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THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR ’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM

The Geopolitics of Support for Turkey’s EU Accession: A View from Lithuania

AZUOLAS BAGDONAS*

ABSTRACT o join the (EU), Why does Lithuania support Turkey in time needs to over- Turkey’s accession to the European Tcome two obstacles. First, it Union? The article analyzes some PGGFUVQEQPVKPWGHWNſNNKPIVJGTGSWKTG- of the key domestic factors and the OGPVUQHVJG%QRGPJCIGPETKVGTKCKG strategic thinking behind Lithuania’a continuous support. Domestically, the formal political, institutional, and the political culture of the foreign economic conditions for membership. policy elite and the permissiveness 9JKNG UWUVCKPKPI VJG EQOOKVOGPV VQ of public opinion allow treating OGGV VJGUG TGSWKTGOGPVU OC[ DG EJCN- Turkey’s accession as a foreign NGPIKPI VJG UGEQPF QDUVCENG Ō QDVCKP- policy issue, subject to cost-bene!t KPIVJGCITGGOGPVQHCNNCPFGCEJQHVJG calculations. Short-term calculations OGODGTUVCVGUVQ6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQPŌ involve mutually advantageous deals between Turkey and Lithuania. may prove to be even harder to over- Long-term assessments focus on come. In the calculations of the political how Turkey’s membership would elites of certain European countries, a a"ect global, regional, and intra- number of perceived obstacles to Tur- European dynamics of power MG[ŏU CEEGUUKQP UGGO VQ QWVYGKIJ VJG relations. The article suggests that, in QDXKQWU DGPGſVU QH 6WTMG[ŏU OGODGT- the context of lasting foreign policy objectives and concerns, Turkey is ship. There are worries about the po- attractive to Lithuania primarily due NKVKECNCPFGEQPQOKEKORCEVQHCEEGRVKPI to its geopolitical roles: its traditional UWEJCNCTIGEQWPVT[CUYGNNCUEQPEGTPU transatlantic alignment, its function TGICTFKPIEJCPIGUKPVJGHQTOCNCPFKP- as a transit hub for energy supplies HQTOCN FGEKUKQP OCMKPI RTQEGFWTGU KP to , and its potential to the EU. become a great power, engaging in regional competition with . * International Relations Department, Univer- sity, aDCIFQPCU"HCVKJGFWVT

Insight Turkey Vol. 14 / No. 3 / 2012 pp. 177-192 2012 177 AZUOLAS BAGDONAS

Scholars and, especially, the media tend to focus on the position of key EU UVCVGUUWEJCU)GTOCP[CPF(TCPEGCPFPQVYKVJQWVCIQQFTGCUQPŌVJGKTUVCPEG is likely to be of critical importance to the success of Turkey’s membership bid. However, the views of smaller Lithuania’s interest in having states, which numerically constitute Turkey in the EU stems from the majority in the EU, should not the country’s commitment to DGCNVQIGVJGTKIPQTGFHQTUGXGTCNTGC- UQPU(KTUVQHCNNKPECUGQHGPNCTIG- Atlanticism, as well as from the ment, each EU member state has a perceived potential bene!ts UKPINGXQVGTGICTFNGUUQHVJGUK\GQH in terms of reducing Russia’s their population and . Sec- in#uence in the EU ond, Turkey’s ability to convert its CRRGCNKPVQUVTCVGIKENGXGTCIGKPVJG CEEGUUKQPPGIQVKCVKQPUCNUQFGRGPFUQPVJGHQTOCVKQPQHCUVTQPIEQCNKVKQPKPUKFG the EU in favor of its membership.1 Since in the absence of such a coalition, 6WTMG[JCUNGUUEJCPEGVQUWEEGUUHWNN[WUGKVUIGQUVTCVGIKENQECVKQPCUCDCTICKP- KPIEJKRQTVQGPICIGKPGHHGEVKXGTJGVQTKECNCEVKQPUVJGRQUKVKQPQHUOCNNEQWP- tries becomes more important in the accession process.2 +PVJKUEQPVGZV.KVJWCPKCŏUEQPVKPWQWUCPFWPYCXGTKPIUWRRQTVHQT6WTMG[ŏU '7OGODGTUJKRRTQXKFGUCPKPVGTGUVKPIECUGVJCVIKXGUCRGTURGEVKXGQPUQOGQH VJGHCEVQTUCVRNC[KPVJGOQUVEQPUGSWGPVKCNKPUVCPEGQH'7GPNCTIGOGPV6JKU CTVKENGCPCN[UGUVJGDCEMITQWPFQHVJKUUWRRQTVUWIIGUVKPIVJCVVJGOCKPFGVGT- minants of Lithuanian- relations are conditioned by circumstances that JCXGNGUUVQFQYKVJVJG'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPVJCPYKVJVJG'7ŏUGZVGTPCNTGNC- VKQPU.KVJWCPKCŏUKPVGTGUVKPJCXKPI6WTMG[KPVJG'7UVGOUHTQOVJGEQWPVT[ŏU EQOOKVOGPVVQ#VNCPVKEKUOCUYGNNCUHTQOVJGRGTEGKXGFRQVGPVKCNDGPGſVUKP VGTOUQHTGFWEKPI4WUUKCŏUKPƀWGPEGKPVJG'7+PUWRRQTVQHVJKUCTIWOGPVVJG ſTUVRCTVYKNNFKUEWUUVJGHCEVQTUVJCVEQODKPGVQOCMG6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQPCPKU- UWGQHHQTGKIPRQNKE[TGNCVKXGN[KUQNCVGFHTQOUYKPIUKPFQOGUVKERWDNKEQRKPKQP and internal political competition. The second part will explain the dominant HQTGKIP RQNKE[ EQPEGTPU QH .KVJWCPKC HQTOKPI VJG DCEMITQWPF YKVJKP YJKEJ this particular issue is viewed. Finally, the third part will provide an analysis of UQOGQHVJGMG[GNGOGPVUQHUVTCVGIKEVJKPMKPIDGJKPF.KVJWCPKCŏUUWRRQTVHQT Turkey’s accession.

Support for Turkey – not an Issue of Domestic Politics

5KPEGLQKPKPIVJG'7KP.KVJWCPKCJCUEQPUKUVGPVN[UWRRQTVGF6WTMG[ŏU '7DKF1HſEKCNUVCVGOGPVU VQVJCVRWTRQUGJCXGDGGPOCFGD[XCTKQWUJKIJ NGXGNUVCVGQHſEKCNUFWTKPIGCEJQHOQTGVJCPVGPDKNCVGTCNOGGVKPIUVJCVVQQM

