auctions in the 14 outliers for coverage spectrum. Only Hong Kong had an equal

amount of auctions in which its spectrum prices far exceeded the international norm.

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Table 3: Number of Bands Sold at Very High Prices (outliers or extreme outliers) Country Coverage spectrum Capacity spectrum

Canada 1 3 Hong Kong 1 3 South Korea 0 3 United States 0 2 Netherlands 2 0 Ireland, Australia 1 0 Austria, Hungary, Norway, Taiwan 0 1

Total in sample: 6 of 71 14 of 147 Note: In Canada and the Netherlands, incumbent operators and recent entrants paid very different prices for spectrum in certain awards, owing to the use of set asides. In these cases, two price points are reported, one for entrants and one for incumbents. For the Hong Kong award of 1800 MHz (2018), spectrum was sold in two stages, by direct award (RFR) and by auction. Both price points are reported. For the United States, the 2006 AWS-1 spectrum auction is included.

75. As I explained in my examination of the AWS-1 auction results, these excessive spectrum

prices are simply not going away. Rather, providers must set their retail prices higher than

they should be because Canada did not charge spectrum prices that were more closely

aligned with international average prices.

76. The harm to consumers of the high cost of the spectrum has been compounded by the fact

that set-asides and other features of the auctions have been followed by delays in rolling

out the acquired spectrum. For instance, among the winners of set-aside spectrum in the

2008 AWS-1 auction was Shaw Communications. Shaw, however, did not deploy the

spectrum but resold it five year later to Rogers.64 Furthermore, while Shaw waited for the

resale moratorium of five years to expire, Canadian consumers were deprived from use of

64 See Government of Canada, Auction of Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and Other Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range — Licence Winners, May 27, 2008 to July 21, 2008, modified May, 5, 2017, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf09002.html; see also Jamie Sturgeon, “Rogers strikes $700M deal to buy Shaw's wireless spectrum, Mountain ,” financialpost.com, January 14, 2013; Shaw Newsroom, “Shaw announces agreement with Rogers for purchase and sale of assets,” January 14, 2013.)

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the spectrum. Similarly, Wind Mobile (now Freedom) sold the unused spectrum it had

acquired in Saskatchewan and Manitoba to Sasktel and MTS, respectively. 65 In 2017,

Quebecor sold spectrum that it had acquired in the Toronto area in 2008 to Rogers.66 That

same year it also sold seven of the 25 700 MHz and 2500 MHz spectrum licenses acquired

in 2014 and 2015, respectively, to Shaw/Freedom.67 This spectrum had lain fallow for

extended periods, close to 10 years in some instances.68 Other sellers of set-aside spectrum

include Bragg/Eastlink to Bell Mobility and to , a

Bell/Rogers joint venture.69 This spectrum had also been unused.70 Thus, there is a clear

pattern indicating that the preferential treatment of regional providers through set-asides

and other procompetitive measures results in significant delays in the use of significant

amounts of spectrum.

77. The significant amount of spectrum that has been unused (lain fallow) for extend periods

is costly to consumers. As one particular study of the cost of not using spectrum pointed

out, it is important not to omit the “social discount rate” if the auction process introduces

65 See “Wind selling LTE spectrum in Prairies to MTS, Sasktel; MTS moves to divest Allstream,” TeleGeography, August 3, 2015. 66 Ibid. 67 See Konrad Yakabuski, “Ottawa's approval of the Quebecor spectrum sale would see Péladeau laughing all the way to the bank,” The Globe and Mail, June 16, 2017; see also “Shaw acquires 700MHz, 2500MHz spectrum from Videotron for CAD430m, sells ViaWest for CAD2.3bn,” Telegeography, June 14, 2017. 68 For example, as stated by Rogers, “’Our plan is to put this unused spectrum to use to meet this demand, especially in a dense urban area, like Toronto,’ said Rogers chief executive officer Nadir Mohamed.” (Jacqueline Nelson, “Rogers inks deal with Quebecor to buy wireless spectrum,” The Globe and Mail, May 29, 2013, updated May 11, 2018.) 69 See Government of Canada, “Transfer of spectrum licence held by Bragg Communications Inc. to Bell Mobility Inc.,” October 12, 2018; see also Jamie Sturgeon, “Craig Wireless sells licences to Bell, Rogers for $80 million,” Free Press, March 27, 2010. 70 As ISED noted in giving its approval to the Bell acquisition, “the requested AWS-1 Licence Transfer involves spectrum that is not currently being used to provide services and will offer Bell an opportunity to put such spectrum to use for the benefit of all Canadians.”

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an extended delay in the productive use of this spectrum.71 This particular paper concludes,

“[T]he salient fact for welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policy is that any rule

favoring less efficient providers entails expected costs. These costs are properly included

in the welfare analysis.”72

78. Thus, as the evidence from Canada’s AWS-1 and other auctions as well as the economic

literature make clear, acknowledged delays in spectrum usage made possible by set-asides

cost Canadian consumers real money, whether out-of-pocket or in foregone use.

C. Set-Asides Only Benefit the Recipients

79. As this section shows, the benefits of set-asides are immaterial, if not zero, thus rendering

set-asides as a net negative for Canadian consumers. First, ISED has been extending

preferential treatment for over a decade and another nationwide provider has not emerged.

In addition to reserving 40 percent of the spectrum for regional providers in the AWS-1

auction, ISED reserved 60 percent of the available spectrum in its 2015 AWS-3 auction,

and 43 percent of the available spectrum in its 2019 600 MHz auction.73

80. Despite these repeated preferential treatments, none of the regional providers (e.g.,

Videotron, Sasktel, or Tbaytel) expanded nationally. Instead, they elected to focus on either

their native provinces or select urban and suburban areas with positive business cases (e.g.,

Freedom). More important, regional providers generally refrained from “[m]eeting the

needs of consumers and businesses in rural areas [that] present[] particular challenges, as

71 See Thomas W. Hazlett and Roberto E. Munoz, “A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn 2009, p. 425. 72 Ibid, p. 437 (footnote omitted). 73 See Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶¶ 30–31.

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the business case for deploying networks in less densely populated regions is more difficult

than in urban areas.”74 Only nationwide mobile wireless providers typically serve these

areas—the same providers that have to pay the artificially increased spectrum prices caused

by set-asides. There is no reason to believe that offering regional providers another

spectrum price discount will cause them to expand their footprint, let alone cover the

nation.

81. Second, the set-aside provisions in ISED’s spectrum design have only proven beneficial to

its recipients’ profitability. For instance, among the winners of set-aside spectrum in the

2008 AWS-1 auction was Shaw Communications, which paid CAD 189.5 million for its

spectrum. However, Shaw did not deploy the spectrum but resold it five year later to Rogers

for CAD 300 million, representing an annualized return on investment (ROI) of 9.6

percent.75 This ROI outstrips the ROI on NASDAQ (5.9 percent) by a factor of 64 percent.

Further, because Shaw waited for the resale moratorium of five years to expire, Canadian

consumers were deprived from using the spectrum.

