Administration Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-12351-9 — Regulating Government Ethics Chonghao Wu Index More Information

INDEX

Administration Supervision Law of the CCP. See Chinese Communist Party People’s Republic of China, Central Commission for Discipline 91–92 Inspection (CCDI), 174, 198, administrative law, corruption under, 207, 210–211, 214–215, 219, 4 221, 225, 234, 238 Anti-Corruption Law, in China, 7–8 Cheng Xitong, 31 anti-corruption laws, 23 China, corruption in, 1–3. See also anti-corruption strategies Chinese Communist Party CCP and, 49–61 Administration Supervision Law of through political campaigns, the People’s Republic of China, 58–60 91–92 in China, 238–240 Anti-Corruption Law in, 7–8 enforcement strategies and, 192 anti-corruption strategies, 238–240 NIS theory, 2–3 average salaries in, 227–228 Norad study on, 2 bribery, 96 in the Philippines, 17 Civil Servant Law of the People’s regulation systems for corruption Republic of China, 91–92, 94 compared to, 22–49 compared to other countries, 14 types of approaches, 2–3 conflict of interest and, 93–102 appearance of influence peddling, 75, private gain from information, 77–78 99–102 profiting from official position, Before the Gates of Hell: Conversations 99–102, 122–123 with Li Zhen before his self-dealing as, 93–96, 120–122 Execution (Qiao Yunhua), third-party assistance, 98–99 38–46 transfer of economic value as, behaviour changing mechanisms, in 96–98 regulatory systems, 22 Criminal Law of the People’s behaviour manipulation tactics, in Republic of China 1977, ethics enforcement, 163–169 91–92 bias, by judges, 81–82 criminalization of, 5–6, 14 Bo Xilai, 239 death penalty for, 26–27 bribery, in China, 96 DICs and, 10–11 behaviour manipulation tactics of, Cai Bin, 181–182, 208, 212 213–215 CCDI. See Central Commission for CCP and, 61 Discipline Inspection educational programmes, 214–215

290

index 291

enforcement strategies through, government ethics and, 9–10 174–191, 215–218 appearance of corruption and, ethics cases and, 181–182, 123–124 185–186 compared to other nations, 12–13 information gathering tactics of, DICs, 10–11 211–213 enforcement strategies for, interview questions for, 256–262 173–218 political education functions of, for favouritism, 104 176–177 for financial disclosure Property Uncle case and, 181–182 regulations, 107–111 supervisory offices, 205–206, future implications for, 127–130 216–217 government regulations for, 92 economic gains from, 30 for influence peddling, 103–104 enforcement strategies in, for legislative technique for, 233 government ethics, 173–229 nonexistent aspects of, 128 through anti-corruption bureaus, for outside employment and 192 activities, 112–114 behaviour manipulation tactics in, patterns of, 118–127 213–215 rule-making technique group, compliance-oriented, 199–211 128–130 deterrence-oriented, 202 rules for, 10, 91–130 by DICs, 174–191, 215–218, rules reform for, 233–234 234–235 unjustified restrictions for, through formal contracts, 174 114–118 through government agencies, value transfer and, 232–233 173–196 weak aspects of, 128–129 through information gathering, guanxi compared to, 47–48 211–213 influence peddling and, 103–104 interpretation of rules in, 210–211 by judges, 105–106 legal power and responsibilities of, Judges Law of the People’s Republic 196–199 of China, 91–92 in military system, 226 magnitude of, 28 through ministry/bureau of movement from minor deviances to, supervision, 191–192 29–44 through National Bureau of probability of, 29–31 Corruption Prevention, prosecution of, 1 192–196 public ethics regulation in, 5–6 in procuratorates, 192 punishment for, 36 regulatory regime development, death penalty as, 26–27 227–229 magnitude of, 28 resources for, 215–218 probability of, 29–31 styles of, 199–211 sanction magnitude in, 28 violation recognition in, 207–208 regulatory approach to, 11, 14, through whistleblowing, 201 16–22, 61–62, 102–107 work performance assessment as complementary, 22–24 method, 202–203 government as self-regulating, 16 favouritism of political parties, methods of, 17 104–105 as necessary, 22–24

