5. Operation Fath 1 (Attacking to the Kirkuk Refinery) Abstract: Ramadan
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
5. Operation Fath 1 (Attacking to the Kirkuk Refinery) Mohsen Mohammadi Moein Abstract: amadan Headquarters as the centre of commanding and execution of the IRGC Rnon-regular wars was established in the fifth year of the war and it was specified a great deal of missions for this headquarters. The goal of the war commanding to establish such formation was: the penetration of the combatant forces into the depth of enemy territory using the tactics of partisan and guerilla warfare to engage the Iraqi army in various areas, to disrupt the movement of the Saddam war machine, to contact with the Iraqi people and groups including Kurds and Arabs to support the people movements against the Baath regime and to execute the different missions to direct the Saddam military forces to the various areas of Iraq and to create a kind of tension and dispersal amongst the Iraqi divisions and corps. In the second half of 1986, a new chapter was started in the movements of Ramadan Headquarters and the start point of this process was the Operation Fath 1 launched in Kirkuk area in 11 October 1986 with the cooperation of Jalal Talebani and his group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This article discusses the various aspects of the Operation Fath1. 6. Reporting the Operation Beit-ol-Moqadas 6 Hassan Dorri Abstract: The Operation Beit-ol-Moqadas 6 is considered as one of the last operations launched in the final period of war. It has not been published any report about this operation so far. The reports of the narrators of the Holly Defense Documents and Research Centre (the ex IRGC Centre for War Studies and Research) who were with the commanders of units to write and record the events of the operations as well as the archive documents and texts of the military units have been used to make this article. ﺳﺎﻝ ﻳﺎﺯﺩﻫﻢ ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ ﭼﻬﻠﻢ ﺑﻬﺎﺭ 1391 164 ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﻪﺨ ﺗﺨﺼﺼﺗﺨﺼﺼﻲ ﺗﺨﺼﺼﻲﻣﻄ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕﻓ ﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺱﻣﻘﺪﺱﻣﻘﺪﺱ which caused 10/000 of the regional people and some of the Iranian combatants to be martyred or injured. The broad international repercussion of the Halabja disaster affected the diplomatic and media circles as well as the public opinions extensively. This article describes shortly how the Halabja region was chosen for the operation and discusses the pre-actions as well as the operation description and characteristics thereof. The study of political and military results of the Op- eration Valfajr 10 and the chemical bombardment of Halabja requires a separate article. 3. Reporting the Operation Beit-ol-Moqadas 4 Yadollah Izadi Abstract: uring the Iran-Iraq War, the general area of the Darbandikhan Dam in Sulay- Dmaniyah province in Iraq has always been considered as an important mili- tary and political objective in north fronts. In planning the operation, capturing the heights near the dam had been included to secure the operation side and maintain the visibility advantage as well as the possibility of firing the enemy rear area. Because the enemy alert and resistance on one hand, and the weakness of friendly forces on the other hand, the operation launched in this heights was not so suc- cessful. The enemy presence on the operation axis of Surmer and Shimiran was considered as the weak point of the left axis of the Operatio Valfajr 10 and a new operation was planned and implemented within one week to raise this weakness. This article is a short description of the debates relating to the history of the op- erations in this area, requirements, preparations, how and characteristics of the Operation Beit-ol-Moqadas 4. 4. Description of the IRGC Army Operations (Operation Valfajr 10) Saeid Sarmadi, Editor Abstract: fter brutal chemical bombardment of Halanja by Saddam regime, Ayatollah AKhamenei, the then Iranian president and the head of the Supreme Defense Council of Iran, visited the operational fronts in the northwest of the country. In this visit, he inspected the operational axes and held meetings with the friendly units deployed in these axes as well as the commanders and authorities of the Northwest Headquarters. In meeting with the latter ones which held in 31 De- cember 1988, Noor Ali Shooshtari the then commander of Najaf Headquarters presented a short report on the Operations Beit-ol-Moqadas 3 and Valfajr 10 and then, the authorities of Ramadan Headquarters presented a report on the chemi- cal bombardment of Halabja and also described the I.R.I activities to protect