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University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 A Xerox Education Company LIBERTELLA, Anthony Frank, 1945- THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1959: LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS.

The Ohio S ta te U n iv e rsity , P h.D ., 1972 History, modern,

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan [ i

© 1973

' Anthony Frank Libertella

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1959:

LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

BY

Anthony Frank L ibertella, B.A., M. A.

The Ohio State University 1972

Approved by

J\x thdZlJt'jL Adviser Department of History PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my adviser, Professor Austin Kerr, far his

patience, guidance, and generous help throughout the project. Special

thanks goes to Professor Paul N. Lehoczky who, at vital stages, discussed

the project with me at length and raised many significant questions.

I want to thank Professor Warren Van Tine, who examined the manuscript

diligently, and suggested valuable improvements. Hy thanks to Professor

Bradley Chapin for his critical observations of the manuscript. My

debt to a colleague and friend, John Waksmundski, arises from the fact

that he has been, from beginning to end, a constant source of encour­

agement and assistance. I owe a great deal, finally, to my wife, with­

out whose unfailing encouragement and help this study would probably

not have been written.

Far financial assistance, I should like to thank the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University. Oh is institution awarded me a

Dissertation Fellowship so that I could devote full time to this study.

My thanks also goes to William Vollmer, University Archivist at

Ohio State University} for the use of the Paul N. Lehoczky collection, without which this dissertation would not have been complete.

ii I

PREFACE

Many observers have viewed the collective bargaining process in

America after 1950 as a ritual. This ceremony, as they saw it, took

the farm of propaganda displaying itself as facts —a m ilitant show

adopted to persuade the public that a struggle was taking place. Ac­

tually, however, once this m ilitant parade drifted by, labor and manage­

ment negotiators sat down and in a cooperative and friendly spirit settled

the real issues at hand. As Albert A. Blum has described in his essay

entitled, "Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality," "A large share

of collective bargaining is not conflict but a process by which the

main terms of the agreement, already understood by the negotiators,

are made acceptable nob to those in charge of the bargaining, but to x those who w ill have to live with the results. "

Even when collective bargaining broke down and strikes ensued,

the story remained much the same. Such strikes were considered nothing

but a continuation of the collective bargaining ritual. The biting rhetoric and violent action of the past was replaced by a ceremony in which each party knew the other's needs and merely anticipated an

1. Albert A. Blum, "Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality?", Harvard Business Review, 59 (November-December, 1961), pp. 6k-65.

iii appropriate signal to stop speaking and politely and quickly settle their differences. Evidence of this trend was revealed in the fact that during the m id-fifties strikes occurred less frequently and were less prolonged. Mark Starr, the retired Director of the Garment Workers

Union, alluded to this trend when, in 1959> he called attention to the a lessening in strike time itself and the drop in strike activity. His observation seemed valid, for strike activity declined very sharply from the pre-Korean War period (an average of four thousand three hundred and twenty-eight strikes per year) to the post-Korean War era (three thousand six hundred and nineteen per year).

These revelations leave little doubt that the m id-fifties was a period of relative calm in labor -management relations. However, one strike stands out as an obvious exception to the ritualistic collective bargaining activities dominating the post-Korean War era. The 1959 steel strike, a long and bitter affair, witnessed a return of the angry and intransigent attitudes, which governed employer -employee relations during an earlier era. ’

This study focuses on the 1959 steel strike, a short, but crucial period in the history of labor -management relations. Mare specifically,

2. Ibid., p. 66.

3- David E. Cullen, National Emergency Strikes (Cornell University: New York State School of industrial Relations and Labor Relations, 1968), pp. 28-30, 3 2 ; see also, Arthur M. Ross, "The Prospects far Industrial Conflict," Industrial Relations, ( 1961-1962), pp. 57- 67.

iv it attempts to analyze the human, political relationships, motives

and actions of management, the steel union, the steelworkers, the

government, and the public during that prolonged work stoppage. Xt

further seeks to explain why, at the close of the decade there had been

such a determined effort hy both management and labor to resist each

otherTs demands. Finally, this study provides valuable Insight into the actual operations and the behind-the-scenes working of the collec­ tive bargaining process and, more importantly, the elements that some­ tim es cause i t to break down.

Throughout the post World War XI period, steel-labor relations ran in a ceremonial pattern. The story usually followed along these lines. Around the middle of May, the President of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) met steel representatives in a hotel room. There both groups eventually signed an agreement, but usually not before a short inconsequential strike occurred. The result of this ritualistic activity was a wage hike followed by a price hike.

By 1959 j this pattern ceased. With a new breed of top management men and changed economic, political, and social conditions, the steel industry decided to put an end to the ritualistic bargaining of pre- ceeding years. Management’s altered attitude toward collective bargain­ ing was not to be left unchallenged. The steel union, in turn, fought back in an attempt to hold a firm position an its collective bargaining rights. Subsequently, the parties broke from their friendly, accommo­ dating, and ceremonial bargaining to a determined, hostile, and un­ yielding position. Thus, a struggle erupted causing the longest (one

v hundred and sixteen days) and one of the most noteworthy of post-World

War II steel strikes.

This study is divided into six chapters. She first chapter examines the changing economic conditions during the m id-fifties and demonstrates how these alterations affected the outlook of management and labor towards the 1959 steel contract negotiations. The second chapter analyzes management1 s new attitude toward labor relations concomitant with the changing political, social, and legislative conditions during the latter part of the 1950'8• It reveals how these conditions increased the ten­ sions in steel management-labor relations prior to and throughout the duration of the strike.

This contest between steel and the USWA engendered considerable interest on the part of the public. Consequently, the third chapter discusses the campaign undertaken by both factions to mold public opinion and the extent to which each group's campaign was responsible for the state of opinion which prevailed during the early bargaining and strike period. Die fourth and fifth chapters examine in detail the collapse of the collective bargaining process prior to and during the strike.

The farmer chapter describes the strike as an insurmountable deadlock in which two powerful interest groups refuse to compromise on wages and contract changes. The latter chapter investigates the strike in its waning stages. It examines, moreover, the multiple and cumulative eco­ nomic and noneconomic forces that bore heavily upon both steel manufac­ turers and the steel union leaders. It demonstrates how these pressures finally compelled both sides to end their deadlock and reach a mutual agreement. The final chapter attempts to evaluate the new agreement

v i against the original goals set by the parties at the inception of the steel stoppage. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to place the strike in its historical perspective and determine what, if any, long-range sig­ nificance it had on future socio-economic and political happenings.

Naturally, in writing of an episode so recent and controversial,

I have been especially concerned about the danger of factual inaccuracy.

Beyond the usual scholarly checks, I attempted to avoid error through a direct appeal to one cxF the participants in the story. Whenever it seemed necessary or sensible, I journeyed to the office of Hr. Paul N.

Lehoczky, farmer member of the Board of Inquiry in the 1959 steel strike, and had long, critical discussions of the events as they hap­ pened. It was my good fortune to have available on campus Dr. Lehoczky for consultation, as well as his personal library which contained vast information on the 1959 steel strike.

Moreover, a large portion of this study was based on unpublished manuscripts and archival collections. Although very little research on the Eisenhower Administration 1 s domestic policy exists, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to examine manuscript collections of the

Eisenhower Administration, at the Presidential Library in Abileen, Kansas, last summer. The White House Central Files Records of the President, enabled me to reach a better understanding of the governments attitude on domestic policy and mare especially, the feelings it had toward the

3959 steel strike. The papers of James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, contained a large amount of material on the strike, particularly relating to such matters as government domestic policy and philosophy, steel

vii management and steel union activities and public opinion. The personal

papers and records of other top advisors to Eisenhower, including

John S. Bragdan, David Kendall, Frederick Mueller, W. Allen Wallis con­

tained a considerable amount of information an the White House activity

during the strike period.

Records of the EMCS in the National Archives (EG 280) enclosed

critical materials on the actual operation of collective bargaining

in the steel dispute. These materials gave me greater insight into the

practical and ideological aspects involved in the steel-labor relations.

The records of the Secretary of Labor in the National Archives (EG 17^)

had only scattered information on the strike. On public relations

activity before and during the strike, the papers of John W. H ill, lo­

cated in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin in Madison, describe

very thoroughly the tremendous effort on the part of management to win

public support, especially the steelworkers. These papers, moreover,

contain various letters that help to explain industry's purpose far V*- creating such a campaign. The remainder of the study deals with original

sources. These involved congressional hearings, trade and labor publi­

cations, proceedings of conventions and other meetings. The use of con­

temporary newspapers, journals, and periodicals appeared only when

original source material was unavailable.

Although I was generally pleased with most of the findings, certain p a r ts o f my research did prove disappointing. The sections of my stu d y

dealing with rank and file attitudes had relied heavily on private and

viii public surveys a due to a lack of workers1 manuscript material. The

Pennsylvania State University Library, which compiled an oral history of the USWA, could not release its findings due to a twenty-five year

'hold" regulation. Another disappointment came in not being allowed to examine the personal papers of President Eisenhower, because they also had a similar restriction placed upon them. Despite these shortcomings and same minor research difficulties, most of my source material was sufficient enough to enable me to examine thoroughly the topic at hand.

ix VITA

F ebruary 2 5 , 1 9 ^ 5 ...... Bom - Bronx, New York

1968 ...... B.A., Iona College, New Rochelle, New York

1968-1969 ...... U n iv ersity F ellow ship, The Graduate School, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969 ...... M.A., lhe Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969-1971 ...... Teaching Assistant and Associate, Department o f H isto ry , The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 2 ...... Dissertation Year Fellowship, ihe Graduate School, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

American Political, Social, Economic History, 1877- Bresent • Professor Austin Kerr

American Colonial and Revoluntionary • Professor Paul Bowers

Roman History * Professor Cyrus St. Clair

Greek History • Professor Cyrus St. Clair

x TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ii

IHEFACE ...... iii

VITA ...... x

LIST OF TABLES...... x i i

Chapter

I . STEEL: A "SICK INDUSTRY" ...... 1

I I . MEN OF S T E E L ...... 39

I I I . COURTING THE PUBLIC...... 78

IV. THE INSURMOUNTABLE DEADLOCK ...... 106

V. THE DEADLOCK 33 BROKEN...... 169

VI. CONCLUSION...... 232

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 257

xi LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Steel Employment Costs and Shipments Per Man-Hour Worked ...... 12

2. Employee Compensation and Corporate Profit as a Proportion of National Income ...... l4

Average Return on Net Assets, Steel industry Related to Leading Manufacturing Industries ...... 15

A. Steel Industry’s Rate of Return on Sales ...... 16

5* Profits as Percent of Sales and Stockholders’ Equity Steel Industry and All Manufacturing...... 17

6. Uhited States Foreign Trade in Iron and Steel Products .... 2b

7. Occupational Distribution of Wage and Salary Workers in the Basic Steel Industry, Mid -1956 and Autumn 1958 ...... 37

xii CHAPTER I

STEEL A "SICK INDUSTRY”

As the decade of the fifties closed, steel executives viewed their industry as "being in ill health. Utilization of plant capacity steadily declined between 1955 and 1958> while in the same short time the employ­ ment cost per ton of steel rose. The impact of competition from overseas and from domestic products, reduced American steel production. Steel companies, moreover, concerned themselves over the problem of obsoles­ cence. The nations ravaged by World War II quickly recovered creating steel industries that gave many competing American mills a backward look. Compounding the problem, from the viewpoint of American indus­ trialists, was that a serious profit loss had emerged. Thus, the indus­ try felt that the solution to their problems lay in technological im­ provements supported by lower employment costs, better depreciation laws, and lower taxes.

For the steel union, however, the manufacturer's remedy proved un­ convincing. Labor leaders pointed out that the industry's reduction in profits came while it was only functioning at about two-thirds capacity.

The USWA also disputed that higher wages and fringe benefits made it possible for foreign mills to undersell domestic producers. The steel union claimed that increased wages brought about additional consumer buying power which was necessary to further stimulate the econony and

1 create demands which would put idle workers hack to work. The year 1959*

when the steel contract ended, consequently became, in the words of

Professor Grant McConnell, the ‘‘yeex of truth in the steel industry. ”

II

In 1959* the upcoming steel wage-price bargain was in the center of

the economic stage. This was rational for steel was the basic raw

material of America's industrial economy. Its direct association with

various products, from paper clips to automobiles, affected millions of

workers and consumers. Alterations in the price of steel, many experts believed, were the principle force influencing economic behavior.

Several of President Eisenhower's most astute advisors felt that spiral-

ing steel prices, combined with a similar trend in autos were responsible

for the current inflation and recession. In addition, the chief econo­

mist at the Federal Reserve Board, as well as members of both parties on

Capitol H ill held a similar view.

1. Iron Age, April 30, 1959; Pp. 71-72; For the various interpretations by economists, cabinet members, and congressional leaders on steel price increases and its effects on the economy, see U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Aflmlnistered Prices; Hearings, Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, Pursuant to S. Res, 57; Parts 2-4, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957; Hereafter cited as Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957); U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Administered Prices; Hearings, Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, Pursuant to S. Res. 57 on S. 215, pts* 9-12, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, Hereafter cited as Kefauver Committee Hear­ ings (1959); U- S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings on the Economic Report of the President, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pur­ suant to Sec 5(a) of Public Law 304 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957). Wage changes in steel were important, too. For if steel prices set

the pace for industry, steel wages set the pattern for labor. And this

was no mere numbers game. As Woodlief Thomas, the Economic Adviser to

the Federal Reserve Board, emphasized, overhigh prices and wages in

steel threw sand into the economy's delicately interlocked parts, either

slowing the machine (recession) or making it run inefficiently (unemploy­ ment, slow growth).

The steel wage pact ran in similar patterns throughout the postwar period. The story usually followed along these lines. Around the middle

of May, the President of United Steel Workers met steel representatives

in a hotel room. There both groups eventually signed an agreement.

Before the pact was finally signed, however, a strike usually occurred. 1 The result of this action was a wage hike followed by a price hike.

In the first postwar dispute, in 1 9k6, two giants controlled steel.

Philip Murray not only headed the United Steelworkers Union, but was also President of the CIO. Benjamin Fairless was United States Steel's

Chairman and his position in the industrial community was as high as

Murray's in labor.

The bargaining, however, was three-cornered, because President

Truman's administration was deeply involved. The negotiations rambled from White House to United States Steel's suite at the Carlton Hotel.

The union wanted a big wage augmentation for itself. The corporation

Insisted that any wage increase would require a huge price increase.

2. Washington Post, April 5, 1959 During this postwar negotiation Murray and Fairless relentlessly pursued their own interests, each trying to influence government repre­ sentatives John Snyder, the Reconversion Director, and Charles Bowles of the Price Administration. Initially the government, in control of prices, decided to freeze the advance of steel prices at $2.40 a ton.

Industry decided this was not enough to meet the union wage demand and a strike seemed imminent. At the last minute, however, President Truman attempted a compromise, offering an eighteen and one-half cent Increment in wages and four dollars-per-ton price boost. Murray found this accep- tible, but Fairless did not. This touched off a crippling month-long strike, before Truman once again intervened by offering the steel indus­ try an additional one dollar-per-ton price raise. The steel workers, 3 happ£* with the eighteen and one-half cent raiBe, returned to their jo b s.

E s s e n tia lly th e summary o f th e se occurrences became th e model for relationships in steel between 19^6 and 1952. After every subsequent negotiation (19^6, 19^9, 1952) prices were immediately raised. Also, the heavy hand of government was present throughout these postwar strikes.

It was present in 19^9, through an extra-legal board appointed by

President Truman, and again in 1952 during the Korean crisis through the interaction of the Wage Stabilization Board and the illegal seizure of 4 the steel mills by Presidential flat.

3. Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New York: W. W. N orton, 1963), p. 55. b. H. C. Dumb, “Collective Bargaining in Steel,” an address before the Employers' A sso ciatio n o f Summit County, Akron, Ohio, November 19, 1959 (Cleveland: Public Relations Department of Republic Steel, 1959), P. 2. In the summer of 1956, collective bargaining in the steel industry

once again held center stage. The decade following World War II had

proved highly prosperous for most producers. In good years the industry

set new records for income and output. The cold war mentality, along

with the Korean War left the economy essentially as it had been during

World War II except for one important item: There were no controls.

Consequently, prices and wages shot upward as did the stock market. In

the negotiations of 1956, the ritual remained unchanged. Once again

there was a month-long strike, followed by increases in prices and wages.

As in 19^6, the federal government played an important role in settling the strike. According to Iron Age, Secretary of Labor James Mitchell

and Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, a former corporation 5 executive, were instrumental in terminating the strike.

Following the 1956 settlement the steel industry viewed its com­ promised arrangement of wage and price increases with pessimism. The

contract had assumed—erroneously as it turned out—a high level of national prosperity. The industry agreed to give in a three-year period what it was willing to offer over a five-year period. But the high level of prosperity was not upheld, inflation became critical, and the demand for steel declined. The industry tried to solve their dilemmas with price increments, but to no avail. "Price increases

5 . A. H. Raskin, ^Behind the Steel Deadlock, ” Hew Leader, k2 (June 15, 1959), P- 5? See also, McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962, p. 6lj Iron Age, August 2, 1956, p. 46. since World War II,” remarked Roger Blough, “have not ‘been enough to 6 widen profit margins... ”

The steel industry saw its problems in terms of a so-called new type of inflation, 'Srage-push” Inflation. It was called wage-push, by

industry1s definition, because It resulted from the ability of unions to force up wage costs with the consequence of raising production costs.

Roger Blough, Chairman of the Board for USS, testified before the

Kefauver Committee, in 1957, and explained how the wage pressure devel­ oped in. the steel industry. 'To enforce what we regard as inflationary wage demands” remarked Blough, '‘the union has struck our plants five times in the past eleven years; and we have taken these costly strikes in an effort to hold the line against inflation. But hardly has one of these strikes begun before there is a nationwide demand that we settle it. Our customers must have steel or close their plants. Their employees face layoffs and loss of pay. The government, too, must have steel; and 7 daily the pressures upon us keep building up...” Consequently, steel executives saw wage inflation underlying all other cost and price infla­ tion. 'This is because the wage inflation,” explained Blough, “is sur­ prisingly universal and uniform throughout American Industry... ” For

6. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957), p. 2h5; See also, McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962, pp. 61-62; Robert Llvernash, Collec­ tive Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1961) , p. 112.

7- Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957), p. 211; See also, Robert C. Tyson, “Our New Kind of Inflation, ” an Address at the hist Dinner of the National Conference Board, May 16, 1957 (New York; Public Relations Department of U. S. Steel, 1957), pp. 2-12; Roger Blough, 'Trice and the Public Interest,” Vital Speeches, 25 (September 15, 1958), 5h-58; Iron Age, January 1, 1959, pp. 121-123. 7 each dollar that our employment costs Increase our total costs increases e over two dollars.”

The effect of the so-called new “wage-push” inflation became par­ ticularly severe for the steel industry during the terminal years of the 1950's. Alvin Franz, President of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Cor­ poration, addressing the AISI stated that the basic issue underlying

American steel problems was the inflationary trend that existed since

World War II. “inflation, ” warned Franz, <(has brought with It falling productivity coupled with increasing costs, loss of profits, and a rapid growth in foreign and domestic competition. These developments are 9 challenging all American steel companies, both large and small.”

• I l l

Productivity, as management viewed it, gave the economy a comfor­ table subsistence, controlled prices regardless of incremented wages, and afforded an abundance of leisure time. By the late 1950's, however,

8. Ibid., p. 2hb; See also, Roger Blough, “inflation As a Way of Life,” an address before the National Editorial Association in Chicago, Illinois, November 9, 1956 (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel, 195^), pp. 5-20; New York Times, February 20, 1959; Joseph L. Block, “Labor Costs Go Up Faster Than Steel Prices,” United States News and World Report, k6 (June 7, 1957)* 86-93; Roger M. Blough, “Cali a Halt to Upward Splraling of Wages,” United States News and World Report, k6 (June 8, 1959).

9. Alwin F. Franz, '*Fhe Big Squeeze on L ittle Steel,” The Morning Pro­ ceedings of the General Session of the 67th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 27, 1959, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959), p. l6l; See also, Harold G. Vatter, The U. S. Economy in the 1950*s (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), p . 157. lo productivity fe ll "while steel employment costs constantly rose.

Doctor John W. Kendrick, Economist for George Washington Univer­

sity, disclosed management's deep concern over the loss of productivity.

He stated that the causes for the relative augmentations in steel mill

product prices following World War II were two-fold. One was the cost

of the inputs, of which the two most vital kinds were labor, and pur­

chased material, supplies, and contractual services. The cost of the

inputs in, the postwar periods rose more than those of most other indus- j tries, exerting upward pressure on prices. The second determinating

element was productivity, which furnished a means of counteracting aug­ menting input prices. But productivity in the steel industry, according to Kendrick, rose “somewhat less than In manufacturing, or in the eco- IX nomy as a whole, during the period 1957 or 1958* ”

Steel executives concerned themselves over the continuous rising costs of production which resulted from high employment costs. ‘*The fact is ,” argued Blough, ‘‘that rising prices are at once the resuit of inflation and a measure of the degree of Inflation that has occurred.

They do not cause Inflation any more than a clinical thermometer can he

10. Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, The Steel Negotiations and You (New York: Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, 1959), pp. B=9.

11. John W. Kendrick, “How Good Is the Productivity Record,” The After­ noon Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Session of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 28,1959* The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959)* pp. 189-192, 198* See also, Steel, April 20, 1959* PP. ^8-k9. said to cause a patient’s fever... Wo. Since the war the most persis­ tent cause of rising Industrial prices has "been found in the rising costs of production; and the most important element in rising production costs Is the rise in the cost of employment. Throughout American in­ dustry, employment costs—direct or indirect—represent more than 75 12 percent of all costs.”

Consequently, management's measurement of productivity, including all of the inputs over a long period of time aroused concern. In des­ cribing the crisis in productivity one steel executive presented the case of the sand loaders. With the introduction of automation, he ex­ plained, one man with the assistance of a power shovel, was capable of doing the work of six men using only hand shovels. However, the steel executive emphasized, that automation did not necessarily bring about increased profits. One must consider, he pointed out, the aspect of buying and the upkeep of the new equipment, as well as, the higher pay required for more skilled workers. “AH of these added inputs,” ex­ plained the steel executive, 'Wist be set against the added output in 1 3 calculating the productivity.”

Thus, steel manufacturers contended that incremented wages, as well as, fringe benefits rose faster than productive efficiency in the total

12. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1959)> 5 3^7.

15. American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Matters of Fact; A Steel Data Book (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, I 959), p. 14; See also, Republic Steel, Annual Report To Stock­ h o ld e rs, 1958, p . 8. i o economy. Steel management revealed that from sixty-six cents per hour in 19k0 manufacturing workers1 hourly earnings increased more than three­ fold to $2,2k in June 1959- The steelworker not only maintained an advantage • over his counterpart in other manufacturing industries hut he increased his advantage. In 19k0 the steelworkers' average hourly earn­ ings were eighteen cents higher than other workers and in June of 1959 " 1 4 they were eighty-seven cents higher. “Many people, ” explained Clifford

Hood, President of United States Steel, <£understand that one part of the serious problem of inflation is the failure of production to rise as rapidly as production costs... Employment costs have, over the years, increased at a more rapid rate than productivity. United States Steel has no desire whatever to withhold justified wage increases. But we do not want the employees of United States Steel, through their collective bargaining representatives, to demand and strike for unjustified wage 1 5 increases.”

Steel management's stand against wage increases due to productivity loss received further impetus as they examined the findings of Doctor

John Kendrick. Doctor Kendrick found for the period 1919 through 1957 that total national productivity rose at an average annual rate of 2.1/6.

He calculated further that for the 19k8 through 1957 period the average yearly rate of increas was 2.3$* As opposed to the national productiviy augmentation of 2.3$ a year, steelworker employments costs per man-hour

lk. Ibid., p. 1 6 .

15. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957), pp. 358-559* 11

worked incremented at a rate of "between 7*5 and 8$. However, when steel

shipments per man-hour worked was compared with steel employment costs

per man-hour worked from 1940 through 1958 it demonstrated that in 1958

these employment costs were 388$ of the 1940 level and steel shipments

per man-hours worked were 130$ of the 19*tO level. Thus, "the increase

in employment costs per man-hour worked since 1940, ” according to

Kendrick, "was 288$ or nearly ten times the 30$ increase in shipments is per man-hour worked.” (See Table 1.) Consequently, Kendrick's evi­ dence on productivity convinced executives that the steel industry was

in less than vibrant health.

IV

Profits were the major source of the steel companies economic struc­ ture. Loss of profits, according to steel executiver, meant no plants, no production, and no work. By 1958, however, the steel executives saw a severe profit loss developing in the industry.

Steel management became alarmed that their profits amounted to only a small part of America’s wealth. According to the United States Depart­ ment of Commerce data steel profits decreased as a proportion of national income. In 1940, employee compensation took 6 3 .8 cents of the national income, while corporate profit, after taxes, represented 8 cents. By

1 9 5 8, employee compensation rose to 70.4 cents while profits fell to 5

16. American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Matters of Fact: A Steel Data Book, p. 17* TABLE 1

STEEL EMPLOYMENT COSTS AND SHIPMENTS

PER MAN-HOUR WORKED

Employment Costs Per Man-Hour Worked?*1

260 —

220 -

S teel Shipments Per Man-Hour Worked?**

100

1 t5856*50 *Wage employees, steel producing. ##Hourly and salaried employees, steel producing. Does not represent productivity since this factor is only one component of productivity and percentage-wise usually rises faster than the total.

SOURCE: Chart published in American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Trends in the Iron and Steel Industry (New York: A3BI, 1959), p. 1^. SOURCE: AISI Annual S tatistical Reports. 15 17 / N cents. (See Table 2}

Management leaders saw further evidence of a profit loss as they

examined the industry1 s net assets and profits earned per dollar of

sales. During 1958 the steel industry's rate of return on net assets were regularly and considerably lower than the average for other manu­

facturing industries in sixteen of the nineteen years since 1940. The

steel industry ranked twenty-ninth among the forty-one manufacturing

industries on the basis of the return of net assets, according to data 18 released by the First City Bank of New York. (See Table 3) In addi­ tion, steel's rate of return on sales, in which both profit and sales were measured in dollars of similar value, amounted to 6.3$ in 1958*

By comparison the steel industry made a profit of 8.1 cents per dollar 1 9 of sales in 1940, a level which was equalled only once since then.

(See Table 4) Finally, steel executives became alarmed as they viewed the decline in the stockholder's equity. While in 1955 the industry's profit after taxes was 13. 1$ of stockholder's equity, in 1958 i t was 20 7.1$. (See Table 5)

17. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

18. American Iron and Steel Institute, Charting Steel's Progress (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1959 )t p. 6 l7

19. Ibid., p. 62.

2 0 . "Facts about Steel—The Official Report, n United States News and World Report, 47 (August 31> 1959)> PP* 102-103; See also, U. S. Department of Labor, Background Statistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute, including Supplementary Tables, Bulletin No. S-l (Wash- ington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 1959 ), Table 17a. TABLE 2

EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE PROEIT

AS A PROPORTION OF NATIONAL INCOME

19^0-1958

In Cents Per Dollar of National Income

National Income Employee Corporate Profit Year (Billions) Compensation (After Tax) CO *»•

191*0 $ 81.6 63. 8^ •

19^5 181.2 68.0 !*.6

1950 21*1 .9 63.7 9.1*

1955 530.2 6 7 .7 6 .9

1957 566.5 69.7 6 .1

1958 366.2 70.1 5.2

SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, July 1959 j U. S. Department of Commerce.

SOURCE: Chart Published in American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Matter of Fact: A Steel Data Booh (New York: AISI, 1959), P. l8. 15

TABLE 3

AVERAGE RETURN ON NET ASSETS

STEEL INDUSTRY RELATED TO LEADING MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

(Computed from F irst National City Bank Data*)

Ratio of Steel to Average o f Number o f All Leading Steel’s Ranking Industrial Year Mfg. Industries Among Industries Categories Covered

19^0 .825 29th 45 1941 .780 38th 44 19^2 .637 44th 44 19^3 .583 43 rd 44 1944 .531 44th 45 19^5 .548 44th 45 1946 .612 4 l s t 45 19^7 .661 4 l s t 45 1948 .764 34th 45 19^9 .835 26th 45 1950 .895 27th 45 1951 .834 26th 46 1952 .715 34th 46 1953 .913 2 l s t 46 1954 .764 32nd 46 1955 1.020 15th 4l 1956 1.007 18th 4 l 1957 1.023 17th 4 l 1958 .837 27th 4 l

^Monthly Letters, April issues. For actual rates see Appendix A, Table 4 .

SOURCE: Chart published in American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Trends in the Iron and Steel Industry (New York: AISI, 1959 )9 p . 15 • 16

TABLE b

STEEL INDUSTRY'S RATE OF RETURN ON SALES

Year Return on Sales Year R eturn on

19^0 8.1# 19^9 7.2# 191*1 6 .0 1950 8.1 19^2 3-3 1951 5 .8 19^3 2 .8 1952 5-0 19H 2 .7 1953 5.6 19^5 3.1 195^ 6 .1 19^6 5-5 1955 7*9 19^7 6 .2 1956 7 .3 19^8 6 .7 1957 7 .3 1958 6.3

SOURCE: AISI Annual S tatistical Reports.

NOTE: Profit figures for the first half of 1959 are not included because they are misleading. Shipments of steel products in the second quarter of 1959 set an all-tim e record for any such period reflecting an unusually high demand artifically stimulated by customers * fear of a steel strike. Analysis of profits in other strike years, such as 1956 and 1952, show that quarterly or half year results are always inconclusive because of losses sustained during strikes.

SOURCE: Chart published in American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Trends in the Iron and Steel Industry (New York: AISI," 1959), p . 17. TABLE 5

PROFITS AS PERCENT OF SALES AND STOCKHOLDERS * EQUITY

STEEL INDUSTRY AND ALL MANUFACTURING, 1947-59

Profits after taxes Profits after taxes as percent of as percent of sales stockholders * equity 1/ Year

A ll A ll S te e l manufacturing Steel . manufacturing

19VT 6 .6 6 .7 11.7 15.1 1948 7 .6 7 .0 13.9 15.5 19^9 6 .5 5.8 9-8 11.4 1950 7.9 7 .1 13.8 15.0 1951 2 / 5.8 4 .8 12.1 11.8 1952 4 .7 4.3 8.3 10.2 1953 5.3 4.3 10.5 10.4 1954 5.3 4.5 7.9 9 .8 1955 7 .2 5.4 13.1 12.3 1956 2 / 6 .7 5.3 12.3 12.0 1957 6 .6 4 .8 11.1 10.7 1958 5.4 4.2 7 .1 8.4

SOURCE: Chart Published in U. S. Department of Labor, Background Statistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute, Bulletin No. S-l (Washington, 'D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 1959)* 18

Industry viewed their profit loss as a result of rising inflation, inadequate depreciation laws, high tax rates and higher wages and material costs. Inflation, as the steel industry saw it, aggravated the problem of finding the additional dollars for expenditure for faci­ lities. This occurred mainly "because of the serious inadequacy of the

Federal income tax law covering depreciation. This income tax law limited the total depreciation reclaimed during the life of a facility to the number of dollars which were initially disbursed for that faci­ a l lity years ago.

By 1959# with the value of the dollar declining, the depreciation permitted became less and less sufficient to cover the cost of equipment which was purchased if the company was merely to break even. This deficiency in depreciation, according to steel executives, was made up by diverting some of the profit dollars. In periods of inflation a first claim in income reinvested was to make good the deficiency in depreciation. The amount of apparent profit which deflected to fu lfill as this stay even function was known as a “phantom profit”.

21. Benjamin F. Fairless, “Steel1s Depreciation Problem,” The Morning Proceedings of the General Session of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 2b, 1956, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1956), pp. W--U8; See also, Beth­ lehem Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1959, p. 7; Inland Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, pp. 8-9; United States Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 195*1-, pp. 23-27; Inland Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1958, pp. 6-7.

22. American Iron and Steel Institute, Charting Steel* s Progress, p. 6b} See also, Iron Age, March 19, 1959# P- 7; Iron Age, August 6, 1959, pp lfl-lj-3# Kugene Havas, “Phe Consumer in the Steel V ise...,” The Nation, 188 (June 6, 1959)# 510-512. 19

In 195^, United States Steel's Annual Report warned that “with regard to the adequacy of depreciation we are faced with a disturbing fact: Since World War II, depreciation amounts as ordinarily calculated and recognized in tax laws have been quite insufficient to buy new facilities as fast as existing ones have been wearing out or becoming obsolete... ” If depreciation, U. S. Steel pointed out, did not regain adequate buying power the Income after taxes might have to be employed to make up the difference. This was inequitable and hapless, according 23 to management, because it resulted in the taxation of capital.

Steel executives became convinced that inflation and Inadequate depreciation laws created a severe profit squeeze on the industry. In

1956, Inland Steel's Annual Report contended that “when the average life of the plant is relatively long, such as the twenty-five year average for steel mills, and when marked price increases have taken place, then the amount recovered through depreciation on the basis of original cost 2 4 falls far short of providing the necessary funds for replacement."

Joel Hunter, President of Crucible Steel, explained that depreciation was important in steel because plants are so costly and have such a long life expectancy. Inflation, he insisted, posted a grave threat to depreciation expense. “The cost of the new machine, ” Hunter explained,

“which is just the same in a ll respects as the machine bought twenty-

23. United States Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 195b, p. 2k. :

2k. Inland Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1956, p . 8. 20

five years ago and now completely worn out, is net one million dollars

—Taut about two point five million dollars... Where is the extra money 2 5 coming from? It can only come, of course, from retained earnings...”

V

For management, the impact of competition from overseas and domestic

m aterials was "becoming more endemic. '^Foreign competition,” warned

Leslie B. Worthington, President of United States Steel, “is likely to

"be with us from now on. It may hurt a little less one year than another, "but it won't go away like a "bad dream and it w ill make itself 2 6 felt in more and more steel products...”

In the years immediately following World War II, foreign steel m ills gave American steel companies little competition in world markets.

Many of the mills in Europe and Japan were either wrecked or destroyed during the war. Those which escaped damage were worn out and out moded

"by the end of the war. By 1957 that situation changed. The foreign m ills were re-constructed, up-dated and enlarged, mostly with American

25. Joel Hunter, “Our Disappearing Dollars,” The Morning Proceedings of the General Session of the 68th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26, I960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), p . l 8l .

26. Leslie B. Worthington, 'The Wise Man's Eyes,” The Morning Proceed­ ings of the General Session of the 68th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26, I960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), p. 197; See also, The Wall Street Journal, October 27 > 1959* aid. ''The technology of these new and modernized plants, ” stated Ben a s Fairiess, "now compares favorably with our own, ” '*Uhe Russian steel

industry is in a position to set the competitive pace anywhere in the

world,” warned Francis M. Rich, Vice-President of steel manufacturing

for Inland Steel. At the close of World War II, reported Rich, the

Soviet steel industry was in a chaotic state because of heavy war

' damage to big plants and mines in the Ukraine and the Crimea. Since

the end of the war Russia rebuilt its destroyed plants and also con­

structed new facilities. He contended that the Soviet steel industry

functioned on a sound and intelligent basis. He warned that although

America had a good lead on Russia in certain technological aspects of 2 9 steel, the Soviets would catch up quickly.

By the late 1950's management realized that European and non-

European countries created steel industries that gave many Americani mills a backward look. T. Sendzimir, President of I. Sendzimlr, Incor­

poration, told the Kefauver Committee in 1957, that the continuous cast-

27. American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Trends in the Iron and Steel Industry— Background Memo (hew York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1959), P* 21.

28. Benjamin Fair less, facing Up to Competition,” The Morning Proceed­ ings of the General Session of the 67th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute. May 28, 1959, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959), p. 1^5. 29. Francis M. Rich, “Steelmaking In the Soviet Union, ” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Technical Session of the 67th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 27, 1959, The Year­ book of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959), PP. ^5-71; See also, Iron Age, June 4, 1959, P. 10. 22

ing process in Europe and the top-blown oxygen converters in Austria must he developed in the U.S. in order for the steel industry to expand 3 0 and compete with foreign markets. Francis Rich, maintained that "a sound and foresighted basic research program for the American steel in­ dustry should be developed, which can surpass the' effectiveness of the 3 1 highly organized Soviet system. ” ffWith abundant capital, superior facilities, and more efficient management, American industry,” argued

Conrad Cooper, Executive Vice-President for United States Steel, "has been able in the past to compete successfully against foreign competi­ tion in markets both at home and abroad. Clearly, however, the situation has changed. It seems evident that we are well on the road to becoming 3 2 non-competitive with foreign industries.” Alwin F. Franz, President of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation, maintained that many of the foreign plants were as good as America's modern installation and far better than much of the steel industry's older equipment. The steel in­ dustry, explained Franz, no longer had the advantage in facilities that far years allowed it to pay higher wages, and still make inexpensive 3 3 and quality steel.

30. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957), pp. 762- 766; See also, McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962, p. 29; Vatter, The U. 5. Economy in the 19501s, p. 157.

31. Rich, “Steelmaking In the Soviet Union,” p. 69. 32. Conrad Cooper, “The Supervisor and Industrial Competition,” an ad­ dress before the Foreman's Club of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, February 7, 1959 (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel Corporation, 1959), p. 5* 33* Franz, '^Ehe Big Squeeze on Little Steel,” p. 166; See also, Fair- less, ‘^Facing Up to Competition,” pp. 1UU-1U5; "The New Climate of Union-Management Relations,” Personnel Series, No. 150 (February 16- 18, 1953), 2lf-25. 23

Aided "by favorable investment conditions and American foreign aid program, these new foreign mills demonstrated their new capability to vie with American producers—not only for world markets, hut also for the United States market. Evidence of this fact became clear as steel executives examined the exports and imports of steel mill products for

1958. According to United States Department of Commerce data, for that year, American exports of steel mill products were 2,688,481 net tons— just about half as large as steel exports of 5 >177,159 net tons in the comparable period in 1957. While exports were being cut almost in half 34 during 1958, imports tripled in the same short time. (See Table 6)

In addition, the American Iron and Steel Institute revealed that in

1957 more than one-half of barbed wire, more than 20$ of the nails, and nr 3! more than 10$ of steel fence sold in the United States came from abroad.

In 1955, according to American Iron and Steel Institute, domestic sales of stainless steel tableware totaled 14.7 million of dozens, of which 3*6 were inported from abroad. In 1957, of total sales of 13 millions of 36 dozens, inports totaled 11.2 millions. Iron Age reported over 314,000

34. American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Matters of Fact: A Steel Data Book, p. 27; American Iron and Steel Institute, Charting Steel1s Progress, pp. 3, 44; Niles (Ohio) Daily Times, September 12, 1959. 35* American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Trends In the Iron and Steel Industry: Background Memo, p. 22; See also, H. F. Travis, ‘*A Major Study of the ... steel Industry: Looking to i 960, ” The Maga­ zine of Wall Street, 104 (May 9, 1959), 208.

36. Ibid., p. 22. TABLE 6

UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE IN IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS, 1957-59

Year and month In p o rts Exports Year and month Imports Exports

1957 1,164,666 5,177,159 1958: January 70,833 326,845 1958 1 , 702,819 2,688,481 February 68,085 241,879 1959 ( f i r s t 5 months) 1,501,792 850,747 March 92,196 263,817 April 114,024 266,943 May 118,094 244,622 June 126,408 163,309 1957: January 145,569 412,302 Ju ly 171,179 169,345 February 121,005 355,084 August 156,666 171,120 March 122,238 508,963 September 179,555 180,685 April 129,224 491,275 October 200,569 251,410 May 109,555 464,643 November 174,611 238,998 June 88,880 522,430 % December 230,599 169,508 Ju ly 88,816 558,027 August' 68,288 435,269 1959: January 229,369 161,375 September 68,748 380,446 February 240,769 167,586 October 86,145 384,008 March 287,417 177,901 November 63,144 336,843 A p ril 359,450 178,029 December 75,456 329,869 May 384,787 165,856 ...... !

SOURCE: American Iron and Steel Institute.

SOURCE: Chart Published in U. S. Department of Labor, Background Statistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute, Bulletin No. S-l (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 19597. 25 tons of foreign steel came to the West Coast of the United States in

1958—a 609S increase over 1957* N early 30^5 of the estimated western

United States market for buttveld pipe during the first half of 1958 was 37 supplied "by importers.

The great advantage of foreign steel producers, as viewed by the steel executives, was that their wage rates were much lower than the

American steel workers wage. Hourly employment costs of American steel companies were three to six or seven times those of foreign competitors.

Conrad Cooper, speaking before the Foreman's Club of Dayton, was asked his reasons for the sudden demand for foreign made steel products.

Foreign products, he answered, were sold in America fo r prices signifi­ cantly lower than those of American made items. A hundred pounds of

American nails sold for $10.30. A hundred pounds of European nails sold fo r $6.90* Barbed w ire produced in Germany co st a jobber in Dayton approximately 40 dollars a ton less than barbed wire sold in Cleveland by United States Steel. The aptitude to undercut American steel producers, 38 according to Cooper, came as a result of costs, specifically wage costs.

Joseph Block, Chairman for Inland Steel, warned that increased wage cost would eventually force American industry to price itself out of its own 39 market and out of foreign markets.

37* Iron Age, December 18, 1958* p. 75*

3 8. Cooper, "The Supervisor and Industrial Competition,” pp. 3-^? See also, Steel, February 23, 1959> P* ^5*

3 9. Joseph H. Block, “issues In the 1959 Steel Bargaining, ” an address before the Rotary Club of Los Angeles, February 13, 1959 (Chicago; Public Relations Department of Inland Steel, 1959)> P* l^j See also, *tond Your Business,” The Nation, 188 (March 14, 1959)j P* 218. 26

In 1958# the Annual Report for Republic Steel revealed that the in­ trusion of foreign steel demonstrated that a condition which was con­ sidered a pest a few years ago had emerged into a major problem with im­ plications far beyond the steel industry. The Report indicated that there was no doubt the rapid rise in steel employment costs in the past 40 15 years was the principal reason for this situation. In the same vain, Roger Blough, in an essay entitled ‘The Tale of Two Towns," demon­ strated that foreign steel1 s low labor cost, coupled with the incremen­ ted efficiency of new equipment, clearly explained the reasons why a ton of Japanese steel products could be manufactured, carried across the

Pacific Ocean, stored and trans-shipped to American steel producing and market centers at a price from. 20 dollars to 40 dollars per ton less 41 than the price of the American product.

Aside from competition from abroad, the steel industry met firmer competition from other materials. Among the most important of these materials were glass, plywood, plastics, pre-stressed concrete, copper, 4 2 titanium and magnesium. These various materials, ” warned Ben Fairless,

“do not yet compete with steel in all markets by any means. As a group, however, they are growing competitively stronger every day, penetrating

40. Republic Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 195§? p. 8j See also, Steel, May 25, 1959? p. 87.

41. Roger Blough, ‘Talk of Two Towns, ” The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 187 (May 22, 1959)? 10 (2290), 24 (230107”See also, Steel, September 28, 1959? P- 75*

42. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957)? pp. 209-210. 2T 43 markets once dominated or held hy steel.”

For example, for many years the steel industry counted on steel

heing used wherever masonary did not serve. By 1959* steel was "being

usurped in curtain walls hy cement, glass and other metals. The glass

industry felt it could make a product which would do all that steel

could. By 1959* a flexible glass that had the hardness of steel was

developed; this glass would withstand ary temperature a steel alloy could

take. More importantly, steel was heing replaced in automobiles hy the 4 4 aluminum engine hlock and engine.

Thus, management hy the late 1950's realized that competition from

other materials became a definite threat. ‘*Che producers of these t m aterials,” explained Fairless, "are competing, and competing vigorously,

to expand their markets. They have aggressive sales forces... They are

spending more and mare each year in intensive research to develop new

products and improve present conditions. Moreover, our competitors show

imagination and resourcefulness. They are ever alert to opportunity.

■ 45 They are quick to seize upon and develop new trends in marketing. ”

VI

Consequently, hy the late 195°'s, rising costs, low profits, increa­

sing conpetition and falling productivity factors influenced a stiffened

^3. Fairless, “Facing Up to Competition," p. 1^8. American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Trends in the Iron and Steel Industry, pp. 22- 23.

^■5* Fairless, “Facing Up to Conpetition," p. 148. 28

steel management attitude for the upcoming 1959 contract negotiation.

Economic pressures forced steel executives to "be conscious of labor

costs. Following World War II, the emphasis was on production. In the l a te 1950*s, it was on costs reduction throughout the productive pro­ cess. The steel companies found it necessary to cut costs in order to survive.

Steel executives decided that the time had come to freeze wages that would not he paid for hy greater efficiency. Behind this decision was a commitment to end inflation hy holding the line on prices. Higher prices, management contended, would follow higher wages, unless wage increases were followed hy greater output per worker. R. Heath Larry,

Administrative Vice-President for United States Steel, argued that the economic path of the industry between 1956 and 1959 had become clearly intolerable. The time for an assertion of management leadership had arrived. It was obvious, he insisted, “that the needs of the situation, more than ever before, were to call a halt in rising employment costs and to pursue every reasonable step to improve the efficiency of the 4 6 industry's operations.”

46. R. Heath Larry, 'tost-Mortem—Steel Bargaining, 1959, ” an address before the Industrial Relations Conference of Associated Industries of Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, April l4, i 960 (New York; Public Relations Department for United States Steel Corporation, i 960), p. 7; See also, Iron Age, April 30, 1959 , p. 15i Roger Blough, "A Picture of the Wage-Price Spiral at Work, ” United States News and World Report, 46 (May 18, 1956), 64-66; United States Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1956, pp. 25-29; United States Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1955, pp. 26-27. 29

Management decided that the time also had come to alter some -work rules that it considered expensive, outdated and inefficient. By chang­ ing these rules, steel executives contended, their plants could operate more efficiently and thus a -wage increase could he justified, "in the competitive interests of the steelworkers as well as of the companies,” maintained Cooper, "both parties should join in a cooperative effort to revise existing language in the master agreement so that, with due regard for the rights and the welfare of the employees, certain wasteful prac­ tices might reasonably he eliminated and productive efficiency corres- 4 7 pondingly increased.”

Steel executives were irritated over the perennial wage squeeze on profits and viewed wage increases as the hasis for postwar inflation.

“Certain lahor leaders,” explained Benjamin Fairless, “declare that the reason key industries are now operating helow capacity is because of a lack of consumer purchasing power. The corollary argument to the con­ sumer purchasing power theme is that wage increases can he subtracted from profits without price increases. To show up the absurdity of any significant wage increase coming out of profits you need only compare the size of increase in wages with total corporate profit.” Fairless

Vf. R. Conrad Cooper, “The Three C ’s of Steel Labor Relations,” an address before the Virginia Manufacturer's Association, Hot Springs, Virginia, November 6, 1959 (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel Corporation, 1959)* P* 8; See also, United States Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1957, p. 6; Iron Age, July 23, 1959* PP- 29-31; “Significant Issues In Current Collective Bargaining,” Personnel Series, No. 146 (February 18-20, 1952), pp. 8-11; Bethlehem Steel, Annual Rep cart to Stockholders, 1959* p. 8. 3° indicated that in the highest profit year on record, 1950, such a wage

increase took ahout 20% of all corporate profltB after taxes. A squeeze like that on profits had three inevitable effects: It curtailed invest­ ment, reduced productivity, and augmented unemployment. And that, Fair- 4 8 less argued, was hardly the way to strengthen the American economy.

The predominate factors to the steel industry's growth in manage­ ment's view were in investment, hoth in capital plant and in research and development of new scientific and technological capabilities.

