State Learning and Role Playing

State Learning State Playing and Role International environmentalin thecooperation Arctic Council SANDRA ENGSTRAND UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY MALMÖ AND LUND

SANDRA ENGSTRAND State Learning and Role Playing

817536185 789177 9 Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund 2018 NORDIC SWAN ECOLABEL 3041 0903 0903 3041 ECOLABEL SWAN NORDIC 2018 Lund Media-Tryck, by Printed - -

ISSN 0460-0037 LUND UNIVERSITYLUND MALMÖ UNIVERSITYMALMÖ ISBN 978-91-7753-618-5 ISBN 978-91-7104-908-7 Faculty of Social Sciences Lund Political Studies 190 Faculty of Culture and Society Malmö Studies in Global Politics 4 tion,which turns towards the Arctic give to an illustration. Here, the effect from global warming is big and ice-melting rapid, while economic opportunities grow as natural resources, oil and like gas, are lying increasingly bare. The theme is addressed in a case study of the Arctic and Council, more specifically through two negotiation processes dedicated Arctic to oil spill prevention and reduction of short-lived climate pollutants. It is suggested that(the potential international for) cooperation on environmental protectionhas its base in more things than recognized a value of environmental norms per se. The author sheds light on how interacting states, through engaging in arguing and com munication, learn about their social roles, as well Not as their only ‘wants’. nationalideas and interests are here important, but others’ expectations.In this book, it is explored how wishespreserve to its social role in a group, and be to perceived as an Arctic are also drivers ‘cooperator,’ for state learning of norms. environmental State LearningState Playing and Role International environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council How do states learn of environmental This norms? is the theme of this disserta

State Learning and Role Playing

International environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council

Sandra Engstrand

Lund Political Studies 190 Malmö Studies in Global Politics 4

Lund University⏐Faculty of Social Sciences⏐Department of Political Science Malmö University⏐Faculty of Culture and Society⏐Department of Global Political Studies

ISBN, Lund University: 978-91-7753-618-5 (print), 978-91-7753-619-2 (pdf) ISBN, Malmö University: 978-91-7104-908-7 (print) 978-91-7104-909-4 (pdf) ISSN: 0460-0037

Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University Lund 2018

Till Mattias, August och Nils

3 Table of Contents

Acknowledgement ...... 7 1. Introduction ...... 9 What the reader should expect ...... 9 Situating the project ...... 10 Objective, aim, and research questions ...... 18 Learning in International Relations ...... 20 Contributions ...... 25 2. Methodology and research design ...... 29 The theatrical act of cooperation ...... 29 Introducing the setting: the Arctic Council ...... 30 Selection of cases ...... 34 Methods of text analysis and interviewing ...... 37 Conclusion ...... 45 3. Investigating learning by theorizing roles ...... 47 States know what they want, do they? ...... 47 Roles: a tracking tool for learning ...... 51 Symbolic Interactionism ...... 57 Learning through (common) understanding ...... 60 4. Cooperation and role performance in the Arctic Council ...... 65 Learning – movement with direction ...... 65 Arctic Council development: three time periods ...... 72 Period I – 1996-2005: Science as a regional attention maker ...... 74 Period II – 2006-2013: Political cooperation ...... 75 Period III – 2014-present: Cooperation under insecurity ...... 78 Conclusions: on course for Arctic cooperation? ...... 81 Understanding patterns of behavior as role performance ...... 82 Canada – Protector ...... 85 Denmark – Kid-brother realist ...... 90 Finland – Reserved team player ...... 94

4 Iceland – Follower with ambitions ...... 97 Norway – Restless know-how leader ...... 101 Russia – Responsive informant ...... 107 Sweden – Teacher on demand ...... 113 The United States – Innate leader ...... 118 The stability of roles in the Arctic Council cooperation ...... 124 5. Negotiating oil spill prevention – higher expectations, lower ambitions ...... 127 Preventing oil spills through an exchange of experiences ...... 127 Oil pollution and AC cooperation on its prevention: a background ...... 128 TFOPP: reaching a consensus through (avoiding) arguing ...... 134 Common understanding on the need for cooperation ...... 135 Arguing, and the many different worldviews of oil pollution prevention ...... 139 Continuity and change in role performances ...... 147 Confirmative role behavior by Finland and Sweden ...... 147 A Canadian attempt for alter-casting? ...... 148 Norwegian role incoherence, or, ‘who should do the role – is it Me or Me?’ ... 151 Conclusion: a process dedicated (to show) cooperativeness ...... 153 6. Reducing black carbon and methane – high ambitions, lower expectations ...... 155 The AC as oriented toward actions on emission reductions ...... 155 A background on the Arctic Council’s climate change work ...... 156 Introducing black carbon and methane ...... 159 TFBCM: reaching a consensus through arguing ...... 162 Common understanding on soot, as well as ‘staying put’ ...... 162 Arguing on commitment, sector reductions, and the AC dramaturgy ...... 166 Continuity and change in role performances ...... 172 When Me confirms I: the leaders – Norway, Sweden and the U.S...... 172 A problematic situation allowing for Denmark’s I to decide ...... 175 Feeling misunderstood? Two territorial giants reconsidered ...... 177 Conclusion: a process attentive to climate prescriptions ...... 181 7. Conclusion ...... 183 Roles and their uncovering potential for learning ...... 184 Roles are stable, but flexible ...... 185 Understanding – the mechanism activating role-flexing ...... 188 The correlation between roles and learning ...... 192 Learning about the Arctic environment: restrained progression ...... 195 What is there to learn then? ...... 200 References ...... 203 Appendix ...... 237

5 List of abbreviations

AC Arctic Council ACIA Arctic Climate Impact Assessment AEPS Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program O&G Oil and Gas (industry) PP Permanent Participant SAO Senior Arctic Official SLCP/-F Short-lived Climate Pollutants/-Forcers TFBCM Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane TFOPP Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention WG Working Group

6 Acknowledgement

They say a Greenland shark could live for 400 years. Apparently, the combination of cold Arctic waters and slow motions makes wonders for longevity. While writing this dissertation, one of these fascinating and giant old-timers has hung next to me. Framed, I should say. Having her peeking at me has given a much-needed perspective on time: writing a dissertation takes time, but after all not that much time. (Oh yes, I admit, more than once I have searched high and low for an end in sight.) However, the true reason for the picture on my wall is another, much more important. Imagine, there are sharks currently swimming around that swam already in the pre- industrialized era. The speed and the consequences of human-induced climate change are in that comparison even more mind-boggling. For me, writing this dissertation, the Greenland shark has served as a personal memento on just that. And then, all of a sudden, this book was finished. For this, I owe many people a big thank you. First of all, I am grateful to my supervisors, Mikael Spång and Rikard Bengtsson; over the years you have untiringly guided and commented, questioned and suggested, always in a constructive and friendly manner. Mikael, my main supervisor, an additional thanks to you for not only contributing with all your clever thoughts, but for genuinely caring, on different levels, for how the work has proceeded. It has meant a lot to me. A warm thanks to Karin Bäckstrand, Ole Elgström, Christian Fernandez, Maria Hedlund, Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir, Lisa Justesen, Johannes Stripple, and Helena Wegend Lindberg who all kindly have agreed to read drafts of this manuscript, (some of you more than once,) providing me with so many insightful comments on improvements as well as suggestions on where to take the manuscript next. A special thanks to Magnus Ericson who, in a way, started all of this; for quite some time ago, you made me start to think of perhaps someday pursue doctoral studies, and you also introduced me to teaching. Moreover, I wish to thank all my other colleagues at the Department of Global Political Studies at Malmö University, and the Department of Political Science at Lund University, for having contributed positively to this book; either by having a direct bearing on its shape and content, or by – just as importantly – being friendly and helpful people in big and small ways. Especially, I would like to mention Annika Bergman Rosamond, Josef Chaib, Emil Edenborg, Mats Fred, Peter Hallberg, Frida Hallqvist, Kristin Järvstad, Johan Modée, Tom Nilsson, Bo Petersson, Maja Povrzanovic Frykman, Jakob Skovgaard, Michael Strange, Ulrika Waaranperä, and Fariborz Zelli.

7 I am also grateful to Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswärds minne, which granted extra funding to conduct the interviews. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the people who accepted to be interviewed for the study conducted in this book; a sincere thanks to all of you for participating, and for generously sharing your thoughts and experiences. On a personal level, thanks Eva for bringing me on vacation; Jan and Gun, for cheering me on; Jesper, for helping me to clarify some of the ‘technical stuff’; and Jonna, for caring so much. Brithel, my mother, you have always provided me with a well-needed perspective on things (and life), and this time would be no exception. Your big heart, dedicated support and, whenever needed, encouragement, have been much appreciated and of great help. Lastly, my family; August and Nils, the two of you are a constant source of joy to me, turning also bad (writing) days into good ones! (And boys, I agree; the cover picture would have looked much prettier with you on it…) Mattias, how lucky I am who have had you by my side during all of this; thanks for your company, for your comforting solution-mindedness, and for your ever-failing patience. Almost ever-failing; if not before, I knew it was time to drop the pen when even you said, “have you perhaps worked enough on that book now?” So, this specific learning experience has come to an end, and something new begins. Tack alla tre för att ni finns hos mig, och gör allting så mycket bättre.

Häljarp, March 2018

8 1.Introduction

What the reader should expect

Arctic relations could have been a drama of conflicts – over resources and over territory. Due to climate change, the Arctic is rapidly getting warmer, where ice turns into water and permafrost into land erosion, and where the everyday lives of the inhabitants become increasingly difficult. Yet, due to climate change, more commercial opportunities are laying bare. Resources like oil, gas, minerals, and fish become more accessible, and possibilities for cost- and time saving maritime transportations grow as the sea ice reductions continue, turning the Arctic Ocean increasingly ice-free during summertime1 (PAME – Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009). Had the Arctic been all about material interests, it could have been a drama of states making aggressive moves in the name of sovereignty. It could have, but it is not. The effects of climate change in the region are often epitomized as ‘the Arctic paradox:’ what is severely damaging the region from one perspective is bringing prosperity from another. The Arctic is a region where interests collide, but where cooperation – not conflicts – still guides state relations. Therefore, rather than a ‘big drama’ on conflicts, this thesis takes a point of departure in the ‘small Arctic drama’, the drama that is spelled out when interests in Arctic environmental protection are to be balanced energy interests. This is a drama symbolic of the Arctic – a region rich in oil and gas, and which furthermore takes the expression of an energy-environment intertwinement, which, often implicitly, is part of all environmental cooperation. As a drama, it is evident when the Arctic states meet to negotiate and reach a consensus on environmental protection. The good thing with interaction is that it could entail learning processes. This study is devoted precisely to these learning processes, searching for an answer to the overarching question of ‘how do states learn of environmental norms’? The broad theme of this thesis is international cooperation, which is studied from the perspective of International Relations (IR), and in relation to the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization, established in 1996, which has environmental protection and sustainable development highest on its agenda

1 As early as the year 2030, or soon thereafter, it is expected that most of the Arctic will be free of sea ice during late summer (AMAP – Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA), 2017).

9 (Ottawa Declaration 1996, Art. 1(a)). The eight Arctic member states include: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and USA. In this thesis, two different investigations are conducted: firstly, a mapping of the Arctic states’ different roles, as played out in the meetings at the Arctic Council level of Senior Arctic Officials between the years 1999 and 2016, which aim to capture the bigger pattern of development – concerning state behavior but also environmental protection. Secondly, two specific negotiation processes are investigated from a micro perspective to provide for a more in-depth understanding of how state actors learn. These negotiations have been carried out in politically appointed task forces, active between the years 2013 and 2015, and dedicated to oil pollution prevention and a reduction of emissions from short-lived climate pollutants like black carbon and methane, respectively. Learning in this study is viewed partly as something that incorporates new scientific findings, for instance, on climate pollutants. But primarily, learning here is about how interaction shapes understanding among actors, of themselves, and others. A guiding hypothesis is that state actors are affected by the social context, and partially influenced by what is considered to be appropriate behavior in this context. Consequently, it implies that state behavior is socially changeable, rather than individualistic and static. Thus, approaching state interaction as role-playing should be suitable, where a concept like ‘role’ is understood as being reflected in a dynamic process of reflections and understanding. Roles, to paraphrase theatre, are stable over time and they follow a script, but they also have room for improvisation and are attentive to their director, co-actors, and audience. Roles, in that sense, open up for opportunities of state learning. For international relations, this would imply the potential of moving toward greater environmental protection at the expense of commercial interests. The learning approach presented in this project should be of relevance to International Relations (IR) and the research field on Global Environmental Governance (GEG).

Situating the project

At a latitude of approximately 66 degrees north (66°32'N) of the equator runs the Arctic circle.2 According to the scientific definition, once this latitude has been crossed, one has entered into the Polar world. From this circle, the air distance to the

2 The Arctic circle is the definition used to identify eight member states of the Arctic Council. However, this definition is somewhat narrow, not least from a climatic perspective. Other ways of defining the Arctic is through either the 10°C July isotherm, or based on the tree-line: the Arctic border is where the forests end and northern tundra begins. Compared to the Arctic Circle, both of these definitions move further south in relation to the Bering Sea, and also further south in Canada and below Greenland. (AMAP – Arctic Pollution Issues, 1997).

