DOCSLIB.ORG

Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap POLICY CARNEGIE BRIEF ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 87 A p r i l 2 0 1 0 Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap THOMAS DE WAA l Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program S u m m a r y n Armenia and Turkey have embarked on a historic normalization process, but it is now in trouble and the United States needs to take a lead in rescuing it. n If Armenia and Turkey succeed in opening their closed border it will transform the South Caucasus region. But Azerbaijan, Turkey’s ally and the losing side to Armenia in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, has understandable fears. The international community must invest more resources in resolving the Karabakh conflict and breaking the regional deadlock it has created. n The annual debate over the use of the word genocide to describe the fate of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 has turned into an ugly bargaining process. It is time to take a longer view. President Obama should look ahead to the centenary of the tragedy in 2015 and encourage Turks to take part in commemorating the occasion. THE ArMENiA–TUrKEY the House International Affairs Committee prOTOCOlS voted on March 4 to call the 1915 killings In October 2009 Armenia and Turkey began genocide, causing Turkey to recall its ambas- a historic rapprochement, signing two pro- sador from Washington. Turkey’s outspoken tocols on normalizing their relations that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan fur- showed them a way to escape their tragic ther undermined hopes for normalization past. In 2010, the process has run into trou- in a March 17 BBC interview in which he ble. Ankara appears highly unlikely to ratify threatened up to 100,000 Armenians work- the protocols in parliament, saying it will ing illegally in Turkey with deportation. not do so without progress in the Nagorny This looming crisis will reach a head by Karabakh conflict between Armenia and April 24, the date commemorated as Armenian Azerbaijan—even though that conflict is not Genocide Day. Both Armenians and Turks explicitly mentioned in the agreements. The will seek to influence President Obama to use Armenian leadership is suggesting that, if the words on that day that support their position, Turks do not act quickly, Yerevan should cut while the Armenians will continue to press its losses and annul its signature on the agree- Congress to pass a resolution calling the 1915 ment in April. At the same time the United killings genocide. This puts the normalization States’ capacity to mediate was eroded after process under strain. A “hard landing” for the 2 POLICY BRIEF Armenia–Turkey Protocols will be the cause of humanity and civilization,” and many his- recrimination and introspection on both sides. torians agree that more than one million It will reinforce an unhealthy siege mentality Armenians died. For the Armenian diaspora, in Armenia, with Armenians opposed to the most of whom are grandchildren of surviving process saying their skepticism about Turks is Anatolian Armenians, this issue defines their vindicated. Turkey’s relations with the United identity. Since the 1960s they have lobbied States and the EU will suffer, as they will blame internationally for the killings to be termed a Ankara for its role in the failed process. The genocide. Modern Turkey, the successor state already troubled peace process over Nagorny to the Ottoman Empire, consistently denies Karabakh could shut down further, increas- that there was a genocidal policy toward the ing the threat of violence across the cease-fire Armenians and points out that hundreds Thomas de Waal is a senior line separating the Armenian and Azerbaijani of thousands of Ottoman Muslims died in associate in the Russia and armies. deportations and killings during the same Eurasia Program at the There is now virtually no hope that the two period. Carnegie Endowment, protocols will be ratified soon, but there is time Turkey recognized the newly independent specializing primarily in the for the parties to agree to a “soft landing” that Republic of Armenia after the Soviet Union South Caucasus region would allow each to make small steps affirm- collapsed in 1991. However, bilateral relations comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and ing their faith in the process. This will allow quickly became captive to Armenia’s escalat- their breakaway territories, the parties to re-engage with the substance of ing war with Ankara’s new ally Azerbaijan over as well as the wider Black the agreements at a later date—probably after the disputed territory of Nagorny Karabakh. Sea region. the 2011 Turkish elections. In April 1993 Armenian forces extended their De Waal is an acknowl- A persistent curse of the Caucasus is that military campaign beyond the borders of edged expert on the its leaders focus on short-term agendas and Nagorny Karabakh capturing the Azerbaijani unresolved conflicts of the their own political survival and lack the will province of Kelbajar. Turkey closed its border South Caucasus: Abkhazia, and political space to think strategically about with Armenia in protest; seventeen years later, Nagorny Karabakh, and the long term. The Turkey–Armenia