178 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA

RNCEGUKPEG6JGQHſEKCNRQUKVKQPCFQRVGFD[VJG/KPKUVT[QH(QTGKIP#H- HCKTUCPFTGKVGTCVGFD[FKHHGTGPVOKPKUVGTUQHHQTGKIPCHHCKTUFKRNQOCVUCUYGNN as chairmen of the and presidents, is that Turkey is entitled to full OGODGTUJKRUQNQPICUKVOGGVUVJG%QRGPJCIGPETKVGTKC1PUGXGTCNQEECUKQPU various ministers went beyond the passive rhetoric to actively promote Turkey’s KPENWUKQP(QTGZCORNGKP,CPWCT[OKPKUVGTQHHQTGKIPCHHCKTU##\WDCNKU EQCWVJQTGFCPQRGPNGVVGTGORJCUK\KPI6WTMG[ŏUőXKVCNUVTCVGIKECPFGEQPQOKE importance,” followed by another EQCWVJQTGFNGVVGTKP,WPGECNN- Thus, while recent opinion polls KPIHQTCőPGYKORWNUGŒKPVJGCEEGU- placed Lithuania in the minority sion process.3 The position maintained by the of only !ve EU member states HQTGKIPRQNKE[GUVCDNKUJOGPVFQGUPQV where the public supported JCXG WPCODKIWQWU FQOGUVKE RWDNKE Turkey’s membership UWRRQTV CPF RWDNKE QRKPKQP TGICTF- KPI6WTMG[ŏU'7OGODGTUJKRKUJKIJN[RQNCTK\GF'WTQDCTQOGVGTUWTXG[UKP- dicate that, as in most other new EU member states, the public in Lithuania JCUDGGPEQPUKFGTCDN[OQTGGPVJWUKCUVKECDQWVHWTVJGTGPNCTIGOGPVQHVJG'7 than the public in the EU-15 countries. %QPUGSWGPVN[ UWRRQTV HQT6WTMG[ŏU OGODGTUJKRJCUCNUQDGGPIGPGTCNN[JKIJGTVJCPVJG'7CXGTCIGHQTGZCORNG KP6WTMG[ŏUOGODGTUJKRYCUUWRRQTVGFD[RGTEGPVCPFQRRQUGFD[ RGTEGPVKPVJG'7YJKNGVJGTGURGEVKXGRGTEGPVCIGUYGTGRGTEGPVCPF RGTEGPVKP.KVJWCPKCKP6WTMG[ŏUOGODGTUJKRYCUUWRRQTVGFD[RGT- EGPVCPFQRRQUGFD[RGTEGPVKPVJG'7YJGTGCUKP.KVJWCPKCRGTEGPV YGTGKPHCXQTCPFRGTEGPVYGTGPQVKPHCXQTQH6WTMG[DGEQOKPIRCTVQHVJG EU.5 *QYGXGT VJG RWDNKE YCU OQTG UWRRQTVKXG QH GPNCTIGOGPV VQ EQWPVTKGU QVJGTVJCP6WTMG[HQTGZCORNGKPRGTEGPVYGTGHQTVJGKPENWUKQPQH 5YKV\GTNCPFCPFRGTEGPVHQT7MTCKPGPGKVJGTQHYJKEJYGTGGXGPRQVGPVKCN ECPFKFCVGEQWPVTKGUYJKNGRGTEGPVUWRRQTVGF%TQCVKCŏU'7OGODGTUJKR#N- VJQWIJ6WTMG[KUQPGQHVJGMG[JQNKFC[FGUVKPCVKQPUHQT.KVJWCPKCPUVJGRWDNKE QRKPKQPFGRGPFUNCTIGN[QPKPHQTOCVKQPQDVCKPGFKPFKTGEVN[VJTQWIJOGFKCEJCP- PGNUYJKEJIKXGPVJGTGOQVGPGUUQH6WTMG[QHVGPVGPFVQHQEWUQPGZVTCQTFK- PCT[CPFPGICVKXGGXGPVU GCTVJSWCMGUVGTTQTKUVCVVCEMURQNKVKECNUECPFCNUGVE  6JWUYJKNGTGEGPVQRKPKQPRQNNURNCEGF.KVJWCPKCKPVJGOKPQTKV[QHQPN[ſXG EU member states where the public supported Turkey’s membership, opinions TGICTFKPI6WTMG[ŏUECPFKFCE[YGTGIGPGTCNN[OQTGTGUGTXGFCPFOQTGGSWCNN[ split than the views towards the potential membership of other countries. 6JG'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPJCUDGGPCPFVQCNCTIGGZVGPVTGOCKPUCRTQLGEV driven by political elites. Decisions on whether to allow particular candidate member states to join the EU have rarely been validated by national parliaments

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or referendums./QTGQXGTUKPEGOCUUQRKPKQPKUIGPGTCNN[UJCRGFD[GZRQUWTG VQGNKVGFKUEQWTUGRQNKVKECNGNKVGUTGVCKPVJGCDKNKV[VQRTQFWEGUWHſEKGPVNGXGNU QHRWDNKEUWRRQTVHQT'WTQRGCPGPNCTIGOGPV7+PQVJGTYQTFUVQICWIGVJGTGN- GXCPEGQHRWDNKEQRKPKQPCUCHCEVQTQH'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPYGPGGFVQNQQMCV VJGDGJCXKQTQHRQNKVKECNGNKVGUŌYJ[VJG[EJQQUGVQJGGFQTKIPQTGVJGNCEMQH RWDNKEUWRRQTVHQTHWTVJGTGPNCTIGOGPVCUYGNNCUJQYVJG[HTCOGGPNCTIGOGPV VJGTGD[EWGKPICPFőEQPUVTWEVKPIŒRWDNKEQRKPKQP 1PGMG[CURGEVKPVJKUTGICTFKUVJGFGITGGQHGNKVGRQNCTK\CVKQPŌVJGOQTG FKXKFGFCTGVJGRQNKVKECNRCTVKGUQP'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPVJGOQTGNKMGN[CTG they to nurture and make use of the divisions in public opinion. Furthermore, a recent study showed that a coun- Despite the fairly critical media try’s attitude towards Turkish acces- coverage, the EU’s enlargement sion depends critically on whether it to Turkey has never turned into UGGUKVCUCRTGFQOKPCPVN[SWGUVKQPQH HQTGKIPRQNKE[ GI2QNCPFCPFVJG a contentious issue of politics, 7- COCVVGTEQPEGTPKPIKPVGTPCN'7 either between di"erent RQNKVKEU GI(TCPEG QTCPKUUWGQH institutions or between national politics (as in and di"erent parties ).9 If Turkey’s membership is UGGPCUCHQTGKIPRQNKE[KUUWGCPCN[- UGUQHVJGGEQPQOKECPFIGQRQNKVKECNEQUVUCPFDGPGſVUV[RKECNN[TGUWNVKPCHCKTN[ RQUKVKXGCUUGUUOGPV+HKVKUXKGYGFVJTQWIJVJGRTKUOQHKPVGTPCN'7RQNKVKEUVJG EQUVUKPVGTOUQHKVUKORCEVQPVJGQTICPK\CVKQPŏUKPVGTPCNKPUVKVWVKQPCNRQNKVK- ECNUQEKCNEWNVWTCNCPFGEQPQOKEUGVWROC[QWVYGKIJVJGDGPGſVURCTVKEWNCTN[ HQTNCTIGOGODGTUVCVGUUWEJCU(TCPEGCPF)GTOCP[(KPCNN[YJGP6WTMG[ŏU accession is seen as an issue of national politics, i.e., when its impact on the na- tional , societies and security becomes a matter of domestic debates, VJGCUUGUUOGPVIGPGTCNN[VGPFUVQDGPGICVKXG6JGUGVYQCURGEVUŌGNKVGRQNCTK\C- VKQPCPFVJGECVGIQTK\CVKQPQH6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQPŌCTGKPVGTTGNCVGFDGECWUGKP EQPVTCUVVQFQOGUVKERQNKVKECNOCVVGTUHQTGKIPRQNKE[KUUWGUCTGQTFKPCTKN[NGUU NKMGN[VQCVVTCEVUKIPKſECPVRWDNKECVVGPVKQPCPFVJWUQHHGTHGYGTKPEGPVKXGUHQT GNKVGRQNCTK\CVKQP 5GXGTCNHCEVQTUECPGZRNCKPYJ[6WTMG[ŏU'7CEEGUUKQPKUIGPGTCNN[TGICTFGF CUCHQTGKIPRQNKE[KUUWGCPFKUTGNCVKXGN[UJKGNFGFHTQOFQOGUVKERQNKVKECNEQO- RGVKVKQPCPFUYKPIUKPRWDNKEQRKPKQPKP.KVJWCPKC(KTUVN[KPEQPVTCUVVQ)GTOC- P[(TCPEGQT#WUVTKC.KVJWCPKCFQGUPQVJQUVCUKIPKſECPV6WTMKUJEQOOWPKV[ CPFFQGUPQVJCXGOWEJGZRGTKGPEGYKVJKOOKITCVKQPKPIGPGTCN+OOKITCVKQP TGOCKPGFXGT[NQYGXGPFWTKPIVJGRGTKQFQHHCUVGEQPQOKEITQYVJKP YJGPVJGTGYGTGNCDQTUJQTVCIGUKPOCP[GEQPQOKEUGEVQTUCPFHWTVJGT FGETGCUGFUKPEGVJGGEQPQOKEETKUKUKPYJGPVJGUJCTGQHHQTGKIPYQTMGTU