Joseph L. Block, Chairman of Inland Steel, explained that by the late

1950's investments per ton of steel ingot capacity were three to four times as great as those which were necessary in pre-war days. The indus­ try, he warned, must make a return on its investment so that it could 4 9 vie with other industries for capital.

The steel industry had already initiated some new engineering and design techniques to improve Its products. Competition from domestic products made further demands on the industry to continue along the same lines. Republic Steel, for example, indicated that as a result of a long continuing research program in powder metallurgy, the company in

1957 developed a new low alloy, high-strength iron powder. During 1958,

Republic began production of aluminized steel sheets. These sheets carried

lf8. Quoted in, 'Trices ... Wages ... Profits— How 3 Top Executives See Them, u United States News and World Report, 43 (February 7, 1958), 102; Robert Livernash, Collective Bargaining In the Basic Steel Industry (Washington, B.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 1961), 101- 102. k9» Block, “issues In the 1959 Steel Bargaining,” pp. 10-11. 31 a thin coating of aluminum which was resistant to certain corrosive ele­ ments adversely affecting steel. Several new products enjoyed favorable reception during 1959* PerhapB the most successful was Republic X-Tru-

Coat steel pipe—a product combining the strength and u tility of regular steel pipe with the corrosion resistance of high density polyethylene plastic. ^The heavy yellow plastic coating bonded to the exterior of the pipe solved one of the problems which had plagued pipe users for years; that is the corrosive effects of electro-chemical action and acid 5 0 soils on pipe lines.”

Bethlehem Steel realized the ill effects from competitive material produced in this country and accordingly developed newer products that lowered costs of steel making. The new products developed included a porcelain enameling sheet steel, which is known in the trade as Bethnamel and Beth-Led, which waB a leaded screw stock (Bar) steel that had many 5 1 advantages for faster machine production at lower cost. Although the companies' research and development programs alleviated some of the pres­ sure from domestic product competition, management realized newer and better techniques were needed for the future. Doctor John Kendrick,

Economist for George Washington University, advised management that the best way to improve productivity was to expand research, development and

50. Republic Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1957, p. 8; ibid., 1985, P* 7; ibid., 1959, p. 5.

51. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1959, p . 7- 32 5 2 innovational activity even more rapidly in the future than in the past.

Steel executives also realized that technology had to he improved

in order to compete with foreign competitors. Conrad Cooper explained

to the Congressional Committee on Education and Labor that the industry by the late 1950's had to increase its technological progress in order

to survive and grow. Much of the technological advantage, he pointed

out, which American industry once enjoyed was wiped out; anything which prevented industry’s attempts to improve efficiency or which augmented the difference between wages in America and abroad, could only “result

in a weakening of Steel's competitive position with a resultant loss in 5 3 potential sales and jobs.” Alwin Franz, contended that plant moderni- t zation was of paramount importance to the smaller steel companies who must rid themselves of obsolete facilities in order to maintain a corape- 5 4 titive position.

52. John W. Kendrick, “How Good Is the Productivity Record?”, The Evening Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Session of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 28, 1959 j The Yearbook of American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959 )t P* 200; See also, Steel, July 27, 1959j pp. 72-T3i Inland Steel, Annual Report To Stockholders, 19 5*+> PP. 8-9; Inland Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1958, P. 7. 53* U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings, Impact of Automation on Employment, 87th Congress, 1st Sess., 1961 , PP. 359-380, subsequently cited as Holland Committee Hearings; See also, B. J. Widick, Labor Today (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 196k), p . 12.

5b, Alwin Franz, '^The Big Squeeze on L ittle Steel,” p. 163. 33

VII

The steel union, on the other hand, "brought to the 1959 bargaining

table a strong purchasing power view of wages. "New heights of demand

for goods,” argued David McDonald, President for USWA, "cannot be achieved with yesterday's or, indeed, even today's levels of purchasing power.

Wages and salaries must grow in order to furnish the consumer demand, the very basis for greater production and in order to provide much needed jobs for the large number of unemployed...” It followed, argued

McDonald, that substantial increments in wages and salaries must be devised in order that purchasing power be enlarged for the benefit of 5 5 the country and the economy.

Steel union leaders, moreover, considered profits as too high.

Steel union officials felt that Roger Blough and his executives were under compulsion to get larger profits and to try to appease the stock­ holders. They also maintained that management had stock options which

Increased in value i f the company made a la rg e p r o f i t, thus In creasin g 5 6 their own personal net worth.

The USWA also saw management as a new tough breed of anti-unionist, falsely creating the feeling that they were called to save America from inflation. In the 1950*s the old more congenial steel leaders gave way t o a new breed of men. These new e x ecu tiv es, remarked McDonald, f e l t

55* Kefauver Committee Hearings (1959 )> 5 200; See also, Steel Labor (April,1 9 5 9 P -5- 56 . Ibid., 5213j See also, "Is the Steel Industry Seeking a Strike?” AFL-CIO American Federationist, 66 (April, 1959)j 30. that Fairless and his cohorts had not known how to handle the Steel­ workers Union; the new breed were going to show them how to control the

Steel Union. “Management,” explained McDonald, “hit upon this country of heing the saviors of America from inflation, and they talk about in­ flation, at the same time making more steel with fewer workers... They are not fighting to save America from inflation. They are only fighting to have the two people, the two groups hang onto the dollars, number one the shareholder and number two management... Steelworkers are not 57 going to tolerate this any longer.”

The Steelworkers Union, moreover, viewed steel executives as mani­ pulating wages, enabling them to increase prices thus incrementing its profits. Otis Brubaker, Research Director for United Steel Workers, admonished that the steel industry increased its prices regardless of its production level. “The conclusion is inescapable,” he argued, “that the steel industry raises its prices to maximize its profits at the highest possible level which it can achieve and maintain without losing its customers to other industries or without calling down the full wrath 5 8 of the Government and of the public.”

The union also denied management's claim that the companies could not compete with imported steel made by lower paid foreign labor because

57. Ibid., 5 211; See also, David McDonald, “Steel Industry’s Cry of Inflation Is Phony, ” United States News and World Report, 46 (June 8, 1959), 90-91.

58. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957), pp. 421, 472; See also, 'feteel Negotiations Started,” IUD Bulletin, 4 (May 5, 1959), 3; Livernash, Collective Bargaining In the Basic Steel Industry, p. 102. 35

wage scales in America were too high. The USWA officials indicated that

Imported steel products at their highest point equaled only a small per­

centage of steel's total supply. Foreign steel found customers in the

United States not because of low foreign wages, argued steel union

leaders, hut because American prices and profits were unjustifiably high.

The steel union claimed that "if the total value of superior fringe benefits and auxiliary social services are added to the wages of the

steelworkers abroad and the full number of employees of each company is

compared, the labor costs of foreign companies do not compare too un- 5 9 favorably with those in the United States.”

The steel union taking a short range view of the situation felt that domestic conpetition proved undamaging to the industry's financial posi­ tion. "in the main,” explained Brubaker, ftbhe amount of loss which is potential to other industries is not large, certainly at the present time.., You could go down the whole list of the products which are made from steel, and you will find that in major part, the amount of substi- eo tution that could occur is small.”

The Union, moreover, viewed the industry's plea for advancement in automation as a necessity but also as a serious problem. "I am not against automation,” maintained McDonald, "I am not against the idea of

59. United Steel Workers of America, The Foreign Competition Hoax (Pittsburgh: United Steelworkers of America, 1959), p . 3; See also, McDonald, "Steel Industry's Cry of Inflation,” p. 91# "Steel Indus­ try Formenting Strike Talk,” IUD Bulletin, ^ (April, 1959)# 13# "McDonald Attacks Industry for Freeze on Bargaining,” IUD Bulletin, k (June, 1959), 7.

60. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1957), p. h22} See also, Kefauver Committee Hearings (1959)7 P» 22. Improved technology. We only want a reasonable contract. We only want 61 our fair share of what we help to produce.” McDonald, however, also revealed the dilemma that automation placed on the steel union. Between

1956 and 1958, he pointed out, production worker employment dropped from

660,000 to 560,000. (See Table 7) This drop in employment resulted from rapid technological advances in the industry. The more extensive use of oxygen in open hearth and blast furnaces, and a host of other labor- saving equipment and new processes, including, larger furnaces, higher m ill speed and improvement in raw materials resulted in greater produc­ es tion but lower employment. The steel union hoped to solve their prob­ lem through a shorter work week and a program of retraining and transi­ tion of displaced employees. McDonald told the Senate Committee on

Education and Labor, in 1961, that the steel union during the late 1950*s pleaded with the steel industry to help in this program. It was to their advantage to retrain people. The industry, he argued, failed to respond and it left the steel union no other course but to take action on broader S 3 lin e s .

The economic setting for the 1959 steel contract negotiation seemed complete as Alwin F. Franz summarized his feelings at 1959 annual meeting

61. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1959), 5 212.

62. Holland Committee Hearings ( 1961), pp. 4-8; See also, IUD Bulletin (February, 1959), p. 6; IUD Bulletin (April, 1959), p. 5; The New York Times (March 20, 1959), p. 19*

65 . Ibid., 62; See also, Widick, Labor Today, pp. 9-H; New York Times, February 27, 1959J Edward Engberg, ‘The Real Crisis In S teel,^ The New Leader, 42 (November 9, 1959), 6-7. TABLE 7

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OP WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS IN THE

BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY, MID-I956 AND AUTUMN 1958

Occupational Category Mid-1956 Autumn 1958

Total employment ...... 660,000 5 6 0 ,0 0 0

Production workers ...... 545.000 445.000 Semiskilled workers ...... 250.000 2 0 0 .0 0 0 Skilled workers and foremen ...... 175,000 1 5 5 ,0 0 0 Laborers, helpers, and miscellaneous service workers ...... 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 90,000

AdmiTTistrative, pro-Fpss-ionaT , and clerical workers ...... 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 Clerical and sales workers ...... 7 5 ,0 0 0 7 5 ,0 0 0 Professional and technical workers ...... 30,000 3 0 ,0 0 0 Administrative workers ...... 1 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0

SOURCE: Bureau of labor S tatistics.

SOURCE: Chart Published in U. S. Department of Labor, Background Statistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute, Bulletin No. S-l (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 1959)* of the American Iron and Steel Institute. '^This is,” he thundered, "a year of decision! If we can keep costs in line now, and for the next two or three years, and if we are able to get the proper depreciation funds to modernize our plants, we can better meet competition and solve the problems now facing the American steel industry, as we have in the 64 past."

6k, Franz, **The Big Squeeze On Little Steel,” p. l68; See also, Travis, “A Major Study of the ... Steel Industry: Looking to i9 6 0,” 211, 2 3 2 . CHAPTER I I

MEN OP STEEL

By the m id-fifties steel management fundamentally changed its philo­

sophy toward th e s te e l union. Management no lo n g er emphasized accommo­

dation with the steel'union, hut now desired to win hack some of the

prerogatives lost over the past fifteen years. Steel executives seized

the initiative to alter the collective bargaining framework and institute

what they felt to he, a more equal power relationship between business

and labor. A number of increasingly dominant factors emerged to create

management's new aggressiveness in steel labor relations. Changed

economic conditions furnished only a partial answer. First, steel man­

agement was concerned over the irresponsibility, the immaturity, and the political nature of the steel union. Management became convinced that inter-union rivalry, alleged corruption and labor monopoly tactics,

and leadership weakness within the steel union required a new sense of purpose and firmness in steel labor relations. Second, there arose in the m id-fifties a new breed of top management men. These, men differed from their predecessors in that they were hired for their special train­

ing and management skills. Their background enabled them to escape the prejudices of the past and evaluate steel labor relations in a broad, long range and cost conscious manner.' Finally, the social and legisla­ tive climate of the 1950's must be taken into account. The Taft-Hartley

39 40

Act, the right-to-work laws, the Landrum-Griffin Act and the social, economic, and political attitudes of the rank and file enhanced manage­ ment's new initiative. These developments, moreover, Increased the opportunities for friction in the 1959 steel contract negotiation.

II

In the privacy of their offices, stated Tom Campbell, Editor-In-

Chief of Iron Age, steel executives discussed one of their biggest pro- blems—their feeling of loss of initiative and leadership in labor- l management relations.

In the late nineteenth century, it was comparatively simple for a steel executive to wield a strong personal leadership to ensure tightly knit productive teams. Workers, suppliers, and customers all knew the production and marketing operations of the individual firm, and their relationship to the company's goals. At the head of the firm, it seemed to later executives, stood not faceless executive bureaucrats, but real

1. Iron Age, August 28, 1958; I owe a debt to the editors of the journal, Industrial Relations, who had a symposium in 1961 and 1962 on changing attitudes in management-labor relations during th e l a te 195°rs. The following articles provided this writer with some fundamental assumptions (management aggressiveness, new generation of workers, defensive attitude of labor) for this chapter; See, Jack Barbash, "Union Response to the Hard Line ," Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October, 1961), 25-38; George Strauss, "The Shifting Power Balance In the Plant , n Industrial R e la tio n s, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May, 1962), 65 - 96; Frank C. Pierson, • '^Recent Employer Alliances in Perspective, ” Industrial Relations, Vol. 1 (October, 196l), 39-55; Herbert Northrup, "Management1s New Look in Labor Relations, ” Industrial Relations, Vol. 1 (October, 1961), 9-24. personalities identified closely in the public at large with the corpor­

ation. The steel entrepreneurs had unchallenged control over employ­

ment, wages, and working conditions. Attempts by the work force to

resist steel's rule was constantly squashed. Most notably, entrepre­

neurs such as Andrew Carnegie, Henry Frick, J. P. Morgan, and Charles

Schwab, inflicted decisive blows to the Amalgamated Association of Iron,

Steel, and Tin Workers in the Homestead Strike of 1892 and the general

strike against United States Steel in 1901.

Then came the period of rapid expansion. The very size and comp­

lexity of leadership requirements employing many people and making extra­

ordinary demands on the time, energy and thought of top executives, mad

personal leadership difficult. Besides, many steel executives believed

that mass production efficiency was based on an almost "mathematical

blending of machines, materials and men,” In the push for more produc­

tion, firm direction became the prevailing management philosophy. Cen­

tralization, bureautization and efficiency were the key in the philosophy

of firm direction. Two programs were developed to attain these ends.

The first was scientific management, which reached its peak between 1910 to 1920. Based on systematic job analysis, time study of job operations,

"its mechanical prejudice suited the current attitude toward and handling

of plant employees, many of whom were recent immigrants, who spoke little

2. Robert Brooks, As Steel Goes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^0), pp. 25-30; See also, Henry Pelling, American Labor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, i9 6 0), pp. 97-99* 42

English.” The second was the development in the 1920's of personnel management and welfare capitalism. It stressed a variety of techniques including employee representation in company unions, profit sharing, and 3 "benefit programs.

Under the guise of these various programs, the steel executives were able to resist union drives and maintain a firm hand in its affairs.

Most dramatically, they were able to defeat the union in the Steel

Stride of 1919; & strike which enrolled over a quarter of a million union I members. Paired against a centralized management was a dying labor organization. With its craft outlook, outdated constitution, its weak leadership, and its many defeats, the Amalgamated was unable to defeat the stubborn steel executives. Prom 1920 through 1933> the Amalgamated 4 never rep re se n te d as much as 10^ of the nation's steel workers.

The philosophy of firm direction worked—until the great depression.

Then, inflamed by union and government officials and searching for a villain, the public blamed management. Various charges against business

3. David Brody, Labor In C risis; The Steel Strike of 1919 (New York; J. B. Lippincott Co., 1965), pp. 15* 22-24,82; See also, Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Baltimore; Penguin Books Inc., 1966), pp. 174-179; Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor In America, 2nd edition (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 196077 PP. 255-259; Richard Lester, As Unions Mature (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 37-387

Harry Millis (ed.), How Collective Bargaining Works (New York; The Twentieth Century Fund, 1942), pp. 511-512; See also, Iron Age, July 2 , 1959; Brody, Labor in Crisis, pp. I 85-I 86; Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 197l), pp. 483-4-90. 43 leaders emerged out of the depression suffering— they were attacked as enemies of society, greedy, grasping, dictatorial, and anti-social. The steel corporation, United States Steel's chief negotiator Ifyron Taylor confessed early in the collapse, was at the mercy of society just like 5 any other business.

To counteract the charges against them, steel management became more responsible to society and the steel union; this new stance came as a result of force and willing acceptance. Some steel executives, such as Ifyron Taylor, Chairman of the Board for United States Steel,

Ben Fairless, President of Carnegie-Illinois and John Stephens, Indus­ trial Relations Expert for United States Steel, believed that there was no stopping the trend in labor advances and decided to willingly accept e the union, Taylor felt certain that the time was ending when an em-

5. Brody, Labor in Crisis, p. 181.

6 . In th e 1935 AFTj convention the platform of the industrial unionists was defeated, and on November 10 of that year the Committee for Industrial Organization was formed within the AFL. John Lewis and other leaders in the CIO were disappointed with the craft unions’ destruction of newly developed industrial organizations in mass pro­ duction industries. The past failures of the Amalgamated showed that the steelworkers could not be organized without outside help. The CIO launched its movement among the nation’s steelworkers in June, 1936 with the establishment of the Steel Worker's Organizing Committee. Under Philip Murray's leadership it replaced the nearly defunct AAIS and Tff, and established district headquarters in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Birmingham. While preparation for a nationwide strike was under­ way, however, an unexpected and dramatic statement was delivered. On March 1, 1937, John Lewis and Myron Taylor reached an agreement whereby Big Steel recognized the SWOC as the bargaining agent for its members, gave a 10$ wage increase, and accepted an 8 hour day and 40 hour week; See also, Harry M illis (ed.), How Collective Bargaining Works (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1942), pp. 516-517. ifii 7 ployer would tie free to fight unionization. Some other top United

S ta te s S te e l executives f e l t th e same way. '^Management had an o b lig a ­ tion,” explained John Stephens, ''to accept the realization of the day and make the best of the situation, because when employees as in United

States Steel, have indicated by substantial majorities a union prefer­ ence, there is incumbent on management the responsibility of making the union relationship as responsible, agreeable, and constructive as possi- a b l e . . . ”

The priorities of World War II forced other steel executives who had been previously hostile to unions, to submit to a new tune. Men such as Republic's Tom Girdler, National Steel’s Ernest Weir, Bethlehem's

Eugene Grace, and Inland's Joseph Block, some of whom went through the

1919 fracas, as well as, those who waded through the 1937 contracts and the Little Steel Strike of the late 1930's, were forced to change their vie'rs due to new conditions brought on by pro-labor governmental fiat

7. David Brodv in his work, Labor In Crisis (New York: J. B. Lippin- c o tt, 1965)* PP* l80-184, indicated that Taylor wanted to protect United States Steel's recovery. Secondly, he felt that the de­ pression ruined the faith that the steelworkers had in the company's welfare and paternalistic programs. Thirdly, the political change was favorable to unionism. Fourthly, he realized that he encountered a stronger union than the one in 1919* Although these factors aided Taylor to move accordingly, there was, however, one point that over­ rode the rest. Taylor felt that there was no stopping labor's ad­ vances and decided to accept on what he considered “honorable texm s. ”

8. John S. Stephens, Speeches Before Groups Outside the United States Steel Corporation, Vol. I (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel Corporation, 19^3)j p. See also, Robert LIvernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Wash­ ington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor7 19^1), p. ^5 and the war situation. “I won’t have a contract verbal or written, with an Irresponsible, racketeering, violent, communistic b o d y like the CIO,”

Tom Glrdler had protested in 1937, “and until they pass a law making me 9 do it, I am not going to do it. ” But the law and the necessity of a 10 war eco n o n y forced Girdler to recognize the steel union. Consequently, steel management, either through willing acceptance or force, formulated a philosophy on labor relations that centered around compromise and accommodation. Frederick Harbison, writing in How Collective Bargaining

Works, explained that the agreements of 1937 and 19^1 were an "expedient 11 conpromise for management in its relationship with the steel union. n

The changed posture of Industry had a direct effect on lab or-manage­ ment relations. Harold Ruttenberg, farmer steel union research director, maintained that the overall effect of management's altered attitude and action was their abdication of leadership in the whole area of employee relations to the steel union leaders. Management, he argued, continued a compromising collective bargaining program, one that accommodated the 12 steel union, and kept the union leadership content. To wit, John

9. Quoted in, Brody, Labor In Crisis, p. 186.

10. By l£?kl the National Labor Relations Board ordered the companies Involved to recognize the United Steel Workers, and rehire all workers who had lost their jobs through participating In the L ittle Steel Strike, and to accept collective bargaining. Stubborningly, resisting union pressure up to the last moment, the Little Steel executives were finally forced, due to war time emergency, to sur- ’ render through government intervention; See also, Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor In America (2nd ed., rev., New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Com­ pany, I960), p . 502 . 11. M illis (ed. ), How Collective BargyH ning Works, p. 5^2. 12. Harold Ruttenberg, "A New Program for Collective Bargaining, ” Management Record, 20 (March, 1958 )r 80. Stephens, speaking before the American Management Association, in 19Vf,

revealed the complaisant attitude of the steel companies. United States

Steel approached the 19^6 negotiation, explained Stephens, in hope of reaching a means to a peaceful settlement. Alter years of war and gov­

ernment control, it was essential to demonstrate that the interests of

management and labor could be submissive to their respective rights and privileges. United States Steel scrutinized all the alternatives and weighed the union* s probable reaction to no change in the light of im­ proved profits and higher living costs, and concluded that a strike should be avoided. “Reasoned judgment permitted no other conclusion,” remarked Stephens. "Prior to and during the negotiations we realized, whether rightly or wrongly, that we were burdened with a responsibility broader than to United States Steel alone. We considered th at... our negotiations might to some degree influence the framework within which \ private enterprise and unionism might operate in the near future... that our results might influence the econony for some unpredictable period...”

As the decade of the forties closed, however, the philosophy of compromise and accommodation did not succeed as much as industry or labor hoped. Industry, viewing the actions of the steel union as of a political nature, started to re-evaluate its labor relations policy.

Top executives, such as Joseph Block and Eugene Grace, had misgivings about their accommodating attitude. This group, wrote Iron Age, realized

13. Stephens, Vol. 1 Speeches, pp. 13^-135; See also, Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry, p. 63. ^7 that the more it gave, the harder it was when the new contract date came

around again. They realized that unions, with their grandiose demands 14 and “tub-thumping” for the public's edification, were a big business.

John Stephens suggested that the public attacks by the union against

the industry required a re-examination of United States Steel's stance

on cooperative relationship. Perhaps the position and optimism for its

workability was naive,” argued Stephens. “Such attacks,” he concluded,

“lead me to the conclusion at this time that if there is to be success

in the cooperative route... there must, as a condition precedent, occur

a resolution within the union circles of the question whether the trade 1 5 union is to be just that or... emerge... purely as a political force... ”

Yet in the late 19^0 's, the steel executives re-appraisal of its labor relations philosophy, assumed only a rhetorical form and, in actuality, the executives could not break with their New Deal commitments and men­ t a l i t y .

I l l '

Steel management, by the late 1950's, however, had come to view the actions of the union as immature, irresponsible, and of a political nature. Management believed that a firm stand in steel-labor relations was needed in view of persistent inter-union rivalry, alleged corruption and labor monopoly tactics, and leadership weakness within the steel

ll*. Iron Age, March 5, ±959? pp. 50-51.

15. Stephens, Vol. I Speeches, p. 183. m

union, itself.

Management viewed the steel union's immaturity as a result of the

rivalry between the AFL and CIO. Petty jealousies and craft and indus­ tria l union conflicts divided the united f‘House of Labor.” Jurisdic­ tional disputes between certain member unions of the AFL-CIO, especially between the Steelworkers Union and the Metal Trades Union, continued unabated throughout the 1950's. David McDonald, Head of the USWA, refused to relinguish construction work on steel company premises, traditionally 16 done by the steel union members, to metal trade workers. Personal feuds existed, moreover, between certain union leaders. To wit; David

McDonald and Walter Reuther, Head of United Auto Workers of America, had a strong religious and political dislike for one another. In London, in 19^9, Reuther and McDonald furiously debated the issue of the Christian

Unions of Europe entry into the International Confederation of Eree Trade

Unions. McDonald left London commenting, "he could feel the stirrings 1 7 of a cordial dislike for Walter Reuther..." Politically, McDonald dis­ liked Reuther for the disrespect he displayed toward Phil Murray, former head of USWA, at the CIO convention in 1952, MfiDonald stated that "when

Reuther turned the final CIO convention into a personal accolade without i s so much as a mention of Lewis and Murray, I walked out in disgust.”

16 . Eugene Skotzko, "A Review of American Labor in 1958, ” Monthly Labor Review, 82 (January, 1959), 17-18; See also, The Klplinger Washing­ ton Newsletter, February 28, 1959*

17. David J. McDonald, Union Man (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1 969 ), p . 215.

18. Ibid., p. 248. Also, rivalry for prestige in the newly united AFL-CIO caused hitter

fighting between George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, and Walter Reu- 1 9 ther, David McDonald, and James Carey. These actions convinced steel

management that union leaders made and often enforced demands that bore

no reasonable relationship to operable cost structures in order to in- 20 crease the prestige of their union as compared with other organizations.

Some steel executives warned the industry that the Jockeying for leader­

ship positions by union leaders, demanded that management exhibit a 21 large measure of aggressiveness and political insight.

The Steel executives' view of the union as irresponsible, emerged

in 1957 "when a Special Senate Committee on Improper A ctivities in Labor

and Management uncovered corruption within union ranks. Senator John

McClellan, Chairman of the committee, discovered a vast network of cor­ ruption throughout the entire Teamsters Union up to and including its 22 president, Dave Beck, who was also a Vice-President of the AFL-CIO.

19. ‘‘Where Unions Go From Here,” Nation's Business, b j (November, 1959)# 31-32; See a lso , “Showdowns in AFL-CIO R i f t ," B usiness Week (May 30, 1959)# 85.

20. Roger Blough, Free Man and The Corporation (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959)# p. 70; See also, Richard Lester, As Unions Mature, p. 28.

21. Joseph Block, “issues In Steel Bargaining,” an address before the Rotary Club of Los Angeles, February 13, 1959 (Chicago: Public Relations Department of Inland Steel, 1959)# p. 12.

22. Sidney Lens, The Crisis of American Labor (New York: Sagamore Press, Inc., 1959)# PP* 1I+8-I 5 O; See also, Henry Pelling, American Labor, pp. 203-204, 206, 207; Lester, As Unions Mature, p. 68. Moreover, David McDonald found himself faced with the prospect of tes­ tifying "before the McClellan Committee. Some union district directors requested the McClellan Committee to investigate the procedures in the

1956 steel union presidential election. McDonald acted quickly and "by cashing in on some political chips, avoided "being called "before the S 3 committee. This did not, however, prevent the steelworkers or manage­ ment from identifying corruption and monopoly tactics with the steel union’s national headquarters. A machinist wife in Utah complained:

“McDonald i s a d ic ta to r . The b a sic issu e s h a v e n 't been reso lv ed . The 2 4 power of the union is greater than that of the companies. E. J.

Hanley, President of Allegheny Indium, told steel officials to take advantage of labor's scandalous position. “One thing we can do, one thing we must do,” thundered Mr. Hanley, “is to bring monopoly unionism to the light of the day. We must point out racketeering, conspiracy, lawlessness, and contempt of the public generally are but consequences 2 5 of monopoly power.” “The. results of collective bargaining,” declared a United States Steel executive, “between the steel companies and the steel union have been motivated by the objectives of union monopoly 2 6 power. Here indeed we must search for a better way now."

23. McDonald, Union Man, pp. 257-259*

24. “As Steelworkers See It After 116 Workdays Lost, ” United States News and World Report, 48 (January 18, i 960), 48.

25. E. J. Hanley, “The Minutes of the Last Meeting," The Morning Pro­ ceedings of the General Session of the 67th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 28, 1959* The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959)* P* 1^3■ 26 . Roger Blough, “Has the Power of Big Unions Gotten Out of Hand?” United States News and World Report, 47 (November 2, 1959)* 82. 51

Finally, steel management considered McDonald's excessive demands at the "bargaining table a political maneuver to improve his leadership position. McDonald's personality, background and professional outlook contributed to membership dissatisfaction with his style of leadership.

Although David McDonald was a capable bureaucrat, he hardly radiated the charisma possessed by Phil Murray.

Phil Murray had little formal education. He left school in the sixth grade and went to work full time in the mines. In 1902, his family emigrated to America and settled in Western Pennsylvania. In 1920, he became Vice-President of the United Mine Workers, and in 1936, became

President of the United Steelworkers of America. His chief personal characteristics were his quiet and dignified manner, his intense modesty, his deliberate manner of speech, his simple taste, and his deeply-rooted 27- love of th e working man. Upon M urray's death many steelw orkers were quoted as saying: "We have lost the father of our union, no one can 28 ever have two papas.”

In contrast to Murray, McDonald came to the steel union as a tech­ nician. He worked briefly in the steel millB in order to help finance his college education. He graduated from Carnegie Institute of Technology and Duquesne with degrees in drama and accounting. In the early 1920's he became personal secretary to Phil Murray and proceeded to ride on his

2T. Robert R. R. Brooks, As Steel Goes, pp. 177-178* See also, Bern­ stein, Turbulent Years, pp.T4l-Ml-7.

28. Lloyd Ulman, The Government of the Steel Workers' Union (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19^2)7 p. 131. 52 mentor's coat tails to a position of power. At Murray's insistence,

McDonald was appointed Secretary-Treasurer for the steel union; he or­ g a n iz e d and managed conventions, handled collections and did the general housekeeping chores. As Head of USWA in 1955; McDonald emerged as a new kind of labor leader. He was always impecably dressed, as much at home in Pittsburgh's exclusive clubs, as he was in union halls. He made a good speech and had a fine command of language and grammar. He talked, 2 9 acted, and resembled a man found in management. As a steelworker in

Gary remarked: McDonald “looks more like a company-type man than a 3 0 labor leader.” Many steelworkers quite often accused McDonald of

Tuxedo unionism—a dilettante who had lost touch with the workingmen 3 1 he represented.

David McDonald's philosophy of labor-management relations differed somewhat from Phil Murray. Murray believed in union management coopera­ tion, but McDonald attempted to go beyond this with his program of mutual trusteeship. At the 195^ convention, he enunciated the essential

29. ‘tyhen 600,000 Go On Strike,” United States News and World Report, 4l (July 13, 1956), 7^-76; See also, “Steel Talks Start Under Cloud,” Business Week (May 2, 1959); 30; ‘^Don vs. D ave,” Newsweek, 55 (February 15, i 960), 77; New York Times Magazine, July 5; 1959; 18; Steel, August 2k, 1959; p. W; Ulman, The Government of the Steel Workers * Union, p. 131; Brooks, As Steel Goes, ____ , pp. 179-180.

30. Quoted in, "When 600,000 Go On Strike,” United States News and World Report, M (July 13, 1956), 77.

31. McDonald, Union Mian, p. 321; See also, Jack Barbash, American Unions: Structure, Government, and Politics (New York; Random House, 1967); p. 97. 53 features of this program:

In the operation of this mutual trusteeship, full considera­ tion must he given to everyone involved. The managers must give full consideration to the just claims of the workers. And the working force must see to it that the steel properties are operated successfully, because if they aren’t operated successfully, they will have no jobs. And both have an ob­ lig a tio n to th e owners, th e sto ck h o ld ers, because new money must flow In to avoid decadence. That we cannot tolerate. We have something new and v ital in the world in mutual trus­ teeship, and we are going to develop it . . . 32

McDonald's approach to labor-management relations convinced many steel­ workers to charge that he was living too close to management. In 1955,

McDonald commented that "I’ve been criticized on this account, for fig­ uratively going to bed with management. There are those who s till believe that labor contracts should be negotiated at arm's length, in 33 enm ity.”

Two successive political challenges—the first from a group of dis­ tric t directors and the second from the workers revealed further discon­ tent with McDonald’s leadership. In 1955, the first contested election for International Office in steelworkers history was held. Several dis­ tric t leaders, led by Joe Molony, opposed McDonald’s nominee for Vice-

President, Howard Hague, because he did not reflect the rank and file image of a union leader and charging that he was McDonald’s lackey. Ah intense and well-managed campaign enabled Hague to win the election. 34 The final tabulation gave Hague 400,017 votes to Molony’s 184,5^2.

32. United Steel Workers, Proceedings of the Seventh Constitutional Convention, 195^, PP* 11-12; See also, McDonald, Union Man, p. 240. 33. McDonald, Union Man, p. 237.

34. Ulman, The Government of the Steel Workers’ Union, pp. 138-139. Thus, the first contested election for International Office in the Steel

Union paved the way for the first contested election for the International presidency.

In 1957# Donald R arick and N icholas Mamula challenged McDonald fo r the presidency. With Mamula, Chief of a Jones and Laughlin local, as campaign manager, Rarick polled a surprising 223,516 votes to McDonald's

^0^ ,172, gathering support from the rank and file* who opposed a dues increase. Although Rarick and the other leaders of the Dues Protest

Group were defeated, they continued their opposition from behind the 35 scenes.

Steel management, in turn, felt certain that McDonald was concerned about his own standing. To them, it became apparent that he did not command the degree of reverence within the union which Phil Murray had aroused, and there was pressure on him to demonstrate that he had not become a tool of management. ‘‘For the next four years,” warned Iron

Age, '^David McDonald w ill be at it day and night proving to himself and 36 to others that he is as good as Phil Murray...” Similar sentiments were also expressed by several steel executives. “Steel union leaders,” explained Joseph Block, "believe that they must continually outdo one another to hold, their prestige and their Jobs. Such irresponsible action av is costly to the company. ” At the Kefauver Committee Hearings, in

35* Ibid., pp. 140-1^7; See also, Iron Age. February 28, 1957# PP* 35- 37; Lens, The Crisis of American Labor, pp. 220-221; McDonald, Union Man, pp. 255-257.

3 6 . Iro n Age, February 28, 1957# P* 36.

37. Block, “issues in the Steel Bargaining, ” p. 12; See also, The Iron Age, January 8, 1959# PP* 7# 30* 55

1959 } steel executives explained that McDonald had to get higher -wage increases in order to maintain his leadership position in the steel 3 8 union. Thus, McDonald's weak leadership convinced many steel execu­ tives that he would use the collective bargaining process as a political tool for his own ends.

IV

Inter-union rivalry, alleged corruption and labor monopoly tactics and weak leadership convinced industrialists that a changed philosophy in steel-labor relations was now a necessity. They called upon the steel industry to take the initiative at the bargaining table and win back the rights lost over the past fifteen years. They also contended that the steel industry should elevate men to top executive positions, who dis­ played a forthright attitude.,

The idea of formulating their own collective bargaining programs apparently never crossed the minds of industry's leaders, declared Harold

Ruttenberg, President, Stardrill-Keystone Company. ‘^They left that all to the union. Each year management would Just sit there with its heads poked through a hole in a canvas waiting for the labor leaders to throw their next demands at them, ” declared Ruttenberg. "Management can no longer postpone taking the initiative in formulating a fundamentally t sound collective bargaining program of its own. It must begin now.

38. Kefauver Committee Hearings (1959), 5212-5213. 56

Management must set the pace and pattern of collective bargaining and 3 9 industrial relations.”

Earle C, Smith, Director of Research for Republic Steel, stated

that the most crucial problem the American steel industry faced, was

making sure that men of superior intelligence, desire, and initiative

did not slip away. The steel leaders of today, stressed Smith, must be

even better, more skilled, and more Imaginative than the great men of the

past. **Phey must be, because the game is tougher. The tax laws, poli- « tical problem and social ideas of today have restricted the moves they v** * a 4 0 can make in their business affairs.” What Industry needed, concluded

Smith, were people who could make every unit produce at least double the

unit it replaced.

Speaking before the American Iron and Steel Institute in 1955,

Robert K. Burns, professor of economics from University of Chicago

stated: WI don't know what an executive development program is costing

us, but whatever it is, it is cheap. We are going to spend more on it. ' 4 1 I can't think of a better investment in our future...” This program, he explained, means better managers, better management, and a better

America in the future.

In an address to the American Iron and Steel Insitute at New York,

in 1957, Peter Drucker, management consultant and economist, spoke on

59* Ruttenberg, A New Program for Collective Bargaining, p. 80. IfO. Earle C. Smith, “People Are More Important than Things,” The Morning Proceedings of the Charles M. Schwab Memorial Lecture of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 25, i 960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 9 6 0), pp. 22-26. 4l. Robert K. Burns, “Management Development,” Proceedings of the Indus­ tria l Relations Session of the 65 rd General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26, 1955, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1955), PP* 376- 393. In an address to the American Iron and Steel Institute at New York,

in 195T, Peter Drucker, management consultant and economist, spoke on

executive attitudes and performance. Drucker believed that management

should put economic performance first in every decision and action. He

felt that management failed if goods and services desired by consumers were not supplied at prices the consumers were willing to, pay. He fur­ ther stated that the most common source of mistakes in management deci­

sions was the emphasis on finding the right answer rather than the right

question. He advocated strategic decisions for executives that involved

accurate ..understanding about situations and then changing them, or finding out what the resources were and what they should be.

The management of people, explained Drucker, was the second most important .area facing the steel industry. He .indicated that the educa­ tional background of the worker changed drastically during the 1950's .

In the fifties, 60% of the new workers came into the industry with a high school education. The worker, as a result of this education, had formed different expectations as to the kind of Job he wanted and to the way he wanted to be managed. Drucker warned executives that they had to change drastically their ideas on how to manage people. Management formed ideas from first hand contact with a labor force, which no longer existed. He maintained that in order to solve the problem of managing people, executives must take a broader view of their responsibilities and 4 2 a smaller interest in winning friends and influencing people.

42. Peter Drucker, “A Forward Look at the Management of People, ” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Sessions of the 64th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 24," '1956, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute, (New York: AISI, 1 9 5 6), pp. 218-231. Speaking "before the American Iron and Steel Institute, in 1958,

Ernest Dale, Professor of Economics at Cornell, indicated that top man­ agement in the past sought a more "socially conscious objective from their jobs.” Dale maintained that this idea led to an overemphasis on getting along -with people. This was important, but not enough in itself to help accomplish major goals. Industry, he pointed out, should seek men who thought in terms of long-run profitability, took risks, responded to financial challenges and maintained a philosophy of cost conscious­ ness. "Once the economic objectives,.” Dale argued, "have been reached-- there w ill be plenty of time and funds for management to meet the extra- 4 3 curricular social responsibilities.”

V

The steel industry adhered to the pleas of the various scholars and industrialists. Between 1955 and 1959) the chief executives or chief 4 4 negotiators of over half the major companies were replaced. These changes brought to the industry men concerned less with making friends and more in the ability to bargain and engage in power politics. Arthur

Goldberg, Chief Counsel for the TJSWA, commented that the steel industry's hardening of attitudes stemmed from the emergence of a new generation of

^3- Ernest Dale, "Motivating Management,” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Session of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 22, 1958, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1958), p. 3*&-

Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry, p. 111. business men. The past generation cultivated mutual understanding and

even friendship with the union. The generation of the 1950's, he pointed

out, tended to be organization men, with all of the parochial character- 45 istics of that breed.

Some of the major steel companies, through retirements and promo­ tions, elevated younger men into top management positions. Inland Steel,

in 1958 j publicized in its Annual Report, that top management changes were made in order to bring younger men into positions of greater respon­

sibility. For example, William G. Caples, lawyer, who had been President of Inland Steel Container Company since 19^6, was elected Vice-President 4 6 In charge of industrial and public relations. Tom Glrdler, after more than fifty-five years in various capacities in the steel, industry and after serving as Chairman of the Board of Republic Steel since its incep­ tion in 1950, relinquished his duties as Chairman and Director in August, 1 1956. Charles M. White, an engineer and President of Republic since ' 4 T 19^5 was elevated to the office of Chairman. John L. Neudoerfer was elected Chairman of Wheeling Steel in 1958, succeeding William W. Hallo- 4 8 way, who retired after forty-eight years of service. On October 31,

lj-5. “Copy of a Speech by Arthur Goldberg at the University of Wisconsin , n Goldberg to Secretary of Labor Mitchell, November 9, 1958 1 Box 110, 1958 Arthur J. Goldberg, James P. Mitchell Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower; See also George S. Odiorne, "A Management Style Change for the Sixties,” Michigan Business Review, 1^ (November, 1962), pp. 1-5. b 6 . Inland Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1958, p. 15.

Vr* Republic Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1956, p . 11. U8. Wheeling Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1958, p. 15. 60

1957, Eugene G. Grace, President, Bethlehem Steel, from 1916 to 19^5 and

Chairman since 19^5 retired and Arthur Homer, President since 19^5, 4 9 became Bethlehem’s Chief Executive Officer. Ben Fair less, Chairman of

United States Steel and John Stephens, Vice-President for Industrial

Relations at United States Steel, after more than thirty years of service,

retired respectively in 1955 and 1958* Roger.Blough, lawyer, became

Chairman and Conrad Cooper, engineer, was elevated to the position of 50 Executive Vice-President. The rise to top executive positions of

corporation lawyers and engineers, men with strong ideas, unhampered by

the prejudices of the past, with no firsthand knowledge of the steel­ workers community and the union role in it, breathed life into manage­

ment's new ideas of initiative and firmness in steel-labor relations.

Roger Blough and Conrad Cooper may be used as case-points in the

industry’s attempt to promote a new type executive. According to Iron

Age, Blough and Cooper were the force behind steel management's crusade to win back its rights lost over the past fifteen years. Prior to the

1959 steel contract negotiations, the eleven major steel companies deslg- 51 nated Blough and Cooper as the men in charge of the dug in position.

Roger Blough was not cast in the "steelmaker 1 s bluff, up-from-the- m ills mold.” He was an o u tsid e man, a law yer who got to th e to p by

49. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1957, p. 8.

50. United States Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1955, 1958, pp. 12, 10.

51. Iron Age, October 15, 1959, P* 62. 6 l

applying his logician's mind to the problems of heavy industry. Blough

had a lawyer's ability to prepare bargaining strategy thoroughly, before

talcing a stand o r malcing a move. U nlike Ifyron Taylor and Benjamin F a ir-

less before him, who were on friendly terms with the union leaders and

who believed in good labor relations, Blough was aloof and callous and

had a distinct sense of mission. The mission, as he viewed it, was to

free American industry from its subjugation to the trade unions, to

regain for management its rights and to inform the government not to in- 52 tervene in economic and industrial problems. As David McDonald ob­

served: Plough had a lack of humor and totally straightforward atti­ tudes on almost everything that came up, he epitomized all the unkind S3 things labor had been saying about management...”

On graduating from college, Mr. Blough taught school far three years, and then attended Yale Law School, graduating in 1931* His first

contact with the United States Steel Corporation was in 1938; he was

chosen special Counsel to Big Steel during the government investigations

of alleged monopolies. In his work, the young lawyer drew the attention

of high ranking officials. "I noticed,” said one top official, “that young Blough had the thoroughness, the tenacity, and the ability to get below the surface to develop facts... When an opening came up in the

legal end of United States Steel in 19^2, I suggested him for the ■

52. Paul Jacobs, VRoger Blough's Crusade,” The Reporter, 21 (August 20, 1959)* 19-20; ‘^Biggest Steelmaker,” United States News and World R eport, 38 (May 13, 1955), 1^-16.

53. McDonald, Union Man, pp. 203; See also, A. H. Baskin, '^Behind the Steel Deadlock,,rNew Leader, U2 (June 15, 1959)* 5* 62 54 Job.” Mr., Blough took it and moved steadily up the corporate ladder. « In 1955# he became Chairman of the Board, succeeding Ben Fairies s.

Boger Blough’s unique talents enabled him to attain much for United

States Steel. Blough reorganized Big Steel’s sprawling semi-autonomous subsidiaries, into divisions of one central corporation, that took re­ sponsibility for both policy and production. He worked hard for a standard cost system throughout the compary. He enlarged its saving 55 plans and he broadened the incentive program.

His business philosophy concerned itself with union monopoly power, corporate bigness, costs and worker's efficiency and harmony. He believed that it was time to ask the question as to whether the original purpose, so many honest people had in supporting the cause of unions had somehow gotten out of hand. '*Fhe forces of a powerful labor movement, ” he thun­ dered, “adopted objectives that largely contradicted the competitive principle itself. They also imperiled profits, the chief means to im­ prove production. All companies benefit fran inproved tools of produc­ tion, which profits must pay off and competition is what provides the environment in which profits are created. ” Yet today, stated Blough,

“wages and costs spiraled so far out of line that enough profits cannot be accumulated to buy the needed new tools.” Says Blough, (tfche problem 56 isn’t prices, it's costs.”

5h. “Calling the Next Turn on Inflation,” United States News and World R eport, k 6 (May 25 , 1959), H 1*.

55* "Blough of United States Steel,” The Financial Times (July 1, 1959), 10-

56 . Quoted in ‘ftoger Blough,” Time, 75 (June 8 , 1959), 9^* To Blough, the cost issue was important in consideration of the worldly challenge confronting American business. «We are only in the first skirmishes of a battle of production that is destined to rage for many decades,” he maintained. "Whether or not America emerges triumphant depends in large measure on our ability to win the tinder standing of

Government, of labor leaders, of investors in a national effort to en­

courage the investment of capital necessary to develop and acquire the 57 1 finest tools of production on earth.”

Blough was a strong advocate of corporate bigness and efficiency.

"Only big companies,” he pointed out, "can afford the research, build 58 the machines called for by present day civilization.” He also prided himself on United States Steel's achievements in efficiency. He indica­ ted that to enhance efficiency management had to take a benevolent auto­ cratic approach toward the employee while remembering that most employees liked a secure, structured job with appropriate discipline for failures.

“At times, ” Blough warned, " the vorker will have great need far specific direction, even for firm, but fair discipline, for he must turn out pro­ duction at a competitive cost; and if he interferes or fails, he must be 59 guided and encouraged by discipline.”

Blough's tough approach towards labor relations, was augmented by his colleague and friend Conrad Cooper. Cooper, Executive Vice-President

57. I b i d ., p . 9^.

58. "Calling the Next Turn on Inflation, ” United States Hews and World Report* **6 (May 25, 1959); 7^«

59- Blough, Free Man and the Corporation, p. ^5- 6k

United States Steel, succeeded John Stephens in 1958, as the industry's

chief "bargainer. John Stephens, former Director of Industrial Relations

at United States Steel, convinced the corporation, that it was good

"business to negotiate an agreement which represented a genuine attempt

to establish a permanent peaceful relationship with the union. As a

result of this effort, Stephens came to understand the steel union; many

problems were solved through private negotiations and good faith efforts.

Cooper, in contrast, tended to be reserved, forthright, and strictly

no-nonsense. In bargaining sessions, Cooper was calm and predictable.

He showed no interest at all in the Rhetorical by play that marked past 60 bargaining sessions.” “He’s an engineer,” said a union man. “He draws ■ < sx a line and follows it. He's a pretty cold-blooded person.” In 1952,

David McDonald commented: “I marked him then as a tough man to contend with. In my every contact with him, he was cold, one-dimensional, and

intransigent. Negotiating with him was rather like dealing with a corn­ ea puter programmed to say No.”

Cooper grew up on a South Dakota farm. In 1926, he played football, boxed and earned an engineering degree at the University of Minnesota.

Shortly after graduating, Cooper went to work as a field engineer for

Universal. Portland Cement Company, a United States Steel subsidiary.

60. Quoted in, R ig 5 Of "the Steel Strike, ” United States News and World R eport, k j (November 9, 1959), 59; See also, R teel Talks Start Under A Cloud,” Business Week (Mhy 2, 1959), p. 29.

