July 2021 Soleimani’s Shadow

The Fatemiyoun Division & Iran’s Proxy Warfare Propaganda

Amir Toumaj, Candace Rondeaux, & Arif Ammar

Last edited on July 09, 2021 at 12:29 p.m. EDT Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, co-directors of the New America/ Arizona State University Future of War project for their support throughout the production of this paper. A deep debt of gratitude is owed to David Sterman for applying his sharp editorial eye to the text and sharing his analytical intuition throughout the research for this report. A special thanks is also owed to the many ASU faculty and staff at the Center on the Future of War and School of Politics and Global Studies who lent their support through workshops, commentary, and who most importantly allowed the project team the time and space needed to bring this report to fruition.

We are especially grateful to several Afghan, Iranian, European and American scholars who helped frame our analysis and on whose shoulders we stand; for their incisive analysis on the myriad ties that bind Iran, Afghanistan and Syria thanks in particular goes to Ahmad Shuja Jamal, Ali Alfoneh, Ghulam Sakhi Darwish, Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Afshon Ostavar, Lars Hauch, and Tobias Schneider.

Joe Wilkes, Naomi Morduch-Toubman, Joanne Zalatoris, and Maria Elkin laid out the paper and website. Thanks to Emily Schneider for her deft copyedit. This paper was supported in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

It is worth noting that some of the best contemporary research is produced by Iranian, Syrian, and Afghan journalists and analysts who take great risks to bring the world news from the toughest and most unforgiving warzones known to man. Although many publish their works anonymously for fear of retribution we know that we are ever in their debt, and hope that in some small way that our gratitude lifts their spirits in this most troubled of times in the region. All errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, the authors’ alone.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 2 About the Author(s)

Amir Toumaj is a research and policy analyst at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and co-founder of Resistance Axis Monitor, which provides objective coverage and analysis of Iran and its proxies.

Candace Rondeaux directs Future Frontlines, a public intelligence service for next generation security and democratic resilience. A journalist and public policy analyst she is a professor of practice and fellow at the Melikian Center for Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies and the Center on the Future of War at Arizona State University.

Arif Ammar is an independent researcher on armed conflicts and political violence based in Washington DC. As a regular conflict observer, he monitors armed conflict and political violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East while highlighting the human cost of war in the form of civilian casualties and victimization of the vulnerable groups due to state failure in providing safety and protection.

About New America

We are dedicated to renewing the promise of America by continuing the quest to realize our nation’s highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create.

About International Security

The International Security program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the thorniest questions facing American policymakers and the public. We are focused on South Asia and the Middle East, extremist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda and allied groups, the proliferation of drones, homeland security, and the activities of U.S. Special Forces and the CIA.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 3 Contents

Executive Summary 6

Key Findings 7

I. Introduction 11

Astroturfing Afghan Shia Militancy Online: A Visible Cultural and Narrative Footprint 12

Narrative’s Place in Iranian Proxy Warfare Strategy 13

Pitfalls of Iran’s Narrative Strategy and What the Narrative Means for the United States 18

II. The Origins of Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Shi’a Networks 20

From Mashhad to Kabul and Back Again: Early Roots of Afghan Shia Jihadist Factions, 1950-1979 20

III. Crossroads in Khuzestan: Afghan Shi’a Mobilization During the Iran-Iraq War 24

A Fickle Affair: The Quds Force and Afghan Shia in the Post-Soviet Era, 1990-2001 27

IV. The Arab Spring: A New Phase of Iranian Proxy Warfare Strategy 29

From Covert Escalation Management to Overt Intervention 29

V. Keeping the Faith in Sacred Defense 32

Iran Revives the Shia Jihad Narrative 32

Enter Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun 34

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 4 Contents Cont'd

VI. Spinning the Fatemiyoun: Raising an Army of Disposable Afghan Diaspora Online 38

A Telling Change of Emblems 42

Soleimani, the Shadow Commander, Steps Out of the Shadows 47

Putin Steps In: 2015 as Watershed Moment for Iran’s Proxy War Strategy and Narrative 52

Iran’s Proxy War Narrative Goes Viral 54

VII. The Future of the Fatemiyoun Division 63

End of the Islamic State, Drawdown 63

Building Cultural Influence and Deepening Ties 66

Flood Relief is Like Defending the Shrine 69

Syria, Afghanistan, and Preparation for War with Israel 70

Conclusion: Soleimani’s Legacy and What it Means for the Future of Proxy Warfare 74

Appendix I-Timeline: The Rise of Iran’s Afghan Shia Cadres 76

Appendix II-Prominent Fatemiyoun Propaganda Organizations and Groups 77

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 5 Executive Summary

Thousands of ethnic Afghan foreign fghters with the Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade have fought and died in Syria’s civil war over the last decade. Shia fghters from Afghanistan and Pakistan have been critical not only to Iran’s successful quest to restore Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime, but as an asset for Tehran in its fght for regional primacy against Israel and other rivals. Fatemiyoun fghters will continue to serve on the frontlines of Iran’s proxy wars across the Middle East long into the future.

The recruitment and deployment of thousands of Afghan paramilitary fghters at the knife’s edge of Iran’s proxy wars by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) represents a watershed moment in the evolution of Tehran’s information warfare capabilities. Fatemiyoun fghters are the frst forces to be deployed by Tehran at the peak of the age of militarized online “astroturfng” and propaganda by proxy and the IRGC has accordingly used social media to grow the Fatemiyoun brand online. Iranian fnanced propaganda about Afghan foreign fghters in Syria has played a vital role in making the IRGC’s proxy strategy a success. The Iranian support for the Fatemiyon Division’s media production unit illustrates the increased Iranian reliance upon and use of strategic narratives that bind together transnational mobilizations in the wake of the Arab Spring.

For 40 years, the IRGC has placed a premium on mobilizing volunteer Shi’a co- religionists to fght in Iran’s proxy wars. Afghan foreign fghters in Syria hail primarily from the ranks of migrant ethnic Hazara laborers whose families have traversed Iran’s eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan for generations. Their commanders and Iranian handlers were part of a wave of recruits who defended Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Fatemiyoun fghting forces punch far above their weight in part because of their deep connections with key players in Iran’s revolutionary history.

However, the Fatemiyoun Division is the frst unit to be reorganized from tooth to tail under the aegis of the IRGC’s evolving post-Arab Spring military doctrine of “forward” defense, which relies partly on irregular forces deployed beyond Iran’s borders to secure its foreign policy objectives and deter adversaries like the United States and Israel. Today’s Afghan foreign fghters were recruited from 2012 forward under guidance from the IRGC Quds Force’s late commander Qassem Soleimani. The Fatemiyoun Division has subsequently also become part of the everyday weave of Iranian life. This is true especially in parts of the country with strong pro-Islamist leanings where streets are named after fallen fghters. Murals and shrines to the fallen Fatemiyoun dot the landscape of Tehran as well as Qom and Mashhad, which are home to large ethnic Afghan communities.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 6 The IRGC has revived and repurposed Afghan networks to ft Iran’s twenty-frst century fght for regional primacy and efort to control post-Arab Spring narratives regarding regional conficts, not just the military balance in particular conficts. With support from Lebanese fghters from Hezbollah, Afghan-Shi’a foreign fghters have fought alongside Syrian-Arab Army regulars, local militias, and Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group in some of the most strategically important battles in Syria. From their battles at the edge of the Golan Heights as part of Iran’s long running push to fght Israel to their repeated attempts to retake Palmyra, Aleppo, and strategic points in Quneitra and Deir Ezzor, Fatemiyoun fghters have extended Iran’s bridge to Hezbollah and increased Tehran’s ability to project power across the northern Middle East.

Right up until the moment of his death, Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the IRGC's external operations branch the Quds Force, served as both medium and message, snapping frontline selfes with the Fatemiyoun, touting the glories of righteous war and recounting their heroics for the IRGC’s ever-present camera. Like many other proxy forces operating in the Middle East, the Fatemiyoun had a substantial social media following on YouTube and Twitter until both platforms took down their accounts. But they retain a presence on other social media platforms, nonetheless, as a result of IRGC investment. They also have thousands of followers on encrypted social media platforms such as Telegram and its Iranian government-controlled counterpart, Soroush.

The Guard Corps places a high value on cultural production and political warfare in its proxy strategy. Promoting the mythos of martyrdom on the frontlines of Iran’s forward defense strategy is central to that enterprise. However, in doing so, the IRGC has also linked conficts across the region to a greater extent than it has before and played into sectarian narratives that may prove difcult to control in the future while giving power to a network that, while deeply indebted to Iran, is not fully under its control.

Key Findings

• The Fatemiyoun Division traces its antecedents to the IRGC’s decades-long proxy campaigns.

◦ The Fatemiyoun’s founding commanders fought in IRGC-backed proxy units against the Ba’athists in Iraq, and the Soviets in Afghanistan.

◦ The Fatemiyoun’s smaller sister unit, the Zeynabiyoun Brigade, also traces its roots back to the 1980s when Pakistani-Shi’a acolytes of Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini preached revolution in the predominantly Shi’ite border town of Parachinar.

•

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 7 The Fatemiyoun Division’s mobilization since 2013 refects signifcant shifts in Tehran’s overall strategy that emphasize the critical role of narrative control.

◦ Proxy warfare is not simply a matter of guys with guns, it also includes the way states use propaganda to shape the story of their interventions and mobilize fghters.

◦ In the wake of the Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS, Iran increasingly promoted a narrative emphasizing transnational and religious aspects of its proxy network often at the cost of plausible deniability and covertness.

• When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011 it posed a threat to Iran’s one true Arab state ally, Syria, and to the IRGC’s regional infuence. The IRGC tasked the Quds Force with deploying proxies in part to manage that challenge, gradually escalating its intervention as Assad’s grip on power devolved as a means of controlling escalation risks.

◦ Although Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the external operations branch, the Quds Force, was often credited as Iran’s military mastermind, the IRGC’s Hossein Hamedani was the original architect of Iran’s strategy in Syria.

◦ Hamedani and the IRGC drew on narratives of Sacred Defense to covertly mobilize and recruit Afghan and Pakistani Shi’ites until their numbers grew large enough to form distinct paramilitary units.

◦ The successful 2014 war against ISIS allowed Iran to promote a cult of personality around Soleimani that helped stoke the embers of cultural mobilization for proxy paramilitaries like the Fatemiyoun Division.

• Russian escalation in Syria in 2015 created the space for Iran to further promote Afghan and Pakistani paramilitaries.

◦ The number of Iranian forces in Syria increased signifcantly in the wake of Russia’s intervention, and Iran more aggressively promoted narratives about the Fatemiyoun Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade.

◦

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 8 Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was one of the frst senior Iranian ofcials to publicly embrace the Fatemiyoun in a speech given in Mashhad in 2016.

◦ The IRGC embraced the war in public, generating buzz via religious songs, public pageantry, traditional and social media about the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun volunteers.

◦ While Iranian coverage of the Fatemiyoun expanded in 2015 despite Afghanistan’s protests, Iran sought to minimize coverage of the Zeynabiyoun because it viewed the prospect of blowback from Pakistan as a serious risk.

• The Afghan and Pakistani Shi’a militias that Iran mobilized and the narratives through which Iran framed the mobilization will continue to shape the Greater Middle East for years to come even as the militias’ involvement in Syria winds down.

◦ After Iran declared the end of the Islamic State in late 2017, the Fatemiyoun Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade declared they would fght anywhere, anytime. The Fatemiyoun subsequently announced a drawdown of its forces in Syria and a renewed focus on cultural afairs.

◦ Senior Iranian ofcials consolidated the Fatemiyoun Division’s propaganda wing. At the same time, the Fatemiyoun’s cultural afairs unit expanded the scope of its activities.

◦ Despite a brief lull in Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun operations after the 2017 drawdown, fghters from both contingents were reportedly killed in the 2020 battle for Idlib.

◦ The IRGC began recalling Fatemiyoun fghters back to Iran as early as 2018, by some accounts, provoking controversy with the Iranian public, but even after Soleimani’s assassination the Fatemiyoun Division remains in a prime position to mobilize for Iran’s next proxy war ventures.

• IRGC investment in Fatemiyoun Division infuence campaigns creates real battlefeld dividends for Iran, but it also carries signifcant escalation risks.

◦ Inside Afghanistan, the practical efect of narratives around the Fatemiyoun Division’s battlefeld successes may present an

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 9 attractive alternative for embattled Shia communities that are increasingly being targeted by both ISIS and the Taliban as U.S. forces drawdown.

◦ Tehran’s suggestion in late 2020 that Fatemiyoun fghters might serve as a counterterrorism force for the Afghan government could increase the risk that Shia paramilitaries will compete for infuence in what is shaping up to be a new chapter in Afghanistan's long running civil war, as the United States withdraws.

◦ The net efect of these dynamics could erode U.S. infuence not only in Afghanistan but in South Asia writ large, because there is no telling if Tehran will be able to exert sustained control over its Afghan proxies long-term.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 10 I. Introduction

On February 28, 2015, Afghan Fatemiyoun Division1 forces came under heavy attack from Jabhat al-Nusra fghters as Fatemiyoun fghters tried to seize Tal Gharin Hill in Syria's southern Daraa Governorate.2 It was the twentieth night of “Operation Martyrs of Quneitra,” an all-out assault by forces loyal to the government of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad on a pocket of the province that had fallen into the hands of Syrian rebel forces after the defection of a leading general with the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).3 Gaining control of the tiny ridge near the edge of the Golan Heights only 15 kilometers from Israel’s border would not only mean retaking control of a key SAA electronic warfare base that had fallen into rebel hands, it would also deliver a much needed win for Iran after one of its top generals was killed by Israel only about a month earlier in Quneitra.4 Around midnight, Fatemiyoun’s commander and co-founder Ali Reza Tavassoli and his deputy Reza Bakhshi mounted a three-sided assault on the hill, capturing prized high ground, at least temporarily.

At dawn, Syrian rebel forces launched assaults to retake the hill. According to the ofcial Iranian narrative of what happened next, Afghan Fatemiyoun fghters dug in as Israeli artillery rained overhead from across the border.5 Fatemiyoun fghters faced wave after wave of assaults, stacking the corpses of their enemies as a shield against the onslaught and resupplying their dwindling ammunition and supplies from the dead that littered the hillside. By dusk, Fatemiyoun casualties numbered 18 dead, 50 injured. Scores of fghters opposed to Assad’s regime—an estimated 180 fghters in all—had been killed.6 Soon after nightfall, three rockets hit Tal Gharin Hill, decapitating Fatemiyoun’s leader Tavassoli, also known as Abu Hamed.7 Tavassoli's right-hand man, Bakhshi, also known as Fateh or the Conqueror, died in the battle as well.

When the Fatemiyoun Media Center in 2018 released a documentary through its social media channels and advertised it on IRGC-linked media about Tavassoli’s life and fght, it was this last gruesome fact that would stand out in the narrative. Tavassoli's decapitation was, according to Fatemiyoun lore, a ftting end for a devoted defender of Imam Husayn’s memory. The grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third of Imam of Shia Islam, Husayn ibn Ali had also been decapitated during the Battle of Karbala, the legendary clash that sealed the sectarian split between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. Meeting a fate similar to Imam Husayn, Master of Martyrs, was a blessing, Tavassoli's wife later said in an interview featured in the documentary.8 Like other great martyrs before him, Tavassoli’s wife recalled, he had a premonition the end was coming and sent his wife a cryptic message: "The feather of the peacock is beautiful, do not give it to the vulture."9 She learned of his death from a Fatemiyoun WhatsApp channel.10

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 11 Ofcial accounts of Tavassoli and Fateh’s death place the blame on Israel. Some rank-and-fle Fatemiyoun fghters, however, believe that the Guard Corps assassinated Tavassoli in a drone strike because he had become too independent. 11 This internal skepticism among some in the rank-and-fle stems from Iran’s reported mistreatment of a number of Afghan fghters after their Syrian tours were over. As documented by Ahmad Shuja, an Afghan researcher who conducted extensive interviews with Fatemiyoun fghters for the U.S. Institute of Peace, inter-ethnic and class frictions between Iranian commanders and Fatemiyoun’s mostly immigrant fghters were and are still quite pronounced.12 Grievances over promised rewards, such as citizenship papers, became an especially sore point, according to a fghter interviewed by Shuja: "As long as the Iranians need you, you are Mr. So-and-So. But when they are done with you, then you’re ‘Afghan the Donkey.’”13

Lingering skepticism and schisms that emerged from the post-deployment experience of many Fatemiyoun fghters point to a vulnerability in Iran’s proxy warfare strategy. Iran’s development of proxies and particularly its use of narratives tied to religious and sectarian themes have certainly provided a powerful tool for mobilization and fghting in pursuit of Iranian interests. The strategy’s success to date is due in large part to the fact that it targets young Afghans whose lives have stalled due to the ongoing civil war in their country and, in some cases, frustrated eforts to migrate to Europe, as noted by researcher Mohsen Hamidi.14 It, however, has also empowered forces who are not fully under Iranian control and given rise to narratives that have transnational and complex implications. The extent to which Iran can centralize control over these forces and the narratives will be a critical factor in the broader success of Iranian proxy warfare strategy.

For American policymakers and others tasked with confronting Iranian proxy warfare, building strategically on opportunities created by dissension within Fatemiyoun ranks requires comprehensive real-time assessments of how Iran’s propaganda machine works. Above all, policymakers interested in containing escalation risks need to think about proxy warfare not just in terms of guys with guns, but also how Iran uses its propaganda machine to achieve its success.

Astroturfing Afghan Shia Militancy Online: A Visible Cultural and Narrative Footprint

The story of how the IRGC leveraged cultural production to shape the Fatemiyoun Divison’s narrative into a force multiplier highlights how the digitization of sectarian and ethnic divides can transform the experience of individual grievance and socio-economic marginalization into a catalyst to mobilize armies, militias, and mercenaries. To the extent possible, this report assesses what made the IRGC’s transformation of the origin story of Afghan and Pakistani Shia marginalization in South Asia into an efective means of rallying

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 12 armed proxies to its cause for a generation and turned the Fatemiyoun into a weapon of war against its adversaries in Syria. Based, in part, on a review of the wide array of Persian language battlefeld memoirs written by Fatemiyoun fghters as well as social media produced by the Fatemiyoun’s media and cultural afairs unit, this report analyzes the narratives and tropes that have served as a through line in the IRGC’s promotion of proxy propaganda.

Whether fact, fction, or something in between, rumors of friction between the Fatemiyoun’s commander, Tavassoli, and his long-time sponsors in Iran’s most powerful military institution suggest that the mythos of Fatemiyoun’s battlefeld heroism is not impermeable. There is little dispute that Tavassoli’s biography has played an outsized role in IRGC fnanced propaganda used to mobilize Afghan and Pakistani fghters. In death and in life, Tavassoli gained tremendous popularity, and proved himself a capable military commander. The IRGC and the Fatemiyoun consistently hold up the story of Tavassoli’s last stand as an example of bravery and skill that all fghters should aspire to.

In addition to the feature-length documentary about Tavassoli’s last stand at Tal Gharin, Fatemiyoun’s media afairs and cultural unit produced multiple clips and memes depicting Tavassoli striding toward the frontline.15 The narrative of Tavassoli’s battlefeld prowess took on greater social currency after he was killed in 2015, as the IRGC sought to capitalize on the mythos of his martyrdom. In memorials and in memes, Tavassoli’s image has taken on a beatifed quality, his visage appearing frequently alongside the faces of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic Republic founder on banners, posters, and other propaganda materials.

Tavassoli’s nephew Ebrahim would tout his uncle’s legendary last stand on Tal Gharin Hill as he joined the Fatemiyoun in Syria in 2017.16 When Ebrahim later died in August 2019 after stepping on a mine in a clearing operation in Al Bukamal in eastern Syria, the Tavassoli family legend of martyrdom only grew, and their lives solidifed as a central thread in the IRGC’s weave of Fatemiyoun propaganda.17 The story of how, why, when, and where the Fatemiyoun Division fghts is almost as important as the fghting itself for Iran’s strategy in the Middle East.

Narrative’s Place in Iranian Proxy Warfare Strategy

Rallying co-religionists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to defend religious symbols and protect narratives of shared identity is an extension of Iran’s soft war for infuence across a broad swath of Muslim-majority states. The pejorative term for this phenomenon is “propaganda.” But, as Edward Bernays, the American political strategist and godfather of public relations, noted in his classic treatise on the subject, propaganda is a consistent and continuing efort to create or shape events and outcomes by shaping “support for an opinion or a course of action.”18

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 13 In the case of Iran’s proxy wars, cultural productions that communicate and reinforce ideas about the defense of the Shi’a realm are situated somewhere between what the American international relations scholar Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has called “soft power,”19 and what the communication theorist Monroe Price has called “soft war.”20

Outclassed militarily, for now, by its chief rivals—Israel and the United States— Iran relies on asymmetric means to challenge the regional status quo. This includes the use of political warfare to erode the infuence of Iran’s challengers and to build cohesion with a constituency whose identity-driven grievances stem from an outsider status that transcends traditional geographic and political boundaries. Since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, those means have included non-military lines of efort, such as an aggressive battle for hearts and minds meant to persuade allied constituents in the Shi’a community of the righteousness of Iran’s causus belli in what Price has called the “market for loyalties.”21 Iranian leaders and elites welcomed the upswell of civil society activism that precipitated the fall of several rival secularly oriented regimes but viewed the fall of Syria, its one steadfast regional Arab ally, as an existential threat.22

In this context, narratives and messages weaved into public statements, movies, memes, news, social media, constituted a kind of psychological warfare or subversion of culture and identity aimed at forcing “the system to disintegrate from within.”23 Narrative is a crucial element of political mobilization, and it is the lifeblood of violent political movements and warmaking. The system of stories that shape beliefs and mobilize action is underpinned by the peculiar logic of a movement’s ideas about just cause for challenging the status quo through organized violence.

Through its cultivation of ties to Shia diaspora populations, Iran sought to halt the ascendance of pro-democratic, pluralist movements that might threaten its own regime.24 As Iran scholar Afshon Ostovar has pointed out, leaders in Tehran, and most notably Soleimani, saw the promise and peril in the groundswell of populist civic activism that toppled governments in Egypt and Tunisia. By necessity, in the view of Tehran, that efort included outreach to proxy forces. In more neutral terms, it might be better to cast Iran’s eforts to build up the machinery of strategic communications in support of proxy forces such as Liwa Fatemiyoun as a kind of counter-counterinsurgency.

In the Syrian war, the IRGC shaped the myth of martyrdom prevalent in Fatemiyoun narratives in order to attract supporters, recruit and deploy forces into combat. Throughout the war in Syria, Israel has fgured prominently in Fatemiyoun propaganda as the main enemy25 and the Guard Corps has also cast Saudi Arabia and the United States as the true sponsors of ISIS, even as the Guard Corps benefted from U.S. airpower during operations against caliphate fghters in Iraq.26 These narratives have also been instrumental in eforts to quell an

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 14 occasionally rebellious rank and fle, and to energize frontline fghters when morale ebbs.

In Fatemiyoun narratives, Tavassoli's last stand at Tal Gharin Hill, for instance, is a central strand, connecting the current fght in Syria to the glorious sacrifces of Shi’ite followers of Imam Hussein ibn Ali during the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE, a bedrock event in the millennium-old schism between Sunni and Shia followers of Islam. It also serves as the connective tissue for mobilizing historical grievances around the marginalization of Shia communities in predominantly Sunni states. In this context, the bedrock mythos of the Fatemiyoun centers on rebellion against unjust Sunni rulers, as well as their allies, and sacrifce in the name of righteous resistance and just governance under Shia religious law, which under the Iranian revolutionary formulation of velayat-e fqh privileges the authority of a singular clerical leader as the central engine of jurisprudence and rule of law.27

The narrative is more than a means of mobilization and maintaining discipline. The IRGC has a second audience in mind when it casts Fatemiyoun fghters as heroic, self-sacrifcing defenders of the faith. For Iran, this narrative plays a critical role in its forward defense strategy of publicly touting its control over proxies as a deterrent and means of retaliation against the United States.28 In communicating to diferent audiences, the narrative helps justify Iran’s actions in the region, mobilize specifc groups to act in Iran’s defense, and constitutes a means of signaling deterrent capabilities to Iran’s Israeli and American rivals.

Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the IRGC's external operations branch the Quds Force, served as both medium and message, snapping frontline selfes with Fatemiyoun fghters, touting the glories of righteous war and recounting their heroics for the IRGC’s ever-present camera right up until his death. Within hours of reports of the U.S. drone strike on Soleimani’s convoy near Baghdad airport, the Fatemiyoun Division’s ofcial Twitter account began blasting out memes and posts that fused Solemani’s narrative with that of Tavassoli (See also Figures 1 and 2 for materials circulated via Telegram).29

The implied threat of this narrative—when used as a signal to the United States— is that a confrontation between the United States and Iran will not be restricted to a symmetrical clash of states or a secretive tit for tat of covert, deniable operations in which Israel and the United States would have the advantage. Instead, Iran hopes to signal that confrontation holds the potential for a clash with Shi’a and other Muslims across the region, with Iran at the lead, and that the assassination of Iranian commanders will only serve to further strengthen Iran’s infuence and position.

Across its many audiences, Iran’s narrative seeks to inspire a desire for martyrdom and religiously tinged jus ad bellum grounds for waging war. Iran’s political leadership has also repackaged these narratives for a population that

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 15 appears to be increasingly skeptical of Iran’s military adventures abroad. The IRGC leadership believes that this not only gives it a competitive advantage against adversaries, but also helps rejuvenate its ideological aspirations.

Figure 1

Five martyred commanders of the Resistiance Front in one frame. From right, deceased Fatemiyoun Division commander Reza Khavari; Soleimani; deceased IRGC commander Hossein Badpa; deceased Fatemiyoun commander Reza Bakhshi; and Tavassoli. The infographic also carries a quote from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praising Soleimani as “international face of resistance.”30

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 16 Figure 2

A poster advertising a commemoration ceremony for Soleimani and his deputy in Iraq Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis held in Mashhad.31

While the IRGC controls the Fatemiyoun Division and the division’s Pakistani Shi’ite twin, the Zeynabiyoun Brigade, Tehran still insists that both groups are made up of volunteers inspired to answer the call of Shia jihad and to defend Shi’ite holy shrines in Syria. The Guard Corps connects stories of the Fatemiyoun’s battlefeld sacrifces to narratives dating back to the early advent of sectarian schisms within Islam and its broader geopolitical goals, but is wary of fully abandoning the plausible deniability that the use of proxies can grant.

The Fatemiyoun Division has, nonetheless, increasingly played a role in Iran’s military eforts beyond Syria.32 Former Fatemiyoun fghters have been sighted in Yemen and on Libya’s frontlines, and some were reportedly deployed from Syria, but it is unclear whether they were sent to Libya under Iranian orders.33 Thousands of fghters have also returned home to Afghanistan where rising

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 17 instability and threats from ISIS and the Taliban could energize and reactivate Fatemiyoun networks that are far beyond Tehran’s control. The deployment of Fatemiyoun fghters in Syria since the civil war’s early days, suggests the Fatemiyoun Division is well-positioned to support Iran’s regional strategy and that Tehran may be anticipating a diferent kind of proxy war altogether in the years ahead.

Pitfalls of Iran’s Narrative Strategy and What the Narrative Means for the United States

It is far from clear whether Iran’s strategic approach and mobilization of narratives regarding the Fatemiyoun Division will be efective. Tehran’s public support for transnational revolution in defense of Shi’a communities risks could trigger an escalation of tensions with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and stir up domestic discontent. Using one narrative to signal to multiple audiences holds great promise for Iranian strategy, but it also introduces a level of complexity that can backfre.

At the same time, while the United States exerted more pressure and more direct confrontation through the assassination of Soleimani, the imposition of sanctions and other actions, there are reasons to question the credibility of the U.S. commitment when it comes to containing perceived threats from Iranian proxies. For instance, while the United States in 2019 designated the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun as terrorist groups pursuant to Executive Order 13224,34 it has not mounted a sustained, direct campaign to disrupt these groups and they continue to operate freely.

This presents a sharp contrast to global U.S. counterterrorism campaigns against Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda or ISIS. The Trump administration elected to partially subcontract its response to Iran’s proxy warfare to Israel. The Trump administration came close to but eventually pulled back from taking stronger military action in the wake of Iran’s probing of American red lines with attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf or the downing of an American drone.35 Given these complexities, the jury is still out on whether the United States will succeed in managing escalation risks in the future, particularly as the Biden administration recalibrates the United States’ approach to Iran and its proxies.

Tracing the evolution of the Guard Corps’ cultivation of Fatemiyoun Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade fghters, and the narratives that drew them to the Syrian civil war is important to navigate these complex dynamics. Iran’s ability to mobilize a wide array of proxies from across the region is dependent on its ability to efectively message and frame narratives of grievance. Much like their frontline adversaries, ISIS, the scores of young Afghan and Pakistani men stirred to take up arms in defense of Shi’ite shrines to Fatima and Zeynab, frst heard the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 18 call while surfng YouTube or by watching viral video clips passed from cellphone to cellphone.

The Fatemiyoun’s song of martyr mythos online, on the battlefeld, and at the gravesite, represents an unparalleled triumph of the Guard Corps’ experimentation of what our colleagues, Peter Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, have called “Like War” or “the weaponization of social media.”36 But it also empowers the scores of young Afghan and Pakistani men to shape narratives with an impact on the prospects for a potential U.S.-Iran escalation in a way that they would previously have been incapable of—and not necessarily to the beneft of Iran.

The Guard Corps places a high value on cultural production and political warfare in its proxy strategy, and promoting the mythos of martyrdom on the frontlines of Iran’s Forward Defense strategy is central to that enterprise. However, in doing so, the IRGC has also linked conficts across the region to a greater extent than it has before and played into sectarian narratives that may prove difcult to control while giving power to a network that, while deeply indebted to Iran, is not fully under its control. Analyzing the origin and evolution of Fatemiyoun communications strategy is, therefore, critical to tracking the degree of efective control or infuence Iran exerts over one of its key proxies in the region.