180 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA

KPVJGNCDQTHQTEGRNWOOGVGFHTQOVJGCNNVKOGUJKIJQHRGTEGPVKPVQ RGTEGPVKP6JWUYJKNGUWTXG[UUJQYVJCVCNCTIGOCLQTKV[QHRGQRNG XKGYKOOKITCVKQPPGICVKXGN[FWGVQHGCTUQHGEQPQOKEEQORGVKVKQPVJGKUUWG TGOCKPUTCVJGTCDUVTCEVCPFFQGUPQVſIWTGRTQOKPGPVN[QPVJGFQOGUVKERQNKVKECN CIGPFC5GEQPFN[PGKVJGTVJG'7ŏUCHHCKTUPQT'7ŏUGPNCTIGOGPVKPRCTVKEWNCT attract much interest from the public or feature in domestic political debates. 2WDNKEKPVGTGUVKPVJG'7JCUUVGGRN[FGENKPGF UKPEGUWEJVJCVHQTGZ- CORNGVJGXQVGTVWTPQWVKPVJG'WTQRGCP2CTNKCOGPVGNGEVKQPUYCUQPN[ RGTEGPVOQTGVJCPVYKEGNQYGTVJCPVJGVWTPQWVKPQTVJG'7CXGTCIG11 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, there is a history of consensual deci- UKQPOCMKPIQPOCVVGTUQH'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPYJKEJETGCVGFEGTVCKPKPHQTOCN UVCPFCTFUCPFGZRGEVCVKQPUCOQPIVJGRQNKVKECNGNKVGU6JGRCVVGTPYCUUGVHTQO VJGXGT[DGIKPPKPIYJGPCNNOCLQTRCTVKGUFGENCTGFUVCNYCTVUWRRQTVHQT.KVJW- CPKCŏUOGODGTUJKRVQVJG'7VJGTGD[HQTGIQKPICPQRRQTVWPKV[VQECRKVCNK\GQP VJGGZKUVKPIFKHHGTGPEGUKPVJGRWDNKEQRKPKQPQPVJG'7RTGGORVKPIRQVGPVKCN FGDCVGUQPCP[QHVJGPWODGTQHEQPVTQXGTUKCNKUUWGUQHVJGCEEGUUKQP GINCPF RTQRGTV[HQTHQTGKIPGTU'7FGOCPFUVQENQUGVJGPWENGCTRQYGTUVCVKQPGVE  CPFTGRNCEKPIVJGOYKVJCIQXGTPOGPVHWPFGFRTQRCICPFCECORCKIPCKOGFCV GPUWTKPIVJCVGPQWIJRGQRNGUJQYWRHQTVJGTGHGTGPFWOQPVJG'7CPFXQVG yes.125KPEGVJGPOCLQTFGEKUKQPUTGICTFKPIVJG'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPJCXGDGGP rarely subject to widespread politi- ECNFGDCVGU(QTGZCORNGLQKPKPIVJG The security dimension 'WTQ \QPG KU IGPGTCNN[ VTGCVGF CU C outweighs political, economic, technical and not a political issue. and cultural considerations and 6JGSWGUVKQPQHQTICPK\KPICPCVKQPCN referendum to approve the Treaty es- results in Lithuania’s positive VCDNKUJKPIC%QPUVKVWVKQPHQT'WTQRG assessment of Turkey’s EU bid was never considered and the treaty YCUJCUVKN[TCVKſGFD[VJGRCTNKCOGPVYKVJVQXQVGUKPHCXQTDGHQTGKVYCU GXGPQHſEKCNN[VTCPUNCVGFKPVQVJG.KVJWCPKCPNCPIWCIG+PCV[RKECNOCPPGTKP 1EVQDGTVGPOCLQTRQNKVKECNRCTVKGUUKIPGFCPCITGGOGPVVJCV.KVJWCPKCŏU 2TGUKFGPE[QHVJG%QWPEKNQHVJG'7KPYKNNPQVDGUWDLGEVVQRWDNKERQNKVK- cal debates. The combination of the above-mentioned factors provides for considerable KPUWNCVKQPQHVJGSWGUVKQPQH6WTMG[ŏU'7CEEGUUKQPHTQORWDNKEQRKPKQPCPFVJG EQPVKPWKV[QH.KVJWCPKCŏURQNKE[CPFRGTOKVUCFFTGUUKPIVJGKUUWGQPVJGDCUKUQH EQUVCPFDGPGſVECNEWNCVKQPUQHPCVKQPCNKPVGTGUV&GURKVGVJGHCKTN[ETKVKECNOGFKC EQXGTCIGVJG'7ŏUGPNCTIGOGPVVQ6WTMG[JCUPGXGTVWTPGFKPVQCEQPVGPVKQWU issue of politics, either between different institutions or between different par- VKGU+PFGGFYJGPUQOGRQNKVKEKCPUCPFOGFKCſIWTGUGZRTGUUGFETKVKECNQRKPKQPU

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TGICTFKPI6WTMG[ŏU'7OGODGTUJKRKPVJGVJGPOKPKUVGTQHHQTGKIPCHHCKTU #8CNKQPKUVQQMCPWPRTGEGFGPVGFUVGRVQRWDNKEN[EQPFGOPőKNNITQWPFGFCU- UGUUOGPVUVJCVECPURCTMPCVKQPCNCPFTGNKIKQWUFKUEQTFŒCPFENCKOGFVJCVVJG RCTNKCOGPVPGGFPQVFKUEWUUKUUWGUVJCVNKGYKVJKPVJGEQORGVGPEGQHVJGIQXGTP- ment.136JGOKPKUVGTŏUEQPEGTPUCDQWVVJGRCTNKCOGPVRWVVKPIURQMGUKPVJGHQT- GKIPRQNKE[YJGGNYGTGPQVGPVKTGN[WPYCTTCPVGFDGECWUGRCTNKCOGPVCT[FGDCVGU often tend to fall back on emotions and established narratives that are GCUKN[EQORTGJGPUKDNGVQVJGIGPGTCNRWDNKE(QTGZCORNGKP&GEGODGTQH VJGTGRTGUGPVCVKXGUQHVJGUOCNN#TOGPKCPEQOOWPKV[KP.KVJWCPKCOCPCIGFVQ QTICPK\GCPGZJKDKVKQPQHITWGUQOGRJQVQITCRJUHTQOVJG1VVQOCP'ORKTGKP 1915 in the parliament’s halls and then successfully lobbied for a parliamentary TGUQNWVKQPQPVJGTGEQIPKVKQPQHVJGő#TOGPKCPIGPQEKFGŒ+PNCVG&GEGODGT CVVJGGPFQHVJGRCTNKCOGPVCT[UGUUKQPYJGPCNOQUVVYQVJKTFUQH/2UYGTG CNTGCF[OKUUKPIVJGRCTNKCOGPVRCUUGFVJGTGUQNWVKQPJCUVKN[YKVJQWVEQPUWNV- KPIVJG(QTGKIP#HHCKTU%QOOKVVGGCPFYKVJQWVCP[FGDCVG This event did not UKIPKſECPVN[CHHGEVTGNCVKQPUDGVYGGP.KVJWCPKCCPF6WTMG[DWVKVKNNWUVTCVGUUQOG QHVJGRQVGPVKCNFKHſEWNVKGUVJCVOC[CTKUGKH6WTMG[ŏU'7OGODGTUJKRDGEQOGU an issue of domestic politics.

Costs and Bene!ts of Support for Turkey

+HRWDNKEQRKPKQPFQGUPQVRNC[CUKIPKſECPVTQNGYJCVECPGZRNCKP.KVJWCPKCŏU support for Turkey’s EU membership? The short-term rationale is to trade Lith- WCPKCŏUUWRRQTVKPVJG'7HQT6WTMG[ŏUUWRRQTVKP0#616JGNQPIGTVGTOCPF EQPUGSWGPVN[NGUUENGCTN[GZRTGUUGFTGCUQPKUVJGRGTEGKXGFCFXCPVCIGUQHVJG NKMGN[KORCEVQH6WTMG[ŏUOGODGTUJKRQPVJG'7ŏUGZVGTPCNTGNCVKQPU+PIGP- GTCNVJGUGEWTKV[FKOGPUKQPQWVYGKIJURQNKVKECNGEQPQOKECPFEWNVWTCNEQPUKF- erations and results in Lithuania’s positive assessment of Turkey’s EU bid. The HQNNQYKPIUGEVKQPUYKNNGZRCPFQPVJGUGVYQOQVKXGU +PVJGCDUGPEGQHUKIPKſECPVGEQPQOKEVKGUVJGEJCTCEVGTQHDKNCVGTCNTGNC- tions between Lithuania and Turkey has to be viewed almost exclusively in the context of Lithuania’s security interests. While the majority of the seventeen VTGCVKGUUKIPGFDGVYGGPVJGVYQEQWPVTKGUEQPEGTPGEQPQOKECPFVTCFGTGNCVKQPU EQQRGTCVKQPKPVJGCTGCUQHVTCPURQTVVQWTKUOEWNVWTGCPFGFWECVKQPVJGCIGP- FCUCPFVJGVKOKPIQHDKNCVGTCNOGGVKPIUJCXGIGPGTCNN[DGGPFKEVCVGFD[OCVVGTU TGNCVGFVQEQQRGTCVKQPKPVJGCTGCQHUGEWTKV[+PVJGFGECFGDGVYGGPCPF .KVJWCPKCUQWIJVVQQDVCKP6WTMG[ŏUUWRRQTVHQTKVUOGODGTUJKRKPVJG 0#61CPF6WTMG[ŏUCRRTQXCNYCUNCVGTTGEKRTQECVGFD[ECNNUVQDGIKPCEEGUUKQP PGIQVKCVKQPUYKVJ6WTMG[QPUEJGFWNGQP1EVQDGTFGURKVGVJGNCVVGTŏU TGHWUCNVQTGEQIPK\G%[RTWU5KPEG.KVJWCPKCUGGMU6WTMG[ŏUUWRRQTVHQT

182 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA Photo: REUTERS, Fatih Sarıba ş REUTERS, Fatih Photo: Flags of Turkey and the European Union are seen from the roof of the Covered in .