61. Quoted in, Rig Steel's New Negotiator,” Fortune, 59 (March, 1959), 1 9 2. 62. McDonald, Union Man, p. 221. From 1929 to 1937? he worked for a firm called American Associated Con­

sultants, which specialized in helping companies install the Bedaux sys­ tem—an efficiency engineering program that lahor had long considered the

speed-up system. In 1936? he went to Wheeling Steel Corporation, as

assistant to the Vice-President in charge of operations. In 19^-5? United

States Steel hired Cooper to work out standard job classifications and wages for the entire steel industry. He worked for two years on this project and compiled a manual of job description and reduced one thousand jobs to thirty-two classifications. Cooper then attempted to formulate a new incentive program. Using elaborate time-motlon studies, he tried to establish a program based on a fair dayfs work. Steelworkers, however, refused Cooper's plan and called him the evil genius of the speed-up.

In 19^8, he was appointed Vice-President of industrial engineering and later in 1955? became Vice-President of administrative planning. In 1958?

Cooper became Executive Vice-President, a position that enabled him to cut through much of the red tape that had delayed decisions in other 83 y e a rs .

Cooper's proclamation of policy on management's prerogatives and connection to the work force contributed to steel's new policy of aggressiveness at the bargaining table. “I am certain,w Cooper argued,

“that the entire problem of wasteful practices is a job that must be tackled by management... It is a job that must be done...lest the wheels

63. Steel, March 9? 1959? PP* 32-33. 66

of competitive misfortune spin us beyond the point of no return..,”

Clearly, thundered Cooper, this vas not a task that could be accomplished amidst conflict and strife and useless debate about management's rights.

The need vas for acknowledgment and discharge of obligations. He ex­ plained that being responsible to the employees and the stockholders, management could not surrender its duty to the union leaders or anyone 6 4 e ls e .

Thus, Blough and Cooper represented the new tough school of manage­ ment. This new breed placed heavy emphasis on costs and efficiency, rather than on the more humane goals such as winning friends. Moreover, the collective bargaining process, as they perceived it, would be the means to these ends. But rather than compromising and accommodating, the new tough breed were going to be unyielding, relentlessly demanding and forthright.

VI

The initiative developed by the new breed of top management men was both part of and enhanced by the social and legislative environment of the 1950's. Steel management weighed its aggressive policy against the attitudes of the rank and file. The steel industry realized that

6k. Conrad Cooper, ‘‘Management' b Obligation to Manage,” an address before the Canadian Manufacturer's Association, Toronto, June 6 , i 960 (New York: Public Relations Department for United States Steel, 1960); See also, Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Indus­ try, p. 70-71. 67

the members of the steel union, unlike the 1930 workers, thought in middle

class terms—home, cars, and status. They also understood that the

workers received enough economic security to cause them to he more dis- 65 creet and far less violent than two decades in the past.

Jane Stewart, Vice-President for the Group Attitudes Corporation,

was hired hy the steel industry to take a survey of steelworkers a tti­

tudes. The survey revealed a remarkable shift in workers economic,

social, and political outlook. Wage Increases, according to Stewart, was no longer .the major concern of steel workers, because in many in­

stances they had already received substantial pay hikes. The steel­ worker who earned $120 week or more was not in real need like his brother

of the thirties. What he sought, she pointed out, was a better living

stan d ard . He wanted t o buy h is own home, save money f o r h is sons to go 66 to college, and own at least one car and a television set. A United

States Steel worker at Gary stated: “I don't think we need a raise.

I don’t think it makes sense. There are too many fringe benefits we could profit by, like paid up hospital and medical insurance. X am

6 5 . Many labor historians of the 1950's viewed the economic, political and social attitudes of the worker as middle-class, less m ilitant, and apathetic; See, Sidney Lens, The Crisis of American Labor (New York: Sagamore Press, Inc., 1959), pp. 258-239, Richard A. L e ste r, As' Unions Mature (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), PP. 29-357 B. J. Widick, Labor Today (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1964), pp. 39-40; Pelling, American Labor, pp. 183-184.

66. Jane Stewart, ‘The Evaluation,” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Relations Committee of American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26, i 960, The! Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 9 6 0), pp. 242-243. 67 thinking about the future.” A middle-aged worker at Fairless Hills,

Pennsylvania, said simply, “ l don’t want a wage increase. I ’m satis- 68 fied to keep working the way we are.”

The change from the 1930’s to the 1950's was both “psychological and philosophical.” In the depression, steel workers had thought that capitalism was impossible. By the fifties, however, many workers firmly believed in the American system. The average steel worker, having sur­ vived in three recessions since World War II, gained confidence in the capitalistic system. Moreover, the post-war steel contracts complete with unemployment compensation, union-management supplemented benefits and health and welfare programs altered the outlook of the average worker. The enormous progress of the USWA helped to rob it of its 69 missionary elan. The steelworker recognized that there was an area of conflict in short range matters with management, but as Stewart pointed out, the workers attitude could be construed as anti-enployer or anti-

6 7. Quoted in, “Do Steelworkers Want a Strike?” , United States News and World Report. b6 (May 1 8, 1959).

6 8. Quoted in, Ibid., p. If5 .

6 9. Various writers felt that labor’s decline in the late 1950's re­ stated from the union's loss of missionary zeal; See also, Strauss, The Shifting Power Balance in the Plant, 6 6 -6 7; Oscar Oraati, “The Current Crisis: A Challenge to Organized Labor,” Antioch Review, 20 (Spring, i9 6 0), ^2; Dick Bruner, “Has Success Spoiled the Union?” , Harvard Business Review, 3 8 (May 1, i9 6 0), 73-78; Barbash, Union Response to the Hard Line, pp. 36-3 8; Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press, i9 6 0), p. 222; Sidney Lens, The Crisis of American Labor, pp. 2^0, 29^-295; John Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: A Signet Book, 1 9 6 8), pp. 271- 272 ,“ 283^2 8^ 69 70 capitalistic in any long range sense. A soaking-pit worker in Birming­

ham concluded: “it isn't right to have a strike because everybody

suffers. I don't believe in the union holding a whip over the company's 7 1 heads...” A middle-age worker at Sparrows Point added: “A few hot­

heads might want a strike, but most of us figure it doesn't pay. If It

was to save the union that'd be different. But no one's trying to wreck 7 2 the union now. ” f*The company,” declared one steelworker, “has been 7 3 good to me.”

The new generation of workers,' moreover, became consumption con­

scious. Numerous families were so deeply committed to installment pay­

ments, that a long strike, involving possible threats of dispossession, was considered most unpopular. “I struck for six months once, ” explained

a steelworker, “when I worked far a coal mine. It took me three years to catch up and get ahead, so I could see ny way clear to do something 7 4 else. Some of the people In that strike never did catch up again.”

A worker at one plant commented: “I wouldn't favor a strike. I came-to

TO. Stewart, The Evaluation, pp. 2^2-2^3.

71. Quoted In, 1jffow Steelworkers Feel Now About the Strike," United States News and World Report, k l (October 12, 1959)* ^ 6 *

72. Quoted in, “Do Steelworkers Want a Strike?”, United States News and World Report, k6 (May 18, 1959)* ^ 6 .

73* Quoted in, Stewart, “The Evaluation, ” p. 2^2.

Ik , Quoted in, “Will There Be A Steel Strike?”, United States News and World Report, k6 (February 13* 1959)* ^6 . 70 work here just before the 1956 strike. I didn't have any credit anywhere

—at the store or anything. I lost all ny furniture, ny TV set, and my

I ontiac car. I couldn't keep up with the payments. No, I wouldn't want 7 S to go through that again. ”

The apathy of local members and officers weakened union's bargaining position. The steelworker was not strongly pro-union and often admitted 7 6 that he had little to say in the affairs of the national organization.

“I don't think the majority of the men want a strike,” explained a Beth­ lehem worker, "but, out of 1 3 ,0 0 0 in our l

75. Quoted in, *T)o Steelworkers Want A Strike?”, United States News and World Report, 46 (May 18, 1959)* 46; See also, Lens, The Crisis of American Labor, pp. 241-242.

76. Stewart, **The Evaluation, ” p. 243; See also, Widick, Labor Today, pp. 83- 85; Barbash, .American Unions: Structure, Politics, and Government, p. 37*

77* Quoted In, "How Steelworkers Feel Now About the Strike,” United States News and World Report, 47 (October 12, 1959)> 48.

7 8. Quoted in, Ibid., p. 48.

79. Ibid.. p. 47. "burgh worker gave this comment: 'There is a union committee that makes the policies. Many of them are getting salaries from the union. If anyone says something critical at a union meeting, half the people present 80 will holler for him to sit down, ”

Management realized that the internal make-up of the union prevented the worker from having a real voice in the decision making policy. Conrad

Cooper believed that a great majority of the steelworkers would have accepted the industry’s proposals, had they enjoyed the right to vote on them. 'The steelworkers,” he pointed out, 'had no such right, and long before the companies advanced a certain proposal, the union officials embarked upon a campaign of communication designed to convince the workers of the benefits that would accure as the result of a brand new 81 billion dollar bundle.” Due to this lack of representation, Cooper called upon management to take a firm stand at the bargaining table in order to protect the interest of the stockholder, the consumer, and the worker. )

VII

In addition to these factors— the conservative, apathetic and cau­ tious nature of the worker— management’s new found aggressiveness at the

80. Quoted in, 'how Steelworkers. Feel Now About the Strike, ” United States News and World Report, k-7 (October 12, 1959),

81. R. Conrad, 'The Three C’s of Steel Labor Relations,” an address before the Virginia Manufacturer’s Association, Hot'Springs, Virginia, November 6, 1959 (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel, 1959), P- H* 72

■bargaining table stemmed from considerable legislative support. In the

legislative sphere, the steel union "Has on the defensive. The possi­

bility for the union's restoration to the amicable political climate of

the Wagner Act withdrew constantly into the background.

The Taft-Hartley Act furnished the basic legislative foundation

for labor-management relations in the 1950's. Its purpose was to main­

tain an equal bargaining relationship between management and labor.

Thus, the unions were forbidden to force employees, refuse to bargain

collectively, to demand excessive dues, or to participate in either

secondary boycotts or jurisdictional strikes. Moreover, while manage­

ment were s till required to recognize and bargain collectively, they were allowed to fully express their views with regards to union organi- 82 z a tio n .

The Act also imposed additional restrictions which significantly

influenced union security. It prohibited the closed shop. A sixty-day

notice was required of intent to change or end a union agreement. This

act required every union official to post an affidavit certifying that he was n o t a member of th e Communist P a rty . I t a ls o en^hasized th e prerogatives of the public in relation with labor conflicts, placing

special restrictions on strikes, that might be viewed as creating a national emergency or imperiling the national health or safety. The for­

mat for handling such conflicts permitted a federal injunction to

arrest the proposed or actual stoppage.

82. Pelling, American labor, pp. 205-206; See also, Dulles, Labor in America, p. 373. 75 This "would he followed by a Bixty-day cooling off period, marked by the intervention of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service; a fif­ teen day period of voting on the employer's final offer; and a five-day period for the National Labor Relations Board, which administered the act, to certify the voting results. The injunction might then be lifted. If the dispute was still not settled, the President could re- 8 3 port to Congress with recommendations for appropriate action.

The Taft-Hartley Act was followed by a series of restrictive state laws, including the so-called right-to-work laws. These laws attacked the monopoly power of unions and limited its areas of collective bar­ gaining. Many states adopted the cooling off principle. About one- third prohibited sitdown, sympathy or jurisdictional strikes; restricted picketing, and required filing of union financial statements and other reports similar to the Taft-Hartley requirements. The steel union tried desperately to stop the spread of the right-to-work laws to steel union centers, but even as late as 1957 > Indiana adopted such laws. In addition, some states explored other protections for management in labor relations. In Arkansas, for instance, a drive outlawed feather-bedding by making it unlawful to require an employer to hire or use more workers 8 4 than he deemed necessary.

85. Ibid., pp. 57^-575; Joseph Payback, A History of American Labor (2nd ed., New York: The Free Press, I 9 6 6), pp. 599-416; Barbash, Union Response to the Hard Line, p. 26.

84. United Steelworkers of America, Work For Rights, Pamphlet No. 27, (Pittsburgh: Public Relations Department of United Steelworkers of America, 1958), p. 12; See also, ‘^States Get Tougher on Unions,” Business Week (September 12, 1959 )t PP* 145-146; Lester, As Unions Mature, pp. 144-14-5. The history of labor legislation in the 195°'s ended -with the pass­

age of the Landrum-Griffin Act. The major provisions under this law pro­

vided that terms in local unions were limited to three years; and in

national unions to five years; labor unions were required to file public

reports of their financial affairs; extortion and blackmail picketing

were prohibited. The act also moved moderately toward reversing the

Taft-Hartley policy by creating a so-called B ill of Eights for Labor.

For example, strikers were permitted to vote in Jurisdictional elections, 8 5 a privilege they had previously been denied. David McDonald admitted

that the various laws obstructed or prevented altogether the organizing

of workers into labor unions and provided employers a whole bag of legal

tricks they could draw on one at a time to delay collective bargaining 86 and strikes.

VUI

Thus, as the 1959 steel contract negotiations approached, manage­ ment united under one banner that read ‘faold that Line. ” (lFor the first time in all of the five other strikes since World War XI, the companies are holding fast, ” wrote John W. H ill, Chairman of H ill and Khowlton.

‘^This is a great shock to the union which is having difficulty accepting 8 7 the fact that they are face-to-face with a new situation. n

85 . Felling, American Labor, pp. 206-207; See also, Widick, Labor Today, PP* 73-75; Dulles, Labor In America, pp. 400-401.

86. McDonald, Union Man, p. 1 9 2. 87. John W. H ill to Victor Emmanuel, 62AF Box 19, July-August, 1959, John W. H ill Papers, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 75

In essence, "both sides were deeply convinced of the reality of their own problems. The steel union's response to management's increasing aggressiveness was defensiveness. David McDonald became convinced that management had adopted a conscious ideology, which at the very least, looked to reduce union power and, at the most, challenge the steel union existence, “it often has been said as steel goes, so goes the nation,” declared McDonald. “I want to paraphrase that to say that, in this case, as the United Steel Workers go in these negotiations, so may go the future fate of the entire trade union movement... I freely admit that at one time I held the hope that an era of mutual respect and under­ standing was possible in labor relations. Such conditions as we have es exposed in steel negotiations make for dissolutionment...” Arthur

Goldberg, special Counsel for United States Steel, explained the union's defensive stance as a response to management's new aggressiveness.

From the union viewpoint, explained Goldberg, this hardening of manage­ ment attitudes was regarded as part of a newly emerging industry philo­ sophy to replace genuine acceptance of and cooperation with unions by a program of labor-management relations keyed to keeping unions at arms 8 9 len g th .

88. “Unions Size Up Enployers Say They're Getting Tougher, ” United States News and World Report, b6 (June 29, 1959), p. 97; Labor's defensive response toward management during the late 1950*B "was expressed in Barbash, Union Response to the Hard Line, pp. 26, 29; Tom Brooks, “U. S. Labor On the Defensive, ” Hew Leader, h2 (August 31, 1959), PP. 9-10. 89. Arthur Goldberg, “A Union To Ease 'Cold War' Between Labor and Man­ agement,” United States News and World Report, Vf (December 19, i 9 6 0), p. 92; See also, 7!Labor Looks For Trouble Ahead,” Business Week, No. 1552-1556 (June 20, 1959), 58. Industry, contrary to the union, ‘became offensive minded in labor

relations. Steel management's aggressiveness grew out of its convinction

that the stability of the econony required resistance to union demands,

and that unions -were too powerful and were over-reaching themselves, and

misinterpreting management's viewpoints to the employees. The steel

union, explained Harry Lumb, Vice-President for Republic Steel, seemed

completely and fully dedicated to continue the problems of the industry.

“Based on our experience over the past twenty years,” maintained Lumb,

“union's maturity towards recognizing management's indispensable author­

ity and responsibility is and for the forseeable future w ill be far 9 0 down th e ro a d .. . ”

Many other executives felt that the steel union had overreached

itself to the point of irresponsibility. Robert Heath Larry, Adminis­

trative Vice-President of Labor Relations for USS, maintained that

“labor had pushed too fast and too far and that the increased power of

the labor was often abused. ” The path management had to follow over the years, argued Larry, was clearly unbearable and they realized the time had approached when it had to try to do something. It was clear to management that It had to curtail union's irresponsible and immature

action. He concluded, stating that one of the most disturbing things

about the union’s political make-up was the seeming necessity to talk

90. H. C. Lumb, "Collective Bargaining in Steel,” an address before the Employers* A sso ciatio n of Summit County, Akron, Ohio, November 19, 1959 (Cleveland: Public Relations Department of Republic Steel, 1959), P. lh. 77

In terms of a victory. "I fear, ” commented Larry, "if the industry had itself proposed the same terms of the 1959 settlement to the union either at the same time, or any prior time, the union couldn't have taken them.

There would have heen no victory, which seems to he a political necess- 9 1 ity. ”

Consequently, these attitudes laid the groundwork for the friction in the 1959 steel contract negotiation. **The steel industry's steellike refusal to consider any wage increase this year," reported The Christian

Science Monitor, "is based on more than just a will to bargain for the most. It is the outcome of a rapidly hardening attitude in industry 92 toward labor.” (*The companies,” warned Paul Carraham, Chairman for

Great Lakes Steel, ^xave insisted.. .that bargaining be a two-way street— 93 something it has not been before... ” The factions first turned to fight their case in the public communications media.

91. R. Heath Larry, ^ost-Mortem Steel Bargaining, 1959*” an address before the Industrial Relations Conference of Associated Industries of Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, April 14, 19 60 (Hew York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel, i 960), pp. 16-17; See also, R. Heath Larry, "Industrial Relations for the Future, ” Vital Speeches, 27 (January 1, 19&L), 176-181.

92. The Christian Science Monitor (July 13* 1959)* P* l6 .

95* *foadio T ra n sc rip t, ” The S te e l C ontroversy; What is i t A ll About, FMCS, Archives Branch, national Record Center, Suitland, R. G. 280, 1959, DCF-259-3268. CHAPTER III

COURTING THE PUBLIC

As indicated try their frequent public statements and appeals for

public support, both the United Steel Workers of America (USWA) and the

steel manufacturers were quite concerned about the public's attitude

toward the merits of their respective positions in the 1959 pre-strike

and strike period. Both sides sought to influence public sentiment in

their own favor. This led to one of the most powerful and sustained propaganda campaigns since the USWA won their first contract in 1937.

V irtually a ll known communications media was used—newspapers, magazines,

radio, movies, television, company and union publications, news releases

and speechmaking. Each group's campaign was, to some degree, responsible

for the state of opinions which prevailed during the 1959 s tr ik e .

II

In th e 1950* s se v e ra l business., groups made system atic attem p ts t o

create a climate of public sentiment adverse to labor. The Institute of

Life Insurance and the Sound Dollar Committee provided the original

impetus. They sought, through a newspaper advertising campaign, to arouse public opinion opposing an inflationary economy. They related union monopoly power to inflation in their advertising rhetoric.

78 79 The Life Insurance Group initiated a publicity program intended to alert the public that inflation was dangerous to all. As the Korean War brought an increased inflation the Institute’s campaign reminded Americans at home that they could do their share by helping prevent Inflation.

Following a brief period of “stability” the country, was hit by a recession and the Institute again admonished the public that inflation was the greatest of all evils. However, it was not until March 23? 1959 that the Institute launched its largest newspaper advertisement campaign against inflation. Donald F, Barnes, the Institute’s Vice-President and

Advertising Director, stated “we decided the time had come to take off the gloves... And the advertisements are harder-hitting than ever l before.” The Insurance Group's 1959 campaign reached 46,000,000 readers in 575 newspapers. The Institute felt that It was fighting not only the issue which must have severely affected Its particular industry, bub one V. o f th e Immense problems of a l l American b u sin e sse s.

In conjunction with the Institute’s efforts, The Sound Dollar Commit­ tee of New York Initiated a similar campaign. In April, 1959? The Sound

Dollar Group asked newspapers throughout the country to participate in the fight against inflation. The Commitee requested the public and the local corporations to take an active part in the actual presentation of

1. Quoted in, “Gloves Off In New Fight on Inflation, ” Editor and Pub­ lisher, 92 (April 25, 1959)? 28. The Institute, with a membership of 170 life insurance companies, represented 96$ of the life insur­ ance in the country, invested $1,800,000 in advertising for 1959. Seven ads were used in the 1959 series. They were tied together with the sign off line, “inflation is the cruelest tax of a ll,” and a simple drawing of a warfe with the label “inflation” on his swollen b e lly . 80

the propaganda material. Edward A. Rumely, Executive Secretary of the

Commiteee, sent a letter to 2,000 editors and publishers in which he

argued, "if inflation continued to increase, great losses would he suf- 2 fered hy newspapers and every business enterprise in the country. "

In 1957# The N ational A ssociation of M anufacturers a ls o commenced a

campaign against union monopoly power. Part of their effort was a pam­ phlet entitled "Monopoly Power As Experienced by Labor Unions" which they asked the public to put an end to compulsory union membership in any 3 form. Mr. Robey, NAM Advisor, contended that anti-trust regulation of unions was needed in order 'to deal with the economically destructive 4 effects in the labor market by union leaders."

The launching of the ambitious public relations projects of these business groups blended with the thinking of the new leaders in the iron and steel industry. Many steel officials and their allies in local in­ dustrial associations thought it necessary to cooperate with The Sound

Dollar Committee and the Institute of Life Insurance. Moreover, the steel companies adhered to the National Association of Manufacturers drive against union monopoly power. Edward J. Hanley, President of

Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation, warned steel officials that control

2. Quoted in, "Sound Dollar Group’s Ads Hits Inflation,” Editor and Publisher. 92 (April 25, 1959)# 32.

5. United Steelworkers of America, Work Por Rights, pamphlet no. 27# (Pittsburgh: Public Relations Department of United Steelworkers of America, 1958)# PP. 28, 98.

4. Quoted In, U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings, on the January, 1959 Economic Report of the President, 86ith Cong., 1st Sess., Pursuant to Sec. 5 (A) of Public Law 30^ (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1959)# P* 600; Hereafter cited as, Hearings on the January, 1959 Economic Report of the President. 81 of monopoly unionism vas necessary "before the country could confidently

"begin i t s next "big cycle of growth and p ro g re ss. '^?he annual wage in ­ crease, ” he argued, *bad "been virtually institutionalized in many sectors 5 of our economy "because of the power of monopoly unionism.” George M.

Humphrey, Chairman, National Steel Corporation, asked steel officials to get involved in politics so anti-trust laws would "be passed. Mr.

Humphrey further urged a ll "businessmen to take personally a far greater e part in public relations activity.

At the public relations session of the sixty-third annual meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, Donald R. James, Director of

Public Relations, expressed the need for further expansion of public relations activity. At the same meeting, Mr. Delman K. Smith, Vice-

President, Opinion Research Corporation, reported the findings of the survey conducted for the Institute. The results showed that there were four problem areas in which the Institute and the individual companies had made little progress. First, the general public considered the steel n a dangerous place in which to work. Secondly, the public considered steel profits too high* Next, many people "believed there was not enough competition in the industry. Finally, the public thought

5. E. J. Hanley, ‘*Uhe Minutes of the last Meeting, ” The Morning Pro­ ceedings of the General Session of the 67th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 28, 1959, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959), P* 175*

6 . George M. Humphrey, “The Fine Print on the Ballot Requires Business's Concern with P olitics,” The Evening Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Session of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 28, 1959, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1959), P* 99* 82

that the industry was inamiable toward its employees. Consequently,

Mr. Smith called upon the industry to wage a public relations program 7 that would eradicate the public's misconceptions.

It was not until public opinion weighed heavily against the industry

during the 1956 steel strike, however, that a systematic public rela­

tio n s program began. As Phelps H. Adams, V ice-P residen t o f U nited

States Steel asserted: '‘The greatest obstacle to public understanding

of our case in 1956 was economic ignorance—a handicap that cannot be

overcome by a crash program of publicity, but only through a painstaking 8 and continuing process of economic education. ” The repercussions of

th e 1956 steel wage settlement were widespread within the industry.

There were those in the industry who realized that a new public con­

science was now a must. Thus, individual companies and the American

Iron and Steel Institute began a three and one-half year public relations program through which they pleaded their case.

in

In d iv id u a l companies commenced t h e i r p u b lic re la tio n s program imme­ diately after the 1956 wage settlement. Sixty-four companies initiated

7. Dilman M. K. Smith, '^Public Opinion Survey Results,” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Public Relations Session of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 25, 1955* The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1955); PP. 175-187.

8. Phelps H. Adams, '*Phe Performance,” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Rela­ tions Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 2^ I960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), p. 225. 83 9 new activities in thirty-one general areas of community relations. The companies’ made great strides in employee communications, plant visits, and educational cooperation. Republic Steel and United States Steel may he used as case-points in industry’s attempt to influence public opinion.

“in the early days of our communication program in Republic,” de­ clared the Company's President Thomas P. Patton, “we made the common error of letting the men in industrial relations, public relations, and advertising carry the entire responsibility of telling our story to our employees and the public. We found that this was a serious mistake, and we have gradually broadened and deepened the participation of a ll manage- xo ment in the communications program.” Consequently, in 1956, Republic formulated a set of Ten Commandments of Communication for a ll management personnel to follow. They read as follows:

1. Communications must be part of the job of every man on the management team.

2. Seek to improve your communications with your employees every day in the year, not merely when trouble is brewing.

3. Do not underestimate the intelligence of your employees, or their desire to be loyal to the company.

4. Accept your employees' labor union as a fact of life.

5. Seek to understand the fears and aspirations of your em­ ployees, for out of understanding comes wisdom in indus­ trial relations.

9. Max D. Howell, “Keeping Pace with the Steel Industry, ” The Morning Proceedings of the General Session of the 64th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Insitute, May 24, 1956, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1956), p. ?4.

10. Thomas P. Patton, '*The Future, ” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Rela­ tions Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 2b, i 960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), p . 253* 84

6 . Seek to promote public •understanding of your policies and problems, for if you do not you w ill regret it at bar­ gaining time.

7. Strive to educate your employees and the public in the basic facts of economic and business practice, otherwise your “words w ill fa ll on barren ground.

8. Communicate in simple language, otherwise you w ill be talk­ ing to yourself.

9. Do not speak only with words, but with deeds.

10. Listen as well as speak, otherwise you w ill be talking to yourself and those who already agree with you.1*.

These prescriptions had practical effects, especially relating to the worker and industrial safety. In 1957, for instance, Republic held some 140,000 safety meetings in all its departments. The firm worked with the Human Engineering Institute keeping the employees informed of the technological changes in their jobs. It did so in an atmosphere of improved relations with local plant communities, which it tried to foster by incrementing assets of their charitable and educational trust.

Republic sought to communicate this posture of public concern through i s greater utilization of their employee magazine, Republic Reports.

Much like Republic Steel, United States Steel emphasized the need for a broad educational program; if successful, it would be meritorious.

Doing this job effectively, various officials of United States Steel delivered talks to a wide variety of audiences on subjects dealing with

11. Ibid., pp. 48-49-

12. Republic Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1956, pp. 10, 29-50; 1957, p. 29; I960, P. 3. 85 wages, inadequate depreciation, taxes, profits, prices, and the effects of foreign competition. To wit, on November 9, 1956, Roger Blough ad­ dressed the National Editorial Association and talked at considerable length on the problem of inflation. Similar speeches were given by other high ranking officials. Robert C. Tyson, Vice-President of United States

Steel, before the National Industrial Conference Board and the Executives

Club o f th e G reater Boston Chamber of Commerce, commented on th e p ro - 13 blems of taxation and technology.

United States Steel further broadened its public relations acti­ vity by preparing special reports for their employees. A special report t, written In 195T concentrated on those items of greatest interest to the production worker. The special reports, moreover, told the story of 14 American industry and how it served the needs and wants of people.

United States Steel also utilized the television media to inform the public of Its economic story. Televised on the United States Steel

Hour In 1958 were several economic messages that explained the profit

Btory and other facts about United States Steel. The messages emphasized that "in a very real sense, profits and the tools of production were the 15 self-same thing—that you can’t have one without the other.” This

13. These three speeches came from the Public Relations Department of United States Steel, N.Y., N.Y. Roger M. Blough, "inflation as a Way of Life,” an address before the National Editorial Association, Chicago, Illinois, November 9, 1956; Robert C. Tyson, "Our New Kind of Inflation,” an address at the klst Annual Dinner of the National Industrial Conference Board, May 1 6 , 1957; Robert C. Tyson, Recess­ ion With Inflation,” an address before the Executives Club of the G reater Boston Chamber of Commerce, A p ril 18, 1959* lk. United States Steel Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1958, p . 22. 15. Phelps H. Adams, ‘The Performance,” p. 227. 86

Beries was awarded a Freedom's Foundation Medal of Honor.

In conjunction with the individual company campaigns, the American

Iron and Steel Institute formulated and executed a program of its own.

It included "broad communications activities centered about Institute publications, Steelways and Steel Facts. The two journals emphasized the industry's safety training record, good-house keeping program, and technological advancement. The American Iron and Steel Institute jour­ nals stressed that due to industry's efforts, steel employees were i s safer in the mills than they were in their own homes.

The Institute also emphasized its regional technical meetings.

The technical papers delivered at these meetings kept the community and the steelmen abreast of the rapid advancements made in the industry.

The meetings offered an opportunity for newspapermen and educators to better acquaint themselves with the men of industry and understand the 1 7 problems confronting steel.

Another basic element in the Institute's program was its improved and enlarged statistical services. The statistics presented by the

Institute were valuable to statisticians and students of industry.

Analyzed and presented in readable form, they were the basis for nearly

16. Max D. Howell, “Annual Report on Institute Activities for 1957,” The Morning Proceedings of the General Session of the 65 th General Meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 2 6, 1957* The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, 1957 )j PP* 63- 6^; See also, E. J. Hanley, f*Phe Minutes of the Last Meeting,” p. 73.

1 7. Ibid., p. 63. all three hundred press releases issued annually by the Institute. In

1956, the statistic department published three new booklets entitled, \ Expansion In S te e l, More S te e l and More Jobs and S te e l 1 s Progress which

supplied editors, writers and the public with factual background inf or­ i s matlon on technology, wages, production, profits, and competition.

The Institute's public relations activities included cooperation with educators in developing materials and projects of mutual interest.

An important aspect of this program was the community resources work­

shops for teachers, sponsored by colleges and universities in coopera­ tion with steel companies. A to tal of eighteen community workshops existed by the end of 1957, with an attendance of about five hundred 19 te a c h e rs.

The Institute's advertising program was s till another important part of the public relations effort. The American Iron and Steel Insti­ tute, between 19 5 ^ and 1959, developed a series of continuous advertise- » ments each touching on one of the industry's four problem areas. The ad campaign for 195^ consisted of two series of advertisements. The first series of eight ended in April. The second series ended in Sept­ ember. The following year demonstrated a series of six advertisements which appeared in the news media having a combined circulation of about forty million readers. Mid-way through 1958, the Institute began a

18. Ibid., p. 299.

19. Ibid., p. 6k; See also, United States Steel Corporation, Annual Re­ port to Stockholders, 1958, p. 23. series of five ads devoted to the areas of competition, size of profits,

technology and inflation. The first ad in the series publicized the

small amount of profit received "by the companies after taxes and plant

improvements. Still another ad indicated how steelmen utilized techno­

logy to make for cheaper and safer products. Among other ads in this

series, two dealt with the problem of competition. The first demonstra­ ted how some two hundred and fifty companies, big and little were in a continuous battle for business twelve months a year. The second ad dealt with foreign competition and showed how each steel plant was in constant competition with the producers of other metals here and abroad.

The final ad in the series depicted two mountain climbers tied together.

The first climber represented average hourly earnings and the other out­ put per man hour. The ad emphasized that if inflation was going to be licked the two climbers were going to have to stick together better than 20 they have been.

Early in 1959 the Institute started a series of nine ads given to the theme that “Inflation Robs Us A ll.” The ads hammered at five major themes: The improved status of steelworkers over the years; the impor­ tance of productivity through machines as well as men; the industry 1 s need for profits to finance expansion and modernization; the danger of pricing steel out of competition with foreign steel and with other materials; and the inflationary dangers of wage increases that were out

20. Advertisements appearing in various newspapers on May 5, May 26, June 2, June 16, and September 29, 1958, were reproduced and sent to me by Bertis E. Capehart, Director, Education Department, American Iron and Steel Institute. 89 21 of line with the workers' contribution to productivity. The Institute

and the H ill and Knowlton Company decided to place the ads in some four hundred and thirty newspapers at two week intervals starting in January

and concluding "before contract negotiations in May. At that time, "both

groups agreed, a second and separate campaign would get under way,

sponsored "by the Steel Companies Coordinating Committee—the negotiating 22 group.

IV

The USWA, meanwhile, commenced their pre-negotiation campaign in

January, 1959 under the direction of the Robert Wilt man Company. In a weekly series of ads in some forty newspapers the union stressed how an extra one billion dollars in the pockets of 1, 250,000 steelworkers * would bring substantial benefits to the whole economy. The first series of ads were aimed at automobile manufacturers. It read "There is our

'59 model! One billion dollars in new money for your automobile dealer and you! ” Subsequent ads, a ll headed "Memo to ..., ” appealed to other

21. Advertisements appearing in 430 newspapers on January 27, February 10, February 23, March 9, March 23, April 1, April 13, April 20, and April 27 were reproduced and sent to me by John W, H ill, chairman of H ill and Knowlton Co.; See also, "Steel's Advertising Attacks Inflation," Editor and Publisher, 92 (June 6, 1959), 24.

22. "Adversaries in Steel Fight It Out in Advertisements,” Business Week, Wo. 1553-1556 (June 6 , 1959), 25-26; See also, John W. H ill to Conrad Cooper, April 15, 1959, 62AF Box 19, John W. H ill Papers, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, Mr. H ill informed Mr. Cooper that the financial arrangements for the negotiation part of the campaign were to be kept entirely separate from the agreement H ill and Knowlton, Inc., had with the American Iron and Steel Institute. 90 2 3 industries. In special messages to the .American people, David J.

McDonald, the Union President, asserted: “America's greatest hope is

the prosperous steel "worker, the prosperous farmer, salesman, teacher, 2 4 and businessman. What helps one, helps a ll.”

The USWA also disbursed money for radio and television time. Union

locals and districts sponsored a fifteen minute weekly radio program

featuring Phil Reagan, the Singing Cop of stage, screen, and radio.

Each program included a two minute union message to the public. This 2 5 was a twenty-six week series. The union, moreover, sponsored a TV

Meeting of the Month Program over forth strategically located stations.

The February program stressed the unions 1 pre-negotiating theme: “Only people have purchasing power... Only people can buy and use the goods 2 e turned out by American industry.” Furthermore, the monthly program

continually emphasized the philosophy of the union.

Of course, Steel Labor, the union's national newspaper, marked the party-line pitch to the union rank-and-file.

23. “Ads Play Key Role In Steel Pay Dispute As Contract Time Nears,” Printers Ink, 267 (April 3, 1959), 15; See also, “Ad Battle of Steel Institute, Steelworkers Union Near End As Contract Talks Approach,” Advertising Age, 30 (April 20, 1959), 68; “Steelworkers Union Starts Newspaper Ads/” Editor and Publisher, 192 (February 7, 1959), 28.

2k. Quoted in, Iron Age, February 19, 1959, p. 83*

23. Steel Labor, July, 1959, P* 5; See also, Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1959*

26. Steel Labor, January, 1959, p. 2; July, 1959, P- 5; See also, Iron Age, February 19, 1959, p. 2; Radio Script, August, 1959, Local Union 1533 (Beloit), The State Historical of Wisconsin. 91 V

The pre-negotiation phase of the campaign terminated with David

McDonald's rejection, on April 10, of the Steel Companies Coordinating

Committee contract proposal. Consequently, "both Steel and the union

created additional means in order to influence the public.

The industry's program was mainly concerned with enlarged tele­

vision and radio communication. Nationally, H ill and Knowlton was

responsible for news releases. The deliverances were issued from Hew

York "by one of the officials of the twelve companies. The regional

offices of H ill and Knowlton in Pittsburgh, Chicago, Cleveland, Los

Angeles, and Washington handled local releases. ^Cn other sections of the country, the South and Southwest, where H ill and Knowlton had no

offices, the public relations department of the local company in these V- 2 7 areas handled the campaign.

Moreover, a national network of teletype and TWX facilities were

set up by Hill and Knowlton. The teletype enabled the full text of a n

industry releases to be delivered into the hands of newspaper, radio. and television stations in all parts of the country, and especially in • 2 8 plant towns. A group of minutemen handled appearances on television and radio for the purpose of refuting false and misleading statements.

2T. "Program Memorandum, ” John W. H ill to Robert Heath Larry, April 28, 1959* 62AF Box 19, The John W. H ill Papers, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin; subsequently cited as, Program Memorandum.

28. Program Memorandum, p . 3; John W. H ill, "What We Learned Prom th e Steel Negotiations,” Public Relations Journal, 36 (August, i 960), p . 6 . 92

Each company head designated three individuals in his organization to he 2 9 a v a ila b le to make such appearances.

The Steel Company Coordinating Committee (SCCC) set up fifteen weekly minute telecasts setting forth the steel companies' position in the bargaining; and each telecast was followed by a repeat on a radio network embracing most of the steel plant communities. The companies, moreover did a series of radio interviews on tape which were broadcast 3 0 three times a day over stations in the various plant town communities.

Furthermore, the SCCC presented a slide film to small groups of

Congressmen, editors and reporters and representatives of veterans organizations, farm organizations, and chambers of commerce. This kind of informal presentation with groups of opinion leaders in their own 3 1 areas proved quite successful.

Special consideration was given to newspapers throughout the strike period. The SCCC gave weekly luncheons to the writers covering the strike and arranged four special luncheons for the senior newspaper executives of the New York Times, the Harold-Tribune, the Scripps-Hcward 3 3 publishers, the U.P.I. and Hearst.

29. Program Memorandum, p. 3i See also, “What the Steel Settlement Means to .America," a text of a telecast by Roger Blough over the N.B.C. television network, January 4, 1960. The companies for the first time bought nationwide T.V. time to present a full, uninterrupted statement of their case to the American public. 30. Program Memorandum, p. 4; See also, Adams, “The Performance, ” p. 234-236. 3 1 . Program Memorandum, pp. 4-5. 32. ‘(Recommendation Program," John W. H ill to Steel Companies Coordina­ tin g Committee, May 11, 1959* 62AF Box 19* John W. H ill P apers, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, pp. 1-3. 95

The coordinating committee also authorized a series of weekly

studies of steel-workers attitudes. The Group Attitudes Corporation,

a subsidiary of H ill and Knowlton, made these surveys in a ll of the

major steel communities. Week after week, for over two months, these

studies gave top executives a candid and reliable picture of steelworker 33 a ttitu d e s .

Three reference books, entitled Economic Matters of Fact, The Steel

Negotiations and You and Facts for Management, provided facts and figures

to support the industry1s stand. The books were distributed to editors,

writers, and all management personnel. The books became the “Bible of

the steel companies and enabled them to te ll at the local level the 34 story that the SCCC was publicizing at the national level.”

Meanwhile, the USWA advanced its public relations program during

the negotiations and strike period. The union’s newspaper ad campaign used more direct talk and drove home points a little harder than the

earlier ads. For example, the USWA ran on May 4, in forty newspapers

33. Jane Stewart, “The Evaluation,” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Re­ lations Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 2 6 I960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), pp. 241-251. 34. This speech was reproduced and sent to me from the H ill and Knowlton Company. John G. Mapes, '*Ehe S tory of Communications in th e 1959 Steel Negotiations,” a talk before the Industrial Information Insti­ tute, Youngstown, Ohio, February 29, I960, p. 3; See also, American Iron and Steel Institute, Economic Matters of Fact: A Steel Data Book (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1959 )t S te e l Companies Coordinating Committee, The Steel Negotiations and You undated (New York; Steel Companies Coordinating Committee); Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, Facts for Management undated (New York: Steel Companies Coordinating Committee). the union position on wage augmentation, The ad demonstrated a trea­ sure chest containing the fantastic first-quarter profits far United

States Steel with the caption reading, "Shame on United States Steel 35 for trying to deny its workers a raise.”

More importantly, the USWA conducted speaking campaigns "by top union executives to influence the public and the workers. David McDonald,

I. W. Abel, Howard Hague, and Arthur Goldberg endlessly visited plant districts throughout the country to clarify the union's message to its 30 members.

As the strike progressed the USWA printed numerous pamphlets that were eventually sent to all the members. The most influential pamphlets were entitled, Fact-Finding In the Steel Dispute, The 1959 Steel Strike, 37 and Steelworkers and Automation.

The industry and the union's newspaper ad attack continued through­ out the remainder of the strike. The industry, especially, continued

3 5 . "There'b A Basic Weed for Labor Communication,” Advertising Age, 30 (June 1, 1959), 7 6 .

3 6 . Steel Labor described seme of the tours of the picket lines and the district plants by top union executive officials; See Steel Labor, July, 1959, IX, p. 11; Steel Labor, July, 1959, p. Steel Labor, August, 1959, II, PP. 2, 11; Steel Labor, September, 1959, pp. 5, 19.

37. United Steelworkers of-America, Steel Workers and Automation, Pamphlet No. PR-129 (Pittsburgh: Public Relations Department of United Steelworkers of America, 196l); United Steelworkers of America, The Foreign Conpetition Hoax (Pittsburgh: Public Relations Department of United Steelworkers of America, 1959); United Steel­ workers of America, Work For R ig h ts, Pamphlet No. 27 (Pittsburgh: Public Relations Department of United Steelworkers of America, 1958). to refine its ads in order to clarify their message to the public.

VI

Did the public relations campaigns obtain results or did they merely

express Jaw-wagging? More specifically, who benefited the most from

the communication effort?

The industry's campaign opposing inflation and foreign competition

■was remarkably successful. Editorials in newspapers and magazines ran

generally in favor of the companies anti-inflat ion drive. ffBut are we to go on forever—up wages, up prices,” thundered The Wall Street Journal. \ " T 1 • “ . . .We th in k Mr. McDonald w ill fin d h is answer in th e s t e e l companies 3 9 firm stand on inflation. ” The Cleveland Plain Dealer considered the

“inflationary wage demands by the steelworkers highly injurious to the public.” The Plain Dealer further stated that “if the steelworkers were down trodden and” Oppressed, they would have a good case for a better

contract. But they can scarcely make such a plea when they are among highest paid workers in industry... ” The steel conpanies, added the

3 8. The continuous refinement of various ads was evident when examining the numerous drafts done by the H ill and Knowlton Company. See '^Draft of Ads,” Msy-June, 1959, 62AF Box 19; July-August, 1959, 62AF Box 19; September-October, 1959, 62AF Box 20, John W. H ill Papers; the actual ads used during the negotiations and strike period by the Steel Companies Coordinating Committee were published in two brochures. See pamphtlets, Where The Steel Companies Stand undated , (New York: Steel Companies Coordinating Committee), pp. 5-10; What The Steel Strike is About undated , {New York: Steel Companies Coordinating Committee), pp. 1-*+. 39. The W all S tre e t Jo u rn a l, J u ly 27, 1959* 1+0. Cleveland P la in D ealer, November 21, 1959* Christian Science Monitor, “have claimed and deserve credit for holding the line against inflationary effects which might result from a wage 4 1 increase. ” The Iron Age declared that lffche ordinary people—most of whom are not in high-paid "brackets—have decided "big wage hikes brings 4 2 nothing but higher prices.” Life insisted “if it takes a long, tough strike to put Roger Blough and Company in a position to keep steel prices down and meet their market, then a long, tough strike it should 4 3 be.” David Lawrence, New York Harold-Tribune, wrote that David

McDonald was “completely out of touch with the temper of the workers and with public opinion.” He further indicated that the union was responsi- 4 4 ble for the strike due to their insistence on a wage increase. News­ week accused McDonald of Ignoring “the competitive inroads that foreign 4 5 steel was already making on the American industry. ”

Most businessmen looked at steel's anti-inflation drive with de­ light. Chairman John D. Wright, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., Cleve-

Ifl. The Christian Science Monitor, July 50, 195 9} See also, '*Ehe Steel Industry and a Billion Dollar Bundle, ” The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (March 12, 1959), 1189, 1212. h2. Iron Age, August 20, 1959* P* 7; January 8, 1959; March 5* 1959* April 25, 1959; See also, Steel, February 25, 1959, p. ^3* k j. ‘tow Steel Terms Involve You,” Life, kf (September 7, 1959), ^3; “Steel: What The Workers W ant,Time, 73 (June 15, 1959, 88- 89.

Ml-. David Lawrence, ‘tabor 1 s Out of Touch,” New York Herald-Tribune, November 11, 1959* lf5* wIt Hasn’t Been T rie d ,” Newsweek, 5 ^ (November 2, 1959), 9°i Iron Age, October 1, 1959; Steel, May 25, 1959, P. 8 7. 97 4 0 land, "believed that "steel was right in holding the line on inflation. ”

The N.A.M. summed up their feeling by commenting that wage increase was 4 7 the major cause of inflation.

Political opinion leaned Blightly in favor of industry's campaign against wage-push inflation. The Congressional Joint Economic Committee in 1959 carried this conclusion: ‘The increase in steel prices is due f 4 to the extraordinary rise in wage combined with only an average rate of increase of productivity, and to the increase in profit, taxes and in 4 8 depreciation charges.” Senator Kefauver, Chairman of the Senate Anti-

Trust and Monopoly Committee, suggested that steel prices could be held in line if steel wage demands were limited to average increments in 4 9 productivity. The Administration believed that ‘the principal threat to efficient functioning of a free enterprise system was inflation. ”

‘Tbccept where necessary to correct obvious injustices, ” stated President

Eisenhower, “wage increases that outrun productivity, however, are an inflationary factor.” President Eisenhower further added that "business 5 0 in its pricing policies should avoid unnecessary price increases.”

46. Quoted in, ‘Tut Steel 1 s S tory i s Hard t o T e ll, ” B usiness Week, No. 1570-1574 (October 24, 1959), 31.

47. Hearings on the January, 1959 Economic Report of the President, p. 599. 48. Quoted in, Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New York: W. W. Norton Co., Inc.), pp. 65 - 66. 49. Iron Age, March 5, 1959, PP* 49-51.

50. Robert Vexler (ed.), Documents of Dwight D. Elsenhower (New York: Oceans Publications, 1970), p. 106; Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘The Sound Dollar," Vital Speeches, 25 (July 15, 1959), 578-579. Moreover, the industry was quite successful in "winning the support

of many of its half-million union employees. Donald D. Rarick, a steel­ worker, who in 1958 I’an for the presidency against Donald McDonald,

commented: ‘T’ev steelworkers are anxious to get an increase in wages, because they know that prices w ill go up when they get the wage increase, 5 1 and the workers then are no better off than before.

Samuel Lubell, a diligent analyst of public opinion, visited ten steel-producing cities on the eve of union management steel contract negotiations. His survey established that five out of every six steel­ workers interviewed were against further.wage augmentation. He explained that ,cthe bulk of the steelworkers were fed up with the constant upward spiraling of prices, wages, and taxes that had followed each steel wage 5 2 boast through the postwar years.”