10 Norwegian North Cap – often considered the northern most point of the European mainland – measures about 670 km. From the North Cap, an additional 2,100 kilometers has to trekked before one could proclaim to have reached the North Pole. The Arctic is a vast area, in addition to being home to four million people. It is a region that comprises cities, even big ones, like the Russian city of Murmansk, which in its heydays was home to half a million people. For most people, associations of the Arctic do not bring cities, cars, and shops to mind. Instead, it is thought to be a remote area – harsh, icy, and cold – triggering the adventurous and explorative nerve in those who look in from the outside. In 1878, the Finland-Swede Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld sailed the Northeast Passage; in 1905, the Norwegian Roald Amundsen and his expedition became the first to sail the Northwest Passage, and in 1909 (although disputed) the American Robert Peary together with four Inuit men set their feet on the North Pole. For those approximately 500,000 indigenous people who live in the Arctic (Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat, 2017), often in a symbiotic relationship with nature, the Arctic is not about adventure. Instead, it is about everyday life. Although the lifestyle of the Arctic indigenous people generates few sources of anthropogenic pollution, the region acts like a sink for pollutants released elsewhere but transported to the region: persistent organic pollutants (POPs), heavy metals, and radioactivity are threatening Arctic ecosystems and negatively impacting human health (AMAP – Human Health in the Arctic, 2015). Arctic warming, in addition, impedes a traditional way of living, for instance, for people dependent on ice for reaching hunting areas, or for those who find the thawing soil to lack sufficient bearing capacity for homes and settlements (SWIPA, 2017). Oil spill prevention and reductions of short-lived climate pollutants, the two environmental issues studied in this thesis, are both of significant importance to the Arctic: short-lived climate pollutants since these create warming and ice-melting in a region highly adapted to the presence of ice; and oil spill prevention since energy extraction in the offshore Arctic, where a vast majority of resources are located, means a substantial risk for oil spills and methane leakages (Kakabadse, 2015; Kutepova et al., 2011). Should a spill happen, the consequences here would be more severe than accidents elsewhere in the world, due to remoteness and icy conditions that would stall rescue operations and clean-up, while sensitive ecosystems would be badly affected (PAME – Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 2014; WWF, 2014). From a marine safety perspective, to reduce the probability of oil spills is therefore essential for any carried out Arctic marine operations (EPPR – Recommendations on the Prevention of Marine Oil Pollution in the Arctic, 2013). With regard to Arctic warming, a short-lived climate pollutant like black carbon contributes to this by absorbing sunlight, causing the ice – on top of which it lays – to melt. Methane, another short-lived climate forcer, is a potent greenhouse gas trapping heat in the atmosphere (AMAP – Arctic Climate Issues, 2015). In the Arctic, the permafrost has

11 started to thaw, threatening to release even more methane, amplifying climate change further (ibid; AMAP – Methane as an Arctic Climate Forcer, 2015). Although the two issues of oil spill prevention and reduction of short-lived climate pollutants are different in nature, they are symbolically intertwined under the bigger heading of ‘climate change.’ The ‘Arctic paradox’ points to a dichotomous relationship: had oil production gone obsolete oil spills would obviously seize in existence. In addition, methane emissions and black carbon would decrease, benefitting the climate. Yet, in the Arctic Council, this is not how the issue of oil spill prevention is approached; therefore, the reader should have two different entanglements of oil spill prevention and environmental protection in mind while continuing to read: one is oil spills in relation to maritime environmental protection, and one is a more general understanding of oil spills as linked to oil extracting activities within a context of global – and not least Arctic – warming. Arctic offshore oil and gas (O&G) extraction has been an established reality for states like Canada, Norway, Russia, and USA since the 1960s to the 80s. Russia and Norway have established themselves as global top producers regarding oil and gas, where the Arctic plays an important role. In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey concluded an assessment of the remaining oil and gas resources in the world. The Arctic was then declared the winner, estimated as storing 20–25 percent of all yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves in its sediments. Thus, also well into the future, Arctic energy extraction could mean good news regarding energy security, export, and revenues for Arctic littoral states.

The Arctic drama

Not a drama on major conflicts… The U.S. Geological Survey publication benchmarked a political shift, or rather more possible, a new Arctic rhetoric. Coalescing in time, the Arctic was described as a region becoming increasingly centered on conflicts and rivalry (Borgerson, 2008; Huebert, 2010; Posner, 2007). These predictions found nourishment in the economic possibilities that Arctic activity was believed to generate through increased transport and large reserves of resources, which is why it was assumed that territorial borders would gain in importance. Territorial claims pertaining to land in the Arctic are close to settled, but several overlapping claims exist in relation to the sea. Many of these claims do not concern ownership over water and ice, but over the seabed (Byers, 2009; 2013; Dodds and Nuttall, 2016). The most symbolic example of an ownership issue yet to be resolved is the recent claims by both Denmark and Russia, with a Canadian claim planned for 2018, to the North Pole (The Independent Barents Observer (hereafter Barents Observer), 141215; 150804; Radio Canada International, 160503). Indeed, with not all the borders fixed, the risk for geopolitical conflicts could potentially be expected (Runge Olesen, 2015).

12 Still, the Arctic states have adhered to international law, and their respective territorial claims have followed rules of procedure and been submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) for a decision. Voices predicting an Arctic scramble have also been noticeably fewer. One of the probably most vocal authors foreseeing an “Arctic meltdown,” IR-scholar Scott Borgerson (2008), later reviewed his prediction, saying: “[a] funny thing happened on the way to Arctic anarchy. […] Proving the pessimists wrong, the Arctic countries have given up on saber rattling and engaged in various impressive feats of cooperation” (2013:79). Similarly, an international project led by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, GeoPolitics in the High North 2008-2012, reached the same conclusion: no race to the North in sight. ‘Interests are there,’ they said, and ‘interests differ, but carefulness and cooperation – rather than political drama – characterizes the Arctic’ (Udgaard, 2013). A vast number of scholars devalue the risk of conflicts breaking out in the Arctic (Byers, 2013; Chater, 2016; Exner-Pirot, 2016; Heininen, 2015; Hough, 2013; Keil, 2014; Nicol and Heininen, 2014; Young, 2009; 2011). Contributing to this is a decline in the accumulated interest due to the global context and energy market (see Keil, 2014). Nonetheless, other things also have an impact, such as joint interests, Arctic kinship, and a symbolically important reference to the region as standing above turmoil. We “look forward to a long term future of peace and stability in the region,” the eight Ministers for Foreign Affairs stated, celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Arctic Council (Joint Statement from the Arctic States, 2016). Actually, Arctic cooperation is a commitment that stretches back in time to President Gorbachev, who in 1987 held his famous Murmansk speech calling the Arctic nations to create a ‘zone of peace.’ This zone has since then been kept, anchoring states to cooperation on foremost environmental protection and sustainable development: firstly, through the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991, and later through the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, which expanded institutionalization into the Arctic Council. The voices heard a decade ago have silenced. What seems clear is that the Arctic was neither before, nor now, headed to a predestined future of conflicts. The Arctic paradox is still a paradox without a roadmap. Stories told on ice-melting as unavoidably leading toward resource rushes are precisely stories, narratives, versions of reality rather than the reality (cf. Dittmer et al., 2011; Avango, Nilsson, and Robert, 2014). However, stories can also shape reality where media optics, rhetoric, and provocative depictions could hurt stability (Bergman Rosamond, 2011:51). This is again worth keeping in mind, as the region’s geo-political situated-ness between major powers whose relations, in an international context, has deteriorated. Predictions of a conflict between foremost the U.S and Russia to spillover, or at least for the potential of a spillover, into the Arctic affairs have therefore been made (Huebert, 2016; Mearsheimer, 2015; Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017). Yet, bearing in mind the before mentioned constructed-ness of the Arctic, the Arctic future is as

13 much a commodity as it is a political concept, where different actors will fight over getting to determine the outcome (Wormbs and Sörlin, 2013). If the future can be fought over, it also turns the future into something actively – not accidentally – decided upon, in parallel allowing for learning to occur. The empirical ambition and interest of this thesis fit the view of the liberal perspective on Arctic affairs as in essence prone to cooperation.

…But well a small drama of energy-environment intertwinement Whereas cooperation acts out like a learning result on how to overcome conflicts, i.e., the ‘big’ Arctic drama, learning still has to guide this cooperation if interactive hurdles of environmental protection should be overcome. Environmental protection and reaping the benefits of various commercial activities stand in symbiotic relationships to one another, and where both are legitimized under the concept of sustainable development. On this concept, a leveling of ongoing interest occurs, where actors try to find the correct balance between its main pillars of economic, social, and environmental development.3 Yet, with ensured welfare, now and into the future, interpreted as the goal of sustainable development, the sustainable use of environmental resource bases has an important function to fill should development occur. When it comes to environment and economy, environment is often given a subordinated position. This seems also valid for the Arctic Council: a study conducted halfway into its cooperative performance confirmed the Arctic Council to frame oil and gas in a superior way to climate change, talking about how Arctic climate change impacted on oil and gas but not the reverse (Langhelle, Blindheim, and Øygarden, 2008:33). At the same time, if energy-environment – represented as the Arctic paradox – would be intertwined in only a one-directional manner, Arctic environmental protection could not do anything else than wait for the day that fossil fuels become dated. If, on the contrary, it is understood as a two-directional intertwinement, which this thesis suggests, then nuances could be added that have less to do with materialism and strategic thinking, and more to do with norms and appropriateness, allowing some room for potential learning to occur.

3 An important dimension here to settle, but which is outside the scope of this thesis, is whose sustainable development is one trying to promote? The local, national, regional, and global level might not apply a shared perspective on what is to be considered a sustainable use of Arctic resources. At the same time, those who are living close to the Arctic nature are further away from the political decision-making and economic power. The inclusion of indigenous associations as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council is an attempt to secure the local perspective to be consulted by the member states, as well as to provide for active participation by the indigenous representatives (Ottawa Declaration 1996, Art. 2).

14 The ‘small’ Arctic drama involves two different stories to be told. One is the story about Arctic oil and gas as resources that will be extracted,4 where, for instance, the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers confirms the Arctic as “a top advocacy focus area” (2017). Climate change would be the other Arctic story told, where almost each year is a new record breaker concerning Arctic warming, like the year 2016: never before in our modern history had the global average temperature been as high, the Arctic as warm, its sea-ice as thin, and its spreading as limited. Further, 2017 was only slightly cooler, coming in as the second warmest year (Arctic Report Card, 2017). The temperature rise in the Arctic has since before been established to be more than twice that of the global average5 (Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), 2007; SWIPA, 2017). With both of these stories – or rather realities – having prominent positions within Arctic cooperation, the small Arctic drama is illustratively presented, although in disguise, in the words by former Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, who summed up Sweden’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council between 2011 and 2013 with the following call:6

Let that message from all of us here in Kiruna be loud and clear. We are committed to do whatever we can [emphasis added] to protect the fragile Arctic environment (Words of welcome, Kiruna Ministerial meeting, 2013).

This speech act is particularly interesting because within the words ‘whatever we can,’ the Arctic drama has a playing field of its own. Reaching a goal of environmental protection by doing ‘whatever we can’ may take one far, or, it may take you nowhere. For instance, the Arctic Athabaskan Community (AAC), the Inuit Circumpolar Association, and Greenpeace together with Nature and Youth have all sued their respective governments (Canada, the U.S., and Norway), for not doing enough to slow the Arctic warming. The lawsuit against the Norwegian government was explicitly directed to the decision to allow for new and expanded oil drilling in the Barents Sea7 (Earthjustice, 2013; Greenpeace, 2016a; ICC Canada, 2005; Nunatsiaq News, 061215). ‘Whatever we can’ is a constrained promise, where more aspects than

4 This message echoed with strength at conferences for the Oil and Gas (O&G) industry (for instance, the Arctic Oil and Gas Conference, 2014; Arctic Technology Conference, 2015; and IEA (International Energy Agency) Gas and Oil Technology, 2017). 5 Since 2011, the Arctic has been warmer than any time before (since measurements began around 1900), and its warming speed for the past 50 years has been twice as rapid as for the rest of the world. (SWIPA, 2017:3). 6 This message is sent to the whole of the world; Arctic’s sensitivity toward global warming is addressed in the speech, where it is emphasized that it is not only important what the Arctic states are doing, but what the rest of the world equally does (Ministerial statement by Sweden, 2013). 7 The legal argument put forward was that such expanded drilling would violate Norway’s commitments under the Paris agreement, as well as future generations’ right to safe and healthy environment (Greenpeace, 2016a).

15 a lived or observed environmental degradation define the frames for action. Yet, the Arctic drama has additional layers going in the opposite direction as well; oil companies like Shell, for instance, caused headlines by its decision to withdraw from the Alaskan Chuckchi Sea, after investing billions of dollars and years of work. In the Canadian Beaufort Sea, other oil companies have done the same8 (The Guardian, 150928; The Wall Street Journal, 150626). To not extend or issue new drilling leases were political decisions made by the former Obama administration in the US, as well as in Canada (The Guardian, 151016; United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, 2016). Whereas much of this could be referred to as record low oil prices making it unprofitable to drill in difficult Arctic conditions, all this is yet a result of active decisions going contrary to what many expected: to claim that the Arctic, rich in resources, did not automatically trigger a commercial and political activity in line with that. Environmental protection could not be ruled out as a factor changing the cost analysis – with costs here broadly understood – regarding oil extraction. Still, the fact that states are pluralist in character – together with their contextual location – generates differing views on environmental problems. For environmental measures to be taken, it means that politics, not science, will determine an apprehended need for action: first comes politics, then science (Wormbs and Sörlin, 2013). However, views are changeable and not static, and environmental pollution and overexploitation furthermore generate consequences. To accept or not to accept these consequences is ultimately a choice resting upon values (Sörlin, 2014:213). Values, therefore, are big in the ‘small’ Arctic drama.

Approaching the Arctic as ‘a common’?

From a legal perspective, the Arctic is not much of a global common. All land is territorially linked to the Arctic states, and most of the Artic water as well. The Arctic Ocean and related waters are clearly regulated through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Each coastal state has here the sovereign right to regulate foreign shipping within twelve nautical miles from its coast. The area between the coastline and 200 nautical miles further is the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), which grants the state sole rights for fishing and resources. Outside this area, the state that can prove to the UN Commission on Delimitations of Continental Shelves, that its continental shelf continues, will be given continued right to seabed and resource extraction (UNCLOS, Art. 76). Another dimension where the Arctic is promoted as a region governed by sovereigns is in relation to the ‘Arctic exception’ as listed in Article 234. Here, coastal states are given enhanced pollution prevention powers in icy waters, despite this being beyond twelve nautical miles from the coast. However, as pointed out by Michael Byers (2013:165), with more ice turning into water, it

8 For instance BP, Exxon Mobile, and Chevron.

16 means more vessels from abroad will sail the Arctic waters. At the same time, Article 234 may lose its significance, should the requirement of ice no longer be fulfilled. As such, the Arctic states could potentially lose the right to claim tougher pollution regulation, while still being the closest to any accident and the consequences therefrom. From the perspective of regional and sovereign control, there are strong incentives for Arctic states to cooperate: AC agreements on cooperation such as Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011) and Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013) are, for instance, establishing the rules of procedure should accidents occur at the sea, sorting out issues of responsibility as well as formally establishing a willingness to help each other out in a region where ports are at long distances. It is also important to stand united in international negotiations, for instance, on International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) the Polar Code, which was adopted in 2014 after almost two decades of negotiations. This code acknowledges that polar eco systems, and to some extent also Arctic communities, are vulnerable to ship operations, and thus strengthens the requirements for risk mitigation for those vessels that want to sail – what is described as – “inhospitable” polar waters.9 The Arctic (littoral) states’ wish for resources, control, and security turns Arctic waters into something that should be considered as little ‘common’ as possible,10 especially if one with ‘common’ stretches on to the international society. Since coastal states are entitled to claim continental shelves as extended, there is also only a small part of Arctic seabed resources to consider as ‘common heritage of mankind’ (UNCLOS, Art. 136; Byers, 2013). However, from an environmental legal perspective, a regime such as ‘common concern of humankind’ has evolved, not least in relation to climate change and biodiversity, taking things such as atmosphere, water columns, and surface/land into account. It is less circumvented than its equivalent in UNCLOS, but also more interpretative in terms of what to count as ‘common concern’ (Bartenstein, 2015:9). Scientifically, there is a strong ecological and climatological linkage confirmed between the Arctic and the world – a warming Arctic provides for climate feedback (i.e., cause additional climate change) in three distinct ways: by reflecting less solar

9 The Polar code is also applicable to Antarctic waters. It includes greater requirements, for instance, on ship design and ice classifications, equipment, training for the personnel, and environmental protection like pollution prevention. 10 Littoral states’ worries are foremost linked to water columns outside the EEZs, and in relation to ocean surface beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast. Illustrative, in 2015, the coastal states agreed in a Declaration concerning the prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in the central Arctic, not to enter the high seas to harvest any living marine resources until science provided a sign of clearance. It has been suggested that the coastal states by such an initiative tried to protect their fishing stocks from great catches made by foreign-flagged vessels, by sending a message to the rest of the world – fishing companies and nations – to follow their example and abstain from fishing (The New York Times, 150721). As such it would be a message on ‘appropriate behavior,’ since legally, anyone has a right to fish in this part of the Arctic Ocean.