VJGEQPVKPWCVKQP0#61ŏU$CNVKECKTRQNKEKPIOKUUKQPCUYGNNCUUGXGTCNQVJGT RTQLGEVU6JGCKTRQNKEKPIKUUWGJCUDGGPVJGJKIJGUVQPVJGCIGPFCKPVJGRCUV HGY[GCTU+PVJGCDUGPEGQHUWHſEKGPVCKTHQTEGECRCEKV[.KVJWCPKCTGNKGUQP assistance from NATO countries to secure its airspace and seeks to either make VJGVGORQTCT[0#61CKTRQNKEKPIOKUUKQPKPVJG$CNVKEUVCVGURGTOCPGPVQTCV NGCUVGZVGPFKVVQ15 Cooperation on these and other security-related issues has been one of the core reasons behind Lithuania’s support for Turkey’s EU aspirations. +VOC[CRRGCTVJCV.KVJWCPKCŏUUWRRQTVHQT6WTMG[KUOGTGN[CPGZEJCPIGQH CDKTFKPVJGJCPFHQTVYQKPVJGDWUJYJGPVCPIKDNGDGPGſVUCTGGZVTCEVGFKP GZEJCPIGHQTUWRRQTVKPCPGPVGTRTKUGYJKEJYKNNQPN[DGTGCNK\GFKPVJGHWVWTG CPFOC[YGNNEQOGVQPQVJKPI*QYGXGTDG[QPFVJGRCTVKEWNCTKUUWGUKORQT- VCPVCUVJG[CTGRGTEGKXGFVQDGVJGTGKUCNUQVJGNCTIGTEQPVGZVQH.KVJWCPKCŏU UWRRQTVHQT'7ŏUGPNCTIGOGPVVQ6WTMG[YJKEJUWIIGUVUVJCVUWRRQTVYQWNFDG HQTVJEQOKPIGXGPKPVJGCDUGPEGQHKOOGFKCVGCPFCFXCPVCIGQWUXGPWGUHQTEQ- QRGTCVKQP6QGZCOKPGVJKUNCTIGTEQPVGZVCPFVJGUVTCVGIKEVJKPMKPIQPVJGRCTV QHVJG.KVJWCPKCPHQTGKIPRQNKE[OCMGTUVJGUKIPKſECPEGQH6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQP to the EU has to be discussed. Naturally, the accession of such a populous country would have a consider- able impact on virtually all aspects of the life of the Union and the full extent of

SUMMER 2012 183 AZUOLAS BAGDONAS

VJKUKORCEVOC[PQVDGVJQTQWIJN[CRRTCKUGFRTKQTVQCEEGUUKQP(QTGZCORNG .KVJWCPKCJCUDGGPQPGQHVJGNCTIGUVPGVTGEKRKGPVUQH'7HWPFUDQVJKPRGT ECRKVCVGTOUCPFCUCRTQRQTVKQPQH)&2CPFKVOKIJVUGGOVJCVVJGRTQURGEV QH6WTMG[FTCKPKPIVJG'7ŏUDWFIGVYQWNFDGCPWPYGNEQOGQPG*QYGXGT uncertainties in the accession timetable and future prospects of national and re- IKQPCNFGXGNQROGPVRQUUKDNGEJCPI- Much of Lithuania’s foreign GU KP '7ŏU OCKP URGPFKPI RQNKEKGU policy since the restoration CPFVJGNKMGNKJQQFQHURGEKCNCTTCPIG- of independence in 1990 can OGPVUYJKEJOC[DGCITGGFWRQPKP the case of Turkey, reduce the value be explained by the incessant of forecasts on Turkey’s impact on feeling of insecurity toward VJG'7DWFIGVCUCDCUKUHQTHQTOKPI Russia GPNCTIGOGPVRTGHGTGPEGUCVNGCUVHQT small states like Lithuania. Certain other predictions, while perhaps no less speculative in their nature, provide ſTOGTIWKFGNKPGUHQTHQTGKIPRQNKE[5RGEKſECNN[VJTGGCURGEVUCTGYQTVJOGP- VKQPKPI6WTMG[ŏUKORCEVQP'7ŏUGPGTI[UGEWTKV[TGNCVKQPUYKVJVJG75CPF 4WUUKCCPFVJGDCNCPEGQHRQYGTKPVJG'76JGRGTUKUVGPVCPFCNNGPEQORCUUKPI .KVJWCPKCPHQTGKIPRQNKE[VJGOGWPKVKPIVJGUGFKXGTUGCURGEVUKUVJGEQWPVT[ŏU CUUGUUOGPVQHKVUUGEWTKV[GPXKTQPOGPVŌPCOGN[VJGRGTEGRVKQPQH4WUUKCCU the main source of political, economic, and military threat. A more extensive FKUEWUUKQPQHVJKUVJGOGKUPGEGUUCT[VQIGVCENGCTGTRKEVWTGQHVJG.KVJWCPKCP HQTGKIPRQNKE[OCMGTUŏUVTCVGIKEVJKPMKPI

Lithuanian Foreign Policy, Russia, and the EU

/WEJQH.KVJWCPKCŏUHQTGKIPRQNKE[UKPEGVJGTGUVQTCVKQPQHKPFGRGPFGPEGKP ECPDGGZRNCKPGFD[VJGKPEGUUCPVHGGNKPIQHKPUGEWTKV[VQYCTF4WUUKC8KTVW- CNN[CNNOCLQTHQTGKIPRQNKE[FGEKUKQPUCPFKPKVKCVKXGUJCXGDGGPUJCRGFD[VJG RGTEGRVKQPQH4WUUKCCUCRGTRGVWCNUQWTEGQHGZKUVGPVKCNVJTGCV&WTKPIVJGGCTN[ UCNNFKRNQOCVKEGHHQTVUYGTGFKTGEVGFCVCEJKGXKPIKPVGTPCVKQPCNTGEQIPKVKQP QHVJGKPFGRGPFGPEGCPFTGOQXKPIVJG4WUUKCPCTOGFHQTEGUHTQO.KVJWCPKC &WTKPIVJGFGECFGUKPEGVJGEJKGHHQTGKIPRQNKE[CKOYCUVQGPVTGPEJVJG EQWPVT[ŏUKPFGRGPFGPEGD[LQKPKPI0#61CPFVJG'75KPEGKPCFFKVKQP to policies within NATO and the EU, various initiatives have been undertaken, DQVJKPFGRGPFGPVN[CPFYKVJKPKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPUVQQDUVTWEVCPFYGCM- GP4WUUKCŏUTGUWTIGPVKORGTKCNKUOD[RTQXKFKPICNNV[RGUQHFKTGEVCPFKPFKTGEV UWRRQTVHQTVJGƀGFINKPIFGOQETCEKGUQHVJGHQTOGT5QXKGVTGRWDNKEUGURGEKCNN[ 7MTCKPG)GQTIKCCPF/QNFQXCCUYGNNCUD[VT[KPIVQNKOKV4WUUKCŏUKPƀWGPEG on the international arena.