A survey taken by the Mew York Dimes in eight major steel centers indicated that most union members felt that higher wages would not be beneficial to them. In Pittsburgh James Price, former President of a union local, summed up the feeling of many workers in this comment: "if there is a wage increase, prices are going up again, and what is the extra money going to mean? I think men want steady employment, even at the present rates... This rat race has got to stop sometimes, and it 53 might as well be now. ”

51. Quoted in, "Will There be a Steel Strike?”, United States News and World Report, 46 (February 13, 1£59), 45.

52. "What Workers T hink,” Newsweek, 53 (May 4, 1959)# 73; New York Times, April 30, 1959.

53* New York Times, June 14, 1959* 99

Similar surveys taken "by U.S. Mews and World Report and The Wall

Street Journal showed that most workers in the steel industry, did not want a straight pay raise. Furthermore, the U.S. News and World Report revealed that industry succeeded somewhat in their campaign to develop friendlier relations with employees. The report indicated that ail those interviewed, not one had anything to say against the company; 5 4 nobody appeared to he mad at management.

Moreover, the general public favored the companies anti-inflation campaign. The S te e l Companies C oordinating Committee in v ite d comments from the public in a July 22 newspaper ad accusing the union of going

"on strike for more inflation,” The ad which appeared in four hundred newspapers, repeated the industry’s contention that a wage augmentation would force a steel price boost and kick off another round of inflation.

The Committee reported that the public favored the advertisement by a 5 5 twenty to one margin.

The Gallup Poll indicated that the substantial majority of Americans opposed a wage boost for steelworkers. The poll revealed that 49# were 5 6 against a pay raise for steelworkers while 29# voted for a raise. The

54. "Do Steelworkers Want a Strike?”, United States News and World Re­ port, 46 (May 18, 1959)* 44-45; The Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1959*

55« Adams, 4‘The Performance,” p. 235; See also, The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1959* The Committee reported that out of 5*600 letters tallied, 4,968 were favorable to the advertisement's stand. Fur­ thermore, the letters revealed the public's disfavor of union mono­ poly and dictatorship.

56 . George Gallup, "Public S till Opposed to Wage Boost,” Youngstown Vindicator, July 14, 1959* 100 main reason for opposition to a wage boost, added Gallup reporters, was a fear that such a move might set off a new round of price increases nil down th e lin e .

Readers of The San Francisco Chronicle were asked to give their opinions on major issues in the steel strike. One of the most decisive votes on the entire ballot showed 62?! disagreeing with the union conten­ tion that wages should be raised to offset the rise in living cost. The same percentage agreed with management’s argument that wage increments demanded by the union would seriously aggravate inflation. Sixty-six percent felt that, if granted, wage increases would create a pattern for inflationary demands in other industries. The San Francisco Chronicle poll disclosed that hjfi agreed that the union was responsible for the 57 failure to reach a settlement prior to the strike.

The January, 1959 Research Report by the Opinion Research Corpora­ tion indicated that the general public and union members were fed up with overreaching wage demands that jacked-up prices. The report demon­ strated that over 66?! of the union members interviewed were against blg- scale wage boost for 1959* The study revealed that of the public felt that management should refuse a pay raise even at the risk of a strike. Some 21?! were in favor of a pay raise while 37?! had no opinion 56 a t a l l .

57* San Francisco Chronicle, August 31* 1959.

58. Opinion Research Corporation, l4th Trend Survey on National Labor Issues; Labor’s 1959 Bid for Power (Princeton, New Jersey, 1959), PP. 3 , 9, 10. 101

Public opinion favored management by a ratio of four to one, accor­

ding to Don Paarlberg, Special Assistant to the President for Economic

Affairs. Mr. Paarlberg disclosed that inflation was one of the major 5 9 concerns of the 1,083 letters sent to the President. Further surveys

of letters received at the White House during the strike clearly indi- 6 0 cated that over 9®% were against so-called wage-push inflation.

VII

The Industry won the early phase of the propaganda battle, but promptly lost its advantage by introducing— cold, without advance plan­ ning— the work rules issue. The union seized the initiative and acted

quickly to inform its members that the demanded elimination of local work practices would abolish seniority and regress them twenty-five years. It adopted an effective strike slogan: '^The job you save might be your own. ” Worries over what changes in local practices might mean- in the way of lost jobs— created an emotional strike issue. The union leaders convinced the steelworkers that a threat to their security

39* Don Paalberg to General Persons, November 21, 1959, Box 636, Offi­ cial File 124-D-3, White House Central Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Library.

60. The White House received over 20,000 letters throughout the strike perio d . I randomly examined 1,600 l e t t e r s betw een May-November and found over 90% in favor of management’s anti-inflation drivej Steel Dispute and Public Opinion, Boxes 950, 951, 955, 956, General File 126-D -l, 6 , 8, 13, 25, ^3, White House Central Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 102 61 e x is te d .

"you can't te ll -what the companies Intend to do,” commented a Re­ publican steelworker. "If they want to break the union, I'd rather see 62 the strike go on until next year than have that happen. ” Joseph D.

Lahman, Illinois State Treasurer, addressing the USWA D istrict 31 con­ ference stated: "I say... that in this democratic society of ours there need to he strong voices raised... and especially in this time of jeo­ pardy when labor itself is challenged by those who would take advantage 6 3 of temporary prosperity in the land to set labor back. ” "The money doesn't mean a thing to us now,” exclaimed Norman Osborne, a steelworker at the Pittsburgh works of Jones and Laughlin. "I just want to have the 6 4 same rights under the contract that I had before the strike. In

Gary, USWA official John Howard put the case even more strongly: **Ehe 6 5 feeling of themen is that they w ill stay out until hell freezes over.”

61. Most observers felt management’s campaign completely failed because of the work rule issue. However, this view should be modified somewhat as one examined the favorable editorials management re­ ceived on the work rules issue as the strike progrssed. See, The Milwaukee Journal, November 21, 1959; Cleveland News, December 8, 1959; The Evening Independent (Massilion, Ohio), December 1, 1959*

62. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, September 2T, 1959*

6 3 . Joseph D. Lahman, "in d u stry E ffo rts t o Force Labor Back to Dark Ages, ” Steel Labor, November, 1959 > P- H*

6k. Quoted in, "isteel Town Takes Strike Calmly,” Business Week, No. 15 6l- 1565 (August 29, 1959), 3k.

65 . Quoted in , "Steelw orkers Mood,” Newsweek, 5k (November 2, 1959), 88. 103

These worker attitudes were noted in the press at the time, and in a few instances at least were a course of negative editorial comment.

The U.S. News and World Report survey disclosed workers' fear that work changes would force them to surrender many rights and benefits gained 6 6 in years past. The New York Times survey, taken after the industry had indicated that it would insist on work rules changes, revealed a 6 7 sharp upsurge in rank and file support far the steel strike. ‘TPhe steel companies, ” warned The New Republic, "are doing their best to revert to 68 an earlier era of industrial relations,” Max Lerner, of the New York

Post, blamed the strike on the steel executives insistence to uphold 6 9 the work rules changes and anti-inflation drive.

The Gallup poll taken in August indicated that management lost substantial ground to the union; sympathy during the strike went from

51 $ for management and 30? union in mid-July to 32$ management and 27$ ro union.

66. Quoted in, **How Steelworkers Peel Now About the S trike," United States News and World Report (October 12, 1959)* Mj-4 5 .

6 7. New York Times, July 16, 1959.

6 8. The New Republic (August 10, 1959>

6 9. Max Lerner, "Class War Prom the Top,” New York Post, July 15, 1959; See also, editorial, New York Post, August 10, 1959*

70. George Gallup, “Approves Compulsory Arbitration in Strike,” Youngstown Vindicator, December 4, 1959. 10k

VIII

The "battle for the public mind resulted in a stalemate. The indus­

try 's campaign against inflation and foreign competition was warmly

received by the general public. The USWA, however, regained the sym­

pathy and the support of the public and more especially the steelworkers

through its campaign against the work rules issue.

Each side evaluated its public relations program in terms of the

failure of the other to realize fully its program. The union campaign

for the public's sympathy suffered from a number of serious disadvan­

tages, however. Most importantly, it lacked both the substantial funds which a systematic advertising campaign requires and, at the outset of the affair at least, the theoretical understanding necessary for the molding of public opinion. This latter deficiency was rectified somewhat

"by 1959 with the publication of Strike Publicity Guide for Labor Unions, 71 a guide to the proper use and value of publicity. The shortage of money was more endemic. The USWA placed ads in only forty newspapers, as compared to the four hundred of the SCCC, during the pre-negotiation and negotiation period. The simple fact of the matter was that the union

could not command resources comparable to those of management far these purposes. Before the strike was over, the USWA relied heavily on support \

71. AFL-CIO, Proceedings of T hird C o n stitu tio n a l Convention, (San Fran­ cisco, 1959 )) pp. 10fPll9j AFL-CIO American Federationist (October, 1959)# p . 8; See also, United Steelworkers of America, Assistance Provided by Public and Private Agencies, 13 (Pittsburgh, By the au th o r, 1959), PP* 1-20. 105

from the other unions for maintenance of the strike. It was the policy

of the AFL-CIO to ask every organized worker in the nation to contribute 7 2 an hour’s pay each month to a special steelworker's fund. Overall,

then, insofar as the publicity canpaign was concerned, the unioni suffered from disadvantages.

Despite the superior publicity resources which management enjoyed,

however, its campaign suffered too. Management's canpaign lacked the

timing, simplicity and emotion for complete success. Without time to

lay the groundwork with the public on the work rules Issue, ” explained

John W. Hill, Chairman of Hill and Knowlton, "the Industry’s communica- 7 3 tions were at a distinct disadvantage.” The Group Attitudes Corpora­

tion, a subsidiary of Hill and Knowlton, interviewed thousands of steel­ workers and discovered the workers difficulty in understanding the 7 4 language of management’s message.

To be sure, the steel management and the Bteel labor communication

efforts served as a sounding board for labor-management viewpoints over

the 1959 steel contract negotiation. The tenacious campaign effort by both sides was just a glimmer of the long negotiation struggle ahead.

72. "Union Builds Strike Power," Nation's Business, 48 (January, i 960), p. 64; Gerald Pomper, '^!he Public Relations of Organized Labor,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Winter 1959-1960), 485-497* This article described the weaknesses of labor's Public Relations Pro­ gram during the 1950's (cultural, social, political, economic).

75* John W. H ill, "What We Learned Prom the Steel Negotiations,” Public Relations Journal, 532 (August, i 960) , 8.

74. Jane Stewart, "The Evaluation,” pp. 245-244; See also, Mapes, "Communications Story,” p. 15 . CHAPTER IV

THE INSURMOUNTABLE DEADLOCK

The negotiation for the 1959 steel contract "became a now-or-never

situation for the tough school of management. The 1956 and 1958 econo­ mic episodes, as viewed by industry, showed the damaging effects of

aggressive labor and soft management. For steel executives it seemed to be an appropriate time to win-certain demands. They felt certain that the public and the rank and file would object to any wage increase that resulted in an increase in steel prices. With Eisenhower in the

White House who had pledged to keep hands of collective bargaining, they saw an important advantage. Furthermore, management knew they would have the backing of the steel users who had ample opportunity to put in extra Inventory for the strike stand. In this favorable atmos­ phere, the companies made their bid for a wage hold down and for the elimination of various work rules. This latter proposal, as it turned out, solidified the apathetic steelworkers and enabled the union leaders to resist management's demands. Consequently, the actions by both sides precipitated a strike. The shutdown dragged on through the summer months with a lot of public harranging, but little progress resulted.

II

Against this background of prior experience, and armed with the basic facts which emerged from industry’s and union's elaborate public

106 107

relations preparations, negotiations began with a letter offer "by the

Steel Companies Coordinating Committee on April 10, the corpus of which was that both groups should consent to perpetuate the present wage and

other benefits without alteration for an additional year. Moreover, the companies proposed that the coBt-of-living escalation be ceased

as inflation engendering.

The proposal was based upon what management believed were sound

considerations. On the cost-of-living issue, the steel executives con­ tended that union members had already received increments in wages and other benefits far exceeding cost-of-living increases which had occurred in the past. On the question of competition with employees in other industries, the companies said the steelworkers had achieved such gains in recent years that ‘there is no basis for a claim they need to catch up with anything. ” As to the question of higher wages, the producers felt the mill workers' were ahead for years to come.

Management hoped that the union would join in a honest endeavor to make a significant contribution toward slowing the wage-cost spiral.

There was little necessity, the companies argued, to put more money in the pockets of steelworkers now at work. “The real needs,” the companies said, ‘*are to avoid further employment cost increases, and thus restrain inflation and encourage continued progress essential to increasing employ­ ment opportunities for those now unemployed... ” This proposal, management argued, was made in the belief that its acceptance would add both to the 108 i progress of the economy and to the welfare of the steelworkers.

The steel union, however, rejected the offer out-of-hand and called it a publicity stunt. On April 13, McDonald replied that the union too was concerned about inflation. He proposed, therefore, that there he an agreement that steel prices should not he raised during the life of the new contract. Wage negotiations, McDonald continued, would then occur in view of protecting real wages, reflecting increased output per man hour, and protecting stockholders' return on equity. He called for negotiations to hegin May 4, two weeks ahead of the existing schedule.

The union asserted it was willing to continue meeting, “day and night, on a seven-day-a-week hasis to achieve an equitable settlement well a before the June $0 strike deadline.”

On April 15, the companies' negotiation team replied favorably to the advanced date for negotiations but rejected the union proposal on

1. Copy of letter from the Steel Conpanies Coordinating Committee to McDonald, April 10, 1959, EMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, Record Group 280, 1959, Dispute Case File 259-3268; H. C. Lumb, "Collective Bargaining in Steel," an address before the Employers' Association of Summit County, Akron, Ohio, November 19, 1959 (New York; Public Relations Department of United States Steel Corporation, 1959), PP. 6-7.

2. Copy of letter from McDonald to Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, April 13, 1959, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959, Dispute Case File 259-3268; The change of letters between management and the union during April were reproduced in booklet form and mailed to me by Frederick Foote, Director of Public Relations for United States Steel, see, "Copy of Letter from David McDonald to the Twelve Major Steel Companies” (Cleveland: United States Steel Corporation, April 13, 1959), PP* 5-6. prices as illegal, stating: "We do not intend now or in the future to

bargain or to have any understanding with you on this subject.” The

Bteel companies also rejected McDonald's principle concerning profits

and output, "four second, so called principle proposes that we now

commit ourselves to increase wages on the basis of output per man hour

and profits. ThiB we are not willing to do... To the contrary, our

firm convinction is that there Bhould be no such increase. ” The com­

panies, then, reiterated their conviction that the April 10 proposal

to continue present wages and other benefits for additional period of

one year would best serve to combat inflation, and preserve for the

steelworkers the purchasing power of their present high wages and bene- 3 f i t s .

Thus far a ll the bargaining was done through the post office. The

chanage of messages left both sides agreeing that inflation was harmful.

However, their opinions on what should be done to restrain it were so

diversified that hope for arriving at an early agreement appeared slim.

ThuB, it would now be left to direct negotiations to try to reach a peaceful compact.

On May 5 formal negotiations began in New fork. Full negotiating

committees of first the United States Steel Corporation, and then the eleven major basic steel producers met with union committees for exp lor a-

3. "Copy o f L e tte r from Twelve S te e l Companies to Mr. McDonald,” (Cleveland: United States Steel Corporation, April 15, 1959); PP* T-9i See also, New York Times, April 1 6, 1959; Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1959. 110

tory talks, with pledges of unrelenting attempts to reach a non-infla­

tionary agreement without a strike.

At the opening session at the Hotel Roosevelt, R. Conrad Cooper,

executive vice president of personal services for United States Steel,

proposed a one-year extension of present terms--essentially, the same position taken on April 10 hy the Steel Companies Coordinating Committee.

,#We do not think,” explained Cooper, “that the way to increase production

and consumption of goods lies in the direction of further increases of wage rates. We are convinced that this process has gone far enough—

in fact too far in steel, with the consequent results that steel labor

is pricing itself out of the market and thus jeopardizing the johs of the people we represent.”

David McDonald countered by proposing a necessary substantial

improvement in the steel wage structure. '^The United Steelworkers of

America,” thundered McDonald, “intends to press forward today as it has always pressed forward in the past to achieve for its members an 5 ever higher standard of living.” This higher standard of living, argued the union chief, could be accomplished through providing to the employees monetary gifts sufficient to enable them to afford that stan­ dard for themselves and their families. McDonald, then, presented in a general way other union demands. He called for '^progress toward the

4. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, May 6 , 1959; See a ls o , “S te e l Nego­ tiations StartedTHEUD Bulletin, k (May, 1959), 5.

5. Quoted in, New York Times, May 6, 1959; See also, 'taiat American Steel Workers Want, ” AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News (May, 1959), 1-2. I l l

division of work in a manner that will provide full wages...for a larger * number of employees than are presently employed.” He asked for contract

revisions to eliminate other deficiencies in such fields as grievance

procedures, seniority provisions, weekend premium pay, insurance, and e pension programs.

The first day of negotiations also produced a maze of conflicting

economic evidence presented to support the opening bargaining positions

of labor and industry. The industry distributed a twelve page pamphlet

designed to show that steelworkers’ wages had outstripped those of

other industrial employees. Two union studies, in contrast, demonstrated

that steelworkers were not as well off as pictured. The reports termed

as "foolish and wholly erroneous the Industry's contention that steel

wages were too high simply because they were higher than those in some 7 industries.” The union stressed that working conditions and hazards,

productivity growth, company profits, and the value of its product should

be considered in setting wages. As these economic items were finally

exposed, it became obvious to those present that the first day of nego­

tiations made very little progress.

Moreover, the opening talks revealed management's determination to

break from the old bargaining strategy of cooperation and compromise.

#*The first session,” wrote McDonald, "ended with a plea on ny part that

we not negotiate this agreement in the press.” But the industry nego-

6 . "Steel Talks Start Gravely,” Business Week, No. 1548-1552 (May 9, 1959), 316.

7. New York Times, May 6 , 1959. 112 tiators felt less determined to agree with McDonald than uphold their

own pre-determined course. Thus, the steel executives held a press con­

ference and maintained that everything done in collective bargaining in s the steel industry since 19^1 had been wrong.

The companies action, moreover, was a faint prelude to the steel

manufacturers new tough stand at the bargaining table. On May 11, when

direct negotiations between the two-four-man teams began, management's

new tough stance became even more prevalent. Prom the beginning,

McDonald remarked, there was none of the horseplay, wisecracks, or

inside jokes that had lightened other negotiations and made them toler­

able. The steel industry negotiators were callous, indifferent, and

aloof. *faore than once,” the union chief declared, "my thoughts wan­

dered from the drone of management's polemics to a better day when there was mutual respect and always a hope of compromise, I thought those 8 years had taught us to learn to live together a bit better,” But,

contrary to McDonald's wiBhes, the Fairlesses and Stephenses were gone.

The new heads in the steel industry had decided they were going to

demonstrate just how tough they could be.

A sharp verbal exchange over the causes of inflation opened the

May 11 session between steel industry and union negotiators. Conrad

Cooper, the industry's chief spokesman, called inflation the nation's

8. David McDonald, Union Man (New York: E. D. Dutton, 19^9), p. 265- 266.

9. Ibid., p. 271. 113

number one problem and asserted ftfche way to combat inflation in steel

was at its source, which was rising employment costs.” He then restated

the companies1 earlier position: <

to accomplish this result (a non-inflationary settlement) would be to

continue present wages and other benefits, without change, for one year 10 beyond June 30/ 1959*w McDonald countered by calling the issue of

inflation “a fictictious monster created by the steel industry’s tremen­

dous sales .Job in publicity. ” The union chief declared that the United

Steel Workers of America (USWA) saw deficiences in the programs adopted

in 1956—programs related to grievance procedure, seniority, rates of

pay, and other benefits. McDonald emphasized that the 1959 contract 11 would have to rectify these deficiencies.

A final round of sharp exchanges erupted at the conclusion of the

session. The flare-up was sparked when McDonald, at a Joint press

conference, interrupted Coopers' discussion on employment costs, call­

ing industry's fig u re pure.'fiction. Immediately, Cooper reprimanded the union leader for his lack of courtesy and thereupon proceeded to walk 12 out of the conference room. This action, once again, reflected man­

agement *s no-nonsense attitude towards the negotiating sessions.

After the May 11 session, sparring continued in news conferences, public meetings, and negotiating sessions. Between mid-May and early

10. Quote in, Steel, May 11, 1959/ p. 99*

11. Wall. Street Journal, May 12, 1959-

12. Ibid., May 12, 1959. June both sides were steadily becoming more angry and frustrated.

The bargaining teams met quite regularly during the latter part of

May. The negotiating sessions usually centered about problems, such as

wages, work rules, pensions, and unemployment. McDonald, moreover,

placed special emphasis on the problem of unemployment. He pushed a

proposal calling for a 30 hour week with no pay loss. This plan inclu­

ded for each employee a work week of four eight hour days every four

weeks which would average out to 38 hours on a weekly basis, with pay

checks made out for 40 weeks. The union, thus, pressed its demand for

a spread-the-work plan based on a shorter work week, higher wages, and 1 3 other measures to expand purchasing power and cut employment. / The four man industry team, contrary to union 1 s demands, stood fast

against any rise in labor costs for 1959. Top company re p re se n ta tiv e s

clashed with union negotiators over economic issues. An example of

this uncompromising attitude appeared at the May 15 session. Cooper,

during this session, charged the Steel union with making Invalid com­

parisons that created misleading impressions in that labor costs since

1952 had remained constant while company profits had doubled. Cooper

complained that in 1952, the year used as a base figure in the union's

view, the steel industry was closed by a two month strike. To these

figures Cooper replied sharply: "By selection of statistics over a short 14 period of time you can produce any result you want.” The industry

13. Hew York Times, May 13, 1959; See also, Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1959. llf. Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1959- 115 rejected union’s demands and refused to "budge from its pre-negotiation position. Thus, the private negotiating sessions proved to be futile.

The bargaining sessions, therefore, became a place to propound, expose, amplify, and clarify— without ever being too specific, certainly with­ out agreeing on anything basic.

When the negotiators weren't challenging each other at the bargain­ ing table, they usually resorted to public debate and harrange. For in­ stance, the union sent a bulletin to all locals which informed the rank and file that all major segments of industry were organizing to help the steel companies defeat the union's drive for higher wages. "Almost every corporate and industry power in America,” the union wrote, "has now joined forces to help the companies bottle up wage and job condi­ tions of the steelworkers.” The bulletin characterized the business attacks as “fresh evidence that the industry may force a strike rather 1 5 than deal sensibly and objectively on economic and contractual problems. ”

The union was not alone in its public accusations, management also contributed its share of acrimony. To wit, Roger Blough, Chairman of

United States Steel, told the National Press Club that a steel wage freeze would "apply a powerful brake to the forces of inflation that threaten our national economy. ” At the Press Club Blough was asked whether United States Steel might stress this point by proposing to re­ duce prices if wages remained unchanged. "United States Steel has

15. Quoted in , New York Times, May 23, 1959. 116 already tried th is,” Blough replied. ”We reduced our prices in 19^8, for the same reasons that are "being offered now. The wage demands that were sweeping through industry continued.” As a result, he said, United

States Steel felt it only fair to raise wages for its own employees, and in a few months steel prices had to "be raised again. "I doubt very much whether we'd want to undertake that again,” he said.

At the |conclusion of the talk Blough spoke about high wage rates and its effect on industry's import and export trade. Higher wages helped convert America from a net exporter of steel to a net importer in a few months, Blough said. Prom 19^8 to 1957 , average annual exports were lj-,0^5,000 tons and inports 1,137*000 tons, he declared. But in

December, 1958, the tide turned, explained Blough, and the excess of inports over exports rose to 37,000 tons in February and in March doubled to 7^*000 tons. Tariffs won't solve the problem, asserted

Blough. Overseas unions haven't succeeded in bringing foreign wages up to the levels of the United States, he explained, and neither was it possible to reduce American wages to foreign scales. f

16. Quotations In, Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1959* By l a t e May, th e p riv a te n e g o tia tin g se ssio n s had made very l i t t l e progress. Meanwhile, the union leaders and the various steel executives continued to publicly dehate one another with everyone becoming more abusive. On May 27 at the National Press Luncheon, the USWA President, spoke with irritation about the industry’s minus zero offer, a reference to the industry's firm "hold the line in 59” bargaining position. **The companies' negotiators are encircled by that zero to the point where the union is giving serious consideration to filing refusal-to-bargain charges with the NLKB, ” McDonald asserted. He charged that the industry negotiators had absolutely declined to bargain In good faith on the union's fair and reasonable demands for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The union, argued McDonald, at first hoped that the companies mention of a freeze in 1959 was only a b it of ‘Vindow- dressing, ” that something definite in the way of gains would be offered in the early stages of contract talks. "Now,” explained the union chief, '‘the union is convinced that the industry is really primed for a fight against even a token raise. ”

"While McDonald talked tough in Washington, industry spokesmen were being equally blunt against the union in appearances in New York before the meetings of the American Iron and Steel Institute. Commenting on

McDonald's charge that steel companies were not bargaining in good fjdth,

Avery C. Adams, President and Chairman of Jones and Laughlin Steel, stated that proof that industry had always bargained in good faith was

17. "Steel Talks Hit New Low Point, ” Business Week, No. 1553-1556 (June 6 , 1959), 78. 118 that steelworkers got paid 8^ cents more (an hour) than the workers for other industries. “We have made our proposal,” Adams asserted flatly,

“and we w ill stand "by it, for it is in the test interest of the econo- my. ” Arthur B. Homer, President of Bethlehem Steel, contended that the steel union made it more and more difficult to afford the mill improve­ ments required ty American industry to keep pace with European products.

Also commenting on McDonald’s statements, Charles M. White, Chairman of

Republic Steel, uho declared that labor monopoly had forced strikes*

Asked why McDonald would desire a strike. White replied: '(He wants to la stay ahead of Walter Reuther.” Thus, it "became apparent that the pri­ vate negotiations and the public debating brought forth no substantial change in the industry’s or the union’s position.

By the first week in June, therefore, there had been no purposeful bargaining. Neither side had got to the point of give-and-take negotia- I tions. Moreover, the continuous debating both in public and private had severely strained the relations between the bargaining teams. One steel company official described the situation confronting the industry and union negotiators as the worst ever. '(Relations are more strained than they have ever been this early in contract talks,” he said glumly. 1 9 “There is little on the bright side. ” McDonald summed up the frustra­ tion and bitterness that pervaded the bargaining sessions. “We’ve

18, Quotations in, Wall Street Journal, May 28, 1959; See also, New York Times, May 28, 1959*

19. 'feteel Talks Hit a New Low Point,” Business Week, No. 1555-1556 (June 13, 1959), 28. 119 talked and talked and talked—and talked some more, ” McDonald commented. 20 "We got nowhere.” Consequently, the strained relations caused both sides to call for a week recess.

Meanwhile, as the industry-union negotiations were in recess, each bargaining team evaluated its position. The union realized that the wage issue proved unpopular with the workers and the public. Neverthe­ less, McDonald had to remain firm on the economic issues, until some other means of breaking the negotiations off dead center emerged. There­ fore, the steel union's strategy, at this time, called for continued negotiations. ‘^There is no reason,” McDonald explained, “for a strike to take place if reason and moderation prevail in genuine collective bargaining.” The steel union, he concluded, “does not want a strike and 21 has not been talking strike.”

Management, on the other hand, remained firm in itB position not to give into union's demand for a wage boost. J. L. Neudoerfer, Chairman of

Wheeling Steel Corporation, said the industry had no desire to retreat from its demand for a contract extension without change for one year.

Adding his voice to the advocates of a firm stand, Charles White of

20. “S tra te g y in S te e l: Wait Them O ut,” B usiness Week, No. 1553-2-556 (June 13, 1959), 28.

21. ^ Quoted in, “Steel Industry Spurns Bargaining," IUD Bulletin, 4 (July 5, 1959), 5j “McDonald A ttacks In d u stry f o r Freeze on B a rg ain in g ,” IUD Bulletin, 4 (June, 1959), 1} The unpopularity of a wage increase with the public and the workers was evident throughout the early stages of the strike, see pages 13-16 in Chapter III. 120

Republic stated there would be no wavering on the part of industry. “I

see no lack of unity in the industry’s opposition to a cost-boosting 22 contract, ” he remarked. Several factors enabled management to hold its position even at the risk of a strike. The strategy of the steel companies assumed the allegiance of the government, the steel users, and the steelworkers.

In the case of the Federal Government, the companies found a wel­ comed ally in the Eisenhower administration. Wrapping themselves in the mantle of the White House was management's approach during the nego­ tiation period. Cooper refused to talk about any wage increase because, so he said, any steel wage increment must mean a price increase. A steel price increase, he added, would run directly opposite to President 2 3 Eisenhower’s anti-inflation campaign. Thus, industry’s refusal to bargain about wages was represented as holding the anti-inflation line for the President.

Concern over inflation had made the wage-price spiral a major are for the Eisenhower administration. This concern, as Republicans viewed

It, was Ignited by augmented prices and wages during the 1957-1958 re­ cession and the phobia that recent price stability would be shattered by a new round of labor cost increments. President Eisenhower summed tip the problem in his Economic Report. He said:

22. Q uotations in , Wall. S tre e t Jo u rn a l, May 27# 1959*

23. Youngstown Vindicator, July 10, 1959* 121

Despite recession during the first part of the year, wage rates continued to move upward. The rate of increase was nearly as great as in periods of economic expansion, and higher than the rate at which gains in productivity have been achieved in our economy over extended p e rio d s. Ob­ viously, if we have only limited success in restraining increases in unit costs during recession, much remains to he done to achieve a basis for holding prices reasonably steady when productive capacity is mare fully utilized. 4

The Eisenhower Administration felt that any sort of inflation would prove harmful to the economy. “This country,” declared Secretary of

the Treasury Anderson, “can have a bright economic future; it can have

it without inflation. This country cannot have an enduring bright

economic future with inflation. This is a principal tenet of ny be- a s l i e f . ”

For the Republic administration, then, price stability became the

cornerstone to economic growth. The President, in his annual report,

said the outlook was good for a continuation of the business recovery

in 1959, but he warned economic growth might be damaged unless “increases

in wages and other costs are held within lim its consistent with reason­

able stability of consumer prices.” Government, business, and labor all have a role in price stability, declared Eisenhower. Businessmen, he

said, must keep prices low enough to uphold wide and growing markets.

The President, moreover, urged businessmen to hold the line against wage

increases that surpassed productivity as part of the “ceaseless war

against costs.” Most dramatically, Eisenhower directed his sharpest

2h. The Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1959), P* 5*

25. Robert Anderson, 'There is no Need for Inflation, ” Vital Speeches, 25 (June 1, 1959), ^82. 122

comments at organized labor, "tenders of labor unions have a particular

critical role to play, in view of the great power lodged in their hand,”

he declared. He warned labor that wage increases that went beyond the

bounds of productivity gains "are inevitably inflationary and fee If - 2a defeating." Thus, Eisenhower's policy of price stability laid the

groundwork for the country's domestic policy in 1959* This policy, in

particular, became significant as it related to the 1959 steel contract

negotiations.

From the standpoint of Republicans, steel was the crucial test for

its economic policy. With the steel contract negotiations getting

underway in May, the administration felt it necessary to make its posi­

tion clear in regards to wages and prices.

The Administration's attitude toward a steel wage increase first

appeared in the hearings on the President's Economic Report. In a

statement submitted to the subcommittee, Eisenhower's chief economic

adviser, Raymond J. Saulnier, stressed the view that excessive wage

increases were the primary cause of recent inflation. "In my judgment,”

declared Saulnier, "increases in wages and other employee compensations have been a major factor for the price increases that have occurred

since mid-1956, and these price increases have in turn been a major fac- 2 7 tor in limiting real demand. ” The lesson to be learned from these

26. • Quotations in, The Economic Report of the President, p. v, vi; See also, Wall Street Journal, January 23, 1959.

27. U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings, the January, 1959 Economic Report of the President, 86th Cong., 1st Session, pur­ suant to sec. JVY of Public Law 30^ (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press, 1959)* P* 58* 123

past events, he explained, was obvious. The United StateB could attain

a higher and more balanced rate of economic growth in the future if it

stabilized prices and costs.

Dr. Saulnier re-emphasized the damaging effects of cost-push infla­

tion during his testimony before the House Appropriations subcommittee.

He admonished Congress of the danger of a steel wage increment setting

a pattern for wage boosts in the rest of the economy. He asserted:

An increase in the price of steel would, of course, increase the cost of production for a very wide range of commodities and for construction. So you could expect it to have an inflationary effect diffused widely through the economy. And if an increase in the price range of steel were to occur at this time because of a substantial increase in the wage rate in steel, a further inflationary effect might occur if the wage increase in steel were to set a pattern that was followed elsewhere in the economy and caused price in­ creases there.28

Thus, a wage-price increase in steel, as Saulnier viewed it, would de­

finitely create an inflationary economy.

Vice President Nixon, in charge of the Cabinet Committee on Price

Stability for Economic Growth, took an even sharper stand than Saulnier,

A wage increment, Nixon argued, even if limited to productivity gains that produced no steel price rise, would still be unacceptable if it

set a pattern for wage settlements by other unions that did result in SB price increases. Nixon's Cabinet Committee informed Eisenhower in an interm report, that the possibility of a steel industry's wage settle-

28. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, May 6-12, 1959, See also, ibid., June 29, 1959.

29. ^Big Steel and Union Warm Up for Crucial Bargaining, ” Business Week, No. 15^8-1352 (May 2 , 1959), Zk. 12k ment that might lead to a Bteel price increase was an “inflationary danger which could not he ignored.” The report, moreover, emphasized that the most effective cure to inflation was in increased efficiency 3 0 and productivity of the econony.

Thus, the statements by Nixon and Saulnier helped to re-enforce the President's position on price stability. The Administration had let it be known that they would regard as inflationary any steel wage boost that resulted in a steel price increase. The question that re­ mained, however, was what sort of policy did the administration plan to use to stop the wage-price spiral. More specifically, what device, if any, was going to be utilized to enforce this policy?

Many proposals were advocated to step the wage-price spiral.

Among the earliest suggestions was Senator Jacob Javits* appeal for

President Eisenhower “to call in steel management and the union and really talk turkey to them.” “I certainly would hope that the President would call the parties into the White House, ” Senator Javits declared. ltl don't think, that constitutes interference,” he said. “I think that's 3 1 Just trying to do your Job.” In a somewhat stronger proposal, Senator

Symington of Missouri, increasingly concerned there would be a steel strike, appealed to the President to call both parties to the White

30. Interm Report of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth Sent to President Eisenhower, June 29, 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, RG 280, i 960, Dispute Case File 159-5777, pp. 5, 10.

31. Quoted in, New York Times, May 11, 1959. 125

House to head it off. "I -would hope *n he added, 'that the President

today would create a climate where Eoger Blough and McDonald can get together... President Roosevelt and President Truman would have done

it, and President Eisenhower should exercise that same kind of leader- 32 ship.w The chief executive, explained Symington, should inform the

leaders of "both factions that agreement must he obtained without a

s tr ik e .

Moreover, President Eisenhower could re3y on policies set by his­

torical precedent. He could have called the parties to the White House

and direct them to settle—or else. This was what Truman did in 19^8.

Another potential device would be appointment of a special fact finding board with the power to recommend a settlement. In 19^9, Truman ap-> pointed such a board, and in 1952 the Wage Stabilization Board, a Korean war agency, looking into the dispute. Eisenhower could also go to the 33 far left and seize the mills as Truman did in 1952. These various proposals, however, proved too extreme for the Administration. The policy applied by the Republican administration proved to be a bland

compromise compared to the interventionist programs of the Democratic party in the past.

The policy that President Eisenhower decided to choose was one of voluntarism. The method employed to enforce this policy involved a farm

52. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1959-

35. Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 196577 PP» 53-59; See also, Philip E. Stebbins, '*Pruman and the Seizure of Steel: A Failure In Communication, ” The Historian, XXXIV, No. 1 (November, -1971), p. 1-21. 126

of admonition. The administration "believed that government should not

interfere with the collective "bargaining process, A settlement, as

Eisenhower viewed it, should "be derived at through voluntary self-

discipline and restraint by both groups.

An early example of Eisenhower's appeal for voluntary restraint

in steel negotiations came in a news conference in early March. In a

strong plea for labor statemanship, the President cautioned both sides

to avoid any action that would cause a general price increase. The

President added that it was the policy of his administration "to keep

outside the business of collective bargaining, and not to inject it- 3 4 self into that process, so far as any specific recommendation is made,”

As negotiations got underway on May 5> Elsenhower once again warned both groups of the dangers of a wage-price increase. He called

upon both sides to exhibit economic statemanship. He asked both man­

agement and the union to reach an accord for the good of the country.

“Both sides can do th is,” he said, "if people w ill just keep before 3 5 their eyes what the U.S. needs, rather than just each side.”

Thus, the President deviated little from his faith in the concept

of voluntarism. He continually emphasized his reluctance to have the

government take a direct hand in collective bargaining and his even greater dislike for legal ceilings on profits, prices, and wages.

3^. Quoted in, New York Times, March 26, 1959.

35* Quoted In, Youngstown Vindicator, July H , 1959i See also, “Steel Talks Start Gravely,” Business Week. (May 9> 1959 )j H 6 . 127

"Our economy, if it is going to "be competitive and a free economy, must

"be just th at,” Eisenhower told a group of Business Magazine Editors.

"It’s the only way we are going to he strong and expanding. If we are

going to live as free people, we must not he controlled people, and we as must not start controlling prices in time of peace.” Similar senti­

ments were revealed hy the President at a press conference in June.

When asked for an opinion on the possibility of economic controls in

the steel dispute, the President remarked:

While I would urge again, personally and directly or indi­ rectly and through press and press media, for each side to recognize the great dangers that come about in inflation and in price rises, I believe for the government directly to go into this thing further, and in trying to apply political or other pressure, then we are getting into the beginning of a process that could be more hurtful than helpful.

Moreover, Eisenhower's cabinet, Labor Secretary James Mitchell,

Commerce Secretary Frederick Muller, and Secretary of the Treasury

Robert Anderson, for the most part shared his conservative economic

view. Conservatism was also prevalent in the thinking of Raymond

Saulnier, Head of Council of Economic Advisers and Vice President

Richard Nixon. Both men held the belief that deficits, public spend­

ing, increasing government intervention were bad for the economy. These men, in the same fashion as Eisenhower, believed that government could best help the economy by not interfering with the process of free

collective bargaining.

3 6 . Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Sound Dollar,” Vital Speeches, 25 (Ju ly 15, 1959), 579* 37- Quoted in, "Ike's View on Steel Wage Talks,” United States News and World Report. kS (June 2 9, 1959)j 99* 128

These top ranking officials, moreover, felt that they could con­

tribute to holding the price line by keeping hands off the steel wage

negotiations. **Ehe Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic

Growth rejects government control of prices and wages as a method of con- 38 trolling inflation,” declared Nixon. Dr. Saulnier expressed a similar

view as he analyzed a b ill by Rep. Henry Reuss, Democrat from Wisconsin,

calling for price and wage controls. “This b ill,” he explained, “would

seem not only to invite but to require presidential intervention in 3 9 decisions relating to specific wage and price increases.” Such in­

terference, declared Saulnier, would be altogether undesirable.

I n th e same v a in , S ecretary o f Commerce, F red erick M ueller f e l t

the most favorable conditions for economic growth was through less in­

terference and regulation. “We in the Eisenhower Administration are

opposed to straight-jacketing our economy with controls,” he remarked.

“We put a halt to price and materials controls when we came in. Con­

trols are bound to be arbitrary, to develop inequities and work hard­

ships on all people—to say nothing of their effect on our free competi- 4 0 tive enterprise system which we prize so highly. ” Following his

colleagues sentiments, Labor Secretary Mitchell felt that the government

38. Interm Report of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth Sent to Present Eisenhower, June 29, 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, i 960, DCF 159-5777, pp. 5-6.

39* Quoted in , “New I n f la tio n Weapon In S ig h t, ” N ation1 s B usiness, Vf (March, 1959), 39. Ml. Quoted in, ‘‘New Cabinet Member Favors Minimum Control,” Nation1 s B usiness, k-J (September, 1959), 66. 129 should follow a hands-off policy in the steel talks. "in response to a question on the government’s position in the steel negotiations, Presi­ dent Eisenhower indicated that the government must keep outside the pro- 41 cess of collective bargaining. I agree fully," Mitchell declared.

The government * s role, argued Mitchell, was to prlvide a legal arrange­ ment in which emplcyee-employer relations could function. The free pro­ cess of collective "bargaining, within this structure, was the duty of labor and management.

Thus, the domestic policy held by the Eisenhower Administration greatly affected the economic course of the late 1950's* More speci­ fically, this policy, as viewed by steel executives, proved even more significant as it related to the steel dispute.

President Eisenhower’s policy of voluntarism and admonition played into the hands of the steel Industry. The administration contributed to management's cause by its continued warnings that wage increases posed as the major threat to price stability. It became obvious that the statements by the Eisenhower administration added the weight of government to their side of the table on the economic Issues at stake.

As Clifford Hood, President of United States Steel, asserted: ‘Ve have said many times that if Inflation is to be successfully halted the line must be held on all fronts, and more wage costs driving up prices Is one of these fronts,” A similar view was held by Joseph Block, Chairman of

Inland Steel. "Our company, ” declared Block, "is just as anxious to hold ifl. Quoted in, Steel, May 18, 1959, P* 58* 130 price lines as the President. The only -way to accomplish this is to 4 2 hold the cost line.” Management benefited further from Eisenhower's policy by its ability to work from a free bargaining position.

Steel executives realized that they could stand firm against the union without fear of public pressure. The administration's emphasis on allowing the process of collective bargaining to run its natural course without Interference re-enforced management's belief. Steel manufacturers felt that government concern would nob move from admoni­ tion to action—at least nob at this early stage of the negotiations.

“Until June 30,” wrote Steel, “look for the President to confine any direct action about the steel labor situation to press conferences 4 3 appeals for statesmanship by both sides.” According to Iron Age, some industry leaders claimed that the President had already gone as far 4 4 as he wanted to—for the moment, at least. Some steel executives be­ lieved that the President's entrance into the steel dispute would not come about fear some tim e. f#Pew i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,” w rote Iro n Age, “expect the Administration to enter the strike picture unless the strike should 4 5 ru n h5 days.” Thomas Patton, President of Republic Steel, believed that the President wouldn't ask for a Taft-Hartley injunction unless a strike

h2. Quotations in, Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1959.

1*3. Steel, June 15, 1959* P* 91.

1*4. Iron Age, June * 1-, 1959* p . 90*

Iron Age, January 29, 1959* p. ^9- 151 46 had been going on for sometime.

Thus, hy early June the steel manufacturers realized that the

Eisenhower Administration exhibited a probusiness viewpoint which out of principle intervened little in the transactions of its backers and' friends. The Republican Administration pampered, amused, and contained businessmen. Consequently, it simply could nob stop businessmen from enforcing their authority. As Frederick Mueller, former furniture m anufacturer and now S ecretary o f Commerce, remarked:

I believe the chief federal responsibility is to maintain a favorable climate for private enterprise—one that inspires confidence, the generator of increased business activity. I have great faith in the individual businessman, his ingenuity and his ability. I don't think that industry wants to be spoon fed or controlled by any government agency and it cer­ tainly doesn't want Uncle Sam to engage in business activities that compete with private enterprise. 7

This courtship that existed between business and government was carried out further into the steel dispute by George M. Humphrey, former

Secretary of Treasury and now Chairman of the National Steel Corporation.

**The man who placed his imprint upon the decade, ” wrote Robert Lekachman, f

46. Steel, June 8, 1959 * P* 60.

47. Quoted in, "New Cabinet Member Favors Minimum Control, ” Nation* s Business, 47 (September, 1959)* 64.

48. Robert Lekachman, The Age of Keynes (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 219-220. Lekachman gives a fine account of the Eisen­ hower Administration's pro-business and conservative outlook. 132

Eisenhower Administration, and it was scarcely an exaggeration, as

Marquis Childs wrote, '‘to say that he, more than any individual... set 4 9 the tone of the Eisenhower era.”

More specifically, Humphrey1 s influence once again became prevalent as the steel negotiations got underway. On April 22, Humphrey told the members of the American Iron and Steel Institute that he thought it would be unfortunate for the government to take a hand in the new con- trace talks. "I Just hope,” he declared, “there w ill no occasion for restrictions and that this case w ill work itself out in orderly fash- 50 ion.” This same attitude was brought to bear on the Administration when the President and the Secretary of Labor called upon Humphrey for advice regarding government intervention. At two different sessions 51 Humphrey advised the Administration to keep hands off.

The steel executives, therefore, received a definite political advantage at the outset of the Bteel contract negotiations. Management could stand firm against the union without the fear of public pressure.

For the steel industry, the support of government was theirs; an alle­ giance they hadn't received since the days of Calvin Coolidge.

Along with the government's support, management assumed the alle­ giance of the steel users. Early in the year, steel buyers became con- b9* Marquis Chiluj, Eisenhower: Captive Hero (New York: Hareourt, Brace, and Co., 1958)* P * 167.

50. Quoted in, New York Times, April 23, 1959*

Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1939) See also, Wall Street Journal, June 29/ 1959- ■ vinced that a long and "bitter steel strike was a certainty. According to a survey taken "by Steel, over 96 % of the 200 purchasing agents inter- 5 2 viewed felt there was going to be a walkout. As one agent remarked:

'X think there's going to be a helluva strike.” 3 3 This attitude per­ suaded many purchasing agents to back tonnages as far in advance as

June. In the Chicago district, mills allocated plates and cold rolled sheets several weeks in advance. The same buildup was prevalent in

Pittsburgh. "Orders are just swamping us,” reported a major Pittsburgh mill. *

Large companies, moreover, began to build a strike cushion as early as possible. Automotive, appliance and other large companies sent word to their suppliers to get enough steel on hand to last through the '59 model season. "We're moving to protect ourselves against a p o ss ib le s t r i k e , ” explained Ford Motor Company's Harold Compson, raw materials buyer. "We've sent letters to our suppliers authorizing them to acquire enough steel to see them through the balance of the 55 1959 model year and the start-up of the i 960 model production.”

52 . Steel, February 1 6 , 1959, p. 93*

53. Quoted in, Iron Age, January 29, 1959, P* k f,

"The Insides of the Steel Strike, ” United States News and World Report, 47 (November 2, 1959), ^1«

55* Quoted in, "What Steel Strike Is Going to Cost, ” United States News and World Report, kT (July 27, 1959), PP* 33“3k. 15^

Like the automotive companies, major appliance manufacturers hedged against a steel strike for months. "Our suppliers are ten to fourteen days "behind on sheets," an industry leader reported, "but we're not worried. Even if we don’t get everything we ordered for June, w e'll have enough steel for at least^ sixty days. I don't think we'd have 56 any real trouble for three months.” Westinghouse Electric Corporation, started building its inventory early in January. As to the extent of the build-up, A. M. Kennedy, Jr., Vice-President of Purchasing and

Traffic, indicated that Westinghouse would s till be in good shape after a two month strike.

Other buyers, such as railroad manufacturers and canmakers, were prepared for a break in steel production. "We're figuring on a maximum twelve-week strike and are stocking in enough steel to take care of our 57 carbuilding program through September,” stated a railroad official.

"We're trying to have our inventories built by Jtuie 1st,” reported The

Budd Company of Detroit. '*We should have enough to carry us through 58 October production.”

Small companies also increased their steel supply. But their task, in contrast to the larger companies, wasn't so easy. Many of these companies depended upon steel service centers to carry them through a possible strike period. Xt wasn't until April 23rd, that steel service

56 , Quoted in, Steel, June 8, 1959, p. 60.