82. Similarly, Wind Mobile (now Freedom) sold the unused spectrum it had acquired in

Saskatchewan and Manitoba to Sasktel and MTS, respectively, with MTS paying CAD 45

million in 2017 for spectrum Wind had acquired for CAD 14.4 million, a ROI of 13.4

percent.76

74 Ibid, ¶ 22. 75 This includes the CAD 50 million paid for the option to purchase the spectrum. (See Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Auction of Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and Other Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range – Licence Winners,” May 27, 2008 to July 21, 2008, modified May, 5, 2017, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf09002.html; see also Jamie Sturgeon, “Rogers strikes $700M deal to buy Shaw's wireless spectrum, ,” financialpost.com, January 14, 2013; see also Shaw Newsroom, “Shaw announces agreement with Rogers for purchase and sale of assets,” January 14, 2013.) 76 See “Wind selling LTE spectrum in Prairies to MTS, Sasktel; MTS moves to divest Allstream,” TeleGeography, August 3, 2015; Globalive Wireless LP licenses for Winnipeg and Brandon reported in Government

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83. Quebecor also benefitted from what The Globe and Mail correctly described as “subsidized

rates.”77 In 2017, Quebecor sold the spectrum it acquired in the Toronto area for CAD 96

million in 2008 to Rogers for CAD 184 million.78 That same year it also sold 700 MHz and

2500 MHz spectrum to Shaw/Freedom. Quebecor has indicated that the sale of spectrum

outside of Quebec is part of its “focus on core business.”79 In 2014 and 2015, Quebecor

paid CAD 420 million for 25 licenses across several provinces and sold seven licenses to

Shaw for CAD 430 million.80 This spectrum had lain fallow for extended periods, close to

10 years in some instances.81

84. Other sellers of set-aside spectrum include Bragg/Eastlink to Bell Mobility and Craig

Wireless to Inukshuk Wireless, a Bell/Rogers joint venture.82 This spectrum had also been

unused.83 Thus, there is a clear pattern indicating that preferential treatment of regional

providers through set-asides and other procompetitive measures only results in a significant

ROI for those benefitting from the set-asides.

of Canada, “Auction of Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and Other Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range – Summary by Licence Winner,” Date modified: May 5, 2017. 77 Konrad Yakabuski, “Ottawa's approval of the Quebecor spectrum sale would see Péladeau laughing all the way to the bank,” The Globe and Mail, June 16, 2017. 78 Ibid. 79 Quebecor, “CIBC 16th Annual Eastern Institutional Investor Conference,” September 28, 2017, slide 11. 80 See Konrad Yakabuski, “Ottawa's approval of the Quebecor spectrum sale would see Péladeau laughing all the way to the bank,” The Globe and Mail, June 16, 2017; see also “Shaw acquires 700MHz, 2500MHz spectrum from Videotron for CAD430m, sells ViaWest for CAD2.3bn,” TeleGeography, June 14, 2017. 81 As stated by Rogers, “‘Our plan is to put this unused spectrum to use to meet this demand, especially in a dense urban area, like Toronto,’ said Rogers chief executive officer Nadir Mohamed.” (Jacqueline Nelson, “Rogers inks deal with Quebecor to buy wireless spectrum,” The Globe and Mail, May 29, 2013, updated May 11, 2018.) 82 See Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Transfer of spectrum licence held by Bragg Communications Inc. to Bell Mobility Inc.,” October 12, 2018; see also Jamie Sturgeon, “Craig Wireless sells licences to Bell, Rogers for $80 million,” Winnipeg Free Press, March 27, 2010. 83 As ISED noted in giving its approval to the Bell acquisition, “the requested AWS-1 Licence Transfer involves spectrum that is not currently being used to provide services and will offer Bell an opportunity to put such spectrum to use for the benefit of all Canadians.” (Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Transfer of spectrum licence held by Bragg Communications Inc. to Bell Mobility Inc.,” October 12, 2018.) NERA Economic Consulting Page 50 of 87

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85. Third, whereas set-asides increase the regional providers’ profitability, nationwide

providers serve the country, including some of the most rural areas in Canada, and must

pay highly inflated prices. The asymmetric effect of set-aside provisions is easily

observable in the result from the recent 600 MHz auction where nationwide providers paid

significantly more on a MHz per population basis than its regional competitors did. Table

4 reveals that Rogers and TELUS paid CAD 1.71 and CAD 2.35 per MHz-Pop,

respectively. However, regional providers paid on average CAD 0.81 and as little as CAD

0.34 for the same spectrum. Thus, set-asides in the 600 MHz auction afforded regional

providers a discount of over 50 percent over Rogers and 65 percent over TELUS. Shaw

and Quebecor received 92 percent of these discounts that, as explained above, are publicly

traded companies with market capitalizations of CAD 13.6 billion and CAD 8.1 billion,84

respectively. Notably, in the case of Shaw, it has no apparent strategy to deploy services in

rural communities, let alone nationwide.

84 See Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SJR/B:CN (accessed July 14, 2019); see also Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/QBR/A:CN (accessed July 14, 2019). NERA Economic Consulting Page 51 of 87

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Table 4: 600 MHz Auction Final Results (in CAD) Percent Price Paid Reserve Price Above Bidder Price Paid MHz-Pop of Package Reserve (2)/(4)-100% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Open Spectrum Rogers $ 1,725,006,000 $ 1.71 $ 642,974,000 168% TELUS 931,238,000 2.35 235,174,000 296% Bell no spectrum obtained - nc

Set-aside Spectrum Freedom 491,977,000 0.78 423,149,000 16% Videotron 255,780,000 0.99 175,789,000 46% Xplornet 35,755,000 0.99 12,997,000 175% Eastlink 13,046,000 0.36 13,046,000 0% SaskTel 12,168,000 0.37 11,823,000 3% tbaytel 2,802,000 0.36 2,802,000 0% ICE 2,556,000 0.34 2,175,000 18% SSI no spectrum obtained - nc Novus no spectrum obtained - nc

Unsold na 16,830,000 nc na – not applicable. nc – not calculable. Source: Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Auction of Spectrum Licences in the 600 MHz Band, Auction Results,” May 31, 2019, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt- gst.nsf/eng/h_sf11331.html.

86. Fourth, regional providers generally do not overlap in serving areas. In an auction setting

this means that regional providers often do not bid on the same licenses. With nationwide

providers excluded from bidding on the reserved spectrum, regional providers often

acquire their licenses at or near the reserve price. Table 5 shows that although Rogers and

TELUS paid 168.3 percent and 296 percent of the reserve prices, regional providers paid

on average 32 percent above the reserve prices. Several set-aside licenses sold at the reserve

price. This phenomenon exacerbates the distortionary market effects of auctions with set-

aside provisions.

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Table 5: 2500 MHz Auction Final Results (in CAD)

Percent Price Paid Reserve Price Above Bidder Price Paid MHz-Pop of Package Reserve (2)/(4)-100% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

TELUS $ 478,819,000 $ 0.36 $ 133,810,000 258% Videotron 186,952,000 0.42 52,960,000 253% Bell 28,985,000 0.12 17,262,000 68% Xplornet 25,435,731 0.09 14,879,000 71% Rogers 24,086,270 0.10 16,743,000 44% Bragg 4,821,000 0.08 3,536,000 36% CCI 2,299,000 0.05 2,299,000 0% MTS 2,242,000 0.09 2,242,000 0% Tbaytel 1,731,000 0.24 424,000 308% IC na nc 4,660,000 nc

na – not available, nc – not calculable. Source: Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Auction of Spectrum Licences for Broadband Radio Service (BRS) – 2500 MHz Band,” May 12, 2015, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt- gst.nsf/eng/h_sf10939.html.

87. With no evidence that set-asides stimulate geographic expansion, and ample evidence that

the preferential treatment serves as an opportunistic investment tool for regional providers

and artificially increases the costs of nationwide providers, set-asides offer no benefits to

Canadian consumers. Contrasted against the significant losses in consumer surplus (chiefly

from increased retail prices), the proposed set-aside provision will have a net negative

effect on social welfare.