184 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA

.KVJWCPKCŏUHQTGKIPRQNKE[KUITQWPFGFKPTGCNKUVVJKPMKPICPFFQOKPCVGFD[ IGQRQNKVKECNKOCIGT[RTGXCNGPVCOQPIRTCEVKVKQPGTUOGFKCRWPFKVUCPFUEJQN- ars alike. From this perspective, the view that Russia presents a constant threat JCTFN[PGGFUCTIWKPI6JGEGPVWTKGUNQPIEQORGVKVKQPDGVYGGPVJG.KVJWCPKCP )TCPF&WEJ[CPF/WUEQX[YJKEJEWNOKPCVGFKPVJGFKUCRRGCTCPEGQHVJG2QN- KUJ.KVJWCPKCP%QOOQPYGCNVJHTQOVJGOCRQH'WTQRGCVVJGGPFQHVJGth EGPVWT[CPFDTQWIJVOQTGVJCPCEGPVWT[QH4WUUKCPTWNGVJG5QXKGVCIITGUUKQP CPFCPPGZCVKQPQHVJG4GRWDNKEQH.KVJWCPKCKP,WPGŌKPFGGFVJGGPVKTG history of political and military relations between the two countries seems to indicate a historical pattern. Lithuania was able to defend its interests when 4WUUKC YCU YGCM CPF EQPXGTUGN[ YJGPGXGT 4WUUKC YCU UVTQPI KV HQNNQYGF GZRCPUKQPKUVRQNKEKGUCPF.KVJWCPKCNQUVKVUUQXGTGKIPV[6JGIGQRQNKVKECNHQT- OWNCVKQPUVTCPUNCVGFVJKUINQQO[XKGYKPVQQPGQHVJGOQUVKORQTVCPVHGCVWTGUQH EQPVGORQTCT[.KVJWCPKCPHQTGKIPRQNKE[ŌCſTOCPFWPSWGUVKQPCDNGVTCPUCVNCP- VKEQTKGPVCVKQPCUYGNNCUCOQTGQTNGUUENGCTN[GZRTGUUGFUVTCVGI[QH4WUUKCŏU containment.17 (TQOVJKURGTURGEVKXGVJGEJKGHHQTGKIPRQNKE[IQCNKUVQCEJKGXGOKNKVCT[ CPFGEQPQOKEUGEWTKV[QHVJGEQWPVT[CICKPUVRQUUKDNGKPVGTXGPVKQPHTQO4WUUKC 6JGOKNKVCT[UGEWTKV[UVTCVGI[KUDCUGFQP0#61OGODGTUJKRKPVJGURKTKVQH .QTF+UOC[ŏUENCUUKEHQTOWNCVKQPőMGGRVJG4WUUKCPUQWVVJG#OGTKECPUKPCPF VJG)GTOCPUFQYPŒ#NVJQWIJVJG%QNF9CTKUQXGTCPF0#61OCMGUHCKTN[ TGIWNCTCVVGORVUVQGPICIG4WUUKCKPUGEWTKV[EQQRGTCVKQPQPCTCPIGQHKUUWGU EGTVCKPGNGOGPVUQH%QNF9CTVJKPMKPICPFDGJCXKQTTGOCKPCNKXGCPFYGNNKPVJG $CNVKETGIKQP(QTGZCORNGKPQPVJGUGXGPVKGVJCPPKXGTUCT[QHVJG5QXKGV KPXCUKQPQH2QNCPFKP5GRVGODGT4WUUKCJGNFNCTIGUECNGOKNKVCT[GZGT- EKUGUKP.CFQICCPF

SUMMER 2012 185 AZUOLAS BAGDONAS

LWUVQPGQHOCP[GZCORNGUQHVGPUKQPUCTKUKPIHTQO4WUUKCŏUTGUWUEKVCVGFITGCV RQYGTCODKVKQPUCPFVJGKTIGPGTCNKORCEVKUVQETGCVGCPCVOQURJGTGQHFGGR suspicion and fear, as well as to push Lithuania ever deeper into the fold of the . 9JKNGőMGGRKPIVJG)GTOCPUFQYPŒOC[CRRGCTVQDGCPQDUQNGVGOKUUKQP VJG.KVJWCPKCPHQTGKIPRQNKE[OCMGTUCTGRTQHQWPFN[FKUVTWUVHWNVQYCTFKVU'W- TQRGCPRCTVPGTUŏCDKNKV[CPFYKNNKPIPGUUVQRTQXKFGCFGSWCVGEQNNGEVKXGUGEWTKV[ IWCTCPVGGUKPVJGHQTGUGGCDNGHWVWTG1EECUKQPCNNCRUGUUWEJCU(TCPEGŏUFGEK- sion to sell two amphibious assault ships to Russia or Germany’s Rheinmetall’s EQPVTCEV VQ GSWKR C 4WUUKCP EQODCV VTCKPKPI EGPVGT KP  CU YGNN CU EQP- stant differences between Lithuania and EU players in the perception and CUUGUUOGPV QH VJTGCVU VJCV 4WUUKC RQUGU EQPſTO VJG GUVCDNKUJGF XKGY COQPI VJGHQTGKIPRQNKE[FGEKUKQPOCMGTUKP.KVJWCPKCVJCVQPN[VJG7PKVGF5VCVGUECP őMGGR VJG 4WUUKCPU QWVŒ 6JG RTGUGPEG QH VJG 7PKVGF 5VCVGU CPF KVU PWENGCT YGCRQPU KP'WTQRGCPFVJGUVTGPIVJQHVJGVTCPUCVNCPVKECNNKCPEGCTGEQPUKFGTGF GUUGPVKCNVQVJGTGIKQPŏUCPFVJGEQWPVT[ŏUUGEWTKV[.KVJWCPKCŏU&GHGPUG/KPKUVGT FKFPQVGZCIIGTCVGOWEJYJGPUJGENCKOGFVJCVőRCTVPGTUJKRYKVJVJG75KP the of defense is the foundation In the context of the of our statehood.” Thus, when the overarching Lithuanian foreign was put under strain by dis- CITGGOGPVUKPVJGYCMGQHVJG75 policy goals Turkey’s accession KPXCUKQPQH+TCS.KVJWCPKCFGEKFGF- entails a number of potentially ly supported the U.S. position over bene!cial consequences Germany and , joined the so- ECNNGFőEQCNKVKQPQHVJGYKNNKPIŒCPF FWTKPIVJGFGECFGUKPEGYGPVQWVQHKVUYC[VQCEEQOOQFCVGINQDCNCPF TGIKQPCN 75 KPVGTGUVU19 Despite the period of more reserved relations with VJG75HQNNQYKPI2TGUKFGPV1DCOCŏUCVVGORVVQőTGUGVŒTGNCVKQPUYKVJ4WUUKC there can be little doubt over which Lithuania would choose, should there be another rift in the in the short- to medium-term future. 6JGRQUUKDKNKV[QHVJGYGCMGPKPIQHVTCPUCVNCPVKEEQOOWPKV[RTGUGPVUCVJTGCV VQ.KVJWCPKCPPCVKQPCNUGEWTKV[#NVJQWIJVJG'7CPFKVUNGCFKPIUVCVGUCTGEQP- UKFGTGFNCTIGN[KTTGNGXCPVVQ.KVJWCPKCŏUOKNKVCT[UGEWTKV[VJG[CTGGUUGPVKCNVQ KORTQXKPI VJG GEQPQOKE UGEWTKV[ CPF RCTVKEWNCTN[ UQNXKPI QT OKVKICVKPI VJG RTQDNGOQHGPGTI[FGRGPFGPE[QP4WUUKC.KVJWCPKCKUHWNN[FGRGPFGPVQP4WU- UKCPICUCPFRCTVKCNN[FGRGPFGPVQPKVUQKNUWRRN[+PCFFKVKQPUKPEGVJGENQUKPI QHVJG+IPCNKPC0WENGCT2QYGT2NCPVCVVJG'7ŏUDGJGUVKP.KVJWCPKCKU KPETGCUKPIN[TGNKCPVQP4WUUKCPGNGEVTKEKV[5VTCVGIKERTQLGEVUFGUKIPGFVQTGFWEG VJGGPGTI[FGRGPFGPEGUWEJCUDWKNFKPICNKSWGſGFPCVWTCNICU .0) VGTOKPCN GUVCDNKUJKPIEQPPGEVKQPUVQVJG'WTQRGCPRQYGTITKFCPFEQPUVTWEVKPICPGY

186 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA

PWENGCTRQYGTRNCPVTGSWKTGſPCPEKCNCPFRQNKVKECNUWRRQTVHTQOVJG'7(QTGZ- ample, the planned LNG terminal would not by itself secure access to alternative UQWTEGUQHPCVWTCNICUUKPEG4WUUKCEQPVTQNUVJGVTCPUOKUUKQPCPFFKUVTKDWVKQP RKRGNKPGUQHVJGICUPGVYQTM+PVJKUTGICTFVJGOCPPGTCPFVJGUWEEGUUQHVJG KORNGOGPVCVKQPQHVJG'7ŏU6JKTF'PGTI[2CEMCIGRTQXKUKQPUDGEQOGETKVKECN /QTGIGPGTCNN[UKPEG.KVJWCPKCNCEMUVJGRQYGTVQCEJKGXGVJGFGUKTGFQWVEQOG KPPGIQVKCVKQPUYKVJ4WUUKCQPGPGTI[KUUWGUCPFJCUVQTGN[QPVJG'7VJGKP- ternal EU divisions and power dynamics, and the positions taken by France and )GTOCP[KPRCTVKEWNCTCESWKTGXKVCNKORQTVCPEG5JQWNFVJG'7CPFVJG7PKVGF 5VCVGUGZRGTKGPEGUGTKQWURQNKVKECNFKUCITGGOGPVUCUVJGHQTOGTUVTGPIVJGPUKVU EQOOQPUGEWTKV[CPFHQTGKIPRQNKE[FKOGPUKQP.KVJWCPKCYJKEJEQWNFDGUGGP as the U.S.’s in the EU, may be forced to choose between military and economic security to the detriment of the latter.