17 energy so more ice melts; by raising sea-levels and by altering ocean circulation patterns; and by a release of greenhouse gases as the permafrost thaws (Arctic Council – Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), 2004). Still, the lack of real ownership renders the Arctic region to potentially suffering from a management deficit of collective resources, a problem famously known as ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). However, with rising levels of environmental cooperation, globally as well as in the Arctic, a tragedy is an outcome that should not be considered a predestined necessity (cf. Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Rose, 1986). The Arctic states also address responsibility – regional but also global – in relation to environmental pollution, by referring to a ‘commonality’: to ‘common Arctic issues,, to ‘common concerns, and to ‘common objectives’ (see Bartenstein, 2015; national Arctic strategies; Arctic Council declarations). It has been suggested that as Arctic ice-melting continues, the Arctic Council should develop its role in the future: toward either a society of sovereign states, giving priority to ‘government’; toward acting like a steward for the region, prioritizing environmental ‘governance’; or toward being a regional security actor (Wilson, 2016). However, at least for now, these are dimensions all found within the AC cooperation, causing somewhat different cooperative logics: the wish to control the region and the wish to protect the region require different things from the actors. Not least in relation to learning: the more ‘commonness’ one is after, the more shared understanding one should wish interaction to bring about. Because, to achieve enhanced environmental protection and escape the tragedy of the commons, has less to do with inherited characteristics of human nature and more to do with norms and values (McCay, 1996:117). Arctic environmental pollution should therefore best be understood as a drama of the commons (Dietz et al., 2002), where the common is both regional and global to its scope.

Objective, aim, and research questions

The overall objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which and how learning processes in international cooperation take place. This objective is normatively anchored in a wish for Arctic environmental cooperation to be progressive. It is a wish that may prove wrong but does nonetheless represent the motif, the reason, for conducting the investigations carried out under this project. The aim, however, has nothing to do with normativity but describes learning in cooperation as processes rather than endings. The aim has two dimensions. Firstly, (1) the thesis wants to illustrate how states that engage in negotiations and cooperation learn what their appropriate behavior would be like. With ‘appropriate,’ it is here referred to an actor’s interpretation of the social context given both perceived national interests and ideas; (perceived)

18 expectations from others; and what type of behavior the cooperative mandate – explicitly through terms of reference and implicitly through norms – is prescribing. In other words, it wishes to investigate how roles are developed in interactive processes. Secondly, (2) in doing so, the thesis turns toward the intertwinement of Arctic energy- and environmental interests as expressed in the Arctic Council, by analyzing two specific task force negotiation processes: the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP), and the Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM), respectively. An understanding is sought regarding how compromises on interests are made, and how these are linked to each other. Processes of learning will be studied both at the meso-level to capture the development of the Arctic Council as well as states’ roles and role performances, and at the micro-level in task force negotiations. By conducting a reasonably detailed investigation of individuals at this latter micro-level – how they express their thoughts and experiences and how they interact within a certain negotiation setting – the project aims to reveal small-scale cognitive processes associated with learning. This implies that it is relevant to theoretically connect learning with roles. A sociologically inspired Constructivist theory like Role theory is applied in order to show how role performance is something that becomes constructed from multiple expectations: from domestic expectations on interests and norm fulfillment, on to perceptions of others’ expectations of how the role will be performed, to international norms and their demands for participation. Furthermore, a focus on role performance – rather than state behavior – directs attention toward the social setting, since the way in which actors perform, speak, and reflect stems as much from there as from ‘at home.’ Following this line of thought reveals the prospect for states to learn (part of) their role when engaged in social interaction. Any revealed changes in states’ roles and role performances are of interest, guided by the assumption that any change – behavioral or perceptive – contains a reflection which at least holds the potential for learning. By learning, two things are referred to in this thesis: (1) how states may start to redefine who they are and what they want (what their role is and how it should be played), given their social interaction and (2) the progressive shift occurring toward greater environmental protection. Learning, therefore, is the area of interest that unites both of the aims presented above. The overarching research question of this thesis is: How do states learn of environmental norms? This question is broken down into smaller areas of investigation, providing different types of input. In this thesis, investigations and discussions serve to shed light on the following: how is the intertwinement between energy and environment expressed in the Arctic Council interaction, how is learning manifested within these interactive processes, how do expectations serve to either encourage or constrain learning and lastly, to what extent does a role change reveal learning?

19 Chapter outline Having outlined the aim of the thesis, this chapter will continue by discussing learning: how learning fits the field of IR, in more general terms, and how learning, in this particular case, will be approached through a conceptualization of roles. The topic of chapter 2 is methodological reflections and choices of method, where roles – how to study them – will be discussed also more practically. In chapter 3, a social constructivist perspective on international relations will be applied, where the theoretical underpinnings of roles will be discussed more in depth. Arguing, understanding and norms constitute forming qualities for the way roles and learning are expressed. In chapter 4, the focus is on the performance pattern of each Arctic Council member state. Here, state behavior will be mapped according to how it has been expressed in Senior Arctic Official’s meeting. The chapter also provides role patterns with a bigger social context, where the development – and characterization – of Arctic Council cooperation will be described. In chapters 5 and 6, a micro perspective will be in focus through an investigation of the processes where state representatives attempt to reach a consensus. These chapters are interested in how consensus is reached, what social interaction does for understanding, and how social interaction may add nuances or changes to those role patterns previously mapped in chapter 4. In chapter 7, the separate analyses that have been made throughout the book will be tied together, providing the reader with some conclusions on the Arctic environmental cooperation, and how learning processes occur therein.

Learning in International Relations

To view the Arctic as a region more inclined toward cooperation rather than conflicts does not presuppose a Liberal perspective on International Relations (IR). However, when Arctic cooperation is viewed through a Realist and power-political perspective, for instance, as done by Borgerson (2013), who previously was quoted as saying that the Arctic states engaged in “impressive feats of cooperation,” the explanation to such development is yet to be found in material motifs: cooperation made it, for instance, safer and more accessible to engage in Arctic activities. It is however still national interests – fed by the rationality of economic drivers and utility maximization – that render cooperation attractive. In this thesis, the entry point to cooperation is the opposite. The interesting aspect of cooperation is where it can take actors, preferably by a shared understanding on environmental norms. Norm diffusion, perceptions of actorness (ego and alter expectations), and (prescriptive) structures are things linked to an operationalization of learning through a study of roles. What is considered intriguing with learning, as argued by this thesis, is the movement it comprises. We end up where we end up due to something, or someone,

20 having activated changes in our held ideas and perceptions. So we start to think a bit differently, perhaps even in a way previously unknown to us. This is not to say that learning always takes us to better places, but it at least leaves the door open. From a theoretical perspective and for validity to hold throughout a study, the tricky thing with learning is also a major thing, i.e., to reveal its existence while moving from theory to operationalization (Checkel, 2003). To demonstrate a newly gained skill like riding a bike, building a kite, or tying your shoe laces is a type of learning that is easy to both identify and confirm. The child that can tie a shoe has obviously learned something new through what probably was laborious practicing. A distinct ‘before and after’ – bruises, untied shoes vs. unpatched jeans, neat shoe lace knot – helps to identify the break where learning has occurred. However, not all learning is that easily discovered, or as easily traced to definitive moments in time and space. Really, to learn does not even need to involve a skill but could just be a thought. For that reason, role theory is assumed to be a well-suited tool to apply, since it allows access to a state’s belief system, and how the process works to have it affected. When studying learning in IR, the focus is on interaction acting as the generator. Of interest is not so much what actors learn but how they learn. One of the first to talk about learning within IR-theory was Karl Deutsch. To him, learning occurred through outside stimulus, and it was to be observed within organizations. Indicative of learning was how – i.e., it had to be in a new way – an organization responded to this externally delivered information and stimulus. (Deutsch, 1952:372). With outside stimulus as the inducement – together with the notion that the information delivered from the outside can be abstracted and dissociated in memory – Deutsch laid the foundation for his theory on Pluralistic Security Communities by an implicit referral to learning. Almost a half-century later, Emanuel Adler discussed these communities as cognitive security regions by referring to socializing dialogues and learning processes around normative collective knowledge (1997). Not long after Deutsch, Ernst Haas described and predicted European integration as a process of collective learning, where an integrative spillover effect would be granted continuity through partly active and aware, and partly unaware, socialization processes (on learning, see Haas, 1990). In the 1970s, John Ruggie picked up on epistemic communities, describing them in Foucauldian wordings to represent a dominant way of looking at social reality – thereby also as a way to delimit social reality for those who are part of the group and socialized through the episteme (Ruggie, 1975:570). Peter Haas later took the concept further, focusing on how epistemic communities – networks of expert knowledge – function as coordinators between states in an increasingly complex world. Justified knowledge is produced and for policy-makers to learn from, by changing how to value “principles (normative) and causal beliefs” (Haas, 1992:35). Another source of learning in IR has been explained to be international norms, i.e., norm diffusion (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Alexander Wendt (1999), furthermore, views

21 systemic change to occur only insofar as states are first capable of engaging in social learning. However, although learning is a cornerstone in IR, it often takes on an implicit form. Socialization, integration, managing the commons, and progress are all concepts about learning although without learning necessarily touched upon per se. Also found in the literature using the word ‘learning,’ this phenomenon has been taken for granted, rather than in need of greater understanding regarding operational proceedings. Therefore, in the 21st century, there have been calls for a greater conceptualization and methodological stringency (cf. Checkel, 2001; Hofmann, 2008; Harnisch, 2012; Knopf, 2003). Up until the mid 1990s, there seems to be a general consensus of learning as stemming from experience (Etheredge, 1981; Levy, 1994; Nye, 1987; Rose, 1991). Learning also tends to depart from an individualist methodology describing state learning and not how states learn together (see, for instance, Farkas, 1998). But if learning is going to be understood as normative rather than only adaptive, as social and shared rather than individual, a framework is needed that takes interaction into consideration while also managing to separate one actor’s beliefs from the bigger governance structure. Jeffrey Knopf has reminded the IR community of why learning in international relations matters. It matters, he said, for potentially achieving reduced armed conflicts (2003). As a process on movement, learning is a powerful tool on normative progression benefitting humanity. Having concluded that, he handed over the relay baton to other scholars to identify mechanisms and ways in which these produce shared learning – or international learning as he labeled it. This assignment has been happily accepted by role theory, where Sebastian Harnisch, for instance, described the theory as being suitable for the task due to it being a “social theory of international politics” (Harnisch, 2012:48). Certainly, from a normative perspective on environmental protection then, international learning is a guiding light. Foremost, however, this project is a modest attempt to engage in understandings on learning processes in general, and from there shed light on how states – more specifically – learn on environmental norms.

Learning as role change – the concern of this study

To study the process of learning, how state actors learn, presupposes access to more things than the result, i.e., a behavior to observe. For that reason, role theory is considered helpful, since it opens up actors’ behavior as a deliberation between different expectations – expectations imbedded in the interactive structure, from others, and from an actor’s ego and alter. Understanding how actors learn, so the thesis argument goes, is derived from these deliberations on expectations that are made visible by a state’s different role components.

22 Learning is a social undertaking as well as a consequence. This implies that it is social interaction in various forms that create a need for learning. It furthermore implies that communication has an effect on how states learn. Thomas Risse’s triangle of Three Logics of Social Action (2000) is considered particularly helpful in providing a scheme for how communication – through arguing – reveals to actors which type of action-based logic to apply [figure 1]. Risse’s argument follows on Jürgen Habermas’ theory on Communicative action and views actors as truth-seekers who want to arrive at mutual understandings based upon reasoned consensus. This means that actors are open for change. Indeed, arguing is a learning mechanism, against which actors not only can evaluate interests, knowledge, and information, but where they also reflect and assess whether norms could be claimed valid enough to be considered to constitute ‘appropriate behavior’ (Risse, 2004:288). Actions guided by a logic of consequentialism try to maximize individual preferences, whereas actions based upon logic of appropriateness draw on the idea that actors try to ‘do the right thing.’ As such, this logic is primarily applied, since it is through a contestation over norms that it could be established what is meant by “good people do X,” or ‘that the right thing to do’ could be to engage in strategic bargaining (ibid, 2000:4-6).

Figure 1: Three Logics of Social Action Figure 2: Three Kinds of Learning in Social (Thomas Risse, 2000:4) Interaction

Risse’s triangle of logic serves quite well to illustrate what learning is understood to be in this thesis, here presented as ‘Three Kinds of Learning in Social Interaction’ [figure 2]. The upper corner of the triangle acts as the driver of movement in my triangle, as in Risse’s. Ego- and alter learning is the main focus of the triangle since this is the mechanism that pushes actors in the direction of either adaptive or normative learning, just like arguing is deciding which logic to apply. As such this is not learning per se, but rather an explanation to how states learn.

23 Adaptive learning – 1st degree of role change Adaptive learning correlates with the left corner of Risse’s triangle, where logic of consequentialism guides behavior. In this type of learning, an actor changes strategies to achieve something, but the actor does not change any fundamental beliefs. New information leads to a change in means but not in ends (Levy, 1994). If interaction does not manage to touch upon foreign policy goals, no reassessment of interests, behavior, and perceptions would be needed. A state’s belief-system would be kept stable. Following role theorists like Harnisch, Frank, and Maull (2011:253), adaptation, therefore, could be described as a first degree of role change, since changes in perceptions and expectations regarding ‘who they are’ would be very modest. The same goes for connecting it to environmental norms: adaptive learning of the environment does not indicate any profound changes regarding beliefs on which value to ascribe to nature.