This report attempts to do just that. It is divided into eight parts, including this introductory section. The second section, outlines the origin story of the Fatemiyoun Division and explains how millennium-old tropes about martyrdom in the Shia faith became the rallying cry of the 1979 Iranian revolution and soon drew many Afghan and Pakistani faithful to Ayatollah Khomeini’s cause. It also explores how infuential Iranian clerics in major cities in eastern Iran near the Afghan and Pakistani border became an important resource for marginalized migrants who poured into Iran in waves as South Asia was rocked by the U.S.- Soviet proxy war in the 1980s. The third section details how Guard Corps commanders mobilized Afghan and Pakistani fghters to join them on the front at the crossroads of the disputed territory of Khuzestan during the Iran-Iraq War. The fourth section examines in depth the language, signs, and symbols that are so central to the Fatemiyoun media wing’s cultural production. The ffth section explains how the IRGC reactivated the Fatemiyoun’s social networks as the Syrian civil war began in 2011. The sixth section traces the impact of the Guard Corps progressive consolidation of the Fatemiyoun’s propaganda machine as Iran turned its attention from the fght against ISIS in Syria in 2017 to other pressing objectives in its regional proxy war strategy. The seventh section contemplates the Fatemiyoun Division’s potential future trajectory, and the concluding section refects on the implications of Soleimani's death for the movement and the region.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 19 II. The Origins of Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Shi’a Networks

From Mashhad to Kabul and Back Again: Early Roots of Afghan Shia Jihadist Factions, 1950-1979

The Fatemiyoun Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade origin story is deeply rooted in the Iranian revolution, the U.S.-Soviet proxy war in the 1980s, and Iran’s mobilization of South Asian proxies during the Iran-Iraq War. Historically, Iran has exerted considerable cultural, religious, and political infuence over Afghanistan’s Shia minority, and for generations, key religious and cultural sites in the Iranian cities of Mashhad and Qom have been a major draw for Shia among Afghanistan’s ethnic Hazaras.

Long marginalized under laws and customs promulgated by Afghanistan’s dominant Pashtun Sunni elites, ethnic Hazaras are of Turkic, Mongol, and Persian extraction, and their distinctive features have marked them with an outsider status in both Afghanistan and Iran.37 But, since the start of the anti- monarchist, anti-colonial uprisings in both countries that started with the rise of political Islam across the region in the 1950s, Iran has served as a kind of cultural, political, and economic refuge for Shia Hazaras and a patron to a certain class of Hazara elites.

Although there has been no ofcial census in Afghanistan since 1978,38 various estimates suggest Afghan Shia Hazaras constitute anywhere from 10 to 20 percent of the country’s 27 million people.39 For generations under the Afghan monarchy, Hazaras’ minority status resulted in their enslavement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and for much of the twentieth and twenty- frst centuries Hazaras have traditionally been politically marginalized and discriminated against in the realm of education and labor.40 Successive waves of civil unrest and civil war in Afghanistan have also resulted in the forced migration of millions of Hazaras who, over the last century, have settled in large clusters in Mashhad, Qom and the Pakistani city of Quetta.

While Afghanistan outlawed slavery under a constitutional provision passed in 1923, the rise of Pashtun nationalism in the 1930s in the country, the resettlement of Pashtuns in traditionally Hazara areas, and the constant whittling away of land rights in the twentieth century placed Hazaras frmly in the country’s underclass. 41 Consequently, for generations, most Hazaras lived in poverty and many worked as domestic servants or manual laborers. As Afghan scholar Amin Saikal notes, Afghan ruling elites frequently persecuted and exploited Hazaras.42 These factors and Afghanistan’s long history of widespread political violence have contributed to a kind of culture of exile among Afghan Shia and a valorization of

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 20 resistance and outsider status that permeates the music, literature, media, and art of the community.43

For many years, a lack of access to government-subsidized public schools up until the late 1960s and 1970s meant that informal education through religious centers of learning such as mosques and madrassahs remained one of the few consistent sources of education for Afghan Shias.44 Consequently, in search of higher and better education, large numbers of Shias traveled to Iran and Iraq’s religious cities.45 As a result, a sizable number of educated Afghan Hazara academics, religious scholars, and infuential politicians also studied in Iran. Sayed Ismail Balkhi and Ayatollah Mohaqiq Kabuli are among the most prominent in this cadre, and count as the frst-nodes in the network of Afghan- Iranian Shia leaders that later played a crucial role in the relations between revolutionary Iran and Afghan Shias.

Born in 1919, Balkhi is often thought of as the ideological progenitor of Afghanistan’s Shia jihadist movements and the link between Afghan Shia, Qom, a key hub of religious power in Iran, and Tehran, the seat of political power in Iran. Kabuli, on the other hand, is often thought of as the more authoritative religious fgure within the movement. Born in 1928, Kabuli came of age in the years after the abolishment of slavery in Afghanistan and later spent time in exile in Syria, then Najaf before settling in Qom.46 The two represent important interrelated strands of the distinctive ethno-political culture at the root of the Fatemiyoun movement.

A pioneer of his generation and later an iconic revolutionary fgure among Afghan Hazara Shia, Balkhi was part of a wave of reformist student political movements that emerged during the turbulent reign of Afghanistan’s regent Zahir Shah.47 He was an early adopter of the ideological tenets of political Islam and studied religious theology in the eastern Iranian city of Mashhad. In 1935, during an anti-Reza Shah protest, Balkhi escaped violent state suppression of uprisings in Mashhad and retreated to the western Afghan city of Herat, where he began making public speeches and established pro-republican political cells.48

After serving a 15-year prison term for his involvement in a violent anti- government putsch against Zahir Shah in Kabul in 1950, Balkhi continued his political organizing activities in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif and the Afghan capital of Kabul. Balkhi was eventually drawn back to Iran in 1967 when he embarked on a religious pilgrimage to visit Shia sacred sites Mashhad and Qom in Iran, Najaf in Iraq, and Damascus in Syria where he met scores of Shia scholars, revolutionists, and anti-Reza Shah dissidents including Ayatollah Khomeini, who was then living in exile in Najaf.49 In their meetings, the two clerics talked of the crucial role of resistance, revolution, and rebellion in harnessing the power of social movements in support of political Islam.50 Over time, Balkhi’s cross-border consultations and political activism would eventually

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 21 earn more sustained attention and his teachings gained greater attention in the early 1970s from co-revolutionaries in Iran.

By February 1979, the Iranian revolution had shifted into full gear. The Shah had fed Iran and Khomeini had returned from exile in France. Khomeini and his followers methodically started to eliminate and sideline rivals in the opposition that toppled the Shah in order to establish a government that enforced their rigid interpretations of Islamic law.51 In the narrative of Khomeini's followers, the cleric's return and the project to Islamize Iran was akin to an explosion of light, and these acts were necessary for the path of correctly implementing God's law. The Pahlavi dynasty's fall and Khomeini’s rise rocked the world, accelerating an Islamist movement that arose in part from the ashes of British and French colonialism in the aftermath of WWII.

It also made manifest the long sought-after dream of Shia revolutionaries building a republic based on the governing religious principle of velayat-e faqih or “guardianship of the jurist,” which vests Islamic clerics with supreme authority in interpreting and administering the law.52 And, in Afghanistan, where the rebellion against the Soviet incursion was raging, Iran’s revolution in governance found echoes in the formation in 1979 of a loosely knit revolutionary council known as the Shuray-e Ittefaq in the predominantly Shia region known as the Hazarajat, marking the frst time in generations that Hazara communities were self-governed in Afghanistan.53

Soon after taking power, Khomeini dispatched several representatives (wakil) to predominantly Shia areas across the Hazarajat region in northwestern and central Afghanistan. Some 12 clerics served as ofcial envoys of Khomeini’s Ofce of the Supreme Leader throughout the 1980s.54 In addition to collecting funds, Khomeini’s representatives preached and advocated taking a more hardline stance against the regime in Kabul.55 It was in this way that the very personal bond between Khomeini and Balkhi reinforced connections between Iranian elites and Afghan Shia. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and after Khomeini’s Islamic revolutionary movement successfully overthrew the government of Reza Shah in 1979, there were increasing signs that Balkhi and Khomeini’s hardline religious views were becoming more infuential among Afghan Shia religious leaders.

In the early stages of the anti-Soviet resistance, Afghan Shia adherents of Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine of velayat-e fqh, who were popularly known as the Khat-e Imam56 (Imam’s Line), launched full-scale cultural and religious campaigns aimed at mobilizing support for a sustained resistance movement.57 Disorganized at the outset, the Khat-e Imam eventually sought out an ideological organizing principle in the form of fatwas or religious edicts blessing violent political resistance or jihad and formed their own jihadist factions with separate liaison ofces in Tehran and Qom. Facilitated by the Islamic Republic, these

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 22 groups were later reorganized into an umbrella council known as Ettelaf-e Hashtgana (the coalition of eight Shia parties).58

Yet, while the Iranian revolution and the Afghan anti-Soviet uprising provided the initial spark that would seed the frst Afghan Shia jihadi factions that ultimately gave rise to Iran’s modern strategy of proxy warfare and the religious narratives that undergird it, the Iran-Iraq War was played a much more signifcant role in the formation of the Pakistani and Afghan networks that would pave the way for the Fatemiyoun.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 23 III. Crossroads in Khuzestan: Afghan Shi’a Mobilization During the Iran-Iraq War

In 1980, a combination of perceived threats and opportunities drove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to invade Iran. The proximate cause of Baghdad’s confict with Tehran lay in a long simmering territorial dispute over the oil-rich and predominantly Arab border region of Khuzestan. But, Hussein was also deeply alarmed by Khomeini's open calls for the overthrow of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime.59 After several assassination attempts against senior Iraqi ofcials that Hussein suspected were sponsored by Tehran, Hussein subsequently expelled thousands of Iranian backed Dawa Party members from Iraq in the early 1980s.60

At the same time, Iran itself was in turmoil, facing insurgencies in peripheral and predominantly minority regions, like Kurdistan, even as Khomeini’s government moved to consolidate its power by purging the military of royalist and anti- revolutionary elements. In the summer of 1980, as Khomeini’s government struggled to gain its footing amid the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, Hussein saw the domestic turmoil in Iran as an opportunity to annex disputed territory and push back the Iranian border with Iraq deeper into Khuzestan. After a summer of border skirmishes, Hussein’s Iraqi forces invaded Iran in September 1980, triggering the longest conventional war of the twentieth century. Initially caught of guard, Khomeini ultimately welcomed the confict, seeing it as an opportunity to purge Iran’s military and consolidate power at home while exporting the revolution abroad.61

It was during this early phase of the eight year-long Iran-Iraq War that Khomeini’s government began to craft the narrative of martyrdom and sacrifce on the battlefeld known as "Sacred Defense."62 In the context of the confict with Baghdad, Saddam Hussein and his Gulf backers as well as the United States were the modern day Yazidi and the fght to secure Khuzestan and Kurdistan was a reenactment of the Battle of Karbala. Khomeini’s government cast the war as an opportunity for the faithful to demonstrate that they were followers of Imam Hussein, willing to fght for God until the end. Martyrdom was also a vehicle through which to save the community from the penury of unjust, un-Islamic rule and cleanse the Shia community of its impiety and impurity.63

Iranian forces sufered several battlefeld defeats but as the skirmishes with Iraq drifted into a stalemate, Khomeini continued to invest in reinforcing cross- border links with revolutionary Shia cadres in neighboring Afghanistan. There were several channels of interaction between Afghan Shia jihadi factions and the Islamic Republic administration, but the most signifcant was with Afghan Shia who had earned strong support from Khomeini because of their early loyalty to the Iranian revolutionary cause. Ayatollah Kabuli who had returned from teaching in Najaf to Afghanistan at the outset of the anti-Soviet uprising was

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 24 among them. It was through the networks of madrassahs and mosques led by Afghan allies like Kabuli and other informal channels that the new revolutionary government in Tehran developed its frst iteration of a comprehensive proxy warfare strategy.

More formally, Tehran managed its relations with its Afghan Shia allies through distinct administrative and military channels. Iran’s Ofce of the Representative of the Supreme Leader for Afghanistan Afairs served as the main outreach ofce to the Afghan Shia jihadi factions for cultural and religious afairs. This ofce, through the Iranian Supreme Leader’s special representative for Afghanistan, also mediated between Shia groups at times of confict and disagreement.64

In 1982, after a series of battlefeld losses, Khomeini rejected Hussein’s ofer of a truce, demanded his removal, and invaded Iraq with the help of Iraqi Shia paramilitaries trained by the IRGC.65 Three years later, in 1985, Iran’s military leaders merged those Iraqi militia forces and other units into a single force under the command of Iranian expeditionary force ofcers in Department 900, a special intelligence unit predecessor to the Quds Force that had been established a year earlier to sustain a northern front against Iraq and was headquartered at what was then called the Ramezan Base.66 Ofcers in Ramezan also briefy oversaw an Afghan unit in the war.

As far as ideological training and material military support, it was Iran’s Liberation Movements Unit, under the control of Sayed Mehdi Hashemi that oversaw IRGC operations abroad including its Shia clients in Afghanistan.67 Hashemi’s Liberation Movements Unit, however, soon fell out of favor for its perceived disloyalty to Khomeini and suspicious behavior in the eyes of IRGC’s leadership; the unit dissolved in 1982.68

From the mid-1980s forward, the Guard Corps sponsored the formation of Afghan groups that later would constitute the leadership cadres of the Fatemiyoun. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Guard Corps dispatched operatives to train Afghan forces initially in Afghanistan, and, following the Iraqi invasion, on bases in Iran under the supervision of Islamic Movements Training Center, which answered to the IRGC Intelligence unit.69 Then-Guard Corps commander Mohammad-Javad Hakim Javadi, who was training Afghans for jihad against the Soviets, proposed to form and deploy an Afghan unit to the front with Iraq in order to better train them before deployment to Afghanistan.70

By the late 1980s, the IRGC also dispatched several ofcers to serve as cultural and military advisers in Afghanistan where they embedded with cells in the anti- Soviet resistance movement.71 Thus, the Abouzar Brigade was born, named after one of the companions of Prophet Muhammad whose steadfast support to Ali later led to his exile. The name was especially redolent of the long history of Hazara migration and the community’s outsider status in Afghanistan. Young

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 25 Hazara men have long viewed cross-border migration to Iran from the Hazarjat region in Afghanistan’s central highlands and from Quetta, Pakistan as almost a rite of passage.72

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Afairs at the same time began making inroads with more moderate anti-Soviet Afghan factions. These subtler Iranian diplomatic eforts with the assistance of the Quds Force and the Ofce of the Special Representative to the Supreme Leader laid the foundation for the formation of a more broadly based Afghan Shia political movement later coordinated by the Hizb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), which was established in 1989 just as the Soviets withdrew.73

Afghan Islamist political parties provided the bulk of the Abouzar Brigade’s recruits and after they were eventually integrated into the command structures of Ramezan Base, the frst Abouzar contingent deployed to the western front of Kurdistan in the winter of 1985-1986.74 Some fghters worked on a rotation between fronts, deploying back and forth between battlefelds in Iraq and Afghanistan.75 A year after its formation, however, the Abouzar Brigade disbanded.

Iranian commander Javadi blamed this on Ramezan's failure to support the unit. 76 Ofcial estimates have put the number of Abouzar Brigade fatalities at 2,000-3,000, a remarkably high fgure.77 In a collection of Abouzar Brigade memoirs written many years later and published in 2019, several fghters recounted how Iranians ordered Afghans to storm enemy strongholds and march directly into the line of fre, a phenomenon echoed in the way the Quds Force apparently deployed Afghan Fatemiyoun fghters a generation later.78 This may explain why Abouzar commanders refused to fght any longer. Javadi and a former Abouzar commander lamented that the unit could have been the precursor to "another Hezbollah" in Afghanistan, but the use of Afghans as cannon fodder in Iraq spoiled any chance of standing up a permanent Shia militia element loyal to Tehran in Afghanistan.79

A sizable enough remnant remained in the 1990s that Javadi was able to cobble together a new contingent as hardline Sunni Taliban forces began sweeping across Afghanistan. Sepah-e Mohammead was meant to be a sectarian militant organization loyal to Iranian leadership. With support from Quds Force commanders, Sepah-e Mohammad established training bases in Zahidan, capital of Sistan and the Baluchistan province of Iran. The Afghan Shia paramilitary force’s primary objective was to destabilize the Taliban’s hold in western Afghanistan and secure a bufer zone along the Iranian border. It made two failed attempts by fomenting a small rebellion in Herat city and dispatching a small armed unit into the border district of Herat province.80 The former was crushed and the latter ambushed.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 26 The Sepah-e Mohammad contingent dissolved in the mid-1990s. Some members, however, remained on an informal covert reserve status, most probably for what Iran anticipated might be a Taliban-ruled and Saudi- infuenced Afghanistan. According to Javadi, Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud once said, "If I want to imagine Islamic mujahid it would be the forces of Mohammad Corps."81 The U.S. military invasion in late 2001, however, neutralized the potential threat of an Iranian backed Shi’ite paramilitary ffth column, and the unit fully disbanded following the 2001 U.S. incursion into Afghanistan.82

While the Guard Corps did not sponsor a major Pakistani Shiite militia, a Pakistani cleric named Arif al-Husayni established a pro-Khomeini network among Pakistani Shiites. Al-Husayni was one of Khomeini's students prior to the revolution in Najaf. He preached Khomeini's brand of Islamic revolution in the eastern town Parachinar, where Pakistani Shiites predominantly reside, and he is sometimes referred to as the "spiritual father of the Zeynabiyoun," Fatemiyoun’s Pakistani counterpart.83 Although al-Husayni was assassinated in 1988 at the height of Arab infltration into the jihadi factions of northwest Pakistan, his networks, like others in Afghanistan that Tehran had invested in, endured throughout the Taliban era and into the post-Taliban era albeit at a reduced scale.

A Fickle Affair: The Quds Force and Afghan Shia in the Post-Soviet Era, 1990-2001

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army and the formation of the predominantly Hazara faction of Hezb-e Wahdat, relations between the mainstream Shia groups and Iran were fundamentally transformed. Hezb-e Wahdat leaders’ gradual exercise of political compromise with their one-time Sunni rivals among the mujahedin reshaped its relations with Iran.84 As a result, Iran began to shift its attention beyond its traditional Shia clients in Afghanistan, as the country became more unstable under the Soviet-backed regime of Najibullah.85

When Najibullah’s government collapsed in 1992, ferce internecine battles between warring ethnic factions erupted across Kabul. Iran began to adopt a more pragmatic approach to its foreign policy in Afghanistan by focusing on its interest in maintaining stability in Afghanistan rather than exporting the revolution through its Shia clients.86 The most dramatic evidence of this change is Iran’s decision to cut ties with the leadership of Hizb-e Wahdat in response to its violent opposition to Rabbani’s predominantly Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance interim government. At the same time, Iran also encouraged other small non-Hazara Shia groups within the Wahdat Party to split and join the government.87

For many Hazaras in Kabul, however, anti-government resistance was a do-or- die quest to ensure that the discriminatory regime of the past was not resurrected

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 27 under Rabbani’s government. Consequently, for many young Hazara leaders in Kabul, Iran’s open support for Rabbani’s regime dramatically reduced the Quds Force’s infuence during the early 1990s. But that changed quickly when the Taliban overtook Kabul in 1996 and drove Hezb-e Wahdat and Rabbani’s Jamiat- e Islami party out of the Afghan capital. Alarmed by the rapid pace of Taliban advancement across the country, Iran soon realized the perils of its fckle foreign policy in Afghanistan and joined Russia and India in extending military and fnancial support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.

Iran’s support to the Northern Alliance increased in 1996 and 1997.88 To that end, Soleimani, who had recently been elevated as Quds Force commander, played an instrumental role in the formation and empowerment of the anti-Taliban resistance front known as “Jabha-e Muttahed” (the United Front) in the north of Afghanistan.89 Iran’s reassured support to the Northern Alliance resistance— until the defeat of the Taliban in 2001—through the Quds Force was critical, and Soleimani’s role was pivotal in making that happen.90

By the mid-1990s, the Quds Force, which was then under the command of Ahmad Vahidi, had already dispatched its own diplomats and military advisers to Afghanistan to support Afghan Shia groups and the Northern Alliance resistance against the Taliban. This group included Soleimani who after serving on the frontlines of the Iran-Iraq War in Kurdistan was appointed as the Quds Force regional commander in the southeastern Iranian province of Kerman and ran counter-narcotics operations along the Afghan-Iranian border.91 In Afghanistan’s interior, Quds Force general and Soleimani’s eventual successor Esmail Ghani focused on advising Hazara resistance fghters.92

After the Taliban consolidated its power across the country in 1997, and took several Iranian diplomats hostage in 1998,93 the Quds Force attempted to remobilize Sepah-e Mohammad (Mohammad Army) to fght alongside other Northern Alliance contingents against the Taliban. The Quds Force even deployed them to predominantly Sunni districts in Takhar, Farah, and parts of Herat, but they failed to rally local support.94 Soleimani eventually dissolved the contingent, but the IRGC’s assistance to both Shia and Tajik resistance forces in the fght against the Taliban helped Iran mend fences with disafected Afghan Shia groups, including more mainstream moderate elements within the Hezb-e Wahdat Party.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 28 IV. The Arab Spring: A New Phase of Iranian Proxy Warfare Strategy

From Covert Escalation Management to Overt Intervention

In the decades following the Iranian revolution, Syria served both as a base of support for Iran’s most potent proxy Hezbollah and a territorial bridge that allowed Tehran to expand its strategic depth across the Middle East.95 Syria was in efect Iran's "35th province," as Mehdi Taeb, the director of pro-Khamenei think tank Ammar Base, once put it, and if Assad’s Damascus fell, so too would Tehran.96 The Arab Spring and the uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s government in Damascus in 2011, however, launched a new phase of Iranian proxy warfare strategy that saw not only a new managerial mode for Hezbollah but new roles for Afghan and Pakistani fghters.

As the confict in Syria escalated, Iran, despite the harsh economic toll from sanctions imposed due to its nuclear program, progressively stepped up its support, spending billions to prop up Assad’s regime.97 In the early phases of the crisis, Iran deployed a Law Enforcement Forces commander to lead the mission, followed by Quds Force Operations and Training commander Mohsen Chizari.98 Syria dispatched teams of security and military ofcers for training on cyberwarfare and surveillance for training in Tehran.99 A Syrian ofcer who defected said that the Iranians were responsible for the arrest of many activists early on.100 Syria, said Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei’s foreign policy adviser, is the “golden ring of resistance” for Iran, and the Shia in the Middle East, and must be defended at all costs.101

At the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Iran’s military aid to Assad’s regime was largely covert, and Tehran strived to maintain a degree of plausible deniability.102 Initially Iran heavily censored coverage of the deteriorating security situation for Assad’s government and denied any military involvement. That changed after the U.S. Treasury issued several assessments in 2011 and 2012 detailing a number of arms embargo sanctions violations by Iranian airline companies. In May 2012, Quds Force commander Esmail Ghani openly acknowledged that Iranian forces were in the country serving in an advisory capacity and providing a transfer of experience to Syria.103

Throughout 2012, Iran progressively increased the number of advisers and operatives it sent to Syria and also provided forces loyal to Assad with training, weapons, communications, and internet surveillance equipment.104 Despite the extra support, Syria was, however, unable to staunch the fow of its massive manpower losses due to large-scale defections within the ranks of Syria’s security forces and high battlefeld casualty numbers. Yet, the Quds Force, which was

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 29 principally organized as an advisory train-and-equip force, was ill-prepared to take on a direct combat role in Syrian counterinsurgency operations.

Tehran, moreover, was unwilling to risk the potential escalation of retaliatory measures by Israel and the United States that the direct involvement of its own forces might trigger.105 A new strategy was needed quickly and Soleimani turned to Hossein Hamedani, one of the Quds Force’s most experienced commanders, to roll out a plan for Iranian military assistance in Syria. During the 1970s under the Shah, Hamedani served in Iran’s airborne special forces, and after the revolution he played a crucial role in Khomeini’s violent suppression of the Kurdish insurgency.106 Hamedani was subsequently on the frontlines for almost the entirety of the Iran-Iraq War.

He later led the Guard Corps' efort to crush the Green Movement in Tehran in the 2009 post-election protests.107 Years after the 2009 protests, Hamedani told Javan-e Hamedan weekly that he recruited and organized 5,000 thugs in three battalions to crack down on protests, which showed that "if we want to train mujahids we must bring such individuals who know their way with knives and blades."108 When, in January 2012, Hamedani arrived in Damascus with a new strategy in hand he encouraged Assad to apply similar techniques.109 Hamedani, however, soon encountered resistance from Syrian ofcials when he pushed to expand training to include urban warfare tactics, and Hamedani told Khamenei that he was unable to fulfll his mission there.110

Hamedani insisted that Assad’s best bet for survival was the formation of a homegrown Basij type militia force to help crush urban uprisings, but Syrian ofcials remained fxed on conventional warfare.111 After anti-Assad Syrian rebels took dozens of IRGC advisers hostage in August 2012, it was all the more evident that a new approach was urgently needed.112 Khamenei and Soleimani reassured Hamedani, telling him not to be discouraged: "Syria is sick, and it does not know it is sick… Syrian ofcials must be made to understand this sickness. If Syria refuses to go to the doctor, you force it to go to the doctor. If Syria refuses to take its medicine, you keep giving it medicine and make sure the medicine is taken until the sickness is cured.” 113

Hamedani eventually managed to convince his Syrian counterparts that a change was needed, and began fully training Syrian forces three months later.114 Designated by Khamenei as the lead architect of Iran’s Syria strategy, Hamedani next turned his attention to crafting a more durable and comprehensive strategy for Syria and began working in consultation with Hezbollah’s chief Hasan Nasrallah. Nasrallah, in turn, acted as Iran’s ofcial representative for Iran policy in Syria, and put Hezbollah in charge of managing day-to-day operations.115 By the summer and fall of 2013, scores of local recruits underwent intensive urban warfare training under the auspices of Iranian advised forces variously known

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 30 early on as the People’s Army, Popular Defense Forces, and National Defense Forces.116

Yet, while progress was made on some fronts, Russia’s entry into the war and progressive increase of deployments of military advisers hindered Iran’s ability to control strategic outcomes. The tug of war between Iran and Russia over how best to train and organize local paramilitary forces undercut Tehran’s infuence and its ability to maintain plausible deniability.117 In the fall of 2013, the BBC released a documentary that included video footage of an IRGC operational base near Aleppo taken by an IRGC videographer who had likely been sent to Syria to produce packaged propaganda, but was killed during a skirmish near the ancient city in August.118 The subsequent escalation of U.S. sanctions and increasing fnancial involvement of Saudi Arabia and Turkey in backing their own proxies in Syria and other unstable parts of the Middle East in 2013 placed enormous strain on the Assad regime.119 It was these events that paved the way in part for Iran’s reactivation of Quds Force networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and an aggressive push to backfll personnel gaps in the Syrian armed forces with the force of new recruits.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 31 V. Keeping the Faith in Sacred Defense

Iran Revives the Shia Jihad Narrative

After Hamedani’s freshly trained local militia forces successfully repelled a rebel attack near the presidential palace in early 2013, Assad gave Hamedani a much freer hand to build out a unifed command structure for local Alawite and Shia paramilitaries under the National Defense Forces.120 Yet, Assad’s forces continued to lose ground to rebel forces afliated with Jabhat al-Nusra. When, in the spring of that same year, Jabhat al-Nusra began shelling the Sayyida Zainab Mosque and was nearly at the gates of the suburban Damascus shrine complex where Ali and Fatima’s daughter and the Prophet Muhammad’s granddaughter is buried, Soleimani saw in the onslaught an opportunity to turn the tide.121

Before the 1979 Iranian revolution, the site of the Sayyida Zainab shrine was considered a lesser stop along the Shia route of Middle Eastern Shia pilgrimage sites, but after Iran fnanced improvements to the site that saw the construction of the site’s iconic golden domed mosque in the 1980’s it began to attract more visitors.122 Trafc to the site and its signifcance as a cultural node in Syria began to increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s when senior Shia leaders also pushed for the construction of a tomb and schools and ofces nearby.123 Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1990s, small waves of itinerant Afghan construction workers and former fghters began focking to the site and formed a small community there.124

Situated in an area of suburban Damascus that for decades has been predominantly Sunni, the Sayyida Zainab shrine was a point of sectarian friction even before the Arab Spring brought tensions to a high boil.125 While the steady stream of Twelver Shia pilgrims that fooded the site each summer provided an economic boost to the area, their open displays of religious rituals occasionally provoked hostile responses from locals. Not surprisingly, the shrine also emerged as a central battleground in the early stages of Syria’s civil war. Jabhat al Nusra’s attacks on the Sayyida Zainab shrine and its subsequent desecration of the shrine of Hujr ibn Uday, a closer supporter of Ali and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, in the Damascene suburb of Adra in May 2013 compounded sectarian tensions fears. In a documentary about the Fatemiyoun's formation, Origin Story, the desecration of Uday incident is cited as the reason that Tavassoli decided to form the Fatemiyoun Division.126

The attacks provided a bitter reminder of unsettled scores and entrenched caste divisions that had long roiled the Middle East, providing an opening for Iran to expand its infuence. In his televised statements, Soleimani connected the defense of the Sayyida Zeynab shrine to the Imam Ali Shrine in Iraq's Najaf, and

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 32 the Imam Reza Shrine in Iran's Mashhad, warning that "if Syria falls to these [Sunni extremists]" they will destroy "Shiite sanctities." Soleimani referenced the 2006 bombing in Samarra, Iraq when he explained in his oral history how he coined the term "shrine defenders" at "the beginning of the Syria crisis."127 Although nearly seven years had passed since the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque of the Golden Dome in Samarra, Iraq, the sectarian fury the bloody event unleashed had in no way faded.128

Throughout 2013, Iranian media expanded coverage of "shrine defenders” who died on the battlefeld in Syria, though it generally covered the funerals of non- Iranians killed in action; a refection of the desire to limit the perception of Iranian involvement for both foreign and domestic audiences. The singular exception was the assassination of Quds Force general Hasan Shateri, also known as Hesam Khoshnevis, in February 2013 as he traveled from Damascus to Beirut, where he was stationed.129 Whether the fghter was of high-rank like Khoshnevis or a lowly Afghan foot soldier, the Sacred Defense narrative served two purposes: to draw more frontline recruits and to build a stay-behind cadre of support as an insurance policy in the event of Assad’s downfall. Should Assad be removed from power, the foreign fghters who answered the call to defend sacred Shia sites could theoretically serve as a bulwark in the creation of a much smaller Alawite-led statelet that would still allow Iran to maintain its land bridge to Lebanon and Hezbollah.130

Protection of the holy Damascene shrines of Sayyida Zeynab and Sayyida Roqayya proved a highly efective motivation for mobilizing proxy forces from across the region and from Afghanistan in particular, where Hazara communities repeatedly came under attack from Taliban insurgents from 2001 forward. Relying on a narrative of persecution also helped connect the fght in Syria to the fght against Sunni extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.131 Drawing on collective Shiite memories of persecution dating to the Battle of Karbala, Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah capitalized on it to mobilize Shiite fghters.132

Fatwas for jihad in Syria by loyalist senior clerics like the Qom-based Ayatollah Kabuli and Iraqi Ayatollah Kazem Ha'eri, who has a large following among Iraqi paramilitaries, provided religious legitimacy to the cause, though other prominent senior clerics in Qom and Najaf disputed the ruling.133 Those objections proved to be largely inconsequential. The call to defend the shrines in Damascus went viral on social media and spread by word of mouth. Registration forms for volunteer fghters soon began appearing online in Iran.134

The Sacred Defense movement was nascent, but it would gain momentum in 2014. The Syrian crisis was sectarian before Tehran's entry, thanks to the Alawite-dominated leadership's policies.135 However, Iran embraced the sectarian narrative of defending the Shiite faith against "takfris," a term used to describe Sunni extremists who ex-communicate other Muslims, but also any and all opposition fghters to Assad.136

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 33 Enter Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun

The frst public news in the English language press about the Fatemiyoun appeared in 2014, including an article in the Wall Street Journal that reported that Afghans deployed for promises of money and residency.137 The early reporting on the Fatemiyoun generally created a perception that Afghans, as well as Iranians, who deployed to Syria were mercenaries, a notion that Iran and its supporters felt compelled to push back against. Fatemiyoun fans took to social media platforms like Instagram to refute the claims, saying that fghters only wished to protect the shrines and defend their faith, and that they only received small stipends.138

In the early phases of the Syrian confict, the IRGC covertly recruited Shia from across the region as part of its mobilization to defend the Assad regime. The frst waves of Afghan fghters were auxiliaries of Iraqi contingents in Syria.139 The founders of the Fatemiyoun were 22 Afghans, many of whom were veterans of the wars against the Soviets, Ba’athists, and Taliban.140 Tavassoli played a key role in mobilizing Afghans in Iran for the defense of the shrines in Syria, and Tavassoli’s own history illustrates how Iran’s mobilization of proxies during the Arab Spring drew on the networks developed in the 1980s and 1990s in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Tavassoli had deployed to the Iran-Iraq War but was refused a position at the front because he was a teenager. He later saw action against the Taliban in the 1990s while fghting for the reconstituted remnants of the Sepah-e Mohammad forces. According to the Fatemiyoun documentary about Tavassoli’s life, he and other Sepah-e Mohammad and Abouzar Brigade veterans who resided in Mashhad kept in touch through religious gatherings.141 In the documentary, his spouse avers that Tavassoli started holding weekly meetings with other veterans to discuss the wars they fought, and that he gradually convinced some to join (See Figure 3). The very frst group afliated with Tavassoli’s circle of veterans deployed in May 2013, but Fatemioyun at this time was covert.142 The founders decided to change the name of the group from the Corpsman of Muhammad, a legacy of the Muhammad Corps decades earlier, to Fatemiyoun, meaning "Fatima’s people."143

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 34 Figure 3

Footage from the documentary Time of Being in which a fghter recounts that Tavassoli gathered a meeting of 22 men to fght in Syria to "defend" the shrine.144

Most media accounts and oral histories of the Fatemiyoun Division credit Tavassoli with initiating the idea to form the Fatemiyoun in order to defend the shrines. The self-initiative account, however, seems unlikely. The IRGC at the time was overseeing the deployments of Lebanese Hezbollah and militant Iraqi- Shiite deployments to Syria.145 The Guard Corps likely obfuscates its role in the Fatemiyoun's formation to project an image that the narrative of the Islamic revolution was truly inspirational.