292 index

China, corruption in (cont.) Civil Service Code, in Hong Kong, parameters of, 16 126 for public bodies, 17 Civil Service Code, in UK, 34, 65, restrictions for, 16 126–127, 137–138 reporting rates of, 27–28 Civil Service Commission, in UK, research on, 236–238, 240–241 138–140. See also enforcement, methodology of, 242–243 of government ethics sanction magnitude of, 28 clean plate campaign, 215 Chinalawinfo,92 Commission on Civil Rights, 65 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Commodity Futures Trading anti-corruption approaches of, 49–61 Commission, 65 through political campaigns, compliance-oriented enforcement 58–60 strategies, 143–144, 147–152, corruption within, 1 154–156 criminal approach against, 57–60 in China, 199–211 rates of, 59 conflict of interest regulatory approach against, in China, 93–102 60–61 private gain from information, ruling legitimacy influenced by, 99–102 54, 57–60 profiting from official position, DICs and, 61 99–102, 122–123 economic growth as influence on, 53 self-dealing as, 93–96, 120–122 government ethics rules, 92 self-dealing by public officials, private gain from information 93–96, 120–122 under, 99–102 third-party assistance, 98–99 profiting from official position transfer of economic value, under, 99–102 96–99 self-dealing by public officials transfer of economic value as, under, 93–96 96–98 third-party assistance under, by political position, 69 98–99 principles of, 66–68 transfer of economic value under, private gain from information as, 96–98 66–67, 99–102 Great Leap Forward and, 52–53 private party assistance as, 66–67, historical development of, 49–52 72–73, 98–99 Marxism and, 50 profiting from official position as official ideologies of, 52–53 result of, 66–67, 69, 73–74 ruling legitimacy of, 49–61 regulation of, by country, 66–74 corruption as influence on, 54, self-dealing by public officials as, 57–60 66–69 moral justification of, 56 transfer of economic value as, 66–67, utilitarian justification of, 56 69–72 Three Represents and, 51–52 values identification in, 66 Civil Servant Law of the People’s corruption. See also anti-corruption Republic of China, 91–92, 94 strategies; China, corruption in Civil Service Bureau (CSB), in Hong under administrative law, 4 Kong, 138–139, 171–173. within CCP, 1 See also enforcement, of criminal approach against, 57–60 government ethics rates of, 59

index 293

regulatory approach against, within CCP, 60–61 60–61 in China, 11, 14, 16–22, 61–62, ruling legitimacy influenced by, 102–107 54, 57–60 as complementary, 22–24 consequences of, 1–2 criminal approach in anti- under criminal law, 4, 21–22 corruption compared to, 22–49 improvement strategies for, 25–32 development of, 32–37 favouritism as government as self-regulating, 16 in Hong Kong, 76, 78–123 methods of, 17 in UK, 76, 78–123 as necessary, 22–24 in US, 76, 78–123 parameters of, 16 in Hong Kong, 1 for public bodies, 17 appearance of influence peddling restrictions for, 16 as, 75, 77–78 sanction magnitude for, 25–26 favouritism in appointment as, 76, in Singapore, 1 78–123 in Sweden, 1 favouritism of political parties as, traditional acts of, 20–21 76, 78–79 in UK through judicial impropriety, 76, appearance of influence peddling 79–82 as, 75, 77–78 regulating appearance of, 74–82 favouritism in appointment as, 76, judges and 78–123 appearance of bias by, 81–82 favouritism of political parties as, appearance of influence peddling 76, 78–79 by, 75, 77–78 through judicial impropriety, 76, in Hong Kong, 79–82 79–82 improper acts by, 79–80 regulating appearance of, 74–82 improper statements by, 80–81 in US impropriety by, 76, 79–82 appearance of influence peddling in UK, 79–82 as, 75, 77–78 in US, 79–82 favouritism in appointment as, 76, through maladministration, 37–49 78–123 through misconduct, 37–49 favouritism of political parties as, in New Zealand, 1 76, 78–79 nonmonetary gains from, 31 through judicial impropriety, 76, public ethics regulation and, 4–5 79–82 punishment for, 25–28 regulating appearance of, 74–82 death penalty as, 26–27 Corruption Perception Index, 23, 129 economic sanctions as, 27 criminal law, corruption under, 4, imprisonment as, 26–27 21–22 magnitude of, 25 improvement strategies for, 25–32 probability of, 25–26 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic sanction magnitude, 25–26 of China 1977, 91–92 seriousness of, 26–27 CSB. See Civil Service Bureau reduced economic investment from, 230 DAEO. See Designated Agency Ethics regulation systems for Official anti-corruption strategies Dai Xuemin, 239 compared to, 22–49 Deng Xiaoping, 50–51