Normative learning – 2nd degree of role change The right corner of the triangle stands for the logic of appropriateness when it comes to action-guiding principles. Here, it is translated into normative learning, but others would call it ‘complex learning’ (cf. Levy, 1994; Nye, 1987) or ‘real learning’ (Haas, 1990). It entails a learning that is not restricted to preferences or strategies in means but rather, targets the belief-system. This learning involves aspects of changed perceptions and expectations that go deeper into values as being understood as appropriate; for instance, regarding other actors, on how to define the situation in a new way with new goals, or through a redefinition of itself as an actor. However, if arguing leads toward normative learning, this, for sure, does not need to include learning about “good” values. It simply prescribes “good manners” – as in appropriate behavior – given those actors and structures that form the specific context. Conceptually, normative learning includes a common understanding of which social rules govern. Empirically, though, normative learning is wishing for more, concerning the common understanding, where this also should include some kind of progression ‘to the better.’ The outermost illustration of such common understanding would be found within the concept previously mentioned as ‘international learning’ (Knopf, 2003:191). Still, for any common understanding of environmental norms to develop, for instance on climate change, it needs the guidance from institutionalized expert knowledge. This brings attention to epistemic communities, and the process where organizations are “learning to learn,” or “learning to do better” (Haas, 1992; Haas and Haas, 1995). The knowledge that international organizations produce, through the episteme, is for states to respond to, learn from, and possibly even change beliefs on.

24 Ego and alter learning – the cog running the wheel Ego and alter learning differs from the two learning types mentioned above in that it is the mechanism, the cog, which leads to learning in various forms. It is a type of learning that directs lights toward how actors learn, rather than what they learn. As such, it also becomes the tool to use for operationalizing learning. Following role theory, it is argued that learning happens through interaction, when actors are carrying out ego and alter reflections. It is these reflections that fill adaptation as well as normative learning with substance. As a consequence, states perform (behave) a bit differently, and possibly change perceptions regarding who they are as actors. In order to capture how states’ learning processes are tied to the interactive structure, ‘expectations’ should be added. Expectations target different aspects of interaction: (1) the ego part of an actor (who am I as an actor and what do I therefore expect of myself), (2) the alter part of an actor (how do I as an actor interpret others’ expectations of me), (3) my held expectations of others, and finally (4) expectations of what constitutes ‘appropriate’ behavior, for instance, in a negotiation. This structure is therefore part of pushing actors’ role performances toward sometimes an appropriateness built around adaptation of means and strategies, and in other times around normative learning on beliefs and values. Learning becomes identifiable and possible to conceptualize through the observation of some kind of role change, caused by, for instance, a conflict or an ambiguity within actors’ role conceptions (Harnisch, 2012:53). In chapter 3, roles will be conceptualized further. In addition, Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1984) will be discussed, focusing on how communication makes states aware of their roles and possible role conflicts; on how understanding affects interactive strategies; and on how consensus is reached through (sometimes) succumbing to the better argument. Included as well, is George Herbert Mead’s referral to a dialogue as spelled out within an actor – between I (where the ego-part of a role hosts) and Me (where others’ expectations are interpreted). Role theory in combination with Habermas and Mead’s theories create a sociologically inspired theoretical framework on international relations, which have been applied previously (on Habermas, see Diez and Steans, 2005; Müller, 2011; Risse, 2000; on Mead see Harnisch, 2011b, 2012; McCourt, 2012).

Contributions

For clarification purposes, the reader of this text should code this project as located within the broader framework of global environmental governance (GEG). This field aims for “planetary stewardship” by finding ways to reduce and alleviate the pressure put on the environment by the last century’s substantial population growth and

25 growth in economic activity (Speth and Haas, 2006). Since the global order has also become a multi-centric one – affected by many actors, such as states, non-state and private actors alike – GEG is argued to represent an opportunity for transformation of world politics (Pattberg, 2012:98). The interest is linked to regimes – how these transform, but also how they could be rendered more efficient (Humrich, 2013; Nilsson and Koivurova, 2016; Stokke, 2013; Young, 2008, 2010). Oran Young, leading scholar within the field of Arctic governance, describes what is needed in order for the global governance structure to become effective:

What is needed, for best results, are sets of rights, rules, and decision-making procedures that are not only accepted by those subject to them as proper or legitimate in principle but that also become sufficiently embedded or entrenched that key players participate in the resulting practices without thinking about the pros and cons of doing so each time they act in a manner that conforms to the relevant rights and rules (Young, 2008:21-22).

The above description calls for a socialization effect, if global environmental governance should have an imprint on international relations. Part of this socialization is that states within international relations today have to take into account what Robert Falkner (2012) describes as a “greening of international society.” To him, international society has been normatively expanded to also take global environmental responsibility into account, in parallel to prior existing norms of state sovereignty, international law, and the market. Clapp and Dauvergne describe it as “[t]he history of global environmental politics is inextricably tied to contest of ideas: battles of worldviews and discourses” (2011:45). These ideas are sent back and forth between different regimes, creating horizontal interlinkages between them that become “sites for collusion or contestation over these broader [governance] norms (Zelli, Gupta and van Asselt, 2012:176). Thus, global environmental responsibility has gained an undisputed position within the global setting on norms. All regimes continuously change, and no regime develops in the same manner; some become stronger whereas others decline, depending on ‘endogenous factors’ such as institutional operating capabilities, on the one hand, and exogenous factors like the political and economic context (Young, 2010), on the other. A vertical interlinkage may as well impact, causing different institutions to prioritize norms (imbedded in other norms) differently: environmental norms within World Trade Organization (WTO), for instance, are faced with broader norms for promoting free trade, whereas environmental norms in the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) receive a more prioritized position (Speth and Haas, 2006:130- 131). Such hierarchy is potentially found as well within the Arctic Council cooperation on sustainable development, due to interpretative space on which type of development (values) to prioritize, and which regime – climate or energy – to link up with horizontally.

26 A contribution through a micro-level approach Global environmental governance is, of course, a very extensive research field and what has been said so far barely touches the surface. Yet, the small selection above serves to describe ways of reasoning, which are highly relevant to this thesis. As an intergovernmental organization, it is ultimately the states that decide within the Arctic Council, and who sign the agreements. For that reason, in this project states have been selected as the actors to be studied. Yet, much of this thesis is located in and kept close to the small, in what sociologists refer to as the micro-level. This approach has been guided by the idea that any understanding of the big picture runs through an understanding of the small. Members of an organization can, through regime interlinkage, “sometimes foster (or perhaps implicitly force) states to act outside their perceived self-interest, since there is much to gain from being understood as a reasonable actor in international settings” (Faure and Lefevere, 2011:74). This thesis wishes to present the reader with some of these bits and pieces of how this ‘fostering’ occurs, by aiming to contribute with understanding of how global environmental protection is a learning process originating in reflections, perceptions, understanding, and expectations found in the ‘small.’

A theoretical contribution on Arctic Council development The Arctic Council has been studied quite vigorously, especially during the last few years. With an Arctic region moving more and more into centrality, attention has been given to issues such as how to move governance through the Arctic Council forward into the future (Axworthy, Koivurova, and Hasanat, 2012; Nord, 2016a, 2016b; Dodds, 2013). In a similar vein, others have investigated the possible roles that the Arctic Council can take on when the region is now being faced with increased activity and growing environmental challenges (Pederson, 2012; Wilson, 2016). Arctic Council working groups have been described as constituting the Arctic messenger for the need to acknowledge climate change (Stone, 2015); one specific role that has been suggested for the future is a ‘cognitive forerunner,’ where the Arctic Council’s use and improvement of soft power is linked to its ability to reach effectiveness (Nilsson, 2012). Moreover, Arctic environmental governance has been investigated in relation to security, and how the environmental field could represent an entry into also enhanced state security in the Arctic (Stokke, 2014). In relation to (regime) effectiveness, the Arctic Council has been described as a complex governance system (Young, 2012; Stokke, 2013) or a fragmented governance system (i.e., Humrich, 2013), involving governing not only under sovereignty rights, but also through, for instance, EU regulation as well as UN law. Where some have pushed the need for a more all-encompassing environmental treaty or framework that to a greater extent takes into consideration the transboundary character of eco-systems (Koivurova, 2008; Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010), others link the Arctic Council success to the extent it manages to affect or be backed by other (international)

27 institutions (cf. Humrich, 2013; Stokke, 2011; Young, 2009). This way of reasoning highlights regime effectiveness through the dimension of interplay (i.e., interlinkages) that exists within different levels of regulation governing the Arctic. The Arctic Council has also been studied in terms of ‘good governance,’ and the extent to which it allows for indigenous peoples’ participation in norm- and decision-making (Koivurova and Heinämäki, 2006; Poto and Fornabaio, 2017). Still, to my knowledge, no one has actually studied the Arctic Council and its development in terms of either learning or by applying role theory to better understand state behavior and preferences. In that sense, this project will apply a theory to a case not previously investigated through such a theoretical lens. This project therefore is believed to add new dimensions to the understanding of Arctic cooperation and development. The theoretical value would be to show role theory as being well suited to localize, identify, and reason about the Arctic state learning, whereas the empirical value would be enhanced knowledge of the interactive foundation for what is going on in the Arctic.

A contribution through new empirical material The last contribution is empirical and originates from the material collected for the project. Previously, a questionnaire-survey has investigated the former Artic Council members and participants and their views on the Arctic Council being an effective governance system (Kankaanpää and Young, 2012); moreover, a recent dataset study has provided an analysis on stakeholders’ participation in AC meetings (Knecht, 2017). However, the Arctic Council development has not been studied over time through minutes from meetings between Senior Arctic Officials (SAO), at least not to the extent done in this study; in order to explain Russia’s cooperative commitment in the Arctic Council, SAOs meeting minutes have previously been analyzed during three chosen time periods (Chater, 2016). Nevertheless, meeting minutes have not been investigated altogether, nor linked to patterns of states’ role behavior. Furthermore, the Arctic black carbon regime has been investigated in terms of mitigation effectiveness (Shapovalova, 2016), and the agreement on marine oil pollution and preparedness and response in the Arctic (2013) – an agreement resulting from a previous task force than the one studied here – has been investigated in terms of substance and governance impact (Vigeland Rottem, 2015; 2016); however, no studies have been conducted of those two task forces that are of special focus here, and certainly not from a micro perspective. Interviews have been carried out with task force participants; furthermore, these interview records play a significant role in not only providing material to analyze under role theory, but also to give an insight into the functioning of the Arctic Council.

28 2. Methodology and research design

The theatrical act of cooperation

‘Theatre state’ refers to how states are dramaturgically governed, where power is less an issue of coercion and more of convincing ideas. Ideas, in such a setting, are not unobservable mental stuff but made visible in symbols, spectacles and culture (Geertz, 1980:135). Although it is a concept originally applied to the nineteenth century’s Bali, it still captures something symbolically relevant also for this project: states and state representatives are always in front of an audience, and they perform their roles with the help of a script. In environmental cooperation too, ideas are not unobservable stuff; they are expressed in expectations and in learning processes and ultimately in roles. A modified and modern version of theatre states could refer to rituals of environmental diplomacy (Death, 2011). For instance, climate summits contain a large element of diplomatic dramaturgy, where speech-making – and not end results – are governing: “the dominant message of a successfully performed summit is that political elites have risen to the challenge and are hard at work resolving the differences that stand in the way of effective action on environmental problems” (ibid, 2011:7). Meetings, on the one hand, represent politics of performance, and on the other hand, orchestrated spectacles on certain social realities, for instance, on how environmental problems should be understood (Campbell, et al., 2014). In that sense, multilateral summits are, also translated into Artic cooperation, a technique of global governance that stretches beyond state interests on to environmental diplomacy as conveying the ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Death, 2011:13). In this chapter, two methods will be presented and discussed. Both of them serve to gain an understanding of ‘the theatrical act of cooperation,’ and how states act according to a script with many actors involved. The first (1) method chosen is text analysis, applied in order to map the eight Arctic states’ roles. The material used is public available minutes from meetings held between the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) which are national high-level representatives – often Arctic Ambassadors and often from respective state’s foreign ministry. These meetings are exercises of environmental diplomacy, which is why a finding of states as being steered toward environmental cooperation – ‘to have risen to the challenge’ – is somewhat expected. Nonetheless, a text analysis of these meetings aims to reveal more about states than

29 their speech making on the environment; it also provides information on displayed state characteristics within that particular AC setting. As such, it helps to make those ‘ideas observable,’ as spoken of by Geertz (1980), of what it means to be a certain state within the Arctic environmental cooperation, and where things such as expectations and interests contribute to shaping the way states perform roles. The second (2) method chosen, interviews, serves to get an increased understanding of how learning may come about by entering the subjective field of cognitive processes. The interest here is hermeneutically located in an understanding from within (Wacquant, 2002), by ‘scrutinizing and dissecting social mechanisms, such as for instance meaning-making’ (ibid:1470). Thus, the intent with interviews is to get access to how state actors reason about the processes they are part of; how their own state interests, perceptions, and role characteristics fit within the specific process, and how understanding – of others, the process, and of themselves – may create changes on how to perform the role, or ultimately, on beliefs. The endeavor to “make sense of how others make sense of the world” (Jackson, 2008:91) is deduced from a theoretical framework on roles and ego- and alter expectations. Before turning to the respective method, this chapter will continue with a presentation of the Arctic Council, followed by introducing arguments on the selected cases of inquiry.

Introducing the setting: the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council (AC) represents the perhaps most stable and encompassing institution for cooperation in the Arctic, which has moved from a ‘high-level forum’ to an international organization (Dodds, 2013; Nord, 2016a, 2016b). Whereas the Arctic region has been described as a different, unique, regionalization process due to being constituted by competing Arctic interests and discourses, while yet attempting to enhance Arctic governance (Albert and Vasilache, 2017), it has also been considered a unique model for peace- and stability-building (Brigham et al., 2016). There are other fora for cooperation in the Arctic, like the Barents Euro-Arctic Region or the Nordic Council, but the AC has been chosen for this project for several reasons: it includes all Arctic states, it is devoted to Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development, and its working groups (WGs) are providing the Arctic states with new information, knowledge, and perspectives on extended Arctic governance. These WGs are reputable and have produced many reports that put the Arctic on the global environmental map, not least through the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA, 2004). The AC is about decision-shaping rather than decision-making, since its mandate does not stretch to enforcement or monitoring of policies and regulations (Knecht, 2017). However, it bases its work on an inclusive “soft-law approach” (Koivurova and Heinämäki, 2006), where associations of indigenous people can also give their input

30 on the agenda, and have an effect on how Arctic issues are understood and approached (ibid). Although no formal decision-making power is allotted to them and they cannot break a consensus, one representative from an indigenous people’s association – which in the Arctic Council obtains membership as the so called Permanent Participant (PP) – explains the impact to be normatively anchored: “I have never seen the Arctic states move forward with something that PPs would disagree on without dealing with the reasons for those disagreements […]. In a consensus based context, PPs have a lot of power, more than people realize” (Interview, 2015a). Consequently, other things than just material state interests serve to establish ‘the conduct of conduct’ in cooperation. The AC is therefore understood to represent an arena where requirements for change (foremost science, PPs, and environmental interests), and preferences for continuity (industries and economic interests) offer an illustrative setting for the learning processes at play – also in connection with environmental norms – amongst interacting states. In 2016, AC celebrated its 20th anniversary. During its lifespan, it has widened its scope of cooperative issues that it deals with, approaching environmental protection and sustainable development from new perspectives.11 The institutional structure has been deepened, with a standing Secretariat formally established since 2013 in Tromsø and based on a Norwegian initiative, as well as three legally binding agreements: on search and rescue in the Arctic (2011), on marine oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic (2013), and on enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation (2017). Issues such as transparency, efficiency, and follow-up have also gained stronger ground (Nord, 2016a:31). Apart from the eight Arctic states including Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S., members of the AC also include six organizations of Arctic indigenous communities. These are Permanent Participants (PPs) and represent traditional knowledge holders: the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (Raipon), as well as the Saami Council. Living conditions, culture, and ethnicities do not only differ between organizations, but within organizations. Raipon, for instance, represents more than a quarter of a million people, and 41 different groups of indigenous communities. In addition to states and PPs, the Arctic Council hosts a number of observers, both states and organizations,

11 The exact phrase of the founding statute is that cooperation and interaction should be promoted on “common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.” Matters related to military security are explicitly excluded (Ottawa Declaration, Art. 1a). The AC has widened in other ways, by creating independent regimes through recent offsprings such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), the Artic Offshore Regulator’s Forum (AORF), and the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), all established in 2015.