process the border remains closed. South Ossetia. From 2002 to briefly but heroically defied that trend. It Over the past decade, however, people- 2009 he worked as an analyst was the most positive initiative in the South to-people Armenian–Turkish relations have and project manager on the Caucasus in years and still has the potential to improved. The mayors of Kars and Gyumri conflicts in the South transform the region. If the process is to get have lobbied jointly for a re-opening of the Caucasus for the London- back on track, all involved parties, including border. Armenian tourists visit Turkey regu- based NGOs Conciliation the United States, should articulate a strate- larly, and thousands of Armenians live and Resources and the Institute gic vision for the region, and for resolution work illegally there. There are weekly Armavia for War and Peace Reporting. of the Karabakh conflict. They must set their (Armenian Airlines) flights between Yerevan He is author of the sights on larger goals several years hence and and Istanbul. In Turkey the taboo about talk- authoritative book on the “make haste slowly” toward them. The cen- ing about the Armenian issue has been lifted. Karabakh conflict, Black tenary of the Armenian tragedy in 2015 is a Celebrated author Orhan Pamuk has publicly Garden: Armenia and good reference point by which to set the goal challenged his countrymen to break their Azerbaijan Through Peace of Armenian–Turkish normalization. silence on the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. and War (NYU Press, 2003), The Istanbul editor Hrant Dink—an ethnic which has been translated A TrAGiC HiSTOrY Armenian and Turkish citizen—played a key into Armenian, Azeri, and Armenian–Turkish relations live under the role in bridging the divide. Dink’s assassina- Russian. His new book, The shadow of the mass deportation and killing tion in 2007 by a seventeen-year-old national- Caucasus: An Introduction of the Armenian population of Eastern Ana- ist fanatic triggered grief and outrage. At his (Oxford University Press), will be released in summer tolia by the Ottoman Young Turk regime in funeral tens of thousands of mourners walked 2010. the years following 1915. The allied powers the streets of Istanbul, some chanting “We are at the time called the killings “crimes against all Armenians.” ARMENIA AND TURKEY: BRIDGING THE GAP 3 This small but vocal civic movement with Turkey re-opens, imported goods will backed Turkish President Abdullah Gül as be cheaper and their volume will increase he and Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian by 13 percent over five years; transportation moved this rapprochement to a state level. Gül costs will be cut by 20 percent. Armenia will accepted Sarkisian’s invitation to an Armenia– benefit from sharing an open border with a Turkey soccer match in Yerevan in September country that since 1996 has had a customs 2008, and the two sides began working on union with the European Union for trade in measures to normalize relations. Both took non-agricultural products. advantage of a changed geopolitical environ- ment: Russia, Armenia’s strongest ally, backed The Turkey–Armenia process … was the most positive the initiative and has dramatically improved its initiative in the South Caucasus in years and still has own relationship with Turkey in recent years. the potential to transform the region. For Turkey’s governing AK Party, holding out an olive branch to Armenia fit within the For the Turkish government, a successful new “zero problems with neighbors” policy rapprochement with Armenia will allow it devised by its chief foreign policy strategist, to engage in the South Caucasus as a disin- Ahmet Davuto˘glu, who is now Turkey’s foreign terested power. Ratifying the protocols would minister. Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian also be a major step toward ending the per- also saw an opening. His legitimacy had been petual humiliation of foreign parliaments damaged by the violence which accompanied passing genocide resolutions that condemn his election in February–March 2008, and his Turkey. For four decades Ankara has expended courageous decision to invite Gül to Yerevan time and resources fighting the Armenian opened a new credit line of international diaspora on this issue, yet the parliaments support. The Armenian and Turkish foreign of nineteen countries, including Canada, ministers eventually signed two protocols on France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Russia, and normalizing their relations at a ceremony in Sweden, have passed resolutions on the 1915 Zurich on October 10, 2009, supported by, massacres, with most designating the killings among others, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary as genocide.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Doing Business Guide in EMEIA: Payroll Operations