57- Quoted in , Iro n Age, January 29, 1959/ p. ^7*

5 8 . Quoted In, Iron Age, April 9j 1959* PP* 5^-55* centers were fully prepared to meet the needs of the smaller manufac­ tu r e r s . *\le "believe we can support the smaller companies through a

sixty-day strike,” reported Robert G. Welch, executive vice-president

of American Steel Warehouse Association, "Our inventories are 20 pet above a year ago, ” declared a Philadelphia service center. "We believe we could help our customers for four to five months without a strain.” Similar inventory buildup was done by other service centers.

"Barring excessive runs on certain crew sizes,” remarked the Whitehead and Kales Company of Michigan, "we could then go about six weeks.”

Thus, the hedge buying by large and small companies proved beneficial 59 to the steel executives fight against the union.

The inventory buildup enabled management to avoid the usual pres­ sure by steel users for a settlement of the dispute. More important, steel executives realized that the steel buyerB understood and backed their attempt to gain a firm hand over industry's costs. “One object­ ive of the Westinghouse build-up,” explained A. M. Kennedy, "has been to put the company in shape where its supply situation would not bring eo a quick settlemtn on labor's terms—in event of a strike.” Several other companies felt the same way. As a buyer for a large eastern railroad commented: "What we and other companies can do to help the mills get a favorable settlement is to buy enough steel to last through

59. Q uotations in , Iro n Age, A p ril 25, 1959# pp. 65-64.

60. Quoted in, Steel, June 8, 1959# P* 59. 136 61 a strike.” A steel distributor from California informed Congressman

Edgar Heistand that “it's time for a show down between business and labor, as to who is to control business,” and he continued, “the steel mills w ill never be in a better position than they are today to take a 62 stand against unfair labor demands.” The allegiance of the steel users, therefore, proved invaluable to industry’s cause in terms of moral and financial support.

Besides the support from the government and the steel users, man­ agement assumed the allegiance of the steelworkers. “We do not think the steel union represents the sentiment of its employees,” Cooper re­ marked at an early negotiating session. They would not strike for a pay increase, he said, because they received substantial pay hikes and 6 3 benefits in the past. Reassuring reports came from various steel centers. For example, a Bethlehem coup any official remarked that <£the majority of workers are contented, and prefer to remain at their Jobs.”

“The Bteelworkers are not anxious to strike,” explained a United States 6 4 Steel official. “They only want a contract.”

These company reports were also supplemented by a wide range of private and public surveys. Each survey showed that the rank and file

61. Quoted in, Iron Age, January 29, 1959, pp. 48-if9«

62. George R. Borrman to Edgar W. Hlestand, May 20, 1959, Box 636, 0F-124-D-1, "White House Central Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

6 3 . Quoted in, Hew York Times, May 20, 1959* 6h. Quotations in, The Wall Street Journal. May 28, 1959. 137 would reject any wage increase that jacked up prices. '*The workers aren't especially interested in a pay raise,” remarked Jane Stewart,

Vice President of Group Attitudes Corporation, A steelworker put it this way: "I te ll ny wife I'm getting a raise and she say's so what.

Then she tells me who else is getting a raise—the hutcher, the grocer, and the place where we "buy the kids' clcthese. Prices go up every time 65 I get a raise, so I don't gain anything.” Other surveys, taken by newspapers and hy individual pollsters, such as Gallup, showed that 60 steelworkers were not anxious to get an increase in wages.

Thus, the allegiance of the steelworkers served as a great psycho­ logical advantage to the steel executives. Moreover, management realized that with the hacking of the steelworkers, they could easily

"blame the union for whatever events followed. The various strategies of the companies placed management in a strong position aB negotiations re-opened in June.

IV

As negotiations resumed in early June, it seemed as though the steel union had no other alternative, hut to capitulate. But on June 10th the situation changed quickly. Management decided that it was time to

65 . Jane Stewart, **Ehe Evaluation,” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Relations Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26, i 960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), p. 2k2. 6 6 . For further discussion on rank and file attitudes toward a wage boost see Chapter III, pp. 13-1^. 138 spell out Its demands in a more precise manner, Conrad Cooper, there­ fore handed McDonald a letter, demanding eight severe alterations in labor-management. relations, including the requirement that the union relinquish its prerogative to confer with management on operating changes and waive grievance or arbitration procedures in the event of 67 a disagreement.

It was an ill-timed move by the steel committee. Up to this point, the steelworkers were apathetic towards any sort of wage in­ crease, The steel executives missed, however, the symbolic importance of the work rules issue with regards to the steelworkers sense of security. McDonald seized upon this issue to inform the workers that the industry planned to destroy the union and with it their jobs.

McDonald's sentiments were revealed on June 11th in a letter to the

Steel Companies Coordinating Committee. He wrote:

You are determined to destroy the individual rights which have been carefully and painstakingly developed under our contracts and that you have nothing but contempt for our employees. Your intentions, as are now plain, are to eliminate the substance from our collective agreements. You appear to be willing to permit the Union to continue to exist, but only at the price of converting it into a coup any union and eliminating the protections for our

67. '‘Letter from Cooper to McDonald,” June 10, 1959> FMCS; Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, i 960, DCF 259“ 3268; The other seven changes in management's new proposal dealt with 1. Wildcat Strikes, 2. Incentives, 3* Work Schedule, k. Vaca­ tions, 5* Seniority, 6. Overlapping and Distribution of Benefits, 7. Simplification and clarification of contract language, see, U.S. Board of Inquiry, Report to the President on the 1959 Labor Dispute in the Steel Industry. Under executive order IO 8U3 and 10848 (Wash- ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959 )j pp. 5-6. 139

members which we have so p a in fu lly obtained over th e p a st twenty years.. .as

McDonald realized that the proposal by industry for changes in the

work rules, gave the union a new lease on life. It was an unwise ges­

ture by the steel manufacturers, remarked McDonald. The union members,

he explained, were generally obese, satisfied and had little need for

a strike; there probably would have been substantial pressure on us to

surrender on a number of points had the industry been willing to yield

on the work rules issue. “But now,” he declared, ((we had a t o t a l l y new 69 game. The industry negotiators had done us a favor, handed us an issue.”

The work rules issue, therefore, enabled the union to be in a better bargaining position. Moreover, it brought about a change in steelworker

a ttitu d e s .

McDonald c re ate d apprehension among th e steelw o rk ers. The rank

and file became convinced that a change in local work practices consti­ tuted a threat to their employment security. As an open-hearth worker at Inland Steel Company plant remarked: ‘^The foreman could say some younger man is quicker or better at my job, and then they put me in a labor gang. You don't know what it was like in the old days before we had seniority. The foreman gave all his friends and relations the good jobs. The union changed th at.” In Birmingham, Alabama, at the Tennessee

68. “Letter from McDonald to Steel Companies Coordinating Committee,” June 11, 1959* FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959, DCF-259-3268; See also, The Christian Science Monitor (June 12, 1959)t Steel Labor (July, 1959)> p. 8.

69* David McDonald, Union Man, p. 267. lUO

Coal and Iron division of United States Steel, It was the same story.

“They want to cut down th e manpower f o r d iff e r e n t jo b s, ” remarked a

brickmason's helper, “if they take those things away from us, we

might as well start all over again!” At the Fontana, California plant

of Kaiser Steel Corporation, a millwright remarked: “They want to cut 7 0 a ll job classes down, so no matter what we get we'd be worse off.”

Thus, the sleeping steelworker was awakened, now, and the industry

compounded the problem by refusing to bend on the work rule issue.

Each worker had construed these proposed alterations In the li$at of

his own job, and concluded that he might be hurt. As of June 11th,

the union finally had a solid issue on which to stand firm. The changes

in the steelworkers attitude enabled McDonald to resist management's

demands regardless of the consequences.

Although a strike seemed imminent following McDonald's letter of

June 11th, some l a s t d itc h e f f o r ts were made t o b rin g about a s e t t l e ­

ment. Between mid-June and July 1st, when the contract officially

terminated, attempts by the union, the SCCC, and the administration

followed in order that a peaceful agreement might be reached.

The first attempt toward reaching a settlement came on June 25th, when McDonald appealed to President Elsenhower to establish an impartial

fact finding board. This board, explained the union chief, would examine

70. Quotations in, 'faow Steel Workers Feel Now About the Strike,” United States News and World Report, kj (October 32, 1959)* ^5* Xkl

such issues as wages, profits, and productivity. McDonald then pledged

to bargain night and day “on the basis of the facts determined toward 71 a non-inflationary settlement.

President Eisenhower, however, rejected this proposal. He con­

sidered the setting up a fact finding board as the first step in invol­

ving the Taft-Hart ley Act, something he did not want to do. The Presi­

dent stated further that Congress wisely had limited this procedure 7 2 only to national emergencies. As one administration official put

it: '^President Eisenhower felt that setting -up a fact finding board

would amount to direct intervention in the steel dispute. The Presi­

dent felt the board would substitute the Government's facts and figures

for those now being presented by the two sides in the actual negotia- 7 3 ting, and be the same as bringing the negotiators into the White House.”

Thus, McDonald's attempt to reach a settlement failed, but some good

came out o f h is e f f o r t.

President Eisenhower, acting on the letter from McDonald, decided

to make a plea for continued negotiations, “i suggest to both parties

71. New York Times, June 28, 1959*

72. U. S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the-Federal Register, National Archives and Record S erv ices, 1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, PP. U82-l*85, Cited Hereafter as Public Papers of President Eisenhower; See also, “ike's View on Steel Wage Talks,,rUnited States News and World R eport. h6 (June 29, 1959), 97-99. 73* Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1959. 142

to this dispute,” •wrote Eisenhower, “that they continue to bargain with­

out interruption of production until all of the terms and conditions of 7 4 a new contract are agreed upon. Acceptance of this suggestion, ex­

plained the President, would he in the interest of the steel workers,

the steel companies, and the public. As one Government official stated:

'*Uhe President thought the negotiators had gotten themselves painted

into a corner... This gives them a way to prolong the talks and keep 7 5 their dignity. On June 28th, the union and the companies responded with the assurance that they would comply with the President’s wishes.

Each group stipulated that the talks would be extended for two weeks

from the original expiration date of July 1st.

The extension, however, proved to be a short lived remedy. Both

Bides were so entrenched in their position that they were virtually blinded to any compromise situation. On the one hand, the industry held firm in its demand for a one year wage freeze, abandonment of the

cost of living escalator, and eight contract changes designed to promote efficiency. On the other hand, the union refused to talk of the work rules issue and held out for a wage package estimated at 15 to 20 cents, an hour. Subsequently, on July 8th, the negotiations once again reached an impasse. McDonald informed Vice-President Nixon that the ensuing negotiations had gotten absolutely nowhere, because of the completely

74. ^The T a lk ... The M eaning,” Newsweek, 54 (Ju ly 6, 1959)* p . 63* See also, Public Papers of President Eisenhower, p. 483.

75* Quoted in , V ail S treet Journal, June 29, 1959* 143 recalcitrant attitude of the steel companies. He then declared that the union would not agree to another strike truce unless a wage settle- 7 6 ment was reached before the contract deadline.

On J u l y 12th, talks were at a breaking point on three of the in­ dustry1 s proposals relating to local working conditions, wildcat strikes, and proposals concerning increased efficiency. A final attempt, there­ fore, was made in order that a strike might be avoided. In an exchange of letters, both sides recommended solutions to the thorny issue of work practices. McDonald informed the'SCCC that the union agreed to talk about the work rules issue and offered to refer it to a joint committee for study while the two sides settled on wage rates. '*The union,” wrote McDonald, Relieves that your fears over local working conditions are unjustified and that the clauses of the agreements per­ mit the industry to increase efficiency and productivity... The Union, therefore, proposes that we lay this issue aside and refer it to a joint committee of the union and the industry to access the facts during the term of the next contract and to recommend to the parties whatever 7 7 solutions are justified by the facts.” McDonald then proposed that the impartial committee should be headed by such people as Benjamin

Fairless, Clarence Randdall, and Clinton Golden.

76 . Hew York Times, July 8, 1959-

77- Letter from McDonald to Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, July 12, 195 9t FMCS, Archives Branch, Hational Record Center, Suit land, R.G. 280, 195 9> DCF 259-3268; See also, Hew York Times, July 13, 1959; Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1959. Ikk

But the companies stood pat and refused to talk atout higher pay

or fringe benefits until the issue of local practices was decided. "We

doubt,” wrote the SCCC, “that further study is needed to come to grips

with the problem by the existing local working conditions clauses. If,

however, you s till feel that further joint study of the problems is 7 8 advisable, we are willing to participate in such a study.” But the

deferment of the local working conditions, argued management, meant that

any consideration of increased wages or employee benefits be likewise

deferred. Moreover, this deferrment could only be accomplished by the

union’s acceptance of industry's earlier proposal of a straight one

year contract extension, or an indefinite extension cancellable on

five days' notice.

The union rejected both of industry’s proposals. Moreover, this

brought from McDonald a declaration that "it is simply inconceivable

to the union that a local working condition such as the great American 7 9 custom of a coffee break is preventing a settlement.” It was on this

note that the talks collapsed. McDonald, then, spent the final minutes

before the beginning of the strike, talking to more than a thousand

members at United States Steel Dairiess Works at M orrisville, Pennsyl­

vania. "When the final chips are down,” he thundered, “the union w ill

7 8. Letter from Steel Companies Coordinating Committee to McDonald, J u ly 13, 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Sultland, R.G. 280, 1959* DCF-259-3268; See also, Robert Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Steel Industry (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 196l7, pp. 302-303.

79* Quoted in , New York Times, July 15, 1959. 145

win the finest labor agreement any union ever had. ” Within minutes

after the speech at midnight on July 14, the word went out to the steel- ao workers, “No contract—no work.”

Thus, following months of frustrating negotiations, of insulting

charges and countercharges, and of maneuverings by both sides, the

contemplated strike finally became a reality.

V

On July 15, the strike began with approximately 5^0,000 workers

out and 85?> of the nation's steelmaking capacity shut down. Late that

afternoon, President Eisenhower recommended that steel industry manage­ ment and labor representatives call on Federal mediators for assistance

in reaching a contract agreement. Both sides agreed within the hour to meet with Joseph Finnegan, director of the Federal Mediation and 81 Conciliation Service.

At this first meeting, McDonald proposed that the companies and the union set up a fact finding board of three members, the company to name one, th e union to name one, and t h ir d t o be named by Chief J u s tic e

Earl Warren. This board would investigate the issues and recommend a settlement. The companies rejected this proposal on the grounds that it represented an effort by the union to shun its collective bargaining responsibilities. The companies maintained that both sides already had

80. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1959; See also, McDonald, Union Man, p. 269.

81. Public Papers of President Eisenhower, p. 520* enough facts and did not need third parties to establish them fresh.

The refusal prompted Finnegan to state that he could see little reason for optimism in a settlement, “it is obviously a very serious situa­ tion, ” he added, “when you have experienced seasoned negotiators on both ea sides and they are unable to negotiate a contract.” This dispute, he explained, "was not susceptible to any early agreement.

As both groups went through the first day of exploratory talks, the government set up its own apparatus for gathering facts on the

Bteel situation. President Elsenhower’s technique was to appoint

Secretary of Labor Mitchell as his personal fact-finder. The Labor

Secretary acted under the law \dilch required him to Investigate a ll controversies and disputes between employers and employees as they occurred and which tended to interfere with the welfare of the people of the several states. The Administration, however, made sure that the appointment of a fact-finder had not detracted from its original position of a “hands-off” policy. “This exploration of the facts and causes of the strike,” explained Mitchell, “will not be the same as a

'classic' fact-finding board, because it would not stop the strike or 83 prevent the parties from continuing their negotiations.” Similar sentiments were expressed by President Eisenhower. He maintained that the dispute should be settled through private negotiations, but, never-

82. Quoted in, The Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1959•

8 3. Edging Toward Steel Intervention,” Business Week, No. 1557-1560 (July 25, 1959)? 23-2l|-; See also, Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1959. xkl theless, it was the duty of government to keep fully abreast of every 8 4 development. Thus, the government hoped a settlement could he reached through private voluntary negotiations under the direction of the FMCS.

As the strike proceeded into the first three weeks, little change had taken place since the pre-strike negotiations. Most of the private meetings between the companies committee and the steel union dealt with exploratory talks on economic and non-economic issues and organizational procedures.

Between July 20th and July 26th, Director Finnegan met separately with the union and management representatives. At this time a round of exploratory discussions with both sides had been attempted. The r e s u l t b of these sessions, however, proved futile. Finnegan reported that the general attitude of the parties showed a lack of flexibility 8 5 and signs of personal hostility. The personal fighting centered about the change in local working conditions. The union insisted that the industry at one time agreed in substance to its proposal of a study committee to examine the problems of working conditions. Management, contrary to the union, denied any such agreement had every been made.

Therefore, the first full week of discussions had indicated that neither group was ready to recede from its pre- strike position.

81*. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Waging Peace, 1956- 196l, Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965) , p. ¥55 .

85 . Summary Report of the FMCS Meeting in the Steel Dispute: Steel Negotiation Chronology, July 23, 1959* FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959 > Dispute Case File 259**3268; See also, New York Times, July 23, 1959* 148

With separate meetings proving futile, Finnegan decided to hold joint sessions. On July 27th, the FMCS brought union and company nego­ tiators together for the first meeting since the strike began. The session concerned itself ■with the work rules issue, but once again both sides showed unwillingness to alter its pre-strike position. The union especially became very upset when management demanded that it was their right to change conditions in local plants. Thus, the first face-to- 86 face conference collapsed swiftly.

Subsequently, on August 7th, another such confrontation was held, but the same results occurred. The breakdown of the joint sessions prompted Fineegan to state that there was little prospect for an early or easy settlement, "it would be raising false hopes, ” declared Finne­ gan, “to say the strike is the least bit closer to being resolved.”

Finnegan conceded that little progress was made during the sessions.

He said negotiators “continue to grapple with language difficulties over 8 7 wording of a new contract. ” It was on this note that McDonald decided to leave the negotiations and let his second team of negotiators take over. “I am sick of that show in New York,” explained McDonald, “and

I 'll not take part in the Steel Strike negotiations until the industry

86. Summary Report of the FMCS Meetings in the Steel Dispute: Steel Negotiation Chronology, July 27, 1959# FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959# DCF-259-5268.

87. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1959; See also, Summary Reports of the FMCS Meetings in the Steel Dispute: Steel Nego­ tiatio n Chronology, August 6, 7# 1959# FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959# DCF-259-5268. 1^9 as makes a concrete offer on a new wage contract.” Conrad Cooper

followed the lead of his chief opponent and also decided to boycott

the bargaining sessions.

Meanwhile, as the top negotiators stayed away from the bargaining

table, they brought their case to the public. The steel union leaders

directed their attention toward the steelworkers. Thus, various

union officials toured steel towns, making emotional speeches againBt

the industry. A throng of more than 5,000 workers were on hand as

McDonald lashed out at the industry in a rousing speech at the Fair-

less Works plant at Morrlsville, Pennsylvania. "The industry wanted this strike. They wanted our men to be out on the streets, ” McDonald

explained. f*They have done no negotiating whatsoever as they pursue their planned course to wreck your union. Well we are on the road to victory, and by the Gods we are going to win,” Vice President Howard

Hague, in his sweep through the Midwest pledged to the pickets: "We w ill take no backward step. ” Similar sentiments were expressed by

Secretary and Treasurer X. W. Abel, as he swung through the Pittsburgh mill towns. Steelworkers are no longer serfs or slaves of the steel 89 barons,” he told an audience at Hazelwood, Pennsylvania. At Detroit,

McDonald directed his speech toward the wives of the workers, "you

88. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1959; See also, Youngs­ town V in d icato r, August 10, 1959; Summary re p o rt o f th e FMCS Meet­ ing in the Steel Dispute: Steel Negotiation Chronology, August H , 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959, DVF-259-3268.

8 9. Quotations in, Steel Labor, II, July, 1959* p. H; See also, Steel Labor, September IT* 1959* P* IT* 150 women, ” he argued, “have a stake in the strike: your husbands may he the next to lose their jobs if we were to agree to industry's viscous 90 eight-point wreck-the-union proposal.”

As union leaders traveled the various picket sights, top executives took their case to the media. At various news conferences and televi* sion appearances, management reiterated its intention to hold the line against union wage demandB. Roger Blough, speaking at a press confer­ ence in New York, emphasized the need for the industry to hold firm against higher employment cost. Many people, remarked Blough, mis tak­ ingly feel that a steel wage increment would not be inflationary if it did not result in an increase in steel prices; and thus we hear much about whether industry could manage to boost wages and benefits another notch. “But the fact is,” argued Blough, “that whether steel prices rise or not, inflationary wage increases in construction, motors, and other industries ripple out over the entire economy as other unions 91 strive to catch up to the new, high level. ” Aside from news con­ ferences, industry brought its story to the public through the television media. An example of this tactic came in late August when R. Conrad

Cooper spoke on “New York Forum, ” a new weekly public affairs program presented by the Columbia Broadcasting System. Asked whether a public fact-finding board should be appointed to help end the strike, Cooper

90. I b id .j I I , August, 1959* P« 2.

91. Quoted In, New York Times, July 29; 1959; See also, Wall Street Jo u rn a l. Ju ly 29, 1959*

fits 151

replied:

We know the facts in the situation, and the union knows the facts in the situation. We don't need anyone to tell us the facts in the situation. What is needed iB for the USWA to take a mature attitude rather than a selfish one in the negotiations. a

For a period of three weeks, neither the top negotiators for the union

or management participated in private negotiations— public debating

seemed the only course of action.

With the steel strike rounding the corner into its second month, political pressures were building up for the union and the companies

to settle. In the House, Connecticut Democrat Chester Bowles, once

Federal wage-price stabilizer, suggested that the companies could cut the price of steel and hold the line on wages. The proposal that Bowles

sent to the President suggested that wages remain at present levels in . 93 exchange for a ?10 per ton reduction in steel prices.

In the Senate, Democrats urged President Eisenhower to intervene.

r*The situation is far too serious to permit any longer a continuation of the President’s 'hand's off' policy,” thundered Senator Hubert Hum-

92. Quoted in, Hew York Times. August 2k, 1959; Tke companies utilized the T.V. media at various other times, See, Republic Steel Corpora­ tion, What's The Steel Strike AL1 About? texts of a series of radio interviews between Warren Guthrie and Thomas F. Patton, September, 29, 1959; October 1, 6 , 8, 15 , 15, 1959; December 10, IT, 25, 1959; Also see, United States Steel Corporation, Basic Issues In the Nationwide Steel Strike, texts of a series of radio interviews be­ tween George Hicks and R. Conrad Cooper, September 8, 15, 22, 25, 29, 1959* These radio scripts were sent to me from the Public Re­ lations Department of United States Steel and Republic Steel.

95. Chester Bowles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, August k, 1959, Box 656 , 0F-12k-D-l, White House Central File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 94 phrey. Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri vent a step further than

Humphrey’s plea and called upon the President to summon representatives of hoth groups to the White House and set a time limit for a negotiated accord. The Symington resolution urged the President to set a deadline for voluntary agreement on new contract terms. If agreement was ncrt reached within the time lim it, the President would he authorized to commission an im partial fact-finding hoard which would recommend a settlement. The resolution, moreover, emphasized that the imminence of the Khrushchev visit and the importance of inpressing the Soviet

Premier with the country's hasic strength provided an extra incentive 95 for a quick end to the steel stoppage.

Republicans, also were calling for action. Senator Jacoh Javits of Hew York and Senator George Aiken of Vermont prepared a plan that would act as a substitute for the Symington resolution. "Our suggestion is a substitute for the Symington resolution,” Senator Javits and Aiken d eclared . {CV[e omit the request to the President that he act as a mediator of the strike, which is one of the main points of the Symington

Resolution, and we do not call for the President to make recommendations 96 as to the terms of settlement.” In a situation like this, explained

9k, th. S^ Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Part 15, September 1^, 1959, Vol. 105, p. 19632. 95* Hi C ongressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 105, S. cong. Res. 69, August 4, 1959, PP* 15°56-15037; See also, S. Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Session, Vol. 105, August 11, 1959, P- 15426. Thirty-three Democratic Senators listed themselves as co-signers of the Symington Resolution. 96* Hi Hi Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 105, August 17, 1959, pp. 159t&-15985. 153 the two Senators, public fact-finding would prove to he the most effec­ tive way to settle the dispute. The Senators urged the President to share with the people the facts found for him by his own fact-finder,

Labor Secretary Mitchell. These facts, remarked the Senators, would enable the public to understand the crisis and thereupon apply pressure on both groups to settle.

The President, however, remained indifferent to the various pro­ posals. At first, Eisenhower waB very inpressed with the Bowles pro- 97 posal. But later, he was advised by his cabinet to refrain from com­ menting on any specific proposal for fear of placing the Administration 98 directly into the dispute. Thus, Eisenhower promptly relayed the

Bowles plan, via Labor Secretary Mitchell, to United States Steel Chair­ man Roger Blough, where it was promptly rejected. As for the suggestion that he intervene before Khrushchev arrived, the President had nothing but scorn. <(Uell don't we want Mr. Khrushchev to see this country as 99 a ... freedom-loving place?” he declared. "In the example of Pittsburg,”

97 • Bryce Harlow, administrative assistant to the President, informed Steve Saulnier that the President seemed most interested in Bowles' proposal, especially the section dealing with a cut in price with no change in wage rates, see, Memorandum, Harlow to Saulnier, August 5, 1959, Box 656 , 0F-124-D-1, White House Central Pile, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

9 8. Don Paarlherg, special assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, informed the President that although he, Saulnier, and Mitchell saw a sound economic case in the Bowles' proposal, they felt it was wiser to avoid the issue so not to interject the government into the controversy, see, Memorandum, Paarlberg to Eisenhower, August 13, 1959, Box 636, 0F-12^-D-1, White House Cen­ tra l Piles, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 99* Quoted in , temperance In S te e l,” Newsweek, 5k (August Sk, 1959), 62. 15^ stated Eisenhower, “Mr. Khrushchevm a y learn America’s finest lesson.

Our m ills, our factories, our shops, our offices are operated by free men, united in their determination to remain free and to continue to 100 force the highest standards of productivity in the -world.”

Moreover, the President refused to act according to the Symington resolution, but he did favor the Javits' proposal of making public

M itchell's fact-finding. Subsequently, on August 20th, Secretary Mitchell made public, statistical data dealing -with the issues of the five-week, old steel strike. The figures dealt with the company profits, labor 101 productivity, wages, prices, and other major aspects of the industry.

The Mitchell report, however, made sure that it did not place the government on one side or the other. The Labor Secretary failed to set forth any conclusive evidence concerning a settlement. He avoided the major issue of how much of an increase in pay, if any, was justified by the facts. The report was so restrained and objective that each side 102 interpreted it as supporting its own position. R. Conrad Cooper said the report demonstrated that steel wages had put the steelworkers at the top of the list. Increases in employment costs, exceeded increase in 103 output per man hour, Cooper declared, thereby forcing up prices.

100. Quoted in, New York Times, September 19, 1959*

101. '‘M itch ell Gets th e F acts on S te e l, ” B usiness Week, No. 1561-1565 (August 22, 1959); 27; U. S. Department of Labor, Background Sta­ tistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute, Bulletin No. S-l (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 1959). 102. Chicago Daily News, August 25, 1959-

103 . The Christian Science Monitor, August 20, 1959; See also, New York Times, August 20, 1959. 155

David McDonald claimed the report favored the steel union 1 s position.

It showed, argued McDonald, that “fewer employees and fewer hours of

work are required for each ton of steel produced and shipped than ever 104 "before in the history of the steel industry.” Moreover, the report was so comprehensive and "balanced as to leave the general public, for whom it was ostensibly designed, lost in a sea of statistics and unable

to make up its mind. “Secretary M itchell,” wrote the Baltimore Sun,

**has merely found facts—and offered them without clarification 1 0 s recommendation.”

Thus, the President stood firm against White House intervention.

He held his position in the face of Democratic calls for direct federal pressure to end the tie-up. “Now so far as the strike is concerned, for

the moment at least, I repeat this one thing,” Eisenhower told his

Washington News Conference. “I shall insist that free bargaining meanB that these people must solve their own problems. I have urged both

sides that negotiations must not contribute to inflation because here 106 is a terrible enemy ready to pounce on us any time we get unwary.”

The same sentiments were expressed by Secretary of Labor Mitchell, “i

think it's incumbent on both sides to bargain continuously and not on

a two-to-four basis, not with Friday to Tuesday weekends, ” he declared.

104, Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, August 20, 1959.

105* Quoted.i n The Evening Sun (Baltimore), August 20, 1959; For other criticism s of the Mitchell Report see, Congressional Record. 86th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 105, August 20, 1959, pp. 165*4-1- 1 6 5 *42 . 106. Quoted in , New York Times, August 20, 1959. 156

Mitchell also urged that top representatives for hath union and manage­ ment take part in the talks. “Certainly,” he asserted, “bargaining 107 can't take place until the principals meet.”

Following M itchell's plea for continued negotiations and a request hy Federal Mediator Finnegan to resume talks, top negotiators returned 1 0 s to the bargaining table. Between late August and late Septeniber, the negotiators met intermittingly in joint and separate negotiating se ssio n s.

On August 20th, Mediator Finnegan met with Cooper and McDonald, together to discuss secondary contract issues, such as supplementary unemployment insurance, pensions, and vacations. The results of the discussion proved futile. “l am not hopeful that the strike w ill be 109 settled soon,” declared Finnegan. Other discussions with similar results occurred throughout the remainder of the week. On August 25th,

Robert H. Moore, deputy director of the FMCS, told newsmen that neither side had indicated any change in its position. “I am not particularly n o hopeful,” he declared, “of reaching an agreement on the contract.”

107. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, August 20, 1959*

108. On August 2 0 , 1959, James Mitchell told Joseph L. Finnegan that parties had to meet and if they did not he would put pressure on them; See, Summary Report of the FMCS Meetings with the Companies and Unions. Steel Chronology, Aueust 2 0 , 1959, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959, DCF-259-5268.

109. Quoted in, New York Times, August 25 , 1959. HO. Quoted in, Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1959* 157

The negotiating sessions, therefore, held to the consistent pattern of

no progress, and no change "by either side. At the close of the August

27th session, the negotiators took a five day recess.

Following the five day recess, Federal mediators decided to try a

new "bargaining technique in an effort to "break the long deadlock. The

new procedure involved a combination of summit and grassroots negotia­ ting sessions to seek solutions for company-by-company problems over work rules and other local issues. The shift in procedure involved the calling to New York, on September 10th, of k$0 union officers and rank and file representatives form the mills of the twelve companies.

They established subcommittees to discuss local problems with Manage­ ment representatives of their own companies. The company spokesmen were drawn from the 150 members of the original committees for the twelve procedures. The subcommittees were under the supervision of the official four man bargaining teams for both sides; Finnegan ex­ plained that the new approach was being tried "because of complexities arising out of differences among the contracts between each of the twelve companies and the union and because of the necessity for further dis- xxi cussion of local problems.”

The shift in the negotiating techniques, however, brought little headway toward a settlement. Mediator Finnegan reported that discussions reached an unbroken deadlock on all basic issues. The union held to its

15 cents hourly wage increase. Xt also requested whatever additional

111. Quoted in , New York Times, September5j 1959; ib id ., September 7, 1959. 158

money would "be due to employees under a contract escalator clause. The

steel industry, on the other hand, rejected all proposals that would

call for increased labor costs. It also upheld its previous demand to 112 eliminate wasteful practices.

By the last week in September, therefore, bargaining sessions had been more cursory and fruitless than ever. The major talks had seldom

lasted more than half an hour, and McDonald and Finnegan agreed that the talkB showed no progress of any kind. “The situation is just about the same as it was when we entered the negotiations on July 1 6 , ” Finne­

gan said. McDonald asserted that “absolutely no progress had been made 1X3 during the two weeks of subcommittee bargaining on local issues.”

In a last ditch effort to keep bargaining open, President Eisen­ hower warned both groups that collective bargaining was on tria l in the steel strike. He appealed for new efforts at hard and intensive nego­ tiating. The President told both sides that he had seen far more diffi­ cult problems than the steel dispute resolved in far less time by people who spoke different languages and had diverse backgrounds. He pleaded 114 for a spirit of compromise and a will to agree. The President's request, however, fell upon deaf ears.

IIP.. Ibid., September 12, 1959i Summary Report of the FMCS Meeting in the Steel Dispute: Steel Negotiations Chronology, September U , 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, R.G. 280, 1959, DCF-259- 3268.

115 . Quotations in, New York Times, September 2k, 1959* 114. Wall Street Journal, September 2k, 1959* 159 On September. 25, the United Steelworkers of America "broke off nego­ tiations with the steel industry, “tie a re going home, ” sa id McDonald.

**This farcical filibuster that has been going on since May 5 has ended. ”

The union's action included the cancellation of rooms and office space 1 1 5 it had occupied at the Roosevelt hotel since May.

The steel Industry, meanwhile, continued to hope that bargaining would be resumed. have urged the union to join us in bargaining on

Monday at 2 P.M.,” remarked Cooper. "We hope the union w ill reconsider its position and join us then in a renewed effort to break the dead­ lock.” But McDonald specified that he would not attend talks in N.Y., unless the companies presented a definite economic proposal. fVe w ill resume meetings,” McDonald declared, '‘the moment the leaders of the steel industry make an honest offer worthy of consideration by self- respecting steelworkers. Until they do, further meetings will serve 116 only to confuse the situation—not clarify it.”

Thus, the deadlock seemed to be insurmountable.

VI

Meanwhile, as the band of negotiators for both sides left their luxurious New York City hotel suites amidst acrimonious accusations, insulting charges and countercharges, the picket lines, exenplified an air of peace and quiet and friendliness. An early example of this

115. Quotations in, New York Times, September 26, 1959*

116 . Ibid., September 26, 1959. friendly atmosphere was exhibited at the entrance to Youngstown Sheet

and Tube’s Campbell Works where Supervisor of Industrial Relations

Albert H. Lemon had stopped to talk on the union's picket line. tfEey

Julius, ” he asked, “where was the picket captain who was to work this

morning? He failed to show up.” Picket Captain Julius Pahlan of

Campbell came to h is c o lleag u e’s defense. “Aw, maybe h is old lady made 1 1 7 him stay home and work. That’s tough, but we didn’t need him anyway.”

A pparently s a tis f ie d , Lemon dropped th e su b je c t. The company o f f i c i a l

and the union 1 s head man on duty then exchanged a few pleasantries and went their respective ways. Similar acts of friendship between union and company men occurred in many other picket areas. Foreman and super­ visors frequently went in and out of plants without any disturbances.

Strikers and company management alike realized that property had to be

safeguarded to Insure jobs would s till be there once the strike ended.

Sometimes strikers even worked within the plants to protect some pro­ perties, such as tempermental and sensitive coke plants. A picket

captain summed up the changed attitude toward coup any officials: “Aw, these fellows. Just like us, they're working for the coup any. They've 118 got a job to do. So do we. Ho sense wasting time being mad at them.”

These actions, unlike those of past years, showed the changes wrought in the steel industry.

117. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, August 23, 1959; See also, New York Times, J u ly 2k, 1959*

118. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, August 23, 1959* l6l

Down on the picket lines, among the real victims of the Bteel strike, there existed a strange lack of heat, a strange low temperature, and a strange lack of hostility. '^Chere have always heen some workers who wanted to "break through the gates in other strikes,” remarked George

Pole, President of Steelworkers’ Local 2695* “But not a one showed up 119 this time. They’re not anxious. They want a contract.” Unlike the

1937 steel strike, where steelworkers fought on picket lines out of frustration the workers of the fifties peacefully walked the picket lines. The new rank and file member supported his union hut his sense of participation in it was limited. The picket areas often found workers participating in idle talk, card playing, swimming, and other light duties. Mary steelworkers directed their idle conversations to­ wards sports. In the steel mills and "barrooms of Allquippa, Pa., the men heatedly dehated one subject, reported Time Correspondent Jack

Olsen. The important subject: the Pittsburgh Pirates, once the door mat of the National League hut at last five games from first place.

“A reporter, ” remarked Olsen, “going into interview the steelworkers about baseball's Pirates would have a snap. The men devote their entire attention to the fact that Harvey Haddlx is pitching or B ill Virdon hit a homer. But when it comes to the steel labor negotiation, they do not 120 know or seem to care what is going on. ” Aside from baseball some

119. Quoted in, “Steelworkers Mood,” Newsweek, 5k (November 2, 1959), 86. 120. Quoted in, “What the Workers Want,” Time, 73 (June 15, 1959), 88. 162 workers found time to talk about the various people working in the plant.

At Local 2165 of Sheet and Tube's Campbell Works the pickets and plant guards talked about one of the supervisors admitted into the plant for maintenance. The men agreed he was a pretty good guy.

Besides idle talk, some steelworkers passed the time playing pino­ chle or poker for nickels and pennies. f^Play all day and lose maybe sixty cents. It's a pretty cheap way to pass the time,” one picket 122 said. Local 1330, the district's largest union representing nearly

5,000 men at the Ohio Works, had erected wooden shanties in order that strikers could play cards. A striker at Gary, Indiana, bored with card playing decided to set up a swimming pool in front of the picket line area. “In this weather and with this facility, it’s almost a pleasure to be on picket duty,” he smiled. “I remember one winter there was 1 2 3 snow on the ground and my feet almost froze.” For the steelworker, then, the life on the picket lines became an almost pleasurable and leisurely experience.

Several strikers, however, found the idle talk and card playing a monotonous routine. These workers discovered other means, away from

121. Quoted In, Youngstown Vindicator, July 19, 1939.

122. Ibid., July 19, 1959.

123. Quoted in, Milton Berber, “Steel Strike Complicates 20 Years of Progress in Labor Relations, ” New York State Department Labor Industrial Bulletin, 38 (November, 1959), 24. 163

the picket area, to entertain themselves, '*Dhe municipal golf course

swarms with strikers playing eighteen holes,” reported the Youngstown

Vindicator. “There has also teen a tig Increase in fishing, and the sale 1 2 4 of worms and other ta it is on the upturn. ” According to Business

Week, steelworkers from the Bethlehem plant took advantage of the shut- 125 down to wet their fishing lines in the Lehigh River. Merchants

from Gary, Indiana, made a quick survey and found that many steelworkers

spent their strike time on improving their homes. Local merchants

estimated that they enjoyed a 5° per cent increase in business during

the strike period. The Sears Roebuck and Co. store, in Gary, showed

a 71 per cent gain in sales of home improvement products. A Sears

salesman reported that he had brought in a truckload of paint and sold 1 2 6 it right out of the trailer to the striking steelworkers. Harry

Booty, a Youngstown steelworker, explained that he got a ll his home

work—the cleaning, painting, clearing of shrubbery, and other chores— 1 2 7 ” caught up since the strike began. Initially, therefore, the workers benefited from the free time, but as the strike continued they began

to feel its effects.

124. Youngstown Vindicator, July 25, 1959.

125. 'fe te e l Town Takes S trik e Calmly, ” B usiness Week, No. 1561-1565 (August 29, 1959), 32.

126. wAd Men See New Threat to Advertising if Steel Strike Passes the Seventh Week," Printers Irik, 268 (August l4, 1959), H .

127. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, August 23, 1959; See also, "When Steel Closes Down, ” United States News and World Report, 47 (July 15, 1959), 37-39* 16 k

By the end of the summer, the strikers1 life on or away from the picket line lost its glamour. The strike "began to pinch many workers, especially those who skipped some work in the 195T and 1958 recession and didn't draw ranch supplemental unemployment pay. "it's a lot of

Baloney that our workers have savings and good hank accounts to carry them through, ” declared Joseph Germano, district union director for

Chicago. "The only thing they can do is tighten their Belts and live 1 2 8 like they did in depression days.” "A lot of workers are in pretty

Bad shape,” a social worker reported. "They hadn’t yet recovered from 1 2 9 the recession, now they are Back at the old relief stand again. ”

One steelworker complained that his SUB check went to pay Back payments on his house and he s till owed more. He explained that he had Been out of work during the recession for more than a year and had other deBts as well.

Compounding the problem of used up savings and Back payments was that of illness and Bad weather. A soft-spoken Puerto Rican worker, eight years in Youngstown, waited in the long relief line among the other workers. His wife's illness had wiped out his savings, and now there was no money for her medicine. Another worker was at the relief line Because his daughter was crippled By polio and medical expenses had eaten up everything he had. Besides costly illnesses, the Bad weather posed another major problem for the rank and file. Cold weather

128. Quoted in , Chicago D aily Hews, Ju ly 23, 1959-

129. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, August 23# 1959* 165 required more money for heat and clothing; items the steelworkers could not readily afford. “iMost families,” reported the Youngstown Vindicator, lt&re "barely making ends meet now with savings and help from Mahoning welfare department.” “We'd be out again when it's cold; let’s settle it now when our expenses aren’t as high,” suggested a father of three 1 3 0 children. Welfare director, I. L. Feuer, stated that the situation would really hurt the steelworker as the fall months set in. <{As the strike extends into September and no advances are made,” commented

Feuer, (tfche shock effect begins to set in slowly, taking in more persons as the crisis lasts. Things will be worse before they are better, 1 3 1 everyone knows.”

Because of these problems many steelworkers desired to get back to work. More and more of the rack and file began to wonder whether strikes weren't an outmoded weapon in labor disputes, “it's silly,” explained a rolling-mill worker, “to say that strikes are inevitable.

Every man would feel better if he didn’t have to worry about a strike every few years. ” As a soaking-pit worker in Birmingham commented:

“it isn't right to have a strike, because everybody suffers,” Some workers suggested that some form of arbitration might be the answer.

“We aren't accomplishing anything the way things are going now,” re­ marked an employee at the Fairiess Works. “I would favor an arbitration board made up of one union man, one management representative, and one

130. Quotations in, Youngstown Vindicator, September 27, 1959*

131. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, August 23/ 1959- independent.” A motor inspector at the Gary steel mills believed arbi­ tration would help settle stubborn disputes. "In a case like this one,” he added, "where it’s been carrying on so long, I guess arbitration is 1 3 2 the only thing. It would get the facts out in the light.” For some, the crushing burden of payless paydays, long ago overrode any other considerations, “if the company let me in,” said a *i9 year old mainte­ nance man, “I ’d go back tomorrow with ny suitcase and clothes and I ’d like to see anybody get me out.” “i want ny husband to go back to work,

T a ft-H a rtle y o r no T aft-H artley , ” sa id a t a l l b ru n e tte , summing up 1 3 3 the overwhelming majority view of steelworkers' wives.

Moreover, the steelworkers’ desire to return to work led them to accuse the union leaders and the manufacturers of negligence and undo stubbornness. “The union and management teams,” argued a steelworker from Jones and Laughlin, “could have settled their differences in half 1 3 4 an hour if they’d really gotten down to business.” 'You can't 1 3 5 expect to get something every time,” one striker commented. Some t 100 wives of striking steelworkers from McKeesport, Fa., demanded that company and union negotiators “cut a ll the falderal and get down to the

132. Quotations in, “How Steelworkers Feel How About the Strike,” United States News and World Report, k7 (October 12, 1959), ^ 6 .

135* Q uotations in , “Steelw orkers Mood,” Newsweek, (November 2, 1959), 88.

13^. "How Steelworkers Feel Now About the Strike, ” United States News and World R eport, hi (October 12, 1959)> ^6. 135. Youngstown Vindicator, September 27, 1959. "basic, facts.” The women unanimously adopted a resolution calling on X 3 S McDonald and Roger Blough to take over the bargaining themselves.

Thus, as the strike continued, more and more workers felt that both sides should give ground in an effort to end the strike.

Meanwhile, away from the picket lines, the media accused the union and the industry of negligence. The press and the public adopted a Plague-on-Both-Your-Houses attitude toward each group.

A special committee of the National Council of Churches accused both management and labor of having failed to exhibit a sufficient 1 3 7 sense of public responsibility in the dispute. “Somehwere along the lin e,” warned Steel, “the Steel Companies Coordinating Committee w ill need to give a little . The United Steel Workers w ill need to 138 give a lot. ” The Christian Science Monitor called for statesmanship 139 on the part of management and labor. The Youngstown Vindicator called for the union and the steel industry to apply themselves whole­ heartedly to the business of working out a settlement. '*Uhe steel dispute,” added the Vindicator, "has been going on since May... It’s 1 4 0 high time that they get something done.” “Both parties involved in

136. Ibid., August 29, 1959. 137. New York Times, November 2 6, I960; See also, “Church Score Press Steel Strike Report,” Editor and Publisher, 193 (December 3# i 960), p . 12. 138. Steel, June 1, 1959, P- ^5. 139* C h ristia n Science M onitor, August 5, 1959- lUO. Youngstown Vindicator, August 20, 1959. 168 the steel strike,” ordered the New York Times, “should get down to 1 4 1 serious negotiations.” “The lesson of the steel strike,” wrote the

Pittsburgh Press, “is becoming pretty plain—too much pwer in private 1 4 2 hands. ”

Thus, public opinion went against each side in the dispute. More­ over, the steelworkers and the public began to question the seemingly uncontrollable power of the private interest groups. This attitude placed the government in a precarious situation as the negotiations remained in recess. The strike reached a point where the Eisenhower administration could no longer remain indifferent to the endless strug­ gle* , .

l4l. New York Times, August 2k, 1959*

1^2, Pittsburgh Press, November 12, 1959- CHAPTER V

THE DEADLOCK IS BROKEN

By the end of September, the strike -was at an Impasse and public outcries mounted demanding government intervention to end the dispute.

Responding to public opinion, President Eisenhower asked both groups to the White House and appealed to them to end the strike. The Presidents plea, however, proved fruitless as negotiations remained deadlocked.

Meanwhile, as the strike dragged on for endless weeks, steel supplies and secondary unemployment reached threatening proportions. In these precarious circumstances, President Eisenhower was compelled to invoke the provisions written into the emergency clause of the Taft-Hartley

Act. The President declared that the steel strike endangered the nation1 s health and safety, commissioned a Board of Inquiry, and when the Board reported that it could not settle the strike, he requested the Justice Department to seek and 80 day injunction. The union and the industry, however, continued to hold their positions and both sides appeared to be fully prepared to resume the strike when the injunction period ended. Finally, on January 1960, the situation suddenly changed. In the face of economic and non-economic pressures, the indus­ try and the union reached a peaceful settlement.

169 170 II

As the strike entered its 10th week, the deadlock seemed insur­

mountable. The half-hearted attempts at a settlement by management and

labor persuaded many observers to believe that the government should

take a more direct role in the dispute. The workers, the Congress, and

the press demanded that public interest be upheld. A cutter in the

Inland Steel plant put it this way: "The government ought to have done

something so it wouldn't have been necessary to strike.” A worker at

Sparrows Point said: "I don't know about compulsory arbitration, but

there ought to be something better than th is.” '*The government,” ex­

plained a Bethlehem worker, "ought to have insisted on arbitration this 1 time.” Most Democrats In the Congress favored some form of government

intervention as a means to settling the dispute. '*Dhe situation is far

too Berious to permit any longer a continuation of the President's

'hands o f f policy*” thundered Senator Hubert Humphrey. The steel in­

dustry, he argued, played by far too important a role on the U. S.

economy, and affected directly or indirectly too many people to tolerate a such a stand. The news media also felt that the government should step

into the strike. “Government,” reported The Christian Science Monitor

"can and must fix the bounds for such industrial struggles and chart

1. Quotations in, "How Steelworkers Feel Now About the Strike,” United States News and World Report, kj (October 12, 1959), h6.