VIII. AN ECONOMICALLY SUSTAINABLE WAY FORWARD OMITS SET-ASIDES

88. The impetus for ISED’s proposal for “pro-competitive measures” is its concern “that

competition in the post auction marketplace could suffer without measures to facilitate

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regional service providers’ and WISP’s access to spectrum.” 85 ISED’s concern about

regional and WISP providers is rather unique in modern economies and, as discussed, finds

no economic support in Canada. However, as the international comparison in Section V

shows, several of its peers share ISED’s concern about competition in the post-auction

market. Therefore, an economically sustainable policy and licensing framework for

spectrum in the 3500 MHz band should not protect individual market participants or a

group thereof but must protect the entire post-auction market. This section introduces a

framework that addresses ISED’s competition concerns and that aligns with international

best practices. Should ISED decide to implement set-asides nevertheless, I will also discuss

how to minimize (though not eliminate) the net negative impact of this measure on

consumer welfare.

A. If ISED Wants a Procompetitive Measure, then Spectrum Caps Are More Appropriate than Set-Asides

89. Spectrum caps are far more common than set-asides; they are also economically superior

to set-asides because they do not distort the market yet offer the post-auction market

protection sought by ISED. Spectrum caps predate spectrum auctions, and regulators have

used them since the inception of mobile wireless networks in the 1990s to ensure that

spectrum was not concentrated among a few providers, thereby preventing the

development of a competitive market. 86 Regulators have only used spectrum caps in

85 Consultation 3500 MHz Auction, ¶ 28. 86 See Arthur D. Little, “Mobile Broadband, Competition and Spectrum Caps,” An independent paper prepared for the GSM Association, January 2009, https://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp- content/uploads/2012/07/Spectrum-Mobile-broadband-competition-and-caps-report-2009.pdf. NERA Economic Consulting Page 54 of 87

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auctions to prevent excessive spectrum holdings by individual parties in specific bands,

thereby protecting all market participants.

90. Set-asides are fundamentally different. This measure extends a competitive advantage to

some market participants, and it distorts the market because it offers a competitive

advantage (i.e., reserved spectrum) to a select group of bidders at the expense of other

bidders that face higher prices due to the artificial spectrum scarcity created by the set-

asides.

91. A regulator’s role is to protect the public interest by ensuring competitive markets. Such

markets, in turn, offer consumers innovative and high quality services at competitive

prices. A measure that has a distortionary market effect is most often in conflict with this

objective, particularly when non-distortionary tools that protect the market are available.

92. In fact, ISED has previously acknowledged that spectrum caps are sufficient to protect the

market and has presented a list of criteria that it used to determine the circumstances under

which spectrum caps offer a superior alternative to set-asides. As the Department explained

in setting the policy and licensing framework in the 700 MHz and 2500 MHz auctions:

Spectrum caps are more appropriate than set-asides for the auctioning of 700 MHz and 2500 MHz spectrum because of the limited quantity of 700 MHz spectrum available; the different values that providers may place on the specific blocks of 700 MHz; and the fact that certain companies already hold licences for large amounts of 2500 MHz spectrum. The use of caps will not require Industry Canada to identify specific blocks of spectrum for a set-aside, but will allow companies to choose blocks based on equipment ecosystem preferences and business plans. For these reasons, the use of caps will support the objective of sustained competition in a less intrusive manner than the use of a set-aside.87

87 Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, “Licensing Framework for Residual Spectrum Licences in the 700 MHz, 2500 MHz and PCS-G Bands, 2500 MHz Consultation,” SLPB-009-17, December 2017, ¶ 36. NERA Economic Consulting Page 55 of 87

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93. The same conditions apply in the present auction. Specifically, there is a limited quantity

of 3500 MHz available in this auction, providers place a different value on the spectrum

(particularly because the 3500 MHz band is a flexible use band), and certain companies

already hold licenses for large amounts of 3500 MHz spectrum. Thus, applying ISED’s

own reasoning dictates that if ISED decides to use a procompetitive measure that measure

must be spectrum caps. The decision to use spectrum caps would be consistent with prior

decisions; it would align with international best practices and would be economically

superior to set-asides because it avoids much of the distortionary market effects produced

by the latter measure.

B. If ISED Decides to Use Set-Asides despite the Economic Evidence, It Must Revise the Eligibility Criteria

94. If ISED decides to implement set-asides in the upcoming 3500 MHz auction despite the

strong evidence demonstrating that such a measure would harm Canadian consumers, it

must revise the eligibility criteria. Under ISED’s eligibility proposal, a bidder must (a) have

a nationwide subscriber market share of less than 10 percent, (b) be a facilities-based

provider, and (c) be active in the Tier 2 in which it seeks to acquire a license. ISED needs

to make at least one improvement to its eligibility requirements. Regional providers do not

vie for nationwide market share, and the Competition Bureau as well as ISED has

previously defined the relevant geographic market for regional providers to be the

province. For instance, as cited by ISED, the Competition Bureau measured the alleged

impact of “a strong regional competitor” at the provincial not national level. Similarly, in

assessing the merger of Bell and MTS, the Bureau opined, “The relevant geographic market

for assessing the Proposed Transaction was found to be no broader than the province of

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Manitoba.”88 The Bureau further added, “Mobile wireless carriers can, and do, set different

prices for mobile wireless plans in different Canadian provinces.” 89 Similarly, ISED

proposes an activity requirement at the Tier 2 level that consists of eight provinces and six

large regional areas in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. It is inconsistent to use a

nationwide metric for one eligibility requirement and a provincial metric for another. Both

eligibility requirements must be at the same geographic level. Given the regional providers’

footprints and the Bureau’s prior determination of the geographic market, both

requirements must be at the provincial level. Hence, ISED must revise the market definition

in its nationwide 10 percent market-share threshold requirement to a provincial 10 percent

market share threshold, that is, companies with 10 percent or more of provincial subscriber

market share.

95. I note that the recommended eligibility improvement also addresses subscriber share

variances among provinces. For instance, under the 10 percent nationwide subscribers rule,

SaskTel is eligible for set-aside spectrum despite not intending to deploy services outside

of Saskatchewan and a provincial subscriber share of 61.8 percent. 90 Yet, nationwide

providers that have a market share much smaller than that of SaskTel are not eligible to bid

on the set-aside spectrum covering Saskatchewan. This clearly cannot be correct.

C. If Set-Asides Are Used Despite the Economic Evidence, Eligible Bidders Must Not Be Permitted to Bid on Non-Set-Aside Spectrum

96. In addition to revising the eligibility requirement, ISED must minimize the market

distortionary effect of this measure. As discussed, set-asides distort the market because

88 Bell-MTS Merger Statement, p. 3. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. NERA Economic Consulting Page 57 of 87

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they (a) create artificial additional spectrum scarcity and (b) encourage “fake bidding”

where regional providers place bids on open (unrestricted) spectrum with no intention of

buying but with the objective of increasing the prices the non-eligible bidders have to pay.

There is an easy way to close this artificial bidding opportunity by bifurcating the spectrum

into spectrum reserved for set-aside eligible bidders and spectrum reserved for all other

bidders. However, this measure would infuse artificial scarcity for set-aside spectrum by

limiting the regional providers’ ability to bid beyond the set-aside spectrum. Nevertheless,

given that regional providers typically do not overlap in their service areas, this potential

drawback does not outweigh the benefits such bifurcation would generate.