the nonmilitary people of the region and to resident them safely. Finally, the situation of the counterrevolutionary groups in the area was discussed as well. ﺳﺎﻝ ﻳﺎﺯﺩﻫﻢ ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ ﭼﻬﻠﻢ ﺑﻬﺎﺭ 1391 165 Abstracts Essays 1. Changing the Strategy of Iran in 1987: Northwest Instead of South Dr. Hussien Ardestani Abstract: o answer the reason of changing the operational strategy of Iran in 1987 and Tshifting the process of war to the northwest front, the paper refers to the impor- tance of the northwest and south fronts in the Iranian military strategy to implement the operations, and describes the situation of the South front in which it was impos- sible to do any operations because of the full alertness of the Iraqis troops therein. In addition, the activeness of [the Iranian] Ramadan Headquarters and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the northwest front and their positive views in this re- gard have been effective on this development as well. Amongst the other important factors affecting the changing process of Iranian strategy, it has been the functional results of the nature of military strategy of Iran. In the strategy of "War till One Vic- tory" which was pursued from 1982 after the Liberation of Khorramshahr, the re- inforcement of Iranian military was not proportional neither with the developments of the war scenes nor with the growth of Iraqi military power. Therefore, Iran with a limited power was not able to fight Iraq in south front in 1987. In addition, the another requirement in the new strategy which mainly emerged in 1986 and 1987 was that Iran needed a victory and implementing a successful operation was the first preference for the Iranian diplomacy to impose their will on Iraq and its supporters. So, the IRGC troops were dispatched to the northwest front in 1987 and by 1988 they implemented a series of operations therein. 2. Reporting the Operation Valfajr 10 Yadollah Izadi Abstract: In 13 March 1988 (one week to the Iranian new year), the Operation Valfajr 10 was launched as a major annual operation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the heights and trains on the west of Darbandikhan Lake known as "Dasht-e-Zoor". Mean- while, the Iraqi Army was planning on this imagination that the Iranians continue their operations in the south fronts. The Iranian quick operation, quick access of the Iranian units to the specified objectives, as well as the Iraqi surprised and lost its objectives, all caused Iraq to loss a 1000-kilometer area (Dasht-e-Zoor) includ- ing 3 towns and more than 7 villages which were sieged and then captured by the Iranians. In reaction to the reception of the Iranian combatants by the Kurds of the region and to compensate what lost in this region, Iraqi regime attacked the certain regional towns and villages including Halabja extensively by the chemical weapons ﺳﺎﻝ ﻳﺎﺯﺩﻫﻢ ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ ﭼﻬﻠﻢ ﺑﻬﺎﺭ 1391 166 ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﺗﺨﺼﺼﻲ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﻣﻘﺪﺱ Contents Articles Changing the Strategy of Iran in 1987: Northwest Instead of South 5 Dr. Hussen Ardestani Reporting the Operation Valfajr 10 23 Yadollah Izadi Reporting the Operation Beit-ol-Moqadas 4 53 Yadollah Izadi Description of the IRGC Army Operations (Operation Valfajr 10) 79 Saeid Sarmadi, Editor Operation Fath 1 (Attacking to the Kirkuk Refinery) 101 Mohsen Mohammadi Moein Reporting the Operation Beit-ol-Moqadas 6 117 Hassan Dorry Conferences Reporting the First Conference of the Narrators of the Center 133 Seyed Ehsan Husseni Nasab for Holy Defense Documentation and Research Documents The Interrogation Report of the Iraqi prisoner, Major General Ali Hussein Owaid al-Egavy, the Commander of the 43th Infantry Division of the Iraqi Army 143 Hassan Dorry Book Review Martyr Baqeri Books 151 Maryam Asadi Ja'fari A Literary Collection of Selected Speeches of Martyr Hassan Baqeri 153 Maryam Asadi Ja'fari Book Analysis and Study Reporting the Conference on Review and Studying the Book of the Spring of 2003 155 Seyed Ehsan Husseni Nasab Holly Defence Researches And Documentation Center Vol.11 No.40 Spring 2012 Publisher IIRG’s Sacred Deffence Document Center Executive Manager And Managing Editor Dr. Hossein Ardestani Editorial Board Dr. Gholam Ali Rashid Dr. Hossein Alaei, Dr. Mahmood Yazdanfam Hamid Aslani Internal Manager Hassan Dorri Page Designer Seid Hadi Khavoshi Editor Hanieh Morshedi, Zahra Golmohammadi Publishing Supervisor Mohammad Behrozi Address 77/ Shahid Vahid Dastgerdi (Zafar) Alley, Shariati Alley, Tehran, Iran. Email [email protected] Tel +98 21 - 22909522 Fax +98 21 - 22909538 Price 4000 T.