During this covert recruitment phase, Iranian media acknowledged some Afghan fatalities and directly tied them to the defense of the shrine. The frst known ofcial Fatemiyoun fatality was three months after the initial wave deployed to Syria in secret, but that death was hidden from the public because of "the people's lack of familiarity from Fatemiyoun Brigades jihadi activities in its early months," according to a report in IRGC-linked media years after the fact.146

In December 2013, documentary flmmaker Ruhollah Raf'i told a gathering of Afsaran, a pro-IRGC group, that he met an Afghan in Syria who had gone to fght there on his own initiative, and fought as a component of the Syrian NDF (National Defense Forces).147 The flmmaker said that the Afghan was there to "defend the Islamic revolution" and the shrine.148 The flmmaker added that he spoke with the fellow when forces took Zeynabiyeh neighborhood in suburban Damascus, which is the area surrounding the shrines, around the time of Ashura, the most sacred holiday in the Shia religious calendar. That added even deeper religious signifcance, connected the battle to Karbala, and hinted at divine assistance.

While Afghans were buried in Iran initially in secret, that started to change toward late 2013, several months before the Fatemiyoun's ofcial formation.149

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 35 The funerals of most fghters, however, were not publicized in order to minimize the perception of involvement. In one example, two fghters were called "defenders of the shrine of Hazrat-e Zeynab."150 Their joint funeral ceremony at their residence city of Qom was held at the shrine of Hazarat-e Fatima Ma'soumeh, the sister of the eighth Shiite Imam Reza. The fghters' caskets carried banners that read "Ya Hossein," meaning "Oh Hossein," a Shiite slogan. 151 The two were buried in Qom's Behesht-e Ma'sumeh cemetery in a special section next to unknown martyrs.

The Pakistani Zeynabiyoun Brigade likewise formed covertly. A commander called Abbas said that the Quds Force formed ties with militants in 2001, when the United States invaded Afghanistan.152 After pleading with handlers, according to an ofcial account, fghters eventually received the green light to form a unit of 50, but a condition was that they could only recruit from Pakistanis who lived in Iran, while "all of our trained warrior and jihadi forces were in Pakistan."153 A signifcant number of recruits were clerics who studied in Qom's Al-Mostafa University, an important state-owned seminary school where foreign students, like Tavassoli decades earlier, have studied.154

The frst gathering of Pakistani recruits was in the winter of 2013-2014, and the frst deployment was in spring 2014, according to an ofcial history on the Iranian Judiciary's website.155 Among the Zeynabiyoun ranks were militiamen who fought against Sunni extremists in Pakistan.156 The Zeynabiyoun did not publicize their operations or fghters’ deaths in order to avoid scrutiny from Pakistan’s intelligence services or Salaf jihadists and to avoid tensions between Iran and Pakistan.157 Iran's desire to not advertise its use of Pakistani nationals in proxy warfare so as to not increase tensions with Islamabad stands in contrast with Iran's more liberal record of publicizing the role of Afghan militants, despite Kabul's protests.158

For Iran, the Afghan and Pakistani diaspora provided a cheap and disposable way to backfll the manpower defcits that had so concerned Hamedani and the IRGC. Large numbers of impoverished Afghans and Pakistanis provided a recruitment pool that could be connected to the existing networks characterized by fgures like Tavassoli. The overwhelming majority of fghters were recruited in Iran, home to approximately 3 million Afghan refugees, only a third of whom are registered.159 Although the Guard Corps primarily recruited from the Afghan refugee diaspora in Iran, a smaller number of Afghans who lived in Syria around the Sayyida Zeynab shrine also took up arms.160

Hundreds were also directly recruited from Afghanistan.161 As previously mentioned, many Afghans migrated to Iran following the Soviet-Afghan war, and many continue to look to Iran for better opportunities. Afghans in Iran have faced, nonetheless, widespread discrimination, a fact openly acknowledged by Guard Corps commanders who often used it as leverage in enticing recruits.162

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 36 Moreover, a severe economic downturn in 2013-2014 stemming in part from the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan contributed to an infux of Afghan Shia refugees to Iran.163 The Guard Corps ably exploited these vulnerabilities, paying Fatemiyoun meager salaries of anywhere between $400-$1,000 per month and promising Afghan refugees permanent residency status.164

While Pakistani Shiites number fewer than Afghans, an infux of refugees into Iran created a larger base of recruits. Zeynabiyoun fghter Abbas added the recruitment base grew after the United Arab Emirates expelled 12,000 Pakistani Shiites, many of whom went to Iran and enlisted in the Zeynabiyoun.165

Historian Tom Cooper, citing Guard sources, said that the Quds Force in 2012 had incurred signifcant losses after it deployed two divisions of Iranian fghters to Damascus.166 Iran's decision to expand the recruitment of Pakistani and Afghan fghters coincided with its decision to fully shift to proxy warfare in Syria as a result of early Iranian losses. By 2013, the IRGC concluded that it needed to expand the presence of foreign fghters under its command to augment the training of Syrian paramilitaries in the NDF. Facing the prospect of further losses and the hemorrhage of manpower in Assad's army, the Guard Corps doubled down on proxies. In 2013, Hezbollah also openly intervened, marking a turning point in the war.167 The Fatemiyoun announced its formation later that same year.

Proxy warfare via Pakistani and Afghan fghters allowed escalation control and a cheap means to change facts on the ground. As the Syrian uprising continued to devolve into war, Iran faced tightening international sanctions over its nuclear program and was reeling from the 2009 post-election protests.168 Deploying even larger numbers of Iranians elevated the risk of provoking even tighter sanctions. It would have also generated criticism back home, where many Iranians would have questioned the logic of escalating retaliatory risks for what many Persians viewed as an Arab autocracy. For these reasons, the Guard Corps maintained that its presence in Syria was limited to advise and assist operations, and it tried to obfuscate its presence on the ground. That is where the magic of the media and the IRGC’s propaganda machine came in handy.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 37 VI. Spinning the Fatemiyoun: Raising an Army of Disposable Afghan Diaspora Online

The Guard Corps overtly stepped up its recruitment of Afghan and Pakistani militias between 2013 and 2017 as its intervention in Syria deepened. During this time, it also began to openly acknowledge the fatalities of "shrine defenders," with the media casting them as martyrs, and comparing them to Afghans and other Shia fghters killed during the Iran-Iraq War, or Sacred Defense.169 Yet, even as Iranian ofcials praised Afghan and Pakistani martyrs, they would not deign to drape their cofns in the Islamic Republic's fags like Iranian soldiers killed in combat, though for the most part, the fallen Afghan fghters and families were not Iranian citizens.170

Fighters shared videos of combat on phones that spread on social media platforms, which inspired some recruitment.171 Some of these same memes and viral videos even enticed a signifcant number of Fatemiyoun fghters who were U.S.-trained former soldiers in the Afghan National Army, and elite Afghan special forces.172 A former fghter said that many of these soldiers registered because of discrimination or the Afghan government's lack of care toward the army.173 The Guard Corps selected these individuals for command posts.174 The Guard Corps also deployed Afghan child soldiers as young as 14 who went to recruitment ofces to earn more money; recruiters did not enforce the nominal rules of 18 years of age and parents' consent.175

There are few written accounts available about eforts to recruit Pakistani Shia fghters into the Zeynabiyoun Brigade. While it is likely that similar conditions drove Zeynabiyoun recruitment, it would be unwise to draw a defnitive conclusion. The IRGC recruited through word of mouth in Afghan communities, for instance through work (very often construction jobs), neighborhoods, or mosques.176 An Afghan group based in Yazd, called Ansar ol-Abbas Battalion, said that the Guard al-Qadir provincial unit commander in 2011 helped form the group, stressing that the group had its own initiative.177 The group worked on cultural and social issues, according to the commander. The Battalion’s group leader said that after the Syrian war started, the battalion worked with the Guard Corps to deploy forces to Syria.178 They recruited about 100 people, fve of whom died and 20 of whom were injured, a high casualty rate.

From 2014 forward, Iranian media coverage, particularly from an IRGC-linked news agency, portrayed a positive image of Afghans in Iran, and stressed that Afghans were supporters of the Islamic Republic.179 Reports centered on stories about government and social mistreatment of Afghans in Iran. One Afghan cited in a report from Tasnim News that "our problem is not with the Islamic Republic, but with the obstacles to fulfll the revolution."180 In another 2014 media take, an Iranian cleric claimed that the Supreme Leader had called for better treatment of

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 38 Afghan migrants and for a committee to form in his ofce to help improve their conditions (there has been no indication about progress on this).181

Murals and shrines to fallen fghters began to decorate parts of the capital Tehran, and media coverage of funerals increased, as did the circulation of reports that featured heroic tales of Afghan defenders of the shrine.182 Funerals were usually held in areas that had large Afghan populations and where the fghters resided, such as Qom and Mashhad (See Figures 4 and 5).183 Funeral posters like those seen in Figure 4 below typically showed faces of fghters with their names with a background image of the shrine. Online blogs dedicated to covering news and memorials about martyrs reinforced the narratives.184

Figure 4

A banner carrying the faces and names of deceased Afghan fghters during a funeral ceremony for two fghters in Qom in October 2014. Along the bottom is the sponsoring committee, called the Committee of Martyrs and Warriors of Hazarat-e Zeynab Shrine Defenders.185

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 39 Figure 5

Caskets of two fghters at a funeral ceremony in Mashhad. The casket reads, "We answer your call, oh Husayn. We answer your call, oh Zeynab." A cleric is speaking before the crowd during funeral ceremonies in Mashhad.186 While the caskets are shrouded in green, representing heaven, and religious symbols Iranian fghters' caskets at the time were shrouded in the Islamic Republic's fag.

Both the Fatemiyoun and Zeynaibiyoun used social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook to raise their profle, though at frst they lacked cohesive messaging. This occurred even as Iran stepped up its censorship of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter in the wake of the 2009 post-election protests, when protesters used these platforms to coordinate protests.187 IRGC- backed groups like the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun used these platforms to advertise themselves and create an online community.188 The pages were run by afliated accounts or individuals. They would announce fatalities that sometimes had not been covered in Iranian media.189 In 2015, Facebook took down their pages.190

When Instagram surged in popularity in early the 2010s in Iran, the Fatemiyoun’s presence on the platform quickly followed, increasing in fall 2015. Fighters would post photos from the battlefelds of Syria.191 In 2018, Instagram shut down the group's page, but current and former fghters continue to use the platform and hold personal accounts, in part because Instagram is one of the rare Western social media platforms not censored by the Islamic Republic.192 Instagram accounts include those dedicated to fallen fghters.193 The Fatemiyoun's reach beyond their online community was small compared to the Islamic State,

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 40 however, which had achieved the status of a global household name through its strategic use of social media.

In May 2015, the Fatemiyoun declared that their numbers had expanded. Iranian media said that they ofcially upgraded from a brigade to a division, which is nominally a unit of more than 10,000 fghters.194 Iranian media and ofcials have said that the group numbers between 10,000 and 20,000 fghters at any given time.195 A report in the Judiciary's news agency Mizan, however, said that the Fatemiyoun made the upgrade after the number of forces surpassed 3,000 fghters.196 Changing the name from brigade to division and disseminating news of the change through formal and social media helped project a stronger presence on the ground.

The actual number of Fatemiyoun fghters, however, is contested. The late Fatemiyoun commander Hosseini said that Fatemiyoun reached 14,000 fghters in Syria in 2016.197 Other analysts like Ali Alfoneh, on the other hand, have estimated that the number of fghters at any given time has been below 10,000. 198 A former Fatemiyoun deputy commander told analyst Ahmad Shuja Jamal that about 50,000 Afghans deployed to Syria between 2013 and the end of 2017. 199 Whatever the actual number there is little debate that Afghan fghters changed facts on the ground in Syria.

The Islamic State's declaration of the caliphate in 2014 fed into the IRGC's narrative of defending Shiism. Here was a viciously anti-Shiite group with genocidal intentions.200 Massacres of Shiites, for instance, the notorious execution of about 1,700 Shiite cadets at Camp Speicher in June, made the threat clear.201 IRGC-linked news agencies and pro-IRGC social media accounts on Telegram republished uncensored videos of Islamic State atrocities.202 The Guard Corps could not have asked for a better enemy to justify its intervention abroad. The Islamic State magnifed the narrative of defending the shrine. A particularly potent narrative would be that fghters in Syria were there to prevent Zainab being "taken captive again."203 The Iranian public overwhelmingly supported the fght against the Islamic State in Iraq.204 Support for Assad, on the other hand, was contentious.205 From then on, Iran justifed its presence in both Syria and Iraq as an efort to fght against the Islamic State menace, even though it was in Syria well before the group grew and became a key player on the battlefeld.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 41 A Telling Change of Emblems

Figure 6

An early Fatemiyoun insignia.

Figure 7

An early Fatemiyoun emblem.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 42 Figure 8

First ofcial Fatemiyoun emblem.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 43 Figure 9

Latest ofcial Fatemiyoun emblem.

The Fatemiyoun Division has had several unofcial emblems since 2013, as can be seen from Figures 6 through 9. The changes in these emblems over time refect the unit’s growth and the rising signifcance of the mission of defending the shrine for Iran’s proxy warfare strategy. More recent logos emphasize the defense of the shrine and a more global agenda with imagery that did not appear in earlier logos.

An emblem that was not widely adopted, Figure 6, shows a rising fst, symbolizing masses rising up; an AK-47, a cheap and common rife long associated with third world struggles; and a leaf, which represents the desire for peace. The three symbols are also found in the IRGC's logo itself, drawing from the Marxist-Islamist Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO), from which it split in the 1970s. 206 "Indeed, we have given you, [O Mohammad], a clear conquest," reads the top verse that is from Quran 48:1, a revelation that marks the Prophet's conquest of Mecca. Figure 7 has appeared on social media channels. It shows an outline of the country of Afghanistan on a map of the world, with big letters that say "Afghanistan Hezbollah."207 Letters also read, "Shrine defenders of the Fatemiyoun Battalion," and "fghters without borders."

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 44 Afghan fghters adopted the image in Figure 8 on a wider scale from around the time the Fatemiyoun ofcially formed in late 2013 and early 2014.208 The symbol shows the globe, which refects their growing emphasis on internationalism. In the middle reads “Fatemiyoun” written in Persian. Part of the verse from Quran 3:160 on top reads, "If God should aid you, no one can overcome you." The rest of the verse reads, "but if He should forsake you, who is there that can aid you after Him? And upon God let the believers rely." The verse prior to this recommended the faithful to have trust in the divine, and this verse explains the result of that. The various interpretations of these verses agree that only the Almighty has the power to determine victory and defeat. This full trust and realization would allow the faithful to fear no one else but God, and to ensure that they perform their religious duties. If a mujahid, or a warrior fghting for God, faces defeat, then there is wisdom in that. This theme probably applies better to the ebbs and fows of combat.

The latest logo, shown in Figure 9, was unveiled in late 2015. It is an homage to the group’s IRGC roots with an update refecting its ofcial raison d'etre of defending shrines in Syria.209 The book on the bottom represents the Quran, with two AK-47 assault rifes. These represent the group's religiosity and willingness to take up arms. The globe from the IRGC's logo remained in the new logo. A new feature is the shape of the dome of a shrine around the name of the Fatemiyoun in the front, which represents its declared mission to protect Shiite shrines. The number on the bottom represents the paramilitary group's founding year in the Islamic calendar, 1435, or 2013-2014.

Figure 10

Early Zeynabiyoun insignia.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 45 Figure 11

Latest Zeynbiyoun insignia.

The Zeynabiyoun Division's emblem has likewise changed. Its early symbol, seen in Figure 10, bears a striking resemblance to Lebanese Hezbollah's symbol, which was adopted from the Guard Corps. The globe, leaves, hands, and AK-47 rifes are all present. Zeynabiyoun is written in the middle. "Is there any defender to defend the household of the Prophet of God," reads the writing on top, which is attributed to Imam Hossein during the heat of the battle of Karbala when dust settled and he looked upon the remains of his dead soldiers.210 The symbol below the hand appears to a pen, which suggests knowledge, and a book, which probably suggests the Quran. On the bottom is written "Islamic Resistance in the World." Resistance refers to the alliance of state and non-state actors led by Tehran. The motto reafrms the Zeynabiyoun's transnational Shiite identity. That is also adopted from Hezbollah, though the Lebanese organization has "Islamic Resistance in Lebanon." This Zeynabiyoun emblem was the ofcial representation until at least 2016.211

Toward the end of 2016 and early the following year, the Zeynabiyoun adopted a new emblem, shown in Figure 11, which is remarkably similar to the previous one. The hand, AK-47, globe, pen, leaves, and name of Zeynabiyoun are present. One diference is the change in the writing, which is replaced with a verse from Quran 61:13: "victory from God and imminent conquest." The full verse is: "And

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 46 [you will obtain] another [favor] you love - victory from God and imminent conquest; and give good tidings to the believers." The open book on the bottom represents the Quran. Like the Fatemiyoun, the number on the bottom is the group's founding year in the Islamic calendar, 1435, or 2013-2014.

Soleimani, the Shadow Commander, Steps Out of the Shadows

The story of the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun cannot be told without Qassem Soleimani, the famous commander of the Quds Force who met his end in the land where his legend began, Iraq. Soleimani’s own history is an example of the links between Iran’s mobilization of Afghan and Pakistani networks in the Iran- Iraq War and during the 1990s and the confict in Syria. However, over the course of Iran’s involvement in Syria, its war against ISIS, and escalating tensions with the United States, Soleimani took on an increasingly public role. This public role would eventually connect to and help fuel the growing narrative of Iranian support for the Fatemiyoun.

Born in 1957 to a poor family in a remote village in a tribal area in Kerman Province close to the Afghan border, Soleimani left his job as a construction contractor for the Kerman Water Organization and joined the Guard Corps following its establishment in 1979.212 He rose to command a division and form close ties with commanders during the Iran-Iraq War.213 After the war, he fought smugglers in southeast Iran in the 1990s, continuing his post as commander of the Sarallah Division. He assumed command of the Quds Force in 1997 or 1998, to lead Iranian eforts against the Taliban, a top security concern at the time.214

Soleimani’s profle among the Iranian leadership rose after his direction of the Iranian war efort against American and coalition forces in Iraq following 2003.215 Khamenei bestowed a medal to Soleimani for his role during Hezbollah's war against Israel in 2006 (known in Iran as the 33-Day War), which was not publicized at the time.216 In 2011, Khamenei promoted him to Major General, making him the only general among the fve branch Guard Corps commanders below the overall commander who held that rank.217 At that time, Soleimani mostly kept a low public profle, but was well known to experts on Iran and Iran's adversaries.

Western media helped cultivate the perception of Soleimani as a mastermind, even as he committed errors and failures. In 2013, a New Yorker profle cultivated —at least in the imagination of many Western—the image of the grey-bearded shadow commander who has been "reshaping the Middle East."218 Syria was the highest profle operation he was associated with at that time. In other words, Soleimani reaped the rewards of the strategy Hamedani designed. Soleimani, however, failed to predict or prevent the Islamic State's 2014 incursion into Iraq, capture of Mosul, and march to the vicinity of the Iranian border.219 While Iran prevented Assad's fall, there was no end in sight to that war. Furthermore, Iran's

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 47 ties with Arab states had plummeted. Rumor and speculation spread that Soleimani might be sidelined or replaced.220 Even though the media reported that he was in Iraq to fght the Islamic State, he continued to largely keep a low profle.

That changed around September 2014, when Soleimani's use of social media propelled him to celebrity status. Photos, selfes, and videos of Soleimani at the front lines with fghters in Iraq, and meetings with commanders began to surface and be shared by users on social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube at a high rate (See Figures 12-14).221 Ostovar has linked Soleimani's use of social media to his desire to maintain his prime position.222 Here was the shadow commander on the front lines to combat the Islamic State, which was also using social media to inspire tens of thousands of followers. The Islamic State was the perfect enemy for Soleimani, whose presence on the front lines against this hated enemy commanded attention. He became a viral sensation. That increased his infuence and power on the ground, as well. Footage at recently conquered areas fed his public perception as a mastermind. That in turn fed into even more attention, creating a momentum that grew his legendary persona. His presence became a morale booster for allies, and a menace for his adversaries. The social media revolution allowed Soleimani and the Islamic State to not only spread their messages but change geopolitics.

Soleimani transformed the face of Iran’s infuence in southwest Asia. He became the message and the medium. The IRGC and the Islamic Republic enthusiastically started to promote a cult of personality around him. His public persona is that of a charismatic, humble, and pious general committed to the Islamic Revolution, loyal to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and to Iran’s revolutionary cause of challenging American hegemony and power projection in the Middle East.223 While the anti-Islamic State coalition pushed back the Salafst jihadist group in Iraq, the Syrian war was becoming more desperate for Iran.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 48 Figure 12

Qassem Soleimani near Amerli, September 2014.224

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 49 Figure 13

Soleimani with Iran-linked Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) fghters near Tuz Khurmatu, October 2014.225

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 50 Figure 14

A viral meme of Soleimani with astronaut Neil Armstrong on the moon parodying the photos Soleimani was releasing in public in a number of areas, which through social media became an internet sensation.226

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 51 Putin Steps In: 2015 as Watershed Moment for Iran’s Proxy War Strategy and Narrative

Figure 15

Selfe of Soleimani with a Russian soldier that circulated widely on social media in February 2016.227

Early 2015 was grim for Damascus and Tehran. A jihadist-led coalition conquered Idlib Governorate, which could act as a launching pad for further territorial gains including in the Alawite heartland in the west.228 Damascus controlled small patches of Syrian territory. Iran had already deployed thousands of its foreign legion. Tehran had two options: cut its losses and concentrate on securing the territory stretching from Latakia in the west and down the Lebanese border to Damascus, or escalate to turn the tide of war.229 The latter would mean the deployment of tens of thousands more Iranian and Shiite paramilitary boots. That carried high costs and the risk of war with outside powers that, at that time, would have found a full-scale Iranian invasion of the Levant intolerable. Iran was already facing the threat of attacks against its nuclear facilities and was under crushing sanctions over its weapons program.230 Tehran's adversaries had the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 52 leverage of destroying Iran's air bridge to Syria, its primary supply route, to cripple Iranian operations. The Guard Corps had no answer for their superior air power and air defense systems.

Iran needed the intervention of another power on its side: Russia. In 2015, Soleimani personally traveled to Moscow with a proposition for President Vladimir Putin: Russia and Iran could save Assad, the Kremlin's long-time ally, and turn the tide of the war.231 In a meeting that is said to have lasted over two hours, Soleimani told Putin that "the last trench of the eastern bloc is Syria, and if you lose this, Westerners would no longer value you."232 In this deal, Iran would provide the bulk of ground forces, and Russia would provide its airpower, as well as some Russian ground troops.233 Iran could inject Iranian boots into its Shiite expeditionary forces and escalate without the high risk and cost of a solo Iranian intervention. Putin also saw an opportunity to fex the Kremlin's muscles abroad and escalate militarily without the burden of signifcant Russian casualties.234

Coordination between Russia and Iran has endured despite mutual mistrust.235 Tehran and the Kremlin mobilized following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015, which removed international sanctions in exchange for a temporary freeze on the nuclear program.236 That deal allowed Iran to de-escalate tensions with the West. In September, Putin announced in a press conference that Russia would escalate its involvement in Syria.

After the Russian announcement, Iran stepped up its military presence, but continued to obfuscate the level of its involvement. Commanders acknowledged they were coordinating with Russia in Syria.237 Iran, however, continued arguing that its military personnel were advisers, the narrative it has used since 2012.238 The facts on the ground, however, proved otherwise. The most senior commander killed during this period was Hamedani, an event that grabbed headlines across the world, and the Guard Corps held a massive funeral for him. 239 The Islamic Republic deployed thousands of Guard Corps personnel drawn from the Ground Forces, an unprecedented scale in its proxy warfare history, though the quality of Iranian soldiers atrophied compared to the early phases of the war due to casualties.240 Many Iranian fghters and Basij paramilitary members who died during this time were not professional soldiers, and received three months of basic training before deploying to Syria.241 Many were members of Basij who were deeply infuenced by ideological programs and training courses that instilled a desire for martyrdom.242

Across Syria, the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun participated in virtually every major battle. The Fatemiyoun had pronounced roles in the battles for Palmyra in 2016 and the next year for a second time after the Islamic State wrestled control of the area again. Both battles became the subject of documentaries, like the “Battle for Palmyra,” and “On the Line of Fire,” which was about the second

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 53 battle.243 These paramilitary groups have been instrumental for Tehran's gains in Syria and shape regional geopolitics without these paramilitary groups.

Iran’s Proxy War Narrative Goes Viral

While the IRGC maintained that it was in an advisory role, it capitalized on the increased presence of Afghan and Pakistani fghters in Syria to augment its cultural production activities. Stories about Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun fghters began appearing more frequently in Iranian state-backed media along with more and more online and ofine memorials. In time, he combined the impact of Russia’s entry into the war, and Soleimani’s eforts to build up his own mythic status made Iran’s sectarian narrative go viral. The IRGC further exploited the moment by cranking up its production of documentaries and viral videos.