D. A Shorter Resale Moratorium Benefits the Public Interest

97. Spectrum is a scarce resource that ISED must allocate to the maximum benefit of Canadian

consumers. A proposal that prohibits licensees to resell the spectrum in the secondary

market must carefully weigh the pros and cons of such policy decision. On the upside, a

resale moratorium lowers the incentive for a bidder to acquire spectrum for speculative

purposes only. However, there is likely no reasonable resale moratorium sufficiently long

to eliminate speculation. The AWS-1 auction had a five-year moratorium. Despite this, and

as I explain in Section VI above, it resulted in several instances where the licensee did not

deploy service but resold the spectrum at a significant resale margin after five years. Thus,

the policy seems largely ineffective.

98. However, the policy carries a significant downside for Canadian consumers that are

deprived from using the spectrum if the spectrum is not deployed in a timely and efficient

manner to provide wireless services. Considering the seemingly minimal benefits of a

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resale moratorium and balancing them against the significant harm indicates that Canadian

consumers are better off if the spectrum is resold promptly to a party that is willing to

deploy it in this fashion. Given the enormous value of the 3500 MHz spectrum to Canadian

consumers, a shorter resale prohibition period is generally superior to a longer period.

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APPENDIX A: CURRICULUM VITAE OF CHRISTIAN M. DIPPON, PH.D.

Christian M. Dippon, PhD

CHAIR, NERA’S GLOBAL ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, COMMUNICATIONS & INFRASTRUCTURE PRACTICE

Dr. Dippon is a Managing Director at NERA and a leading authority in complex litigation disputes and competition matters in the communications, Internet, and high-tech sectors. He is also the Chair of NERA’s Global Energy, Environment, Communications & Infrastructure (EECI) Practice, where he leads over 100 experts in the areas of energy, communications, media, Internet, environment, auctions, transport, and water. Global Arbitration Review (2019) ranks Dr. Dippon among the world’s leading commercial arbitration experts, saying, “Christian Dippon is regarded by clients as ‘a highly intelligent, articulate and sophisticated expert who possesses deep technical knowledge of the telecommunications industry.’”

Dr. Dippon advises his clients in economic damages assessments, class certifications and damages, false advertising, antitrust matters, and regulatory and competition issues. He has extensive testimonial and litigation experience, including depositions, jury and bench trials in state and federal courts, domestic (AAA) and international arbitrations (UNCITRAL, ICC, ICSID), and submissions before international courts. He assists clients with a broad range of litigation disputes related to wireline, wireless, cable, media, Internet, consumer electronics, and the high-tech sector. Dr. Dippon also routinely testifies before US and international regulatory authorities, including the Federal Communications Commission, the International Trade Commission, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, and the Competition Bureau Canada.

Dr. Dippon has authored and edited several books as well as book chapters in anthologies and has written numerous articles on telecommunications competition and strategies. He also frequently lectures in these areas at industry conferences, continuing education programs for lawyers, and at universities. National and international newspapers and magazines, including the Financial Times, Business Week, Forbes, the Chicago Tribune, and the Sydney Morning Herald, have cited his work.

Dr. Dippon serves on NERA’s Board of Directors, the Board of Directors of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS), and on the Editorial Board of Telecommunications Policy. He is a member of the Economic Club of Washington, DC, the American Economic Association (AEA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA).

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EDUCATION

Curtin University, Perth, Australia PhD in Economics, 2011

University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA MA in Economics, 1995

California State University, Hayward, CA, USA BS cum laude in Business Administration, 1993

Thesis “Consumer Preferences for Mobile Phone Service in the U.S.: An Application of Efficient Design on Conjoint Analysis,” Curtin University, 2011.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

NERA Economic Consulting

2017–present Chair, NERA’s Global Energy, Environment, Communications & Infrastructure (EECI) Practice 2017–present Member, Board of Directors, NERA Economic Consulting 2014–present Senior Vice President / Managing Director 2014–2017 Co-Chair, Communications, Media & Internet Practice 2015–2017 Head, NERA Washington, DC 2014–2015 Co-Head, NERA Washington, DC 2012–2014 Chair, Communications, Media & Internet Practice 2004–2014 Vice President 2000–2004 Senior Consultant 1998–2000 Consultant 1997–1998 Senior Analyst 1996–1997 Analyst

BMW Thailand

1993–1994 Business Analyst

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HONORS AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Member, International Bar Association (IBA) Member, The Economic Club, Washington, DC Editorial Board, Telecommunications Policy Board of Directors, International Telecommunications Society (ITS) Assistant Treasurer, International Telecommunications Society (ITS) Member, American Economic Association (AEA) Member, Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA) Associate, American Bar Association (ABA) Who’s Who Legal Arbitration 2019, Expert Witness

TESTIMONY IN REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS (2010–PRESENT)

ON BEHALF OF [CONFIDENTIAL SATELLITE INDUSTRY] In the Matter of an Arbitration und the Rules of Arbitration of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Case No. [Confidential], [Confidential], Claimant against [Confidential], Respondent against [Confidential], (Expert Report on Behalf of Claimant], January 9, 2019 (Economic Damages / Industry expertise).

ON BEHALF OF [CONFIDENTIAL CONSUMER ELECTRONICS] In the Matter of an Arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Case No. [Confidential], [Confidential], Claimant against [Confidential], Respondent against [Confidential], Counterclaim-Respondent, July 6, 2018 (Expert Report on Behalf of Respondent], November 16, 2018 [Second Expert Report on Behalf of Respondent], December 20 – 21, 2018 [Oral Testimony on Behalf of Respondent] (Economic Damages / Industry expertise).

ON BEHALF OF ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC. In the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, In re: Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Brilliant Telecommunications, Inc., Juniper Networks, Inc., et al., December 7, 2012, December 13, 2012, February 21 and 25, 2013. (Economic Damages / Industry expertise)

ON BEHALF OF AT&T ALABAMA

Before the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC 20554, BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T Alabama, Complainant v. Alabama Power Company, Defendant, Proceeding No. 19 - __, Bureau ID No. EB-19-MD-__, Affidavit of Christian M. Dippon, Ph.D. In Support of Pole Attachment Complaint. April 16, 2019. (Regulatory Rate Dispute / Industry Expertise)

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ON BEHALF OF BELL MOBILITY Before the Superior Court, Province of Quebec, District of Montreal, In the Matter of Gagnon vs. Bell Mobility, No: 500-06-000496-105, October 25, 2013, March 14, 2014 (updated version from October 25, 2013, and April 2–3, 2014. (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF CALINNOVATES Before the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC, In the Matter of Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices, MB Docket No. 16-42, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, CS Docket No. 97-80, April 22, 2016 (Public policy), October 11, 2016. (Economic damages)

Before the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC, In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket 14-28, “Economic Repercussions of Applying Title II to Internet Services,” White Paper, by Christian Dippon, PhD and Jonathan Falk, filed as attachment to the Reply Comments of CALinnovates, September 11, 2014. (Public policy)

ON BEHALF OF CELLCOM ISRAEL, LTD. Before the Israel Ministry of Communications, Expert Report of NERA Economic Consulting, “Reply to Frontier’s Responses, Estimating the Cost of Wholesale Access Service on Bezeq’s Network,” Christian Dippon with Marta Petrucci, Leen Dickx, and Howard Cobb (Finite State Systems), September 29, 2014. (Regulatory policy and cost modeling)

Before the Israel Ministry of Communications, Expert Report of NERA Economic Consulting, “Estimating the Cost of Wholesale Access Services on Bezeq’s Network, A Cost Modeling Review,” Christian Dippon with Nigel Attenborough, Marta Petrucci, Sally Tam, Anthony Schmitz, and Howard Cobb, March 10, 2014. (Regulatory policy and cost modeling)

