Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations February 2009 01/09 Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations 1 by Richard Giragosian 2 Summary After nearly a decade and a half of tense relations, closed borders and a lack of diplomatic relations, Armenia and Turkey are moving quickly to normalize relations. Following an official invitation extended in July 2008 by Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian, Turkish President Abdullah Gul became the first-ever Turkish head of state to visit Armenia. The September 2008 visit marked the public opening of a new process of engagement after months of secret meetings between Armenian and Turkish officials in Switzerland. The changing relationship between Armenia and Turkey can result in a “win-win” situation for both countries. For Armenia, it provides a much-needed foreign policy success and a new economic opportunity. For Turkey a possible rapprochement in Turkish-Armenian relations would do much to improve Turkey’s standing in the eyes of both the European Union and the United States. A border opening and subsequent diplomatic relations would enhance Turkey’s record of domestic reform. Just as crucially, the regional landscape has also changed in the wake of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, offering a new impetus for opening the Armenian-Turkish border and heralding a new level of Russian support for a breakthrough between Armenia and Turkey. 1 The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of FES. 2 Richard Giragosian is Director of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies (ACNIS) in Yerewan. 1 Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations February 2009 A Breakthrough in Armenian-Turkish outstanding issues. Second, Turkey Relations also wants Armenia to more clearly renounce any territorial claims on In July 2008, Armenian President Serzh Turkey or, at a minimum, to formally Sarkisian extended a public invitation to recognize the territorial integrity and his Turkish counterpart, President current borders of the Republic of Abdullah Gul, to attend a 2010 World Turkey. Cup qualifying match between the Armenian and Turkish soccer teams Turkey’s third goal, although a less hosted in the Armenian capital in stringent demand, centers on its desire September 2008. The invitation and for some progress from the Armenia subsequent visit by the Turkish side over the unresolved Nagorno president followed months of secretive Karabakh conflict. This third goal of closed meetings between Armenian and progress over the Nagorno-Karabakh Turkish officials in Switzerland. Those conflict is largely driven by Turkey’s talks, aimed at forging a preliminary strategic relationship with Azerbaijan, understanding of the issues dividing which lost control of the Armenian- both sides, culminated in the historic populated Nagorno-Karabakh enclave first-ever visit of a Turkish head of state along with several districts bordering to Armenia. Karabakh in the early 1990s. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Following the historic visit, the Armenian is seen as a “frozen” conflict that has and Turkish foreign ministers held two both impeded regional development and follow-up meetings, thereby pursuing a triggered Turkey’s initial imposition of a new, high level round of bilateral talks blockade of Armenia in support of and engagement. This engagement Azerbaijan. offers both countries a new opportunity to move forward in seeking to normalize The Evolution of Armenian-Turkish relations. Relations Although both Armenia and Turkey are Despite the fact that Turkey was one of committed to pursuing a new round of the first countries to recognize Armenian direct negotiations and dialogue, the independence in 1991, Turkish- division between the two sides remains Armenian relations have been marked far from resoled, however. Turkey by a period of tension and conflict. seeks three specific goals prior to a During the early 1990s, the war between normalization of relations. First, the Armenia and neighboring Azerbaijan Turkish Government is adamant in over Nagorno-Karabakh prompted demanding an end to international Turkey to seal its border with Armenia efforts to recognize the Armenian and withhold normal diplomatic relations. genocide, 3 offering to overcome the genocide issue by placing under the For both Turkey and Armenia, the last jurisdiction of a bilateral “historical decade and half has been a period of commission” empowered to tackle this stalemate. Turkey’s closure of the issue as part of a broader package of border failed to coerce Armenia and the lack of diplomatic relations only deprived both sides of options or dialogue. 