The October 2015 coordinated assault on rebel positions across Syria by Russia and Iran coincided with Muharram, the mourning of the Master of Martyrs, Imam Hoseyn. The Guard Corps capitalized on that, calling the assault Operation Muharram.244 The Syrian battlefeld was thus the latest reenactment of and the continuation of Karbala. In this act, the new Yazid were foreign powers like the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel that Tehran said wanted to overthrow Assad as well as all Syrian opposition to Assad, who were called ISIS, Saudi mercenaries, or followers of "American Islam,” a derisive term used to describe a depoliticized version of the true faith.245 State-linked news agencies typically served as a primary pipeline, running videos, photos, and interviews that appealed to religious and nationalist emotions to justify the presence in Syria.246

Those productions spread on social media and received many reactions, particularly among pro-IRGC groups.247 On social media, such as Instagram, channels dedicated to shrine defenders, especially those that provided exclusive coverage, became popular.248 A ritual that evokes a lot of emotion is videotaping and photographing families' mourning when they receive and embrace the remains of their loved ones; the caskets remain closed if the injuries are too grievous (See Figure 16).249 These events are held at places called Ascension of Martyrs, or me'raj-e shohada, which have their own professional studios.250 The publication of memoirs of deceased fghters by IRGC-linked and pro-IRGC publication centers also increased.251

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 54 Figure 16

Family of Fatemiyoun fghter Eskandar Karimi mourn as they receive his casket, October 2016. The Guard Corps has fown in close family members of deceased fghters if they are in Afghanistan.252

The Islamic Republic helped drive the cultural production of the Afghan and Pakistani groups. Afghans and Pakistanis were equal to Iranian soldiers as "shrine defenders,” at least as far as narratives went.253 While the numbers of funerals increased due to the spiking fatality rate, not all the dead were announced or given funerals in order to control public perception about death rates.254 Iranian media have explicitly said that Zeynabiyoun funerals have a lower profle because of Pakistan's sensitivities and ISI's concentration on Shiites. 255 That is an example of Tehran's concern about blowback in its proxy wars, as it fears Islamabad more than Kabul (the Guard Corps runs Fatemiyoun training camps in Afghanistan, according to an ofcial who disclosed the information under Chatham House rules).

Most Afghans and Pakistanis were buried in cities home to a substantial number of migrants, such as Mashhad, Qom, and Varamin, which is outside the capital Tehran.256 The Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun also became subjects of memoirs. Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group has compiled a number of memoirs on the Fatemiyoun as well as shrine defenders in general.257 Zeynabiyoun Commander "Meysami", which is probably a nom de guerre, writes in the introduction to a memoir of slain fghter Mohammad Adil that Pakistani fghters began on their own initiative to write their memoirs in 2015 or early 2016, and that, despite challenges like the language barrier, the group eventually started the publication

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 55 of series called "Children of Ruhollah [Khomeyni]."258 Meyasmi, who is probably Iranian since he referred to Iranians as compatriots with whom he shared the same language, unveiled the memoir on Adil alongside three others in a ceremony in 2019.259 Iranian media has not published a photo of Meysami.

The Guard Corps has had a high tolerance for losses in these groups. The Fatemiyoun were often used as cannon fodder.260 The Zeynabiyoun are praised as line breakers.261 Afghans fought in the most dangerous situations and battles. Entire units would sometimes be wiped out.262 A former fghter said that Iranians would shoot at Afghans trying to retreat, but that Afghans eventually earned respect.263 At least one unit refused the order of an Iranian ofcer to deploy to a high-risk situation and beat him up.264 At the same time, there are Afghans who are proud of their service in the Fatemiyoun on their social media accounts, and say so to expatriate news agencies.265 That means that the abuses were probably not systematic and depended on individual cases.

Figure 17

Families of deceased fghters meeting with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.266

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 56 Figure 18

Poster with the Pakistani Zeynabiyoun logo on it, and the faces of fallen fghters as well as the group's "spiritual father" Aref al-Husayni, who was assassinated in Pakistan in 1988. The below text quotes Khamenei, who said "give my regards to Pakistani shrine defenders. The Zeynabiyoun fght very well. They engage in jihad very well. Give my regards to their fathers, mothers, and families."267

As a result of participation in combat and more transparency about the war, Khamenei recognized the fghters (See Figure 18). In what has become an annual tradition, Khamenei received the families of deceased fghters during the Iranian New Year holidays in late March 2016 at Imam Reza shrine in his hometown of Mashhad, where he spends his new year holidays every year (See Figure 17). Some families of deceased fghters had passed along a request to Khamenei's representative while opening a sports complex named after shrine defenders, according to a documentary called Father produced by the Fatemiyoun Media Center about that meeting between Khamenei and the families.268 Hailing the participation of Afghans in the 1979 revolution against the Shah and the Iran-Iraq War, Khamenei told the families that "your children put their lives as shields so that these ill-wishers and wicked do not reach the shrine of Ahl-e Bayt [Household of the Prophet]…may your dear martyrs be in the company of the martyrs of the early days of Islam, the revolution, and Karbala."

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 57 The families interviewed in the documentary Father said that the meeting was a dream come true. Line of Hezbollah, a weekly publication by the Supreme Leader's Ofce, wrote following the meeting that "the Afghans of Fatemiyoun have now blossomed to the fowers of the spring who continue the basiji thought of Khomeyni the great in the region and the world with their jihad and martyrdom."269 Khamenei has received poets and religious singers who have praised the Fatemiyoun and martyrs.270 "The cloudy air after you, in the silence of sunset/has mounted my shoulder of sorrow," read a line by Afghan poet Hassan Mobarez. With regards to the Pakistani fghters, Khamenei in 2016 told the family of a deceased fghter, "the Zeynabiyoun fghts very well…give my regards to their fathers, mothers, and families."271

Figure 19

Soleimani giving a supplication prayer alongside Fatemiyoun Division fghters in Syria close to the Iraqi border. 272

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 58 Figure 20

Soleimani alongside Fatemiyoun fghters. The text in the middle says "Tasnim," referring to the IRGC-linked news agency, June 2017. 273

Soleimani also tried to cultivate in public a close relationship with Fatemiyoun fghters linking his increasingly public role and the narrative of his infuence and control to that of the Fatemiyoun. Fighters have posted photos and selfes with Soleimani, and Soleimani's social media accounts have also posted such photos (See for example Figures 19 and 20).274 After Tavassoli's death in 2015, Iranian media carried a photo of the deceased commander and Soleimani together, as well as Soleimani's statements that praised him.275

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 59 Figure 21

Qassem Soleimani, left, with fabled Iranian commander in the Fatemiyoun, Mostafa Sadrzadeh. 276

Later that year, Soleimani spoke at the commemoration of an Iranian commander in the Fatemiyoun, Mostafa Sadrzadeh, whose death in October 2015 coincided with Tasu'a, which marks the day before Imam Husayn's death in Karbala. Soleimani's speech, which was released in November, marked one of the instances in which Soleimani's remarks about the Fatemiyoun were made public.277 Sadrzadeh has a central role in Fatemiyoun hagiography, described as an Iranian who disguised himself as an Afghan to join (See also Figure 21).278 In a video of Soleimani among Fatemiyoun fghters, he praised Sadrzadeh for going through the trouble to disguise himself.279 He is not the only probable Quds Force member in the Fatemiyoun who was described as joining on his own but is the most famous among them.280

The death of an Iranian in Fatemiyoun ranks caught the attention of many in pro- IRGC circles, who elevated Sadrzadeh into a prominent fgure in Fatemiyoun lore. "I loved him," Soleimani has said about Sadrzadeh.281 Sadrzadeh's death coincided with rising fatalities in the fall of 2015.282 In 2016, Soleimani-afliated social media accounts released photographs with Fatemiyoun fghters at the front line.283 IRGC-linked and state media publicized Soleimani's meeting with Tavassoli's family in that summer.284 Soleimani hailed Tavassoli, saying that he "left us too soon," gifting a ring to Tavasoli's son. That is remarkable considering that at least some Fatemiyoun members believe Soleimani ordered Tavassoli's assassination. Soleimani continued that the "oppressed and humble Afghans" voluntarily went to defend "the oppressed in another part of this cruel world," adding that the Fatemiyoun had been "very efective on the battlefeld." He then said that the Fatemiyoun have caused a "transformation" within Iranian society's

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 60 views about Afghans, acknowledging long-standing discrimination. He noted that "graves of Afghan martyrs have become like [shrines of] Imamzadehs [ofspring of Shiite Imams]," meaning that the graves were attracting visitors, and that they were becoming religious symbols.

In October 2016, Soleimani publicized a meeting with Sadrzadeh's family on the frst anniversary of his death, continuing a ritual that predates the Syria war and further solidifes Sadrzadeh's position in the pantheon of holy warriors, as well as his own perception as a general who truly cares about his men.285 Soleimani continued releasing photographs with fghters, for instance in the campaign in the eastern Syrian desert in 2017.286 In contrast, Soleimani publicized fewer photos and statements with the Zeynabiyoun, probably in order to not raise Islamabad's ire. Iranian ofcials and commanders have also heaped praise on the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun. Guard Corps commanders and ofcials, such as the Supreme Leader's representatives to provinces and Friday Prayer leaders, have visited funerals of fghters, as well as families of deceased fghters.287 A retired commander who had fought in Syria said in 2016 that the Fatemiyoun would help constitute the "Shia Liberation Army."288 That was controversial, particularly in the Arab press, because it suggested the IRGC had ambitions beyond Iran's sphere of infuence in the northern Middle East.289 Iranian media retracted the interview.

Speaking at a commemoration of fghters at the shrine of Imam Reza on the anniversary of Fatimah's martyrdom, then-Quds Force deputy commander and the current force chief Esma'il Gha'ani said the Fatemiyoun represents "a new culture" within the Islamic resistance culture who are fghters continuing the path of Fatima "who do not recognize borders to defend Islamic values."290 "The liberation of Aleppo was not a joking matter," he declared, adding that the Fatemiyoun "hit America in the mouth" in Syria.291

Religious singers have played crucial roles in mobilizing fghters and producing the culture. Known as Maddah, religious singers in recent years have increasingly supplanted the clergy in retelling the stories of Karbala and have grown into political and cultural icons. Mixing with elements of modern music, the singing, lyrics blend with mysticism, and the congregation's rhythmic chest beating and chorus elevate the crowd into a trance-like state.292 During the Iran-Iraq War, religious singers mobilized for combat and to raise morale at home, extolling values like martyrdom. The singers' political and cultural popularity grew in the 2000s, aided by mass media and communications.

War in Iraq and Syria provided fresh material for singers, who would publicize via their social media channels going to Syria to sing for fghters, or extol them at home, including at congregations before the Supreme Leader. Leading a congregation of Fatemiyoun fghters in Syria in 2019, prominent fgure Ahmad Vaezi sings, "We are the Fatemiyoun, Allah is with us…We are the Fatemiyoun, used to love we are. It has enamored us, the excitement for martyrdom."293

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 61 Fatemiyoun also set up in-house courses to teach religious singing.294 Fighters in Syria themselves would hold sessions of singing before and after combat to raise morale. In one instance, fghter Yaser Ja'fari leads a congregation before battle while artillery is heard in the background.295 He dedicated the song to Hazrat-e Zeynab, who is often called "bibi," meaning mother, Zeynab: "oh hope of my mournful heart, I have a last will with you, oh my Zeynab, I leave the house to you."296 Later that night, Ja'fari died in action. Another religious singer in Fatemiyoun lore is Iranian Hamed Bafandeh, the subject of a 2018 Fatemiyoun Media Center documentary called The Last Chapter of Life.297 Killed a year earlier by an improvised explosive device (IED) near Hama Governorate's Halfaya, the documentary says that Bafandeh deeply impacted Afghan fghters, inspiring fghters with his eulogies and religious singings before and during battle, as well as in commemorations of deceased fghters.298

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 62 VII. The Future of the Fatemiyoun Division

Much has changed since the confuence of the Syrian civil war’s escalation; the rise of ISIS and Russia’s entry into the Syrian war helped make the Fatemiyoun, Zeibaniyoun, and Iran’s narratives of transnational religious duty go viral. Iran has rhetorically ended its war against ISIS, the Assad regime has substantially degraded the armed Syrian opposition, and the United States killed Soleimani. Despite these changes and some level of demobilization, the Fatemiyoun and Zeibaniyoun continue to play a signifcant role in the Middle East. Their cultural production has continued and expanded, they have played a role in domestic Iranian politics, continue to operate in Syria, and have been touted as a potential actor in a projected future war with Israel. The networks and organizations mobilized to defend the Assad regime and the narratives used to mobilize them are unlikely to disappear from the region’s politics anytime soon.

End of the Islamic State, Drawdown

In November 2017, after a months-long campaign in eastern Syria, Tehran declared victory against the Islamic State, claiming the credit. By that time, the caliphate had lost its strongholds in Iraq to a coalition of U.S.-, Iraq-, and Iranian- led paramilitary groups.299 In Syria, pro-Assad forces and U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), separated by the Euphrates River, were progressing down the valley toward the border with Iraq.300 IRGC-led forces led the ofensive in capturing the border town of Al Bukamal, re-opening a viable land supply route from Iran to the Levant that had been lost since the middle of 2012.301 After that operation, Soleimani published a letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei, declaring the end of the Islamic State.302 Afterwards, with the end of major operations, the number of IRGC forces including Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun has been reduced, though they have continued deployments to Syria.

The Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun reafrmed their allegiances and vowed they would be ready to fght for the Islamic Republic, anytime, anywhere. In a statement attributed to Fatemiyoun commanders and rank-and-fle, the paramilitary group congratulated Soleimani for commanding forces in the defeat of the "Zionist Da'esh [ISIS] terrorist group," and that the "blood of the martyrs is still watering the tree of the pure Muhammadean Islam."303 The statement warned that the "masters of Da'esh in Tel Aviv and Washington" would stoke sectarianism among Muslims, that Fatemiyoun would fght until the destruction of global Zionism." Although Khamenei is not widely acknowledged as an imam outside of his hardcore supporters in Iran the statement also called for Fatemiyoun to rally behind Iran‘s Supreme Leader.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 63 The Zeynabiyoun echoed the Fatemiyoum message in a subsequent letter attributed to its commanders, fghters, and families of martyrs.304 The statement said that Zeynabiyoun fghters, who have "experience of defense against Wahabbis in Pakistan answered the call of the commander of Muslims worldwide [Khamenei] and under Soleimani command, followed the "valuable teachings of the eight years of Sacred Defense [Iran-Iraq War]" to defend the shrine of Zeynab. The group vowed to help build an Islamic world and afrmed readiness to fght for "parts of the Islamic world under attack by Global Arrogance [West] and international Zionism."

After claiming the end of ISIS, Fatemiyoun's cultural deputy Hojjat Gonabadinejad said the group would draw down its forces and focus on cultural activities.305 In another instance, Gonabadinejad said that a Fatemiyoun Basij base formed in Mashhad, where there is an exclusive base for Fatemiyoun fghters in the Golshahr neighborhood.306 While there were reports that the Fatemiyoun has stopped recruitment, the paramilitary group has since publicly touted its deployments to Syria.307

The IRGC for the most part sat out major Assad ofensives in Idlib until early 2020 after Soleimani's death by a U.S. drone strike. Soleimani's successor Esma'il Gha'ani deployed the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun as a show of strength, and more than a dozen were killed.308 While the Quds Force and Russia helped Assad make signifcant and strategic territorial gains, Turkey put a stop to the ofensive after dozens of its forces died in an airstrike.309 Hezbollah fghters were confrmed killed in Turkish retaliations, and a number of Iranians also died but their deaths were not made public.310 The decision to not publicize the deaths refects the fact that the Iranian public and the IRGC are more willing to accept Pakistani and Afghan deaths than Iranian deaths.

The Fatemiyoun have paid a heavy price for their service. Then-Fatemiyoun Cultural Afairs Director, Hojjat ol-Eslam Zahir Mojahed, said in 2018 that 2,000 fghters died and 8,000 were injured.311 That may not be the full fgure of the dead, either. A report in IRGC-linked Tasnim in 2019 said that Fatemiyoun had the highest number of "martyrs in the Resistance Front," and that more than triple the amount of Afghans than Iranians were killed.312 There are no ofcial fgures about Iranian deaths. Researcher Ali Alfoneh has documented 571 Iranian deaths between 2012 and February 2020 based on publicly released information. 313 The real fatality rate is probably higher because Iranian media continues to censor deaths in Israeli airstrikes. Former IRGC commander and prominent pundit Hassan Abbasi said in 2019 that there were 2,300 Iranians killed in Syria. 314 Whatever the actual fgures, the Guard Corps has controlled the fow of information about fatalities in order to minimize public blowback, while also using the release of information about deaths and rituals of martyrdom, such as funerals and commemorations, in order to advance its narratives.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 64 The Zeynabiyoun was practically silent between late 2017 and early 2020. A noteworthy incident was the Iranian police's brief March 2017 arrest of Zeynabiyoun Brigade commander Abbas Musavi and a companion because of expired permits, which raised the ire of some pro-IRGC supporters on Telegram. 315 After the eastern Syria campaign, there was no evidence of continued Zeynabiyoun deployments. A blog called "Voice of the Defenders," which claims to be run by former IRGC fghters, lamented in August 2019 that Iranian ofcials were ignoring Pakistani fghters who had returned to Iran, and that fghters who returned to their home countries were being watched by Pakistani intelligence services, and that "various reports are published about [their] arrests or going missing."316

However, in early 2020, during the ofensive in Idlib, Iranian media declared that about a dozen Zeynabiyoun fghters died and were being returned to Qom for burial (See Figure 22).317 Fatemiyoun also released photos in March 2020 that showed Zeynabiyoun members hoisting the paramilitary group’s fag (See Figure 23).318 It is possible that the Zeynabiyoun, like its big brother group, demobilized a large number of fghters after the end of 2017, possibly the entire fghting force, and that fghters were remobilized in early 2020. The paramilitary group has also paid a heavy price. Alfoneh documents 130 fghters killed, though that fgure is an absolute minimum.319

Figure 22

Mourners in Qom attending the funeral ceremony of Zeynabiyoun Brigade fighters in March as news of the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran was spreading. Some of the mourners wear masks.320

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 65 Figure 23

Zeynabiyoun fag hoisted, with the Fatemiyoun in the back, during a mourning ceremony to mark the anniversary of Hazrat-e Zeynab's death in the vicinity of Aleppo, March 2020.321

Building Cultural Influence and Deepening Ties

Two years into Syria’s civil war, building infuence among Afghan and Pakistani Shia constituents became a fxation for the IRGC. The formation of the Fatemiyoun Division's Cultural Directorate in 2017 centralized the group's cultural and outreach activities. The Fatemiyoun had cultural bases in Syria that predated the directorate.322 But the directorate’s consolidation represented an efort to bring more coherence to cultural programs such as trainings for clerics, religious ceremonies, and memorials.323

When discussing the directorate's formation, Mojahedi said that "there is no diference between the cultural trench and the front line," because "the enemy in its media war is attacking us in our own backyard."324 He referred to a belief popular with the Supreme Leader and the Guard Corps that the U.S. government is using American cultural products like Hollywood as tools of foreign policy to

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 66 undermine Iranian religiosity and the Islamic Republic's values.325 Mojahedi also said that the directorate would coordinate cultural activities related to the Fatemiyoun and prevent individuals from taking advantage of the Fatemiyoun's name when they've had no ofcial ties.326

A multi-billion dollar religious foundation has deepened its involvement with the Fatemiyoun. The current Cultural Directorate chief is Hojjat ol-Eslam Hojjat Gonabadinejad, who is also the Director of the Cultural Organization of the Holy Reza Precinct, a multi-billion dollar, Vatican-like institution that oversees the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, and has conglomerates and business interests in industries like pharmacy and agriculture.327 The religious precinct only answers to the Supreme Leader.328 Media sources cited Hojjat Gonabadinejad as the Fatemiyoun Cultural Deputy as early as March 2017.329

The Fatemiyoun referred to Mojahedi as cultural directorate deputy in that year, though Iranian media cited him as cultural afairs director in January 2018.330 Mojahedi left the directorate sometime after that point. The precinct's involvement with the Fatemiyoun grew under the tenure of former trustee Ebrahim Raisi, 2017 presidential candidate whom Khamenei appointed as judiciary branch chief in 2019.331 Raisi has met with families of deceased fghters several times including in his post as judiciary chief.332 Raisi's successor at the Precinct, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ahmad Marvi, has continued meeting with families of "martyrs."333 Since Raisi's tenure, the precinct has increased its involvement with the Fatemiyoun. Its media directorate has helped produce several documentaries about Fatemiyoun fghters.334 The precinct in 2017 handed over 36 housing units at low rent to families of deceased fghters in Baqer Shahr, on the outskirts of the capital Tehran.335 The latter included a workshop to teach tailoring in the "housing-cultural complex," in which there is also a prayer room.336

Although Instagram and Facebook shut down the outlet's ofcial channels, its Telegram channel today has the widest audience. The group continues to have a small presence on Twitter. It also uses Iranian Sorush, which is supposed to be the alternative to Telegram. The center produced at least 30 documentaries, which involve the group's exploits, and profles of deceased fghters and commanders.337 The frst documentaries on the Fatemiyoun were produced by state outlets like the Islamic Revolution Documentary House, which produced a documentary on Tavassoli in the spring of 2015.338 The Fatemiyoun's media center started producing content the following year.339 The 2017 documentary War, Camera, I explored a Fatemiyoun cameraman who said that if there are no cameras to record "the children of Khomeini," then the group would allow others to write its history.340

During a televised panel discussion, Pouriya Najaf, the director of a documentary on the Fatemiyoun called The Commander of Palmyra, praised the Fatemiyoun Media Center for "taking up a weapon in hand" and portraying the

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 67 "bravery of the shrine defending warriors." In that panel, flm critic Ne'matollah Sa'idi said that "he who narrates the war wins the feld."341 To fll technical gaps, it produced documentaries with state- and IRGC-linked media shops like Islamic Televisions and Radio Association, Ofogh TV, Cheshmeh Documentary Center, and Haghighat Documentary Center.342

Mysticism and the special relationship between martyrs and God appear as themes in the narratives about Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun. By implementing values such as the desire for martyrdom and piety, a mujahid may develop a closer relationship with the divine. There are numerous accounts of fghters including in the Iran-Iraq War seeing Imams in their dreams, or family members having a premonition that they would achieve martyrdom.343

One example is a video circulated on IRGC-linked news agencies and social media in which slain Fatemiyoun commander Sadrzadeh told the camera, "God willing, I’ll be with Abbas on Tas'ua."344 The interpretation of that video was that he predicted his own death, which is a common story in the narrative about martyrs. Other narratives involve family members having premonitions about his death, often saying that an Imam visited them in a dream.345 Qom Municipality has set up a website for a "virtual pilgrimage" of the graves of fghters buried in Qom's cemetery (See Figure 24).346 In one documentary narrative featured on the site, an Afghan fghter always wanted to visit Karbala to see Imam Hossein's Shrine.347 He died in Syria before he could. His remains were mistakenly sent to Karbala instead of Iran. God fulflled his wish after he sacrifced his life for the righteous cause.

Figure 24

Screenshot from the website launched by government authorities in the Iranian city of Qom where visitors can conduct a "virtual pilgrimage” to the graves of Afghan and Pakistani fighters buried in Qom's cemetery. The website plays a somber religious song. 348

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 68 Like the IRGC, the Fatemiyoun have also fused their activities into a religious- based calendar to sustain their culture and spread their message. The Fatemiyoun also held group activities in Iran and Syria for 24 birthdays and deaths of the Imams. They advertise these events on social media. Pro-IRGC social media accounts, and IRGC-linked news agencies echo Fatemiyoun activities. Events include anniversaries of the death of fighters, the most important of which is Tavassoli's. Other cultural activities included theater and art competitions.349 IRGC Chief Commander Hossein Salami issued a statement on the 2020 anniversary of his death praising Tavassoli and the paramilitary group.350 Shiite religious events are also important ceremonies.

One of the most important ones is Arba'een, or the fortieth day after the death of Imam Husayn, during which millions of Shiites go on pilgrimage to Karbala, with long treks on foot. Along the way, volunteers set up aid stations, known as movakkeb, to give away food and water. Iran has overseen the distribution of propaganda material in these aid stations with the goal of tying the Islamic Republic to Shiism. Similarly, the Fatemiyoun have also set up aid stations for pilgrims at various religious sites, distributing propaganda material and showcasing documentaries about the group and posters to martyrs under Fatemiyoun banners. Other religious and ideological activities sponsored by the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad and the Hazrat-e Ma'sumeh shrine in Qom include shrine volunteers, known as servants (sing. khadem), visiting the families of fallen Fatemiyoun fghters or distributing aid during the COVID-19 pandemic. 351

Flood Relief is Like Defending the Shrine

To boost their image in Iran, the Fatemiyoun have participated in humanitarian aid eforts. In March and April 2019, unprecedented foods struck Iran's northeast and southwest regions.352 Soleimani encouraged the Fatemiyoun to deploy to Iran's southwest to help fooded areas. The Islamic Republic's failure to appropriately respond to the food raised blistering public criticism.353 Soleimani stepped in, declaring in a statement that he would deploy to help with food relief eforts in the hard-hit southwest for a month, and called on Guard Corps commanders and veterans to do the same.354

Arriving in Khuzestan, he announced through his social media accounts that helping in food relief eforts is like "defending a shrine."355 Shortly after, a poster circulated on social media requesting volunteers. That poster was claimed by the Fatemiyoun Division Warriors Committee, a veterans group, and the IRGC Basij

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 69 Fatemiyoun Division Martyrs Area 6 Meysam, a paramilitary Basij base stationed in Mashhad that named itself after the Fatemiyoun and is active in organizing events for the group.

IRGC-led paramilitary groups deployed to help in food relief eforts in the southwest, a move that proved controversial in the Iranian public. After reports and footage appeared of Fatemiyoun and Iraqi paramilitary groups helping with food eforts, many Iranians on social media called it a move to crack down on people fed up with the poor government response. The short documentary From Defense to Aid, released in 2019, chronicles the Fatemiyoun's food aid efort, pushing back against the perception that the fghters deployed to crack down on Iranians, arguing they did so to demonstrate solidarity.356

The debate came on the heels of a warning by the Tehran Islamic Revolution Court Chief Prosecutor Hojjat ol-Eslam Musa Qazanfarabadi in March 2019 that "if we don't help the revolution, Iraqi Hashd al-Sha'bi [PMF], Afghan Fatemiyoun, Pakistani Zeynabiyoun, and Yemeni Houthis will come and help the revolution."357 He made the remarks at Qom's Ma'sumiyeh Seminary School, a top institution for training clerics who graduate to the Islamic Republic's military and security services. While it stirred controversy on social media, no ofcial rebuked or pushed back against him. His statements followed the 2017-2018 nationwide protests.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Fatemiyoun has heavily publicized its aid eforts, both in Iran and Syria. In Iran, it showed volunteers helping disinfect areas, as well as giving aid packages to the families of deceased fghters.358 The group showed a factory in Syria in which fghters produced masks for distribution to Syrians, and said that a number of masks were exported to Afghanistan.359 They called themselves "defenders of health," connecting the anti-COVID-19 efort today to defending the shrine.360 IRGC-linked news agencies and media have reported on these activities in positive terms. The aid eforts have not proven to be as controversial as the deployment during food relief just a year earlier.

Syria, Afghanistan, and Preparation for War with Israel

Despite the Fatemiyoun's earlier announcement that its military operations were over, the group continues to have a military presence in Syria. It continues to promote fghters stationed in various bases including Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, and Palmyra.361 Fighters frequently hold religious ceremonies and attend addresses at the shrine of Hazrat-e Zeynab. Many demobilized fghters have, nonetheless, returned to Iran and Afghanistan often to communities that are openly hostile to them. Those who have returned to Afghanistan hide in secret amid the fear of prosecution, and remain closeted about their tours of duty in Syria for fear of being cast as proft seeking mercenaries.362 Yet, even in secret, returnees

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 70 represent a possible reserve force that the IRGC can call up again in the event that Iran enters into a confict with a major regional rival like Israel. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif suggested in late 2020 that the Fatemiyoun could help Afghan government forces in the future, raising the prospect of a Fatemiyoun deployment post-U.S. withdrawal should Tehran’s ties with the Taliban deteriorate.363

As can be seen from the Fatemiyoun propaganda poster in Figure 25 below, the Guard Corps is drilling the destruction of Israel as an ideological objective into Fatemiyoun fghters. Khamenei, Khomeini, and many ofcials and commanders consider Israel's existence as fundamentally illegitimate.364 Tehran has incurred signifcant costs in order to continue supporting Palestinian factions like Hamas. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declared to a gathering of foreign ambassadors in Tehran in 2019 that "we are proud to be pressured for our support to Palestine."365 Khamenei declared in 2015 that Israel would be destroyed by 2040.366

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 71 Figure 25

Poster of deceased Fatemiyoun co-founder Alireza Tavassoli, with text in Persian and English that reads: ”Our enemy is not ISIS and al-Nusrah. Our main enemy is the mother of all corruption, the usurper Israel and the criminal U.S.” The poster was distributed on Fatemiyoun's social media channels in May 2020 to mark the anti- Israel Quds Day, held on the last Friday of every Ramadan since 1979.

Many Guard Corps commanders, including those who deployed to Syria, have declared that they expect an eventual war with Israel. In the documentary Time of Being about the Fatemiyoun, the narrator showed footage of Tavassoli

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 72 overlooking the Golan Heights, promising that the Fatemiyoun would go to fght Israel soon.367 The narrator in the documentary blamed Israel and the United States for stoking war in Syria to "help Israel's security and weaken the resistance," but that "we will not stop until ending the lives of Zionists."

Israel has launched hundreds of airstrikes against Guard Corps positions in Syria in recent years, most of which are not claimed.368 Israel's declared objectives have been to prevent "game changing" Iranian weapons transfers, such as advanced air defense systems.369 A September 2019 Israeli strike on the Fatemiyoun position near Al Bukamal in eastern Syria, for instance, sent a strong message that Israel considered all IRGC positions, including proxy positions, to be fair game for targeting.370 The Fatemiyoun compound would have probably helped consolidate the IRGC's position near the border crossing, which is perceived as constituting the "land corridor." In response to the strike, the Fatemiyoun's Imam Sadeq Division stationed in Palmyra held a drill. Neither the Fatemiyoun nor the IRGC has the means to counter Israeli strikes, and Russia has not intervened to prevent such Israeli strikes. Nor are they able to retaliate in a way that does not invite more strikes. The aim of the drill was to raise morale following strikes for which the group had no answers.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 73 Conclusion: Soleimani’s Legacy and What it Means for the Future of Proxy Warfare

Paramilitary groups like the Fatemiyoun have sought to stress that they could continue the path of Soleimani's legend following his death. The Fatemiyoun and the Islamic Republic have stressed the bond between Fatemiyoun and Soleimani, afectionately known as the "commander of hearts," because of his perceived ability to win over hearts and minds.371

Yet, Soleimani as a cultural and political icon is irreplaceable. The circumstances that led to his legend, starting from the Iraq war, Syria, and the war in Iraq against the Islamic State cannot be replicated. This helps explain why Islamic Republic ofcials have sought to reassure their followers and warn adversaries that the Quds Force would continue in Soleimani's path.372 In the order appointing former Deputy Commander Esmail Ghaani as the force chief, Khamenei declared that Soleimani's path must proceed.373 While the Islamic Republic and its myriad factions and organizations have wrangled over Soleimani's legacy, there was a general consensus within the system about how to respond to Soleimani's death, a term coined harsh revenge.374

Leading up to and after Iran’s retaliatory missile strike against U.S. forces in Iraq, IRGC commanders and ofcials gave diferent ideas of how to fulfll that revenge, such as a sustained asymmetric campaign against U.S. forces in the Middle East. Eventually, Tehran agreed on launching missile launches against U.S. forces in Iraq's Ayn al-Assad, which resulted in no fatalities but dozens of traumatic brain injuries. Iranian propaganda said that dozens and even over a hundred U.S. forces were killed.375 That was meant to provide cover for an option that, at least compared to other options, minimized the risk of U.S. retaliation while saving face.