ON BEHALF OF COMCAST CORPORATION Before the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, White Paper, “Public Interest Benefits of Repealing Utility-Style Title II Regulation and Reapplying Light- Touch Regulation to Broadband Internet Services, July 17 and August 28, 2017. (Competition analysis)

ON BEHALF OF THE COMMERCE COMMISSION NEW ZEALAND “Review of Covec’s ‘Economic Analysis of 700MHz Allocation,’” Christian Dippon with James Mellsop, Richard Marsden, and Kevin Counsell, February 14, 2014. (Regulatory policy and competition analysis)

ON BEHALF OF THE COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA The Commissioner of Competition, Applicant and Wireless Inc, and Inc., Respondents, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, June 13, 2012, July 25, 2012, August 15–16, 2012. (Economic damages / Industry expertise)

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ON BEHALF OF FPL GROUP INC. In reference to Adelphia Communications Corp., et al., Adelphia Recovery Trust, v. FPL Group Inc., United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, July 8, 2011, July 26, 2011, April 17, 2012, and May 2–3, 2012. (Competition analysis)

ON BEHALF OF MICROSOFT MOBILE OY AND NOKIA INC. Before the United States International Trade Commission, In the Matter of Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components, Investigation No. 337-TA-613, September 12, 2014, October 3, 2014, October 15, 2014, November 21, 2014, December 12, 2014, and January 28, 2015. (Competition analysis)

Before the United States International Trade Commission, In the Matter of Certain Wireless Devices including Mobile Phones and Tablets II, Investigation No. 337-TA-905, June 26, 2014. (Competition analysis)

ON BEHALF OF MONSTER, INC. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Chancery Division, Amy Joseph, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Benjamin Perez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Intervening Plaintiff vs. Monster, Inc., a Delaware Corporation and Best Buy Co, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 2015 CH 13991, September 9, 2016 and February 8, 2018. (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF NETLINK TRUST Before the Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore (IDA), “The Appropriate Cost Methodology for Price Regulation of Interconnection Wholesale Fiber Services,” Christian Dippon with Dr. Bruno Soria, December 15, 2015. (Regulatory policy)

ON BEHALF OF NOKIA CORPORATION AND NOKIA INC. Before the United States International Trade Commission, In the Matter of Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA- 868, August 23, 2013, September 5, 2013, September 20, 2013, October 8, 2013, November 19, 2013, December 6, 2013, January 6, 2014, and February 18, 2014. (Competition analysis)

Before the United States International Trade Commission, In the Matter of Certain Integrated Circuit Devices and Products Containing the Same, Investigation No. 337-TA-873, August 30, 2013, September 16, 2013, and March 6, 2014. (Competition analysis)

ON BEHALF OF NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS US LLC In the Matter of the Arbitration between MTPCS, LLC d/b/a Cellular One vs. Nokia Solutions and Networks US LLC d/b/a Nokia Networks, Before the American Arbitration Association, RE: 01-15-0003-5349, December 5–6, 2016 (Economic damages and competition analysis) and May 4, 2016. (Economic damages)

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Before the American Arbitration Association, Nokia Siemens Networks US LLC n/k/a Nokia Solutions Networks US, Plaintiff vs. Viaero Wireless a/k/a NE Colorado Cellular, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 50 494 T 00510 13, May 27, 2014 and June 2, 2014. (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF QATAR TELECOM (QTEL) In Connection with Vodafone Qatar Q.S.C v. Qatar Telecom (Qtel) Q.S.C, Pursuant to Dispute Resolution Agreement Dated 11 November 2010, January 20, 2011 and February 21, 2011. (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF SINGAPORE TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED AND SINGAPORE TELECOM MOBILE PTE. LTD. Before the District Court of Tangerang, “Economic Assessment and Examination of Alleged Anticompetitive Behavior in the Indonesian Mobile Market,” Expert Report by Christian Dippon, Nigel Attenborough, and William Taylor, April 21, 2010. (Economic damages)

Before the Central Jakarta District Court, “Economic Assessment and Examination of Alleged Anticompetitive Behavior in the Indonesian Mobile Market,” Expert Report by Christian Dippon, Nigel Attenborough, and William Taylor, Prepared for Singapore Telecommunications Limited and Singapore Telecom Mobile Pte. Ltd., January 15, 2010. (Economic damages and competition analysis)

ON BEHALF OF SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT AMERICA LLC Before the United States District Court Northern District of California San Francisco Division, In Re Sony PS3 “Other OS” Litigation, Case No. CV-10-1811 SC, April 4, 2017 and June 7, 2017. (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF SPRINT COMMUNICATION COMPANY L.P., SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P., AND NEXTEL OPERATIONS, INC. Before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Comcast Cable Communications, LLC; TVWorks, LLC, and Comcast Mo Group Inc. v. of Sprint Communication Company L.P., Sprint Spectrum L.P., and Nextel Operations, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:12-cv- 00859-JD, July 15, 2015. (Economic damages), March 18, 2016 (Economic damages), February 14, 2017 (Economic damages and incremental cost modeling)

ON BEHALF OF SPRINT SPECTRUM LP AND WIRELESS CO. LP, NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS INC., AND NEXTEL CALIFORNIA INC. Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, JCCP No. 4332, Case No. RG03114147, Ayyad, et al. v. Sprint Spectrum Limited Partnership, et. al., Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, September 13, 2011, April 26, 2013, May 29, 2013, July 16, 2013, July 30, 2013, April 1, 2016, and January 29, 2016. (Economic damages)

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ON BEHALF OF TELE FÁCIL MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. In the Matter of an Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade Agreement and The Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (1976) between Joshua Dean Nelson, in His Own Right and On Behalf of Tele Fácil Mexico, S.A., De C.V., and Jorge Luis Blanco (the Claimants) and The United Mexican States (the Respondent), ICSID Case No. UNCT/17/1, November 7, 2017, June 5, 2018, November 21, 2018, April 21, 2019 (hearings). (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC. Before the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, CRTC 2019-57, Review of Mobile Wireless Services, An Examination of the Regulatory Framework for Mobile Virtual Network Operators and Other Wholesale Mobile Services, Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon. Ph.D., On Behalf of TELUS Communications, Inc., May 15, 2019. (Competition policy / industry expertise)

Before the Competition Bureau Canada, Market Study Notice: Competition in Broadband Services, “Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, Ph.D. On Behalf of TELUS Communications Inc., August 31, 2018 and November 26, 2018. (Competition Policy / industry expertise)

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, SLPB-004-18, June 2018, Spectrum Management and Telecommunications, “Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, PhD On Behalf of TELUS Communications Inc.,” Consultation on Revisions to the 3500 MHz Band to Accommodate Flexible Use and Preliminary Consultation on Changes to the 3800 MHz Band, August 10, 2018. (Competition Policy / industry expertise)

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, SLPB-005-17, August 2017, Spectrum Management and Telecommunications, “Expert Report of Christian M. Dippon, PhD On Behalf of TELUS Communications Inc.,” Consultation on a Technical, Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 600 MHz Band, October 2, 2017 and November 3, 2017. (Competition Policy / industry expertise)

Before the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, CRTC 2017-259, Reconsideration of Telecom Decision 2017-56 regarding final terms and conditions for wholesale mobile wireless roaming services, September 8, 2017 and December 1, 2017. (Competition Policy / industry expertise)

