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POLICY CARNEGIE BRIEF ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 87

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Armenia and : Bridging the Gap

THOMAS DE WAA L Senior Associate, and Program S u m m a r y n and Turkey have embarked on a historic normalization process, but it is now in trouble and the needs to take a lead in rescuing it. n If Armenia and Turkey succeed in opening their closed it will transform the South region. But , Turkey’s ally and the losing side to Armenia in the Nagorny conflict, has understandable fears. The international community must invest more resources in resolving the Karabakh conflict and breaking the regional deadlock it has created. n The annual debate over the use of the word to describe the fate of the Ottoman in 1915 has turned into an ugly bargaining process. It is time to take a longer view. President Obama should look ahead to the centenary of the tragedy in 2015 and encourage Turks to take part in commemorating the occasion.

THE ARMENIA–TURKEY the House International Affairs Committee PROTOCOLS voted on March 4 to call the 1915 killings In October 2009 Armenia and Turkey began genocide, causing Turkey to recall its ambas- a historic rapprochement, signing two pro- sador from Washington. Turkey’s outspoken tocols on normalizing their relations that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan fur- showed them a way to escape their tragic ther undermined hopes for normalization past. In 2010, the process has run into trou- in a March 17 BBC interview in which he ble. appears highly unlikely to ratify threatened up to 100,000 Armenians work- the protocols in , saying it will ing illegally in Turkey with . not do so without progress in the Nagorny This looming crisis will reach a head by Karabakh conflict between Armenia and , the date commemorated as Armenian Azerbaijan—even though that conflict is not Genocide Day. Both Armenians and Turks explicitly mentioned in the agreements. The will seek to influence President Obama to use Armenian leadership is suggesting that, if the words on that day that support their position, Turks do not act quickly, should cut while the Armenians will continue to press its losses and annul its signature on the agree- Congress to pass a resolution calling the 1915 ment in April. At the same time the United killings genocide. This puts the normalization States’ capacity to mediate was eroded after process under strain. A “hard landing” for the 2 POLICY BRIEF

Armenia–Turkey Protocols will be the cause of humanity and civilization,” and many his- recrimination and introspection on both sides. torians agree that more than one million It will reinforce an unhealthy siege mentality Armenians died. For the , in Armenia, with Armenians opposed to the most of whom are grandchildren of surviving process saying their skepticism about Turks is Anatolian Armenians, this issue defines their vindicated. Turkey’s relations with the United identity. Since the 1960s they have lobbied States and the EU will suffer, as they will blame internationally for the killings to be termed a Ankara for its role in the failed process. The genocide. Modern Turkey, the successor already troubled peace process over Nagorny to the , consistently denies Karabakh could shut down further, increas- that there was a genocidal policy toward the ing the threat of violence across the cease-fire Armenians and points out that hundreds Thomas de Waal is a senior line separating the Armenian and Azerbaijani of thousands of Ottoman Muslims died in associate in the Russia and armies. and killings during the same Eurasia Program at the There is now virtually no hope that the two period. Carnegie Endowment, protocols will be ratified soon, but there is time Turkey recognized the newly independent specializing primarily in the for the parties to agree to a “soft landing” that of Armenia after the South Caucasus region would allow each to make small steps affirm- collapsed in 1991. However, bilateral relations comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, and and ing their faith in the process. This will allow quickly became captive to Armenia’s escalat- their breakaway territories, the parties to re-engage with the substance of ing war with Ankara’s new ally Azerbaijan over as well as the wider Black the agreements at a later date—probably after the disputed territory of Nagorny Karabakh. Sea region. the 2011 Turkish elections. In April 1993 Armenian forces extended their De Waal is an acknowl- A persistent curse of the Caucasus is that campaign beyond the of edged expert on the its leaders focus on short-term agendas and Nagorny Karabakh capturing the Azerbaijani unresolved conflicts of the their own political survival and lack the will province of Kelbajar. Turkey closed its border South Caucasus: , and political space to think strategically about with Armenia in protest; seventeen years later, Nagorny Karabakh, and the long term. The Turkey–Armenia process the border remains closed. . From 2002 to briefly but heroically defied that trend. It Over the past decade, however, people- 2009 he worked as an analyst was the most positive initiative in the South to-people Armenian–Turkish relations have and project manager on the Caucasus in years and still has the potential to improved. The mayors of and conflicts in the South transform the region. If the process is to get have lobbied jointly for a re-opening of the Caucasus for the London- back on track, all involved parties, including border. Armenian tourists visit Turkey regu- based NGOs Conciliation the United States, should articulate a strate- larly, and thousands of Armenians live and Resources and the Institute gic vision for the region, and for resolution work illegally there. There are weekly for War and Peace Reporting. of the Karabakh conflict. They must set their (Armenian Airlines) flights between Yerevan He is author of the sights on larger goals several years hence and and . In Turkey the taboo about talk- authoritative book on the “make haste slowly” toward them. The cen- ing about the Armenian issue has been lifted. Karabakh conflict, Black tenary of the Armenian tragedy in 2015 is a Celebrated author Orhan Pamuk has publicly Garden: Armenia and good reference point by which to set the goal challenged his countrymen to break their Azerbaijan Through Peace of Armenian–Turkish normalization. silence on the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. and War (NYU Press, 2003), The Istanbul editor —an ethnic which has been translated A TRAGIC HISTORY Armenian and Turkish citizen—played a key into Armenian, Azeri, and Armenian–Turkish relations live under the role in bridging the divide. Dink’s assassina- Russian. His new book, The shadow of the mass deportation and killing tion in 2007 by a seventeen-year-old national- Caucasus: An Introduction of the Armenian population of Eastern Ana- ist fanatic triggered grief and outrage. At his (Oxford University Press), will be released in summer tolia by the Ottoman Young Turk regime in funeral tens of thousands of mourners walked 2010. the years following 1915. The allied powers the streets of Istanbul, some chanting “We are at the time called the killings “crimes against all Armenians.” Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap 3