    Payroll Operations in Europe, the Middle East, India and Africa — essential compliance and reporting considerations Introduction This booklet contains market-by-market newly established, stand-alone guidance1 on key HR payroll matters to operations. Where the EMEIA operation be considered as you expand your is a regional headquarters or a holding operations across EMEIA. company for foreign subsidiaries, or if In our experience, careful consideration there are existing operations in EMEIA, of these matters at the outset is the other considerations must be taken into most effective way of avoiding any account. issues and ensuring an optimal setup In all situations, we recommend that you structure of your business and seek specific professional advice from employees in new EMEIA markets. the contacts listed in each chapter. They This booklet is general in nature and not will take into consideration your specific to be relied on as professional advice. circumstances and objectives. Furthermore, the chapters focus on NB: This guide will work best with Adobe Acrobat Pro. 1 This information was compiled in July 2019. 2 Payroll Operations in Europe, the Middle East, India and Africa — essential compliance and reporting considerations EY contacts Payroll Operate Services Sheri Sullivan Michael Van Den Brand EY Global Payroll Operate Leader EY EMEIA Payroll Operate Leader T: +17168435050 T: +34 933 666 340 E: [email protected] E: [email protected] Country Payroll leader Email address Armenia Kamo Karapetyan [email protected]
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing the Development- Displacement Nexus in Turkey
    Assessing the Development- Displacement Nexus in Turkey Working Paper Fulya Memişoğlu November 2018 Assessing the Development- Displacement Nexus in Turkey Working Paper Acknowledgements This report is an output of the project Study on Refugee Protection and Development: Assessing the Development-Displacement Nexus in Regional Protection Policies, funded by the OPEC Fund for Inter- national Development (OFID) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). The author and ICMPD gratefully acknowledge OFID’s support. While no fieldwork was conducted for this report, the author thanks the Turkey Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Development, ICMPD Tur- key and the Refugee Studies Centre of Oxford University for their valuable inputs to previous research, which contributed to the author’s work. The author also thanks Maegan Hendow for her valuable feedback on this report. International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) Gonzagagasse 1 A-1010 Vienna www.icmpd.com International Centre for Migration Policy Development Vienna, Austria All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission of the copyright owners. The content of this study does not reflect the official opinion of OFID or ICMPD. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the study lies entirely with the author. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS \ 3 Contents Acknowledgements 3 Acronyms 6 1. Introduction 7 1.1 The Syrian crisis and Turkey 7 2. Refugee populations in Turkey 9 2.1 Country overview 9 2.2 Evolution and dynamics of the Syrian influx in Turkey 11 2.3 Characteristics of the Syrian refugee population 15 2.4 Legal status issues 17 2.5 Other relevant refugee flows 19 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Border Security: the Role of the U.S. Border Patrol
    Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol Chad C. Haddal Specialist in Immigration Policy August 11, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32562 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol Summary The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation’s first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency’s adoption of “Prevention Through Deterrence” as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy.
    [Show full text]
  • H. Khachatrian. Economic Impacts of Re-Opening the Armenian-Turkish
    Economic Impacts of Re-Opening the Armenian-Turkish Border By Haroutiun Khachatrian 1 The economic consequences of the possible re-opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will appear quickly and will mean a rapid improvement for both countries, but especially for Armenia. The current economic relationships between Armenia and Turkey can be characterized in short as follows: Turkey exports goods to Armenia worth some 260 million dollars a year, whereas imports of Armenian goods to Turkey are worth a mere 1.9 million dollars (data of 2008). In other words, the Armenian market is open for Turkish goods, while the opposite is not true, as Turkey applies a de-facto embargo (not declared officially) to imports from Armenia. All of this cargo transfer is chanelled through third countries, mainly Georgia. This shows the first possible benefit for Armenia once the de-facto embargo is lifted. The huge Turkish market, a country of 70 million, would become available for Armenian exporters. Meanwhile, today the immediate markets available for Armenian goods are only the market of Armenia itself (3.2 million people) and Georgia (4.5 million), both being poor countries which restricts the volume of the market. Two other neighbors of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran are practically inaccessible for Armenian exports, the former for political reasons and the latter because of high trade barriers. Along these lines, opening the Turkish market to Armenia would greatly improve the investment rating of Armenia as the limited volumes of markets nearby make it a risky site for investments, today. 1 The author is an analyst and editor with the Yerevan based news agency Noyan Tapan.