Zedi Canada Inc. vs. TELUS Communications Company, Expert Report, May 27, 2016; Oral Testimony, June 23, 2016. (Economic damages / industry expertise)

Before the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Regulatory framework for wholesale mobile wireless services, CRTC 2015-177, November 23, 2015 (Regulatory policy), May 31, 2016 (Competition analysis and cost modeling), April 4, 2017. (Regulatory cost modeling)

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Before the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, CRTC 2014-76, Review of Wholesale Mobile Services, August 20, 2014 (Competition analysis and regulatory policy) and September 30, 2014. (Regulatory policy)

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia between Michelle Seidel, Plaintiff, and TELUS Communications Inc., Defendant, Proceeding under the Class Proceeding Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.50, No. L050143, Vancouver Registry, March 3, 2014 and July 4, 2014. (Economic damages)

Before the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, In the Matter of Wholesale Mobile Wireless Roaming in Canada, CRTC 2013-685, January 29, 2014. (Regulatory policy)

ON BEHALF OF U MOBILE SDN BHD “The Refarming of the 900 MHz Spectrum in Malaysia, Expert Report,” September 25, 2010. (Economic damages)

ON BEHALF OF 425331 CANADA INC. AND NEXTWAVE HOLDCO LLC Inukshuk Wireless Partnership, Plaintiff vs. 425331 Canada Inc. and Nextwave HoldCo, LLC, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File CV-13-10031-00CL, April 5, 2013. (Economic damages)

WHITE PAPERS AND CONSULTING REPORTS (2010–PRESENT)

ON BEHALF OF [MERGING PARTY]

Economic Supplement, A Critical Review of Rewheel’s Digital Fuel Monitor Reports, March 26, 2019.

ON BEHALF OF TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Oversimplified and Misleading Price Comparisons Must Not Guide Policy and Regulatory Decisions, A Critical Review of Rewheel’s Digital Fuel Monitor Reports, March 13, 2019.

ON BEHALF OF TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

An Accurate Price Comparison of Communications Services in Canada and Select Foreign Jurisdictions, October 19, 2018.

ON BEHALF OF [MERGING PARTY]

An Examination of the European Experience with Mergers in the Wireless Sector, Economic Lessons for the Evaluation of [Confidential], Christian M. Dippon, September 17, 2018.

ON BEHALF OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER AND COMPETITION COMMISSION

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“NBN Co’s Proposed Price Structure: An Economic Evaluation,” with Katherine Lowe, Howard Cobb, and Sally Tam, August 31, 2012.

ON BEHALF OF BROADBAND AUSTRALIA LIMITED

“An Economic Analysis of the Value of Australian Spectrum,” August 5, 2010.

ON BEHALF OF CALINNOVATES

“This Old Act: Economic Repercussions of Relying on the Telecommunications Act of 1996, January 30, 2017.

ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNET ASSOCIATION

“Economic Value of Internet Intermediaries and the Role of Liability Protections,” June 5, 2017

ON BEHALF OF THE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MINISTRY OF FINANCE “An Examination of Charges for Mobile Network Elements in Israel,” with Nigel Attenborough, Thomas Reynolds, and Sumit Sharma, May 3, 2010; “Mobile Network Cost Elements Model, A Technical Report,” with Nigel Attenborough, Thomas Reynolds, and Sumit Sharma, May 4, 2010.

ON BEHALF OF NETVISION LTD

“Creating Effective Wholesale Access Markets in Israel, Economic Assessment and Policy Recommendation,” April 6, 2011.

ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY

“Pricing Consultancy and Regulatory Support, Final Recommendations,” August 4, 2012.

ON BEHALF OF TURK TELECOM

“Wholesale Access to Fiber Ducts and Dark Fiber – A Benchmark Study,” June 28, 2013.

ON BEHALF OF U MOBILE SDN BHD

“U Mobile Sdn BhD, Application for Spectrum Assignment (2600 MHz Spectrum),” November 19, 2010.

ON BEHALF OF WHITWORTH ANALYTICS

“FirstNet: An Economic Analysis of Opting-In vs. Opting-Out,” March 2017.

ON BEHALF OF WIRELESS BROADBAND AUSTRALIA LIMITED

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“An Economic Analysis of the Value of Australian Spectrum, August 5, 2010.

BOOK PUBLICATIONS

“Measuring Economic Damages with Maximum Certainty,” with Julie Carey and Will Taylor, Chapter forthcoming in The Guide to Damages in International Arbitrations, Fourth Edition, Global Arbitration Review, 2019.

“Stated Consumer Behavior with D-Efficient Choice Set Designs: The Case of Mobile Service Bundles,” with Gary Madden, Chapter in forthcoming book Essays in Honor of Gary Madden, publication pending 2019.

K&L Gates – NERA 2008 Global Telecom Review, A Legal and Economic Examination of Current Industry Issues, Christian Dippon and Martin Stern (Eds.), April 23, 2008.

“Regulation under Fixed Mobile Convergence, Examining Recent Developments in Hong Kong,” by Keith Lee, Wendy Lo, Christine Yam, and Christian Dippon, Chapter 4 in K&L Gates – NERA 2008 Global Telecom Review, A Legal and Economic Examination of Current Industry Issues, April 23, 2008, pages 21–26.

“Size Matters, Relevant Market Definition and Competition Review in a World with Intermodal Competition,” by Christian Dippon, Chapter 3 in K&L Gates – NERA 2008 Global Telecom Review, A Legal and Economic Examination of Current Industry Issues, April 23, 2008, pages 15–20.

“Mobile Virtual Network Operators: Blessing or Curse? An Economic Evaluation of the MVNO Value Proposition,” by Christian Dippon and Aniruddha Banerjee, National Economic Research Associates, Inc., ISBN 0-9748788-2-0, 2006.

“The Implications of Convergence in Telecommunications,” by Christian Dippon and Timothy Tardiff, published in The Preston Gates Guide to Telecommunications in Asia, 2006 Edition, Asia Law & Practice, 2006, ISBN 962-936-155-8, pages 31–40.

“When East Meets West –Converging Trends in the Economics of Intellectual Property Damages Calculation,” by Christian Dippon and Noriko Kakihara, Chapter 19 in Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property Policy, Litigation, and Management, edited by Dr. Gregory Leonard and Dr. Lauren J. Stiroh, National Economic Research Associates, Inc., 2005, ISBN 0-9748788-1-2, pages 277–291.

“Marketing Research,” Chapter 4 in Internet Marketing: Building Advantage in a Networked Economy, an MBA coursework textbook by Rafi Mohammed, Robert J. Fisher, Bernard Jaworski, Aileen M. Cahill, published by McGraw-Hill Higher Education, ISBN 0-07-251022-6, pages 127–167.

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PAPER AND ARTICLE PUBLICATIONS (2010–PRESENT)

“Do Economic, Institutional, or Political Variables Explain Regulated Wholesale Unbundled Local Loop Rate Setting,” with Dr. Gary Madden and Dr. Hiroaki Suenaga, Applied Economics, Volume 48, 2016 – Issue 39.

“FCC Open Internet Order Creates Uncertainty and Risk,” with Marty Stern and Sam Castic (K&L Gates), published in Corporate Counsel, July 27, 2015.

“Is It Worth the Effort? Measuring the Benefits of D-Efficient Survey Design to Qualitative Choice Analysis,” November 1, 2014.

“Consumer Demand for Mobile Phone Service in the US: An Examination beyond the Mobile Phone,” November 1, 2014.