Sometime after Soleimani's death, the unnamed commander of the Fatemiyoun defned what it means for the Fatemiyoun to continue Soleimani’s path. Speaking at a commemoration ceremony in Kerman, Iran, the commander called the formations of paramilitary groups Soleimani's largest legacy, and that he left the groups' management to the people.376 The commander said that Soleimani, on the day of his death, convened a meeting in Syria in which he invited the leaders of IRGC-led groups there. He laid out a fve-year plan for the Fatemiyoun, that "may be his last will," but the Fatemiyoun commander did not discuss the details of that. The commander also said that the Fatemiyoun would exact vengeance by driving the United States from areas like Afghanistan. While that was probably posturing for the moment and the United States will exit Afghanistan in 2021, it does underscore the probability of Fatemiyoun deployment into Afghanistan.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 74 The Fatemiyoun's commemoration of Soleimani has refected that of the Islamic Republic and other paramilitary groups, projecting a narrative that Soleimani led a unifed transnational Shiite-Islamist force. At the same time, Soleimani and Fatemiyoun had a strong bond. The group and Iranian ofcials have credited Soleimani with establishing the group and forming a strong bond with fghters. Ali Shirazi, the Supreme Leader's representative to the Quds Force who also acts as the force's chief ideologue, said during an interview that Soleimani loved the Fatemiyoun and other groups.377

The Fatemiyoun have participated in major ceremonies commemorating Soleimani, for instance, a prayer station near Khomeyni's Mausoleum in Tehran on the 40th day of Soleimani's death, which in Shiism is a signifcant milestone. 378 The Fatemiyoun said that the station was reminiscent of prayer stations held during Ashura ceremonies, further stressing the spiritual and religious nature of the event. He then said that Soleimani's formation of the Fatmeiyoun drove a cultural shift in Iranian society, improving the "dignity" of Afghans in their eyes.

Since Soleimani's death, the Fatemiyoun have reiterated their oaths to the revolution, participated in a revolution anniversary march, and reiterated their commitments to fghting Israel. The new IRGC chief commander Hossein Salami has paid attention to the Fatemiyoun, releasing a statement addressed to the group on the anniversary of the death of Tavassoli in February 2020.379 IRGC Khatam ol-Anbiya Construction Base, the Guard's engineering arm, has announced the construction of a tailoring factory to help create jobs for the Fatemiyoun’s families.380

The recruitment and deployment of thousands of Afghan paramilitaries at the knife’s edge of Iran’s proxy wars by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) represents a watershed moment in the evolution of Tehran’s information warfare capabilities. Fatemiyoun fghters were the frst forces to be deployed by Tehran at the peak of the age of militarized online astroturfng, and the IRGC has accordingly used social media to build and grow the Fatemiyoun brand online. Along the way, Iranian-fnanced propaganda about Afghan foreign fghters in Syria and Tehran’s support to Fatemiyoun’s media center and cultural afairs unit has played a vital role in making the IRGC’s proxy strategy a success. The Iranian support for the units’ media production illustrates the increased Iranian reliance upon and use of strategic narratives that bind together transnational mobilizations in the wake of the Arab Spring. How these narratives will fgure in future iterations of Iran’s proxy warfare calculations is anybody’s guess, but there can be no doubt that keeping an eye on Fatemiyoun’s media channels will be a must for understanding where escalation risks may come up next.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 75 Appendix I-Timeline: The Rise of Iran’s Afghan Shia Cadres

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 76 Appendix II-Prominent Fatemiyoun Propaganda Organizations and Groups

@Fatemiyoun1434 (Telegram channel, 9,000 followers)

Al Waght

Arsh Cultural Institution

Ava Studio

Cheshmeh Documentation Center

Dar Masir-e Aftab

Fars News

Fatemiyoun Media Center

Haghighat Media Center

Harim-e Haram

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) Basij Center

Islamic Televisions and Radio Union (state-linked, sanctioned by the U.S. in 2020)

Mashregh News

Meyghat Radio

Ofogh TV

Oveys News Agency

Revayat-e Fath Documentary Group

Reza Holy Precinct

Rouyeh Documentary Center

Tasnim News

Ya Zahra Publications

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 77 " لهچ تیاکح و تارطاخ یندینش زا یادهش رکشل Notes 5 نویمطاف " 1 In the scholarly literature on the Fatemiyoun ("Chehel hekayat va khaterat-e shenidani az Division and Zeynabiyoun Brigade, the group’s name shohaday-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun," "Forty Memorable is sometimes transliterated into English from the Accounts and Memoires of Fatemiyoun Division Arabic Liwa Fatemiyoun and at other times translated Martyrs"), Martyr Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group, 2016, directly from the Persian Lashkar-e Fatemiyoun to 18-19. Fatemiyoun Division while the Tipp-e Zeynabiyoun is translated into English as Zeynabiyounna. In this 6 Ibid. report, we use the original Persian since the groups are both Afghan in origin. 7 Ibid.

Two years after Tavassoli was killed in a battle in 8 " لهچ تیاکح و تارطاخ یندینش زا یادهش رکشل 2 Syria, the IRGC-led Fatimiyoun Media Center نویمطاف " ("Chehel hekayat va khaterat-e shenidani az released a 42-minute documentary that recounts his shohaday-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun," "Forty Memorable life story and military exploits. A version of the Accounts and Memoirs of Fatemiyoun Division documentary is available here: " دنتسم هدنامرف " ,Martyrs"), Martyr Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group, 2016 18-19. ("Mostanad-e farmandeh," "Commander’-A documentary about the life of Alireza Tavassoli"), Bult 3 Leith Aboufadel, “Northern Dara’a: Syrian Army an News, April 1, 2017. https://www.bultannews.com/ and Hezbollah Advancing Towards Tal-Al Harra,” Al- fa/news/464472/. Masdar News, February 22, 2015. https:// " دنتسم هدنامرف " www.almasdarnews.com/article/northern-daraa- 9 syrian-army-hezbollah-advancing-towards-tal-al- ("Mostanad-e farmandeh," "Commander’-A harra/; Nicholas Blanford, “Iranian-backed Advance documentary about the life of Alireza Tavassoli"), Bult in Southern Syria Rattles Israel,” Christian Science an News, April 1, 2017. https://www.bultannews.com/ Monitor, March 6, 2015. https://www.csmonitor.com/ fa/news/464472/. World/Middle-East/2015/0306/Iran-backed- advance-in-southern-Syria-rattles-Israel. 10 Ibid.

4 For details on the 2015 Southern offensive in Syria, 11 Ahmad Shuja Jamal, The Fatemiyoun Army: see: Phil Sands and Suha Maayeh, “Exclusive: The Reintegration into Afghan Society, Special Report No. Spy Who Fooled the Assad Regime,” The National 443, United States Institute of Peace, March 2019, 5. News, March 17, 2015. https:// https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/ www.thenationalnews.com/world/exclusive-the-spy- fatemiyoun-army-reintegration-afghan-society. who-fooled-the-assad-regime-1.66950; Leith Aboufadel, “Northern Dara’a: Syrian Army and 12 Ibid, 11. Hezbollah Advancing Towards Tal-Al Harra,” Al- 13 Ibid. Masdar News, February 22, 2015. https:// www.almasdarnews.com/article/northern-daraa- 14 Mohsen Hamidi, “The Two Faces of the syrian-army-hezbollah-advancing-towards-tal-al- Fatemiyun: Revisiting the Male Fighters,” Afghanistan harra/; “Iran general died in 'Israeli strike' in Syrian Analysts Network, July 8, 2019. https:// Golan,” BBC, January 19, 2015. https:// www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/regional- www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30882935.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 78 relations/the-two-faces-of-the-fatemiyun-i-revisiting- 25 Ahmad Majidyar, “After ISIS, Fatemiyoun Vows to the-male-fighters/. Fight with ‘Axis of Resistance’ to Destroy Israel,” Middle East Institute, November 22, 2017, https:// -www.mei.edu/publications/after-isis-fatemiyoun " یرازگرب مسارم یاعد ،هبدن دوبدای یادهش ادیواج ل رث 15 vows-fight-axis-resistance-destroy-israel # نویمطاف " ("bargozariy-e marasem-e du'ah-e nudbah, yadboud- e shohada-ye javid al-asar-e #Fatemiyoun," "Holding 26 Alex Vatanka, “Iran’s Islamic State Problem Isn’t Nudba prayer ceremony, commemorating the eternal Going Away,” Foreign Policy, June 19, 2017. https:// #Fatemiyoun martyrs") Telegram, December 12, 2019. foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/19/irans-islamic-state- https://t.me/Fatemiyoun1434/29543. problem-isnt-going-away/. “Why did the US create ISIS?” Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, November “ هدازردارب ،دماحوبا هدنامرف دیهش نویمطاف هچ یسک 16 /https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8097 .2020 ,16 دوب ؟” (“baradarzadeh-ye abu hamed farmande-ye shahid-e Why-did-the-US-create-ISIS. fatemiyoun che kasi bud?,” “Who Was The Nephew of Abu Hamed, Martyred Fatemiyoun 27 Hamid Mavani, “Ayatullah Khomeini's Concept of Commander?”), Tasnim News, August 11, 2019. Governance (wilayat al-faqih) and the Classical Shi‘i https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ Doctrine of Imamate,” Journal of Middle Eastern 1398/05/19/2072755/. Studies, 47:5, 807-824, 2011.

17 Ibid. 28 For more detailed analysis on the evolution of Iran’s Forward Defense strategy, see: Alex Vatanka, 18 Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda, New York: “Whither the IRGC of the 2020’s?” New America, Horace Liverwright, 1928, 19-21. https:// January 15, 2021. https://www.newamerica.org/ www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/ international-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/. Bernays_Propaganda_in_english_.pdf. 29 Liwa Fatimeyoun’s official Twitter handle posted 19 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, updates and commentary almost daily before its Autumn 1990, No. 80, 153-171. suspension: https://twitter.com/Fatemiyoun; archived version of Fatimeyoun’s Twitter account: 20 Monroe E. Price, “Iran and the Soft War,” Internat http://archive.is/wip/ncZdE; the group’s new Twitter ional Journal of Communication, No. 6, 2012, 2397– page formed in December 2020 is @gharin1434: 2415. https://twitter.com/gharin1434.

"پ جن رادرس دیهش ههبج تمواقم رد کی باق " Monroe E. Price, “Strategic Communication in 30 21 Asymmetric Conflict,” Dynamics of Asymmetric ("panj sardar-e shahid-e jebhe-ye moghavemat dar Conflict, 6:1-3, 2013, 135-136. yek ghab," "Five Martyred Commanders of the Resistance Front in One Frame"), Telegram, January 22 Price, op.cit., “Iran and the Soft War,” 2012, 2399. 3, 2020. https://t.me/Fatemiyoun1434/29761. 23 Ibid, 2399-2400 " مسارم تشادگرزب رادرس دبهپس دیهش جاح مساق 31 س ینامیل و هدنامرف یبعشلادشح دیهش یدهموبا سدنهملا " 24 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion ("marasem-e bozorgdasht-e sardar sepahbod shahid Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Oxford: hajj Qasem Soleimani va farmande-ye hashd ol-sha'bi Oxford University Press, 2016, 240. shahid Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis," "Commemoration Ceremony for Commander Lieutenant General

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 79 Martyr Haj Qasem Soleimani and Popular Sanctions to Combat Terrorism, Sept. 10, 2019. Mobilization Forces Commander Martyr Abu Mahdi https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ al-Muhandis"), Telegram, January 4, 2020. https:// executive-order-modernizing-sanctions-combat- t.me/Fatemiyoun1434/29773. terrorism/. In January 2019, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) issued a sanctions 32 See: Candace Rondeaux, “How the Return of notice naming the Fatemiyoun Divison and Iranian-Backed Militias From Syria Complicates U.S. Zeynabiyoun Brigade. See: U.S. Treasury, Press Strategy,” World Politics Review, May 24, 2019. Release, “Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Fighter https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/ Militias in Syria along with a Civilian Airline Ferrying 27883/how-the-return-of-iranian-backed-militias- Weapons to Syria,” January 24, 2019. https:// from-syria-complicates-u-s-strategy; Tolonews.com, home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm590. “Afghans Returning Home After Fighting War in Syria,” April 1, 2019. https://tolonews.com/ 35 Mark Landler, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, afghanistan/afghans-returning-home-after-fighting- “U.S. Puts Iran on Notice and Weighs Response to syrian-war. Attack on Oil Tankers,” New York Times, June 14, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/us/ 33 See: U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, politics/trump-iran-tanker-hormuz.html. Operational Environment Watch (OE Watch), April 2020, 42, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/ 36 P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, Like War: fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/359091/ The Weaponization of Social Media, New York: download; Declan Walsh, “By Air and by Sea Houghton, Mifflin Harcourt, 2018. Mercenaries Landed in Libya. Then the Plan Went South,” New York Times, May 25, 2020. https:// 37 For detailed background on Afghanistan’s Hazara www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/world/middleeast/ communities, see: Niamatullah Ibrahimi, The Hazaras libya-mercenaries-arms-embargo.html; and Deir and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Ezzor 24, ” “New Rapprochment between Russia and Struggle for Recognition, Hurst & Company, London, Iran 2017; and Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: The Status of in Deir Ezzor,” July 2020, https://deirezzor24.net/en/ the Shi'ite Hazara Minority,” Journal of Muslim new-rapprochement-between-russia-and-iran-in- Minority Affairs, 32:1, 80-87, 2012. DOI: deir-ezzor/; Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Michael 10.1080/13602004.2012.665623. Georgy, “Exclusive: Iran steps up support for Houthis in Yemen's war – sources,” Reuters, March 21, 2017. 38 Andrew Pinney, “An Afghan Population https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran- Estimation. Snapshots of an Intervention. The houthis/exclusive-iran-steps-up-support-for-houthis- Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of in-yemens-war-sources-idUSKBN16S22R. Assistance. 2001,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2011. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp- 34 On September 23, 2001, President George W. content/uploads/downloads/ Bush signed Executive Order 13224. The order gives 2012/09/22_Pinney_An_Afghan_Population_Estimati the U.S. government the authority to trace and halt on.pdf. funding flows to individuals and entities found by U.S. national security agencies to be linked with 39 As noted by Afghan scholar Amin Saikal, the terrorist activity. In 2019, President Donald J. Trump majority of Hazaras count themselves as members of amended the order to consolidate the rules and the Twelver-Shia Imamate sect, but a slim minority parameters for terrorism financing designations. See: within the Hazara community belong to Afghanistan’s White House, “Executive Order on Modernizing majority Sunni sect. Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: The

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 80 Status of the Shi'ite Hazara Minority,” Journal of meeting of Said Ismail Balkhi with Imam Khomeini in Muslim Minority Affairs, 32:1, 80-87, 2012, 81-82. Najaft+pictures”), Ahl-ul Bayt News Agency (ABNA), July 13, 2013. https://fa.abna24.com/service/asia- 40 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, The Hazaras and the center/archive/2013/07/15/440866/story.html. Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition, Hurst & Company, London, 2017, 111. 50 Ibid.

41 Ibid, 110-112. 51 Misagh Parsa, Democracy in Iran, London: Harvard University Press, 2016, 61-97. 42 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: The Status of the Shi'ite Hazara Minority,” Journal of Muslim Minority 52 Ruhollah Khomeini, “Islamic Government,” in Prin Affairs, 32:1, 80-87, 2012, 80-83. ceton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden, eds. Roxanne L. 43 Ali Karimi, “Medium of the Oppressed: Folk Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Oxford: Music, Forced Migration, and Tactical Media,” Princeton University Press, 2009, 176. Communication, Culture & Critique 10, 2017, 729–31. 53 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, “The Dissipation of 44 Ibrahimi, op.cit., 111 Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009,” Working Paper, Crisis States Research 45 Ibid, 112 Centre, June 2009, 1. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 28493/1/WP51.2.pdf. 46 Ayatollah Kabuli died in June 2019. For details on " نیلوا شیامه تشادوکن ماما ناگدنیامن ی کول و his biography see: 54 ینیمخ ناتسناغفا رد " " هللا تیآ ققحم ،یلباک عجارم زا دیلقت نایعیش ناتسناغفا awalin humayesh nekod’asht nomayendagan wa“) تشذگرد ," 9, (“ayatollah mohaqeq kabul, az maraje-e taqlid wokaly-e imam Khomeini dar Afghanistan,” “The First shi’ayan-e afghanestan dargozasht,” “Ayatollah Memorial and Appreciation Conference of Imam Kabuli, One of Afghanistan’s Shiite Sources of Khomeini’s Representatives in Afghanistan”), Shia Emulation, Has Died”), BBC Persian, June 11, 2019, News Association (Shafaqna), June 4, 2016. https:// https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-48592141; af.shafaqna.com/FA/134997. Ijtihadnet.com, “Ayatollah Mohaqiq Kabuli Passes Away,” June 11, 2019. http://ijtihadnet.com/ayatollah- 55 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, The Failure of a Clerical mohaqiq-kabuli-passes-away/. Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984, Working paper no. 6, Crisis States Research Center and London School 47 Hafizullah Emad, “Radical political movements in of Economics and Political Science, September 2006, Afghanistan and Their Politics of Peoples' 6. Empowerment and liberation,” Central Asian Survey, ماما طخ ینیمخ " ناتسناغفا رد هر) ( " DOI: 56 .2001 ,427-450 ,20:4 10.1080/02634930120104627 (“khat-e imam khomeini (ra) dar Afghanistan,” “Imam Khomeini’s Line [Path] in Afghanistan”), Fars News 48 Ibrahimi, op.cit., 109 Agency, February 11, 2019, https://af.farsnews.ir/ culture/news/13971122000699. " یارجام یخیرات تاق لم لیعامسا دیس یخلب ماما اب 49 .Ibid 57 ینیمخ فجن رد ریواصت + " (“majera-ye mulaghat tarikhy-ye sayed ismail balkhi ba Imam Khomeini dar Najaf+Tasaveer,” “The historic

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 81 شخب خیرات - -22737/14- یمیهاربا دندومرف اقآ - هدنیامن - امش - - - " بیسآ یسانش بازحا یداهج عیشت ناتسناغفا رد " 58 ماما ناتسناغفا نم- رد- دیتسه - - . aasib shenasi ahzab-e jihadi tashayyu dar“) afghanistan,” “Pathology of Shia Political Parties in Afghanistan”), Sayed Jafar Adeli Hussaini, https:// 65 "Iran Rejects Iraq's Call For Cease-fire," New York www.adeli-af.com/artical/1223.html, October 20, Times, June 13, 1982. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2011. The coalition was established as part of a 1982/06/13/weekinreview/iran-rejects-iraq-s-call-for- power-sharing arrangement with Sunni jihadi groups cease-fire.html; "IRAQ vii. IRAN-IRAQ WAR" in Encycl in the Mujahidin-led interim government led by opedia Iranica, accessed March 30, 2020. http:// President Burhanuddin Rabbani. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war.

59 Hal Brands, "Why Did Saddam Invade Iran? New 66 Ali Alfoneh, "Generational change in the Iranian Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force: Brigadier Factor," Journal of Military History, July 2011, 75:3, General Iraj Masjedi," American Enterprise Institute, 861-885. March 29, 2012, https://www.aei.org/research- products/report/generational-change-in-the-iranian- 60 One of the most infamous incidents involving revolutionary-guards-corps-quds-force-brigadier- Saddam’s backlash against the Dawa Party resulted general-iraj-masjedi/; Ramezan Base's personnel also in the illegal detention, torture, and massacre of included forces from Nosrat Base, a top-secret Guard hundreds of men and women after an unsuccessful Corps Base formed after 1982 that recruited among assasination attempt against Saddam on July 8, 1982 Arab tribes in southwestern Iran, see: Amir Toumaj, in the town of Dujali. See: Human Rights Watch, "Death of a General: What Shaban Nasiri Reveals “Judging Dujali,” November 19, 2006. https:// About Iran’s Secretive Qods Force," War on the www.hrw.org/report/2006/11/19/judging-dujail/first- Rocks, March 23, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/ trial-iraqi-high-tribunal. 2018/03/death-of-a-general-what-shaban-nasiri- reveals-about-irans-secretive-qods-force/. " ماما تاکرب ینیمخ م عافد ل سدقم ک رد )س"( 61 ("barekat-e defa'e moqaddas dar kalam-e Imam 67 Rosa Shapiro-Thompson, “Importing Arms, Khomeyni,” "The Blessing of Sacred Defense in The Exporting the Revolution: Mehdi Hashemi and His Word of Imam Khomeini"), Institute for The Fatal Leak to Ash-Shiraa,” The Yale Review of Preservation and Publication of The Works of Imam K International Studies, April 2019. http://yris.yira.org/ homeyni, September 29, 2018. http://www.imam- essays/3333. khomeini.ir/fa/n23098/. شرازگ " | تضهن دحاو شخبیدازآ یاه ' یهورگ ؛ دروم '68 تیامح یرظتنم تمدخ' رد هک نمشد دوب' " ارچ یلیمحت گنج " هب عافد سدقم » « روهشم ؟ دش "! 62 ("chera jang-e tahmili be 'defa-e moqaddas' mashur (“wa’hid nehzat-haye azadi-bakhsh; groh-e mowred shod?!," "Why Did The Imposed War Became Known hemayat montazeri ki dar khedmat doshman bod,” as 'Sacred Defense'?!"), Quds Online, September 25, “The Liberation Movements Unit backed by 2016, http://www.qudsonline.ir/news/459425/. Montazeri was at the service of the enemy”), Tasnim News Agency, May 13, 2020. https:// 63 Meir Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, New www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 80 - 89. 1399/02/24/2265312/.

64 “Interview with Shaikh Hussain Ibrahimi, 69 Mohammad Sarvar Raja'i, " تشد زا یلیل هریزج ات نونجم " Khamenei’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan,” Jamaran News, August 16, 2012. https://www.jamaran.news/ ("az dasht-e leyli ta jazire-ye majnun," "From Leyli Field to Majnun Island"), Qom: Islamic Revolution

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 82 " رذوبا تسناوت یم ناتسناغفا بزح هللارد یا دشاب " Cultural Front Studies Desk Oral History Unit, 2019, 78 42-43. ("abuzar mitavanest Hezbollah-i dar afghanestan bashad," "Abuzar Could Have Been a Hezbollah in 70 Raja'i, From Leyli Field, 517-519. Afghanistan"), Bultan News, January 24, 2016. https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/324497/. 71 Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees " رذوبا تسناوت یم ناتسناغفا بزح هللارد یا دشاب " Rahmani, Robert Stewart, Leila Mahnad, Iran’s 79 Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. ("abuzar mitavanest Hezbollah-i dar afghanestan Drawdown, National Security Research Division, bashad," "Abuzar Could Have Been a Hezbollah in RAND Corporation, 2014, 5. Afghanistan"), Bultan News, January 24, 2016. https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/324497/. 72 Alessandro Monsutti, “Migration as a Rite of " لهچ تیاکح تارطاخ و یندینش یادهش زا رکشل Passage: Young Afghans Building Masculinity and 80 نویمطاف " ,Adulthood inIran,” Iranian Studies, Apr., 2007, 40: 2 170-174. ("chehel hekayat va khaterat-e shenidani az shohaday-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun," "Forty Memorable 73 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, “The Dissipation of Accounts and Memoires of Fatemiyoun Division Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: Martyrs"), Martyr Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group (Iran), 2001-2009,” Working Paper, Crisis States Research 2016, 10; Raja'i, From Leyli Field. Centre, June 2009. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28493/1/ WP51.2.pdf. 81 Mohammad Sarwar Rajayi , “Story of Afghanistani fighters in sacred defence,” Ettelaat 74 Mohammad Sarvar Raja'i,‏ Daily, 2014. www.ettelaat.com (Accessed on August .(2018 ,2 " تشد زا یلیل هریزج ات نونجم " ("az dasht-e leyli ta jazire-ye majnun," "From Leyli " لیکشت هتسه هیلوا رکشل نویمطاف اب ۲۵ رفن " Field to Majnun Island"), Qom: Islamic Revolution 82 Cultural Front Studies Desk Oral History Unit, 2019, ("tashkil-e haste-ye avvaliye-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun 42-43; Raja'i, From Leyli Field, 517-519. ba 25 nafar," "Forming The First Nucleus of The Fatemiyoun Division With 25 Individuals"), Shoma 75 Mohammad Sarvar Raja'i, News, October 25, 2015. https:// شخب - یسایس - www.shomanews.com/7/302416- " تشد زا یلیل هریزج ات نونجم " لیکشت هتسه هیلوا- نویمطاف رکشل - - - اب- رفن - . az dasht-e leyli ta jazire-ye majnun," "From Leyli") Field to Majnun Island"), Qom: Islamic Revolution " دنتسم ناقشاع هداتسیا دنریم یم " Cultural Front Studies Desk Oral History Unit, 2019, 83 42-43; Raja'i, From Leyli Field, 517-519. ("The documentary of ‘lovers die standing’"), Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (Iran), July 19, 2017. دنتسم - Leyli Field, Op. Cit., 520. http://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/1919234/%20 76 ناقشاع هداتسیا دنریم-یم - ملیف - . " لهچ تیاکح تارطاخ و یندینش یادهش زا رکشل 77 " تلود یمشاه حانج یسایس یاه و ؛ناتسناغفا نومزآ 84 نویمطاف " یاطخ ماجرفویب " chehel hekayat va khaterat-e shenidani az") shohaday-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun," "Forty Memorable (“dawlat-e hashimi wa jinah-ha-ye seya’si Accounts and Memoires of Fatemiyoun Division Afghanistan; azmon o khata’ ye be farja’m” “Hashimi’s Martyrs"), Martyr Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group (Iran), Administration and Afghan Factions; Unfinished Trial 2016, 10; Raja'i, From Leyli Field, 26. and Errors,”) Ayub Arvin, BBC Persian, June 13, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-38594017.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 83 85 Ibid. 93 Larry P. Goodson, “Afghanistan and The Changing Regional Environment,” Chapter 5 in Afgha 86 Ibid. nistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban, Seattle: University of 87 Ibid. Washington Press, 2001, 165.

88 Larry P. Goodson, “Afghanistan and The 94 Phone interview with a Hazara historian, Changing Regional Environment,” Chapter 5 in Afgha Washington, D.C., August 2020. nistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban, Seattle: University of 95 Mohammad Khalilpur, " یتیاور توافتم قطنم زا روضح ناریا هیروس رد " .Washington Press, 2001, 165 ("revayati motefavet az manteq-e hozur-e iran dar 89 Waheed Paima’n, suriyeh," "A Different Account About The Logic of Iran's Presence in Syria"), Qom: Dar Masir-e Aftab (In " مساق ینامیلس ناتسناغفا و " (“qassem soleimani wa Afghanistan,” “Qassem The Path of the Sun), 2016. Soleimani and Afghanithe gstan,”), Daily Hashte Subh, January 3, 2020, https://8am.af/qasim- 96 "Iran News Round Up," Critical Threats Project, sulaimani-and-afghanistan/; Also see: Alireza Nader, February 14, 2013, https://www.criticalthreats.org/ Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert briefs/iran-news-round-up/iran-news-round-up- Stewart, Leila Mahnad, Iran’s Influence in february-14-2013-1. Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown, National Security Research Division, RAND 97 An Iranian lawmaker in May 2020 said that Iran Corporation, 2014, 5. has "perhaps" spent between $20-30 billion Syria, though the actual figure is probably higher. See: Arsalan Shahla, "Iran Has Spent as Much as $30 " دوبن ریثات ینامیلس دوبو هنایمرواخ رد " 90 (“ta’sir bod-o-nabod-e soleimani dar kha’war mia’na,” Billion in Syria, Lawmaker Says," Bloomberg, May 20, “The Impact of Soliemani’s Presence and Absence in 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ the Middle East,”) quoted from The New Yorker 2020-05-20/iran-has-spent-as-much-as-30-billion-in- interview with Wali-Nasr. See at: https:// syria-lawmaker-says; Amir Toumaj & David Adesnik, pe.annabaa.org/political/2472, Annabaa Center for "Iran Spends $16 Billion Annually to Support Strategic Studies, January 4, 2020 Terrorists and Rogue Regimes," Foundation For Defense of Democracies, January 10, 2018, https:// 91 Ali Alfoneh, “Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/01/10/iran-spends-16- (sic): A Biography,” American Enterprise Institute, billion-annually-to-support-terrorists-and-rogue- 2011. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/ regimes/ 2011/10/suleimani.pdf. 98 Gol-Ali Baba'i, ماغیپ" یهام اه " " نازابرس هاپس سدق هنوگچ هناخ هیاسمه هب 92 ,("peygham-e mahiha," "Message From Fishes") ؟دندیسر " (“sarba’za’n-e sepah-e quds chegona ba kha’na-e Tehran: 27 Publications and Sa'eqeh Publication, hamsa’yeh rasidand?,” “How did Quds Forces’s 2015, 434; U.S. Treasury, Press Release, Soldiers End up in the Neighbor’s Yard?”), Iran Wire, “Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the February 20, 2020, https://iranwire.com/fa/features/ Government of Syria Accountable for Violent 36575. Repression Against the Syrian People,” May 18, 2011. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- releases/pages/tg1181.aspx; U.S. Treasury, Press

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 84 Release, “Treasury Designates Iranian Ministry of 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/ Intelligence and Security for Human Rights Abuses 09/senior-iranian-commander-killed-in-syria-hossein- and Support for Terrorism,” February 16, 2012. hamedani. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- releases/Pages/tg1424.aspx; U.S. Treasury, Press 107 Al-Jazeera, “Iranian Opposition in Protest Call,” Release, “Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others January 30, 2010. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ Involved in Arms and Communications Procurement 2010/1/30/iranian-opposition-in-protest-call. Networks and Identifies Blocked Iranian Aircraft,” یارجام" ۵۰۰۰ یرگبوشآ ۸۸ هنتف رد هک تسد هب September 19, 2012, https://www.treasury.gov/press- 108 رادرس ینادمه » « عفادم تینما دندش " .center/press-releases/Pages/tg1714.aspx ("majara-ye 5000 ashubgari ke dar fetne-ye 88 be 99 Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country, New dast-e 'sardar hamedani' modfa'e amniat shodand," York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019, 269. "The Story of the 5,000 Rioters Who Became Defenders of Security at The Hands of 'Commander 100 Ibid. Hamedani] in The '88 Sedition [2009 protests]"), Stud ent News Network, October 10, 2015. https://snn.ir/ 101 "Iranian official: Attack on Syria is attack on us," fa/news/448779/. Associated Press published in Times of Israel, January 26, 2013, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian- 109 Baba'i, Message from Fishes, 434; Saeed Kamali official-attack-on-syria-is-attack-on-us/. Dehghan, "Senior Iranian commander killed in Syria," The Guardian, October 9, 2015. https:// 102 Ostovar, op.cit., 2016, 208. www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/senior- iranian-commander-killed-in-syria-hossein- 103 Hamed Mohammadi, hamedani. هیروس " : هلاچ توبکنع " ("suriyeh: chale-ye ankabut," "Syria: a Spider Hole"), 110 Babai, Message from Fishes, 437-438. London: Keyhan London, 2018, 22-27; .Ostovar, op.cit., 2016, 208-213 111 " تروص رد هلمح لییارسا ییاج رد ملاس یمن دنام " ("dar surat-e hamle jayyi dar esrae'el salem namimanad," "In Case of Attack, No Where in Israel 112 Ostovar, op.cit., 2016, 212. Will Be Left Unscathed"), Farda News, September 16, 2012, https://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/220813/. 113 Babai, Message from Fishes, 437-438.