294 index

Designated Agency Ethics Official compliance-oriented, 199–211 (DAEO), in US, 139–140. deterrence-oriented strategies, 202 See also enforcement, of by DICs, 174–191, 215–218, government ethics 234–235 deterrence-oriented enforcement through formal contracts, 174 strategies, 148, 154–156 through government agencies, in China, 202 173–196 DICs. See Discipline Inspection through information gathering, Committees 211–213 Ding Yuling, 57–58 interpretation of rules in, 210–211 Discipline Inspection Committees legal power and responsibilities of, (DICs), 10–11 196–199 behaviour manipulation tactics of, in military system, 226 213–215 through ministry/bureau of CCP and, 61 supervision, 191–192 educational programmes, 214–215 through National Bureau of enforcement strategies through, Corruption Prevention, 174–191, 215–218, 234–235 192–196 ethics cases and, 181–182, 185 in procuratorates, 192 by district, 186 regulatory regime development, information gathering tactics of, 227–229 211–213 resources for, 215–218 interview questions for, 256–262 styles of, 199–211 political education functions of, violation recognition in, 207–208 176–177 through whistleblowing, 201 Property Uncle case and, 181–182 work performance assessment supervisory offices, 205–206, method, 202–203 216–217 collaboration as part of, 146 discipline-oriented enforcement common features of, 171–173 strategies, 152–154 compliance-oriented, 143–144, disclosure regulations. See financial 147–152, 154–156 disclosure regulations deterrence-oriented, 148, 154–156 dimensions of, 132–133 employment. See outside employment discipline-oriented, 152–154 and activities educational programmes in, 167–169 enforcement, of government ethics. See efficacy of, 156–157 also Hong Kong; United through financial disclosure forms, Kingdom; United States 135–162 advisory opinions on, 164–167 information gathering tactics, agencies for, 134–142 160–163, 211–213 behaviour manipulation tactics, investigatory powers in, 142–143 163–169 law making powers as result of, through cases and claims, 163 144–146 in China, 173–229 legal authorities for, 142–146 through anti-corruption bureaus, purpose of, 133 192 resource allocation for, 169–171 behaviour manipulation tactics in, response to violations, 155–156 213–215 responsibilities of, 142–146

index 295

rule interpretation in, 157–158 DICs, 10–11 styles of, 146–159 for favouritism, 104 through whistleblowers, 162–163 for financial disclosure ethics. See also corruption; public regulations, 107–111 ethics; regulatory systems, for future implications for, 127–130 government ethics government regulations for, codes of, 18–19 92 in criminal law, 20 for influence peddling, 103–104 defined, 18 key issues for, 252–255 maladministration and, 20 legislative technique for, 233 misconduct and, 20 nonexistent aspects of, 128 for outside employment and favouritism activities, 112–114 in China patterns of, 118–127 government ethics and, 104 rule-making technique group, for political parties, 104–105 128–130 as corruption rules for, 10, 91–130 in Hong Kong, 76, 78–123 rules reform for, 233–234 in UK, 76, 78–123 unjustified restrictions for, in US, 76, 78–123 114–118 of political parties value transfer and, 232–233 in China, 104–105 weak aspects of, 128–129 in Hong Kong, 76, 78–79 codes of, 126 in UK, 76, 78–79 conflict of interest and in US, 76, 78–79 in China, 93–102 Federal Reserve System, 65 by political position, 69 financial disclosure regulations principles of, 66–68 in China, 107–111 private gain from information as, items for, 110–111 66–67 reporting rank as influence on, private party assistance as, 66–67, 108–109 72–73 for state officials, 107–108 profiting from official position as government ethics and, 82–85 result of, 66–67, 69, 73–74 for nonsenior officials, 84–85 regulation of, by country, 66–74 for senior officials, 83–84 self-dealing by public officials as, Fong, Phyllis, 33 66–69 Fox, Liam, 171–172 transfer of economic value as, 66–67, 69–72 government ethics. See also values identification in, 66 enforcement; Hong Kong; for financial disclosure regulations, public ethics; regulatory 82–85 systems, for government ethics; for outside employment and United Kingdom; United States activities, 85–88 in China, 9–10 patterns for, 88–91, 232 appearance of corruption and, private gain from information and, 123–124 66–67 CCP rules for, 92 private party assistance and, 66–67, compared to other nations, 12–13 72–73