3 The Turkish Government does not recognize the World War I-era massacres and ethnic cleansings of The deadlock also deepened mutual the Armenian minority population of the Ottoman Empire as genocide. misunderstandings, largely centered on 2 Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations February 2009 Armenian Diaspora efforts to pursue Drivers and Determinants international recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide triggered a defensive In terms of assessing the recent Turkish reaction that tend to view the changes in Armenian-Turkish relations, same period as anything but genocide. there are several key factors that serve as drivers or determinants. In the early- to mid-1990s, there was an effort by the Armenia state to pursue a First, Turkey is undergoing a dynamic two-track effort aimed at establishing period of strategic reorientation, normal “neighborly” relations with involving Turkey’s role within the region, Turkey. On a state level, Armenian including is relations with its neighbors. diplomats held a series of meetings with As part of a broader Turkish initiative to their Turkish counterparts spurred by assert its geopolitical influence, Turkish the vision of then-President Levon Ter Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo ğ an Petrossian for a new chapter in has recently launched a new bid for Armenian-Turkish relations based more bolstering stability and security in the on the future than on the past. region. Hailed as the “Platform for Stability and Cooperation in the In addition, the diplomatic efforts of the Caucasus,” this new Turkish initiative Ter Petrossian Administration were seeks to forge a cooperative attempt at bolstered by a second, private “track- conflict-prevention, multilateral security two” attempt to engage Turkey. This and regional stability, as well as for private initiative, through the so-called securing the vulnerable energy export “Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation routes running from the Caspian basin Commission” (TARC), sought to provide to Europe. a closed arena for discussing the more controversial issues, including the Although Azerbaijan and Georgia have Armenian genocide, which divided both obvious vested interests in the Turkish sides. proposal driven by their shared energy ties, the exclusion of Armenia from the Although these early attempts at regional energy infrastructure will only engagement failed, they did provide an exacerbate the challenge of convincing important preliminary round of talks that Armenia of the need to accept and the more recent diplomatic engagement support the initiative. has been able to use as a foundation for dialogue. Although this challenge seems to be recognized by Ankara, Armenia seems Yet, the most powerful impetus for a by no means ready to follow Ankara’s possible breakthrough in relations lead without any serious improvement in between the two countries was not a the two countries’ non-existent relations state initiative, but arose in the wake of and closed borders. the tragic killing of prominent Turkish- Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in A second, related factor driving Turkey’s January 2007, with a mass outpouring engagement of Armenia relates to the of grief as over 100,000 ordinary Turks potential benefits from a much-need joined a public funeral in Istanbul. The economic opportunity. In this way, the tragedy of Dink’s death went beyond opening of the border has also acquired influencing Turkish public opinion, but a new significance for Turkey, as the also prompted a new opening within the need to stabilize the eastern Kurdish Turkish state. regions of Turkey has become an even 3 Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations February 2009 more essential element of Turkish In addition the lower labor costs on the national security. Armenian side may entice Turkish textile producers and small manufacturing to Yet equally important, the potential set up new factories within neighboring economic benefits for Armenia from an Armenia. opening of the border with Turkey are substantial. First, an open border with The August 2008 conflict in Georgia is Turkey would provide immediate relief to the third factor. As the most recent the years of isolation imposed from the determinant of Armenian-Turkish virtual blockade and embargo of engagement, the Georgia conflict Armenia resulting form the closure of its spurred a new breakthrough in talks, borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. with an added impetus for at least The opening of at least one of the two opening the closed Armenian-Turkish closed borders would result in a border and offering both countries a significant alternative to Armenia’s potentially important new economic and reliance on Georgia as its sole external trade route alternative to Georgia. And outlet, thereby lowering excessive side from the Georgian factor, another transit costs for Armenian importers and key to this new diplomatic opening, exporters. however, was Russia’s support for such a breakthrough between Armenia and Second, an open border with Turkey Turkey. would provide greater market access, even beyond the Turkish market, with For Turkey, the process of engaging potential market penetration into the Armenia is also important in terms of European and Middle Eastern markets. foreign policy, as for far too long, Turkey was actually limited in its options for The third economic benefit is the dealing with Armenia due to its close promise of greater competition from an partnership with Azerbaijan. Many open border, a crucial development to Turkish officials are trying to balance counter the power of import and export their desire for closer relations with monopolies within Armenia.