31 where the latter are both non-governmental, inter-governmental, and governmental ones. The interest to become an observer has steadily increased.12

The structure of the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council is structured as a hierarchical pyramid, around bodies performing both political and scientific work on Arctic issues. Ministers are located at the top of the decision-making chain. Since 2011, the reference to ‘Ministers’ has predominantly been Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Ministerial meetings take place every second year and is hosted by the country holding the Chair.13 Chairmanship rotates in cycles of two years, coalescing in rotation with the Ministerial meeting. This meeting ends with the signing of a declaration, named after the locus of the held Ministerial, and, if any, agreements. The declaration reflects the direction for the coming two years.

Figure 3: Structure of the Arctic Council

12 North-East Asian states, like China, Japan, South Korea, and also Singapore, who all gained observer status in 2013, have followed the development of the Arctic sea lanes with increased interest, as they are economically beneficial for the transportation of imported and exported goods (Jakobson and Lee, 2016). Observer membership is open to states or organizations that the AC “determines can contribute to its work” (Ottawa Declaration, 1996, Art. 3). An Environmental ngo like Greenpeace has applied for membership, but it has not been granted it. WWF was present at the signing ceremony establishing the Arctic Council, and received observer status already in 1998. Currently (2018), thirteen non-Arctic states are admitted observers, as are thirteen inter-governmental-/inter- parliamentary organizations and thirteen non-governmental organizations. 13 The order of chairmanship has been the following: Canada 1996-98, USA 1998-2000, Finland 2000- 02, Iceland 2002-04, Russia 2004-06, Norway 2006-09, Denmark 2009-11, Sweden 2011-13, Canada 2013-15, USA 2015-17, and Finland 2017-.

32 Even though the Ministers hold the formal power in the AC, they are not involved in the daily work. Instead, the lion share of tasks in the Council is carried out far from decision-making and political power, at the pyramid base by Working Groups (WGs). These research entities encompass six, each one organized through its own mandate and structure, and performs scientifically-based assignments and evaluations of the Arctic region, developing reports and making assessments. As such, they map, investigate, and recommend, extensively contributing to the Arctic knowledge base, providing a background and enhanced understanding for actors operating on a more political mandate. Their work is generally well received and regarded, not only by policy-makers within the AC but also the broader global setting. Often, WGs seek contributions from scholars across the Arctic, as well as input from the permanent participants (Nord, 2016a:47-48). Much of their work is instigated by themselves, but all material marked with an AC logo has been ordered and approved by a joint decision from the Senior Arctic Officials. Senior Arctic Officials, often Arctic Ambassadors, are the hub of the Arctic Council: everything that happens in the AC runs through the SAOs. They discuss things such as the ACs future, outreach activities, and pressing concerns. Furthermore, projects undertaken by the working groups are presented to SAOs, in a condensed format, who then ask questions or raise concerns. SAO meetings are held twice a year. Before each Ministerial meeting, SAOs put together an extensive report based upon all work conducted by the working groups and others, with deliverables and work plans, to the Ministers. Ministerial meetings, as one interviewee with working group experience explains, often reserve only two hours for a review of the work conducted – reports, agreements, and plans ahead (Interview; Adviser 11). It is thus SAOs – not Ministers – that prepare for all the decisions that are to be made, ready for the Ministers to sign. Lastly, task forces are also sanctioned by the SAOs, and approved by the Ministers, brought into existence by specific terms of reference. These task forces are negotiation forums, and thus have a political dimension. Their mandates stretches for two years, and their conclusions are suggestions that in one way or another pertain to how the Arctic cooperation should move forward within specific issue areas, such as oil spill prevention. Currently, one Expert group is also active, as a direct follow-up on – and administration of – the task force on reductions of black carbon and methane, working on recommendations on how to practically (and nationally) progress with the task force agreement on emission reductions.

33 Selection of cases

The focus of this thesis is targeted at the level of the SAOs, as well as the task forces. Although working groups represent the movement forward on environmental norms – it is through assessments and mappings that the experts and scientists identify and shed light on the Arctic problems – they are not decision-makers. A study on learning could, of course, have chosen this level, dissecting how epistemic communities could teach organizations to improve environmental management activities by providing nonpartisan scientific information (Haas and Haas, 1995; Stone, 2015; Miller, 2004), or to focus on the scale and re-scaling process on norm-production (Speth and Haas, 2006; Zelli, Gupta and van Asselt, 2012). It could also have chosen to devote more attention to members such as permanent participants, and the role of traditional knowledge within international norm-making (Koivurova and Heinämäki, 2006; Shadian, 2013). However, with a thesis aim dedicated to an understanding of how states learn – with the implicit goal of arriving at more knowledge on how close or how far away Arctic environmental protection is – the focus shifts from norm production to norm cascading and norm internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The important thing to investigate, for this thesis, is not that norms exist, but rather how states – those who ultimately make decisions – become susceptible (or not) to current state of Arctic affairs, and choose to either embrace or resist the norms made aware by science. For that reason, interaction governed by state representatives, such as task forces and SAOs, have been selected as objects of analysis, rather than WGs or PPs. The theoretical framework presented in this thesis connects ‘the visibility’ of learning to a pattern of behavior approached as a role where the state is the actor. Meetings between the Senior Arctic Officials are here deemed the most suitable type of interaction to depart from, for primarily three reasons: firstly, they are appointed Arctic ambassadors, and as such diplomatic representatives of high rank, explicitly and formally acting as ‘the state’. Secondly, the perpetuation of meetings, twice each year, makes it possible to not only describe a role as it was expressed at a particular time and space, but to identify a role pattern where things such as context may add dimensions. It should therefore be possible to account for a potential incorporation of new norms (i.e., learning) into the role. Thirdly, a practical reason concerns the material, where meeting minutes are public and thus available for longitudinal analysis. However, it is not only the SAOs that are performing the state role, task forces are also engaged in negotiations. Each state delegation consists of a Head of delegation (from the relevant government ministry) acting as chief negotiator. In addition, the task force delegation team consists of civil servants and experts, from ministries and authorities (like Environmental Protection Agency, Coast guard, and similar). Sometimes the business sector is invited to join a delegation as well, for instance, oil

34 companies, or a non-governmental organization like the WWF. The idea with incorporating task forces into this project goes in the opposite direction of what was said about the SAOs, and is derived from an appreciation of these processes having a clear beginning and end. As such, one can apply the role mapped at the level of the SAOs onto the task force interaction, and gain a fuller understanding of how processes of social interaction may spur states to learn. The SAOs, in that sense, provide the background, whereas the task forces bring the possible learning substance about: norms and expectations to be provided with meaning given each state’s role, and the character of the specific negotiation process. There are two task forces studied in this thesis: Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP) and Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM). Both of them were created through the Kiruna Ministerial in 2013 and had their work completed by the Iqaluit Ministerial in 2015. These task forces represent in a way two different cases: one where oil, commercial interests, and security are the focus, and another where climate change and Arctic warming is in the spotlight. TFOPP is a task force where the delegation sizes are substantial, up to 12– 14 national representatives per meeting, in comparison with TFBCM where a handful of delegates maximum attended each meeting. This could indicate differences in political priority, or at least, political sensitivity. In this thesis, the two task forces are understood as two separate cases. Each task force is analyzed as a specific part of a ‘universe,’ a well-defined episode. It is furthermore a case of something – in this case an interactive process – potentially leading up to learning. (George and Bennet, 2005:18). Still, although one could argue learning to be the interactive effect that this thesis dwells upon, it is less interested in linking this to a search for specific causes. It is therefore not a comparative case study, which attempts to search for an independent variable that causes learning to happen (or not) in the task forces, or that departs from a negative method of difference when approaching them (ibid:153). Rather, the two task force cases serve to enhance an understanding on learning processes, and should therefore be viewed as complementary cases.

Level of analysis

As described in the beginning of this chapter, roles and learning are approached from a micro perspective (task forces) as well as a meso perspective (meeting between the SAOs). To refer to meso and micro, and not state (or organization) and individual level, originates from a sociological understanding of IR: actors are not isolated entities but social beings. There is a difference between approaching levels as ‘objects of analysis’ and levels as ‘sources of explanation’ (Buzan, 1994). In this thesis, objects of analysis are states, investigated both through the SAOs and the task forces. Regarding the source of explanation, it is social interaction that is investigated in both the case of SAOs and

35 the task forces: In SAOs, in relation to roles, and in task forces, in relation to efforts to reach an understanding – and then for both of them, in the longer run, in relation to learning. However, by adding a meso and micro perspective in relation to interaction as a source of explanation, a distinction evolves on how to study this, depending on whether the focus is on the SAO level or the task force level. From a meso level (i.e., SAOs and the Arctic Council), the roles are partly something that can be observed based upon role performance. From a micro level (task forces and individuals representing states), the roles are more reasoned as cognitively created processes within individuals. Levels are here understood as a way to ‘frame space’ into expressions of different dimensions of social interaction (Onuf, 1995), rather than depicting levels as hierarchically ordered. The guiding assumption is that the more we know about the ensemble of components making out action, and the relations between them, the more we can derive from actions in higher levels (ibid:54), like Global Environmental Governance. In this project, it has been considered important to include a micro perspective to enhance an understanding of how states learn in environmental cooperation. Of focus is how state representatives understand and relate to the processes of which they are part. Things such as trust, sincerity, awareness, and notions of Self are all imbedded in – and highlighted by – the micro perspective (Habermas, 1984; Frank, 1989). To capture the personal in politics seems thus highly important, since a relationship may affect what will be attributed meaning-systems within political decision-making (Corson et al., 2014: 21, 25). Behavior cannot be solely deduced from the macro level and the structures ordering that sphere, since that would bypass the process of making meaning systems. The micro level is a bearing foundation for understanding of higher levels’ state behavior (Habermas, 1984; Frank, 1989). It is also a bearing component when attempting to understand how ideas circulate, and could act as a good entry into higher levels of Global Environmental Governance (Campbell et al., 2014; Corson et al., 2014).

Object of analysis From the outset, the object of analysis has been established to be states; specifically, states playing roles. At the same time, state interaction within the task forces is approached through individuals, through interview accounts of their experiences and expectations. To what extent could these individual accounts yet be translated into a possibility for state learning? The approach taken here is that states are organized through individuals. At the same time, it also acknowledges that social norms and structures impact even though individuals, perhaps not even the majority, would agree to these. This reconciliation between methodological individualism and holism is also one found within the social constructivist perspective on IR, where states cannot be reduced to individuals (see List and Spiekermann, 2013). Although states are attributed the same qualities as people, being rational, sincere, holding beliefs, and so on – states can only act like as-if persons: they are the behavior and discourses of

36 the people who make up them, but yet bigger than the sum of that interaction that takes place among people (Wendt, 2004). In that sense, states are driven by individuals who in a coherent manner respond to driving (cognitive) motivations of what is meant by being a social human being, but who also find their behavior to be formed by norms and structures. To investigate how states learn, applying a micro perspective (on individuals) is an illustration of states acting like as-if persons, without reducing states to individuals. Oran Young (1991) argues that the ultimate determinant of success or failure of regime formation is the way individuals express political leadership. State interaction, through negotiations or cooperation, could be argued to bring forward ‘the best’ in individuals by offering them an area to “demonstrate their personal attractiveness” by showing “their intelligence, their cleverness, their coolness” (March, 1994:215). In their role as state representatives, they proclaim their value as individuals – at least those values that are highly cherished socially (ibid). The latter touches upon individuals, that is state representatives, to succumb under ‘the state’ as bigger than the sum of people. This is because two watchwords that few state officials want to violate are public trust and professional integrity (March and Olsen, 1995:58). Individuals representing states could therefore be assumed to keep their respective state’s policy preferences and good reputation in mind as a norm on professionalism to not be violated. Within this assumption also lies a willingness to play the state role as rehearsed, expected, and deemed appropriate.

Methods of text analysis and interviewing

Text analysis The text analysis carried out in this thesis aims to map the role of each Arctic state. Once the role is mapped, it can then serve as a ‘starting-point’ for discussions in sequential chapters (5-7) on processes of learning. However, the role mapping itself also involves social interaction to add an understanding of learning processes: in national policy documents like the Arctic strategies, states describe their Arctic interests, ambitions, and activities, and how they perceive themselves to be Arctic. In the Arctic Council and in the SAO meetings, the role performance may, or may not, be in line with this. Any discrepancy between them directs light on interaction as potent enough to affect the role performance, or reveal to the state a role ambiguity. Interaction is here understood as representing a ‘diplomatic dramaturgy’ conditioned by things such as understandings of social rules. The role performance made visible in the SAO meeting minutes is also interesting since it gives information on how the AC has developed, and not least – how the Arctic states have acted therein.