This small but vocal civic movement with Turkey re-opens, imported goods will backed Turkish President Abdullah Gül as be cheaper and their volume will increase he and Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian by 13 percent over five years; transportation moved this rapprochement to a state level. Gül costs will be cut by 20 percent. Armenia will accepted Sarkisian’s invitation to an Armenia– benefit from sharing an with a Turkey soccer match in Yerevan in country that since 1996 has had a customs 2008, and the two sides began working on union with the for in measures to normalize relations. Both took non-agricultural products. advantage of a changed geopolitical environ- ment: Russia, Armenia’s strongest ally, backed The Turkey–Armenia process … was the most positive the initiative and has dramatically improved its initiative in the South Caucasus in years and still has own relationship with Turkey in recent years. the potential to transform the region. For Turkey’s governing AK Party, holding out an olive branch to Armenia fit within the For the Turkish government, a successful new “zero problems with neighbors” policy rapprochement with Armenia will allow it devised by its chief foreign policy strategist, to engage in the South Caucasus as a disin- Ahmet Davuto˘glu, who is now Turkey’s foreign terested power. Ratifying the protocols would minister. Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian also be a major step toward ending the per- also saw an opening. His legitimacy had been petual humiliation of foreign parliaments damaged by the violence which accompanied passing genocide resolutions that condemn his election in –March 2008, and his Turkey. For four decades Ankara has expended courageous decision to invite Gül to Yerevan time and resources fighting the Armenian opened a new credit line of international diaspora on this issue, yet the parliaments support. The Armenian and Turkish foreign of nineteen countries, including , ministers eventually signed two protocols on , , , , Russia, and normalizing their relations at a ceremony in , have passed resolutions on the 1915 Zurich on October 10, 2009, supported by, massacres, with most designating the killings among others, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary as genocide. Clinton. Both sides gave themselves extra However, neither government received room to maneuver by requiring their parlia- a groundswell of domestic support for the ments to ratify the Zurich protocols. Once Protocols. In Armenia, public opposition was they are ratified, the documents stipulate that not fierce: Armenia’s veteran nationalist party, diplomatic relations must be established and the ARF or Dasnaktsutiun, left the governing the Armenia–Turkey border opened within coalition in protest but did not convene more two months. than a few token street protests. But popular enthusiasm for the Protocols has not been OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS strong either. Much of the public expresses The Zurich Protocols opened up hopeful short-sighted concerns about the shops of vistas for both countries. For Armenia they Yerevan being flooded with cheap Turkish promise an end to regional isolation and goods or more general worries that Turks long-term economic transformation. Even cannot be trusted. There is a consensus that with the border closed, Turkey is Armenia’s Turkey must open the border but that nothing fifth biggest trading partner via Georgia, with should be expected from Armenia in return. an annual trade turnover of more than $200 Sarkisian faced much stronger criticism million. The country manager of the when he visited , France, and the Bank in Armenia, Aristomene Varoudakis, United States to sell the Protocols. Some crit- cites figures predicting that when the border ics within the diaspora accused him of selling 4 POLICY BRIEF