2. U. S. Congressional Record. 86th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 105 September 14, 1959, P- 19632; See also, ibid., 86th Congress, 1st S ession, Vol. 105, September 11, 1959, p. 19118* 171

paths that lead not toward 'victory' for one or the other hut toward 3 solutions for the national good.” Other editorial comments were simi­

lar. "it may he,” stated America, "that the growth of private power

in the nation's basic industries has progressed to the point where puh- At lie authority can no longer remain indifferent in its exercise.”

The convoking for federal intervention was not only limited to

public opinion. The top ranking officials in the Eisenhower adminis­

tration itself, also felt some form of federal interposition was needed

at this stage of the strike. During the last week in September, there­

fore, Mediator Finnegan, Labor Secretary Mitchell, and Chairman for the *i Council of Economic Advisors Eaymond Saulnier, repeatedly met in Washing­

ton to discuss the various options open to the President. At these

meetings, Finnegan, summarized the possible alternatives he saw open

to the President for reaching a settlement. The FMCS director indicated

that the method of continuous mediation would prove futile. He main­

tained further that the appointment of a fact-finding board outside the

Taft-Hartley Act would be unusable. Finnegan also contended that

another Presidential appeal to the parties would prove ineffectual, for both industry and union treated such an appeal as supporting their posi­ tion. The Director, moreover, discouraged the notion of both parties being brought to the White House to discuss the dispute. The only

3. The Christian Science Monitor, July 2k, 1959* k, *Vhen Collective Bargaining F ails,” America, 102 (October 31, 1959)* 121. 172 course seemingly open to the President at this time, according to the s FMCS director, -was the application of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Raymond S a u ln ie r, th e Chairman of th e CEA, disagreed . S au ln ier maintained that Taft-Hartley did not remain the only resort open to the

President. He indicated that the President could take some public action. preliminary to seeking a Taft-Hartley injunction, hoping thereby to obviate the need for the latter. This action, according to Saulnier, would entail calling the chief executives of the twelve major companies and the Steelworkers Union to the White House impressing upon them the need to avoid recourse to Taft-Hartley. Another form of action, as

Saulnier viewed it, would he to have the President make a statement similar to that alluded to in above, but without summoning the parties to the White House. Such a statement, he added, might be made through e the Press Secretary's office or possibly through a brief T.V. talk.

Thus, Eisenhower, realizing the unpopularity generated by the steel

ImpasBe, and being advised that further mediation would prove inept, knew he had t o move.

The President, however, was still reluctant to authorize direct I federal intervention. Labor Secretary Mitchell, speaking at the AFL-CIO

5. Summary Report of the FMCS Meetings in the Steel Dispute: Steel Negotiations Chronology, September 25, 1959; FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, Record Group 280, 1959; Dispute Case File 259-5268.

6. Memorandum for the President, September 22, 1959; Box 656 , 0F-124-D-^, White House Central Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 173

annual meeting, gave one of the major reasons for the President's re­

fusal to invoke the Taft Hartley Act. ‘*Dhe injunction, ” he declared,

‘Vi 11 merely stop bargaining for 80 days. Very likely no agreement

would he reached and the strike would he resumed with no further redress r as far as the government is concerned.” There were, however, several

other major factors for delaying Taft-Hartley. The Administration felt

that since there was not a serious threat to defense projects at this

time, the reopening of the mills could wait. Reports hy the armed

forces and the Atomic Energy Commission indicated that their operations 8 were not yet seriously impaired hy the eighty day old walkout. As one

high ranking government official stated: ‘*Dhere w ill he no government

pressure for a settlement because there is no hollering yet from the 9 Pentagon for the metal.” And yet there was still another major reason

for the President refraining from federal intervention. Eisenhower

maintained a strong belief that collective bargaining was on tria l in

7. Quoted in, ‘feteel Stalemate Stirs White House to Action,” Business Week, No. 1570-157^ (October 3, 1959), 29.

8. Reports sent to the President by the U. S. Department of Commerce and Defense Department indicated that defense production had not been yet affected by shortages of steel. The report also pointed out that not until mid-October would steel shortages affect the defense projects in the country, see, “Report on the Impact of Steel Strike,” September 15, 1959, Box lMf, 1959 Steel (September 15-30), James P. Mitchell Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; “impact of the Steel Strike on the Economy, ” August 17, 1959, 1959 Steel (August 16-31), A-6^-10, James P. Mitchell Papers.

9. Quoted in, Youngstown Vindicator, August 30, 1959; see also, New York Times, October 9, 1959. 1

17^ the steel dispute and felt that every avenue of a possible direct settlement should be explored.

Subsequently, on September 30th, Eisenhower, contrary to the EMCS wishes, chose to hold a White House meeting with top industry and union spokesmen. The President made an appeal, in separate one-half hour talks for a demonstration that collective bargaining could be made to work without Government compulsion.

The President conversed first with management informing them that he -would not suggest solutions to the strike. The government, he ex­ plained, was not intervening in the strike, but he wanted to stress the fact that the public welfare was involved. He told management that collective bargaining was on trial in this dispute and that he had tried his best to keep the government out of it. Eisenhower pointed out, however, ‘‘that public opinion was mounting and that members of the congress were getting sick and tired of this continued dispute.”

The President, moreover, disclosed that the strike was becoming increasingly damaging for the United States, particularly when viewed against the background of world affairs. He informed management that

Russian productivity was increasing and in several areas the U. S. was faced with the loss of world markets. Due to these circumstances,

Eisenhower called upon management to use its good sense and renew nego­ tiations immediately. He emphasized that a settlement should be derived at by the process of collective bargaining. ‘frree collective bargaining,” he warned, “cannot be permitted to fall down.” The steel executives responded favorably to the President's plea.

Roger Blough, Chairman for the United States Steel, indicated to the

President, that the steel industry appreciated his viewpoint and the position he had taken. Moreover, Blough revealed that the steel com­ panies were confronted with a serious problem of wanting to live within their means, as well as reach a settlement that was non-inflationary.

So the President could accommodate the companies by stressing these terms to the union. He also stated that under the American system of life, companies must have freedom to manage their own affairs. The

President replied that any substantial suggestions on his part would be considered government intervention and consequently all would be lost. The steel executives concluded the meeting by promising that they would do everything in their power to reach a negotiated Bettle- 10 ment.

Following his meeting with management, Eisenhower met with union representatives admonishing them that they must view the U.S. against the background of a tense international situation. He indicated the government was doing everything it could to ease the situation, but nevertheless it did exist. **The Soviets,” he warned, “were going into a definite economic competition with us— indeed it is really an economic war.” The President expressed his assumption that Americans did not

10. Memorandum of Conversations, September 30, 1959# Box 6 3 6 , 0F-12U-L-14:, ■White House Central Filesj see, “industry Meetings, ” September 30, 1959# Box 7# 1959 Steel Strike The President's (l), Records of David W. Kendall, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 176

•want to Bee the economy weakened, that everyone must unite to deal with \ this threat.

Eisenhower then told the union leaders that time was of the essence

in settling this strike. He asserted that the steel union, as well as

industry, had to work at the situation seriously if free collective

■bargaining was going to prevail. The President explained hy no means

was he siding with one group or the other, that actually he was staking

his own reputation on the issue that free collective hargaining would

succeed.

The steel union's response was similar to that of management's.

McDonald told the President, “w e'll try .” He also maintained that impor­

tant issues were at stake here, specifically alterations of the work

ru le s issu e . N evertheless, McDonald contended th a t th e s t e e l union 11 would meet with management in order that a compact might he reached.

The plea hy the President for a demonstration that collective hargaining could triumph without government compulsion resulted in a

decision hy "both sides to resume formal peace talks in Pittsburgh on

October 1st. In the following three days the companies put into more

specific terms the economic package which they were prepared to offer.

The October 1st proposal called for a two-year agreement providing for

increases in employee benefits the first year and an increase in wages

the second year. This offer increased the companies* employment costs

11. Memorandum of Conversations, White House Central File; see 'labor Meeting,” September 30 1 1959> Box 1, The 1959 Steel Strike The President's (l), Records of David W. Kendall. 177 to an average of 2$ o r jj? cents a year.

Industry, moreover, reduced its proposed eight-contract changes to

just three ‘^Phe steel companies,” remarked Cooper, "has scaled down

to an irreducible minimum their requests for improvement in contract

language, adherring only to those that would clearly operate in the i s long-range interests of the steelworkers themselves.” First, manage­

ment demanded fu ll freedom on work schedulings. Secondly, industry

required that the local unions accept full responsibility in observance

of contract provisions—namely wildcat strikes. Management also deman­

ded the right to discharge any employee engaging in such action.

Finally, the steel companies wanted complete authority to institute a

new work practice. The companies proposal concluded with the stipula­ tion that agreement was needed on the three contract changes, prior to 1 3 bargaining on the allocation of the 2$ employment costs.

In connection with this proposal the companies on October 3rd,

spelled out in detail their suggestions for improvement in pensions, in­

surance, and supplemental unemployment benefits. This letter to McDonald pointed out that the offer of a two-year fifteen cents an hour package

of improved benefits and wages, was purposely stated in terms which

12. Quoted in, New York Times, October 6, 1959.

13. Report from. Mr. Harold Boeschenstein, October 2, 1959, Box 636, 0F-12k-D-3, White House Central File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; See also, U. S. Board of Inquiry, Report to the President on the 1959 Labor Dispute in the Steel Industry, Under Executive Order 1084-3 and 10848 (Washington; Government Printing Press, October 19, 1959), P* 6 . Subsequently cited as Report to President. 1?8

f

this stun as between wages and benefits, so as to give the greatest

possible satisfaction to the employees.” The proposal also indicated

that the companies were entirely willing to consider alternate benefits,

should the immediate effect of improved insurance benefits upon take-

home pay present problems that precluded the arrival at a settlement of

the strike. Moreover, the steel manufacturers brought forth one addi­

tional point. They asserted:

The conpanies willingness to assume wage and benefit increases in the amount of 2$ per year of total employment cost confers upon the employees during the next two years, the maximum that the companies can reasonably hope to provide and s till live within their means. It is the maximum that can be gen­ erated without increasing cost. Hence, it is the maximum that can be granted without inflationary effect.

On October 4th, the steel union turned down management's motion,

McDonald made i t q u ite c le a r th a t th e union would not back down on th e work rules issue. “The United Steelworkers of America,” the union

chief thundered,

14. Steel Companies Coordinating Committee to David McDonald, October 3, 1959, Box 636, 0F-124-D-2, White House Central Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 15. U. S., Board of Inquiry, Hearings, On the 1959 Steel Strike, In the matter of the labor dispute between the United Steelworkers of America and certain companies in the steel industry, held at Washington from October 12 through October 18, 3 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: CSA Reporting Corporation, 1959), P- 17; Hereafter cited as, Hearings on the Steel Dispute. 179 charges against local unions or employees engaging in wildcat strikes, the union felt the present contract language was more than sufficient.

**We don't -understand -what the purpose is in adding this additional lan­ guage," declared Arthur Goldberg, special council for the USWA. 'Ve don't think the suing of local unions would bring any peace in the steel

Industry. In any event, the International Union is responsible under 1 8 the contract, and the local unions are also responsible.” With re­ spect to work scheduling, the union made its own stipulation. t(We indicated a willingness to meet your problems in this area,” asserted

McDonald, “if you were prepared to agree to appropriate penalties for scheduling violations of the contract. You have in the past, however, 1 7 rejected this approach.”

Following the repudiation of management's proposal, the steel union also made an offer. McDonald proposed a settlement that called far employment cost increases that amounted to 5%$ or 60 or more cents per hour over a three year period. He also suggested the creation of an arbitration commission to study contract problems. The union, how­ ls ever, would have veto power over any of the commission's findings.

Management rebuffed the union's proposition on the grounds that any such Increase in steelmaking costs endangered the competitive position of the American steel industry in markets both home and abroad.

16. Ibid., p. 93.

17. New.York Times, October 6, 1959.

18. Report From Mr. Harold Boschenstein, October 2, 1959* Box 636, QF-224-D-3? White House Central File. 180

Subsequently, on October 5th, negotiations once again dispersed.

Management and the union resorted to accusations in order to justify their unwavering positions. Conrad Cooper put it this way: <

ship's responsibility for the continuing deadlock. Throughout the nego­ tiations the union leaders have insisted upon an inflationary, some- 1 9 thing-for-nothing settlement,” McDonald, however, placed the blame on the steel companies. “Let me make it perfectly clear that the com­ panies are not offering the steelworkers 15 cents an hour,” remarked the union president. f*They are still demanding that we take zero minus... This so called offer was obviously and deliberately designed 20 to force the steelworkers to reject it. They could do nothing else.”

Thus, the statements by the top negotiators clearly revealed the com­ plete separation of the parties.

With the breakdown in negotiations, Eisenhower seemed le ft with no other alternative except to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act. Several new factors emerged on the scene that made this decision even more impera­ tive. As the steel strike ended its thirteenth week, the impact of the strike was reaching threatening proportions. Steel stockpiles were shrinking rapidly and extensive secondary work stoppages were occurring 21 at an even faster rate.

19. Statem ent by Cooper, October 5* 1959* Box 656 , OF-12^-D-2, White House Central File.

20. Quoted in, New York Times, October 6, 1959* 21. Report by U. S. Department of Commerce on the Effect of the Steel S trik e On th e Economy, Box 1^-, October 12, 1959* 1959 S te e l (Octo­ ber 1-1^), James P. Mitchell Papers. l 8 l

For many "businessmen, the collapse of negotiations "brought little

comfort. Their problems were immediate due to steel shrinkages. General

Motors' President John F. Gordon declared that GM would turn out only

1*75,000 o f i t s i 960 models before its assembly plants were forced to

close for lack of steel. Most Chevrolet assembly plants indicated they would close by October 20th. Other auto makers were severely pinched.

Chrysler, for example, thought its steel supplies were in good shape— 22 until it found out that it was running low on cushion wire steel.

A survey taken by Business Week reporters revealed that hundreds of companies became more aware of the threat posed by the depletion of supplies. Mar^y businessmen who accepted the steel strike calmly two weeks ago, realized that though they could keep their plants open for a while, time was fleeting. They felt that every day the strike con­ tinued meant that they had to cut productivity by a day or more. Anthony

Ruediger, head of the National Association of Purchasing Agents' Steel

Committee, put it this way: ‘*The situation is critical. There's little or nothing left to go into the pipelines. If the strike ends this week, steel ordered from the mills in July w ill be delivered late in October; steel ordered in September won't be-delivered until some time in December. Fourth-quarter orders don't mean a thing. They 2 3 won’t be delivered until next year.” Secretary of Labor Mitchell,

22. Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1959- 23. Quoted in, '‘Steel Stalemate Stirs White House to Action, ” Business Week, No. 1570-157**- (October 3, 1959), 29-30; See also, “A Report: Effect of Steel Strike on Inventories,” September 3°, 1959, Box l44, 1959 Steel (October 1-1*0, James P. Mitchell Papers; “Now the Strike Really Hurts,” Business Week (September 19, 1959), 28. 182 moreover, received reports disclosing that many of the large companies in the country feared their "buying plans would "be gravely affected if 2 4 the stride went beyond October 15th.

Besides the problem that faced businessmen, the rank and file also suffered from the steel stoppage. After October 1st, Delco Appliance

Division laid off 2,000 of its 3,000 workers. As the Delco general manager, P. H. Rutherford asserted: “We’ve simply run completely out of steel.” Harrison Radiator Division laid off 1,000 men—20$ of its work force—at the end of the first week in October. Many of the same results occurred in other industries. The Caterpillar Tractor Company, for example, laid off 11,500 employees-- 25 $ of its work force—in three 25 of its major plants.

The unemployment crisis, moreover, proved fatal for many states as the strike remained deadlocked. Several Governors revealed their apprehension over rising unemployment. In a telegram sent to Eisenhower the Governors' Conference Executive Committee asked to meet with the 2 6 President to discuss the mass layoffs resulting from the steel strike.

Some Governors, moreover, sent individual telegrams to the President revealing the damaging effects of the steel stoppage in their area.

‘'The damaging effect of the steel strike on our state,” wrote Governor

2b. Memorandum, Aryness Joy Wickens to the Labor Secretary, September 30, 1959, Box 1W-, 1959 Steel (October 1-1^), James P. Mitchell P ap ers. 25 . “Steel Stalemate Stirs White House to Action,” Business Week, Wo. 1570-157^ (October 3, 1959), 30. 26. Telegram, Governor J. Caleb Boggs to the President, September 16, 1959, Box 636, 0F-12U-D-2, White House Central Piles. 185

Michael DiSalle of Ohio, "is growing critical and more so every day. We

are anxious to report this increasing impact on our people directly to 27 you, ” As early as September 6th, Governor Lawrence of Pennsylvania,

informed the President of the tremendous financial loss and human suf­

fering that occurred as a result of the long strike. He reported that

220,000 workers were laid-off as an aftermath of the steel stoppage.

Forty-eight thousand of these workers were in industries indirectly

affected hy the strike. '*This total,” the Governor declared, "is

increasing daily as plants around the state are exhausting inventories 28 of steel.”

Moreover, various government reports also demonstrated a sharp

increment in unemployment as the strike entered the first two weeks of

October. According to Labor Secretary Mitchell's thirteenth report, the impact of the steel strike had an increasing effect on the indus­ trial economy. Steel-consuming areas, the brief showed, were now being hit hard, whereas until the latter part of September the impact had been

concentrated in steel-producing centers. Moreover, the account indi­

cated that the number of idle workers reached a new total of a little

over 725,000 by October 7th. More specifically, this brief disclosed that about 3 0 , 000 workers were laid off, compared with 17,000 in the

27. Telegram, D iS alle to P re sid e n t, September 4, 1959* Box 636, 0F-24-D-1, White House Central File.

28. News Releases, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor's Office— Harrisburg, Box l^t, 1959 Steel (September 15-30), James P. Mitchell Papers. 1 8 k

previous week and 11,000 two weeks earlier. Layoffs, as the report i demonstrated, were particularly heavy in construction, primary metals,

fabricated metals, and the automobile parts industry. Furthermore,

the states experiencing the greatest impact of the strike were Pennsyl-

vanis, with over 6k,000 layoffs; Illinois, 17,000; Ohio, 17,000; Indiana, 29 over l6,000; and Kentucky and New York, each about 13,500*

Besides the Labor Department Reports, special semi-monthly surveys

taken by state employment security agencies for thirty-one major steel-

producing and steel-consuming areas revealed a sharp upsurge in unemploy­

ment. The survey for the weeks of October 1 through the 15 revealed

that secondary layoffs attributable to the steel dispute accelerated

markedly, with the strike impact continuing to widen in terms of areas

and industries affected. Approximately kl,200 strike-related layoffs

were reported in the thirty-one areas during this time—more than double

the previously semi-monthly total and by far the largest figure since

the period immediately following the start of the dispute. The report predicted that a further very sharp rise in secondary layoffs was ex­ pected during the last half of October. The predicted secondary layoff total, as viewed by state employment agencies, was to climb from 280,000 3 0 in mid-October to 337*000 by October 21st.

29. Report On the Steel Strike: No. 13, October 13, 1959, Box lkk, 1959 Steel (October 1-lk), James P. Mitchell Papers. 30. Memorandum on the Effects of the Steel Strike in 31 Major Areas, R obert C. Goodwin t o th e Under S e c re tary , October 29, 1959, Box lkk, 1959 Meeting at Camp David (October 31“November 1, 1959), James P. Mitchell Papers. 185

Besides the problem of unemployment, the country's public works

projects were being jeopardized. A survey taken by the Bureau of Re­

clamation, a branch of the Department of Interior, revealed that power

plants and dams were either delayed or stopped due to the lack of

steel. The Penstocks and Reservoic Refinery Engineering Company post­

poned work on the Upper and Lower Molina power plants in Colorado,

because it was short 1,000 feet of steel pipe. The Midland Constructors,

Inc., asked for extension time in the building of steel towers for'

Bismarck-Jamestown 2J0kv transmission line Ho. 2 in North Dakota, be­

cause it could not get steel. The Lewis Hopkins Company had to retard

its work on the enlargement of the L ittle Wood River Dam in Idaho, due

to its inability to get wire for the control shaft in the dam. Besides

the delays, various projects ceased altogether. The work on the Shade-

h ill Dam in South Dakota, for example, was suspended by the contractor

due to the lack of steel. The construction needed to be done on the

East Selah Substation to Roza Dam in Washington, also had to be discon- 31 tin u e d .

Many other Federal Civil projects were also influenced by the

strike. Norman P. Mason, administrator for BHFA, announced that about

$50 million worth of college housing would be seriously affected, if the strike went beyond October. Elementary schools, according to Mason,

51. Summary Report of Bureau of Reclamation Construction Jobs Being Affected by the Steel Strike, T. W. Mermel, Chief Division of General Engineering to Colonel Meek, October 13, 1959} Box 73, Steel Shortage #1, Records of John S. Brogdon, Dwight D. Eisen­ hower Library. 186

would receive $60 million worth of damage if the steel stoppage did not

terminate. He also indicated that in "eight districts—Detroit, In­

dianapolis, Baltimore, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Charleston,

West Virginia, and Philadelphia—housing in general had been slowed due 3 2 to lack of certain steel materials.”

The situation for highways proved more serious than that of hous­

ing. According to the survey taken by the Bureau of Public Roads,

numerous stoppages and delays occurred throughout the country. More

specific, the Bureau indicated that 27 interstate contracts estimated

at a value of $30, 000,000 were halted and 57 interstate contracts cost- • _ 3 3 ing approximately $87,000,000 had to be postponed. The highway pro­

gram in general reached threatening proportions as the strike ended

its thirteenth week. John S. Bragdon, special assistant to the Presi­

dent for Public Works Planning, maintained that there was approximately

$450 , 000,000 m illio n s o f stoppages and delays in th e c o u n try 's highway- 3 4 programs.

Moreover, the steel stoppage affected the country's defense pro­

grams. As early as September 25 th, top military men warned that the

Btrike would be a threat to the Air Porce missile program if it lasted

32. A Report on S te e l Shortage by Mr. Norman P. Mason, October 13* 1959 Box 73* Steel Shortage #1, Records of John S. Bragdon. 33. Summary of Comment on Delays, October 14, 1959* Box 73* Steel Shortage #1, Records of John S. Bragdon.

34. Memorandum for Mr. Saulnier, October 14, 1959* Box 73* Steel Short­ age #1* Records of John S. Bragdon. 18T

u n t i l m id-October. Major G eneral Benjamin I . Funk, commander o f th e

B allistics Missiles Center of the Air Material Command at Los Angeles,

stated at a Rotary Club Luncheon that if the strike was not settled in 3 a couple of weeks “it w ill start to affect our program very seriously.”

According to Labor Secretary M itchell's thirteenth report, the defense

situation was increasingly a matter of concern. The account predicted

in the week ending October 7th, that there would be a growing shortage 3 6 of special steel materials which could not be met by the m ills. The

Department of Commerce's survey held similar views to that of labor.

"Since inventories in the hands of defensive contractors were estimated

(at the beginning of the steel strike) to be approximately 90 d a y s,” reported the Commerce Department, “it's apparent that there w ill be in­ creasing shortages which cannot be fully overcome by the mills s till 3 7 operating. ”

In specific defense projects, the shortage of steel proved fatal.

The National Aeronautics and Space Agency revealed that work on the

Goddard Space Flight Center had been delayed seven wedcs due to a lack of steel. Moreover, the completion of a test stand at Edwards Air Force

Base, in California, had also been detained. This stand was required in order to “provide test facilities for the million-and-a-half-poirnd,

35* Quoted in, New York Times, September 25, 1959.

36. Report On the Steel Strike—No. 13, October 13, 1959, Box lUk, 1959 Steel (October 1-14), James P. Mitchell Papers.

37. Effect of the Steel Strike on the Economy, October 12, 1959, Box lMf, Steel (October 1-lU), James P. Mitchell Papers. 188 single chamber, rocket engine under development by North American Avia- 3 8 tion, ” The Atomic Energy Commission Indicated that ten projects esti- 3 9 mated at $7,000,000 had been either delayed or curtailed. All totaled, defense projects approximately worth $111,000,000 were either discon­ tinued or detained at the end of the thirteenth week of the strike.

In addition to the factual information contained in the various Federal civil reports, more important was that top government officials were forewarned by their contacts that the situation would deteriorate 4 0 sharply if the strike went beyond mid-October.

Thus, these threatening developments left Eisenhower with no other alternative, but to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act. The immediate problem o f mass la y o ffs and th e hazards th a t faced many companies made th e

President's decision inevitable. More important, the delay and stop­ pages in public works and defense projects provided an added incentive needed t o make t h i s d e c isio n . As Raymond S au ln ier p u t i t : f^This o u t­ look suggests that the tim e for a decisive step by government is to hand. As each week goes by the impact of the strike is greater and the 4 1 severity of Impact will intensify in the immediate future.” The

38. Steel Shortage: Report by National Aeronautics and Space Agency, October 1 kf 1959* Box 73; S te e l Shortage #1, Records of John S. Bragdon. 39. Steel Shortage: Report by Atomic Energy Commission, October 14, 1959; Box 75; Steel Shortage #1, Records of John S. Bragdon. ifO. Memorandum fo r Mr. S a u ln ie r on P u b lic Works Planning, October 1^, 1959, Box 73; Steel Shortage #1, Records of John S. Bragdon. kl. Summary: Current Alternatives for Presidential Action, undated, Box 636, 0F-12U-D-3, White House Central Files. 189

President held a similar view with regards to the steel strike impact.

'^Because of this clear threat to the country's security,” remarked 4 2 Eisenhower, “the time has come to use the resources of existing law.”

Therefore, on October 9th, the President under executive order 108^3 invoked the emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. President

Eisenhower asserted:

After carefully studying the circumstances surrounding the thirteen-week-old steel strike, I have concluded that, if permitted to continue, this strike would imperil the national health and safety... To bring about a resumption of produc­ tion, I am invoking the statutory means which Congress has provided for that purpose. I have today issued an Executive Order appointing a Board of Inquiry to examine immediately into the issues of this dispute and to submit to me the re­ port prescribed by law.43

The creation of the national emergency board was the first step toward formal application for the issuance of an eighty-day no strike injunction.

I l l

The Board of Inquiry commissioned by the President was composed of

George W. Taylor, University of Pennsylvania, Chairman; Paul N. Lehoczky,

Ohio State University; and John A. Perkins, University of Delaware.

These men were selected for their, im partiality, experience and a resource- k2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956- 1961, Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday and Co., I 965J , p. ^55- k j. U. S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Record Services, 1953-)> Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959> p. 711; cited hereafter as Public Papers of President Eisenhower. 190 fulness to bring about a settlement without judicial help. As to the unbiased nature of the Board, one government official summed it up this way: “The number of repeat engagements, by these men, in various in­ dustries, indicates a high degree of impartiality. ” Other comments by government officials re-enforced this view. “None of these arbitra­ t o r s , ” declared George E. Strong, General Counsel for FMCS, “is depen­ dent upon the steelworkers union or steel companies for any substantial amount of their arbitration work.” This was important, explained

Strong, for it allowed the panel to examine the facts fairly without 44 any unwarranted pressure from either side.

In addition to the high degree of neutrality, the Board members were called for their experience. Dr. George W. Taylor, the Board's

Chairman, ranged as the country* s foremost arbitrator. He served fre­ quently as chairman of fact-finding panels appointed by Presidents

Frankin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman to settle major industrial dis­ putes in the war and post-war periods. As a mediator, Taylor was known to display a sense of industrial morality. He f^ten endeavoured to bring conflicting parties together on a sensible, sound, and workable covenant. The other members of the Board, also possessed considerable cognizance. Dr. Paul N. Lehoczky, reputed for his incisiveness, fair­ ness and conviction, became an arbitrator during World War II, at which time the War Labor Board yearned for an incentive rates expert. Since

Memorandum from George E. Strong to Mr. Joseph F. Finnegan, Septem­ b e r 18, 1959> Box 130, 1959 Board Inquiry (steel) (2), James P. Mitchell Papers. 191 then, he "branched out into general arbitration, having served as an intercessor in 2,400 labor-rnanagement controversies. He -was considered within labor to "be one of the shrewdest minds on work practice issues.

Dr. Perkins, on the other hand, was comparatively new to the labor relations world. However, “he had long experience in government, both in teaching the art of public adminstration and in its practice. ” In

1957, he served as the Undersecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.j Hence, Perkins was described as a man of facts with an intense dislike for the run-around.

More important, the panel members were selected for their sincere belief that a settlement should occur through voluntary arbitration, rather than resorting to an 80 day injunction. In appointing the Panel, the President stressed his strong preference for a negotiated accord.

“White House o fficials,” wrote the New York Times, “made it plain today that the three panel members had been picked with the hope that they 4 6 could find a peace formula.” The language of the law implied that the function of the Board of Inquiry was a purely fact-finding role—merely to report to the President the issues involved in the strike and each side's position in relation to them. The Board was prohibited from making any recommendations. But Taylor and his colleagues did not believe the text of the law was a bar to doing what they could, short of specific proposals, for a settlement.

45* Biography Material on Board of Inquiry, October 21, 1959 > Box 130, 1959 Board Inquiry (Steel) (l), James P. Mitchell Papers. 46. New York Times, October 11, 1959* 192

The Board emphasized from th e commencement th a t i t intended to break with precedent, “i realize,” wrote Hr. Lehoczky, '‘that mediation

is not legally a function of the Board, but we hoped that we might be 4 7 able to settle this strike before we report to the President. The panel agreed to go beyond its statutory authorization to try to arrange

a compact through private mediation efforts. "We are going to do

everything within our powers under the act to narrow the differences 4 8 between the parties,” Dr. Taylor asserted. Taylor admitted frankly, that the panel would attempt to discover grounds for bringing the groups together to negotiate, not merely trying to gether facts for

President Eisenhower. The Board Chairman made it quite blunt in

speeches and writings that he abhorred the use of injunctions in labor disputes. He believed that a Taffc-Hartley board should be a mediating board—not merely a fact-finding agency. Moreover, Taylor was on record as saying that “the Taft-Hartley machinery was incapable, alone, to 4 9 manage big strikes. ” In a real sense, then, the task the panel em­ barked upon was a test of its own resourcefulness and of the extent to which the tight language of Taft-Hartley operates a straight Jacket.

47. Lehoczky to Leland Hazard, Director of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, October 20, 1959; RG 40, University Archives, Ohio State University; Lehoczky to Mason, President of Marion Broadcasting Co., October 20, 1959; RG 40, University Archives, Ohio Stats University, Columbus, Ohio.

48. New York Times, October 12, 1959; ‘^Drive for Steel Peace Quickens,” Business Week (October 17, 1959); 26.

49. wAny Answer to Strikes, ” United States News and World Report, 47 (October 19, 1959); 70-71. 193

With the Board's foundation established, there began, on October 12th, an intense effort on the part of the fact-finding panel to obtain a basis for resolving the dispute.

From October 12th through the 15th, the Board of Inquiry held hearings between the union delegates and the steel representatives. At these audiences, it became apparent that the principal obstacles inter­ fering with an agreement were in the area of economics and work rules.

The economic issues centered about such matters as wages and fringe benefits. The unions, in support of its case, argued that the increase in the productivity of the average steel worker was sufficient to warrant a large wage increase, and s till permit the company enough room to pay its higher costs and gain a profit, “it is the union's position,” testified Otis Brubaker, Chief Economist for the steel union, <(that as long as productivity was advancing at the rate that it was, that the industry could easily show this level or this rate of progress with or without being hurt at all, and without having to 5 0 raise its prices.” Brubaker demonstrated that in the past twenty years from 1939"1959* the output per man hour of steel production workers rose by 87$. The comparable earnings f igure, also on a real wage basis, was only 77$. “T h is means,” explained Brubaker, “that workers have not been able to share, and this is important... in terms of the equities of this situation, steel workers... have not actually

50. Hearings On the Steel Dispute, p. 151. X9k

"been able to share on a real "basis in the productivity in this indus- 5 1 t r y . ”

Brubaker also opposed the wage-push theory of inflation, -which was advocated by the steel manufacturers. Instead he claimed that increased wages brought about additional consumer buying power which was necessary to further stimulate the economy and create demands which would estab- 5 2 lish Jobs for idle workers. This belief was further supported by

Robert Nathan, a union consulting economist. He informed the Board that industry could easily afford to increase wages without raising prices, if it would abolish the practice of financing plant expansion and improvements out of profits, and resorted, instead, to borrowing or floating stock. But he stressed that it was unnecessary for the steel manufacturers to enlarge its steel making capacity any further, anyway. Aside from a few special cases, he asserted, u there is no question whatsoever, but that the present supply of steel from currently operating m ills... is far more than enough for the health and safety 5 3 of the country. ”

The steel union representatives concluded their testimony on eco­ nomic issues, calling for a 15 cents an hour per year increase in wages and fringe benefits. The union sought a wage Increase averaging 8.5 cents an hour for each new contract. In addition, It desired an extra

51. Ibid., p. 158.

52 . Ibid., p. 269.

55. Ibid., p. 25^. 195

"boost of 1.1 cents per hour for workers paid on an incentive "basis— according to the production. Thus, to tal wage increases would amount to 9*^ cents. As to fringe benefits, such as insurance, pension, and vacations, the union "beseeched improvements estimated at 5.6 cents an hour. Aggregating "both the fringe and wage demands, the union valued 5 4 its offer at about 15 cents an hour per year.

The steel manufacturers, on the other hand, assumed the position that they could not foresee any wage increases during the year of 1959 *

Conrad Cooper, Chief spokesman for SCCC, testified: "As plainly as we can state it, the Bteel companies believe that they must be£. >\■ t o liv e within their means, that the participants cannot take out of the business more than it can produce, and that therefore new wage and benefit increases for the employee can be provided only as made avail- 5 5 able through more effective operations of the business.”

Industry spokesman disclosed to the fact-finding board, that wage boosts in 1959 would generate an inflationary increase in production costs. Steel companies, therefore, proposed a wage increment in i 960 amounting to 7*5 centB per hour, with an additional 2.5 cents an hour in fringe benefits. The companies also offered to increase insurance and pension benefits and pay an additional 2 cents an hour for unemploy­ ment conpensation. The alterations in the first year of the contract,

5*K Report To the President, pp. 18-19; See also, Hearings On the Steel Dispute, pp. 315ff . 55. Hearings On the Steel Dispute, pp. 36^ -365 ; See a lso , Report To The President, p. 3* 196 would cost 5*5 cents an hour, according to company estimates, and 2.5 5 6 cents the second year.

Industry and the union also differed on the question of a cost-of-

living raise. The union insisted that this practice persevere, with

an automatic wage increase as the cost of living went up. Industry, 5 7 however, wanted to discard the idea of tying wages to prices.

Most dramatically, it was over the work rules issue that most of the heat and bitterness of the strike focused. In broad terms, the local work rules clause, known as 2B, protected existing work practices.

It was written into steel contracts in 19^7, because of the practical impossbility of incorporating into a national agreement the multi-local rules and practices established in many plants. These practices in­ cluded such topics as the size of a crew for a specific operation, relief time, spell arrangements and other working agreements. Section

2B gave management the right to "change or eliminate any local working condition, if, as a result of action taken by management... the basis for the existence of the local working condition is changed or elimina- 5 8 ted. ” That is, an alteration can be made if management modified a machine or a production method. However, the company was nob allowed to make changes in operating methods— short of a major change of machin-

56 . Ibid., pp. 386- 588; Report To the President, pp. 17-18.

57- *Vhat The Fact Finders Found In Steel, " United States News and World Report, VT (October 26, 1959)# 12(T

58. Report To the President, pp. 7-8. 197

ery. Thus, under 2B, any new methods or smarter efficiency techniques

tried by management were prohibited unless it had the union's consent.

Even where machinery changes had taken place, disputes might arise on

what was a new basis for a Job, so "any affected employee shall have

recourse to the grievance procedure and arbitration, if necessary, to

have the company Justify its actions.” Actually, industry had been

quite successful in these arbitrations, but frequently they took as

long as two years to decide. Thus, 2B meant that without union per­

mission a conrpany could not alter any local work practices, that had previously been approved by both factions, orally or in writing, or 5 9 that simply had become a custom.

The pugnacity over the meaning of 233 stemmed as far back as 1952.

At that time, the argument concerned itself with whether the practices

should be negotiated at the national level instead of by local bargain­

ing. The 'Wage Stabilization Board settled the issue indicating that there should not be a change in existing contractual provisions. How­ ever, the work rules provision in years hence remained an issue to many steel executives, especially, with new. modernizing developments

59* Management's unhappiness stems primarily from the requirement that in order to change a local working condition, the technical basis for its existence must be shown to have been changed or eliminated. Two key decisions have given substantial meaning to this language. .The first was a decision of Ralph Seward on July 3* 1951* the second a decision of Sylvester Garrett on January 7* 1953. These decisions made it clear that there must be substantial changes in the objec­ tive conditions which led to the establishment of the local working condition in order to Justify a change, see, Harry Weiss' Summary Report on the Local Working Conditions Issues in Steel Case sent t o Under S e c re tary , Ju ly 30, 1959* Box l^U, 1959 Meeting a t Camp David (October 31-November 1, 1959)* James P. M itchell Papers; See a ls o , "What Work R u le s ,” Fortune, 60 (December, 1959)* 215-217. 198 60 and efficiency techniques invading the industry.

During the public hearings, steel executives maintained that Sec­ tion 2B seriously restrained attempts to improve plant efficiency. The hindrance came, according to steel executives, in situations -where there had not been an investment in new facilities to change the basis for the existence of a local working condition. Cooper declared that the com­ panies insist on the right to take sound measures, other then the in­ stallation of new mechanical systems, to eliminate and to improve effi­ ciency. “Gentlemen ,” he asserted, “we are not talking about coffee breaks; and we are not trying to destroy seniority or any other right which benefits the steel workers. We are talking about contract pro­ visions which are often interpreted to mean that once an operation has been performed, in a certain way, it can never be performed in a 61 more efficient manner without union consent.”

To wit, Cooper discussed the case of the man in the crane cab.

The companies1 chief spokesman stated that in one mill, the union, many years ago, requested that the operator of the crane be allowed a relief

60. Sylvester Garrett, arbitrator for United States Steel, viewed the 2B issue as a Crusade in which Cooper hoped to achieve the objective he almost achieved in 19^7. At that time, he wanted the right to re-engineer all Jobs at United States Steel. Although he was turned down, the issue has become sort of a holy war in which Cooper hopes to regain the right that once belonged to management, See, Harry W eiss1 Report on his Conference with Sylvester Garett sent to the Under Secretary, September 11, 1959; Box 1¥j-, 1959 Meeting at Camp David (October Jl-November 1, 1959)* James P. M itchell Papers; see also, Report To the President, p. 8-9; See also, Robert Livemash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, 1961), pp7 68-71, 113-117.

6l. Hearings On the Steel Dispute, p. 382. 199 mem to spell him, because of the extreme heat of the mill. This was

granted, but the question arose of how much time must he be permitted

off the Job. Under Section 2B, remarked Cooper, the local work rule

in this case prevented us from rendering a decision without union s a consent. John Morse, Counsel to Bethlehem Steel, took a more intense

stand than Cooper. He testified that 'tatnagerial ingenuity is being

destroyed and blocked day by day because of union resistance to changes

in work rules.” Morse maintained that management should have the right

to cut crew sizes, “ingenious managers should be free to establish

efficient new ways of doing things, without hindrance by obsolete 6 3 work rules,” he declared.

The United Steel Workers, contrary to management’s belief, argued

that “the existing language rebuts the notion that featherbedding has been protected or that management has been obstructed in improving 6 4 productivity or efficiency. It maintained that Section 2B merely protected its members against “unilateral imposition of an increase in

an individual's workload. ” The steel union, for example, presented the

case of the 12-man crew. “Without Section 2B,” the union argued, “a

foreman could cut the crew size to 10 men if he considered 12 unneces­

sary. Because the 10 would have to do more work individually and share more responsibility, some would have to be upgraded in their Jobs—entit-

62. Ibid., p. 385.

63. I b id ., p . kk5i See also, Youngstown Vindicator, October 25* 1959*

6k. Report To th e P re s id e n t, p. 8. 200

ling them to an additional 6 cents an hour in pay. But two jobs would es have been eliminated at a saving of more than $7.00 an hour,”

McDcnald contended that the loss of jobs that might occur, due to

a change in work rules, was astronomical. He also added that this

change would not only affect workers1 jobs, but the entire foundation

of the union itself. “i have said publicly," thundered McDonald, “that

the companies intend to break the union. X mean that and I repeat it.”

The real issue, according to McDonald, remained undiminished, “it is

whether the union can be beaten, can be turned into a tool of management,

willing to accept whatever crumbs are offered by the powers that control es this industry.” Various other union leaders expressed similar senti­

ments. Elmer Malory, Chief of the steel union's wage division, testi­

fied that “lawyers and engineers have taken over the steel industry

and that’s why we are having this problem,” Malory denied management’s

claim that unnecessary manpower was prevalent in some operations, “if

anybody is featherbedding,” Malory argued, “I’d like to find it.”

Arthur Goldberg, Chief counsel for USWA, summed up the attitude of the

union towards the work rules issue. He stated that the work rules pro­ visions did not prevent automation or technological change, that the

industry had always been free to introduce new methods and machines and

set work rules for them. ''But," he said, “an established practice can’t

65. “Steel Fight Goes to Court,” Business Week (October 2k, 1959), 30.

66. Hearings On the Steel Dispute, pp. 10, 35-36. 201 67 be changed until the conditions that created it has been changed.”

In addition to the public investigations, the board held night

meetings with the union and industry. These assemblies represented

the panel’s mediation attempts at solving the issues at hand. At these

sessions, Taylor urged both industry and the union to eliminate legal­

istic double talk and state the issues in terms, that everybody inclu­

ding the public, could understand.

Both the union and industry, however, were unwilling to compromise.

Arthur Goldberg acknowledged to the board that the union could not

surrender the work rules provision, because symbolicly, it represented

the power of the steel union. For the union to give in on 2B, declared

Goldberg, meant that the USWA was Trilling to destroy itself. Management proved just as adamant in its defense. Cooper told the panel that the

steel industry was required to modernize its plants due to competition

from overseas. The companies, he remarked, did not want to be handi­

capped by ancient and outdated work rules provisions during its techno­

logical changeover. It soon became apparent to the panel that a resolu- es tion to the dispute through private sessions seemed implausible. As

67. Ibid., pp. 205, 215.

68. These private night sessions were held secretly and although newspapers knew of them they did not know what went on in these sessions. This information was revealed to me by Dr. Paul N. Lehoczky during an interview at Ohio State University, see, Interview with Dr. Paul N. Lehoczky, A rbitrator and Board Member of U.S. Board of Inquiry, July 2k, 1972; see also, The Philadelphia In q u ire r, October 1^, 1959* 202

Dr. Lehoczky remarked at the close of the night session: "As a matter of fact we met up with the problem of trying to unify two immovable 69 objects and this, of course, you know is mathematically impossible.”

For both parties, according to Lehoczky, the contract-change issue was more a matter of philosophy and mood than anything else.

At the duration of the three-day hearing, the public meetings also proved futile. As Taylor remarked: "if we accomplish a settlement ro this week it would really be a miracle of the first order. ” Both parties, according to Taylor, were nob willing to concentrate on an economic settlement. The union was in complete disagreement, he de­ clared, on management’s demands for contract changes to eliminate wasteful plant practices. In his closing remarks on October 15th, the

Chairman of the fact-finding board told both groups that the President granted the panel a three day extension, because they lacked the time to draft a comprehensive report. Taylor then informed both groups to take advantage of the extension and try to negotiate. "I suggest that pronto, without the Board, both of you get together right after lunch 71 to settle this dispute. ”

69. Lehoczky to George Williams, Vice President of American Steel and Wire, October 20, 1959, RG 40, University Archives, Ohio State University.

70. The Wall Street Journal, October 1^, 1959; New York Times, October 157 1959. Hearings On the Steel Dispute, pp. 55^-555; See also, The Evening S ta r (W ashington), October 15, 1959* 20J

At the conclusion of the hearings, therefore, each side indicated a willingness to negotiate further. Subsequently, collective bargaining resumed on October l6th. The steel union at this time made a new pro­ posal to the companies. The United Steelworkers retreated from its original economic demands. It offered to do without a wage increase in

1959; limiting itself to fringe gains now and a moderate increase in pay the following year. The union, moreover, agreed to create a panel to study and recommend a long range program for sharing benefits of increased productivity among stockholders, employees, and the public.

The union, however, would not withdraw the work rules clause from its 7a contract. —

Subsequently, industry rejected the union's offer and in turn made a new recommendation which dismissed the preconditions on contract changes, on which they had previously insisted prior to consideration of the economic issues. Management raised its wage-fringe motion from

2>6 to 2.6^ of total employment costs and declared that it would accept a limited cost-of-living provision in a new contract. At the same time, the companies offered to revise its contributory insurance pro- 73 gram to incorporate a new non-contributory major medical plan. The companies' proposal, moreover, contained a new suggestion to establish a Human Relations Research Committee “composed of an equal number of representatives designated by the parties, under the co-chairmanship of two persons of outstanding qualifications and objectivity, one each

72. The Wall Street Journal, October 16, 1959J See also, Hew York Times, October 18, 1959i Report To President, pp. 1^-15.

73* Hearings on the Steel Dispute, p. 6k9. 20b to "be designated by the company and the union . }> This committee would

design and direct studies and advocate remedies on mutual problems in

such areas as wage incentives, seniority, and any other overall problems 7 4 that occurred. The steel manufacturers, however, held its position with regard to local working conditions, work scheduling, and wildcat

strikes. The union rejected management’s proposal on the grounds that the creation of this research committee failed to alter the manufactur­

er’s position on the work rules issue, '^because it merely provided for a study of problems after the companies, pursuant to their revised

clause of October 1st, had made unilateral change in local working 7 5 conditions."

Following the two days of negotiations, the fact-finding board reconvened on October l 8th. The companies and the union reiterated their views on the basic issues at Btake. Suddenly, at the last minute of the inquiries, Cooper offered to submit local work practices to binding arbitration within sixty days. Under the companies’ plan, the arbitration by a thre.e man board would concern itself with one basic question; 'tyhat, if any, changes should be made in the local working conditions provisions to enable the companies to take reasonable steps to improve efficiency and eliminate waste with due regard to the wel- 7 6 fare of the employees. ” The steel union, actually surprised by the

74. Report To the President, pp. 15* 75* Ibid., p. 16} Hearings On the Steel Dispute, p. 607. 76. Hearings On the Steel Dispute, p. 699- 205 unexpected offer to arbitrate, rejected the proposal. McDonald dis­ closed to newsmen o u tsid e th e h earing room: '*That d o e sn 't change 7 7 anything. We w ill not g iv e in on 2B. ”

After the union's rejection, Chairman Taylor announced the collapse of negotiations. On October 19th, the Board of Inquiry submitted its report to Eisenhower. Taylor Bummed up the frustrated and hopeless feelings of the panel: “As we submit this report, the parties have failed to reach an agreement and we see no prospects for an early cessa­ tion of the strike. The Board cannot point to any single issue of any 7 8 consequence whatsoever upon which the parties are in agreement.”

Meanwhile, the President met with various government officials to discuss the Board's report. It was the concensus of all present that a national emergency existed in the country. labor Secretary Mitchell reported that a “further.very sharp rise in industrial layoffs can be expected even after steel production is resumed, because serious steel 7 9 shortages will continue several weeks beyond the strike.”

The more Immediate effects of the strike were revealed by other government departments. Unemployment service agencies in most major steel cities revealed that through the week of October 21st, the cumu­ lative total of secondary layoffs was approximately 557 , 000, making an

1 time high of 855 , 000, including half a million striking steelworkers.