37 The text analytical method described here concerns states’ roles and role performances, which are investigated through materials such as meeting minutes from the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO).14 The SAOs hold their meetings twice a year, hosted by the country holding the Chair. Each meeting results in a report – meeting minutes – generally ranging from about 10 pages up to 25 pages, describing the current state of the AC, its activities, and where it is heading These meetings also bring up comments, initiatives, and concerns as put forward by the individual SAOs (i.e., member states). Meeting minutes are available from 1999,15 and these are studied until year 2016. It covers in total 33 meetings, distributed over approximately 500 pages, and provides thus an overview of how the AC cooperation has developed up until the present day. A code book has been developed and used for clarifying what to search for when reading the documents. It builds upon the ambition to map the eight Arctic states16 and their frequency within three listed categories of cooperative dimensions (altogether 39 different variables). The first (1) category entailed topics of specific interest for this study, such as climate change, short-lived climate pollutants, maritime safety, and oil and gas issues. Additional topics were included as well, for instance, fishing, sustainable development, indigenous populations and traditional culture. The second (2) category concerned expectations and judgments on other actors (member states, WGs, or PPs). Most of the variables in categories one and two were set up in two versions in order to capture the attitude: one variable covered a neutral or positive attitude (on state x, climate change, etcetera), whereas the other variable covered a negative or cautious attitude toward the same. The last category (3) concerned different types of behavioral characteristics, such as leader, initiator, administrator, expert, and so forth.17

14 Other types of material found in the Arctic Council is official material like Ministerial Declarations (one per chairmanship), Statements by ministers (at Ministerial meetings), agreements, and not least reports and assessments from the WGs. Working groups also produce material summarizing practical workshops, (rescue) exercises, and similar. Meeting minutes from the SAOs are not approved AC material per se, and thus provided with a disclaimer stating that these minutes only represent drafts (and not approved versions like reports and assessments), which are made available in order to provide a historical perspective of the Arctic Council. For the purpose of this thesis, this more ‘unofficial’ character is considered the most suitable for capturing and describing role patterns. This pattern has also been associated with Ministerial statements to make role illustrations. Also, task forces write short meeting minutes, so called “Two-pagers,” as well as publish a list of meeting attendees, agendas, and recommendations, all of interest for this thesis. 15 Exceptions are the following: the year 2000 and 2004 have minutes available from only one meeting, and no minutes are available at all from 2006. Minutes up until year 2016 are included in the scope of this study. 16 ‘SAO’ was also included as an actor to speak on cooperative topics. Also, PPs were included to get a reference of the frequency of states mentioning specific topics. 17 Altogether, 18 behavioral characteristics were initially searched. To start with, more forms of categorized behavior, which then could be combined under a ‘bigger’ heading – for instance, administrator, communicator, and organizer – were considered more appropriate, than the other –

38 The text analysis is a content analysis that makes use of both qualitative and quantitative elements, but where the latter takes a subordinated position by ‘counting’ state characteristics – or perhaps rather categorizing in an excel document – into things like attention devoted issues, attitudes, and behavior, where the analysis identifies a behavioral pattern for each state (Bergström and Boréus, 2000:45, 47-48). Rather than attempting to establish behavior in numbers, the text analysis is dedicated to tendencies and patterns regarding states’ roles. This behavioral pattern has then been illustrated, not by numbers but through characteristic examples of how the role is performed, using a more ‘personal’ or ‘small’ perspective that signifies this thesis. Each meeting has therefore also been captured in writing and divided per state, to provide the pattern with empirical substance.

Problems encountered The SAO meeting minutes are written to be made public. As always, this means that more things have occurred at meetings than visible in the text. However, attending the SAO meetings has not been possible, partly because a mapping of roles requires a study of meetings that already have taken place, but also because it would have been both politically18 and logistically impossible to observe all the meetings needed in order to get access to a role. Also, to ‘study up,’ i.e., to use participant observations as a research strategy, becomes unavoidably more difficult the higher up the social structure one finds the study object in question (see Gusterson, 1997). A quite significant problem encountered has to do with the uneven way of writing meeting minutes.19 Whereas the first handful of years promised more for the analysis in terms of detailed accounts of who said what, when and how, minutes have become less detailed and more anonymized (referring to ‘most SAOs’ rather than individual states). This correlates with the AC – and the Arctic – moving up the political agenda. For that reason, it is not possible to present any numbers or charts on role components, topics, or state mentioning of each other: such figures would more likely point toward what the particular note taker of that meeting wanted to make public, rather than have it represent a general trend in cooperation. This means that the analysis has to be carried out in a context-specific and relational manner, where each

more definite – way around. Such a strategy also ensured that those uncertainties that existed regarding how to code a certain behavior (would it, for instance, be as a communicator searching for transparency and accessibility, or as the closely related administrator searching for efficiency), would not have an effect on the larger ‘state role’ later developed. 18 With the assistance of the Swedish delegation that together with Canada co-chaired the Task force on Black Carbon and Methane, I sent a request to participate as an observer in one of their meetings. However, the request was not accepted. 19 Initially, the aim was to conduct a bit more quantified analysis in SPSS, and all the data were distributed to and coded into this program. However, since the material was of varying quality, in terms of details provided for, an analysis to measure the actual frequency would be misleading as information on role performance and role change.

39 state behavior has been interpreted in light of the frequency-level revealed by the other states in the same period of time. Obviously, this constraints what is possible to conclude regarding the development of the AC. Still, the information is considered sufficient to establish a general role pattern, which means a foundation to emanate from in those learning discussions to come in later chapters.

Interviews For this project, 28 interviews have been conducted with participants in the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP) and the Task force for Action on Enhanced Reduction of Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM).20 16 of these interviews were with TFOPP participants, and 12 with participants in the TFBCM. 23 of the interviews were conducted with state representatives, and the others represent observers, PPs, and WGs. A little less than half of the state representatives acted as the Head of Delegation. The vast majority of interviewees professional titles were similar to advisers and senior advisers, senior consultants, and directors. As such, they fit the definition of elite interviews by being either in close proximity to power and policymaking (Lilleker, 2003; Mikecz, 2012), or having particular expertise (Morris, 2009 (following Burnham, 2004)). Interviews followed an interview-guide, but were semi-structured and allowed the interviewee to develop on themes of special importance. Most interviewees, however, stayed close to the questions. Broadly, the interview guide centered around four themes: key message from state x in relation to TFOPP/TFBCM; how the task force process was experienced; which (implicit) role state x perceived itself to be given and/or perform, in addition to perceptions of the other states; and ‘lessons learned’. The focus in interviews was thus on interviewees reflections on what it meant to represent a specific state in a specific group, rather than attempting to establish or re- create the exact episodes taking place within the respective task force. The majority of those interviews that were conducted with representatives from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia were made face-to-face, whereas the rest were conducted over the phone. The average length of the interview lasted for an hour, but two were as short as 35 minutes, and several others as long as 1 and a half to 2 hours. The fact that 28 interviews cover two different task forces, each involving eight states in addition to observers and PPs, means that the state perspectives and reflections that will be described in chapters 5 and 6 do not rely on a whole lot of different interview accounts. However, this is still as it should be, given that a cooperative process (on learning) – not individual states – is the topic of this thesis.

20 Apart from these interviews with the task force participants, two interviews have been carried out with Arctic experts at environmental non-governmental organizations, to provide for an expanded perspective on the Arctic and issues of oil pollution and short-lived climate pollutants. In addition, more than half a dozen of informal interviews have also been carried out with civil servants and officials involved in the Arctic Council work, as a starter for this project and with the purpose of identifying relevant issues to focus on in the Arctic.

40 One should furthermore bear in mind that the earlier discussion on object of analysis, where it was argued that professionalism and conformity guided the behavior of individuals representing the states, and expect the same to be true here as well. From a practical perspective, the interviews conducted with the state representatives are distributed between seven states per task force: Iceland did not actively participate in the TFBCM, and in the TFOPP none of the contacted Canadian state officials wanted to be interviewed. For several of the delegations, this still meant full answering frequency: state delegations in the TFBCM and TFOPP ranged from 1 person up to about 20 participants in total (and with 12-14 people occasionally present at the meeting). Participants with a high meeting attendance were given priority when interview requests were sent out. That many delegations are rather small complicates the issue of anonymity. Whereas all interviewees were offered this opportunity, it was not the preference for most. Still, in order to grant anonymity to those who wished, all interviews are anonymized, referenced by the interview date as the general rule. Yet, depending on the context – in which chapter passage the interview account is figuring – a date can also be too much information. In other situations, knowing that the particular interviewee does not wish for anonymity, more information than a date has been deemed to add further situated understanding, foremost concerning the function (adviser/negotiator) of the interviewee in the task force Therefore, other ways to reference than by interview date will also be used in order to protect the integrity – both ways – of the interviewees.

Interpreting interview data

Whenever a method like interviewing is used, the validity of such material lingers on reflections concerning how these interview accounts came about. Epistemologically, the type of knowledge produced would be highly dependent on the relationship between the interviewee and interviewer. Does the interview generate data, or is the act of interviewing itself the data; is it a resource, or a topic (see for example, Rapley, 2001)? Similarly, the Norwegian psychologist Steinar Kvale (2009) portrays the interviewer as either a miner or a traveller; as someone who either ‘digs out’ (reveals) knowledge hidden within the respondent, or as someone who sees the interview as a conversation with no pre-determined direction. To treat the interview data as a resource, as knowledge made visible through ‘mining,’ would then give us a position on data where there are such things as “facts about behaviour and attitudes” (Silverman, 2001:89). It would further, to use the words by Kvale, illustrate knowledge as something that can be collected rather than the opposite of being a constructed result of the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (2009:48). This project adheres to an understanding where knowledge can be collected (by listening to the interviewee), and where analytical focus is on the

41 interview result (what the interviewee said). To exemplify, the interview is believed to be capable of providing and generating knowledge on – for instance – meeting procedures, state preferences and expectations, as well as the importance being ascribed to the negotiated issue. However, as the example below tries to illustrate, to ‘collect knowledge’ is not without difficulties:

If the interview conducted above had been all about revealing information possessed by Mr. M – and where his words had been taken to ensure real experiences – not much room had been given to think about my impact as a researcher on these told experiences. This is critically referred to as the ‘vessel of answer’ approach, where interviewees are treated as passive objects (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). If the focus is only on what is being said and not how these words came about, then there is a risk of a researcher-biased result. In such an approach, one fails to view the interviewee as an active subject – a vessel of topic – that in an interactive setting actually partakes in producing knowledge (ibid). To return to Mr. M: Mr. M quite evidently felt reluctant to answering questions about the social dimension of international negotiations – but he still repeatedly tried to. What does this mean for the interview result; was he pushed in a direction of saying what he thought was expected of him? Did my choice of words and questions create an interview knowledge that was constructed to such an extent that it had less to do with the interviewee’s experiences and more to do with our interaction? When interpreting the interview data, these are questions to consider. A quite simple but nice answer regarding how to interpret data, which seems questionably sprung, is provided in the following: “[t]he point is to try to grasp the relationship between the interview as social interaction and as vessel of topic”

42 (Warren, 2012:130). In other words, in order to know if the respondent’s answer is suitable to use as a resource, as data, the researcher should pay enough attention to the social interaction that occurs within the interview setting. But how would ‘grasping’ then be achieved? Mats Alvesson (2011) offers guidance through reflexivity, allowing for the subject matter to be interpreted from different angles. Reflexivity should inform interpretations and allow different possible interpretations to exist in parallel; it should challenge the prevailing interpretation, and it should spur imaginative efforts and thereby extend the thinking of specific phenomena (2011:106). Reflexivity would also be important in order to correctly interpret which subject is given voice in the interview. Mr. M, for instance, is giving me the interview in the capacity of him being a state representative. In the previous interview quote, however, he makes reference to himself as the subject rather than the role of being a state representative. To separate roles – capacities in which people speak – could be difficult during an interview. It is however important to be attentive to which subjectivity is talking since this could have an effect on how the data should be interpreted.

Illustrating interpretations – where words are misleading To concretize how a reflexive approach on social interaction will add important information regarding interpretations, two examples will be given. (1): When sharing views on the presence of energy political interests within the task force on reductions of emissions from black carbon and methane, one of the co-chairs expressed the following:

Well, it has not been as noticeable as I thought it would be. But that is because we have concentrated on this issue [reducing black carbon and methane], we have not discussed a ban on Arctic oil prospecting or production. Then, of course, it had been much clearer lines of division between those who want it and those who do not (laughing subtle).

Although a first read might suggest that the interviewee did not consider energy politics to have impacted upon negotiations, a second read slightly adds nuances. This is because the interviewee starts off by telling us that he started off from somewhere in his expectations of how energy politics would have an impact. Compared to this starting-point, energy politics was not as noticeable as would have been expected. Perhaps of little surprise, there is a background from which all expectations depart. These expectations could be linked to prior experiences of ‘energy politics’ noticed within the national/international environmental processes, or they could more loosely be linked to general expectations of how energy political interests operate. Nonetheless, to really grasp what the interviewee describes would require a more thorough knowledge of where his expectations start out from. “Don’t argue with the members” is an advice by Gubrium and Holstein (2012), pointing toward the

43 importance of context as sense-maker of meaning. One should not challenge accounts given by the interviewee by replacing it with one’s own meaning, but rather try to track where it contextually stems from. The meaning would be found to be located there.To apply a reflective approach here means (following Alvesson, 2011:113-114) to imagine the interviewee as, on the one hand, a truth-teller (regarding lived experiences) and on the other hand, as a political actor that is being constrained by certain structures (regarding what he sees). What is in between is then possible to think about and reflect upon in different ways; to stretch imagination but also to eradicate misunderstandings and interpretative mistakes. For elite interviews, where people often have an agenda of their own, are knowledgeable, and accustomed talkers, it becomes possibly even more important to be aware of what ‘is in between’ (see Mikecz, 2012). (2): The next example concerns the social dimension of interview as a method. In many ways, it is similar to conversations. Through conversations, people get to learn about people, whereas in interviews they learn about peoples’ lives by asking questions (Kvale, 2009). It therefore triggers ordinary social behavior, which is why imitation should not be underestimated; people (normally) smile when smiled at, are more right to the point when the conversational partner seems in a hurry, and lower their voices in mirror. Then, of course, words used are also copied. The following interview transcript is an attempt to illustrate the latter. Here, the task force interviewee had just talked about different state behaviors, or roles, and I, the interviewer, was interested in finding out more about how this behavior was, or became, cooperative.

Interviewer: Would you say there are aspects of adaptation to each other, perhaps even learning?

Interviewee: […] We entered this process with the resolution of achieving a binding quantitative goal, but gradually we understood it would never pass the US Congress. It needed to be formulated differently. One learns from each other during the course of action and realizes that it needs to be something that suits us all, or it will end up being nothing.

Interviewer: You said ‘learn from each other,’ can you elaborate on what you mean? Would you, for example, say that learning such as thinking in new ways has been present?

Interviewee: Well, I have not really thought about it like that. It has been a successive process for a year and a half…But yes, for sure, I believe one has a different thinking at the end of the process than in the beginning, yes definitively, I believe that.

The second part of this transcript is close to me, the interviewer, asking leading questions by telling the interviewee which learning ‘to count.’ Learning, I say,

44 equalizes thinking in new ways. Thereby, our interaction potentially is leading astray from the interviewee’s real experiences and perceptions thereof, rendering the data questionable. The first part however feels more as originating from the interviewee, but the question is still to what degree? The interviewee mentions learning, that national delegates ‘learn from each other’ in international negotiations, something liked to be conceptualized further. However, to what extent is the interviewee’s account of learning really ‘worth’ something, since initially the word was coming from the interviewer? How much more value would instead be added in the case if learning firstly appeared in the interviewee´s vocabulary, and then picked up by me? In this particular transcript, it is believed that social interaction has rendered the concept of learning quite empty. But by being attentive to and aware of where mistakes have been carried out, interviews are a rich source to gain knowledge about events and experiences that one cannot acquire.