104 Dagher, Assad, 289. 114 Ibid, 439.

105 The Quds Force has broader authorities. One 115 Ibid, 441. U.S. official said that it is like rolling the State 116 Ostovar, op.cit., 2016, 210. Department and the CIA all into one; Afshon Ostovar, "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy," Carne 117 For details on the Russian role in Syria’s proxy gie Endowment For International Peace, 2016. https:// war and frictions between Russian and Iranian carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/30/sectarian- military advisers see: Candace Rondeaux, “Decoding dilemmas-in-iranian-foreign-policy-when-strategy- the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Russian and-identity-politics-collide-pub-66288. Private Military Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare,” November 7, 2019. https:// 106 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Senior Iranian www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/ commander killed in Syria," The Guardian, October 9,

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 85 decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private- News Agency, IRGC-linked Tasnim News and Islamic military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/. Televisions and Radio Union: دنتسم تقو ندوب " " 118 Yalda Hakim, “Iran’s Secret Army,” BBC, ("mostanad-e vaqt-e budan," "Time of Being November 3, 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/ Documentary"), Aparat, 2019, https:// programmes/n3cstnps. www.aparat.com/v/nT7ti.

119 For more detailed analysis on the Gulf States 127 Soleimani’s memoir was posthumously involvement in proxy warfare in the post-Arab spring published by Ya Zahra Publications, an Iran based era see: Alexandra Stark, “The Monarch’s Pawns? publisher which has released several books about the Gulf State Proxy Warfare, 2011-Today,” New America, Guard Corps and the Islamic Revolution. A Farsi June 15, 2020. https://www.newamerica.org/ language review and excerpt published shortly after international-security/reports/the-monarchs-pawns/. his death included details about his role in formulating the defense of the shrine narrative: نیلوا " یدرف ظفل هک ناعفادم مرح' راکب ار درب' " .Babai, Message from Fishes, 446-447 120 ("avvalin fardi ke lafz-e 'modafe'an-e haram' ra be kar 121 Ruth Sherlock, "The Telegraph visits the mosque bord," "The First Person Who Used The Phrase on Syria's front line," The Daily Telegraph, Posted 'Shrine Defenders'"), Fash News, January 25, 2020, May 17 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch? http://fashnews.ir/fa/news-details/72166/. v=oDZTS0D8ANI. 128 Robert F. Worth, “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, 122 Toby Matthiesen, “Syria: Inventing a Religious Setting Off Sectarian Fury,” New York Times, War,” New York Review of Books, June 12, 2013. February 22, 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/ https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/06/12/syria- 2006/02/22/international/middleeast/blast-destroys- inventing-religious-war/. shrine-in-iraq-setting-off-sectarian.html.

123 Toby Matthiesen, “Syria: Inventing a Religious 129 Will Fulton, "The assassination of Iranian Quds War,” New York Review of Books, June 12, 2013. Force General Hassan Shateri in Syria," AEI's Critical https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/06/12/syria- Threats Project, February 28, 2013, https:// inventing-religious-war/. www.aei.org/articles/the-assassination-of-iranian- quds-force-general-hassan-shateri-in-syria/. 124 Phone interview with Hazara historian, August 2020. 130 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, & Sam Wyer, "Iranian Strategy in Syria," Institute for the Study of 125 Sabrina Mervin, “Sayyida Zaynab, Banlieue de War, Critical Threats Project, 2013. http:// Damas Ou Nouvelle Ville Sainte Chiite ?” Cahiers d’Et www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy- udes sur La Méditerranée Orientale et Le Monde syria. Turco-Iranien, 22:1996. https:// journals.openedition.org/cemoti/138. 131 Kathy Gannon, "Iran recruits Afghan and Pakistani Shiites to fight in Syria," Associated Press, 126 The incident at Uday, however, is not September 16, 2018. https://apnews.com/ prominently mentioned in other historiographies of 4731b95dae684f77b27d83c26e72a276/Iran-recruits- the Fatemiyoun and may have only been added later Afghan-and-Pakistani-Shiites-to-fi to inflate Fatemiyoun’s mythology. The documentary was produced by the Fatemiyoun Media Center in 132 Dagher, Assad, 333. 2019 cooperation with Arsh Cultural Institute, Oveys

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 86 دنتسم تقو ندوب " " Ali Mamouri, "Shiite Seminaries Divided On 144 133 Fatwas for Syrian Jihad," Al Monitor, July 29, 2013. ("mostanad-e vaqt-e budan," "Time of Being https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/ Documentary"), Aparat, 2019, https:// syria--jihad-fatwas-shiite-clergy-iran- www.aparat.com/v/nT7ti. iraq.html#ixzz6NCb27AZK. 145 Phillip Smyth, “The Shiite Jihad and Its Regional 134 Ibid. Effects, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, February 2, 2015, 21-36. 135 Dagher, Assad, 274-275, 294, 316. " نیتسخن دیهش نویمطاف یسک هچ ؟دوب " 146 136 Ostovar, "Sectarian Dilemmas" ("nokhostin shahid-e fatemiyoun che kasi bud?," "Who Was The First Fatemiyoun Martyr?"), Fash 137 Farnaz Fassihi, "Iran Pays Afghans to Fight for News, September 14, 2019, http://fashnews.ir/fa/ Assad," The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2014. news-details/69510/. https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-recruiting-afghan- " عافد هیروس ناردارب رد یم سال یناغفا ب قنالزا " refugees-to-fight-for-regime-in-syria-1400197482. 147 ("defa-e baradaran-e afghani az enqelab-e eslami dar 138 Mohammadi, Syria: A Spider Hole, 34; suriyeh," "Afghan Brothers' Defense of the Islamic .Revolution in Syria"), YouTube, December 28, 2013 یهاگن" شقن هب نویمطاف » « ههبج رد تمواقم " ("negah-i be naqsh-e 'fatemiyun' dar jebhe-ye https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbfuO2EpSMw. moqavemat," "A Look at The Role of The 'Fatemiyun' " نیتسخن دیهش نویمطاف یسک هچ ؟دوب " in The Resistance Font"), Jahan News, December 3, 148 2017. http://www.jahannews.com/news/570077/. ("nokhostin shahid-e fatemiyoun che kasi bud?," "Who Was The First Fatemiyoun Martyr?"), Fash /News, September 14, 2019, http://fashnews.ir/fa دنتسم تقو ندوب" " 139 ("mostanad-e vaqt-e budan," "Time of Being news-details/69510/; " عافد هیروس ناردارب رد یم سال یناغفا ب قنالزا " //:Documentary"), Aparat, 2019, https www.aparat.com/v/nT7ti; Phillip Smyth, “The Shiite ("defa-e baradaran-e afghani az enqelab-e eslami dar Jihad and Its Regional Effects, The Washington suriyeh," "Afghan Brothers' Defense of the Islamic Institute For Near East Policy, February 2, 2015, 40-41. Revolution in Syria"), YouTube, December 28, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbfuO2EpSMw. 140 “Commander Documentary," Bultan News. " عییشت رکیپ یادهش ناغفا عفادم مرح ترضح 149 141 “‘Commander' Documentary," Bultan News. بنیز )س مق( رد + سکع " ("tashi-e peykar-e shohada-ye afghan-e modaf-e دنتسم تقو ندوب" " 142 haram-e hazrat-e zeynab (s) dar qom + aks," "Burial of ("mostanad-e vaqt-e budan," "Time of Being The Remains of the Martyred Afghan Defenders of Documentary"), Aparat, 2019. https:// The Shrine of Hazrat-e Zeynab (pbuh) in Qom + www.aparat.com/v/nT7ti. Photo)," Qom News, November 26, 2013, http:// ./www.qomnews.ir/news/16883 " یارجام یراذگمان نویمطاف پیت ؟دوب هچ " 143 ("majara-ye namgozari-ye tipp-e Fatemiyun che 150 References to “shrine defenders’ are abundant in bud?," "What Was The Story of Naming The the numerous online and offline memorials to fallen Fatemiyun Brigade"), Shohada-ye Iran, May 7, 2015. Fatemiyoun fighters; See for instance: AbuhlBayt یارجام - /http://shohadayeiran.com/fa/news/74952 News Agency (ABNA),” Beheaded Body of Hazrat-e یراذگمان نویمطاف پیت- - هچ- دوب - . Zainab Holy Shrine Defender,” January 29, 2014.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 87 https://en.abna24.com/service/important/archive/ %D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8% 2014/01/29/501271/story.html. AA%E2%80%8C%D9%87/

ناعفادم “ مرح ” 156 " عییشت رکیپ یادهش ناغفا عفادم مرح ترضح 151 modafe’an-e haram,” “Shrine Defenders”) Martyr“) بنیز )س مق( رد + سکع " ("tashi-e peykar-e shohada-ye afghan-e modaf-e Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group: Tehran, 2018, 52. haram-e hazrat-e zeynab (s) dar qom + aks," "Burial of " ؛نویبنیز یرکشل تخس هک نیرت تایلمع رد ار اه The Remains of the Martyred Afghan Defenders of 157 هیروس ماجنا دادیم " + The Shrine of Hazrat-e Zeynab (pbuh) in Qom Photo)," Qom News, November 26, 2013. http:// ("zeynabiyun; lashkari ke sakht-tarin amaliat-ha ra dar www.qomnews.ir/news/16883/. suriyeh anjam midad," "Zeynabiyun; The Army That Undertook The Most Difficult Operations in Syria"), Is //:lamtimes.org, May 18, 2019. https " تفگ سابع وگو نیلوئسم یکیاب زا رکشل نویبنیز 152 /goft va go ba abbas yeki az mas'ulin-e www.islamtimes.org/fa/article") ناتسکاپ " lashkar-e zeynabiyun-e pakestan," "Interview With 794953/%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1%DB%8 One of The Commanders of The Pakistani C-%D8%B3%D8%AE%D8%AA- Zeynabiyoun Division"), Martyr Rahimi International %D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86- Institute, March 3, 2017. https:// %D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8% AA-%D9%87%D8%A7- وگتفگ نيلوئسم - اب- - /www.shahidrahimi.com/3309 D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-% رکشل نویبنيز ناتسکاپ - - . %D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85- 153 Ibid. %D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF.

" تفلاخم روضح لباک اب نایماظن هبش ناغفا هیروس رد 158 " تشذگرس نایعیش بیرغ نویبنیز پیت " 154 قارع و" sargozasht-e shi'ayan-e gharib-e tipp-e") zeynabiyun," "The Tale of The Obscure Shiites of The ("mokhalefat-e kabol ba hozur-e shebh-e nezamian-e Zeynabiyoun Brigade"), Shahid News, July 9, 2016. afghan dar suriyeh va araq," "Kabul's Opposition With Afghan Paramilitary Presence in Syria and تشذگرس - /http://www.shahidnews.com/view/103551 //:Iraq"), TRT News, November 27, 2017. https نایعیش بیرغ - نویبنیز پیت- - . www.trt.net.tr/dari/fgnstn/2017/11/28/mkhlft-khbl-b- .hdwr-shbhnzmyn-fgn-dr-swryh-w-rq-856660 " ؛نویبنیز یرکشل تخس هک نیرت تایلمع رد ار اه 155 هیروس ماجنا دادیم " ("zeynabiyun; lashkari ke sakht-tarin amaliat-ha ra dar 159 "Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in suriyeh anjam midad," "Zeynabiyun; The Army That Syria," Human Rights Watch, January 29, 2016. Undertook The Most Difficult Operations in Syria"), F https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending- arhang-e Eslami, February 2, 2020, https:// thousands-afghans-fight-syria#. ؛نویبنیز یرکشل - - هک- /farhangeeslami.com/news " یلعف یکشت نویمطاف تل ادتبا تئیه یگناخکی 160 تخس نیرت تایلمع -ه ./ Archived at: https//: دهشم دوب " //:web.archive.org/web/20201130072246/https farhangeeslami.com/news/ ("tashkilat-e fe'li-ye Fatemiyun ebteda yek hey'at-e %D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9% khanegi-ye mashhad bud," "The Current Formation of 88%D9%86%D8%9B- Fatemiyun Was Initially a House Religious Gathering %D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1%DB%8C- in Mashhad"), Buzdid, June 18, 2016, https:// - یکشتتل نویمطاف یلعف - ادتبا- - /DA%A9%D9%87- buzdid.ir/post/4251612% کی تئیه - یگناخ دهشم- - دوب - -/ یدادعت ناغفا زا- - اه- اپورا زا- - - %D8%B3%D8%AE%D8%AA%E2%80%8C%D8%AA% D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 88 -article/us-iran-currency-protests/iranian-police نویمطاف هب دندمآ- - - دیهشو- دندش - ?…/ type=ShowPostRelated. clash-with-protesters-over-currency-plunge- idUSBRE8920DS20121003. 161 Sune Engel Rasmussen & Zahra Nader, "Iran covertly recruits Afghan Shias to fight in Syria," The 169 Mohammadi, Syria: a Spider Hole, 138. Guardian, June 30, 2016. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran- 170 Mohammadi, Syria: a Spider Hole, 138. covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria. 171 Jamal, op.cit., 2018, 16. 162 “Unwelcome Guests," Human Rights Watch, " لباقم گنج زا نابلاط رباربرد گنج ات شعاد " November 20, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/ 172 2013/11/20/unwelcome-guests/irans-violation- ("az jang moqabel-e taleban ta jang dar barabar-e afghan-refugee-and-migrant-rights; Amir Toumaj, da'esh," "From War Against The Taliban to War "IRGC commander discusses Afghan militia, ‘Shia Against The Islamic State"), IranWire, October 2, liberation army,’ and Syria," FDD's Long War Journal, 2018. https://iranwire.com/fa/features/27876; " شزومآ اکیرمآ تمدخ رد رکشل نویمطاف ناریا " /August 24, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org archives/2016/08/irgc-commander-discusses- ("amuzesh-e amrika dar khedmat-e laskhar-e afghan-militia-shia-liberation-army-and-syria.php. fatemiyoun-e iran," "America's training at The Service of Iran's Fatemiyoun Division"), IranWire, April 25, 163 Jamal, "The Fatemiyoun Army," 8. 2018. https://iranwire.com/fa/features/26974.

164 Toumaj, "IRGC commander discusses Afghan 173 Ibid. militia." 174 Ibid. " تفگ سابع وگو نیلوئسم یکیاب زا رکشل نویبنیز 165 Iran: Afghan Children Recruited to Fight in" 175 ناتسکاپ " ("goft va go ba abbas yeki az mas'ulin-e lashkar-e Syria," Human Rights Watch, October 1, 2017, https:// zeynabiyun-e pakestan," "Interview With One of The www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/01/iran-afghan-children- Commanders of The Pakistani Zeynabiyoun recruited-fight-syria#; " تیاور کدوک نازابرس رکشل نویمطاف ؛هیروس رد گنج زا ,Division"), Martyr Rahimi International Institute سناش میدروآ میدرمن " /March 3, 2017. https://www.shahidrahimi.com/3309 revayat-e kudak sarbazan lashkar-e fatemiyoun az") وگتفگ نيلوئسم اب- رکشل- نویبنيز ناتسکاپ- - - . jang dar suriyeh; shans avordim namordim," "Account 166 "Iran And Its Iraqi Allies’ Role In The Syrian And of Child Soldiers of The Fatemiyoun Division From Iraq Wars, Interview With Author Tom Cooper," Musi War in Syria; We Were Lucky We Did Not Die"), Iran ngs on Iraq, February 6, 2019. http:// Wire, April 26, 2020. https://iranwire.com/fa/ musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2019/02/iran-and-its- features/37975. iraqi-allies-role-in.html. 176 Sune Engel Rasmussen & Zahra Nader, "Iran 167 Marisa Sullivan, "Hezbollah in Syria," Institute Fo covertly recruits Afghan Shias to fight in Syria," The r The Study of War, April 2014. http:// Guardian, June 30, 2016. https:// www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria. www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran- covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria. 168 Yeganeh Torbati & Marcus George, "Iranian police clash with protesters over currency plunge," R 177 Fatemiyoun1434, 2019, “ شرازگ یامیس ادصو ناتسا هفرغ دزی زا نویمطاف رد /euters, October 3, 2012. https://www.reuters.com

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 89 " وگتفگ ناعفادم اب مرح ترضح بنیز )س"( 182 هاگشیامن قیرط نیسحلا " (Broadcasting Yazd Province Report from Fatemiyoun ("goft-o goo ma modafean-e haram-e hazrat-e Kiosk in Tarigh al-Hossein Exhibition)," Telegram, Zeynab," "Interview With Defenders of the Shrine of https://telegram.me/s/Fatemiyoun1434? Hazrat-e Zeynab"), Hamshahri Online, June 9, 2014. وگتفگ - /before=28950. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/262016 ناعفادم اب - مرح ترضح - - بنیز - راددیلک-س- مرح - زا- - یاهزور تخس - . The group has not had a prominent website or 178 social media presence in order to verify these claims. The individual could be telling the truth, or may have 183 Ibid. reflected a recognition of the Guard commander that " خرس یاه یبنیز جوراهل تایلمع رد ل مرحم " he could mobilize Afghan Shiites to fight later. 184 (“orouj-e laleh-ha-ye sorkh-e zeinabi dar amaliat-e moharram," "Ascendance of Red Tulips of Zeinab in " یلیخ ،رود یلیخ ؛کیدزن همدقم ناتساد دنلب 179 ,the Muharram Operation"), Modafe-e Haram یناریا» اه « ناغفاو» اه "« ("kheyli dur, kheyli nazdik; moqaddame-ye dastan-e October 30, 2015. http:// ناعفادم ; مرح _ /boland-e 'irani-ha' va 'afghan-ha,'" "Very Far, Very modafeaharam.persianblog.ir/tag Close; Introduction to The Long Story of 'Iranians' Surging in popularity in the 2000s, blogging declined and 'Afghans'"), Tasnim News, 1 July, 2014. https:// toward the mid-2010s thanks in large part to state www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1393/04/10/337077/ censorship, which left pro-system blogs alone, as well as the rise of social networking sites like یلیخ رود - یلیخ کیدزن- همدقم- ناتساد - - دنلب یناریا - - اه- -و- Facebook, Instagram, Telegram and WhatsApp. (Fred ناغفا اه- . Petrossian, Arash Abadpour & Mahsa Alimardani, ,The decline of Iran’s Blogestan," Washington Post" نیرجاهمام یاه" هیلگ ،یناتسناغفا داقتنا یروهمج هب 180 /April 11, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com ؛تسین یم سال عناوم تسا هب ققحت ب قنال " ("gelayeha-ye ma mohajerin-e Afghanestani, enteqad news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/11/the-decline-of- be jomhouri-ye eslami nist, be mavane'-e tahaghogh- irans-blogestan/. e enghelab ast," "We Afghan Migrants Have No " عییشت رکیپ دیهش ود عفادم مرح ترضح بنیز )س( Criticism of the Islamic Republic, it is About 185 دهشم رد سدقم " ,Obstacles to Fulfilling Revolution"), Tasnim News July 19, 2014, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/ (tashi-ye peykar-e do shahid-e modafe'-e haram-e ",hazrat-e zeynab (s) dar mashhad-e moghaddas هی-ل نیرجاهمگ یاه- ام- - /news/1393/04/28/435156 Burial of Two Martyred Shrine Defenders of Hazrat-e" یناتسناغفا داقتنا یروهمج- هب- - یم- سال تسین - عناوم هب- - - ,Zeynab (pbuh) in Holy Mashhad"), Isaar, August 21 ققحت -ب قنال تسا - . 2014. http://isaar.ir/doc/news/fa/88161/. یمیهاربا مل"س تجحلا : ماقم مظعم یربهر روتسد 181 .Ibid 186 ،دنداد نیرجاهم یناتسناغفا ار میرکت » « دینک " ("hojjat ol-eslam ebrahimi: maqam-e mo'azzam-e rahbari dastur dadand, mohajerin-e afghanestani ra 187 Mehdi Fattahi, "Iranians manage to surf the web 'takrim' konid," "Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi: The despite tide of censorship," Associated Press, July Supreme Leader Have Ordered to 'Honor' Afghan 26, 2019. https://apnews.com/ Migrants"), Tasnim News, November 30, 2014. fa030c4f6ada4131a2b03147a06cc58e. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, House 188 572250/08/09/1393/ تجح -م یمیهاربالسلا- ماقم - - Committee on Foreign Affairs, Iran’s Islamic مظعم یربهر روتسد - نیرجاهم یناتسناغفا دنداد- - - - میرکت ار- - - Revolutionary Guard Corps: Fueling Middle East دینک . Turmoil, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 2015, 25-49.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 90 هقطنم %E2%80%8C يا فذح / دنچ- تسپدص- - قلعتم - -هب - ..Ibid 189 یادهش عفادم مارگاتسنیا - مرح - زا- - بسیف-و- _html.748538. 190 Ibid. 193 A series of popular or fan accounts were taken 191 Interview with researcher, Washington, D.C., down in 2019. “ تسپ فذح دص دنچ قلعتم یادهش هب عفادم مرح زا .2021 مارگاتسنیا کوبسیف و ”! 192 The official Fatemiyoun Instagram page had (“hazf-e chand sad post motealleq be shohada-ye more than 46,000 followers, the largest on any social modafe’-e haram az Instagram va facebook,” “Several media platform, before shutting down. According to Hundred Posts Belonging To Martyred Shrine IRGC-linked Mashregh News, Instagram took action Defenders Eliminated From Instagram and after Fatemiyoun teased portions of a documentary Facebook!”). Ahl-ul-Bayt News Agency, March 6, رابخا - ارف - /called “Shadow of Destruction” about the 2019, https://fa.abna24.com/news هقطنم %E2%80%8C يا فذح / دنچ- تسپدص- - قلعتم - -هب - paramilitary group’s campaign against ISIS in eastern یادهش عفادم مارگاتسنیا - مرح - زا- - بسیف-و- _Syria. Instagram shut down the official Fatemiyoun .html.748538 page after the group set up another page. The " نویمطاف پیت رکشل هب اقترا تفای " biggest moves against the Fatemiyoun and some 194 popular affiliated pages or fan accounts was in ("tippe fatemiyoun be lashkar erteqa yaft," March 2019; the platform continued to shut down "Fatemiyoun Division Upgraded to a Division"), Taghri pages after others were being set up. The platform b News Agency, May 20, 2015. http:// پیت- /has cited that page’s “support for a violent and/or www.taghribnews.com/fa/news/192345 نویمطاف رکشل اقترا - تفای- - . criminal organization and group” as the reason for shutting it down. U.S. officials may have nudged the social media platform to enforce this rule. 195 Ahmad Majidyar, "Iran Recruits and Trains Large Numbers of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites," Middle “ فذح هحفص یمسر نویمطاف مارگاتسنیا زا ” (“hazf-e safhe-ye rasmi-ye fatemiyoun az Instagram,” East Institute, January 18, 2017. https://www.mei.edu/ “Fatemiyoun’s Official Instagram Page Took Down”), publications/iran-recruits-and-trains-large-numbers- Mashregh News, May 23, 2018, https:// afghan-and-pakistani-shiites www.mashreghnews.ir/news/858210/;‏ " رکشل ؛نویمطاف زاغآ زورمازا ات / ییاهوزاب یارب 196 فذح" هحفص یمسر نویمطاف - مارگاتسنیا- - زا- - ; “ هحفص تمدخ عافد مدرم مرح هبوزا " یمسر نویمطاف اددجم طسوتً مارگاتسنیا دودسم دش ” (“safhe-ye rasmi-ye fatemiyoun mojaddadan ("lashkar-e fatemiyoun; az aghaz ta emruz/ bazuhay-i tavassot-e Instagram masdud shod,” “The Official baray-e defa az haram va khedmat be mardom," Instagram Page Was Blocked Against by Instgram”), T "Fatemiyoun Division; From Beginning to Now/ Arms asnim News, July 17, 2018. https:// To Defend the Shrine and Serve the People"), Khabar, www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ May 12, 2019. https://khabari.org/article/1529931/ نویمطاف رکشل - زا- زاغآ زورما ییاهوزاب- ات- - - یارب - عافد - زا- - ;/1397/04/26/1778743 مرح تمدخ-و- مدرمهب- - . “ تسپ فذح دص دنچ قلعتم یادهش هب عفادم مرح زا مارگاتسنیا کوبسیف و ”! (“hazf-e chand sad post motealleq be shohada-ye 197 Tobias Schneider, "The Fatemiyoun Division in modafe’-e haram az Instagram va facebook,” “Several the Syrian Civil War," Middle East Institute, October Hundred Posts Belonging To Martyred Shrine 2018, 5. Defenders Eliminated From Instagram and 198 Rasmussen & Nader, "Iran covertly recruits Facebook!”). Ahl-ul-Bayt News Agency, March 6, Afghan Shias to fight in Syria," The Guardian. رابخا - ارف - /https://fa.abna24.com/news .2019

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 91 مرآ یمسر " رکشل نویمطاف » « ییامنور دش سکع+ " Jamal, "The Fatemiyoun Army," 7. 209 199 ("arm-e rasmi-ye 'lashkar-e fatemiyoun' runamayi 200 Ranj Alaaldin, “The Isis campaign against Iraq’s shod + aks, "The Official Logo of 'Fatemiyoun Shia Muslims is not politics. It’s genocide,” The Division' Unveiled + Photo"), Jam News, November 3, Guardian, January 5, 2017. https:// 2015. https://www.jamnews.com/detail/News/ www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/05/ 593330. isis-iraq-shia-muslims-jihadis-atrocities. " حرش لماک هعقاو اروشاع لتقم زا فوهل " 210 201 Patrick Cockburn, "Camp Speicher massacre: ("sharh-e kamel-e vaqe'ey-e Ashura az mofatel-e Retracing the steps of Isis's worst-ever atrocity," The lahuf," "Full Description of Ashura Incident From Independent, November 7, 2017. https:// Lohoof [Sighs of Sorrow]"), Tabnak, November 14, حرش - /www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ 2013. https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/357713 لماک اروشاع هعقاو - - زا- لتقم - فوهل - . -camp-speicher-massacre-isis-islamic-state-tikrit-air academy-iraq-a8040576.html. " عییشت رکیپ رهطم دیهش ود نویبنیز پیت رازگرب 211 دوش یم " .Mohammadi, Syria: a Spider Hole, 35-36 202 ("tashi-ye peykar-e motahar-e do shahid-e tipp-e zeynabiyoun bargozar mishavad, "Funeral To Be Held " دنتسم هرابود ریسا یمن یوش " 203 ("mostanad-e dobar-e asir nemishavi," "You Will Not for Two Pure Remains of Zeynabiyoun Division Be Captured Again Documentary"), Aparat, June 18, Martyrs") Basij Press, January 18 2017. http:// 2014. https://www.aparat.com/v/dhlRy/. basijnews.ir/fa/news/8809714/.

