South Africa Sweden | United States 6 Minimal Support for Democracy and Human Rights South Africa P
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Supporting Democracy Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers minimal moderate moderate moderate limited limited minimal strong very strong moderate Brazil | European Union | France | Germany | India | Indonesia | Japan | Poland South Africa Sweden | United States 6 minimal support for democracy and human rights South Africa P. M. Graham EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction In June 1946, the Indian government requested that South Africa, as the strongest and most di- the UN Secretary-General include the discriminatory verse economy in sub-Saharan Africa, plays treatment of Indians, which was enshrined in South an assertive international role. In combi- African law, on the agenda of the first session of the new United Nations. From that moment, internation- nation with its history, this has created an al organizations and civil society solidarity move- expectation both domestically and abroad ments, in partnership with South Africans in the that the country will provide leadership in country and in exile, began a struggle for freedom support for democracy and human rights. and an end to apartheid. When, in 1994, the first democratic election was held and Nelson Mandela At present, however, South Africa does not was inaugurated, the celebration was not only for meet this expectation. South Africans but for all those who believed in the South Africa’s approach to upholding ultimate triumph of human rights and democracy justice and the protection of human rights over discrimination and violence. emphasizes domestic and regional solu- Beginning with the Mandela administration, South tions to conflict, respect for sovereignty, and Africa reoriented its policies toward the goal of promoting democracy and fighting poverty interna- About this project international action through multilateral tionally. In particular, during Thabo Mbeki’s presi- This project analyzes institutions. It believes that, to date, inter- dency (1999–2008), the country began an assertive support by 11 democratic national solidarity to support democracy program to make the 21st century the African cen- powers for democracy tury based on a new understanding of self-reliance and human rights and human rights has often been selective during the period and hypocritical. However, South Africa has that included economic independence and “African June 2012–May 2014. solutions to African problems.” The new program not demonstrated that its own approach was manifested in the New Partnership for Africa’s About the author achieves its stated ambition to help guar- Development (NEPAD) and the transformation of the P. M. Graham is chair of antee that the rights of its own constitution Organisation of African Unity into the African Union the International Steering (AU), which was established in 2002. Committee of the Com- extend to all people. Many supporters of munity of Democracies human rights and democracy have been Many observers expected South Africa to provide NGO process and former frustrated by South Africa’s policy choices, leadership for the emerging democracy and human executive director of the rights architecture of the time. Its own aspiration Institute for Democracy in which increasingly appear self-interested for a seat on a reformed UN Security Council and South Africa (IDASA). and conservative. its willingness to take on UN leadership through 1 www.freedomhouse.org Supporting Democracy South Africa Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers hosting both the World Conference against Racism, international bodies. This policy has remained Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related remarkably consistent over time, underpinned by Intolerance in 2001 and the World Summit on five pillars, as described in the 2011 White Paper: Sustainable Development in 2002 encouraged South Africa therefore accords central impor- this expectation. tance to our immediate African neighbourhood These expectations thus far have not been fulfilled. and continent; working with countries of the South Africa is now celebrating 20 years of democ- South to address shared challenges of under- racy in a different world. Its foreign policy appears development; promoting global equity and so- self-interested and conservative; it has adopted a cial justice; working with countries of the North rhetoric that stresses sovereignty and support for its to develop a true and effective partnership for traditional relationships. The White Paper on South a better world; and doing our part to strengthen Africa’s foreign policy published in 2011 emphasizes the multilateral system, including its transfor- a cautious vision: “We therefore champion collab- mation, to reflect the diversity of our nations, oration, cooperation, and building partnerships and ensure its centrality in global governance.4 over conflict. This philosophy translates into an These values are taken directly from the South approach to international relations that respects all African constitution. nations, peoples, and cultures.”1 Nevertheless, among South African international South Africa does still claim to support the prop- relations think tanks, nongovernmental organiza- osition that the rights it aims to guarantee for its tions (NGOs) involved in development and democ- own citizens should be extended to all people. “As racy work outside South Africa, and civil society a beneficiary of many acts of selfless solidarity in organizations focused on human rights causes, the past,” the White Paper continues, “South Africa skepticism is growing about whether South Africa believes strongly that what it wishes for its people has a democracy and rights agenda at all. Instead, should be what it wishes for the citizens of the the government appears focused on the promo- world.”2 But the government has not found a way to tion of narrowly defined national interests, placing advance global rights while managing its bilateral secondary importance on the interests of the region and multilateral relationships in a way “that respects and only when those coincide with its own. all nations, peoples, and cultures.” Instead, it has moved away from the leadership role it aspired to DIRCO’s annual report focuses primarily on achieve- under Mandela to an approach based on national ments in institution building on the continent, in interests. Moreover, it has not been able to explain socioeconomic dialogues, in reform of international its approach to those whose rights are abused and institutions, and in public diplomacy. Direct democ- whose aspiration to democracy is blocked by the racy support is limited to election observation and very states with which South Africa maintains the improvement of election processes. Human cordial relationships. rights, however, are not neglected. The report states that “human rights remained a key priority for South 5 Foreign Policy Objectives Africa’s foreign policy.” “South Africa’s foreign policy is generally interpreted Nevertheless, from January to May 2014, no state- as the externalisation of its domestic policy, i.e., a bet- ments released through the DIRCO website directly ter South Africa, a better Africa, and a better world. mentioned human rights abuses or promoted The values that underpin the country’s foreign policy human rights values. A number of statements decried include democracy, human rights, human dignity, terrorist attacks (in Nigeria, China, and Kenya), 3 non-racialism, non-sexism, and prosperity for all.” and addressed political developments in Thailand, That is the summary of South Africa’s foreign policy Ukraine, Libya, and Lesotho. Two general statements contained in the guidelines developed by the De- were issued: the first dealing with the rise of military partment of International Relations and Cooperation nonstate actors in a number of African countries, (DIRCO, formerly the South African Department of and the other defending the rights of lesbian, gay, Foreign Affairs), which serve as a directive to South bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) individ- Africans who participate in international events, uals.6 The latter was provoked by legislative action make public statements, lead delegations, or consider against LGBTI groups and individuals in Uganda, agreements and appointments of South Africans to although that country was not named explicitly. 2 Freedom House The Community of Democracies was in part estab- issues related to global governance and reform. It lished to provide an informal, multilateral caucus in considers itself a representative of Africa in BRICS. which countries could act in concert but with less formality than in treaty-based regional or global Development Assistance and Trade institutions. While South Africa was not one of the Development assistance projects from South Africa original convening countries of the Community of are few and varied, and their combined effect on Democracies, it later became one of the Conven- either development or governance outcomes is ing Group members and remains a member of the uncertain. A recent report, “Investments to End Governing Council. However, its voice has become Poverty,” stated that South Africa’s development increasingly muted in community affairs. South cooperation by 2011 was equivalent to 0.05 percent Africa has not volunteered its services to any of the of its Gross National Income.8 However, as South working groups, including that concentrating on the Africa does not report on these financial flows in protection of civil society. In its strategic plan, South a comprehensive way outside of its audited report