296 index

government ethics (cont.) discipline-oriented, 152–154 profiting from official position, educational programmes in, 66–67, 69, 73–74 167–169 regulation of, 230–232 efficacy of, 156–157 development of, 3–6 through financial disclosure research on, 8–9 forms, 135–162 self-dealing by public officials, 66–69 through ICAC, 23, 135 Standards of Ethical Conduct for information gathering tactics, Employees of the Executive 160–163 Branch, 105 investigatory powers in, 142–143 transfer of economic value and, law making powers as result of, 66–67, 69–72 144–146 Government ethics, in China, rules for, legal authorities for, 142–146 10, 91–130 through Political Appointment Great Leap Forward, 52–53 System, 137 guanxi (personal government resource allocation for, 169–171 connections), 47–48 response to violations, 155–156 Guo Baogang, 56 responsibilities of, 142–146 rule interpretation in, 157–158 He Haichang, 182–185 styles of, 146–159 He Tao, 57–58 through whistleblowers, 162–163 Heywood, Paul, 34 government ethics in, 64–88 Hong Kong codes of, 126 anti-corruption laws in, 23 compared to China, 12–13 Civil Service Code in, 126 conflict of interest and, regulation corruption in, 1 of, 66–74 appearance of influence peddling for financial disclosure as, 75, 77–78 regulations, 82–85 favouritism in appointment as, 76, key issues for, 244–250 78–123 for outside employment and favouritism of political parties as, activities, 85–88 76, 78–79 patterns for, 88–91 through judicial impropriety, 76, under POBO, 65, 70 79–82 private gain from information, regulating appearance of, 74–82 66–67 enforcement strategies in, for private party assistance and, government ethics, 134–173 66–67, 72–73 advisory opinions on, 164–167 profiting from official position, agencies for, 134–142 66–67, 69, 73–74 behaviour manipulation tactics, self-dealing by public officials, 163–169 66–69 through cases and claims, 163 transfer of economic value and, collaboration as part of, 146 66–67, 69–72 common features of, 171–173 ICAC in, 23, 135, 194–195 compliance-oriented, 143–144, judicial impropriety in, 79–82 147–152, 154–156 public ethics regulation in, 4–5 through CSB, 138–139, 171–173 historical development of, 34–35 deterrence-oriented, 148, 154–156 Hu Jingtao, 52–53, 210