“Is Faster Necessarily Better? Third Generation (3G) Take-up Rates and the Implications for Next Generation Services,” published in International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences, Vol.5 No.8, 2012, September 2012.

“Replacement of the Legacy High-Cost Universal Support Fund with a Connect America Fund, Key Economic and Legal Considerations,” with Christopher Huther and Megan Troy, Communications & Strategies 80, 4Q2010, pages 67–81.

“Is Faster Necessarily Better? Third Generation (3G) Take-up Rates and the Implications for Next Generation Services,” June 28, 2010, presented at the International Telecommunications Society (ITS) 18th Biennial and Silver Anniversary Conference, Tokyo, Japan, June 30, 2010.

“Wholesale unbundling and intermodal competition,” with Dr. Harold Ware, published in Telecommunications Policy, Volume 34, Numbers 1-2, February-March 2010.

SELECTED NEWS CITATIONS (2010–PRESENT)

Denis Carmel, “Wireless market comparisons: New study slams ISED report; which is right?” CARTT, December 21, 2018.

Giuseppe Marci, “Economists Predict Net Neutrality Cost 700K Jobs and $35 Billion Annually,” Inside Sources, July 20, 2017.

Giuseppe Marci, “Former FCC Economist Says Unlocking the Set-Top Box Will Hurt the TV Market,” Inside Sources, April 23, 2016.

CALInnovates, PRNewswire, “FCC Set-Top Box Proposal Based Upon Faulty Economic Foundation, Will Harm Consumers, Innovators And Golden Age of Television, Warns CALInnovates,” April 22, 2016.

NERA Economic Consulting Page 70 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Sophia Harris, “Telus speed claim not based on real-world experience,” CBC News, October 15, 2014.

Gus Sentementes, “Data-thirsty smartphones lead wireless companies to prep 4G networks,” The Baltimore Sun, October 18, 2010.

SELECTED SPEECHES AND PRESENTATIONS

“How to Effectively Prove and Recover Lost Profit Damages: Practical Guide in 2019,” with Julie Carey, The Knowledge Group, Webcast, May 2, 2019.

“Properly Comparing International Prices of Telecommunication Services, Statistical Method and Policy Implications for the Canadian Case Study,” Presented at the 22nd Biennial Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, June 25, 2018.

“Can Femtocells Resolve the Spectrum Crunch?” Presented at the International Telecommunications Society 6th Africa-Asia-Australasia Regional Conference, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, Bentley, Western Australia, August 7, 2013.

“Modern Approaches to Spectrum Valuation,” Presented at the International Telecommunications Society 6th Africa-Asia-Australasia Regional Conference, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, Bentley, Western Australia, August 5, 2013.

“Consumer Demand for Mobile Phone Service in the US: An Examination Beyond the Mobile Phone,” Presented at the International Telecommunications Society (ITS) 19th Biennial Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, November 20, 2012.

“The Link Between Spectrum Availability and Mobile Market Consolidation,” Session Chair, Second Annual Spectrum Management Conference, Washington DC, October 23, 2012.

“Broadband, Productivity, and Product Innovation - A Look behind the Scenes in the United States,” invited Keynote Address, 5th Africa-Asia-Australasia Regional Conference, International Telecommunications Society Perth, Western Australia, November 15, 2011.

“Build It and They Will Come, Consumer Willingness to Pay for Mobile Broadband Services,” 5th Africa-Asia-Australasia Regional Conference, International Telecommunications Society Perth, Western Australia, November 14, 2011.

“Consumer Preferences for Mobile Phone Service in the US – An Application of Efficient Design to Conjoint Analysis,” Guest Lecture, University of California, Santa Barbara, March 1, 2011.

June 5, 2019

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

APPENDIX B: DIPPON WALL/NORDICITY CRITICISM

“An Accurate Price Comparison of Communications Services in Canada and Select Foreign Jurisdictions” [Submitted as attachment]

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL PRICE DIFFERENCE TABLES

TELUS Prepaid and Post-Paid Plans in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $145.00 2 $72.50 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $200.00 3 $66.67 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $255.00 4 $63.75 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $310.00 5 $62.00 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $155.00 2 $77.50 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $210.00 3 $70.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $265.00 4 $66.25 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $320.00 5 $64.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $165.00 2 $82.50 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $220.00 3 $73.33 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $275.00 4 $68.75 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $330.00 5 $66.00 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $180.00 2 $90.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $235.00 3 $78.33 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $290.00 4 $72.50 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $345.00 5 $69.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $205.00 2 $102.50 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $260.00 3 $86.67 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $315.00 4 $78.75 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $370.00 5 $74.00 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $235.00 2 $117.50 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $290.00 3 $96.67 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $345.00 4 $86.25 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $400.00 5 $80.00 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $335.00 2 $167.50 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $390.00 3 $130.00 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $445.00 4 $111.25 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $500.00 5 $100.00 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $465.00 2 $232.50 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $520.00 3 $173.33 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $575.00 4 $143.75 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $630.00 5 $126.00 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $90.00 1 $90.00 $0.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $100.00 1 $100.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $110.00 1 $110.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $150.00 1 $150.00 $0.00 15 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $180.00 1 $180.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $280.00 1 $280.00 $0.00 40 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $410.00 1 $410.00 $0.00 80 Unlimited Unlimited BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $8.33 1 $8.33 $0.00 0 0 33.3 33.3 BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 15 Unlimited BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0.25 0 100 Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 1 500 Unlimited

BC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 4 500 Unlimited

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $145.00 2 $72.50 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $200.00 3 $66.67 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $255.00 4 $63.75 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $310.00 5 $62.00 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $155.00 2 $77.50 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $210.00 3 $70.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $265.00 4 $66.25 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $320.00 5 $64.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $165.00 2 $82.50 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $220.00 3 $73.33 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $275.00 4 $68.75 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $330.00 5 $66.00 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $180.00 2 $90.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $235.00 3 $78.33 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $290.00 4 $72.50 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $345.00 5 $69.00 $0.00 13 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $205.00 2 $102.50 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $260.00 3 $86.67 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $315.00 4 $78.75 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $370.00 5 $74.00 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $235.00 2 $117.50 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $290.00 3 $96.67 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $345.00 4 $86.25 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $400.00 5 $80.00 $0.00 23 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $335.00 2 $167.50 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $390.00 3 $130.00 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $445.00 4 $111.25 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $500.00 5 $100.00 $0.00 43 Unlimited Unlimited

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $465.00 2 $232.50 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $520.00 3 $173.33 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $575.00 4 $143.75 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $630.00 5 $126.00 $0.00 83 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $90.00 1 $90.00 $0.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $100.00 1 $100.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $110.00 1 $110.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $150.00 1 $150.00 $0.00 15 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $180.00 1 $180.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $280.00 1 $280.00 $0.00 40 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $410.00 1 $410.00 $0.00 80 Unlimited Unlimited ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $8.33 1 $8.33 $0.00 0 0 33.3 33.3 ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 15 Unlimited ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0.25 0 100 Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 1 500 Unlimited