Impact of Turkey’s EU Membership

+PVJGEQPVGZVQHVJGQXGTCTEJKPI.KVJWCPKCPHQTGKIPRQNKE[IQCNUUMGVEJGFCDQXG 6WTMG[ŏU CEEGUUKQP GPVCKNU C PWODGT QH RQVGPVKCNN[ DGPGſEKCN EQPUGSWGPEGU (KTUVHTQOVJGIGQRQNKVKECNRGTURGEVKXG6WTMG[ŏUIGQRQNKVKECNEQFGJCUVTCFK- VKQPCNN[ DGGP EQPITWGPV YKVJ .KVJWCPKCŏU KPVGTGUVU 'XGP OQTG KORQTVCPV CTG 6WTMG[ŏUCVVGORVUVQECRKVCNK\GQPKVUIGQRQNKVKECNRQUKVKQPD[KPXGUVKPIJGCXKN[ KPVQGPGTI[RTQLGEVU6WTMG[ŏUKPENWUKQPYQWNFKPETGCUGVJG'7ŏUKPƀWGPEGKP VJG/KFFNG'CUVCPFOQTGKORQTVCPVN[HQT.KVJWCPKCVJG%CWECUWU5GEQPF 6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQPYQWNFTGEQPſIWTGVJGDCNCPEGQHRQYGTYKVJKPVJG'7CPF CNVGTVJGEJCTCEVGTQHVJG7PKQPYJKEJYQWNFDGTGƀGEVGFKPKVUGZVGTPCNRQNKEKGU as well. All in all, from Lithuania’s point of view, Turkey’s membership could EJCPIGVJGF[PCOKEUQHVJG'7ŏUGZVGTPCNTGNCVKQPUKPCFXCPVCIGQWUYC[U 9KVJKP VJGNCTIG CPFUQOGYJCV GUQVGTKE DQF[QHNKVGTCVWTG QPIGQRQNKVKEU KVKUIGPGTCNN[CEEGRVGFVJCV6WTMG[DGNQPIUVQCPCTGCQHEQORGVKVKQPDGVYGGP VJG7PKVGF5VCVGUCPF4WUUKCCPFHQTOUCPKORQTVCPVGNGOGPVKPVJCVUVTWIING #UUWOKPIVJCVQPGQHVJGMG[IQCNUQHVJG7PKVGF5VCVGUŏUVTCVGI[KUVQRTGXGPV VJGGOGTIGPEGQHJQUVKNGCNNKCPEGUCPFVJGEQPUQNKFCVKQPQHRQYGTKP'WTCUKC 6WTMG[UGTXGU75KPVGTGUVUGXGPFWTKPIVJGNQYRQKPVUQHTGNCVKQPUDGVYGGPVJG two countries.21*KUVQTKECNN[VJG1VVQOCP'ORKTGHQWIJVPQNGUUVJCPVJKTVGGP YCTUYKVJ4WUUKCUKPEGVJGth century, and the relations between Turkey and VJG5QXKGV7PKQPYGTGEJCTCEVGTK\GFD[CFXGTUKV[VJTQWIJQWVVJG%QNF9CT6JG OQTGFGVGTOKPKUVKEUVTCPFUQHIGQRQNKVKECNVJQWIJVVJWURTQLGEVVJGUCOGRCVVGTP QHEQPƀKEVKPVQVJGHWVWTGCUYGNN22(QTGZCORNG

SUMMER 2012 187 AZUOLAS BAGDONAS

UGUUKPIVJGECRCEKV[VQCNVGTVJGGZKUVKPIIGQRQNKVKECNUVCVGQHCHHCKTU EQPVGPFKPI YKVJ4WUUKCCPF+TCPQXGTKPƀWGPEGKP%GPVTCN#UKCCPFVJG%CWECUWU23 Alex- CPFT&WIKPQPGQHVJGDGVVGTMPQYP4WUUKCPIGQRQNKVKEKCPUENCKOUVJCV6WTMG[ KUVJGUVTCVGIKEQWVRQUVQH#VNCPVKEKUO The most important GPETQCEJKPI WRQP 4WUUKCP KPVGTGUVU component of Turkey’s in Central and the , geopolitical appeal to Lithuania and should therefore become an ob- LGEVQHTGNGPVNGUURQUKVKQPCNIGQRQNKVK- is Turkey’s position and active ECN YCT YCIGF D[ 4WUUKC D[ OGCPU role as a potential transit hub QHDWKNFKPICPCNNKCPEGYKVJ+TCPCPF for energy supplies to Europe #TOGPKCCUYGNNCUKPEKVKPI-WTFKUJ .6JWUTGICTFNGUUQHVJG current state of political and economic relations between Turkey and Russia, YJKEJJCXGPGXGTDGGPDGVVGTVJGIGQRQNKVKECNRGTURGEVKXGRQKUGUVJGVYQEQWP- tries as competitors bound to collide sooner rather than later. +PVJKUTGICTF6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQPVQVJG'7KUGZRGEVGFVQPQVQPN[UVTGPIVJ- en the U.S. position but also increase the Union’s involvement and add some muscle behind its policies in the Caucasus and . Lithuania is par- VKEWNCTN[KPVGTGUVGFKP)GQTIKCŏUUKVWCVKQP&KRNQOCVKECEVKXKVKGUKP7MTCKPGCPF )GQTIKCJCXGDGGPVJGEGPVGTRKGEGQH.KVJWCPKCŏUőGCUVGTPŒRQNKE[UKPEG FGUKIPGF VQ EWTD 4WUUKCŏU KPƀWGPEG KP VJG RQUV5QXKGV CTGC GCTP RQKPVU YKVJ VJG7PKVGF5VCVGUCPFECTXGQWVCURJGTGQHKPƀWGPEGKPVJG'7QPVJGDCUKUQH UWRGTKQTMPQYNGFIGCPFEQPPGEVKQPU9JKNGVJGGHHQTVUVQHCEKNKVCVG7MTCKPGŏU OQXGOGPVCYC[HTQO4WUUKCJCXGRTGFKEVCDN[HCKNGF)GQTIKCYJKEJTGOCKPU a staunch ally of the U.S. and has expressed its intention to join NATO and the '7KUUVKNNJKIJQPVJG.KVJWCPKCPHQTGKIPRQNKE[CIGPFC6JGJQRGUCTGVJCV 6WTMG[ŏUCEEGUUKQPVQVJG'7YQWNFDTKPIVJG7PKQPŏUTGNCVKQPUYKVJ)GQTIKCVQ VJGPGZVNGXGNCPFOCMG)GQTIKCŏU'7CURKTCVKQPUOQTGTGCNKUVKEVJGTGD[HTWU- VTCVKPIKHPQVGPFKPI4WUUKCŏUFGUKIPUHQTVJGTGIKQP 2GTJCRUVJGOQUVKORQTVCPVEQORQPGPVQH6WTMG[ŏUIGQRQNKVKECNCRRGCNVQ Lithuania is Turkey’s position and active role as a potential transit hub for GPGTI[UWRRNKGUVQ'WTQRG6JGUGPUKVKXKV[QHUQOGQHVJGMG['7OGODGTUVQ Russia’s interests partly derives from Russia’s dominant position on the Euro- RGCPHWGNOCTMGV+VJCUDGGPCTIWGFVJCVVJG'7KUNGUUFGRGPFGPVQP4WUUKCP GPGTI[VJCPKVYCUVYQFGECFGUCIQVJCV4WUUKCECPPQVGCUKN[EQPXGTVKVURQUKVKQP KPVQRQNKVKECNNGXGTCIGDGECWUGQHKPVGTFGRGPFGPEGCPFVJCVQXGTFGRGPFGPEGKU VJGTGHQTGPQVUWEJCRTGUUKPIKUUWGHQTVJG'7CUCYJQNG25 However, the dif- HGTGPEGUKPVJGNGXGNUQHFGRGPFGPEGDGVYGGPKPFKXKFWCNUVCVGUCPFVJGTGUWNVKPI KPVGTPCNFKXKUKQPUKPVJG7PKQPTGVCTFVJGETGCVKQPQHVJGUKPINGGPGTI[OCTMGV CPFKPVJKUTGICTFIKXGPVJGRTQLGEVGFITQYVJKP'WTQRGCPGPGTI[EQPUWORVKQP