index 297

Independent Commission against Ma Sanshan, 46 Corruption (ICAC), 23, 135, maladministration 194–195 corruption through, 37–49 Independent Parliament Standards defined, 20 Authority (IPSA), 74 Marxism, 50 information military systems, enforcement of ethics in enforcement strategies for in, 226 government ethics, 160–163, Ministerial Code, in UK, 65 211–213 misconduct private gain from corruption through, 37–49 in China, 99–102 defined, 20 as conflict of interest, 66–67 monitoring mechanisms, in regulatory government ethics and, 66–67 systems, 22 integrity defined, 4 National Bureau of Corruption regulation of, 4 Prevention, 192–196 IPSA. See Independent Parliament National Integrity System (NIS) theory, Standards Authority 2–3 New Zealand, corruption in, 1 Jiang Zeming, 51–53, 210 NIS theory. See National Integrity Jiao Yulu, 214 System theory Johnson, Lyndon B., 33 Nixon, Richard, 33 judges, corruption and Norwegian Agency for Development appearance of bias by, 81–82 Cooperation (Norad), 2 appearance of influence peddling by, 75, 77–78 Office of Government Ethics (OGE), in China, 105–106 135–138, 171–173. See also in Hong Kong, 79–82 enforcement, of government improper acts by, 79–80 ethics improper statements by, 80–81 outside employment and activities, impropriety as, 76, 79–82 regulation of in UK, 79–82 in China, 112–114 in US, 79–82 for current office holders, 112–113 Judges Law of the People’s Republic of after retirement from office, China, 91–92 113–114 government ethics for, 85–88 Kennedy, John F., 32–33 for government officers, 85–87 post-employment restrictions, 87–88 Lei Zhengfu, 31 Leung, Anthony Kam-chung, 171 Pei Minxin, 28, 61 Leung Chin-man, 23–24, 73 personal government connections. See Leung Chun-ying, 171 guanxi Leung Ming-yin, 24 Philippines, anti-corruption strategies Li Chengyan, 5, 36 in, 17 Li Zhen, 38–46 POBO. See Prevention of Bribery Lin Zhe, 6–7 Ordinance Liu Hu, 181–182 Political Appointment System, in Hong Liu Jiayi, 57–58 Kong, 137

298 index

political parties, favouritism for for corruption in China, 104–105 anti-corruption strategies in Hong Kong, 76, 78–79 compared to, 22–49 in UK, 76, 78–79 within CCP, 60–61 in US, 76, 78–79 in China, 11, 14, 16–22, 61–62, Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 102–107 (POBO), in Hong Kong, 65, 70 as complementary, 22–24 procuratorates, 192 criminal approach in anti- profiting from official government corruption strategies compared positions, 66–67, 69, 73–74 to, 22–49 through abuse of public funds, government as self-regulating, 16 100–101 methods of, 17 in China, 99–102 as necessary, 22–24 Property Uncle case, 181–182 parameters of, 16 public ethics. See also government for public bodies, 17 ethics restrictions for, 16 in China, 5–6 defined, 3–4 in Hong Kong, 4–5 for government ethics, 230–232 historical development of, 34–35 in China, 227–229 regulation of, 4–5 development of, 3–6 administrative, 36 research on, 8–9 historical development of, 32–37 of integrity, 4 in UK, 4–5 monitoring mechanisms in, 22 historical development of, 34 public ethics, 4–5 in US, 4–5 administrative regulation, 36 during Johnson administration, 33 historical development of, 32–37 during Kennedy administration, sanction mechanisms in, 22 32–33 Rothman, David J., 26 during Nixon administration, 33 punishment, for corruption, 25–28 sanction mechanisms in China, 36 for corruption, 25–26 death penalty in, 26–27 in regulatory systems, 22 magnitude of, 28 self-dealing, by public officials, 66–69 probability of, 29–31 in China, 93–96, 120–122 sanction magnitude of, 28 Shen Lijie, 57–58 death penalty as, 26–27 Sherman, Lawrence, 37–38 economic sanctions as, 27 Singapore imprisonment as, 26–27 anti-corruption laws in, 23 magnitude of, 25 corruption in, 1 probability of, 25–26 Standards of Ethical Conduct for sanction magnitude, 25–26 Employees of the Executive seriousness of, 26–27 Branch, 105 Sweden, corruption in, 1 Qiao Yunhua, 38–46 Three Represents, 51–52 regulatory systems, for ethics transfer of economic value, 66–67, anti-corruption strategies compared 69–72 to corruption strategies, 22–49 in China, 96–98 behaviour mechanisms in, 22 through gifts, 97–99