77* New York Times, October 19; 1959*

78. Report to the President, p. 16.

79. Report On the Steel Strike—No. 15 , November 2, 1959* Box 1^5; 1959 Steel (November l-llf), James P. Mithcell Papers; See also, 'Veeks of Famine S till Ahead,” Business Week (October 51; 1959); 29-30. Among the largest contributors to layoffs wab General Motors. It was denoted that of the 57*000 workers unemployed in the week of October

21st, principally 3k,000 came from th e autom obile in d u stry . The unem­ ployment agencies also reported payroll losses through this same week at an estimated value of $ 1, 035 * 000,000 o f which $850 million represen­ ted losses of wages to steelworkers and about $185 million in wages to 80 other industries idled by the strike.

Moreover, another ominious report concerning defense projects had been rev ealed to th e P re sid e n t. Thomas S. G ates, A cting S e c re ta ry of

Defense, informed Eisenhower that scheduled slippages in a number of high priority missile programs, launching site construction projects and nuclear submarine and other naval construction and conversion pro­ grams, could not be recovered under any circumstances. He explained to the President that delays in the construction of bases for the

Atlas, Titan, and Polaris missiles came as a result of a lack of special 81 alloy steels which were not made in mills that were presently open.

Commerce Secretary M uller's report summed up the impact of the strike on the nation: “if the steel strike continues through November,” the report warned, (tthe country w ill be confronted with a serious economic

80. Memorandum: Weekly Report On Employment Changes Due to the Steel Strike, Robert Myers to the Under Secretary, November 3* 1959, Box 1 k3t 1959 Steel (November 1-1^), James P. Mitchell Papers \ Memorandum: Aryness Joy Wickens to the Secretary, October 15, 1959, Box lifk, 1959 Steel (October 15-31), James P. Mitchell Papers.

81. Copy of the Affidavit of Secretary Gates regarding the Steel Strike, Vincent Burke to David Kendall, October 20, 1959, Box 636, QF-124-D-3, White House Central Files. 207

c r i s i s . ”

It was against this "background that President Eisenhower moved to

obtain an injunction to end the strike for at least 80 days. In a

statement to the press he asserted:

Obviously, the steel strike threatens to imperil the national health and safety... The total numbers of people idled by October l^th was 780,000, including the striking steelworkers. Each week the situation is worse... The hardship which this strike has caused and could cause is tremendous... In order to protect the interest of all the American people, this leaves me with no alternative except to seek an injunction under the existing law . 83

Thus, the petition for an injunction was filed in the Pittsburgh

Federal D istrict Court on October 20th.

IV

The President's request for an injunction was granted on October

21st by Federal Judge Herbert P. Sorg. That order, however, was imme­

diately appealed by the Steelworkers Union. The next day, the U. S.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Philadelphia listened to

arguments from the steel union and the government. Arthur Goldberg, the counsel for the union, argued against a temporary halt to the

strike. He maintained that the Government had not made a sufficient

82. Summary Report of United States Department of Commerce on the Effect of Steel Strike on the Econony, November 2, 1959, Box 1^5, 1959 Steel (November 1-14), James P. Mitchell Papers.

83. Public Papers of President Eisenhower, pp. 730-731* 7^1-7^2. 208 case for declaring an emergency and insisted that an adequate amount of steel would he available to carry the country through 1959 without im- B4 periling the national health or safety. **The government side,” testi­ fied Goldberg, “is confused on the intent of Congress. When they adopted the Taft-Hartley Act, the lawmakers had intended health and safety to mean just that.” He argued that in other cases where an eighty day injunction had been granted—as in the atomic energy dis­ putes, coal strikes, and shipping shutdown—there had been little doubt 65 about a threat to national health and safety.

Goldberg, moreover, challenged the constitutionality of the Taft-

Hartley Act. The union attorney contended that it was unconstitutional to request a court to use its coercive powers temporarily, as part of an administrative procedure attenpting to settle strikes. According to

Goldberg, the President's appeal for an injunction forced the courts to act in a legislative, executive, and administrative fashion rather 86 than a judicial one.

The Government's attorney, Assistant Attorney General George Daub, replied that the ‘^President imposed the Taft-Hartley when he realized that an emergency might result from the steel dispute—first on October

9th and again on October 19th. ” He then argued that a crisis was indeed

84. “As the Steel Crisis Grows,” United States Hews and World Report, 47 (November 2, 1959 )> 40; See also, New York Times, October 23, 24, 1959.

85. C u ttin g Fresh Heat on S t e e l ,” Business Week, No. 1570-1574 (Octo­ b e r 31, 1959), 29.

86. “What's A National Emergency,” Business Week, No. 1570-1574 (Octo­ ber 31> 1959)> 28; See also, Julius Duscha, “Steel and the Taft- Hartley, ” The New Deader, 42 (October 26, 1959)> 3-10; “Goldberg Warns of More Laws,” IUD Bulletin, 4 (November, 1959 )t 8. ao9

at hand and that the public was suffering more and more each day as a S 7 result of the unresolved strike.

After hearing bilateral testimonies, the Appeals Court adjourned

to deliberate the case. Subsequently, on October 27th, the Third Cir­

cuit Court of Appeals, by a 2 to 1 margin, sustained Judge Sorg's in­

junction. The majority ruled that the national emergency clause of the

Taft-Hartley Act -was constitutional and that enough of a potential

threat to the national health and safety had been demonstrated to

warrant use of this procedure. The minority agreed to the validity of

Taft-Hartley and the severity of the steel strike, but commented that

the actual purpose of the emergency strike procedure was to encourage

collective bargaining settlements and that injunctions ,fwould not 8 3 facilitate and might even make more difficult a negotiated settlement. ”

Ensuing the courts decision, the union served another appeal to

the Supreme Court and won a six-day strike stay. On November 3rd, both parties presented their case to the court. The union's testimony

followed the same lines as previously introduced on October 22nd in the

D istrict Court. The union's basic argument was that the government had

failed to produce sufficient evidence that the strike was imperiling

either the national health or safety. The question of constitutionality was once again brought up. The government, meanwhile, upheld its position

87. “Steel Goes to Court,” Business Week, No. 1570-157^ (October 2k , 1959), 26.

88. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 271, U. S. 676 (1959), PP* 676-691. 210

that a clear threat to steelworkers, suppliers and the country in general

sanctioned the use of the Taft-Hartley. With this, the Supreme Court

called for a 4-dayi recess in order to study the situation in more detail. 89

Meanwhile, with the Supreme Court in recess, the FMCS held private

negotiating sessions with both groups on November 2nd through the 4th.

These joint sessions, remarked Finnegan, were scheduled to narrow down

the areas of statistical disagreement. However, Finnegan's attempts

failed as quickly as he had made them. Thoughout the sessions, it be­

came obvious that each group was reluctant to compromise on its demands.

The positions, according to the Director, had hardened to the point of

ossification. Industry, still accused the union of abusing the work

rules provisions. The union, on the other hand, insisted the rules were not barring maximum production, that management really wanted a 9 0 dictatorship.

These talks, therefore, proved hopeless. Each side felt it had a

substantial reason to hold out. The United Steelworkers at this point

felt that they had split the industry's front line, due to separate

agreements they had made with various steel companies. Most notably,

on October 26th, Kaiser Steel broke away from SCCC to negotiate a

89. The Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1959) New York Times, November 3; 4, 1959.

90. Nummary Report of the FMCS Meetings in the Steel Dispute: Steel Negotiations Chronology,” November 2, 3; 4, 1959; FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, RG 280, 1959; DCF-259- ■ 3268; See also, New York Times, November 8, 1959) Pittsburgh Press, November 5; 1959* 211 separate contract with the steel union. The agreement called for a freeze in wages in 1959* "but a 7 cents an hour augmentation in 1960.

This plan cost Kaiser about 9*3 cents in a ll—because of the additional

1 cent from the upward pressure on incentive rates and 1.3 cents from changes in the increment between job classifications. It also provided improvements in pensions, insurance, and supplementary unemployment benefits. Moreover, the plan froze cost-of-living adjustments for 1959* but allowed a 3 cent an hour lim it the following year. More significant, however, was the commissioning of two special committees under the agreement. The first was a joint labor-management committee established to study the problems of automation and work practices and to settle disputes in these areas by mutual agreement. The second, headed by

Mediator David Cole, Harvard's John Dunlop and fact-finding Chairman

George Taylor examined long-range problems, which among other things concerned itself with the distribution of future productivity gains be­ a r tween management and labor.

For the union, the Kaiser agreement represented a significant step in their divide and conquer strategy. Subsequently, the Detroit Steel

Company, th e l6 th la rg e s t producer, signed fo r th e K aiser term s. And, by the latter part of the week, several small companies, including

Granite City Steel Company, were negotiating towards settlements. Thus,

91. <(Why Kaiser Steel Signed... What the Agreement Means,” United States News and World Report, U7 (November 9, 1959)# PP« 99-10°; See also, New York Times, October 29, 1959; Wall Street Journal. Octo­ ber 28, 1959; Youngstown Vindicator, October 28, 1959* 212

the steel union felt content to delay negotiations since it felt secure

in its position. As one top government official reported: “USWA de- 92 laying moves point to one fact. It figures its strength is growing.”

The eleven major steel companies, on the other hand, did not feel

the least hit disturbed by the Kaiser settlement, nor did they think it

warranted the inferences that had been drawn by those union leaders who

predicted a break up in the solid front of the companies. As Joseph

L. Block, Chairman of Inland Steel, commented: ‘*Fhe major companies

remain firm in our resolve to achieve a non-inflationary settlement 9 3 and that as a result an end of the steel dispute is not in sight.”

Actually, the steel executives believed they did not have to yield / at the bargaining table, because McDonald1 s leadership, as they viewed

it, was seriously weakening as a result of the workers discontent over 9 4 the union's stay order of the injunction. This lack of leadership,

as executives perceived it, was becoming evident throughout the negotia­ ting sessions. To wit, Robert Moore, Deputy Director for the FMCS,

92. An unsigned letter concerning the strategy of the Union, October 31, 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suit- land, RG 280, 1959, DCF-259-5268; See also, A Symposium: “The Kaiser Steel Settlement: It's Significant In the Present Steel C risis,” Atlantic Economic Review, 10 (January, i 960), 3- 9.

93. Quoted in, ‘tutting Fresh Heat On Steel, ” Business Week, No. 1570- 157^ (October 31, 1959), 26; See also, Robert Moore to Joseph Finnegan, October 26, 1959, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, RG 280, 1959, DCF-259-3268; ‘tow Ruthless Use of Power By Steel Union Forced Kaiser to Settle, ” The Magazine of Wall Street (November 21, 1959), 21A-215, 266.

Youngstown Vindicator, October 29, 1959- 213

Indicated that Goldberg was the real authority in policy-making for the 05 USWA, although McDonald fought hard to retain this privilege. Simi­

lar sentiments were expressed by other men closely related to the steel

controversy. Dr. Paul N. Lehoczky indicated that Goldberg did practially

all of the talking for the union during the private sessions held by 9 6 the Board of Inquiry. Other reports contended that McDonald's bar­

gaining position was threatened as a result of internal frictions.

According to Commissioner Dave Tanzan, McDonald had a tough time keeping

his own troops in line, “it seemed, ” he remarked, “that Howard Hague,

Vice-President of USWA, was closer to Goldberg and was following him 9 7 instead of McDonald.” For management, the division within.steel u union negotiators, as well as the lack of any real leadership, encoura­

ged them to maintain a tough bargaining position. Industry hesitated

to negotiate seriously, because sooner or later they felt the union's

position would deteriorate by its own internal problems.

Thus, it became apparent that neither side was willing to bargain, because they believed that the other was weakening. With both groups

deeply entrenched in their own position and each side focusing on the

upcoming Supreme Court decision, Director Finnegan on November 5th '

95. Notes of Meeting at Camp David From October 31-November 1, 1959, undated, Box 144, 1959 Meeting at Camp David (October 31-November l), James P. Mitchell Papers. 96. “ Interview with Dr. Paul N. Lehoczky, Arbitrator and Former Member of U. S. Board of Inquiry, July 25, 1959* 97. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation from Mr. Tanzan to Austin E. Finnessy, Special Assistant to the Director, FMCS, Archives Branch, National Record Center, Suitland, RG 280, 1959, DCF-259-5268. 211* 98 announced the indefinite postponement of mediation sessions.

Following this action, the Supreme Court finally convened to ren­

der its decision. On November 7th, the one hundredth and sixteenth day

of the strike, the court, 8-to-l, upheld the Taft-Hartley injunction,

* * ending the longest industry-wide strike in the nation1s history. The

majority vote sustained the constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley

emergency procedure and its application to the steel strike. The sole

dissenter was Justice William 0. Douglas, who wanted to pursue the

case further, as to why the government needed the entire industry re- 9 9 opened as opposed to a few plants for defense purposes. Thus, McDonald,

adherring to the majority's vote, sent telegrams to all union districts

ordering the steelworkers to resume work forthwith.

During the first week of the injunction, little progress was made

in settling the dispute. Director Finnegan delayed further mediation

for a couple weeks to allow for the reopening of the steel mills and

any problems that might arise. At this time, moreover, both sides re- 100 mained adamant in their position.

Suddenly, on November 15th, the negotiations seemed to move off

dead center. In a secret joint session in New York, the SCCC made a

98. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 5* 1959* Pittsburgh Press, November 5* 1959.

99. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361, U. S. 39 (1959)/ PP* 76-77;See also, New York Times. November 8, 1959* also givfes full text of Supreme Court opinions.

100. “Peace Far Off As M ills Reopen,” Business Week, No. 1575" 15^8 (November ll*, 1959)* 150-151. 215 new offer to the union leaders. Conrad Cooper called it “a fair offer to do what can he done and s till keep within non-inflationary hounds in 101 the cost of steel production. ” The proposal called for a three-year contract term, to end in 1962, and a total non-inflationary cost to the industry of, roughtly, 5 ° cents an hour for wages and increased benefits

—with a possibility of up to 8 cents an hour more through cost-of-living adjustments in the 2nd and 3rd year. Thus, the companies improved slightly their previous offer given to the Board of October 17th by pro­ posing additional pension benefits which, the companies stated, raised their total economic offer from 2. 6% to an estimated 2. 7^ of employment 102 co st.

The proposal, moreover, contained a new plan for resolving the troublesome issue of local working conditions. It proposed to refer the 2B issue to a joint committee commissioned to study the problems involved and render non-binding recommendations. If the committee should fail to agree on recommendations or the parties refuse to accept them by June 30th, i 960, the work-rules question would be submitted to a three-man arbitration board for a decision within ninety days. The new p la n read as follow s:

What, if any, changes should be made in the local working conditions provisions of the basic labor agreements to enable the companies to take reasonable steps to improve efficiency and eliminate waste, with due regard for the

101. Quoted in, The Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1959* 102. U. S., Board of Inquiry, Final Re-port to the President on the 1959 Labor Dispute in the Steel Industry, under Executive Order 10843 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, i 960), pp 11, 16 } Hereafter cited as, Final Report to the President. 216

■welfare of the employees, including: the avoidance of undue work burdens; and to the extent practicable, the restraining and placement, on available Jobs in the plant, if any employee affected by such steps. 3

The conpanies' position regarding other contract matters, such as sche­ duling, wildcat strikes, and seniority, remained unchanged.

The union, however, rejected industry’s proposal. “The companies,” declared McDonald, “have not offered a 30 cent package for three years.

They have offered the same old package, rearranged a little bit in form, but s till in substance worth only about 2h cents for three years.”

As to management’s proposal on the work-rules issue, McDonald accused the industry of “insisting upon a one-sided and unfair arbiration, designed to permit them unilaterally to eliminate jobs and benefits won 1 0 4 by the steel workers in their contract for many years.” The pro­ posal, the union chief argued, would merely delay far a year a coup any program to eliminate jobs by modifying work rules. Thus, the steel committee’s offer was not enough to reopen earnest bargaining.

Following the union’s rejection of industry's offer, it was ap­ parent that a strike would recur once the injunction period terminated.

However, some last ditch efforts were made to bring about a settlement.

The latter part of November and a ll of December were devoted to attempts by federal mediators and top government officials to bring about a peaceful agreement.

103. Ibid.. pp. 39-^3; See also, H. C. Dumb, “Collective Bargaining In Steel,” a text of an address before the Employers' Association in Summit County, Akron, Ohio, November 19, 1959 (New York: Public Relations Department of Republic Steel, 1959) > p . 11. 101*. Quoted in, New York Times, November 20, 1959; See also, Report To President, p. 11. 217

Most notably, among these attempts, was that of labor Secretary

M itchell's. Up to now, the Secretary had prodded negotiators to get dovn, earnestly, to the task of reconciling their differences. How­ ever, Mitchell, now changed his tactics and offered a new method. '*It is ,” Mitchell remarked, “an appropriate time to turn unresolved ques­ tions over to the unimpassioned consideration of outsiders.” This outside help could come in one of three forms. First, the FMCS could recommend settlement terms. Second, the parties could allow a non­ partisan board to make recommendations providing a framework for a new agreement. Finally, the groups could let an arbitrator decide unset- 1 0 5 tied issues with both sides agreeing to the ruling. The Mitchell arbitration plan was much broader than that of the steel industry's pre­ vious offer. Under the Mitchell proposal, wages and fringe issues, as well as, work rules would be submitted to arbitration. The steel manu­ facturers offered to arbitrate only on the work r vile s.

Both industry and the union were indifferent to the Labor Secre­ tary's proposal. Conrad Cooper rejected all three of M itchell's sug­ gestions on the ground that the companies were not willing to turn their responsibilities of wages over to third parties. '^Third-party intervention,” argued Cooper, "could only result in recommendations that the union has refused to accept, or in recommendations for a more

105. "New Technique Urged in Steel Talks,” Business Week, No. 1579- 1582 (December 12, 1959)* 15°J See also, '‘Where Steel Companies and Unions Stand Now,” United States News and World Report, k j (December 28, 1959)* ^2. 218 100 costly settlement -which would clearly he inflationary . n The union,

on the other hand, asserted its willingness to allow a fact-finding

hoard to recommend a settlement, hut they halked at binding arbitra- 1 0 7 tlo n .

The Mitchell proposal was only one phase of the behind the scene

efforts to get the steel dispute settled. The FMCS, throughout the

month of December, held joint and separate meetings with both parties

on an almost day to day basis. The mediators most difficult task was that of finding a formula to handle the work rules issue. Industry

offered to let outsiders arbitrate the issue; to allow a panel to decide how local working conditions could be altered by management in order

to improve efficiency in the mills. The union,, however, rejected any 1 0 8 sort of arbitration.

For the first two„ weeks of December, the negotiating sessions yielded nothing. At the duration of these sessions McDonald informed reporters, that there was absolutely nothing new in prospect. Cooper remarked that the sessions had been unproductive as far as he could te ll. Finnegan, moreover, shared the same sentiments as the top nego­ tiators. Federal mediators, according to Finnegan, had stepped up efforts with almost daily talks to comply with President Eisenhower’s

106. "Steel With Six Weeks to Go, ” United States News and World Beport, k-7 (December 21, 1959), 108. 107. Final Report to the President, p. 10.

108. Ibid., pp. 1-2, Appendix B. 219

demand for more intensive ‘bargaining, but the basic attitudes of both

sides remained unchanged. “No progress of substance has been made/'

Following these comments, Finnegan decided to suspend negotiations

until December 21st. The suspension, according to the FMCS Director,

occurred because union leaders were obligated to appear in Chicago for 108 the negotiations with the aluminum industry.

Subsequently, two weekB hence, the private negotiating sessions

were resumed. Despite these talks, however, it became apparent that

neither side in the dispute intended to yield anything before the next

step in the Taft-Hartley injunction procedure—that was the vote by the workers to determine if they wanted to accept their employer's last

contract offer. As one top federal mediator glumly put it: “The

chances for an agreement before the strike injunction runs out appear n o awfully hopeless, now.” The work rules issue proved to be the

downfall of the meetings. The steel executives held to the belief that work practices had to be abolished in order that industry could

operate efficiently. The union rejected this and argued that any de­

feat in the work rules issue would mean the loss of jobs for thousands

of workers. The FMCS, therefore, failed to find a compromise somewhere between the above positions. On December 27th, the last day of the i n sessions, Mediator Finnegan reported zero progress.

109. New York Times, December 4, 6, 1959; See also, Nall Street Journal, December 11, 1959. 110. The Christian Science Monitor, December 2J, 1959*

111. The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1959. 220

With the negotiations tightly deadlocked, the parties used the

remaining time to prepare their final offer for the Board of Inquiry.

Under the Taffc-Hartley Act, the Board was required to submit a final

report on the dispute to President Eisenhower by January 6th . Subse­

quently, on December 28th through the 29'th, hearings were held to dis­

cuss the factions proposals. Essentially, the wage difference between

the company and the union was veiy small. Industry proposed a three

year contract in contrast to the union's two year contract. For the

first year, both parties settled on a no-cash wage increment. In the

second year, the manufacturers offered a wage hike ranging from 6 cents to 12 cents an hour. The steelworkers insisted on a raise anywhere from 7 to 13 cents an hour. Thus, only 1 cent divided them on the wage

issue, although the union wanted to boost to be effective as of July 1X2 1 s t, i 960 as opposed to October 1st.

The work rules issue proved to be the decisive factor for what lay ahead. The employers demanded that the 2B clause be revised to give them more leeway in improving the efficiency of the mills. This clause, according to executives, froze existing working conditions, that had become established. **Ehe overall issue,” Cooper remarked, "is whether this union w ill discharge its moral obligation to settle the steel dis- 1 1 3 pute through the process of true collective bargaining. ” The union,

112. Final Report to the President, pp. 51- 6l, Appendix D, pp. 1-4; See also, “Where the Steel Companies Stand, ” United States News and World Report, 47 (December 28, 1959 )> P* 113, Final Report to President, p. 21. 221

on the other hand, accused the industry of trying to usurp steelworkers' rights that had "been gained in early contracts. They warned that many workers would "be laid off if companies won on this work rules point.

**Fhe one real issue,” thundered McDonald, “is ■whether the companies w ill he successful in their attempt to destroy the USWA as an effective 1 1 4 bargaining force.” Thus, it seemed definite now that the two fac­ tions were too far apart to settle anything. As Chairman Taylor con­ cluded: “I don't see any possibility of a settlement before January 1 1 5 6t h ."

V

All these developments suggested that the dispute would continue through the eighty day injunction with the workers striking again at the end of January. But various pressures were working for a change in this picture.

Economically, the pressures were more than obvious. Unless agree­ ment could be reached, the steelworkers were almost sure to renew the strike on January 26. This would represent another additional payless period for the steelworkers, who had already been idled for one-hundred and sixteen days. The economic plight of the workers, moreover, bore down upon th e union. McDonald re a liz e d th a t th e workers had su ffe red severely during the strike and now, following the holiday season, there

HV. Ibid., pp. 20-21, h0.

115. Youngstown Vindicator, December 29, 1959; Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1959* 222

would be considerably more pressure upon him to reach an agreement.

Mary workers' wives indicated in various surveys that installment pay- n e ments required that their husbands remain on the job.

Management also felt the economic pressures upon them. For many

steel companies and their users a resumed strike meant a decline in

b u sin e ss. A re p o rt tak en by th e Department of Commerce, in d ic a te d th a t

should the strike be resumed steel companies would lose about 20% p ro - 2.1 7 fit for the i 960 season. Besides the loss of money, steel companies

were pressed by various steel buyers. According to Iron Age, auto

companies and other steel users were putting intense pressure on indus- 1 1 8 try due to a loss of business. Another economic pressure that con­

cerned management was the loss of markets to foreign steel producers.

As one steel manufacturer put it: “Until this year, the bulk of the business done by foreign steel producers in the U.S. was only in pipe,

rods, and wire metals. But during the strike months, they've boosted

sharply their business in the generally more lucrative lines of plates, 1 1 9 sheets and strip steel. Besides these obvious economic pressures, there were many non-economic forces working on both groups.

116 . ‘feteel: The Crucial 80 Days,” United States News and World Report, 47 (November 25? 1959)? 122-125; See also, Robert Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Steel Industry (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, January, 196 l),p . 505 . 117. Report on the Background Review of Steel Situation by W. C. Truppner, Director of Industrial Mobilisation and Robert J. Dodd, General Counsel, December 1 6, 1959? Box 2, Steel Industry Labor DiBpute,1959? Records of W, Allen W allis, Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib rary . 118. Iro n Age, November 5 , 1959? PP» ^9-50* 119. “A Wedge to Widen U.S. M arkets,” B usiness Week, No. 1561-1565 (August 1, 1959)? 24. 223

There were also strategic pressures. The steel manufacturers hore

the brunt of these pressures. The union's new agreements with Kaiser

and Detroit Steel and aluminum and cans placed the steel industry in a

tenuous position. These agreements, as executives viewed them, created

an atmosphere in which management had turned into the villian. As Roger

Blough put it: "It was clear that the union, having won substantial

settlements in other industries in which it has contracts, was unwill­

ing to agree to terms we thought we could live with.” This situation, 120 he explained, would only make our position seem even more unworthy.

Industry also found that its maneuvering failed to rally the steel­

workers' support to their side. Although at the outset, the employees

were reluctant to strike, the situation changed drastically when

management attempted to alter the work rules issue. Phillip Adams,

Vice-President of Public Relations for United States Steel, indicated

that the industry lost its advantage by allowing the emphasis of the

argument to shift from inflation to work rules. “And we in public relations were caught with our... well, le t's say with our defense 121 down. ” For this we had made no advance preparations. ” 'feted manu­

facturers therefore realized they were losing ground. Private surveys,

taken for the SCCC by the Group Attitudes Corporation, demonstrated a

120. Summary Report of Blough's Statement to the Press: From H ill and Knowlton Co. to Steel Companies’ Coordinating Committee, January if, i 960, Box 191* i 960 Steel (December), James P. M itchell Papers.

121. Phelps H. Adams, ‘*The Perform ance,” The A fternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Relations Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26, I960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute, (New York: AISI, i 960), pp. 23U-235 .

J 224

definite rejection of the companies' proposal by at least 90/5 of the 122 work force. One source, close to the company negotiations, depicted

the effect of that outlook in these words:

The pressure put on the companies by these straw votes was very, very great. You can see what such an overwhelming defeat would have done to the companies' bargaining posi­ tio n . I t would mean th a t Mr. McDonald, th e union le a d e r, would have been ever more difficult to deal with after receiving such a strong endorsement for his position . 123

All in all, the companies seemed prepared for a way out.

McDonald faced strategic problems, too. Dor one thing, he feared

the results of a conrpany-by-company vote on the employers' last offer.

Several union district reports and professional surveys seemed to justify

McDonald's concern. To wit, the President of a Big Three local admitted that he couldh't be sure of his members reaction to another strike call; 1 2 4 they're mad enough to vote no in an election.” Some other surveys

supplemented this district report. Surveys taken by the Group Attitudes

Corporation indicated that the vote would have varied widely from com­ pany to company and even plant to plant. t(l can te ll you th is,” remarked

Jane Stewart, Vice President of GAC, “the vote would not have been the landslide of no votes McDonald was predicting... And I can te ll you that the rate of acceptance of the offer in some plants would get as high as

122. Jane Stewart, “The Evaluation, ” The Afternoon Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Industrial Relations Committee and Public Relations Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, May 26 , i 960, The Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: AISI, i 960), pp. 240-245. 123. ‘*The Inside Story of What Happened in Steel,” United States News and World Report, 48 (January 18, i 960), 38. 124. *feteel D ispute Hopes Fade, ” Business Week, No. 1583-1587 (January 2, I960), 30. 4c$.” As one union official described it:

On the other hand, there was also pressures on the union. While the union expected to win the referendum, if the vote had been counted on a company-by-company basis it would have revealed some opposition to Mr. McDonald. The vote might have been as high as 30$ against him in some places. So he didn’t want to go to the election if he could avoid it, even though he knew he was going to win i t . 126

A third constraining force was that of political pressures. There

was the'prospect of punitive congressional action, when the Congress

returned to Washington on January 6th. This was a possibility that

both management and labor were aware of, and both attempted to gauge

this to their own needs. Actually, a New York Herald Tribune poll of

Senate and House members d isc lo se d some firm co n v ictio n s th a t Congress 1 2 7 would have to react if the strike was resumed.

A proposal already advanced in Congress was to give the President power to seize a vital industry to prevent a renewal of a strike after

eighty days. The plan was submitted by John F. Kennedy of Mass., who firmly believed in changing the Taft-Hartley emergency provisions. As

Senator Kennedy asserted: “I believe this country should certainly be

in a position to combat a strike that effects the health and safety of 1 2 8 the people. Another suggestion was to set up a labor court to

125. Jane Stewart, “The Evaluation,” pp. 2^6-247. 126. “The Inside Story of What Happened in Steel,” United States News and World Report, ^8 (January 18, i 960), 38*

127. The poll was discussed in an editorial in the Youngstown Vindica­ to r, December 1, 1959-

128. New York Times, November 8, 1959 J ^ P u ttin g More Heat on B argaining, Business Week (October 31, 1959), 105* 226

to determine how disputes were to be settled. This was introduced by

Senator George Smathers, Democrat of Florida, on November 8th . He

suggested a five member court, to be called the U. S. Court of Labor

Management Relations, which would have the jurisdiction over all

national industries and would be used when collective bargaining broke

down. The court's findings and judgment,• according to Senator Smathers, 1 2 9 would be final and binding on both parties.

Another proposal was that of Adlai Stevenson, twice the Democratic

nominee for the President, who proposed a labor law recognizing the

public welfare and giving the President far greater powers than under

the Taft-Hartley Act. These powers would include the right to order

continued production in essential industries like steel while a settle­

ment was being reached. “The steel strike has dramatized the fact that we are at the end of an era,” he told a luncheon meeting of the Insti­

tute of Life Insurance. In that speech he maintained:

What we need is a ... law that w ill provide for investiga­ tion and reporting to the public on the issues involved, one that w ill provide for more effective mediation between the parties... Because these emergency cases are always different, the Congress should give to the President a choice of procedures when voluntary agreement proves im­ possible; seizure provisions geared to the circumstance; or arbitration; or a detailed hearing and a recommendation of settlement terms . . . 130

Some Republicans also made recommendations for change. For in­

stance, Nelson Rockefeller called for federal legislation providing for

129. New York Times, November 8, 1959*

130. “Government Crackdown on Strikes—Stevenson's Plan,” United States News and World Report, ^7 (December 21, 1959)* 104'. 227

fact-finding, accompanied by recommendations and, if all intermedia-

tory steps faltered, compulsory arbitration binding on both parties.

As Rockefeller asserted: "I think the federal government has got a 1 3 1 very strong responsibility to face up to the situation.”

For management was the threat of legislation proved endemic. The

Congress was dominated by Democrats, and a large number of its members,

as steel executives perceived it, were indebted to the union. As one

top government official put it:

Looking-over the management's side, they were even more con­ cerned than the unions about letting the dispute go to the Congress in an election year, when so many candidates are beholding to labor unions for campaign funds and votes. It was considered likely that any action Congress might take would be more favorable to unions, with their great political pcwer, than to the companies . 132

Many steel executives became convinced that a continuation of the

strike after the injunction period would only bring a wrath of anti­

business legislation upon them. As the strike entered the last week

of December, explained R. Heath Larry, administrative vice president

of labor relations for United States Steel, we foresaw the potential

for a worsening situation. “This involved,” he remarked, "concern as

to potential Congressional action which might, in the heat of the

situation react in a way which would be harmful, not only to the parties 1 3 3 but to all industry...”

151. New York Times, December 7j 1959 > Youngstown V indicator, December 1 7 , 1959- 132. “The Inside Story of What Happened in Steel,” United. States News and World Report, U 8 (January 18, i 960) , 38- 3 9. 133* R* Heath Larry, “Post-Mortem Steel Bargaining, 1959,” Business Administration and Economics. VII, No. 53 (April l£, i 9 60) , 1 3 . 228

The union was also concerned about what Congress might do. They

realized that Democratic Senators had instigated the McClellan Committee

H earings and, e v en tu ally many of t h i s same group helped in a c t th e

Landrum-Griffin Act. Consequently, the over-hanging fears of union

leaders with respect to Congressional action seemed justified. As one

union leader asserted:

The union men thought that, with this Democratic Congress, they would do pretty well on whatever action Congress might take. And yet they could not be sure that Congress would not adopt some changes in the basic labor laws which might involve compulsory arbitration. And, of course, the union did not want that . 134

The most decisive political pressure placed upon both factions came from the Eisenhower Administration. During the last week in Decem­ ber, Vice-President Nixon and Labor Secretary Mitchell held a series of unpublicized talks with both management and labor. During these meetings, the top government officials brought all the political pres­

su res home t o th e n e g o tia to rs . More im p o rtan t, th e c a b in e t members

informed the steel executives that the President was becoming very dis-

solutioned and angry over the steel deadlock. This frustration,

Mitchell remarked, had compelled Eisenhower to draft a plan for pre­ venting strikes when the national security was involved. The proposal, according to the Labor Secretary, would involve "serious study and discussion by interested parties on possible actions, including that of

134. “The Inside Story of What Happened in Steel," United States News and World Report, 48 (January 18, i 960) , p . 3 8* 229 temporary reduction or elimination of tarrifs on the products of an 1 3 5 essential industry tied up by a prolonged strike.” The alterations in Eisenhower’s thinking, as steel executives perceived it, made them realize that the backing they had anticipated from the Republican

Administration ceased to exist. This assumption was later revealed by

Roger Blough at a press conference: “It seemed clear that the govern- 1 3 6 ment would not permit the nation to be paralyzed by such a strike.”

The companies felt certain, he asserted, that this situation would com­ pel the administration to obtain a settlement either by persuasion or new legislation.

Thus, in view of all these cumulative pressures, both groups had no other recourse but to settle. Subsequently, on January Ji-th, Nixon and Mitchell recommended a settlement which both factions accepted.

As Labor Secretary Mitchell asserted: “A recommendation for settlement was made by the Vice-President and the Secretary which was accepted 1 3 7 voluntarily by both parties.” The agreement provided a total package worth about JfO cents an hour, spread over the 30 months o f th e new

135* Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956- 1961, Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965) , pp. h$6- J*5T3 Appendix X, p. 705 J See also, “White House Team Breaks Steel Im passe,” Business Week, No. 1583-1587 (January 9» i 9 6 0) , 27 j New York Times, January 5, i 960.

1 3 6 . Summary Report of Blough’s Statement to the Press: From H ill and Knowlton Co., to Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, January ■ i 9 6 0, Box 191, i 960 Steel (December), James P. Mitchell Papers.

137. The Wall Street Journal, January 6 , i 9 6 0. 230 contract. The entire terms of the agre.^ent read as follows:

1. Effective December 1, I960, a 7 cents an hour general wage increase and an increase of 0 .2 cents between job class increments. Effective October 1, 1961, a 7 cents an hour general wage increase and 0 .1 cents increase between increments.

2. Effective January 1, i 9 6 0, insurance program to be non­ contributory and benefits improved.

3* Effective January 1, i 9 60, improvements in the pension program.

4. Cost of living escalation maintained, but adjustments limited to two, limited to 5 cents on December 1, i 960 and 6 cents (less December 1, i 960 adjustment, if any) on October 1, 1 961, further limited by offset related to increase in insurance costs, if any.

5. SUB plan maintained, with restoration of 2 cents con­ tingent liability.

6 . Agency shop in States that had made the union shop illegal.

7. Establishment of a joint Human Relations Research Com­ mittee to study various problems relating to wages, benefits, classifications, incentives, seniority, and medical care.

8. Liberalization of seniority retention in cases of layoff or physical disability.

9. Local working conditions problems to be studied by a tripartite committee, to report to parties by November 3 0 , i 960. 0 3 8 10. Contract to terminate on June 30j 1962.

Following various congratulatory statements, the critics began the task of analyzing the agreement. The remaining question seemed clear: who became the victor after such a long and tedious struggle? Perhaps

1 5 8 . Livemash, Collective Bargaining In the Steel Industry, p. 3 0 6 . a better question would have been, what over-all effects did this set tlement have on the course of the history of American industrial so ciety ? CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The steel strike of 1959 demonstrated that there had been an un­

willingness to compromise by both management and labor. The basic issues

in the strike rested in the belief of the steel executives that the time

had come to hold wage increments that could not be paid far by greater

efficiency. Moreover, the companies felt that the time had also come to

revise some work rules that were considered to be costly, outmoded and

inefficient. By changing these rules, steel executives contended, their

plants could operate more efficiently and thus a wage increase could be

Justified.

The steel union, on the other hand, saw such moves as an attempt by

the industry to destroy its position at the bargaining table. A change

in work rules, as steel union leaders perceived it, would turn back the

clock and deprive them of what they considered improvements in working

conditions that had been won over the years. Moreover, the steel union held a strong purchasing power view of wages. They claimed that increased wages brought about additional consumer buying power which was necessary to further stimulate the econony and create demands which would put idle workers back to work.

The determination of both sides to fulfill their particular needs and demands caused a bitter and seemingly endless struggle. The mediation attempts by the FMCS, the public hearings and "illegal” mediation activities

252 233

by the Board of Inquiry, and the constant admonitions by the government

a ll failed to break the deadlock. Eventually, however, the workings of

various economic and noneconomic pressures upon both factions did farce

an end to the deadlock. Once the strike had terminated, however, a final

question that remained was who became the victor in the dispute? To an­

swer this q.uestion, each side evaluated the new agreement against the

final demands they had put forth at the close of the Taft-Hartley hearings.

II

The agreement as reported by the news media was a 39/ package. This figure was highly criticized as being a defeat for industry and a con­ cession to the union that would eventually give new impetus to infla­ tion. "Dae settlement is inflationary," reported Steel. "Let us not kid ourselves about that. And let us not be kidded by political pam- x posities." Iron Age, expressing similar sentiments, wrote: "The wage-freeze package is inflationary. It w ill mean higher prices. The longer some steel firms wait, the more serious becomes the problem for 2 the wage deal . 11 Moreover, many top executives from various industries reacted pessimistically to the settlement. The reaction of more than fifty metallurgy executives can best be summed up in these words: "It 1 s good for short term business. It’s bad far the long term fight against

1. Steel, January 11, I960, p. 3 1 .

2. Iron Age, January l1)-, I960, p. 7. 23^ 3 i n f la tio n . 11 Some other industrial executives expressed the same sen­

timents. "Anybody -who tells you this settlement isn 't inflationary

ought to have his head examined," declared one manufacturer. Vice-

President Jack S. Barker of General Electric Company expressed manage­ ment feelings in-a speech in Los Angeles. He praised the steel indus­ try 's "courageous and sincere efforts to stop an inflationary wage set- ti tlement and said it was "unfortunate that the steel companies had to relinquish ground in sheer inability to resist the fantastic pressures applied against it."

These impassioned statements, however, reflected certain attitudes toward the strike that were biased and not truly accurate. Thus, as the steel settlement was viewed mare critically, it became more and more ap­ parent that neither the union nor industry won a clear cut victory. The contract, as union leaders viewed it, proved to be an economic victory.

For one thing, the agreement called for industry to absorb and take over the complete cost of their existing insurance program, which had been financed on a fifty -fifty basis, by-employer and employee contri­ butions. Thus, the companies now bore the fu ll cost of worker insurance, hospitalization, sickness, accident allowances, and similar benefits.

Moreover, the steel union received a 3*7$ annual increase in total

3. Steel, January 11, I960, p. 3 7.

4. Quotations in, ’Steel Terms Get a Second Look," Business Week, No. 1583-1587 (January 16, I960), 2 6 . employment cost as opposed to the industry’s last offer of 2 .*$.

The s t e e l union 1 s most substantial gain from the new contract was

the preservation of the work rules provision. Instead, a joint committee,

headed by a neutral chairman, was to examine the work rules problem and

make recommendations far solutions, but the proposals were not to be

binding on either side. This provision fell far short of the binding

arbitration sought by the steel companies. Thus, the victory on these

three issues led McDonald to boast that the agreement left the union e sound, safe, and secure.

Although the steel companies had to absorb the cost of the union's

economic gains, they too won several concessions. As one top executive

of a major steel company remarked: 'No one could ever say this settle­ ment was a victory for the industry, far we did not accomplish our main

objectives. . .of changes in work rules which would promote efficiency."

Nevertheless, the steel manufacturers, he explained, did reduce the rate of augmentation in employment cost to about 3 * 7$ as compared with an 7 average of 8j6 through the post-war period. From the head of another very large steel company came this explanation: 'Vfe’ve been in the

3. "How S te e l Terms Compare W ith th e in d u stry and Union Demands," B usiness Week, No. 1583-1587 (January 16, i 9 6 0) , 106-109; "Victory for A ll," IUP Bulletin, 5 (January, i 960) , 1 , U .

6 . 'T’eace in Steel New Outlook For United States," U.S. News and World Report, 48 (January, 18, i 9 6 0), pp. 35-36; see also, Arthur Goldberg, 'Steel Strike Settlement:Victory For All Workers," AFL-CIO F ree Trade Union News, 15 (February, i 9 6 0) , 1 ,8 .

7. 'Vhat the Steel Industry Says About the New Contract," U.S. News and World Deport, 48 (January 25, I960), 110-111; see also, 'What The Settlement Means to America," text of a telecast by Roger Blough, (New York: Steel Companies Coordinating Committee, January 4, i 9 6 0). price-wage spiral for twenty odd years. You cannot stop a great wave

of that kind dead in its tracks all in one crack. We made a great ef­

fort in the steel "business to try to stop it." The settlement, he con­

tinued, actually gave an advance of about half as much in the next three

years as industry had in the past three years. "That's a pretty fair a step forward," he remarked.

Thus, in economic terms, the steel companies, as they viewed it,

did uncommonly well in the negotiations. Far one thing, management was able to attain a wage freeze that would last until December 1, I960.

Moreover, the contract guaranteed labor peace for two and a half years

instead of the twenty months sought by the union. Furthermore, since the contract was not retroactive, the steel companies also received a two months' free ride on wages. More importantly, there was a lim it o f 6j£ that could be paid to steelworkers in cost-of-living allowances during the thirty month contract. This was a sharp reduction from the

17ji received by the steelworkers in cost-of-living during the past three years. In addition, the new contract contained a provision that might hold cost-of-living to as little as 1^ an hour, or even less. Under that provision, employers were allowed to withhold living cost allow­ ances to offset higher insurance costs. Steel executives believed that the cost-of-living limitation was a significant victory for the steel

8. The Evening Star (Washington), January 18, i 9 60; see also, "Steel's Top O fficial Looks at the New Wage Contract,” United States News and World Report, ^8 (January 1 8, i 9 6 0) , 5b. 257

industry. "In the light of the growing apprehension concerning the

self-feeding and self-defeating effect of unlimited cost-of-living

clauses this seems to be a significant development in the right direc­

tion," declared R. H. Larry, Administrative Vice-President for United 9 States Steel.

Many steel executives viewed the agreement with satisfaction par­

ticularly when they compared it to other settlements made by United

Steelworkers of America (USWA). For example, the steel industry*s con­

tract seemed to fare quite well in relation to the settlements with

Kaiser, can, and aluminum industries. The Metal industries agreements, as steel executives viewed it, would have cost about % per annum as compared to 5*79$ for the steel industry’s settlement. Moreover, the i Kaiser wage increase became effective July 1st, as compared with December

1st for the industry. Steel executives called attention to the fact that industry had an offset against the 3/5 cost-of-living clause in ex­ cess insurance costs; Kaiser had no such offset. In addition, the indus­ try was settled for an extra year, which for steel manufacturers was in itself an advantage. "A settlement that was better than the Kaiser, can, aluminum, and copper deals was quite a remarkable settlement," remarked 1 0 one top steel executive.

9- R. Heath Larry, "Post-Mortem-Steel Bargaining 1959»" an address before the Industrial Relations Conference of Associated Industries of Alabama, April 14, i 960 (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steel, I960), p._l6; Bethlehem Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, 1959 3 pp. 7-8 U.S. Steel, Annual Report to Stockholders, I960, pp.' 3 , 1 2 -1 5 , 2 1 . Id The Evening Star (Washington), January 18, I960 New York Times, January 7, I960; ’Where Employers See a Gain in the Steel Settlement," U.S. News and World Report, if8 (January 25, I960), 114-115. 238

A few steel officials even saw a substantial gain an the work rules

issue. Although the settlement fell far short of the binding arbitration

sought "by the companies, it did succeed in allowing them an absolutely

free hand in the area of automation. Roger Blough, Chairman of United

States Steel, even went to the extent of saying that the contract won a

few changes that "curb to some considerable extent. . .the past excesses 11 from which some of our troubles are flowing. " Thus, both the steel

union and industry received a contract that was more favorable an some points and yet less favorable on others.

Besides management and labor, the federal government also had a crucial stake in the strike. Consequently, it seems necessary to evaluate its performance with regard to its successes and failures.

Of particular interest to Washington was the issue of spiraling in­ flation. It appeared, from the settlement of the strike, that the

Eisenhower Administration managed, if only for a short time, to hold

■liie line on wages and prices. Evidence of this fact came from Conrad

Cooper, Spokesman for the Steel Companies Coordinating Committee (SCCC), when he informed Labor Secretary Mitchell that there was going to be no price increment in the near future. "The wage increase resulting from the steel strike," wrote Cooper, "does not set up a new wage pattern with possible inflationary effects, as happened in the past. The steel wage settlement should not be the cause for any immediate increase in

11. "ttie Price Steel Is Paying For Peace," Business Week, No. 1583- 1587 (January 9> I960), 78. steel prices.” Moreover, Cooper stressed that “if the companies and

the union succeed in attacking the problem of increased productivity

and efficiency so that a ll of the increases was absorbed, then the con- 12 tract would be noninflationary for some time.”

This report was welcomed enthusiastically by the administration,

for it represented their attempt at stabilizing wages and prices. As

President Eisenhower observed: “The companies have said there would be

no immediate price rises—the first time it had happened in any stell 13 contract that I know of since World War I.” Similar sentiments of

satisfaction were expressed by Labor Secretary Mitchell. He remarked:

“Roger Blough has said that there is no immediate steel price increase, and this is the first time, to my recollection, that the steel conpanies have not immediately announced a price increase pegged to a wage increase.

On the basis of the wage settlement, the price situation should remain 14 s ta b le f o r some tim e .”

To be sure, however, the Government did not achieve a ll of its objectives, for like labor and management it too experienced a measure of defeat. The Eisenhower Administration at the inception of the strike

12. “Memorandum, The SCCC to James P. M itc h e ll,” January 6 , i 9 6 0, Box 193, i 960 Steel (January 1-13) (2), James P. Mitchell Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; See also, Roger Blough, "Aftermath in Steel,” an address before National Canners Association Conven­ tion, Miami Beach, Florida, January 18, i 960 (New York: Public Relations Department of United States Steeel, i 960), pp. H - 1 3 .

13. Wall Street Journal, January lk 9 i 960. ik .

This, however, was not to be the case. Although Eisenhower al­ lowed the collective bargaining process to run its natural course throughout most of the strike, when it became apparent that the steel stoppage would undercut certain defense projects, and produce dangerous levels of unemployment, he could not remain aloof. Thus, Vice-President

Nixon and Secretary of Labor Mitchell intervened behind the scenes and recommended a settlement, which both sides eventually signed. The final agreement, therefore, was more a tribute to the Administration's political skill than evidence of any real collective bargaining. Eisenhower ad­ mitted that the Administration had to interfere because the failure of collective bargaining was seriously impairing the economy and national security. "Free collective bargaining—the logical recourse of a free people in settling industrial disputes—has apparently broken down,”

Eisenhower remarked. According to the President, the whole episode had strengthened his conviction that in the long run the country would need better and stronger laws to protect the public interest in labor-management

15. Youngstown V indicator, January 11, 960 i . 2^1 disputes that could seriously hurt the economy and the welfare of the 1 6 country.