204 Ali Alfoneh, "Maximal Exposure, Minimal 212 Ali Alfoneh, "Iran’s Most Dangerous General," A Presence: Iran's Military Engagement in Iraq," The merican Enterprise Institute, July 13, 2011. https:// Washington Institute For Near East Policy, August 25, www.aei.org/research-products/report/irans-most- 2015. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- dangerous-general/. analysis/view/maximal-exposure-minimal-presence- irans-military-engagement-in-iraq. 213 Alfoneh concluded that Soleimani during the war gained experience to become a tactical general, 205 Ibid. but that he never managed to become a strategist: Alfoneh, "Iran’s Most Dangerous General," American 206 Ostvoar, op.cit., "Vanguard," 2016, 52. Enterprise Institute; Ali Alfoneh, "Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani: A Biography," America Enterprise 207 “Liwa al-Fatemiyoun: Martyrdom Graphic,” Institute, January 24, 2011. https://www.aei.org/ Jihad Intel, accessed March 3, 2020. https:// research-products/report/brigadier-general-qassem- jihadintel.meforum.org/identifier/542/liwa-al- suleimani-a-biography/; Former IRGC chief fatemiyoun-martyrdom-graphic. commander Mohammad Ali Ja'fari, who was a senior commander in 1982, wrote in his memoirs that سکع یربخ " / ناعفادم یناغفا مرح ترضح 208 Soleimani during his first major command post at بنیز ) ترضح سو هیقر) (س"( ("ax-e khabari/modafe'an-e afghani-ye haram-e Operation Fat'h ol-Mobin (Manifest Victory) was hazrat-e zeynab (s) va hazrat-e roqayya," "Photo unable to properly secure the flanks of two units, Report/Afghan Defenders of The Shrine of Hazrat-e which bore the brunt of Iraqi pressure. Other Zeynab (pbuh) and Hazrat-e Roqayya (pbuh)"), ABNA, biographies called Soleimani's first major operation a November 1, 2014. https://fa.abna24.com/service/ success: Gol-Ali Baba'i, کلاک یکاخ یاه " : تارطاخ یهافش رکشلرس رادساپ .pictorial/archive/2014/11/01/648368/story.html یلعدمحم یرفعج "

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 92 ("kalakha-ye khaki: khaterat-e shafahi-ye sarlashkar e amrika keshand,” “Qasem Soleimani; The Man Who pasdar mohammad-ali ja'fari," "Dusty Overlays: Oral Touted Iran’s Power to America”), Ahlul Bayt News Memoires of Major General Guardsman Mohammad- Agency, November 30, 2014. https://fa.abna24.com/ Ali Ja'fari"), Sureh-ye Mehr Publications, 2011, 365; service/middle/archive/2014/11/30/655059/ Ehsan Mehrabi, "Ghasem Soleimani: The Mythical story.html; “ یگژیو مساق جاح یق ینامیلسخال یاه تیاور هب هارمه //:Commander," IranWire, April 11, 2019, https زورید زورما و ” .iranwire.com/en/features/5966 (“vizhegiha-ye akhlaqi-ye haj qasem soleimani be 214 Alfoneh, "Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani." ravayat-e hamrah-e diruz va emruz,” “Ethical Characteristics of Haj Qasem Soleimani According to 215 Ostovar, "Vangard," 3. the Companion of Yesterday and Today”), Ettela’at, October 16, 2016. https://www.ettelaat.com/ " لادم رادرس ینامیلس گنج زا سپ 33 هزور سکع + " 216 mobile/?p=5747. ("medal-e sardar soleimani pas az jang-e sio-se ruz-e +asks," "Commander Soleimani's Medal After The 224 Josh Weinberg, "Wow...#Iran IRGC Qods Force Thirty-Three Day War + Photo"), Mashregh News, commander Qasem Soleimani on #Iraq frontlines in March 12, 2019. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/ Amerli via @dgtlresistance," Twitter, September 3, 943778/; 2014. https://twitter.com/josh_weinberg/status/ .507191891801423873 یهاگن یهدنامرف هب " مساق جاح » هیواز زا توافتم یا « " ("negah-i be farmandehi-ye 'haj qassem' az zaviye-i motefavet," "A Look at The Command of 'Hajj Qasem' 225 Golnaz Esfandiari, "Soleimani is everywhere RT From Another Angle"), Mashregh News, March 13, @SumerRising: #Iraq; #Iran IRGC commander 2019. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/943891/. Qassim Soleimani with PUK fighters in Tuz," Twitter, October 6, 2014, https://twitter.com/GEsfandiari/ .status/519000407985901569 "۱۳ رکشلرس یروهمج ناریا یم سال " 217 ("13 sarlashkar-e jomhuri-ye eslami-ye iran," "13 Major Generals of The Islamic Republic of Iran"), Radio Fard 226 Nabih Bulos & Patrick J. McDonnell, “Iran’s a, January 26, 2011. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/ ‘Supermani:’ fabled general, Internet sensation,” Los f4_iranian_13_general_revolutionary_guards_army/ Angeles Times, March 4, 2015, https:// 2287760.html. www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran- supermani-fabled-general-20150304-story.html; 218 Dexter Filkins, "The Shadow Commander," Austin Bodetti, “Even Iranian Military Generals Can September 30, 2013. https://www.newyorker.com/ Become Dank Memes in This Brave New World,” magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander. Vice, January 27, 2017. https://www.vice.com/en/ article/9adwpe/even-iranian-military-generals-can- 219 Ostovar, "Vanguard," 225-226. become-dank-memes-in-this-brave-new-world.

220 Ibid. " سکع یفلس زابرس رادرس سور اب ینامیلس " 227 ("ax-e selfie-e sarbaz-e rusi ba sardar soleimani," 221 Ibid. 226-227 "Russian Soldier's Selfie Photo With Commander 222 Ibid. Soleimani"), Shahid News, February 20, 2016. http:// سکع - یفلس - /www.shahidnews.com/view/70725 زابرس سور - رادرس ینامیلس اب- - - . “ مساق ؛ینامیلس یدرم تردق هک ناریا خر هب ار 223 اکیرمآ دناشک ” (“qasem soleimani; mardi ke qodrat-e iran ra be rokh- 228 Thomas Joscelyn, "The Consequences of Russia’s ‘Counterterrorism’ Campaign in Syria," Comb

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 93 ating Terrorism Center Sentinel, Volume 9, Issue 11, commander-irgc-supplies-intelligence-to-russia-for- December 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the- airstrikes-in-syria.php. consequences-of-russias-counterterrorism- " تروص رد هلمح لییارسا ییاج رد ملاس یمن دنام " campaign-in-syria/. 238 ("dar surat-e hamle jay-i dar esra'il salem 229 Fulton, "Iranian Strategy in Syria," 27. nemimanad," "In Case of Attack, No Where in Israel Will Be Left Unscathed"), Farda News September 16, 230 Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Sanctions," Congressio 2012. https://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/220813/. nal Research Service, October 15, 2012. 239 Ali Arouzi, "Iranian Revolutionary Guard 231 "Iran Quds chief visited Russia despite U.N. Commander Hussein Hamedani Killed in Syria," NBC travel ban: Iran official," Reuters, August 7, 2015. News, October 9, 2015. https://www.nbcnews.com/ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-iran- news/world/iranian-revolutionary-guard- soleimani/iran-quds-chief-visited-russia-despite-u-n- commander-hussein-hamedani-killed-syria-n441551. travel-ban-iran-official-idUSKCN0QC1KM20150807. 240 Mohammadi, Syria: A Spider Hole, 194. 232 This statement was made by Brigadier General Mohammad-Ja'far Assadi, the former commander of 241 Ibid. Iranian advisory forces in Syria: .Ibid 242 یتایئزج " رادید زا مهمو ۱۴۰ هقیقد نیتوپ یا رادرس اب ینامیلس " دنتسم لماک دربن اریملاپ " " Details From The Important and 140-minute 243") Meeting Between Putin and Soleimani"), Parsine, ("mostanad-e kamel-e nabard-e palmyra," "The Full July 15, 2019, https://www.parsine.com/fa/news/ Documentary of The Battle For Palmyra"), //:Rasekhoon, December 13, 2016, https 542888/ یتایئزج رادید زا- - مهم - -و- هقیقد۱۴۰ یا- نیتوپ - اب- - دنتسم - دربن - /rasekhoon.net/media/show/1238534 رادرس ینامیلس - . اریملاپ ; " نیرتدیدج دنتسم نویمطاف تحت ناونع » شتآ یورطخ « .Rondeaux, op.cit., 2019 233 ییامنور دش " 234 Ibid. ("jadidtarin mostanad-e fatemiyoun that-e onvan-e 'ruy-e khatt-e atash' runama-yi shod," "Latest 235 Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and Iran: Historic Mistrust Fatemiyoun Documentary Called 'On The Line of Fire' and Contemporary Partnership," Carnegie Was Unveiled"), SNN, October 8, 2017. https://snn.ir/ Endowment For International Peace, August 18, 2016. fa/news/638471/. https://carnegie.ru/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran- ریواصت " نیرخآ ناعفادم/ مرح » « رد هک تایلمع » historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership- 244 مرحم هنادواج دندش « " .pub-64365 ("tasavir/ akharin 'modafe'an-e haram' ke dar 236 Paul K. Kerr & Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Nuclear 'amaliyat-e moharram' javdan-e shodand, "Photos / Agreement and U.S. Exit," Congressional Research Latest 'Shrine Defenders' Who Reached Eternity in Service, July 20, 2018. 'Operation Muharram'"), Nasim-e Sarkhs, October 27, رابخا ناریا/ - - ناهجو- /http://nasimesarakhs.ir .2015 11729/ ریواصت نیرخآ ناعفادم - - مرح - هک- یلمعرد- - ./ Amir Toumaj, "Commander: IRGC supplies 237 intelligence to Russia for airstrikes in Syria," FDD's Long War Journal, September 27, 2016. https:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 94 245 Behnam Ben Taleblu, "Iran's Greatest Fear: %D9%88%D9%86- 'American Islam,'" https://nationalinterest.org/ %D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1- feature/irans-greatest-fear-american-islam-11951. %D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A 7%D9%86- 246 Mohammadi, Syria: A Spider Hole, 31, 51-52. %D8%A8%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF% D8%B9%D8%A7%DB%8C- 247 Ibid, 52. %D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9- %D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85. 248 Ibid. 254 Ali Alfoneh, “Tehran’s Shia Foreign Legion,” 249 Ibid, 51-52. Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, January 30, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/ 250 Ibid, 52. 2018/01/30/tehran-s-shia-foreign-legions-pub-75387; Iranian commanders and media have said that “100 دلج باتک یارب ناعفادم مرح هدش پاچ تسا ” 251 (“100 jeld ketab bara-ye modafe’an-e haram chap Fatemiyoun deaths are higher than publicly shod east,” “100 Books Have Been Published For announced, see: “ یادهش نویمطاف بیرغ زا نیرت ییادهش تداهش دعب زا هک .Shrine Defenders”), Defa Press, September 20, 2017 انشآ مان مه یمن دنوش ” دلج- باتک - https://defapress.ir/fa/news/258170/100- shohada-ye Fatemiyoun az gharibtarin shohada-yi“) ناعفادم یارب - مرح - پاچ- هدش - تسا - تارطاخ باتک - - مساق - - ”,ke ba’d az shahadat ham nam ashna nemishavand ینامیلس رشتنم - یم- %E2%80%8C دوش . “Fatemiyoun Martyrs Are Most Unknown Martyrs Whose Names Not Known After Martyrdom”), Tasni " عادو رکیپ اب دیهش عفادم مرح ردنکسا یمیرک " 252 ("veda' ba peykar-e shahid-e modafe'-e haram m News, December 20, 2017. https:// eskandar Karimi," "Farewell With The Remains of www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ 1606373/29/09/1396/ نویمطاف یادهش - زا- بیرغ - نیرت - - ,Martyred Shrine Defender Eskandar Karimi"), Hamso ییادهش هک- دعب - تداهش زا- - مه- مان انشآ- - یمن - دنوش - ; /October 25, 2016. http://www.hamso.ir/news/ID “ رکشل نویمطاف هنوگچ سیسأت ؟دش ” 269775/ عادو رکیپاب_ _ دیهش عفادم_ _ ردنکسا مرح _ یمیرک_ _ ; (“Lashkar-e Fatemiyoun Chegun-e Ta’sis Shod?,” How Was The Fatemiyoun Division Formed?”), Tasni“ “ مرسپ ود عافد هار مرح رد ترضحزا ار بنیز ینابرق //:m News, May 12, 2019. https مدرک ” (“do pesaram ra dar rah-e defa’ az haram-e zeynab www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ 2009899/22/02/1398/ نویمطاف رکشل هنوگچ- سیسأت - - - qorbani kardam,” “I sacrificed my Two Sons In The دش . Path of Defending The Shrine of Heer Excellency Zeynab”), IranWire, October 18, 2018. https:// " یرکشل تخس هک نیرت تایلمع هیروس رد ار اه ماجنا iranwire.com/fa/features/28009. 255 دادیم " lashkar-i ke sakhttarin amaliat-ha ra dar suriyeh") “ ؛نویمطاف رکشل نارادرس یاعدایب عفادم مرح ” 253 (“Fatemiyoun; lashkar-e sardaran-e bi edde’a-ye anjam midad," "The Division That Did The Most modafe-e haram,” “Fatemiyoun; Army of Humble Difficult Operations in Syria"), Islam Times, May 18, Shrine Defender Commanders”), Keyhan, December 2019. https://www.islamtimes.org/fa/article/794953/ یرکشل تخس - نیرت تایلمع - - هیروس اه- ماجنا- - یم- داد- . نویمطاف - //http://kayhan.ir/fa/news/64040 .2015 ,26 رکشل نارادرس - یب- %E2%80%8C یاعدا عفادم - مرح - . Archived at: https://web.archive.org/web/ 256 “Visual Pilgrimage of Unknown Martyrs and 20210224182118/http://kayhan.ir/fa/news/ Martyrs of Shrine Defenders; Behesht-e Ma’sumeh 64040/%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%85%DB%8C Cemetary; Qom Province Municipality,” Azm Ziarat,

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 95 " وضع کی قباس رکشل نویمطاف : یناریا تشپ زا اه accessed May 8, 2020. http://azmziarat.ir/fa/ 263 کیلش دندرک امیم هب رارف ات مینکن " pilgrimage/3/; Lars Hauch, "Understanding the Fatemiyoun Division: Life Through the Eyes of a ("yek ozv-e sabeq-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun: irani-ha az Militia Member," Middle East Institute, May 22, 2019. posht be ma shellik mikardand ta farar nakonim," "A https://www.mei.edu/publications/understanding- Former Member of Fatemiyoun Division: Iranians fatemiyoun-division-life-through-eyes-militia- Would Shoot at Us From Behind So We Would Not member. Escape"), IranWire, December 9, 2019. https:// iranwire.com/fa/blogs/227/34709. 257 Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group, “Fatemiyoun Book,” accessed February 3, 2020. http:// 264 Ahmad Shuja Jamal, The Fatemiyoun Army: .Reintegration into Afghan Society, Special Report No نویمطاف باتک . - /www.jhadi.ir/tag 443, United States Institute of Peace, March 2019, 5. 258 Zohreh Shari'ati, رشن یداه“ ” 265 " ناقشاع هداتسیا دنریمیم " ("asheqan istadeh mimirand," "Lovers Die Standing"), (“nashr-e hadi,” “Hadi Publications”), ebrahimhadi.ir, Shahid Kazemi Publications: Qom, 2019, 7. Martyr Ebrahim Hadi Cultural Group, accessed September 15, 2020. http://www.ebrahimhadi.ir/ /index.php/fa هعومجم باتک" یاه نادنزرف حور هللا » « ییامنور 259 .html.40-20-08-29-10-2017/39-09-08-05-09-2018 دش " ("majmu'eh ketabha-ye 'farzandan-e ruhollah' " رادید هداوناخ یادهش یناتسناغفا عفادم مرح رکشل runamayi shod," "The Book Series 'Children of 266 نویمطاف " Ruhollah' Was Unveiled"), Iranian Students' News Agency, December 31, 2019. https://www.isna.ir/ ("didar-e khanevadeh-ye shohada-ye afghanestani-ye modafe-e haram-e laskhar-e fatemiyoun." "Meeting هعومجم - باتک - نادنزرف یاه- - حور - /news/98101007839 of Families of Martyred Afghan Shrine Defenders"), O ییامنور هللا - دش- . ffice for the Preservation and Publication of the Works 260 Ali Alfoneh, "Four Decades in the Making: Shia of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, March 27, 2016. http:// Afghan Fatemiyoun Division of the Revolutionary farsi.khamenei.ir/video-content?id=33070. Guards," Arab Gulf Institute, July 25, 2018. https:// نویبنیز هب "ملس" agsiw.org/four-decades-in-the-making-shia-afghan- 267 fatemiyoun-division-of-the-revolutionary-guards/ ("salam be zeynabiyoun," "Hello to Zeynabiyoun"), Re za Holy Precinct, December 7, 2016. https:// .مل نویبنیزس هب- - /haram.razavi.ir/post " یرکشل تخس هک نیرت تایلمع هیروس رد ار اه ماجنا 261 دادیم " دنتسم " ردپ | رادید هداوناخ یادهش نویمطاف اب lashkar-i ke sakhttarin amaliat-ha ra dar suriyeh 268") یربهر " anjam midad," "The Division That Did The Most Difficult Operations in Syria"), Islam Times, May 18, ("mostanad-e pedar | didar-e khanevade-ye shohada- 2019. https://www.islamtimes.org/fa/article/794953/ ye fatemiyoun ba rahbari," "Father Documentary | Martyred Fatemiyoun Families Meeting With یرکشل تخس - نیرت تایلمع - - هیروس اه- ماجنا- - یم- داد- . Supreme Leader"), Aparat, March 20, 2019. https:// 262 "Iran Sent Them to Syria. Now Afghan Fighters www.aparat.com/v/6LiTU. Are a Worry at Home," New York Times, November " ،نویمطاف دادتما میسن رکفت یجیسب " https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/world/ 269 .2017 ,11 asia/afghanistan-iran-syria-revolutionary- ("fatemiyoun, emtedad-e nasim-e tafakkor-e basiji, guards.html. "Fatemiyoun, Continuation of the breeze of Basiji Thought"), Office for the Preservation and Publication

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 96 “ رادرس ینامیلس هقلح رد ناگدنمزر نویمطاف + of the Works of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, May 23, 276 سکع ” ?http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-report .2016 id=33153. (“sardar soleimani dar halqe-ye razmandegan-e fatemiyoun + aks,” “Commander Soleimani in the ring of Fatemiyoun Warriors + Photo”), Iranian Labor رادید نارعاش " ۹۶ | یناوخرعش یاقآ نسح دیس 270 /News Agency, May 9, 2016. https://www.ilna.news زرابم روشک زا ناتسناغفا " شخب ریاس هناسر - - اه- -369154/10- رادرس ینامیلس - رد- - Meeting of Poets 96 | Poetry of Mr. Seyyed Hassan) ناگدنمزر هقلح نویمطاف - - سکع - . Mobarez From the Country of Afghanistan)," Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of " ینارنخس نتم رادرس ینامیلس عمج ناعفادمرد Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (Iran), June 10, 2017. 277 مرح " ;http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id=37117 matn-e sokhanrani-ye sardar soleimani dar jam-e") " هیثرم ییارس بانج یاقآ مثیم یعیطم " (Requiem Singing By Mr. Meysam Moti'i)," Office for modafe'an-e haram," "Transcript of Commander the Preservation and Publication of the Works of Soleimani's Speech Among Shrine Defenders"), Iran Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (Iran), March 2, 2017. Diplomacy, November 2, 2015. http://irdiplomacy.ir/ ینارنخس نتم- رادرس- ینامیلس - - رد- /http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id=35861. fa/news/1953405 ناعفادم عمج - مرح - .- 271 The Division That Did The Most Difficult Operations in Syria, Mashregh News. 278 Ali Alfoneh, "Shia Afghan Fighters in Syria," Atla ntic Council, April 19, 2017. https:// 272 Amir Toumaj, "Qassem Soleimani allegedly www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/shia- spotted in Syria near the Iraqi border," FDD's Long afghan-fighters-in-syria/. War Journal, June 14, 2017. https:// ردص قشع " " www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/06/qassem- 279 soleimani-spotted-in-syria-near-the-iraqi-border.php. ("sadr-e esghq," "Sadr of Love"), Sima Documentary Channel, 2015. http://www.doctv.ir/Program/150244. 273 Ibid. 280 Ibid. “ رادرس ینامیلس هقلح رد ناگدنمزر نویمطاف + 274 .Ibid 281 سکع ” (“sardar soleimani dar halqe-ye razmandegan-e fatemiyoun + aks,” “Commander Soleimani in The 282 Ibid. ring of Fatemiyoun Warriors + Photo”), Iranian Labor " رادرس ینامیلس هقلح رد ناگدنمزر نویمطاف + News Agency, May 9 2016. https://www.ilna.news/ 283 سکع " شخب ریاس هناسر - - اه- -369154/10- رادرس ینامیلس - رد- - sardar soleimani dar halqe-ye razmandegan-e") ناگدنمزر هقلح نویمطاف - - سکع - . fatemiyoun," "Commander Soleimani Among Fatemiyoun Warriors + Photo"), Iranian Labor News “ تبحص رادرس یاه ینامیلس هرابرد دیهش هدازردص 275 شخب - /Agency, May 9, 2016. https://www.ilna.news + ملیف ” ریاس هناسر - اه- -369154/10- رادرس ینامیلس - رد- هقلح - - sohbatha-ye sardar soleimani darbare-ye shahid“) ناگدنمزر نویمطاف - سکع - . sadrzadeh,” “Commander Soleimani’s Statements About Martyr Sardzadeh + Film”), April 2, 2016. " رظن مساق جاح ینامیلس هرابرد نویمطاف " 284 تبحص - یاه- //http://www.qudsonline.ir/news/363189 nazar-e haj ghasem soleimani darbare-ye") رادرس ینامیلس هرابرد - هدازردص - دیهش - - ملیف - . fatemiyoun," "Hajj Qasem Soleimani's Opinion About The Fatemiyoun"), Al Waght, August 2, 2016. http://

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 97 -commander-discusses-afghan-militia-shia-liberation رادید رادرس- مساق- - /alwaght.com/fa/News/62872 .army-and-syria.php ینامیلس هداوناخ هدنامرف اب- - نویمطاف - دیهش - - -- سکع . Archived at: https://web.archive.org/web/ 20200205174311/http://alwaght.com:80/fa/News/ 289 Afshon Ostovar, "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian 62872/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1- Foreign Policy," Carnegie Endowment For %D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1- International Peace, 2016. https:// %D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85- carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/30/sectarian- %D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8 dilemmas-in-iranian-foreign-policy-when-strategy- 6%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7- and-identity-politics-collide-pub-66288. %D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8% رادرس " ینآاق ناگدنمزر نویمطاف: ' هیروس رد رد' AF%D9%87- 290 ناهد اکیرمآ دندز " D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF% %D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF- ("sarda qa'ani: razmandegan-e 'fatemiyoun' dar %D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%8 suriyeh dar dahan-e amrika zadand," "Commander 8%D9%86--%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3. Gha'ani: 'Fatemiyoun' Warriors Hit America in The Mouth in Syria") Fatemyoun.com, September 19, 2017. //:https://fatemyoun.com/526. Archived at: https " رادید رادرس ینامیلس هداوناخ اب نادیهش یاه عفادم 285 didar-e sardarweb.archive.org/web/20200219212720/https:// soleimani") مرح هدازردص دنژآ و ریواصت ) "( ba khanevadeha-ye shahidan-e modafe'-e haram fatemyoun.com/526. sadrzadeh va azhand (tasavir)," "Commander رادرس " ینآاق ناگدنمزر نویمطاف: ' هیروس رد رد' Soleimani's Meeting With Families of Martyred 291 ناهد اکیرمآ دندز " ,("(Shrine Defenders Sadrzadeh and Azhand (Images Harim-e Haram, October 27, 2016. https:// ("sarda qa'ani: razmandegan-e 'fatemiyoun' dar suriyeh dar dahan-e amrika zadand," "Commander رادید رادرس ینامیلس- - - اب- =harimeharam.ir/news/521?n Gha'ani: 'Fatemiyoun' Warriors Hit America in The هداوناخ یاه نادیهش عفادم- هدازردص- مرح - - - دنژآ ریواصتو- )- . Mouth in Syria") Fatemyoun.com, September 19, 2017. //:https://fatemyoun.com/526. Archived at: https " رکشل نویمطاف رادرس اب ینامیلس زرم قارعهب و 286 //:web.archive.org/web/20200219212720/https هیروس دیسر سکع+ " ("lashkar-e fatemiyoun ba sardar soleimani be marz-e fatemyoun.com/526. araq va suriyeh resid+ax," "Fatemiyoun Division With دنتسم نازابرس" ربهر » « یملیف دیحو زا داتساروپ " Commander Soleimani Reached The Iraq and Syria 292 Border + Photo"), Jam-e Jam Online, June 12, 2017. ("mostanad-e 'sarbazan-e rahbar' filmi az vahid pur- http://jamejamonline.ir/online/ ostad," "'Soldiers of The Leader' Documentary, a Film ,by Vahid Pur-Ostad"), Radio Farda, September 17 2878027701443385393/ نویمطاف رکشل - رادرس اب- - - .https://www.radiofarda.com/a/29494443.html .2018 ینامیلس -هب زرم - قارع - هیروس -و دیسر- - سکع - .

287 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Increasing Number Of 293 Fatemiyoun1434, 2019, " یحادم دمحا جاح یظعاو عمج ناگدنمزررد نویمطاف # " Afghans, Pakistanis Killed In Syria Buried In Iran,” Rad io Free Europe, April 25, 2015. https://www.rferl.org/ ("maddahi-ye haj ahmad-e va'ezi dar jam'-e a/persian-letters-afghans-pakistanis-killed-fighting- razmandegan-e #fatemiyoun," "Religious Singing of in-syria-for-iran/26977907.html. Haj Ahmad Va'ezi Among #Fatemiyoun Warriors), Tel egram, September 14, 2019. https://t.me/ 288 Amir Toumaj, "IRGC commander discusses Fatemiyoun1434/28694. Afghan militia, ‘Shia liberation army,’ and Syria," FDD' یحادم ناگدنمزر "سلک نویمطاف هیروس رد " s Long War Journal, August 24, 2016. https:// 294 www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/irgc- ("kelas-e maddahi-ye razmandegan-e fatemiyoun dar

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 98 هینایب" مهم رکشل نویمطاف » باطخ رکشلرس هب « suriyeh," "Religious Singing Class For Fatemiyoun ینامیلس " //:Warriors in Syria"), Aparat, July 23, 2019. https www.aparat.com/v/TCiZl. ("bayani-ye mohemm-e 'lashkar-e fatmiyoun' khatab be sarlashkar soleimani," "Important Statement by Fatemiyoun Division' Addressed to Major General' " هحون یناتسناغفا رکشل نویمطاف ماقم یب رد یب 295 //:Soleimani"), Farda News, November 21, 2017. https ترضح بنیز )ص"( هینایب - مهم - /nohe-ye afghanestani-ye lashkar-e fatemiyoun dar www.fardanews.com/fa/news/750883") نویمطاف رکشل باطخ- رکشلرس- هب- ینامیلس - - . maqam-e bi bi Hazrat-e Zeynab," "Afghan Religious Singing For Bi Bi Her Excellency Zeynab (pbuh)"), Apa " همان ناهدنامرف هداوناخ و یادهش نویبنیز رادرس هب rat, 2016. https://www.aparat.com/v/FN8rm. 304 ینامیلس " 296 Ibid. ("name-ye farmandehan-e va khanevade-ye shohada- ye zeynabiyoun be sardar soleimani," "Letter of Zeynabiyoun Commanders and Families of Martyrs " دنتسم نیرخآ لصف یگدنز " 297 ("mostanad-e akharin fasl-e zendegi," "Last Chapter to Commander Soleimani"), Jam-e Jam, November of Life Documentary"), Aparat, April 23, 2018. https:// 25, 2017. http://jamejamonline.ir/online/ ناهدنامرف3082471793015453622/ همان - هداوناخ -و- - ./www.aparat.com/v/P3LoK یادهش نویبنیز - رادرس ینامیلس-هب - - . 298 Ibid. 305 Ahmad Shuja Jamal, "Mission Accomplished? 299 "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the What’s Next for Iran’s Afghan Fighters in Syria," War Islamic State," The Wilson Center, October 28, 2019. on the Rocks, February 13, 2018. https:// https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the- warontherocks.com/2018/02/mission-accomplished- rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state. whats-next-irans-afghan-fighters-syria/.

300 Ibid. “ هیروس یراکادف نادرگ یاه نویمطاف شومارف ار 306 دهاوخن درک ” 301 David Adesnik, Behnam Ben Taleblu, H.R. (“Syria Will Not Forget The Sacrifices of The McMaster, "Burning Bridge: The Iranian Land Fatemiyoun Battalion”), Astan News, November 23, Corridor to the Mediterranean," Foundation for هیروس - /https://news.razavi.ir/fa/101933 .2017 Defense of Democracies, June 18, 2019. https:// یراکادف %E2%80%8C یاه نویمطاف نادرگ - شومارف- ار- - - www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/. دهاوخن درک - ; “ هدنمزر زرابم هک یا نادیم انورک » « دش / نویمطاف زا » ات« Gen. Soleimani Congratulates Ayatollah" 302 رهشلگ» ”« Khamenei and Muslims on ISIS termination," Office for The Preservation and Publication of the Works of (“razmandeyi ke mobarez-e meydan-e ‘corona’ shod/ Grand Ayatollah Khamene'i, November 21, 2017. az ‘fatemiyoun’ ta ‘golshahr,’ “The Warrior Who http://english.khamenei.ir/news/5283/Gen- Became Combatant in Field of “Corona”/ From Soleimani-congratulates-Ayatollah-Khamenei-and- “Fatemiyoun” to “Golshahr”), Mehr News, April 11, Muslims-on. 2020. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/ 4892954/%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A 303 Ahmad Majidyar, "After ISIS, Fatemiyoun Vows F%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87- to Fight with “Axis of Resistance” to Destroy Israel," %D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2- Middle East Institute, November 22, 2017, https:// %D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86- www.mei.edu/publications/after-isis-fatemiyoun- %DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7- vows-fight-axis-resistance-destroy-israel; %D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 99 %D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%8 https://twitter.com/Alfoneh/status/ 8%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A7- 1233919093759193096. %DA%AF%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1. 314 "IRGC Strategist Hassan Abbasi Praises Iranian 307 Ibid. Parents Who Handed Over Their Oppositionist Children For Execution: Educating People To This Level Is The Pinnacle Of The Islamic Republic's “ یاهورین21زا نویمطاف پیت نویبنیز و بلدا رد 308 Achievement; Adds: 2,300 Iranians Have Been Killed هیروس هتشک دندش " (“21 nafar az niruha-ye tipp-e fatemiyoun va In Syria War," Middle East Media Research Institute, zeynabiyoun dar idlib-e suriye koshte shodand," "21 March 13, 2019. https://www.memri.org/reports/irgc- Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun Brigade Forces Killed strategist-hassan-abbasi-praises-iranian-parents- in Syria's Idlib"), Radio Farda, March 1, 2020. https:// who-handed-over-their-oppositionist. www.radiofarda.com/a/30462762.html. “ تشادزاب ناهدنامرف رکشل نویبنیز مق رد ” 315 309 "Eight fighters with Lebanon’s Hezbollah killed (“bazdasht-e farmandehan-e lashkar-e zeynabiyoun in Syria," Associated Press, February 29, 2020. dar qom,” “The Arrest of Zeynabiyoun Division https://apnews.com/ Commanders in Qom”) Zeitoons, March 3, 2017. 21190f4721ee413268a0bd7bdb49353f. https://www.zeitoons.com/27033.