out Armenia’s by promising to recog- wording of the court’s commentary, assert- nize the current border with Turkey, agreed ing it added new conditionality to the Zurich with Moscow in 1921. Former foreign min- Protocols. The Turkish objection looked like ister Hovannissian, a major critic of the caviling over details—after all, Armenia’s pol- Protocols, described accepting it as “ratifica- icy is no secret—but it would help the normal- tion of the existing boundary as negotiated by ization process if Sarkisian would state openly the Bolsheviks and Kemalists behind Armenia’s that Armenia attaches no extra conditions to back in 1921.” Others have denounced the the protocols. pledge to establish a sub-commission “on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue THE KARABAKH FACTOR For the Turkish government, the major obsta- But popular enthusiasm for the Protocols has not cle to proceeding with normalization is the been strong either…. There is a consensus that damage this does to its strong relationship Turkey must open the border but that nothing with its Turkic ally, Azerbaijan. accuses should be expected from Armenia in return. Turkey of plotting to sell the disputed terri- tory of Nagorny Karabakh to the Armenians. with the aim to restore mutual confidence The conflict over Nagorny Karabakh between the two nations.” The wording here is the deepest problem facing the South appears to leave the Armenian government Caucasus. The dispute erupted in 1988 freedom of interpretation, but many diaspora when the Armenian majority population in Armenians reject the idea of a dialogue with Karabakh, an autonomous region inside Soviet Turkey over the events of 1915 on the grounds Azerbaijan, tried to secede from rule by Baku that it provides an opportunity to question and join Soviet Armenia. A low-level conflict what they say is a confirmed and well-docu- gradually escalated into a full inter-state war mented genocide. with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fighting This criticism caused Sarkisian, who is ended in 1994, when Armenian forces won a not a risk-taker, to proceed with caution. He military victory that saw them secure control ignored the advice of some aides to have the not just of Nagorny Karabakh itself but, par- Armenian parliament ratify the Protocols at tially or wholly, of seven Azerbaijani regions the end of 2009 (as the pro-government party around the enclave which they called a “secu- has a majority in parliament, the vote would rity zone.” Since then the Armenians have built be a foregone conclusion). Instead Sarkisian up a small, unrecognized statelet in Karabakh insisted that Armenia and Turkey ratify the behind a 110-mile-long cease-fire line, with the Protocols in tandem, a strategy that now leaves two opposing armies deployed on either side. him unable to assert any pressure on the Turkish Protracted negotiations on the conflict invari- side. Sarkisian also sought the cover of send- ably get stuck on the issue of the final issue ing the Protocols for an expert judgment by of Nagorny Karabakh itself. For the past five Armenia’s Constitutional Court, which added years the talks, mediated by the three co-chairs a new complication to the process. In of the Minsk Group of the Organization for 2010 the court ruled that the documents were Security and Co-operation in (OSCE) in accordance with Armenia’s constitution and have centered on a draft Document of Basic 1990 Declaration of Independence, Article Principles (“The ”), which 11 of which states “The Republic of Armenia seeks to resolve this issue through creative for- stands in support of the task of achieving inter- mulations. As talks drag on, Azerbaijan in par- national recognition of the 1915 Genocide ticular expresses frustration with a status quo in Ottoman Turkey and .” that leaves around one-seventh of its de jure The Turkish foreign ministry seized upon the territory under Armenian military control. Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap 5

Azerbaijan (population almost nine mil- Part of the answer is that President Gül and lion) is a junior partner to Turkey (population Prime Minister Erdo˘gan put different priori- 70 million), but has ways of influencing its ties on this issue. It appears that Gül and oth- domestic politics and is also a major supplier ers hoped to see progress on the Karabakh dis- of its gas. On a popular level solidarity between the two Turkic states is strong. Several months It is difficult for the local actors to move first to break before the Protocols were signed in October the deadlock of the Karabakh dispute. International 2009, Erdo˘gan explicitly linked the normal- players need to help them to do so by promising more ization process with Armenian concessions international resources to the resolution of the conflict. over Karabakh. Speaking in Baku in May 2009, he said, “The occupation of Nagorny pute in the months after the Zurich ceremony, Karabakh is a cause, and the closure of the giving them political cover to ratify the pro- border is an effect. Without the occupation tocols. Turkish officials, perhaps as a result of ending, the gates will not be opened.” So why undue U.S. assurances, had an overly optimis- did Turkey commit itself to opening the bor- tic impression of how well the Karabakh peace der with Armenia in a document that never negotiations were going. When the officials explicitly mentions the Karabakh conflict? learned in 2009 that the talks were