Conclusion

States engaged in international cooperation, in this case Arctic Council cooperation, have been approached in this chapter as conveying theatrical acts of role performance, to a certain extent. From a methodological perspective, an understanding of international cooperation as representing role play between states moves the analytical attention beyond state interests further on to (also) structures, norms, and social rewards. To investigate roles from two levels, a meso- and a micro level, is believed to dissect states’ roles in such a way that interests, structures, norms, and social rewards will all be managed within the role concept, and provide a picture of how states learn. A text analytical method has been chosen to map states’ general role patterns, and it departs from the AC level through the SAO meetings. To get access to how states learn, the process where actors think of their role in a reflective and relational manner, a suitable method was argued to be interviews, revealing the micro-perspective on understanding and learning processes. A fair share of this chapter was devoted to interviews and potential difficulties with interpreting its data, which also is connected with how to link the meso- and micro level together in a persuasive way. It was argued that close attention needs to be paid to: how the data came about, what the context and experiences were from which the data was derived, and in which role the interviewee spoke – as someone who represented the state, or as an individual separate from the profession? A state has not changed its role in cases where the interviewee blames his or her own personal shortages (of being poorly prepared, lacking English proficiency and similar) for the specific state performance, neither has a state learned something just because a representative would copy the word ‘learning’ in a conversation. In cases like these, questionable interview data have been generated.

45 Moreover, it might be that interview-talk does not produce reality per se. The interviewee chooses to highlight certain things when answering, and the researcher chooses to interpret some things as more important than others: some things will be viewed as facts, while other things will stay in the interview transcript. As such, it is agreed with those who argue that the interview is more of a “display of perspective” than the only true interpretation, i.e., a version of data and not the only data (see Silverman, 2001; Rapley, 2001; Morris, 2009). Yet, accepting this, interviews still serve well to inform knowledge about ‘reality,’ and where knowledge gained through interviews indeed can be transferred – with the help from theory – to a bigger context.

46 3. Investigating learning by theorizing roles

States know what they want, do they?

In a work dedicated to national interests in international society, the social constructivist Martha Finnemore concluded: “states do not always know what they want” (1996:128). This chapter discusses how ‘wants’ become visible to states through an interactive learning process on roles: what should they want given their role? Moreover, Finnemore also said “states are what they do” (ibid:4). Albeit not disagreeing per se, the theoretical framework presented in this chapter takes one step back by arguing that ‘states become through expectations.’ This is an argument supported by role theory, where expectations in various forms and shapes – from ego, alter, and others’ – push states to review the role they play, as well as its suitability to the context. The theoretical framework presented in this chapter should be read as a funnel on interaction, where its link to learning – the understanding of how states learn – becomes more specific the closer, more micro, one gets. Firstly, an overarching discussion on expectations as well as appropriateness is carried out under a constructivist heading of ideas and how these shape international relations. Thereafter, focus will turn to role theory and how roles are a result of expectations targeting different role dimensions, and how these roles furthermore include potential for changes. The third discussion aims to shed light on how roles are made sense of – and thus recognized by actors as in need for changes or not – by applying a micro perspective stemming from social psychology through symbolic interactionism. The fourth and last piece in the puzzle on learning processes would be communication; communication centered on a wish for a reasoned consensus. When actors negotiate and argue, they enhance understanding – on the social context and them within. Understanding would therefore be the last link to learning, where the understanding that arises through interaction bounces back to roles through – possibly – new expectations on the role. In that process, states may also have come to learn more about what they want.

47 A social world of expectations

Given that the starting point of this research is cooperation, central to theorize then is social interaction. The theoretical toolbox used in this thesis is one belonging to a social theory like Constructivism, which directs attention to international politics as constituted by things and orders: between ideas and interests, and between interests and identities. The source of international relations as constitutively constructed is derived from the relationship between agent and structure: an agent is never bigger than his or her surrounding, just like structures have effects that cannot be reduced to agents (Wendt, 1999:139).21 In that sense, international relations are neither static nor destined toward a particular end. Therefore, when Finnemore also writes “states are what they do” (1996:4), she captures the constructed dimension of what it means to be a state, for instance, by performing different tasks the structure will be or already has been altered, thereby simultaneously changing the state nature itself. States cannot step outside of practice since they – to some extent – are the structure establishing practice. At the same time, part of both structure and agency is expectations, to which not least role theory dedicates a fair share of attention. State interests, as well as preferences on which type of behavior to apply internationally, are therefore processes (also) sprung through the international – and interactive – structure. Following Hedley Bull, the assumption here is that there is nothing immanent with having a world order built around ‘states’ that necessarily would turn these states into obstacles of achieving improvement in international society, i.e., that negotiations cannot lead to improvement ‘for all.’ It all depends on the rules governing the social order within which states interact (Bull, 1979). In a similar vein, Alexander Wendt has argued that states are rule-following; they play by the rules of ‘self-help anarchy’ when the interactive process has brought them there, but could just as well play those of solidarity and friendship (Wendt, 1992). On a general level, this implies that states are rather reflexive regarding structural demands and regulations. What they are reflexive on, Constructivism argues, is the notion of what to consider as an appropriate international behavior given all the various expectations from at home as well as from those imbedded in the interactive structure. However, whenever one is talking about appropriateness – as sprung from expectations – this concept needs to be anchored on to something; standing on its own, no real substance can be attached. Instead, it needs a context to provide it with meaning, and it needs norms to be measured against. Finnemore and Sikkink put it in the following holistic way: “[b]ecause norms involve standards of “appropriate” or “proper” behaviour, both the intersubjective and the evaluative dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms. We only know what is inappropriate by

21 That agent-structure is in a constitutive and reciprocal relationship also points toward few things being static. From such a perspective, interests are similar to ideas, and ideas may change.

48 referencing the judgement of a community or a society” (1998:891-892). Norms, therefore, are issues of attached value.

Norms – the link between appropriateness and expectations To say that actors base their choices of action on whether a chosen course of action would be considered appropriate or not is, of course, a theoretical assumption and not a material fact. Really, it could just as easily be argued that all actions taken by states are based upon a consequential analysis looking at how the state will be affected by doing A or B, and where acting appropriate turns out to be the best option after the logic of consequentialism has had its say. However, also this approach would be a theoretical starting-point rather than material fact. In real-life, actors are most likely applying both types of logics to their decisions on which behavioral path to take (see March and Olsen, 1998). In theory, however, one needs to choose since each logic attaches opposing qualities to what it means to exert agency. By placing appropriateness prior to any consequentialist reasoning – as is done in this project – one situates interaction as preceding states’ ability to calculate or even reflect. If appropriateness could be said to pin the rules of the game down, a game where participating actors are assumed to care for belonging as well as how they are perceived, then rules will be followed according to the expectations on how one ought to act. This however does not mean that actions in the end cannot be based upon an individualist logic (March and Olsen, 1998:951-952). It may well be, since in essence, what “appropriateness” conceptually is referring to, is not much more than “a match of behaviour in a given situation” (ibid, 1995:30). The same type of reasoning – that structures decide appropriateness but without attaching any normative considerations or values to the same – could be applied to norms as well; states follow norms to the extent it is considered the appropriate thing to do. The value of the norm, whether ‘objectively’ good or bad, is secondary to such a decision, just as there would be no guarantees regarding norm implementation is understood as the most appropriate outcome (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Norms are just functioning as guides, not enforcers, and they are dependent on players wanting to follow them (Wentworth, 1980). However, if norms are approached having an empirical learning in mind, then some sort of progression is requested regarding the degree to which actors accept to obey the norms as if they would be rules of legal enforcement. Such a process is offered through socialization. This is a process that attempts to ensure states to conform with norms by linking them to others, and thus appealing to the social (psychological) dimension of international relations.

49 Norms – expressed through socialization Ultimately, socialization is about norm transfer from one entity to another, arriving at conformity in the behavior of agents (Flockhart, 2006; Thies, 2010a) As such, it drives learning; it is the process that makes states review their interests, positions, and capabilities against their social context. Any learning on norms therefore presupposes that actors are interacting and becoming influenced by fellow others (Hofmann, 2008:148). The question then arises as to how, or even why would actors get influenced? Although international relations do not depict order and world society as static, there is some material consistency found within human nature. This is because interests may be constituted by changeable ideas, but the former must nonetheless, as Wendt argues, “ultimately hook on to a material ground” (Wendt, 1999:130). Such material ground is illustrated in an actor’s strife for things like self-esteem and social belongingness: people need to – by nature – belong somewhere, and they furthermore need to feel good about themselves (ibid., 132). This makes actors long for recognition, which in addition to being legally considered a sovereign, includes all such things where others are included rather than excluded (Iser, 2015; Lindemann, 2011). The process of socialization helps to define their roles as either ‘in’ or ‘out’ in the cooperation, as friend or as enemy.22 For instance, to play the role of regional protector would be meaningless without a regional protectee (Thies, 2010b:697). The materiality found within people also makes them susceptible to persuasion, where socialization may spur actors to accept ‘the rules of the game’ in order not to be left out, or associated with the ‘wrong’ role. (Wendt, 1999). The process of socialization has been compared with a game of chess (Wentworth, 1980). Any game, chess included, needs to have rules. From a socialization perspective, this means that actors get to recognize a chess move when seeing a chess move, and that they furthermore know – are aware of – the rules to play by. Still, socialization involves elements of choice: to play a game of chess does not presuppose that one must do a certain move in a certain situation, but knowing the rules lets one know what move may be done (ibid., 56-57). There is thus an element of choice involved in socialization, although it could happen in a more or less unreflective way (Wendt, 1999). Socialization, in that sense, is not headed toward normative learning or adaptive learning, but is up to the specific group dynamic to decide. From an empirical perspective on normative learning regarding environmental protection, it could however be argued that the deeper the socialization process, the more inclined

22 Wendt uses role in a less detailed sense than role theory. Role is one kind of identity, which is considering the effect from interaction regarding how we present ourselves (1999: 224-227). Wendt does not extend roles beyond those of enemy, friend, and rival; however, role theory has been committed to the task of showing how various roles are shaped through different channels of interaction and expectations (See McCourt, 2012). Therefore, we might have an identity of our own, but due to us being social beings we cannot express all of it when being together with others. Instead, actors take on roles.

50 the states would be to expect a behavior in line with the norms: to follow norms would be the appropriate thing to do. To get an overview of socialization depth through norms, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have divided the life cycle of norms into three different stages. The first phase (1) of a norm cycle is through the ‘norm emergence phase,’ where actors try to persuade others to follow. This phase could be compared with ‘establishing the rules of chess.’ When actors make use of persuasion, this is something de-linked from material power, and rather entails social power. Small states, notably the Scandinavian states, for instance, often tend to make use of an international strategy of being norm entrepreneurs, thus, increasing their ‘perceptual size’ (Ingebritsen, 2002; Magnúsdóttir and Thorhallsson, 2011). The phase where norms work to potentially socialize actors is called “norm cascade” (phase 2). Here, norms have entered the interactive structure – actors have become aware of rules. In cases where socialization works out nicely and norms are complied with, states identify themselves as members of an international society (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:902-903). There, they respond to “peer pressure” from other states attempting to be perceived as legitimate actors that cherish conformity. The universal need to search for honor could thus be argued to be fulfilled: to gain respect from those who (is perceived to) matter would be crucial for a sense of self-esteem (Lebow, 2008; Browning, 2015). The last phase (3) would be the ‘norm internalization phase.’ Socialization is now deep, to the extent that any debating on norms would be considered redundant – norms are rather taken for granted. As such, the second and third phases could be argued to include social learning: adaptive learning (where strategies on goals are adapted to a new context), and normative (where belief of the empirical value of the norm is confirmed). A difference is noted in the degree of norm stability, where normative learning and norm internalization should be expected to prevail, also in times of sudden change.

Roles: a tracking tool for learning

Although norms are circulating in international relations and provide a background to all cooperation, states neither interpret nor acknowledge these norms in the same way, or similarly decide to play by them. But social interaction compels states to consider norms relevant in more aspects than if they were just unilaterally approached. The thing with roles in international relations is that they approach behavior as a product of social interaction, to a large extent guided by norms. An in- built receptiveness for socialization thus makes roles, conceptually, inclined toward change, rather than statics. It is also a concept that approaches state behavior in IR as something beyond just national conceptions and interests. Really, the core aspect of

51 what roles can contribute with is the bringing in of “others”. Stephen G. Walker defines roles as “repertoires of behaviour, inferred from other’s expectations and one’s own conceptions, selected at least partly in response to cues and demands” (Walker, 1992:23, in Thies, 2010b:6336). Sebastian Harnisch narrows it down to “social positions (as well as a socially recognized category of actors) constituted by ego- and alter-expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group” (Harnisch, 2015: 5, see also Harnisch, 2011a). A description of roles as ‘social positions’ sheds light on the relational dimension of roles, making states potentially more inclined to act responsively to the context. That states and other actors are playing roles when they interact is, of course, metaphorically borrowed from theatre (Thies, 2010b). In theatre, actors follow a script, which pinpoints the ‘rules’ for the assembly to play by should the story and ‘the end’ concur. In this thesis, script – as manifested through the task force negotiations – refers to the dedicated assignment of negotiating a specific issue: to deliver on this would be required if a happy ending is to take place. As such, the script entails storylines that to a certain extent decode how roles should be performed in an appropriate way (Hajer, 2005).23 However roles, in a way, are a tool used to capture state behavior as an expression for temporality – states may act as mediators, initiators, and balancers for instance, but they may not stay that way forever. Roles are therefore also an expression for sociality, in the sense of being a mutual construction between ego- and alter expectations, as well as others’ as requested by the interactive structure. A script is therefore not written in stone, but leaves certain space open for revisions as well as improvisations.

What roles are about

As a theoretical approach, role theory has its origin in sociology, social psychology, and anthropology. It entered the field of political science via foreign policy analysis, but has been applied within IR, to an increasing degree. With the former actor- centered approach (bottom-up) and the latter’s focus on agent-(international) structure (often top-down), these two perspectives are considered to be a good synthesis through which roles in international politics could be understood (Harnisch, Frank and Maull, 2011; Thies and Breuning, 2012). The breakthrough of role theory in political science dates quite far back in time, through Kalevi Holsti’s seminal article (1970) on national role conceptions. By his

23 Also, theatrical phrases such as ‘setting’ and ‘staging’ could illustrate roles in international relations: setting would be the physical arena of interaction, whereas staging concerns actorship and the attempt to change the setting in ways considered more suitable by individual states (Hajer, 2005:626, 631). In this thesis, however, these concepts are to be succumbed by the role concept, which already consists of different components relating to what it means to act within international relations, also considering various types of expectations.