نویبنیز زا ؟ربخ" هچ " Ibid.; 316 310 az zeynabiyoun che khabar?," "What News of The") دیدج هیروس" موزل رد تشگزابو وحتت ل کیتکات هب یاه .Zeynabiyoun?"), Seda-ye Modafean, August 14, 2019 مساق جاح " ("tahavvolat-e jadid dar suriyeh va lozum-e bazgasht https://www.sedayemodafean.org/sedaye-shoma/ be taktikha-ye haj qasem," "New Developments in 14596/. Syria and The Necessity of Returning to The Tactics of Haj Qasem," Seda-ye Modafe'an, February 29, 317 ‏ عییشت نیفدت و رکیپ " 12 دیهش عفادم " مق مرح رد -https://www.sedayemodafean.org/sedaye .2020 shoma/22590/. ("tashi' va tadfin-e peykar-e 12 shahid-e modafe'-e haram dar qom," "Burial of The Remains of 12 ,Martyred Shrine Defenders in Qom"), SNN, March 1 " لوئسم رکشل نویمطاف ناریا رد : یاهورین ناغفا ود' 311 ./https://snn.ir/fa/news/831498 .2020 رازه هتشک ' هداد دنا " ("mas'ul-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun dar iran: niruha-ye afghan 'do hezar koshte' dadehand," "Fatemiyoun 318 @Fatemiyoun1434, " هتسد نارادازع ههبج تمواقم گوس ترضحرد بنیز Division Official in Iran: Afghan Forces Have Given یربک )س"( ,Two Thousand Dead"), BBC Persian, January 16' 2018. https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-42590722. ("dast-e azadaran-e jebhe-ye moqavemat dar sowg-e hazart-e zeynab-e kobra (pbuh)," "Mourners of The ,Resistance Front in Mourning"), Telegram, March 11 " نیتسخن دیهش نویمطاف یسک هچ ؟دوب " 312 ("nokhostin shahid-e fatemiyoun che kasi bud?," 2020. https://t.me/Fatemiyoun1434/30600. "Who Was The First Fatemiyoun Martyr?"), Fash News, September 14, 2019. http://fashnews.ir/fa/ 319 Ali Alfoneh, “Shiite Pakistani combat fatalities in news-details/69510/. Syria since November 22, 20214: 174. February 2020: 12.,” Twitter, March 1, 2020. https://twitter.com/ 313 Alfoneh, "Iranian combat fatalities in Syria since Alfoneh/status/1234165931439480833. January 2012: IRGC (563); Regular Military: (8). February 2020: 3.” Twitter, February 29, 2020.

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 100 320 ‏ Fatemiyoun, September 19, 2017. https:// .fatemyoun.com/501 عییشت نیفدت و رکیپ " 12 دیهش عفادم " مق مرح رد ("tashi' va tadfin-e peykar-e 12 shahid-e modafe'-e haram dar qom," "Burial of The Remains of 12 327 Mike Saidi, "Supreme Leadership, Economics, Martyred Shrine Defenders in Qom"), SNN, 1 March, and Clout in Iran," AEI's Critical Threats Project, June 2020. https://snn.ir/fa/news/831498/. 17, 2019. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ more-chants-more-protests-the-dey-iranian-anti- 321 @Fatemiyoun1434, regime-protests. " هتسد نارادازع ههبج تمواقم گوس ترضحرد بنیز .Ibdi 328 یربک )س"( ("dast-e azadaran-e jebhe-ye moqavemat dar sowg-e " دماحوبا ،حتاف و تنیز شخب لفحم هراودای یادهش hazart-e zeynab-e kobra (pbud)," "Mourners of The 329 رگشل نویمطاف دنتسه " ,Resistance Front in Mourning"), Telegram, March 11 2020. https://t.me/Fatemiyoun1434/30600. ("abu hamed va fateh, zeynat bakhsh-e mahfel-e yadvare-ye shohada-ye lashkar-e fatemiyoun hastand," "Abu Hamed and Fateh Decorate The " دنتسم نیرخآ لصف یگدنز " 322 ("mostanad-e akharin fasl-e zendegi," "Last Chapter Circle of Fatemiyoun Division Martyrs"), Mehr News, of Life Documentary"), Aparat, April 23, 2018. https:// March 1, 2017. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/ www.aparat.com/v/P3LoK/. 3921319/.

" تنواعم یگنهرف نویمطاف تامادقا زا هنارسدوخ : 330 " لوئسم تئیه ناگدنمزر نویمطاف هیروس رد هچ 323 یریگولج مینک یم " یسک ؟دوب + سکع " ("mas'ul-e hey'at-e razmandegan-e fatemiyoun dar ("mo'avenat-e farhangi-ye fatemiyoun: az eqdamat-e suriyeh che kasi bud? + ax," "Who Was The Head of khodsarane jelogiri mikonim," "Fatemiyoun Cultural the Fatemiyoun Warriors Mourning Group in Syria? + Directorate: We Will Prevent Unauthorized Actions"), Photos"), Rouz News, March 1, 2020. https:// Fatemiyoun, September 19, 2017. https:// www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ fatemyoun.com/501;‏ " لوئسم رکشل نویمطاف ناریا رد : یاهورین ناغفا رازه ود ' ./1398/11/01/2186600 هتشک ' هداد دنا " mas'ul-e lashkar-e fatemiyoun dar iran: niruha-ye") " تنواعم یگنهرف نویمطاف تامادقا زا هنارسدوخ : 324 afghan 'do hezar koshte' dadehand," "Fatemiyoun یریگولج مینک یم " ("mo'avenat-e farhangi-ye fatemiyoun: az eqdamat-e Division Official in Iran: Afghan Forces Have Given khodsarane jelogiri mikonim," "Fatemiyoun Cultural 'Two Thousand Dead"), BBC Persian, January 16, Directorate: We Will Prevent Unauthorized Actions"), 2018. https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-42590722. Fatemiyoun, September 19, 2017. https:// fatemyoun.com/501. 331 "Ebrahim Raisi Appointed Judiciary Chief," Unite d States Institute of Peace, March 8, 2019. https:// 325 Amir Toumaj, "Iran's Economy of Resistance: iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/mar/08/ebrahim-raisi- Implication For Future Sanctions," AEI's Critical appointed-judiciary-chief. Threats Project, 2014, 2. 332 Fatemiyoun1434, " نیرخآ عامتجا زا بش گرزب رازگرب تی ناثراو لو دش " " تنواعم یگنهرف نویمطاف تامادقا زا هنارسدوخ : 326 akharin shab az ejtema'-e bozorg-e varesan-e") یریگولج مینک یم " ("mo'avenat-e farhangi-ye fatemiyoun: az eqdamat-e velayat bargozar shod," "The Last Night of the Great khodsarane jelogiri mikonim," "Fatemiyoun Cultural Gathering of The Inheritors of Guardianship Was Directorate: We Will Prevent Unauthorized Actions"), Held"), Telegram, October 16, 2018. https://t.me/

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 101 Fatemiyoun1434/25156; %D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4- D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-2/8589% " لهج ییادز هقطنم زا ناهج تاکرب زا و نوخ یادهش عفادم D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%84-%- مرح تسا " ("jahl-zodayi az mantaqeh va jahan az barakat-e %D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%87%D8% khun-e shohada-ye modafe'-e haram as," "Eliminating A7%DB%8C- Ignorance From The Region and The World is One of %D9%85%D8%B3%DA%A9%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8 The Blessings of The Blood of Martyred Shrine C-%D8%A2%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86- Defenders"), Islamic Azad University News Agency, %D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3- January 23, 2020. https://ana.ir/fa/news/39/467919/. %D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%88%DB%8C- %D8%A8%D9%87- 333 Hamid Farshbaf, %D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8% AF%D9%87- " رادید یعمج ،املع زا ،دیتاسا یگنهرف ناگبخن ن اعف لو -D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C% ناتسناغفا تیلوت اب ناتسآ سدق یوضر " ("didar-e jam'-i az olama, asatid, nokhbegan va %D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1- fa'alan-e farhangi-ye afghanestan ba towliat-e astan- %D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%8 e qods-e razavi," "The Meeting of a Gathering of 8%D9%86- Afghan Scholars, Teachers, Intellectuals, and Cultural %DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4- Activists With The Trustee of The Reza Holy %D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB% Precinct"), Reza Holy Precinct. https://photo.razavi.ir/ 8C. رادید یعمج- - ،دیتاسا ،املع زا- ناگبخن - - - -و-ن اعفل /fa/64132 " نیلوا هاگراک لغاشم یگناخ هژیو هداوناخ یادهش 336 یگنهرف ناتسناغفا - تیلوت اب- ناتسآ- - سدق - یوضر - . نویمطاف حاتتفا دوش یم " avvalin kargah-e mashaghel-e khanegi-ye vizhe-ye") دنتسم“ اقآ ناملس دمحم دی ینیسحهش ) ”( 334 (“mostanad-e aqa salman,” “Mr. Salman khanevadeh-ye shohada-ye fatemiyoun eftetah Documentary (Martyr Mohammad Hosseini)”), mishavad," "The First House Works Worskhop Aparat, December 3, 2018. https://www.aparat.com/ Dedicated to Families of Martyred Fatemiyoun Will v/LecQR; be Inaugurated"), Bagher Shahr News, July 1, 2017. نیلوا هاگراک- لغاشم - یگناخ- - /http://baghershahrnews.ir دنتسم “ بیبح ) دیهش دمحم قاحسا یردان ”( هداوناخ هژیو - ./ mostanad-e habib (shahid mohammad es’haq“) naderi,” “Habib Documentary (Martyr Mohammad Es’haq Naderi”), Aparat, December 28, 2018. https:// 337 @Fatemiyoun1434, “ دنتسم یداهنشیپ تادیلوت زا زکرم هناسر نویمطاف " .www.aparat.com/v/EbPON (“30 mostanad-e pishnehadi az tolidat-e makaz-e rasane-ye fatemiyoun,” “30 Suggested Documentary " لیوحت یاهدحاو ینوکسم ناتسآ سدق یوضر هب 335 ”,Productions From The Fatemiyoun Media Center هداوناخ یادهش رکشل نویمطاف + شرازگ یریوصت " ("tahvil-e vahedha-ye maskuni-ye astan-e qod-se March 13, 2020. https://t.me/Fatemiyoun1434/30617. razavi be khanevadeh-ye shohada-ye lashkar-e " دنتسم رایسب یابیز ناحتاف ادرف تداشر ریظن یب / fatemiyoun + gozaresh-e tasviri," "Handing Over 338 ناعفادم مرح " Housing Units of Reza Holy Precinct to The Families of Martyred Shrine Defenders"), Ghased News, ("mostana-e besiar ziba-ye fatehan-e farad/reshadat- February 28, 2017. http://www.ghasednews.com/ e bi nazir-e modafe'an-e haram," "The Very Beautiful Documentary Conquerors of Tomorrow/Unparalleled شخب رابخا - -8589/2- لیوحت یاهدحاو ینوکسم - ناتسآ- - - ,Bravery of Shrine Defenders"), Aparat, September 7 سدق یوضر - هداوناخ هب- یادهش - نویمطاف رکشل- - شرازگ- - - ./https://www.aparat.com/v/7yFKc .2015 یریوصت . Archived at: https://web.archive.org/web/ 20200814072136/http://www.ghasednews.com/

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 102 مردام باوخ بنیز" ) ،دید هکس تفگ ار ( : " مرسپ 345 ،گنج ،نیبرود " نم " 339 تبقاع دش ریخ هب ” ,jang, durbin, man, "War, Camera, I"), Tebyan") November 25, 2017. https://film.tebyan.net/film/ (“madaram khab-e zeynab (s) ra ke did, goft: pesaram aqebat be kheyr shod,” “When My Mother‘ 256529/ گنج نیبرود - نم- #TargetPlayerPos. Saw Zeynab (pbuh) in a Dream, She Said: ‘My Son 340 Ibid. Faced a Good Destiny”), Tasnim News, December 14, 2015. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ 942306/23/09/1394/ مردام باوخ - بنیز - -س ار- هک- دید- - یدیعس" : تیاور یسک ار گنج زوریپ دنک هک یم 341 تفگ مرسپ تبقاع- - هب- ریخ- دش- . نادیم تسا " ("Sa'idi: kasi ke jang ra vevayat mikonad piruz-e meydan ast," "Sa'idi: He Who Narrates The War Wins 346 “Visual Pilgrimage of Unknown Martyrs and The Field"), Ammar Film, September 22, 2019. https:// Martyrs of Shrine Defenders; Behesht-e Ma’sumeh ammarfilm.ir/news/ Cemetary; Qom Province Municipality,” Azm Ziarat, 24047/%D8%B3%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C accessed 8 May, 2020. http://azmziarat.ir/fa/ -%DA%A9%D8%B3%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87- pilgrimage/3/. %D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A7- “ تیاور رذوبا یفاکویب ندش دیهشیی برک زا ل D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA- 347% نویمطاف ملیف+ ” D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%DA%A9%D9%86%% D8%AF- (“revayat-e abuzar bivkafi az karbala’i shodan-e %D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2/. shahid-e fatemiyoun+film,” “Abuzar Bivkafi’s Account of a Fatemiyoun Martyr Going to Karbala+Film”), Tas //:nim News, November 15, 2019. https ،گنج ،نیبرود "نم " 342 ("jang, durbin, man, "War, Camera, I"), Tebyan, www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ 2140037/24/08/1398/ تیاور رذوبا یفاکویب - - زا- یی- برکل - /November 25, 2017. https://film.tebyan.net/film ندش نویمطاف دیهش - - ملیف - . 256529/ گنج نیبرود - نم- #TargetPlayerPos; Fatemiyoun1434, Visual Pilgrimage of Unknown Martyrs and“ 348 پیلک یصاصتخا " | میتسناوتن هک فیح دص داعبا یدوجو Martyrs of Shrine Defenders; Behesht-e Ma’sumeh # دماحوبا رتشیب ار کرد مینک " ("clip-e ekhtesasi | sad heyf ke natavanestim ab'ad-e Cemetary; Qom Province Municipality,” Azm Ziarat, vojudi-ye #abuhamed ra bishtar dark konim," accessed May 8, 2020. http://azmziarat.ir/fa/ "Exclusive Clip | So Unfortunate That We Were pilgrimage/3/. Unable To Understand #AbuHamed's Character “ نیتسخن هرگنک تشادگرزب یادهش ههبج تمواقم رد More"), Telegram, February 28, 2020. 349 زاغآ مق دش ” 343 “Greetings Upon Ebrahim,” 109. (“nokhostin kongere-ye bozorgdasht-e shohada-ye jebhe-ye moqavemat dar qom aghaz shod,” “The 344 Fatemiyoun Media Center Official Channel, First Congress To Commemorate Martyrs of ,Resistance Front in Qom Began”), Haraa, January 12 “ اشیا اعوسات ل مسابع شیپ - دیهش یفطصم هدازردص ” نیتسخن هرگنک- - /ishallah tasu’a pish-e abbasam – shahid mostafa 2019. http://haraa.ir/fa/news/135006“) تشادگرزب یادهش - تمواقم ههبج - - رد- مق- زاغآ - دش- . sadrzadeh,” “God Willing I’ll be With Abbas on Tas’ua – Martyr Mosfata Sadrzadeh”) , Aparat video, 1:41, “ مایپ هدنامرف رسمه هاپس هب لک هدنامرف نویمطاف ” September 19, 2018. https://www.aparat.com/v/ 350 payam-e farmande-ye koll-e sepah be hamsar-e“) اشیا اعوسات-_ل _ شیپ_ مسابع _ /yrmZR farmande-ye fatemiyoun,” “The Message of the IRGC یفطصم دیهش _ هدازردص _ _ . Chief to The Spouse of Fatemiyoun Commander”), K

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 103 habar Online, February 27, 2020. https:// Documentary on Presence of Fatemiyoun in Flood- www.khabaronline.ir/news/1357913/. Stricken Areas”), Aparat video, 11:06, May 14, 2019. https://www.aparat.com/v/B6P5c/. “ رادید نارایمداخ یوضر هداوناخ اب یادهش پیت 351 Amir Toumaj, “Senior Iranian official: foreign 357 نویمطاف ” (“didar-e khademin-e razavi ba khanevade-ye Shiite militias to fight in Iran if Islamic Republic in shohada-ye tipp-e fatemiyoun,” “Meeting of Razavi danger,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 8, 2019. Servants With The Families of Fatemiyoun Brigade https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/03/ Martyrs”), Astan News, September 8, 2019. https:// senior-iranian-official-foreign-shiite-militias-to-fight- .in-iran-if-islamic-republic-in-danger.php نارایمداخ رادید - یوضر- - اب- /news.razavi.ir/fa/168582 هداوناخ یادهش نویمطاف- پیت- - . " عطق کمک هب هریجنز تیارس انورک طسوت هبخن یاه 358 نویمطاف ملیف+ " Southwest Iran hit hard by flooding, evacuation“ 352 underway in Ahvaz,” Reuters, April 10, 2019. https:// (“komak be qat-e zanjireh-ye serayat-e corona www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-floods/southwest- tavassot-e nokhbegan-e fatemiyoun+film,” “Helping iran-hit-hard-by-flooding-evacuation-underway-in- Cut Chain of Corona’s Spread by Fatemiyoun ahvaz-idUSKCN1RM1G6. Elite+Footage”), Tasnim News, July 25, 2020. https:// www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/ 353 “Iranian Officials Criticized As Severe Flooding 1399/05/04/2313749/. Wreaks Havoc,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, April " دیلوت عیزوت و کسام نویمطاف یارب مدرم هیروس + https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-officials- 359 .2019 ,3 ملیف ” /criticized-as-severe-flooding-wreaks-havoc 29859256.html. (“tolid va tozi-e mask-e fatemiyoun bara-ye mardom- e suriyeh,” “Production and Distribution of Fatemiyoun Mask For The Syrian People+Footage”), T " رادرس ینامیلس قطانم هب هام تدم کی هب لیس 354 /asnim News, April 7, 2020, https://www.farsnews.ir دور هدز یم ” دیلوت - عیزوت -و نویمطاف کسام- - - /sardar soleimani be moddat-e yek mah be manateq- news/13990218000531“) یارب مدرم هیروس- - ملیف - ; e seyl zadeh miravad,” “Commander Soleimani Will “ یاهورین نویمطاف نارحب رد انورک » « نیتسآ تمه ابل Go To Flooded Areas For a Month”), International هدز دنا ” /Quran News Agency, April 5, 2019. https://iqna.ir/fa niruha-ye fatemiyoun dar bohran-e ‘corona’ astin-e“) رادرس ینامیلس - - -هب تدم - کی- هام- -هب /news/3800989 hemmat bala zadand,” “Fatemiyoun Forces Got To قطانم لیس- هدز - دور یم- . Work During The ‘Corona’ Crisis”), Fars News, May 9, /https://www.farsnews.ir/news ,2020 “ مایپ هژیو رادرس ینامیلس ناقاتشم هب عافد مرح زا ” 355 13990218000531/ یاهورین نویمطاف - نارحب رد- انورک- - - payam-e vizhe-ye sardar soleimani be moshtaqan-e“) نیتسآ تمه - - ابل هدز - %E2%80%8C دنا . modafean az haram,” “Special Message of Commander Soleimani to Those Excited To Defend نویمطاف '" ناعفادم ؛ ناعفادم' تم یمرح'ل هکس ' Shrine”), Al-Alam, https://fa.alalamtv.net/news/ 360 دندش + ریواصت " 4154911/ مایپ هژیو رادرس ینامیلس- - ناقاتشم- هب- - عافد - زا- - Fatemiyoun’: modafe’an-e harami ke ‘modafe’ean-e’“) مرح . salamt’ shodand + tasavir,” “’Fatemiyoun’; Shrine 356 Fatemiyoun Media Center Official Channel, Defenders Who Became ‘Defenders of Health’ + /Footage,”) https://basijnews.ir/fa/news/9238623 عافد دادما زا ات “ | دنتسم روضح نویمطاف قطانم رد لیس نویمطاف ناعفادم - یمرح - ناعفادم هک- - تم-ل دندشس- - هدز ” ریواصت . az defa’ ta emdad | mostanad-e hozur-e fatemiyoun“) dar manateq-e seyl zadeh,” “From Defense to Aid |

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 104 361 Amir Toumaj, “IRGC-led Afghan group releases August 13, 2020. https://www.haaretz.com/israel- Syria training camp video,” FDD’s Long War Journal, news/.premium-israel-attacked-1-000-iranian-and- August 15, 2020, https://www.longwarjournal.org/ hezbollah-targets-in-syria-since-2017-1.9071536. archives/2020/08/irgc-led-afghan-group-releases- syria-training-camp-video.php; 369 Judah Ari Gross, “Netanyahu: Israel acts to keep game-changing arms away from Hezbollah,” Ti “ ییاپرب هرود یشزومآ یاه هژیو ناگدنمزر نویمطاف رد //:mes of Israel, January 9, 2018. https هیروس + ریواصت ” (“barpayi-e doreha-ye amuzeshi-e vizhe-e www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-israel-acts-to- razmandegan-e fatemiyoun dar suriyeh + tasavir,” keep-game-changing-arms-away-from-hezbollah/; “Special Training Courses For Fatemiyoun Warriors in Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Israel launches major air strikes Syria + Images”), Defa Press, November 15, 2020. on Iran-linked targets in Syria,” Reuters, January 12, -https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria.,2021 ییاپرب - /https://defapress.ir/fa/news/426494 -attack-israel/israel-launches-major-air-strikes-on هرود یشزومآ%E2%80%8C یاه ناگدنمزر - هژیو - - - .iran-linked-targets-in-syria-idUSKBN29H32S نویمطاف هیروس ریواصت رد- - - .

" هلمح یکشوم میژر یتسینویهص رقم نویمطاف هب Jamal, “The Fatemiyoun Army,” 19. 370 362 لامکوبلا رد سکع+ ” 363 Tamim Hamid, “Armed by Iran, 2,000 Afghans (“hamle-ye mushaki-ye rezhim-e sahynist-i be Still in Syria: Zarif,” Tolo News, December 22, 2020. maqarr-e fatemiyoun dar albu kamal + aks,” “Zionist https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-168677. Regime Missile Attack Against Fatemiyoun Position in Al Bukamal + Photo”), Khabari, September 15, هلمح - /Ehud Yaari, “How Iran Plans To Destroy Israel,” 2019. https://khabari.org/article/2574389 364 یکشوم یتسینویهص میژر - - نویمطاف هب- رقم - - رد- - //:The American Interest, August 1, 2015, https سکعلامکوبلا,www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/01/how- &Felicia Schwartz ; Nazih Osseiran iran-plans-to-destroy-israel/ “Israel Strikes Iran-Related Targets in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2021. https:// -www.wsj.com/articles/israel-strikes-iran-linked “ راختفا رطاخ مینک هبیم نیطسلف تحت راشف 365 .targets-in-syria-11610564618 میتسه ” (“eftekhar mikonim be khater-e felestin taht-e feshar “ ارچ مساق جاح رادرس ؟دنمان اریم اه لد ” hastim,” “We Are Proud To be Pressured Because of 371 Palestine”), Jahan News, February 13, 2019. http:// (“chera haj qasem ra sardar-e delha minamand,” www.jahannews.com/news/671722/. “Why Do They Call Haj Qassem The Commander of Hearts”), Defa Press, June 2, 2016. https:// 366 Elliott McLaughlin, “Iran's supreme leader: defapress.ir/fa/news/85721/. There will be no such thing as Israel in 25 years,” CN “ باصتنا رادرس پیترس ینآاق یهدنامرف هب ورین N, September 11, 2015. https://edition.cnn.com/ 372 سدق هاپس نارادساپ یم سال ب قنال ” -middleeast/iran-khamenei-israel-will/2015/09/10 not-exist-25-years/index.html. (“entesab-e sardar sartip qa’ani be farmandehi-ye niru-ye qods-e sepah-e pasdaran-e enqelab-e eslami,” “Appointment of Commander Brigadier دنتسم تقو ندوب " " 367 ("mostanad-e vaqt-e budan," "Time of Being General Qa’ani to Command of Islamic Revolution Documentary"), Aparat, 2019. https:// Guard Corps Quds Force”), Office for the www.aparat.com/v/nT7ti. Preservation and Publication of the Works of Grand Ayatollah Khamene’i, January 3, 2020. https:// 368 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel Attacked 1,000 Iranian farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=44555. and Hezbollah Targets in Syria Since 2017,” Haaretz,

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/soleimanis-shadow/ 105 “ هبحاصم هدنیامن یربهر یورین رد سدق هاپس اب 377 “ باصتنا رادرس پیترس ینآاق یهدنامرف هب ورین 373 هاگبو ؛ینانبل دیکأت تیامح رب تمواقم زا یدازآ ات سدق ” سدق هاپس نارادساپ یم سال ب قنال ” (“entesab-e sardar sartip qa’ani be farmandehi-ye (“mosahebe-ye namayande-ye rahbari dar niru-ye niru-ye qods-e sepah-e pasdaran-e enqelab-e qods ba vebgah-e lobnani; ta’keed bar hemayat az eslami,” “Appointment of Commander Brigadier moqavemat ta azadi-ye qods,” “Leader’s General Qa’ani to Command of Islamic Revolution Representative Speaking With Lebanese Website; Guard Corps Quds Force”), Office for the Emphasis on Supporting Resistance Until Jerusalem’s Preservation and Publication of the Works of Grand Liberation”), Al-Alam, May 21, 2020. https:// هبحاصم هدنیامن - یربهر - - /Ayatollah Khamene’i, January 3, 2020. https:// fa.alalamtv.net/news/4942391 یورین رد - سدق - هاپس - ؛ینانبل هاگبو اب- - دیکأت - - رب- .- .farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=44555

“ روضح بکوم نیعبرا یاه ینیسح رکشل و Alexander Smith, “Iran vows revenge and 'harsh 378 374 نویمطاف » « مسارم رد ملهچ تداهش مساق جاح ینامیلس + ,retaliation' after U.S. kills its top general,” NBC News ریواصت ” /January 3, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/news world/iran-vows-revenge-harsh-retaliation-after-u-s- (“hozur-e movakkebha-ye arba’een-e hoseini va kills-its-n1109856. lashkar-e ‘fatemiyoun’ dar marasem-e chehellom-e shahadat-e haj qasem-e soleimani + tasavir,” 375 “Iranian state TV says 80 'American terrorists' “’Fatemiyoun’ Division and Hossein-Like Aid Stations killed in Iran missile strikes,” Reuters, January 8, at Fortieth Ceremony To Commemorate Haj Qasem 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq- Soleimani + Footage”), Defa Press, February 13, 2020. روضح - /security-iran-casualties/iranian-state-tv-says-80- https://defapress.ir/fa/news/384102 بکوم %E2%80%8C نیعبرا یاه ینیسح - - رکشل -و- - -american-terrorists-killed-in-iran-missile-strikes نویمطاف مسارم رد- - ملهچ تداهش- - جاح مساق- ینامیلس - - - ;idUKKBN1Z70LU ریواصت . هتشک“ ندش زا شیب ۱۰۰ یماظن ییاکیرمآ هلمح رد یکشوم ناریا هاگیاپ دسهب لا نیع ” “ مایپ هدنامرف رسمه هاپس هب لک هدنامرف نویمطاف ” koshte shodan-e bish az 100 nezami amrika-yi da 379“) hamle-ye mushaki-ye iran be paygah-e ayn al-asad,” (“payam-e farmande-ye koll-e sepah be hamsar-e “More Than 100 American Military Personnel Killed in farmande-ye fatemiyoun,” “Message of IRGC Chief Iran’s Missile Strike on Ayn al-Asad Base”), Hamshahri Commander To Spouse of Fatemiyoun Commander”), Online, January 18, 2020. https:// Khabar Online, February 27, 2020. https:// هدنامرف مایپ - - لک- /www.khabaronline.ir/news/1357913 هتشک - ندش - /www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/478752 هاپس رسمه هدنامرف هب- نویمطاف - - - . شیب زا- - یماظن ییاکیرمآ۱۰۰- - یکشوم هلمحرد- - - ناریا - هب- - هاگیاپ . “ ییازلاغتشا هاگرارق متاخ یارب هداوناخ یادهش یاه 380 نویمطاف ” هدنامرف ناگی نویمطاف “ : مساق جاح نیرخآ رد رادید 376 eshteghalzodayi-e qarargah-e khatam baray-e“) همانرب نودم ۵ هلاس نویمطاف پیت دنداد ار ” (“farmande-ye yegan-e fatemiyoun” haj qasem dar khanevadeha-ye shohada-ye fatmeiyoun,” “Khatam akharin didar barname-ye modavvan-e 5 sale-ye tipp- ol-Anbiya Creating Jobs For Families of Martyred e fatemiyoun ra dadan,” “Fatemiyoun Unit Fatemiyoun”), Fars News, November 29, 2019. Commander: Haj Qasem Gave 5-Year Plan To https://www.farsnews.ir/tehran/news/ 13980908000036/ ییازلاغتشا هاگرارق - متاخ - یارب - - ,Fatemiyoun Brigade in Last Meeting”), Tasnim News هداوناخ %E2%80%8C یاه نویمطاف یادهش - - . /January 15, 2020. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa هدنامرف نویمطاف - ناگی - - جاح- /news/1398/10/25/2182524 مساق نیرخآ رد- - رادید همانرب - نودم- - -5- هلاس نویمطاف پیت- - - دنداد ار - .

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