    [Show full text]
  • Open Or Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights Elizabeth M
    Kentucky Law Journal Volume 96 | Issue 2 Article 3 2007 Open or Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights Elizabeth M. Bruch Valparaiso University Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Bruch, Elizabeth M. (2007) "Open or Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 96 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol96/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Open or Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights Elizabeth M. Bruch' "We are living in a time when civil rights, meaning basic human rights, are being reformulated, redefined, and extended to new categories of people." Roger Nett (1971) "We should not be afraid of open borders." 3 Bill Ong Hing (2006) INTRODUCTION O PEN borders have not been a popular idea in the United States for at least a century.4 Since the federal government became involved in immigration regulation in the late 1800s, the history of immigration policy has generally been one of increasing restrictions and limitations.5 I Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Centre for Feminist Legal Studies, Law Faculty, University of British Columbia.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989
    FORUM The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989 ✣ Commentaries by Michael Kraus, Anna M. Cienciala, Margaret K. Gnoinska, Douglas Selvage, Molly Pucci, Erik Kulavig, Constantine Pleshakov, and A. Ross Johnson Reply by Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana, eds. Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. 563 pp. $133.00 hardcover, $54.99 softcover, $54.99 e-book. EDITOR’S NOTE: In late 2013 the publisher Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & Littlefield, put out the book Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989, edited by Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana. The book consists of twenty-four essays by leading scholars who survey the Cold War in East-Central Europe from beginning to end. East-Central Europe was where the Cold War began in the mid-1940s, and it was also where the Cold War ended in 1989–1990. Hence, even though research on the Cold War and its effects in other parts of the world—East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Africa—has been extremely interesting and valuable, a better understanding of events in Europe is essential to understand why the Cold War began, why it lasted so long, and how it came to an end. A good deal of high-quality scholarship on the Cold War in East-Central Europe has existed for many years, and the literature on this topic has bur- geoned in the post-Cold War period.
    [Show full text]
  • Passports Into Credit Cards: on the Borders and Spaces of Neoliberal Citizenship
    Passports into credit cards: On the borders and spaces of neoliberal citizenship Matthew Sparke University of Washington Forthcoming in Joel Migdal ed. Boundaries and Belonging (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Copyright protected under Matthew Sparke. Permission to cite may be directed to the Author. "We have included in our design the necessary technological platforms to ensure that the card will have a useful life of approximately five years. Most importantly for commercial users today, it will sport the ubiquitous magnetic strip which the government will not use, making it completely available to the commercial sector. We have also included a microchip in the design as we will require some of the available storage space for automated inspections. We will make the remainder of the chip’s storage available to our commercial partners. We think this is especially significant because of the recent announcement by Visa, MasterCard and Europay of their joint specification for chip- based credit cards. To further the appeal of this idea to the commercial sector, we will also allow cards prepared by our partners to display the logo of the partner. This would create in the mind of the card holder an instant link between our high technology application and the sponsoring corporation. Just think of the possibilities for a frequent traveler pulling out a card bearing the IBM or United Airlines logo, for example. Now potentiate that image by seeing the card as a charge card, an airline ticket, a medium by which you access telecommunications systems, an electronic bank, and/or any other card- based application you can conceive." Ronald Hays1 1 These plans for a new kind of passport using credit card and biometric technology are not the plans of a banker, a commercial web systems designer, or some other corporate planner.
    [Show full text]
  • Bordering Two Unions: Northern Ireland and Brexit
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics de Mars, Sylvia; Murray, Colin; O'Donoghue, Aiofe; Warwick, Ben Book — Published Version Bordering two unions: Northern Ireland and Brexit Policy Press Shorts: Policy & Practice Provided in Cooperation with: Bristol University Press Suggested Citation: de Mars, Sylvia; Murray, Colin; O'Donoghue, Aiofe; Warwick, Ben (2018) : Bordering two unions: Northern Ireland and Brexit, Policy Press Shorts: Policy & Practice, ISBN 978-1-4473-4622-7, Policy Press, Bristol, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv56fh0b This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190846 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen
    [Show full text]
  • Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States
    The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States Updated April 16, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33105 SUMMARY RL33105 The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and April 16, 2021 Relations with the United States Derek E. Mix Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United Specialist in European States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, Affairs including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; a large and mutually beneficial economic relationship; and extensive cooperation on foreign policy and security issues. The UK’s January 2020 withdrawal from the European Union (EU), often referred to as Brexit, is likely to change its international role and outlook in ways that affect U.S.-UK relations. Conservative Party Leads UK Government The government of the UK is led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the Conservative Party. Brexit has dominated UK domestic politics since the 2016 referendum on whether to leave the EU. In an early election held in December 2019—called in order to break a political deadlock over how and when the UK would exit the EU—the Conservative Party secured a sizeable parliamentary majority, winning 365 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons. The election results paved the way for Parliament’s approval of a withdrawal agreement negotiated between Johnson’s government and the EU. UK Is Out of the EU, Concludes Trade and Cooperation Agreement On January 31, 2020, the UK’s 47-year EU membership came to an end.