MAP Nagorny Karabakh: The Heart of the Matter? GEORGI A RUSSI A Sheki Quba

Qazakh Kür () Mingechaur Reservoir

Vanadzor Ganja Shemakhi Kür (Kura) Yevlakh Shaumian AZERBAIJA N Terter Sevan Yerevan ARMENI A Kelbajar Aghdam Khojali NAGORNY TURKEY KARABAKH Fizuli Hadrut axes A r Z E R River A B A Jebrail I Kubatly J A Kafan Nakhichevan N Zone under Armenian military control Julfa NAKHICHEVAN Zangelan The Line of Contact AUTONOMOUS River A r REPUBLIC axes Goris-Stepanakert Road 0 25 50 Kilometers IRA N 0 25 50 Miles

Credit: Christopher Robinson 6 POLICY BRIEF

deadlocked, they found themselves boxed in. It is difficult for the local actors to move More broadly, Turkish officials have dis- first to break the deadlock of the Karabakh dis- played naivety about the Karabakh issue. They pute. International players need to help them have derived their information on the conflict to do so by promising more international from Azerbaijani sources. They underesti- resources to the resolution of the conflict. mated how fundamental the Karabakh ques- Rather than seek to bend the will of the parties tion is to Armenians, believing that Yerevan even further, it makes sense for the American, could be prevailed upon to cede several of French, and Russian mediators of the Minsk the occupied regions around Karabakh in Group to declare a pause in the talks over the exchange for the re-opening of the Armenia– Basic Principles and work on other areas of the peace process that will underpin a final agree- In contrast to the healthy Armenian–Turkish civil ment. In contrast to the healthy Armenian– society dialogue, there is virtually no “Track II” Turkish civil society dialogue, there is virtu- between Armenians and . There ally no “Track II” between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. There is also very little planning is also very little planning for the post-conflict for the post-conflict settlement—the de-min- settlement—the de-mining, reconstruction, economic ing, reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, rehabilitation, and security measures that will be and security measures that will be required required to make a peace work on the ground. to make a peace work on the ground. The European Union is well-suited to play this Turkey border. Yet there is almost no chance latter role, as it did in the , but thus that Sarkisian, a Karabakh Armenian, would far it has been shut out of the overly secre- give up conquered territory for the sake of the tive and narrow Karabakh peace process. A Turkish border. Even if he wanted to—which third that needs more attention is the is doubtful—domestic opinion simply would Line of Contact dividing the Armenian and not allow it. Azerbaijani armies. The cease-fire along it is Azerbaijan sees the Armenia–Turkey issue basically self-regulating, monitored by just six through its own fearful spectacles: It worries OSCE officials with a weak mandate. In 2009, that opening the Armenia–Turkey border a relatively quiet year, there were nineteen would remove a lever on Armenia and make casualties along the cease-fire line. This year, it more intransigent in the negotiations over with high-level talks stalled, there have already Nagorny Karabakh. Many Armenians prob- been two bad shooting incidents. ably share this view and were the border with As a full settlement on Karabakh remains Turkey to open, in the short term Armenians elusive, the two sides can also consider smaller might seek to consolidate the status quo steps that will build confidence and change in and around Karabakh. Yet the longer- a negative dynamic into a positive one. One term dynamic is almost certain to work the potential “win-win” area is the Azerbaijani other way: with its border to the West open, exclave of Nakhichevan, which is separated Armenia would begin to lose its siege men- from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian ter- tality and be more ready to give up occupied ritory. In Soviet times, Nakhichevan was a land in order to emerge from international major junction on the Moscow– rail- isolation. Azerbaijan would likewise be under way. It relied on neighboring Armenia for gas, pressure to soften its aggressive posture on the electricity, and railroad connections. As the Karabakh issue and join Turkey in seeking Karabakh conflict escalated, Armenia cut off to normalize relations with Yerevan. Turkey all supplies to Nakhichevan, leaving the exclave would enter the South Caucasus as a neutral in a desperate condition. All sides would win if player and begin to exert a more positive role. Armenia were to agree to open up communi- Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap 7