188 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA

the development of alternative supply routes and further dilution of Russia’s role KUGZVTGOGN[KORQTVCPV6WTMG[ŏUTQNGKPHCEKNKVCVKPICPFUVCDKNK\KPI'WTQRGCPCE- EGUUVQ%GPVTCN#UKCPCPF/KFFNG'CUVGTPQKNCPFGURGEKCNN[ICUEQWNFVJWUPQV only further reduce reliance on Russia’s supplies but also impede the effective- PGUUQHKVUFKXKUKXGGPGTI[FKRNQOCE[ The second major impact of Turkey’s accession to the EU would be an KPGXKVCDNGTGEQPſIWTCVKQPQHVJGKPVGTPCNDCNCPEGQHRQYGTYKVJKPVJG7PKQP CUYGNNCUVJGRQVGPVKCNEJCPIGQHVJG7PKQPŏUEJCTCEVGT(TCPEGCPF)GTOCP[ JCXGRNC[GFCMG[TQNGKPVJGRTQEGUUQH'WTQRGCPKPVGITCVKQPCPFCNVJQWIJVJKU RCTVPGTUJKRKUPQVOQPQNKVJKECPFCNNQYUHQTUWDUVCPVKCNFKHHGTGPEGUQPCTCPIGQH issues, the two countries continue to dominate European politics even after the Union expanded to 27 member states.&WGVQKVUNCTIGRQRWNCVKQPVJGXQVKPI power of Turkey in various EU institutions would be second only to Germany CPFEQPUGSWGPVN[KPUQOGECUGU6WTMG[YQWNFDGCDNGVQEQPVTQNQTFGVGTOKPG UQOGQHVJGFGEKUKQPUVCMGPKPVJG'76JKUCNNQYUHQTXCTKQWUKPVGTGUVKPICPF PQXGNUEGPCTKQU(QTGZCORNGWPFGTVJG6TGCV[QH.KUDQPXQVKPICTTCPIGOGPVU GHHGEVKXG HTQO  VJG EQODKPGF XQVKPIRQYGTQHVJG7-CPF6WTMG[ Turkey’s geopolitical YQWNF GSWCN VJCV QH )GTOCP[ CPF orientation and investment into France, and decisions in the Coun- energy projects would open cil of the EU could (at least theoreti- new possibilities in the internal cally) be taken without the consent of the latter. decision-making process and The dominance of the German- could lead to more vigorous French axis has frustrated Lithuania positions toward Russia and crippled its ability to achieve its aims both in the EU and NATO. The German-French tandem typically takes OQFGTCVGQTGXGPUWRRQTVKXGRQUKVKQPUYKVJTGICTFVQKUUWGUEQPEGTPKPI4WUUKC (QTGZCORNG0#61ŏUEQPVKPIGPE[RNCPUHQTVJG$CNVKEUVCVGUYGTGTGRQTVGFN[ JGNFWRFWGVQ)GTOCP[ŏUEQPEGTPUCDQWVWRUGVVKPIVJG-TGONKP27&WTKPIVJG $WEJCTGUV5WOOKV(TCPEGCPF)GTOCP[VJYCTVGFVJG75RNCPUVQITCPV C/GODGTUJKR#EVKQP2NCPVQ7MTCKPGCPF)GQTIKCVQVJGFKUOC[QH.KVJWCPKC Within the EU, it was France and Germany who resisted the move towards in- VGITCVKQPQHVJG'WTQRGCPGPGTI[OCTMGVCPFFKNWVGFVJG6JKTF'PGTI[2CEMCIG D[KPUGTVKPIRTQXKUKQPUQPKPFGRGPFGPVVTCPUOKUUKQPQRGTCVQTUYJKEJRGTOKVU 4WUUKCŏU )C\RTQO VQ TGVCKP QYPGTUJKR QH KVU VTCPUOKUUKQP PGVYQTMU While Turkey’s accession to the EU is unlikely to automatically translate into a bolder '7RQNKE[VQYCTF4WUUKC6WTMG[ŏUIGQRQNKVKECNQTKGPVCVKQPCPFKPXGUVOGPVKPVQ GPGTI[ RTQLGEVU YQWNF QRGP PGY RQUUKDKNKVKGU KP VJG KPVGTPCN FGEKUKQPOCMKPI RTQEGUUCPFEQWNFNGCFVQOQTGXKIQTQWURQUKVKQPUVQYCTF4WUUKC

SUMMER 2012 189 AZUOLAS BAGDONAS

Concluding Remarks

6JGCPUYGTVQVJGRW\\NGQH.KVJWCPKCŏUUWRRQTVHQT6WTMG[ŏU'7OGODGTUJKR ECP DG UWOOCTK\GF CU HQNNQYU 2GTOKUUKXG RWDNKE QRKPKQP CPF NQY FQOGUVKE TGNGXCPEGQHVJGKUUWGCUYGNNCUVJGRTCEVKEGQHEQPUGPUWCNFGEKUKQPOCMKPI QPOCVVGTUEQPEGTPKPIVJG'7VWTP Lithuania can be considered Lithuania’s support for Turkey’s EU a clear success case of OGODGTUJKRKPVQCPWPWUWCNN[őRWTGŒ Turkish in terms HQTGKIPRQNKE[KUUWGUWDLGEVQPN[VQ TCVKQPCN EQUVDGPGſV ECNEWNCVKQPU QP of identifying and pursuing the basis of perceived national inter- mutually advantageous venues GUV#UUWEJVJGSWGUVKQPKUXKGYGF for cooperation in a timely primarily within the framework of manner national security, rather than eco- PQOKEQTQVJGTőNQYRQNKVKEUŒKUUWGU 5JQTVVGTOECNEWNCVKQPUEQPEGTPVJGVCPIKDNGDGPGſVUQHőVTCFKPIŒUWRRQTVHQT 6WTMG[KPVJG'7HQT6WTMG[ŏUUWRRQTVYKVJKP0#61.QPIGTVGTOUVTCVGIKE calculations of Turkey’s EU membership include visions of Russia’s contain- OGPVKP%GPVTCN#UKCCPFRCTVKEWNCTN[VJG%CWECUWUDQVJVJTQWIJVJGCFXCPEG- OGPVQH6WTMG[ŏUKPVGTGUVUCPFVJGEQPUGSWGPVGZRCPUKQPQHVJG'7ŏUTQNGKP VJGUG TGIKQPU #PEJQTKPI 6WTMG[ KP VJG 'WTQRGCP KPUVKVWVKQPCN HTCOGYQTM KU UGGP CU C YC[ VQ KPETGCUG VJG UVCDKNKV[ CPF CXCKNCDKNKV[ QH CNVGTPCVKXG GPGTI[ UWRRNKGUCPFVJWUTGFWEKPI4WUUKCŏUKPƀWGPEGYKVJKPVJG'7(WTVJGTOQTG6WT- key’s membership is expected to moderate the dominance of the French-German VCPFGOCUYGNNCUUVTGPIVJGPKPIVJGVTCPUCVNCPVKEFKOGPUKQPQHVJG'7 Lithuania can be considered a clear success case of Turkish diplomacy in VGTOUQHKFGPVKH[KPICPFRWTUWKPIOWVWCNN[CFXCPVCIGQWUXGPWGUHQTEQQRGTC- VKQPKPCVKOGN[OCPPGT6JGECUGTGXGCNUVJGWVKNKV[QHVJGOWNVKRTQPIGFCPF ƀGZKDNG6WTMKUJ'7CEEGUUKQPEQOOWPKECVKQPUVTCVGI[9JCVYQTMUKPVJGő1NF 'WTQRGŒOC[PQVPGEGUUCTKN[YQTMKPVJGő0GY'WTQRGŒ9JKNGVCNMKPICDQWV 6WTMG[ŏUKORQTVCPEGKPHQUVGTKPIOWNVKEWNVWTCNKUOKP'WTQRGYQWNFNKMGN[DCEM- ſTGKPCXKIQTQWUN[%CVJQNKEEQWPVT[VJCVKUUVKNNTGEQXGTKPIHTQOVJGVTCWOCQH VJGſHV[[GCTUQHHQTEGFCVJGKUOCPFTGFKUEQXGTKPIVJGTGNKIKQWUCURGEVUQHKVU KFGPVKV[VJGGORJCUKUQP6WTMG[ŏUEQPVTKDWVKQPVQVJG'7ŏUGPGTI[UGEWTKV[CPF INQDCN TQNG HQWPF C HGTVKNG ITQWPF 6JG IGQRQNKVKECN RGTURGEVKXG Ō VJG modus operandiQHTGURQPUKDNGUVTCVGIKERNCPPKPIKP.KVJWCPKCCPF'CUVGTP'WTQRGKP IGPGTCNŌHQEWUGUQPVJGNQPIGTVGTOIGQITCRJKECPFJKUVQTKECNHCEVQTUTCVJGT VJCPVJGƀGGVKPIGXGPVUQTVCEVKECNOCPGWXGTKPI6JKUUVTKRUVJGTKEJCPFQHVGP contradictory political reality to bare bones distinction, where Turkey is seen as a potential enemy of the enemy and hence a friend. Ultimately, Lithuania’s sup-