Aside from failing to institute voluntary and free collective bar­ gaining, the Republican Administration also lost substantial political support as a result of their participation in a seemingly "forced" set­ tlement. The steelworkers, the business community, the news media, and the public were highly critical of the government’s conduct during the strike.

The steelworkers’ comments were especially critical of Nixon’s role; so much so, that many workers that once voted Republican were now changing their minds. A majority of workers from the Campbell Works plant in

Youngstown, Ohio, who had voted fa r P resid en t Eisenhower in 1956, now listed themselves as Kennedy boosters. None expressed any enthusiasm for Nixon’s role in settling the one hundred and sixteen day steel strike.

On the contrary, there was general grumbling about the manner in which the whole dispute had been handled by the White House. Several maintained that they felt the President had attempted to break the union by obtain­ ing an eighty-day injunction. They considered the contract negotiated with the aid of Nixon and Mitchell as one that had been detrimental to th e union.

As Prank Blystone, a production checker with twenty-four years in the m ill remarked: "I voted for Ike twice, because I thought he would be

16. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Die White House Years:Waging Peace, 1956- 1961, Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday and Co. , 1965)7 pp. 45^-^59* fair to labor, but he stopped the strike Just when we had the supply

of steel down to the point where the union could win. Nixon merely

carried out orders. We got nothing out of the contract at all. M A

crane operator who voted for Eisenhower in the last two Presidential

elections, regarded Nixon's role in the strike as deplorable, "you

don’t see much smoke coming out of th o se chim neys," he remarked. ’When

they don’t smoke, you don’t eat. That’s why I ’m voting far Kennedy 1 7 this year. 11 Similar sentiments were expressed by workers at Inland

Steel. Poor example, a crane operator put it this way: "Nixon Just in­

terfered. He ought to have stayed out of it and let the two parties i s s e t t l e i t . 11

Besides worker discontent, the business community objected to the

Administration’s performance in the strike. Many Republican business­ men fe lt that the Government had sold them down the river. An example

of this negative attitude was expressed by Maynard Sundman, a business­ man in New Hampshire. He remarked: "Usually I vote the Republican

ticket. If you, or Mitchell, are nominated I ’ll certainly vote

Dem ocratic. Many of my frie n d s are ^talking th e same way. A fter t h i s display of weakness and cheap politics, we have no confidence in placing 1 9 the country under your leadership." This attitude was reflected by

17- New York Times, October 51, I960.

18. "As Steelworkers See it After 116 Work Days Lost," U.S. News and World Report, 48 (January 18, I960), 46.

15. Maynard Sundman t o R ichard Nixon, January 5? 2£?60, Box 195, i 960 Steel(January 1-15) (2), James P. Mitchell Papers. other ■businessmen throughout the country. Joe McGuthry, a businessman

and Republican from Washington, had this to say: "You and Secretary

Mitchell didn't settle the steel strike. You sold the GOP. . .down the

river to the hatchet men of labor unions. I've been a Republican all

my sixty-seven years. But from this day on I am no longer a member, by 20 resignation. " A government survey taken by Assistant Attorney General

George Doub in d ic a te d fu rth e r th e d isc o n te n t among businessm en. " I fin d ,

wrote Doub, "that most of the businessmen I surveyed seem to be intensely

critical of the settlement on the ground that it was a politically im- 21 posed one."

Furthermore, the Administration's intervention became a source of

n e g ativ e e d it o r ia l comment. "A p o l it i c a l se ttle m e n t—th e kind th a t

solves no basic problems but merely postpones indefinitely their solution

-has emerged from the steel controversy," wrote David Lawrence. "Vice-

President Nixon and Secretary of Labor Mitchell both could see political

benefits arising from playing a conspicuous part in settling the steel 22 strike." In his column on January 5th, Walter Lippman characterized

the settlement as a political fix. "What happened in the test for free

bargaining was that the government intervened in the person of the Vice-

President," wrote Lippman. ’tHe used the carrot far the union and the

20. Joe McGuthry to Richard Nixon, January 7> I 960, Box 193, I960 Steel (January 1-13) (l)j James P. Mitchell Papers.

21. George C. Doub to James P. Mitchell, January 13, I960, Box 193, i 960 (January 15-20), James P. Mitchell Papers.

22. Youngstown Vindicator, January 6 , i 960. 244

stick far the companies. Bie strike was not settled by free bargaining. 23 It was settled by a political fix ." Similar comments were expressed

in other editorials. The Milwaukee Journal put it this way: "Under

the new settlement, the first of two wage boosts does not take effect

until next December 1st. This timing suggests the neat political touch

of Nixon--no wage increase before the election. . . .Viewed from a ll

angles, it is hard to avoid reaching the conclusion that the strike was 24 settled by a political fix. "

Moreover, public opinion weighted heavily against the Administration.

According to Don Paarlberg, Special Assistant to the President, "the reac­

tion generally is that the settlement represents a defeat farced on 25 management by government." Paarlberg indicated that of the thousands

of letters received at the White House over ninety percent reflected an

unfavorable attitude toward Nixon's and M itchell's roles in the steel wage settlement. Faarlberg's findings were reinforced by other surveys

of letters received at the White House. In these surveys, it was re­ vealed that over 99$ of the letters received showed a complete dissat- 26 isfaction with the Government's handling of the strike. It seemed,

25. Bals editorial was reproduced in U. S. Congressional Record, 86t h Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 106, January 11, I960, p. 211'.

24. The Milwaukee Journal, January 11, I960.

25 . Memorandum: Dan Paarlberg to General Persons, January 18, I960, Box 6 3 6 , OP 124-D-4, White House Central Piles, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

26. Steel Dispute: Public Opinion Survey, January, i 9 6 0, Box 96O, GF 126-D, White House Central Files. 2k3

then, that the Eisenhower Administration lost a personal battle in its

q,uest for free collective bargaining, but it also relinquished consider­

able political support. For the Administration, the victory for hold­

ing the line on inflation proved to be a costly one after all.

Urns, it became apparent that neither management, labor, nor the government received a clear-cut victory. Ben Fair less, President of the American Iron and Steel Institute, best summarized the outcome of the strike in this manner. When asked who had won in the steel dispute, 2 7 he answered: "Who won? Nobody won. Nobody wins in a thing like this. "

III

In addition to its immediate impact on the various economic ele­ ments in society, the strike further served as a critic: and catalyst for socio-economic and political events. In these roles, It did have some positive effects on later events. As a critic of free collective bargaining, it helped to publicize the futility of voluntary labor- management negotiations. Many people felt that the time had come to devise a method to negotiate new labor contracts in major industries in a way that would not harm the national interest. "Ihe steel strike,” wrote Helen Shaffer, 1‘touched off more expressions of dissatisfaction with the processes of uncontrolled collective bargaining than any 2 8 other work stoppage since the early post-war years." Walter Lippman

27. "What the Steel Industry Says About the New Contract," U.S. News and World Report, ^ (January 2 5 , i 9 6 0) , 113.

28. Helen Shaffer, "Future of Free Collective Bargaining," Editorial Research Reports, 2 (December l£, 1959 )j 955-957* 2b6 expressed his dissatisfaction in this manner: "The 1959 strike demon­ strated that the country needs to make a new advance into the region where the government can impose peaceful settlements in accordance with the national interest upon the giant corporations and the giant unions. "

Various other editorial comments revealed its dissatisfaction with the collective bargaining process as it existed. David Lawrence asked the question: 'W ill the Administration reverse itself and, responsive to an aroused public opinion, lay all the facts cn the table, together with recommendations far a law forbidding the monopoly power of industry wide bargaining? It's the only way now to restore free collective bar- 3 0 gaining." The Youngstown Vindicator expressed its concern over the failure of collective bargaining during the strike: "Something must be done to insure that no strike so long and costly can ever occur again.

The conclusion is the country's basic laws need to be rewritten far the public's protection. In a standoff struggle involving two great powers such as those in the steel dispute, the nation can be harmed far more 3 1 than the combatants."

The failure of collective bargaining also prompted various poli­ tical leaders to suggest a changed policy with regard to mao or strikes.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York advocated compulsory arbitration

29. Youngstown Vindicator, October 13, i 960.

30. Ibid., January 1 3 , I960.

31. Ibid., January 11, i 960. 247 32 as the ultimate solution to labor-management disputes. Certain Senators

felt that some legislative initiative had to be taken in order to protect

the country from big strikes. On January l4, I960, Senator Jacob Javits

of New York and Senator Aiken of Vermont introduced S. 2810 to establish

emergency procedures to protect the public interest in the case of la­

bor disputes affecting adversely the national health, safety, or welfare.

"The measurable loss to our economy during the steel strike," Senator

Javits remarked, "was staggering." Borrowing from the Railway Labor

Act, the Senators' b ill authorised the President to name a fact-finding

board whenever the national health and welfare should be imperiled by a

strike or lockout in a vital industry. If the fact-finding board was

unable to reach a settlement with the parties involved, the President

could then ask a D istrict Court to authorize seizure of the plants whose operations he deemed essential to the national health and 3 3 sa fe ty .

Criticism arising fran the failure of collective bargaining in the

steel stoppage also came from labor leaders. Arthur Goldberg, Special

Counsel for USWA, recommended the creation of a Labor-Management

Assembly. This Assembly would allow for open discussions on problems of similar interests to management and labor. Goldberg felt that a

J2. New York Times, June 10, i960, Shaffer, "Future of Free Collective Bargaining, p. 937-

33- United States Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vbl. 106, January 14, i 960, pp. 488-489- m

hostility between the two groups came as a result of lack of communica- 34 tion. Similar sentiments were expressed by George Meany, President

of the AFL-CIO. "Die steel strike," he argued, "demonstrates the need

for management and labor developing guidelines for just and harmonious

labor-management relations to avoid a repetition of strife as long and 35 costly as this struggle." David McDonald, President of the USWA, sug­

gested a. plan calling for Presidential appointment of a permanent Labor

and Industry Advisory Committee to consider many labor problems. "The

Committee should be appointed by President Eisenhower to serve the dual

purpose of keeping the government advised on impending labor trouble

and of keeping labor and management in constant communication between 36 negotiations," McDonald explained.

Ohese prescriptions, moreover, had practical effects. By the sum­ mer of I960, the major steel producers and the USWA completed arrangements

for a joint committee to seek more peaceful long-term relationships.

The aim of the new group was to establish equitable guides far determining wages, incentive payments, fringe benefits, medical care and other over­ a ll problems. The eleven big companies that farmed a united front in the

steel strike of 1959 s operated through a single set of representatives in the joint panel, which would be known as the Human Relations Research

3^. Shaffer, "Future of Free Collective Bargaining," 950*

35* New York Times, January 5s I960.

3 6 . Steel Labor, March, i 960. 2kg

Committee, having two Co-chairmen, one designated try the union and 37 iiie other by the employers.

During this same time, a three-man committee arising out of the

terms of the contract negotiated in 1959 by the USWA and Kaiser Steel

had met several times to discuss the problems of automation. Hie com­

mittee contended in May of I960 that the sessions had been quite success­

ful. Committee Chairman George W. Taylor, who headed the Presidential

Board of Inquiry on the 1959 steel strike, remarked: 'We've got alot 38 to do but we think we are going to come up with the answers." Re­

sults of similar efforts in the railroad industry had been ^ust as

favorable. The "expedient of creating a special railroad commission

to study problems and to make recommendations averted a crisis in 39 I960."

On May 19, I960, the Eisenhower-Meany plan had been put into

effect. Ohis plan called for a continuing series of informal private

discussions between top labor leaders and industrial leaders. The rayi-p

reason for a continuing -conference plan, according to Eisenhower, was

that, "each side would become better acquainted with the problems facing

the other, that long standing animosities would subside, and that areas

37* New York Times, A p ril 2 7, i 960.

3 8. Helen B. Shaffer, "Labor, Management, and the National interest," Editorial Research Reports, 2 (August 4, I960), 58I.

39* B. J. Widick, Labor Today (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 19610, p. 52. 250

40 of common interest would be more clearly defined."

Mare importantly, the failure of collective bargaining in 1959

led future political leaders to seek even stronger actions. To wit,

under the Kennedy Administration, Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg,

Former Chief Counsel of USWA, devised a new basic philosophy of collec­

tive bargaining in which the vital role belonged to the federal govern­

ment. Goldberg’s experience with the steel strike of 1959 led him to

conclude that the collective bargaining process was either totally in­

adequate cr an outright failure. His proposal was government interven­

tion in the farm of guidelines. "The Kennedy Administration," he re­

marked, "has the courage to draw the economic guidelines to protect

the national interest. . . .The government has got to give more help in

the collective bargaining process. " This plan was put into effect for

the steel contract of 1962 as well as for other major industries such 4 3 . as the railroad, the waterfront, and Hew York news media.

IV

Besides giving rise to criticism of free collective bargaining, the steel strike also functioned as a catalyst to activate a new

40. Shaffer, "Labor, Management, and the national Interest," 565 -570, 580.

41. Widick, Labor Today, pp. 60-61* see also, Hew York Times, February 28, 19625 A.H. R askin, "The Government's Role When Collective Bargaining Breaks Down," Ohe Reporter, (January 31, 1963) , 2 7-3 1 . 251

management initiative at the bargaining table. Far many businessmen,

Steel's stand signaled the beginning of a new era of tougher manage­

ment bargaining. This new initiative focused primarily on management's

determination to dictate plant policy. Although the steel executives

failed to alter the work rules provisions, they did throw light on the

fact that management would no longer sit back and let the union make

the decisions in the factory.

Evidence of this new initiative was revealed by a number of lead­

ing mediators throughout the country, 'Mare and more restrictive work

practices and management prerogatives are the critical issues in labor

negotiations," declared one federal mediator. 'Mare than at any time

in modern bargaining history," mediators declared, "management is hold­

ing its line against sharply increased costs. " A mediator in St. Louis

commented that management's determination to keep plants operating—by recruiting replacement workers from outside if needed—seems to be making 4a unions quite hesitant about strike action. Most federal mediators

summed up their evaluation of management's new initiative in this way:

"Very firm notice is being served on unions by the companies (that con­ cessions are expected on the work rules issues) and it could well be that some of the country's major contract negotiations of the future

h2. "Clash Over Management Rights," Business Week (May 21, I960), l*t6. 252

43 will be most difficult."

A review of the major management disputes for i 960 further demon­

strates how widely management* s rights and work practices had became

a vital pugnacious issue. For instance, work rules was the major

grievance in strikes against Swift and Company and Wilson and Company

in the meat-packing industry. The two firms insisted on contract altera­

tions to. allow them relief against crew rules and other costly restric­

tions. Contract changes were also a key issue in nanferrous and alum-

minum bargaining. Far example, Kennecott Copper demanded ample alterations

in its contracts to eradicate what it considered bad shop practices, payroll padding, and feather-bedding. The work rules issue was also

involved in Oil strikes. Amoco maintained that the principal issue in

its dispute with the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers was 'Management’s ability to run its refinery as a successful business enterprise, without 44 the union exercising veto power over management decisions."

A strike by 70,000 longshoremen cn the Atlantic and Gulf coasts terminated with the firms gaining a victory on the work rules issue.

Alexander P. Chopin, Attorney for the New York Shipping Association, de­ clared: "Our industry must simply eliminate feather-bedding, deadtime,

b$. Ibid., 149 1 see also, 'Employers Taking Tougher Line," Business Week, Wo. 1583-1587 (January JO, i 9 6 0), 25; William Gombarg, "She Rule Problem and Property Rights in the Job," The Monthly Labor Review, 84- (June, 1961), 595-596.

44. "Clash Over Management Rights," 14-9J see also, "It Beeps Getting Harder to Win Strikes," U.S. Wews and World Report, 4-7 (December 28, 1959), 70-71. 253

and antiquated methods of doing business if it hopes to survive and

continue competitive with trans-ocean airlines, the Saint Lawrence 4 5 Seaway, and other methods and routes of transporbing goods."

Thus, it was clear that management's stiffened attitude at the bargaining table was one factor emanating from the 1959 steel strike.

In the years immediately following the strike, management doggedly fought for the right to make job assignments in the factory. Taking a lesson from the steel bargainers of fifty-nine, numerous industrial managers throughout the 1960's were determined to restore the pre­ rogatives they once had in earlier years.

V

Finally, the 1959 steel strike served as a catalyst activating a new steel worker attitude. The strike awakened the average rank and filer to the realization that he had little to say in strike-making decisions. Many workers, for various reasons, were reluctant to strike in 1959 > "but McDonald made the arbitrary decision to stop work. For the steel worker, the 1959 work stoppage proved very costly. Members suf­ fered personal hardship, and finally, according to Manual Sierras, a southern-California official, "the contract itself really demoralized 4 6 the membership. " A rear switchman at the Inland Steel Plant in

45* William R. McIntyre, "Featherbedding and Union Work Rules," Editorial Research Reports, 2 (November 4, 2959)? 817. h6. John Her ling, Right to Chall enge: People and Power In the Steelworkers Union (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 197277 P* 202. 254

Chicago remarked: "I am in debt now for the first time in nineteen years.

I'm sunk." From the -wife of a crane operator at Inland Steel came this

comment: "This strike cost us three thousand dollars including eight hundred dollars of savings. We had been saving up for a vacation—the

first one in sixteen years. Now the money is gone." A tin plate in­

spector at Youngstown Sheet and Tube declared that McDonald, "got out 4 7 on a limb too far. "

Many workers believed that they should have had more voice in the

strike settlement. The steelworkers felt a need to challenge the leader­

ship and seek more representation in the decision-making policies. A m ach in ist w ife in Utah conplained: "McDonald i s a d i c t a t o r ." A crane operator at United States Steel Fairless plant charged: 'McDonald is really a Republican. He's after the job of Secretary of Labor. He's finished in this union.11 Most workers began demanding more voice in order to avoid one-sided rule. "The union has to get a different attitude to fit changing tim e s ," a union member declared. "People now are b e tte r edu­ cated than in the thirties when many only had a grade school education, 4 8 or less. They should have more say about what goes on." An open- hearth operator for Inland Steel summed workers new attitude in this way: '"Hie best thing is to give the men more to say, the union shouldn't

47* "As Steelworkers See It After 1U6 Workdays Lost," U.S. News and World Report, 48 (January 18, i 960) , 4-5.

48. Ibid., 48. "be run by one man. If the men had more to say, there wouldn’t be so 49 ■ many strikes. ”

Thus, it became apparent that the strike unleashed a new activism on the part of the rank and file. Moreover, the steelworker sought a new leadership, one that identified with the members berth old and new.

This attitude glaringly revealed itself during the steel union1 s

Presidential election in l9Gh, when McDonald was overwhelmingly defeated by his Secretary-Treasurer, I. W. Abel. Abel's stunning victory was partially due to his stressing the return of collective bargaining to the members from the '*remoteness of McDonald's exclusive meetings with *, so technicians and top management. "

Qhus, th e 1959 steel strike reflected a new set of attitudes that dominated labor, management, and government thinking in the I960's.

F irst, labor officialdom would now represent a work force unlike that of the 1930's through the 1950's. Eie 1960's saw the emergence of a new middle class worker, who was more sophisticated, more intelligent and mare concerned about the decisions that directly affected his well-being.

Secondly, the managerial class took on a new stance, one that included an aggressiveness and initiative in labor-management relations. The

1*9. 'ftow Steelworkers Feel How About the Strike," U.S. News and World Report, 1*7 (October 12, 1959), ^7*

50. Jack Bar bash, American Unions: Structure Government and Politics (New York: Random House, 19&7), PP- 97-99* fifty-nine strike culminated the age of growing managerial power, when the corporate manager was taking credit for the remarkable performance of American industry. Finally, the federal government, a principal actor in the events of 1959 j now assumed a new willingness to interject itself in the economic affairs of the nation. The government drifted away from ineffectual persuasion and inaction to that of action and involvement. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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United States Congress. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Train- . ing of the Unemployed; Hearings, Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, 87th Congress, 1st Session, March 20, 21; June 5 and’*7, 1 9 6 1 .

United States Congress, House. Committee on Education and Labor. Impact of Automation on Employment; Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st Session, March 8-A p ril 2 5 , 1961.

United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Automation and Technological Change; Hearings, Subcommittee on Economic S tabili- zation, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955*

United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Hearings, January, 1957 Economic Report to President, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Pursuant to Sec. 5 (Aj-of Public Law 304. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957-

Unit ed States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Hearings on the January, 1959 Economic Report of the President. 86th! Congress, 1st Session, Pursuant to Sec. 5 (a)-of Public Law 30 k. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959-

United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Instrumentation and Automation; Hearings, Subcommittee an Economic Stabilization, 8iith Congress, 2nd Session, December 32, 13, and 14, 1956.

United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Hew Views on Automation; Papers submitted to the Subcommittee on Automation and Energy Resources, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, i 960.

1 263

United States Congress, Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Administered Prices; Hearings, Subcommittee on A ntitrust and Monopoly. Pursuant to S. Res. 57> Parts 2-4, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957*

United States Congress, Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Administered Prices; Hearings, Subcommittee on A ntitrust and Monopoly, Pursuant to S. Res. 231, Parts 9-12, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959*

United States Congressional Record, Vols. 105, 106, 107.

United States Department of Labor. Background Statistics bearing on the Steel Dispute. Bulletin N. S-l, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor, October, 1959-

United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Impact of Automation. BLS Bulletin 1287, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, i 960.

United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour; Steel Industry, 1947-65.. BIS Report 306, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.

United States Department of labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Techno­ logical Trends In Major American Industries. BLS Bulletin 1474, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19 66.

United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Wage Chronology: United States Steel Corporation, 1937-1964. ELS Report 186, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965-

Unit ed States President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1955 -3 D* Eisenhower, 1959*

Newspapers

Baltimore Sun. 1959-1960.

Chicago D aily News. 1959*

Christian Science Monitor. 1959-1960.

Cleveland Plain Dealer. 1959-1960.

New York Herald Tribune. 1959-1960. New York Times. 1959-1960. 26k

Niles Dally Times. 1959-1960.

Hiiladelphia Inquirer. 1959-1960.

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 1959-1960.

Pittsburgh Press. 1959-1960.

San F ran cisco C hronicle. 1959*

The Evening Star (Washington). 1959-1960.

The Milwaukee Jo u rn a l. 1959-1960.

The Washington Kiplinger Newsletter. 1959-1960.

United States News and World Report. 1959-1960.

Wall Street Journal. 1959-1960.

Washington Post. 1959-1960.

Youngstown Vindicator. 1959-1960.

Books and Dissertations

Adams, Leonard P. and Aronson, Robert L. Workers and Industrial Change: A Case Study of Labor Mobility. New York: Cornell TTnivgpRity, 1957- Auerbach, Jerold S. American Labor: The Twentieth Century. New York: The B obbs-M errill Company, I n c ., 1969•

Bakke, E. W., Kerr, Clark, Anrod, Charles W. Unions, Management, and the Public. New York: Hare our t, Brace and Company, I960.

Banks, Olive. The Attitudes of Steelworkers to Technical. Change. London: Liverpool Uhiversity Press, i 960.

Bar bash, Jack. American Unions: Structure, Government, and Politics. New York: Random House, 1967.

Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology. New York: The Free Press, i 960.

Bell, Daniel, Work and Its Discontents. Boston: Beacon Press ^ 1956. 265

Bernstein,. Irving, Enarson, Harold L., Fleming, R. W. Emergency Dis­ putes and Rational Policy. New York: Harper and Brothers Pub­ l is h e r s , 1955 -

Bernstein, Irving. Turbulent Years. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Com­ pany, 1971.

Bernstein, Irving. She Lean Years. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, I960.

Blough, Roger M. Free Man and the Corporation. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, I n c ., 1959*

Brody, David. Labor In Crisis: ihe Steel Strike of 1919. New York: J . B. L ip p in co tt Company, 1965.

Brody, David. Steelworkers in America. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, i9 60.

Brooks, Robert R. As Steel Goes... Unionism in a Basic industry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^0. * Brooks,'Obamas R. Toil and Trouble: A History of American Labor. New York: D elacorte E ress, 1971* i Broude, Henry W. S te e l D ecisions and th e N ational Economy. New Haven: Yale University Eress, 1963*

Buckingham, Walter. Automation: Its Impact on Business end People. New York: Harper, 1961.

* Caples, William G. A Management View of Employment Problems in the Steel Industry for the Next Decade. Champaign: University of Illinois, 1964.

Childs, Marquis. Eisenhower: Captive Hero. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956.

Cullen, Donald E. National Emergency Strikes. Ithaca: Cornell University, 19SEI

Davey, Harold W. Contemporary Collective Bargaining. New Jersey: P re n tic e -H a ll, I n c ., 1959*

Derber, Milton, end Young, Edwin. Labor and the New Deal. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957* 266

Diebold, John. Automation: Its Impact on Business and Labor. Washing­ ton: National Planning Association, 1959*

Drucker, Peter F. America's Next Twenty Years. New York: Harper, 1957* Dubofsky, Melvyn (ed). American Labor Since the New Deal. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971*

Dulles, Foster Rhea. Labor in America, A History. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19^9*

Galbraith, John. American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. Boston: Houghton and M ifflin Co., Inc., 1956.

Galbraith, John. The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958.

Galbraith, John, Tie New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin C o., 1967.

Ginzberg, Eli. Technology and Social Change. New York: Columbia University Eress, 1964.

Golden, Clinton and Ruttenberg, Harold. Dynamics of industrial Demo­ cracy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 191*2 .

Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade. New York: Vintage Books, i 960.

Galenson, Walter. The CIO Challenge to the AFL, A History of the American Labor Movement 1935-19^-1. Cambridge: Harvard U n iv e rsity Eress, 195(1

Hacker, Andrew (ed.). The Corporation Takeover. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 196k.

Hacker, Andrew (ed.). The End of the American Era. New York: Atheneum. 1970.

Herling, John. Right to Challenge: People and Power In the Steel­ workers Union. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972.

Herling, John. Labor Unions in America. Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 19(&. Hoopes, Roy. Pie Steel C risis. New York: John Day Coi,1963 . 267

Kelly, George and Beachler, E. Man of Steel: The Story of David J. McDonald. New York: N orth American Book C o., 195^*

Kerr, Clark, Dunlap, John T., Harbison, Frederick, and Myers, A. Industrialism and Industrial Man. Cambridge: Harvard University E ress, i 960.

Kirsh, Benjamins. Automation and Collective Bargaining. New York: C en tral Book Company, 196^.

Lekachman, R obert. The Age o f Keynes. New York: Random House, 1966.

Lens, Sidney. The Crisis of American Labor. New York: Sagamore Eress, In c;., 1959.

Lester, Richard A. As Unions Mature. New Jersey: Erinceton University • Eress, 1958.

Lester, Richard A. Labor: Readings on Major Issues. New York: Random House, 1965.

Lipset, Seymour M., Trow, Martin A., Coleman, James S. Union Democracy. New York: Doubleday and Company, I n c ., 1956.

Livemash, Edward Robert. Collective Bargaining In the Basic Steel Industry. Washington: United States Department of Labor ^”1961.

Lube 11, Samuel. Revolt of the Moderates. New York: Harper and Brothers, 195^

McConnell, Grant. Steel and the Presidency, 1962. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, I n c ., 195J!

McDonald, David J. Union Man. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1969. McManus, George. The Inside Story of Steel: Wages and Prices, 1959- 1 9 6 7. New York: C hilton Book Company, 1 9 6 7!

Mee, John F. “a History of Twentieth Century Management Thought,” unpub­ lished Hl.D. dissertation, Department of Business Organization, 1959. M illes, Harry A. (ed.). How Collective Bargaining Works. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 19^2.

• M ills , c. Wright. Ihe New Men of Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19^8". 268

M ills, G. Wright. White Collar. New York: Oxford University Eress, 1956.

Nourse, Edwin G. The 1950’s Come F irst. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.

PeHing, Henry. American Labor. Chicago: The University of Chicago E ress, i 960.

Perlman, Selig and Taft, Philip. History of Labor in the United States 1896-1932, Vol. Labor Movements. New York: Macmillan, 1935*

Pierson, Frank C. Unions in Postwar America: An Economic Assessment. New' York: Random House, 1967.

Power, Luke, Sackman, Samuel H., Walsh, Eugene A. Crisis In Bargaining? Niagara Falls: Niagara University Eress, 1969.

Randall, Clarence B. A Creed for Free Enterprise. Boston: Little Brown and C o., 1952.

Randall, Calrence B. Freedom's Faith. Boston: Little Brown and Co. » 1953- Randle, Wilson C., Wort man, Max: S. Collective Bargaining: Principles and P ra c tic e s . Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1966.

Ray back, Joseph G. A History of American Labor. New York: Qhe Mac­ m illan Company, 19 &k

Rowan, Richard L. and Northrup, Herbert R. (ed.). Readings in Labor Economics and Labor Relations. Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Lac. , i m : ------

Samuels on, Paul A. Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955.

Slichter, Summer and Livernash, Robert E. The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management. Washington, B.C.: Brookings Institute, 195CL

Smith, Richard Austin. Corporations In Crisis. New York: Double day and Company, I n c ., 1963.

S of chalk, Donald G. "ihe Little Steel Strike of 1973 j ” unpublished Ha. D. dissertation, Department of History, Ohio State University, 1 9 6 1. 269 Stieber,. Jack. The Steel Industry Wage Structure: A Study of the Joint Union-Management Job Evaluation Program in the Basic Steel Indus­ try. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959*

Sweeney, Vincent D. The United Steelworkers of America Twenty Years Later, 1936-1956. Indianapolis: Allied Printing, no date of publication.

Taft, Ehilip. The^ A. of L. Prom the Death of Gompers to the Merger. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959*

Taylor, Allan (ed.). What Eisenhower Thinks. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952 *

Tilove, Robert. Collective Bargaining in the Steel Industry. Phila­ delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949.

Torrence, George W. Management 1 s R ight t o Manage. Washington: BNA Boots, 1959-

Ulman, Lloyd. The Government of the Steelworker* s Union. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952.

V a tte r, Harold G. The U.S. Economy in th e 1950*8. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, I n c ., 1963.

Vexler, Robert (ed.). Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1890-1969- New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 197°.

Walker, Charles R. Toward the Automatic Factory: A Case Study of Men and Machines. New Haven: Yale University Eress, 1957^

Walton, Scott D. Business In American History. Columbus: Grid, Inc. , 1971.

W idick, B. J . Labor Today. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1964.

Contemporary Articles

A bel, I . W. “What Does Management Want?” I^_ U. D. D igest, 4 (W inter, 1959), 14-22.

“About $24.00 A Day Plus B e n e fits .” The Commonweal, 70 (May 22. 1959). 215.

“Ad Battle of Steel institute, Steelworkers Itoion Near End as Contract Talks Approach.” Advertising Age, 30 (April 20, 1959), 168. 270

“Ad Men See New Threat To Advertising If Steel Strike Passes the Fifth Week.” Printer's Ink, 268 (August 14, 1959)? 11-12.

“Ads Play Key Role In Steel Pay Dispute As Contract Time Nears.” Printer's Ink, 267 (April 3? 1959), 13-

“Adversaries in Steel Fight It Out in Advertisements.” Business Week, No. 1553-1556 (June 6, 1959)? 24-26.

“As Steelworkers See It After ll6 Work Days Lost. ” United States News and World Report, 48 (January 1 8, I960), 40-48.

“An Exchange o f Views; 1 - R epublic S te e l A ds.” The Commonweal, 70 (June 5, 1959)? 256-257.

Anderson, Robert B. “There Is No Need for Inflation.” Vital Speeches, 25 (June 1, 1959), 482-485.

Ascoli, Max. “Must We Have Compulsory Arbitration?” The Reporter, 21 . (November 12, 1959).

Ascoli, Max. “Die Lesson.” ifae Reporter, 22 (February 4, i 960).

“Aspirin far Steel.” Time, 74- (November 16, 1959)? 28.

“Automation, of Course; but How Far, How Fast?” Steel (July 4, i 960) , pp. 6 8- 71.

“Automation and Jobs.” Steel (September 4, 1961), pp. 53-92.

“Autos Postpone Ads Due to Steel Strike. ” Editor and Publisher, 92 (November 28, 1959)? 26.

“Back to Work.” Time, 74 (November 16, 1959)? 104.

Backman, Jules, “impact of Collective Bargaining on the Course of our Economy." ihe Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 191 (March 24, 1960) , 1273? 1298-1299.

Backman, Jules, “inflation: How Great the Danger?” Nation's Business, 47 (December, 1958)? 34-35? 88-90.

Backman, Jules. “New Inflation Weapon In Sight.” Nation's Business, 47 (March, 1959), 38-39? IOO-IO 3.

Backman, Jules, "ihe Size of Crews.” Labor Law Journal, 12 (September, 1961) , 805-8 1 5 . Backman, Jules. “What Comes After the Steel Strike?” Nation’s Business, 47 (September, 1959), 33-35, kLO. 271

Backman, Jules. “Where Prices Go From Here,” nation's Business, 47 (July, 1959), 29-30, 68.

Bar bash, Jack. “Automation and Collective Bargaining.” Pie American Federationlst, 64 (June, 1957), 1 8-1 9.

Barbash, Jack. “Union Response to the Hard Line.” Industrial Relations, 1 (October, 1961) , 25-58.

“Bargaining has not failed.” Nation's Business, 47 (September, 1959), 112.

Barkin, Solomon. ffacre Implications of Automation.” I. U. D. Digest, 4 (Fan, 1959), 115-123.

Bell, Daniel. “Living with Automation; A Look Ahead. ” Management Review, k6 (January, 1957), 75-83.

Bell, Daniel.' "The Subversion of Collective Bargaining." Commentary, 29 (March, i960), 185-197*

Bernstein, Irving. “The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960.” Labor History, 2 (Spring, 1961), 131-157*

^Beyond the Strike.” New Republic, l4 l (October 26, 1959), 3“^*

“Big Steel and Union Warm up for Crucial Bargaining.” Business Week, No. 1548-1552 (May 2, 1959), 22-24.

“Big'Steel's New Negotiator.” Fortune, 59 (March, 1959), 192.

Bloch, Joseph W. “The Ohird Biennial Convention of the AFL-CIO.” Monthly Labor Review, 82 (November, 1959), 1206-1210.

Bio ugh, Roger M. “Aftermath In Steel.” The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 191 (February 4, i 960), 565-586^

Blough, Roger M. “A Tale of Two Towns.” The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 187 (May 22, 0958), 2290, 2304-2305.

Blough, Roger M. “Price and the Public Interest. ” Vital Speeches, 25 (September 2 5 , 1958), 54-58.

Blough, Roger M. “The Steel Industry and A Billion Dollar Bundle.” The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 189 (March 12, 1959), 1189, 0212-1213. 2T2

Blum, Albert A. "Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality?” Harvard Business Review, 39 (November, December, 1961), 6 3 -6 9.

Blum, Albert A. "why Unions Grow.” Labor History, 9 (Winter, 1968), 39-72.

"But S te e l’s S to ry i s Hard to T e ll.” B usiness Week, No. 1570-1574 (October 24, 1959), 2 5 -3 0 .

Borges an, Roger D. "Collective Bargaining Today.” Personnel Journal, 38 (April, I960), 1)06-412.

Bridges, Francis J ., Marshall A. R., Crawford, James F ., and O'Connor, Roderick F. "A Symposium: The Kaiser Steel Settlement: Its Significance in the Present Steel Crisis. ” Atlantic Economic Review, 10 (January, i 960) , 3-9-

Brooks, Thomas. "Displaced Workers.” Challenge (January, i 960) , 18-22.

Brooks, Thomas. "U. S. Labor on the D efensiv e.” Bae New Leader, 42 (August 31, 1959), 9-10.

Buckingham, Walter. "The Human Side of Automation.” Personnel Adminis­ trator (May/June, 1961), 1-2FF.

Buehler, Alfred G. "The Problem of Inflation.” The Annuals of the American Academy, 326 (November, 1959), 1-10.

"Car Ads Canceled During Steel Strike Lost, Gone Forever.” Advertising Age, 30 (December 7, 1959), 2, 217-

"Car-Ad Cut Bite Deeper As Steel Strike Goes On.” Printer's Ink, 269 (November 6 , 1959), 15*

Carey, James B. "Organized Labor In Politics. ” The Annuals of the American Academy, 319 (September, 1958), 53-527

"Churches Score Eress Steel Strike Report.” Editor and Publisher, 93 (December 3 , I9 6 0 ), 12.

Clague, Evan. "Social and Economic Aspects of Automation.” Labor Law Jo u rn a l, 12 (Septem ber, 1961), 795-810.^

Clague, Evan. "The Economic Climate of Collective Bargaining.” Monthly Labor Review, 83 (August, I960), 837-840.

"Collective Bargaining—Big Steel Passes a Big Test.” Newsweek, 62 (July 1, 1963), 51-52. 275 “C ontroversy Over S t e e l .” The Commonweal, 70 (June 26, 1959)? 515-516.

“Crazy, Mixed-Up Strike, Man.” National Review, 8 (June 18, I960), 385.

Cushing, Richard C. “Collective Bargaining at the Crossroads.” Vital Speeches, 26 (June 1, i 960), if97-5°0.

Cushman, Edward L. 'Management’s Adjustment to Change.” Monthly labor Review, 86 (June, 1965)? 63O-634 .

Davis, Louis E. “The Effects of Automation on Job Design.” Industrial Relations, 2 (October, 1962), 53-71-

Davis, William H. “should Labor Be Coerced?” Nation, 189 (November 21, 1959)? 571-575- Day, Virgil B. “Objectivity In Bargaining with Unions.” Advanced Management, 2k (March, 19^9)> 7-H-

Berber, Milton. “Steel Strike Complicates 20 Years of Progress in Labor Relations. ” New York State Department Labor Industrial B u lle tin , 38 (November, 1959)>”-208, 16-24.

Berber, Milton, Chalmers, W. E ., Edelman, Milton T., “Union Participa­ tion in Plant Decision-Making. ” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 15 (1961-1962), 8 3-101.

“Do Steelworkers Want a Strike?” United States News and World Report, lf6 (May 1 8, 1959)? ^ -^ 8.

Dub in, Robert. “A Theory of Conflict and Power in Union-Management Relations.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 13 (July, I960), 5OI-518:

Diebold, John. “Automation: Its Impact on Business and Labor. ” Looking Ahead, 7 (June, 1959)? 1-6*

“Don Vs. Dave.” Newsweek, 55 (February 15 , I9 6 0 ), 77.

Downing, Thomas G. 'Strategy and Tactics at the Bargaining Table.” Personnel, 37 (January-February, i 960) , 58-6 if.

Drucker, Peter F. '^Recess ion -Proof Your Company." Nation’s Business, k7 (January, 1959)? 31-33? 8 6-88.

Dub in, Robert. “A Theory of Conflict and Power in Union-Management Relations. ” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 13 (July, I 960), 507-515. 2jk

Dunlap, John T., Ginzberg, E li, Meyers, Frederick, Rezler, Julius, Troy, Leo. "Comments: B e rn ste in 's Growth o f American unions, 1945- 1960.” Labor History, 2 (Pall, 1961), 36I- 38O.

Duscha, Julius, “Steel and Taft-Hartley.” New Leader, 42 (October 2 6, 1959)3 3 -*. Duscha, Julius. "Supreme Court's Steel Strike Decision Dims Hopes for Taft-IIortley Revision.” New Leader, 42 (November 2J, 1959 )3 9-10*

Egloff, Majorie C. "A Look at American Labor in 1959* ” Monthly Labor Review, 83 (January, I960), 10-17.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Shall the People Govern?” V ital Speeches, 25 (September 1, 1959)? 674-675*

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "The Sound Dollar.” V ital Speeches, 2 5 , (Ju ly 15, 1959 )3 578-579*

Engberg, Edward. “The Real Crisis in Steel. ” The New Leader, 42 (November 9, 195 9) 3 607.

Ershun, Joseph. "Death of a Steelworker.” Nation, 190 (January 16, I960), 50-52.

Erskine, Hazel Gaudet. "The Polls: Attitudes Toward Organized Labor.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Summer, 1962), 285-296.

'Ethics or Carpenters?” Fortune, 59 (January, 1959)? 157*

'^Example fo r S te e l.” Pie Econom ist, 193 (December 12, 1959)? 1064. fa s t Comeback in Steel.” Time, 74 (November 2 5 , 1959)? 94. featherbedding Kurts You.” Nation's Business, 47 (November? 1959)? 40-41, 79-81. fig h t It Out in Advertisements.” Business Week (June 6, 1959)? 25-26.

"1959 Forum on Technical Progress; Drives and Controls.” Steel (Janu­ a ry 5 , 195 9)3 285-286 FF.

G ates, Ward. "As th e S te e l In d u stry Makes a Stand. ” Pie Magazine of - Wald- Street, 104 (September 12, 1959), 695-698 , 732-733*

Gelman, Norman I. "Public Intervention in Labor Disputes.” Editorial Research Reports, 1 (February 18, 1959)? 125-142. 275 "Gloves Off In New Fight cn Inflation.” Editor and Publisher, 92 (April 25, 1959), 28.

Goldberg, Arthur J. "Challenge of Industrial Revolution II.” New York Times Magazine (April 2, 1961), 11 pp.

Goldberg, Arthur J. "Collective Bargaining. ” Commentary, yo (Ju ly , I 960) , 6 O-6 5 .

Goldberg, Arthur J. Management's Reserved Rights Under Collective Bargaining: A Labor O fficial's View.” Monthly Labor Review, 79 (October, 1956), 1172-1174.

Golden, Clinton S. "Collective Bargaining and Economic Progress.” Looking Ahead, 7 (November, 1959), 5-8.

Gamberg, William, "Dae Work Rule Problem and Property Rights in the Job.” Monthly Labor Review, 84 (June, 196 1), 595-596.

Gamberg, W illiam. "The Work Rules and Work P ra c tic e s Problem .” Indus­ tria l Relations Research Association Proceedings, 1961, 643-654.

Griffin, Robert P. "labor-Management Legislation.” Vital Speeches, 26 (December 1, 1959), 113-118.

Havas, Eugene. "The Consumer in the Steel Vice.” Nation, 188 (June 6 , 1959), 510-512.

H azlitt, Henry. Mobody Wins a Strike.” Newsweek, 54 (August 17, 1959), 80.

H azlitt, Henry. "On Not Interfering.” Newsweek, 54 (August 3, 1959), 6 7.

H azlitt, Henry. Mhy a Steel Strike?” Newsweek, 54 (July 2 7, 1959), 78.

Hoffman, Shirley S. "Perspective on the Steel Strike.” National Industrial Conference Board (Business Record), 16 (December, 1959), 557-559, 565:

Harvitz, Wayne L. "The Crisis in Collective Bargaining.” Personnel, 36 (November/December, 1959), 16-24.

Mow Steel Terms Involve You.” Life, 47 (September 7, 1959), 43.

Mow Steelworkers Feel Now About the Strike. ” United States News and World Report, 47 (October 12, 1959), 44-W. 276

‘few Well Off Are Steelworkers?” Harper, 218 (June 1, 1959), 28.

‘few W ell Off Are S teelw orkers?” The Commonweal, 70 (June 19, 1959), 512 .

“if the President Wants to Act.” National Review, 7 (September 26, 1959), 551-352.

“Impact of the Steel Strike on Business in Cleveland.” Monthly Business Review (November, 1959), 10-11.

“in the Wake of the Steel Agreement.” America, 102 (January 23, I960), k9X~k92.

“inflation Is a Moral Problem.” Nation's Business, if 6 (October, 1958), 1 10.

“i n f la tio n —j u s t an In d ian G iv e r.” The Commonweal, 70 (A p ril 2k, 1959).

“inflation Stop It.” Harper, 218 (April 1, 1959), 26.

“is Automation the Steel Strike Jinx?” The Christian Century, 76 (November if, 1959), 127*

“issues Left Hanging in the Steel Strike. ” Die Christian Century, 76 (November 18, 1959), 1331)--

" it Hasn't Been Tried.” Newsweek, 5^ (November 2, 1959), 90.

“it's Probable: A Steel Strike.” National Review, 7 (May 23, 1959), 70-71.

Janssen, Richard F. ‘faore Companies Teach Men New Skills, Ease Impact of Automat ion.” Wall. Street Journal. (August 2 3 , 1961), Iff.

Justin, Jules J. “Preserving Management’s Rights At the Bargaining Table.” Personnel, 36 (November/December, 1959), if2-51.

“Kaiser Settles with the Union but Big Steel Continues Battle.” Life, if7 (November 9 , 1959), 35-38,

Kassalow, Everett M. “Formula for industrial Progress.” I. U. D. Digest, 5 (Winter, I960), 79-88.

“Labor, Management, and the 1 P u b lic .” Commonweal, 72 (September 16, 1960), 495-^96. 277

“Labor: Same S tory, New L o ca le ." Newsweek, $k (August 3; 1959); 57*

"Labor's Arms In Adjusting to the New Technology.” Monthly Labor Review, 82 (February, 1959); 160- 165 .

Larry, R. Heath, "industrial Relations for the Future. ” Vital Speeches, 27 (January, 1961), 176- 181.

Larry, R. Heath. "The Anatomy of the Crisis in the Steel Industry. ” The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 190 (December 2k, 1959); 21-23.

Lasser, David, 'tabor Viewpoint on Collective Bargaining. ” Advanced Management, 2k (August, 1959); 12-15, 19, 26.

Lekachman, Robert. “Lessons of the Steel Strike. ” New Leader, if3 (February 15; I960), 9-12.

Livingston, J. A. "Blough 1 s Aim in Steel Strike; To Regain Lost Prero­ gatives.” Interview reported in: The Business Outlook, Phila­ delphia Evening B ulletin, September 8, 9; 1959*

Livingston, John W. “The Transitional World of the White-Collar. ” The American Federatlonist, 68 (March, 1961), 6-9*

Lunden, Leon E. 'the 10th Constitutional Convention of the Steelworkers.” Monthly Labor Review, 83 (December, i 960), 1296-1300.

'fajor Advertisers, Undaunted by Steel Strike, Stick With Planned Ad Budget Down the Line.” Printer 1 s Ink, 269 (October 9; 1959); 15.

'taking Personnel Practices and Programs Pay Off. ” Personnel Series, No. 151 (February 16-18, 1953), 3 - 60.

Masse, Benjamin L. '^Economic Statesmanship In Steel. ” America, 101 (June 6 , 1959); ^-Olf.

McIntyre, William R. “Automation and Jobs.” Editorial Research Reports, 1 (June 3; 1959); 403-if20.

McIntyre, William, R. 'featherbedding and Union Work Rules. ” Editorial Research Reports, 2 (November k, 1959); 815-822.

Meany, George. “Labor's Legislation Program.” Vital Speeches, 25 (March 2, 1959); 571-373.

Meany, George. “What Would Labor Do About Inflation?” The Annuals of the American Academy, 326 (November, 1959); 32-39* 2 7 8

Meyer, Arthur, S. 'function of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining. ” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 15 (January, i 960), 159- 165 .

“Miscalculation in Steel.” The Economist, 195 (October 17, 1959), 257-258.

Mitchell, James P. Strikes Are not Inevitable.” Readers Digest, 77 (August, i 960), 91-95.

Mitchell, James P. “The Steel Strike Settlement. ” Vital Speeches, 26 (February 1, i 960), 231-255.

Moore, Philip D. "Criticism and Comment.” Industrial Relations, 2 (October, 1962), 101-102.

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