ON TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 4 500 Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $85.00 2 $42.50 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $120.00 3 $40.00 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $155.00 4 $38.75 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $190.00 5 $38.00 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 76 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $94.00 2 $47.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $129.00 3 $43.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $164.00 4 $41.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $199.00 5 $39.80 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $99.00 2 $49.50 $0.00 11 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $134.00 3 $44.67 $0.00 11 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $169.00 4 $42.25 $0.00 11 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $204.00 5 $40.80 $0.00 11 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $104.00 2 $52.00 $0.00 12 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $139.00 3 $46.33 $0.00 12 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $174.00 4 $43.50 $0.00 12 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $209.00 5 $41.80 $0.00 12 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $110.00 2 $55.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $145.00 3 $48.33 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $180.00 4 $45.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $215.00 5 $43.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $130.00 2 $65.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $165.00 3 $55.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $200.00 4 $50.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $235.00 5 $47.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $165.00 2 $82.50 $0.00 26 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $200.00 3 $66.67 $0.00 26 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $235.00 4 $58.75 $0.00 26 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $270.00 5 $54.00 $0.00 26 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $195.00 2 $97.50 $0.00 34 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $230.00 3 $76.67 $0.00 34 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $265.00 4 $66.25 $0.00 34 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $300.00 5 $60.00 $0.00 34 Unlimited Unlimited

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $0.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $59.00 1 $59.00 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $64.00 1 $64.00 $0.00 9 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $69.00 1 $69.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 12 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 18 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $130.00 1 $130.00 $0.00 24 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $160.00 1 $160.00 $0.00 32 Unlimited Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $8.33 1 $8.33 $0.00 0 0 33.3 33.3 QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 15 Unlimited QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0.25 0 100 Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 1 500 Unlimited

QC TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 4 500 Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $90.00 2 $45.00 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 3 $41.67 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $160.00 4 $40.00 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $195.00 5 $39.00 $0.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $100.00 2 $50.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $135.00 3 $45.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $170.00 4 $42.50 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $205.00 5 $41.00 $0.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $110.00 2 $55.00 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $145.00 3 $48.33 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $180.00 4 $45.00 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $215.00 5 $43.00 $0.00 17 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $120.00 2 $60.00 $0.00 22 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $155.00 3 $51.67 $0.00 22 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $190.00 4 $47.50 $0.00 22 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $225.00 5 $45.00 $0.00 22 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $135.00 2 $67.50 $0.00 27 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $170.00 3 $56.67 $0.00 27 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $205.00 4 $51.25 $0.00 27 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $240.00 5 $48.00 $0.00 27 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $150.00 2 $75.00 $0.00 37 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $185.00 3 $61.67 $0.00 37 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $220.00 4 $55.00 $0.00 37 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $255.00 5 $51.00 $0.00 37 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 12 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 15 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $85.00 1 $85.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $85.00 1 $85.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $100.00 1 $100.00 $0.00 25 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $115.00 1 $115.00 $0.00 35 Unlimited Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Postpaid 1 $115.00 1 $115.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 79 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Term One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Cost per Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $8.33 1 $8.33 $0.00 0 0 33.3 33.3 SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 12 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 15 Unlimited SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0.25 0 100 Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 1 500 Unlimited

SK TELUS MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 4 500 Unlimited

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Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Bell Prepaid and Post-Paid Plans in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan

Plan Plan Term Cost per One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS BC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $90.00 1 $90.00 $35.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $100.00 1 $100.00 $35.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $110.00 1 $110.00 $35.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $135.00 1 $135.00 $35.00 15 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $165.00 1 $165.00 $35.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $5.00 1 $5.00 $10.00 0 0 10 0

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $10.00 0.1 0 Unlimited BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $10.00 0.1 0 100 Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $10.00 0.1 500 Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $10.00 0.5 Unlimited Unlimited BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $10.00 0.35 0 250 Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $10.00 1 500 Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $10.00 1.5 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $90.00 1 $90.00 $35.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $100.00 1 $100.00 $35.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $110.00 1 $110.00 $35.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $135.00 1 $135.00 $35.00 15 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $165.00 1 $165.00 $35.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $5.00 1 $5.00 $10.00 0 0 10 0

ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $10.00 0.1 0 Unlimited ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $10.00 0.1 0 100 Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $10.00 0.1 500 Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $10.00 0.5 Unlimited Unlimited ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $10.00 0.35 0 250 Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 81 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Plan Term Cost per One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $10.00 1 500 Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $10.00 1.5 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $50.00 1 $50.00 $35.00 6 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $59.00 1 $59.00 $35.00 8 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $64.00 1 $64.00 $35.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $75.00 1 $75.00 $35.00 14 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $85.00 1 $85.00 $35.00 16 Unlimited Unlimited QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $5.00 1 $5.00 $10.00 0 0 10 0

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $10.00 0.1 0 Unlimited QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $10.00 0.1 0 100 Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $10.00 0.1 500 Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $10.00 0.5 Unlimited Unlimited QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $10.00 0.35 0 250 Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $10.00 1 500 Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $10.00 1.5 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $50.00 1 $50.00 $35.00 5 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $60.00 1 $60.00 $35.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Postpaid 24 $75.00 1 $75.00 $35.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $5.00 1 $5.00 $10.00 0 0 10 0

SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $10.00 0.1 0 Unlimited SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $10.00 0.1 0 100 Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $10.00 0.1 500 Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $10.00 0.5 Unlimited Unlimited SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $10.00 0.35 0 250 Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 82 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Plan Plan Term Cost per One-Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $10.00 1 500 Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $10.00 1.5 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Bell MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $10.00 2.5 Unlimited Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 83 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

Rogers Prepaid and Post-Paid Plans in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan

One- Plan Term Cost per Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0.1 50 100 Basic BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 150 50 Basic BC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $0.00 0.25 0 50 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $0.00 0.5 0 100 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 1 0 150 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 150 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 0 500 Unlimited BC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited

BC Rogers MNO 1 $70.00 1 $70.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited Prepaid ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic

NERA Economic Consulting Page 84 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

One- Plan Term Cost per Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0.1 50 100 Basic ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 150 50 Basic ON Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $0.00 0.25 0 50 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $0.00 0.5 0 100 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 1 0 150 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 150 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 0 500 Unlimited ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited

ON Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $70.00 1 $70.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $75.00 1 $75.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $95.00 1 $95.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $125.00 1 $125.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $29.00 1 $29.00 $0.00 0 300 Unlimited Basic QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $0.00 0 100 Unlimited Basic QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 200 Unlimited Basic QC Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $0.00 0.25 0 50 Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 85 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

One- Plan Term Cost per Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $0.00 0.5 0 100 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 1 0 150 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 150 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 0 500 Unlimited QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited

QC Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $70.00 1 $70.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 10 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $85.00 1 $85.00 $0.00 20 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $115.00 1 $115.00 $0.00 50 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $40.00 1 $40.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0.1 50 100 Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0.2 1000 Unlimited Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 150 50 Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 200 Unlimited Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $29.00 1 $29.00 $0.00 0 300 Unlimited Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $0.00 0 500 Unlimited Basic SK Rogers MNO Postpaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited Basic SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $30.00 1 $30.00 $0.00 0.25 0 50 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $50.00 1 $50.00 $0.00 0.5 0 100 Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 86 of 87

Before Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 3500 MHz Band

One- Plan Term Cost per Time Data Nationwide Provincial Province Provider Type Plan Type (months) MRC Lines Line Fees (GB) Minutes Minutes SMS SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $65.00 1 $65.00 $0.00 1 0 150 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $10.00 1 $10.00 $0.00 0 0 50 50

SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $15.00 1 $15.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $25.00 1 $25.00 $0.00 0 0 50 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $35.00 1 $35.00 $0.00 0 0 150 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $45.00 1 $45.00 $0.00 0 0 500 Unlimited SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $55.00 1 $55.00 $0.00 0 0 Unlimited Unlimited

SK Rogers MNO Prepaid 1 $70.00 1 $70.00 $0.00 0 Unlimited Unlimited

NERA Economic Consulting Page 87 of 87