    [Show full text]
  • Energy-Efficien Buildings in Armenia: a Roadmap
    Energy-Efficient Buildings in Armenia: A Roadmap Insights and pathways for better buildings 2020-2040 Energy-Efficient Buildings in Armenia: A Roadmap Insights and pathways for better buildings 2020-2040 Energy-Efficient Buildings in Armenia: A Roadmap Table of contents Table of contents Executive summary ........................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Status and key indicators .................................................................................................................. 6 Influencing factors ............................................................................................................................. 9 Deploying efficient technologies ...................................................................................................... 15 Getting future-ready......................................................................................................................... 25 Towards a roadmap for Armenia’s buildings ................................................................................... 29 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 35 References and resources .............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia
    Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia February 2021 Detailed Methodology • The survey was conducted on behalf of “International Republican Institute’s” Center for Insights in Survey Research by Breavis (represented by IPSC LLC). • Data was collected throughout Armenia between February 8 and February 16, 2021, through phone interviews, with respondents selected by random digit dialing (RDD) probability sampling of mobile phone numbers. • The sample consisted of 1,510 permanent residents of Armenia aged 18 and older. It is representative of the population with access to a mobile phone, which excludes approximately 1.2 percent of adults. • Sampling frame: Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia. Weighting: Data weighted for 11 regional groups, age, gender and community type. • The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.5 points for the full sample. • The response rate was 26 percent which is similar to the surveys conducted in August-September 2020. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. 2 Weighted (Disaggregated) Bases Disaggregate Disaggregation Category Base Share 18-35 years old n=563 37% Age groups 36-55 years old n=505 34% 56+ years old n=442 29% Male n=689 46% Gender Female n=821 54% Yerevan n=559 37% Community type Urban n=413 27% Rural n=538 36% Primary or secondary n=537 36% Education Vocational n=307 20% Higher n=665 44% Single n=293 19% Marital status Married n=1,059 70% Widowed or divorced n=155 10% Up
    [Show full text]
  • 'Populism': Armenia's “Velvet Revolution”
    The Armenian Studies Program and the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies present the 42nd Educator Outreach Conference Authoritarianism, Democratization, and ‘Populism’: Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” in Perspective Saturday, May 1, 2021 Livestream on YouTube University of California, Berkeley From end March to early May 2018, a series of peaceful protests and demonstration led to the resignation of Prime Minister (PM) Serzh Sargsyan, whom the then ruling Republican Party he chaired had newly nominated for that office. Having completed his two terms as President, from 2008 to 2018, Serzh Sargsyan’s attempt to remain in power became obvious. This attempt also made it evident that the amended 2015 Constitution, which he had promoted to invigorate democratization by shifting power from the office of the President to the Parliament and the office of the Prime Minister, was merely a ploy to extend his rule. It was also the proverbial “last straw that broke the camel’s back.” A kleptocratic, semi-authoritarian regime that appeared to control all the levers of power and of the economy suddenly, and unexpectedly, collapsed. This regime change—which the leader of the protests and incoming new prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, referred to as a “Velvet Revolution”—was peaceful, something unusual for a post-Soviet republic. Subsequent parliamentary elections brought to power a new generation, younger deputies mostly between the ages of twenty-five to forty. A similar generation change also characterized the formation of the government. Youth, however, also means inexperience as almost none of the new deputies and ministers had held any political position in the past.
    [Show full text]