cations and rebuild shared infrastructure with honoring both the large Armenian-American Nakhichevan in tandem with the opening of community and a strategic relationship with the Armenia–Turkey border. Azerbaijani citi- Turkey. Unfortunately the problem of how to zens would benefit in a tangible way; Armenia would have secured the opening of its western As it seeks to help bridge … [Armenian–Turkish] border without ceding captured territory, and differences, the United States is hobbled by what Turkey could hail the initiative as a success. could be called the “April 24 question,” the issue of how to describe the 1915 tragedy while honoring THE ROAD TO 2015 The current Armenia–Turkey crisis needs both both the large Armenian-American community and a short-term fixes and a longer-term strategy. strategic relationship with Turkey. Turkey has dragged its feet and now needs to make goodwill gestures toward Armenia to describe a great historical tragedy has devolved keep the process alive. Possible gestures include: into grubby political bargaining. On April 24, 2009, President Barack Obama adopted a dig- n An opening of the Armenia–Turkey border nified formula, foregoing the wordgenocide in for noncommercial travelers. favor of the most common Armenian phrase n A limited opening of a zone next to the to describe the tragedy: the meds yeghern, or Armenia–Turkey border that contains the “great catastrophe.” Turkish liberal intellectu- medieval Armenian of , now just als have begun to use the same phrase—and inside Turkish territory. This would allow might have been Obama’s inspiration. Many Armenian tourists to visit the ancient site. of them have taken up the cause of the late Hrant Dink, arguing that Turkey must come n A Turkish initiative to fully open and digi- to its own reckoning with what happened to tize the Ottoman archives containing the its missing Armenians, without pressure from official Ottoman records of the events of foreign parliaments. 1915 to 1921. In order to move away from this annual n A Turkish government initiative to invite agony, it makes sense to reframe the diaspora Armenians to visit the ancient Armenian–Turkish issue within a longer Armenian heritage sites of . perspective. The coming centenary of the Armenian holocaust in five years’ time in 2015 n The opening of a Turkish Airlines route and the growing debate within Turkey on the between Istanbul and Yerevan. “Armenian question” gives impetus to this Although the Armenian leadership will approach. In 2015—whether the Turks like it maintain that the Karabakh issue and nor- or not—the world will mark the anniversary malization of relations with Turkey are not of the Armenian tragedy. The president could formally linked, Yerevan can allay Turkish deliver a message on April 24, 2010, in which The Carnegie Endowment does concerns on this issue by pledging to end the he notes that the centenary commemorations not take institutional positions on isolation of Nakhichevan once the Turkish– are now five years away and pledges that, if public policy issues; the views Armenian border opens. The Minsk Group still in office, he will join in those events (per- represented here are the author’s mediators can play their part by issuing a new haps even in Yerevan), but in which he also own and do not necessarily reflect joint statement that pledges extra interna- promises the Turks a little peace until then by the views of the Endowment, its tional resources to resolution of the conflict. affirming his faith in the internal debate in staff, or its trustees. As it seeks to help bridge these differences, Turkey. Obama could say, “We hope to mark the United States is hobbled by what could this tragic date with our Turkish friends, and © 2010 Carnegie Endowment for be called the “April 24 question,” the issue not without them,” and aspire to be a catalyst International Peace. All rights n of how to describe the 1915 tragedy while for Armenian–Turkish reconciliation. reserved. www.CarnegieEndowment.org

The Carnegie Endowment RESOURCES for International Peace is a Visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs for these and other publications. private, nonprofit organiza- , Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, tion dedicated to advancing Thomas de Waal, (New York: New York University Press, 2003). cooperation between

nations and promoting active Armenia and Turkey: The Truce in Need of a Rescue, Henri J. Barkey and Thomas de international engagement by Waal, Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/05/opinion/la-oe- the United States. Founded barkey5-2010feb05. in 1910, Carnegie is nonparti- Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation, san and dedicated to achiev- David L. Phillips (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005). ing practical results. Building on the successful establish- Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, International Crisis Group, Europe Report no. 199, April 14, 2009, ­http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/ ment of the Carnegie 199_turkey_and_armenia___opening_minds_opening_borders.pdf. Moscow Center, the Endow- ment has added operations Unlocking Nakhichevan, the Gate of Orient, Lifting the on Nakhichevan in , , and Brus- in the Context of the Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, TEPAV Policy Note, November 2009, http://www.tepav.org.tr/eng/admin/dosyabul/upload/PN_ sels to its existing offices in Sark_Kapisi_Nahcivanin_Kilidinin_Acillmasi_ENG.pdf. Washington and Moscow.

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POLICY BRIEF 87