190 INSIGHT TURKEY THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION: A VIEW FROM LITHUANIA

port for Turkey’s EU membership is primarily conditioned by Turkey’s position YKVJTGICTFVQVJG7PKVGF5VCVGCPF4WUUKCCPFPQVVJG'7

Endnotes

1. ĨCDCP-CTFCĩő)GQUVTCVGIKE2QUKVKQPCU.GXGTCIGKP'7#EEGUUKQPVJG%CUGQH6WTMKUJ '70GIQVKCVKQPUQPVJG0CDWEEQ2KRGNKPGŒSoutheast European and Studies, Vol. 11, 0Q  RR 2. 1PTJGVQTKECNCEVKQPUUGG(TCPM5EJKOOGNHGPPKIő6JG%QOOWPKV[6TCR.KDGTCN0QTOU 4JGVQTKECN#EVKQPCPFVJG'CUVGTP'PNCTIGOGPVQHVJG'WTQRGCP7PKQPŒInternational Organiza- tion8QN0Q  RR 3. ő6JG'7CPF6WTMG[5VGGTKPIC5CHGT2CVJ6JTQWIJVJG5VQTOUŒEU Observer (,  TGVTKGXGF,WN[HTQOJVVRIQQIN05[& CPFő6JG'7CPF6WTMG[5VTQPIGT 6QIGVJGTŒEU Observer ,WPG TGVTKGXGF,WN[HTQOJVVRIQQINTV6  4. +PRGTEGPVQHVJQUGUWTXG[GFKP.KVJWCPKCYGTGHQTHWTVJGTGPNCTIGOGPVQHVJG'W- TQRGCP7PKQPCPFQPN[RGTEGPVYGTGCICKPUVKPEQORCTKUQPVQVJG'7CXGTCIGQHRGTEGPV HQTCPFRGTEGPVCICKPUV5GGStandard 74 #WVWOP RTGVTKGXGF,WN[ HTQOJVVRIQQIN#DYYD  5. See Standard Eurobarometer 69 5RTKPI CPFStandard Eurobarometer 74 (Autumn  TGVTKGXGF,WN[HTQOJVVRIQQIN6%ME  6. One notable exception was the referendum in France in 1972. In the past few years, how- GXGTUVGRUJCXGDGGPVCMGPKP)GTOCP[CPFGURGEKCNN[(TCPEGVQKPETGCUGVJGUVTCPINGJQNFQXGT VJG'WTQRGCP7PKQPŏUGPNCTIGOGPVCVCPCVKQPCNNGXGNUQOGQHYJKEJFKTGEVN[EQPEGTP6WTMG[ŏUCE- EGUUKQPRTQEGUU5GG2CWN%TCKICPF)TCKPPGFG$WTECThe Evolution of EU Law 1ZHQTF1ZHQTF 7PKXGTUKV[2TGUU RR 7. ,QJP

SUMMER 2012 191 AZUOLAS BAGDONAS

16. Gediminas Vitkus, &KRNQOCVKPø#RQTKLC6CTRVCWVKPø.KGVWXQUKT4WUKLQU5CPV[MKĹ0QTOCN- izacijos Perspektyva 8KNPKCWUWPKXGTUKVGVQNGKF[MNC8KNPKWU RR 17. 6JGENGCTGUVGZRTGUUKQPKUVQDGHQWPFKPVJGRTQITCOOCVKEUVCVGOGPVRWDNKUJGFKPD[ VJGVJGPQRRQUKVKQPNGCFGTCPFVJGEWTTGPV2TKOG/KPKUVGT#PFTKWU-WDKNKWUŌUGGő4WUUKC%QPVCKP- OGPV5VTCVGI[2NCPQP4GFWEVKQPQH4WUUKCŏU+PƀWGPEGŒ /C[ TGVTKGXGF,WN[ HTQOJVVRIQQINC,I% &GURKVGKVUEQPVTQXGTUKCNRWDNKETGEGRVKQPVJGFQEWOGPVPQVQPN[ GPECRUWNCVGUVJGURKTKVQHVJGEWTTGPVIQXGTPOGPVŏURQNKEKGUVQYCTF4WUUKCDWVECRVWTGUVJGVJKPMKPI DGJKPFVJGGPVKTGVYQFGECFGUQHHQTGKIPRQNKE[ 18. ő4,WMPGXKìKGPø2CTVPGT[UVøUW,#8)[P[DQU5TKV[LG/ijUĹ8CNUV[DKPIWOQ2CITKPFCUŒ DELFI ,CPWCT[ TGVTKGXGF,WN[HTQOJVVRIQQINK$L%  19. (QTGZCORNGKPCPF%+#EJCTVGTGFRNCPGUYGTGIKXGPCcarte blanche to land in .KVJWCPKCCPFCUGETGVRTKUQPYCUGUVCDNKUJGFCNVJQWIJVJGUWDUGSWGPVRCTNKCOGPVCT[KPXGUVKICVKQP found no evidence that any prisoners were held or tortured there. 20. 6JG'7ŏU6JKTF'PGTI[2CEMCIGQHHGTUCPGYTGIWNCVQT[HTCOGYQTMCKOGFCVETGCVKPICP KPVGITCVGFCPFEQORGVKVKXGKPVGTPCNGPGTI[OCTMGV+PVJGECUGQH.KVJWCPKCRCTVKEWNCTN[KORQTVCPV CTGVJGTWNGUYJKEJTGSWKTGVJGőWPDWPFNKPIŒQHGPGTI[RTQFWEVKQPHTQOGPGTI[FKUVTKDWVKQP#E- EQTFKPIVQVJGUGTWNGU4WUUKCŏU)C\RTQOVJGUQNGUWRRNKGTQHPCVWTCNICUVQ.KVJWCPKCEQWNFDG HQTEGFVQUGNNKVURGTEGPVUVCMGKP.KGVWXQU&WLQUVJGOCKPPCVWTCNICUEQORCP[KP.KVJWCPKC which controls the domestic transmission and distribution pipeline network. 21. 1PGUWEJNQYRQKPVYCUKPVJGCHVGTOCVJQHVJG75FGEKUKQPVQKPXCFG+TCSCPFKVGPIGP- FGTGFCNKXGN[CPFQPIQKPIFGDCVGKPVJGCECFGOKENKVGTCVWTGTGICTFKPIVJGEWTTGPVUVCVGCPFVJG HWVWTGQHVJGCNNKCPEGDGVYGGP6WTMG[CPFVJG756JGEJCPIGKPVJGKPVGTPCVKQPCNUGEWTKV[GPXKTQP- ment, as well as political, economic and military developments in Turkey call for a reassessment of DKNCVGTCNTGNCVKQPUYJKEJKUTGEQIPK\GFD[RQNKVKEKCPUQPDQVJUKFGU+VTGOCKPUVQDGUGGPYJGVJGT VJKUTGCUUGUUOGPVYKNNGPVCKNCTGQTKGPVCVKQPQH6WTMG[ŏUHQTGKIPRQNKE[ 22. 6JGDQNFGUVRTQLGEVKQPUUGG6WTMG[CUPQVQPN[CRQYGTDNQEMKPI4WUUKCŏUKPVGTGUVUDWV predict direct confrontations in the Caucasus and the Black Sea in the not so distant future. See )GQTIG(TKGFOCPThe Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the  0GY;QTM&QWDNGFC[  RR 23.

192 INSIGHT TURKEY