index 299

Transparency International, 23 styles of, 146–159 Tsang, Donald, 24, 73, 122 through whistleblowers, 162–163 government ethics in, 64–88 United Kingdom (UK) under Civil Service Code, 34, 65, Civil Service Code in, 34, 65, 126–127 126–127, 137–138 codes of, 126 corruption in compared to China, 12–13 appearance of influence peddling conflict of interest and, regulation as, 75, 77–78 of, 66–74 favouritism in appointment as, 76, for financial disclosure 78–123 regulations, 82–85 favouritism of political parties as, under IPSA, 74 76, 78–79 key issues for, 244–250 through judicial impropriety, 76, under Ministerial Code, 65 79–82 for outside employment and regulating appearance of, 74–82 activities, 85–88 enforcement strategies in, for patterns for, 88–91 government ethics, 134–173 private gain from information, advisory opinions on, 164–167 66–67 agencies for, 134–142 private party assistance and, behaviour manipulation tactics, 66–67, 72–73 163–169 profiting from official position, through cases and claims, 163 66–67, 69, 73–74 through Civil Service Code, self-dealing by public officials, 137–138 66–69 by Civil Service Commission, transfer of economic value and, 138–140 66–67, 69–72 collaboration as part of, 146 judicial impropriety in, 79–82 common features of, 171–173 public ethics regulation in, 4–5 compliance-oriented, 143–144, historical development of, 34 147–152, 154–156 United States (US) deterrence-oriented, 148, corruption in 154–156 appearance of influence peddling discipline-oriented, 152–154 as, 75, 77–78 educational programmes in, favouritism in appointment as, 76, 167–169 78–123 efficacy of, 156–157 favouritism of political parties as, through financial disclosure 76, 78–79 forms, 135–162 through judicial impropriety, 76, information gathering tactics, 79–82 160–163 regulating appearance of, 74–82 investigatory powers in, 142–143 enforcement strategies in, for law making powers as result of, government ethics, 134–173 144–146 advisory opinions on, 164–167 legal authorities for, 142–146 agencies for, 134–142 resource allocation for, 169–171 behaviour manipulation tactics, response to violations, 155–156 163–169 responsibilities in, 142–146 through cases and claims, 163 rule interpretation in, 157–158 collaboration as part of, 146

300 index

United States (US) (cont.) private gain from information, common features of, 171–173 66–67 compliance-oriented, 143–144, private party assistance and, 147–152, 154–156 66–67, 72–73 through DAEO, 139–140 profiting from official position, deterrence-oriented, 148, 154–156 66–67, 69, 73–74 discipline-oriented, 152–154 self-dealing by public officials, educational programmes in, 66–69 167–169 transfer of economic value and, efficacy of, 156–157 66–67, 69–72 through financial disclosure judicial impropriety in, 79–82 forms, 135–162 public ethics regulation in, 4–5 information gathering tactics, 160–163 Van Rooij, Benjamin, 59 investigatory powers in, 142–143 law making powers as result of, Wang Guoyan, 214 144–146 Wang Qishan, 210, 215, 222, 238–239 legal authorities for, 142–146 Wang Xianming, 208 for OGE, 135–140 Wang Yukai, 206 resource allocation for, 169–171 Wedeman, Andrew, 28 response to violations, 155–156 whistleblowers, 162–163, 201 responsibilities in, 142–146 Wu Yongwen, 171–175 rule interpretation in, 157–158 styles of, 146–159 Xi Jinping, 1, 7, 209, 214–215, 222, 225, through whistleblowers, 162–163 238 government ethics in, 64–88 Xiu Lin, 41 codes of, 126 Xu Caihou, 239 Commission on Civil Rights and, 65 Yang Dacai, 212 Commodity Futures Trading Yu Zhengsheng, 224 Commission and, 65 compared to China, 12–13 Zeng Haokong, 208 conflict of interest and, regulation Zhang Hongge, 58 of, 66–74 Zhang Xin, 182 Federal Reserve System in, 65 Zhao Lianhai, 55 for financial disclosure Zheng Xiaoyu, 1–2, 54–55 regulations, 82–85 Zhou Kai, 57–58 key issues for, 244–250 Zhou Yongkang, 239 for outside employment and Zhu Lijia, 207 activities, 85–88 Zhuang Deshui, 206 patterns for, 88–91 Zou Keyuan, 2