52 suggestion that perceptions, values, and attitudes of decision-makers matter, it has been proposed that Holsti’s work ought to be placed within the Constructivism field, if only Constructivism within international relations would have existed at the time (Breuning, 2011:19). Holsti recognized several things of importance when it came to foreign policy behavior, for instance, that actors (state leaders, in Holsti’s approach) in diplomatic settings were enacting several different roles, that there furthermore were behavioral variation amongst these roles, and that structure mattered to encourage individual behavior “to fit the expectations of others” (Holsti, 1970:235- 236). He also brought role theory from the sphere of individuals on to states. However, Holsti did not really take the interaction effect between states into consideration when studying roles: instead, roles originally came from domestic conceptions, which then were adjusted to those external expectations imbedded in the international structure of laws and values. These latter external expectations – expectations that prescribe roles – were ‘relevant’ Holsti said, but ‘treated as a constant’ (ibid., 244). Indeed, these situational constraints, along with identified patterns of behavioral regularities between governments, could help to explain why policies and roles seem to persist beyond those political elites holding the power (Backman, 1970:311). However, replying back to Holsti, role theory was argued to have more to offer studies of international relations, not least when it came to role conflicts and the impact of others (ibid., 1970).

The different components of roles From an IR perspective, Others have a strong position in interaction, making out one of three basic elements that define actors – their “social self-in-situation:” Self (ego), alter (Other), and environment (Situation) (Walker, 2013:25). An analysis of roles engages in studies of interaction carried out between the agent and structure (Breuning, 2011; Thies and Breuning, 2012), and by connecting self and society, identity (as in ego) and action (McCourt, 2012). Really, international roles are in themselves social structures (Harnisch, 2015). They could be separated into three different dimensions, highly affected by certain stimuli over another, which together form a behavioral regularity manifested as ‘a role’: role conception, role prescription, and role performance. Role conception would be the first dimension of a role. This draws in part on things such as national interests, capabilities, domestic values, and cultural heritage (Breuning, 2011:28), expressed as self-conceptualizations. For a study on roles, it is rendered important to firstly understand the domestic context from where role conceptions emerge (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; Wehner and Thies, 2014). If role conception is thought of as something that contains an actor’s belief regarding who he or she is (his or her self-conception), then role conceptions represent an ego-part of a

53 role.24 That states have an ‘ego’ opens up for some sort of coherence in all those multiple roles actors play in various setting, representing a “hard core” of what it is believed to mean to be a certain state (Müller, 2011: 56). What is said above illustrates role conceptions to build upon a mental element. This however is not the whole picture, since a social element should also be added through expectations. There is an ‘inside’ aspect of expectations that relates to self perceptions, domestic ideas, and interests, which also were Kalevi Holsti’s focus as national role conceptions (1970). But there would be an ‘external’ aspect of expectations that stems from others’ expectations of actors. This means that agent- structure also intersects when role conceptions are created, and is therefore not (only) sprung from the domestic sphere (Breuning, 2011). When alter (i.e., thoughts of others’ expectations) is added, a role conception is elaborated that considers itself in relation to others. Therefore, role conceptions do not only result from perceptions of an actor’s position vis-à-vis other actors, i.e., the ego part, but from how others make use of communication and action to signal expected role behavior, picked up by the alter (Harnisch, 2011a:8; Bengtsson and Elgström, 2011). Role prescriptions would be the second dimension of a role. Role prescriptions form the structure that surrounds interaction, and partly prescribe a certain type of appropriate behavior, based upon norms. Prescriptions are others’ expectations, and as such they constrain the extent to which ego conceptions can be translated into action. It is these expectations, those held by others, which – following Wendt (1999) – would represent forcers of socialization, with conformity as the aim, by appealing to actors’ sense of belonging and we-ness, as well as wishes for self-esteem, also including striving for recognition. Because, as Wehner and Thies explain, roles are “a combination of self-conceptions and social recognition prescribed by Others” (2014:414). In order to formulate national interests and social positions within international relations, states are in need of recognition. Role prescriptions also work in a more explicit way, by recognizing the roles of others: roles need other roles – counter roles – to be provided with meaning, since

24 In order to limit the number of concepts used, ‘ego’ will be applied as an umbrella term for individual characteristics derived from within a state, such as identity but also personality. Identity, how it is perceived here, relates to the inner core of what it means to be a certain individual and is – following Kratochwil (2006) – “that notion of sameness that gives our lives coherence, despite the many roles we play over the course of them” (cited in McCourt, 2012:373). The identity signals what one “is,” but it does not signal any activity as such. Instead, personality does that; it is through the personality that states express themselves (and their identity). Personality however does not necessarily need to shine through when we interact and express the identity of ourselves. Personality does not even need to be the same as identity since capabilities such as being rich and strong might give another access to (and personality in) the social world than weak and small. Yet, personality could have been used as an analytical focus if it were not for the uncertainty that follows from interaction: do states always know who they are in any group, and do they always let their personality shine through? The understanding here is ‘no,’ and instead, roles are believed to capture this behavioral uncertainty where ego pertains to those role characteristics that would exists if states only took action based upon self- conceptualizations (Harnisch, 2011a:7).

54 role theory is a social theory of international politics (Harnisch, 2012; Walker, 2013). An actor can therefore act as a cooperative leader or as a cooperative laggard as much as he or she wishes, but as long as others do not recognize the state for this behavior such a position will – depending on the state preference – be neither obtained nor escaped (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2011:114). Recognition involves a normative evaluation where only some behavioral features (over others) will be recognized, and confirmed as good or bad (Iser, 2015:28). A state may therefore be forced to re- evaluate its self-conceptions vis-a-vis others,25 depending on how it is recognized; that is, what type of prescribed state behavior that others’ recognition reveals. The last role dimension is role performance, also referred to as role enactments, and represents the actual state behavior. This is the behavior that becomes visible in international relations after an actor has consulted, on the one hand, his or her ego, regarding its wants and what possibly could be achieved, and on the other hand, its alter, regarding what a prescribed and appropriate behavior would be like. It is thus the sum of how the agent-structure would be constituted at any given situation. Whereas alter partly, or perhaps even largely, works to constrain ego, ego makes use of an imaginary element when developing its self-conceptions, by thinking through Others. Even though roles show tenure in regularity (Aggestam, 2004; Backman, 1970; Holsti, 1970; Walker, 2013), this, as has been pointed elsewhere in this thesis, leaves the door ajar for change. Role performances shape structure and structure shapes role performance, and imbedded between may role change – expressed as learning – ultimately come about.

Learning as role change Change in international relations originates from conflicts. Not violent conflicts carried out by armed states, but smaller conflicts – those types of conflicts battled in mind. While conflicts normally would be associated with something bad like suffering, conflicts carried out in and by the mind could actually be something empirically good; they could induce learning (see Harnisch, 2012). However, most of the times, change as a result of role conflicts will rather create new role conflicts and new demands for change, in an ongoing process in search for stability (Harnisch, Frank and Maull, 2011). Thus, even though roles are fairly stable, representing patterned behavior, they are also complex having multiple expectations to cope with.

25 Once being recognized for a certain type of behavior, this would however be a part of others’ expectations, making any future recognition of a social position more easily accessed (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2011). However, there is also a danger with prior recognitions in that they will shape expectations in such a way that other actors are incapable of actually observing a new (improved) behavior when faced with one. If that occurs, the structure (the alter part of a role) may lead actors astray from a path that potentially would have been a better choice, not just for the individual actor but for all actors involved in the negotiation process. Therefore, to apply role theory on international relations is to make visible how an actor never can become more than others would allow it to be, and where what is allowed by others’ never can exceed the input from the individual actor.

55 States are not just playing one role but deploying a full role-set under one bigger role ‘heading’: roles are somewhat different depending on the issues, interactive context, and perceptions of power and security (Aggestam, 2004:67). Role conflicts could therefore be expected the more incoherence in roles there is; a role is unstable when norms and objectives do not correlate within the role, or when the role conception is questioned, for instance, due to a lack of confirmative alter recognition. The opposite would occur and the role should be expected to be stable the more compatibility there is within the role set, and the higher level of inter-subjectivity there would be on the role (ibid., 69-70). Little incentives for change exist should the enacted role really be, and be considered to be, an expression for ego role conceptions in line with those held by alter. If change is understood as a response to certain role tensions, the source of location could be incoherence within either role conceptions (ego and alter expectations) or role performance, or between them (Harnisch, Frank and Maull, 2011:256). A state that rhetorically cherishes a certain value, but in action does the opposite reveals an incoherence in role performance that may cause other actors to question its legitimacy (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2011:129): for instance, to condemn coal burning in your words, but in action engage in mining activities is an incoherence that may be troublesome for ego and/or alter expectations to handle. Apart from inconsistent role expectations, other things that cause role conflicts are: vague role expectations, deficient role expertise (weak knowledge or understanding of societal norms), or a leadership that favors too personal characteristics and thus incompatible with the nation’s – as well as others’ – conception of its role in international relations (Harnisch, 2012:50).26 Previously in this chapter, it has been argued that states – to a certain extent – get told of their wants. The perhaps most straightforward illustration of this would be alter-casting, which shed light on how social recognition sometimes work to prescribe behavior in international relations. Since role playing builds upon the notion of counter-roles (Walker, 2013; Wendt, 1999), it refers to the process where actors engage in negotiation in order to persuade others of the legitimacy of their own role, and attempt to ‘cast’ Others into a role that would be confirmative thereof. (McCourt, 2012:380; Harnisch, 2012). That is, a protector needs someone to protect from, a teacher needs pupils, and a leader needs someone that follows. It could be agent-driven and executed by a politically aware actor, but it could also have its source of origin in socialization, where a group of states are acting as teachers on certain norms, alter-casting a specific state the role of ‘pupil’ (Harnisch, 2011a:13).

26 Due to the many regime interlinkages in the world, where states are members of not just one institution but many, inter-role conflicts (rather than intra-role conflicts mentioned above) may be spelled out: different institutions may prescribe different norms and thus potentially different types of behavioral appropriateness. This could make expectations too contradictory for the individual state to manage to perform a role in reasonable accordance with its role conceptions (Harnisch, 2012; Harnisch, Frank and Maull, 2011).

56 However, from a less explicit and more conceptual perspective, states that learn about their wants reflect upon their role within a given context. Should a role conflict erupt, a state may respond by a role change, i.e., some learning. This could be manifested as either a role adaptation (adaptive learning), signifying a role performance based upon new behavioral strategies that are being applied or as a role change due to normative learning on beliefs, preferences, and understandings of the nature of the political system (Haas, 1990; Levy, 1994; Harnisch, 2011a). A contextual change, for instance, is expected to cause a role change: “[r]ole conflicts are more likely when the conditions and context within which they were originally formulated change” (Aggestam, 2004:68). A new context may require changes in role performance and behavioral strategies, but an altered context may also bring about new beliefs and understandings. Such underpinning of role change could be linked to socialization, which implies that normative learning has been preceded by “a complex two-way interaction” between states’ roles and for instance organizational structures (Harnisch, Frank and Maull, 2011:253-254). For that reason, normative learning and role change are more inextricably linked through processes of socialization that bring greater coherence between ego and alter expectations than would be necessitated by a role change caused by adaptive learning, which could suffice with only a strategic change in role performance.

Symbolic Interactionism

Role theory approaches role changes as sprung from a role incoherence of some kind, and where alter expectations play a considerable part. Alter expectations are argued as being capable of constraining, or forming, state behavior through an exercise of soft and social power (Elgström and Bengtsson, 2011; Harnisch, 2012; Harnisch, Bersick and Gottwald, 2015). The question then arises: why should alter expectations – others’ expectations – be of so much importance that states change roles – maybe not in total accordance but still somewhat in line with these expectations? George Herbert Mead, American Social Psychologist as well as one of the founders of Symbolic Interactionism, departs from a micro perspective on self-consciousness when stating an answer: “we must be others if we are to be ourselves” (Mead, 1925:276). Through a deepened understanding of how self-consciousness operates, and how actors go through a social learning process in order to be aware of themselves, Mead provides a deeper understanding of how socialization affects learning and roles. Roles in international relations evolve through three stages: role-taking, role- making, and alter-casting. Although not necessarily succeeding each other, they are in a feedback loop. Mead’s interactionist approach is understood to be particularly

57 helpful in explaining ‘role-taking’ within role theory27 (Beneš and Harnisch, 2015; Harnisch, 2011b, 2015; McCourt, 2012). An actor that enacts a role does not automatically know what is embedded in the role, and tries to grasp the content by thinking through Others in order to find the best way to have the Self represented (McCourt, 2012:378-379). According to Mead, the individual Self is constituted by an I and a Me. I is the (ego) part of an actor, which is aware of the social Me (alter), meaning; the I reacts to the self, a self which arises by taking on the attitudes of others (Me) (Mead, 1934: 174). In a stable situation, Me works in a fairly routine manner following norms as practice. I, on the other hand, would be more impulsive, a creative and irreducible part of the self and would therefore more keenly change (Mead, 1934; Harnisch, 2011a:10-11). Mead illustrates the way that actors become aware of their role and its attached appropriateness with the help of play- and game analogies, which are analogies on socialization. Play and game represent different levels of self- consciousness, where self-consciousness should be understood as a prerequisite for an individual’s ability to apply impersonal reason and rationality (Mead, 1934: 138). The analogy starts with a child that is playing. In ‘play,’ children are continuously imitating the roles of others: the small child shows awareness of society and starts to role-play as mom and dad, as crook and hero, as doctor and cashier staff, and other roles found in the society to which the child belongs. However, the child can only respond to his or her own social acts – imitate – to the degree he or she has called out such a response in others. The child is not bigger than his or her experiences. When the child grows older, however, he or she does not play as such but rather plays games. A game involves following rules and it involves a regulated behavior, thus, demanding a greater imaginary ability regarding society. By taking on the roles of, what Mead refers to as, “generalized others,” the child no longer takes on the role of specific others, but of all others involved.28 Generalized others would be the organization of attitudes of the whole community involved in a specific process. By anticipating the attitudes and expectations of many, the world will grow to the child but more importantly he or she now will be provided with a Self; by responding and reacting through others, he or she becomes as a social object (Mead, 1925:269; Mead, 1934: 153-154).

27 If role-taking would be one process where roles are played out in international relations, a second process would be ‘role-making,’ which would be a little more agent-focused than role-taking; here, states are attempting to initiate action (on the role taken on) and have it accepted by Others (McCourt, 2012:379). Alter-casting would, as described elsewhere in this thesis, be the act of casting Others into roles with the underlying logic of having this to fit the role (vision and goal) of the first actor (McCourt, 2012:380). 28 Generalized others are an abstract social category and pertain, for instance, to what it means to be ‘human’ or to belong to a certain group. Significant others, on the other hand, are the primary socializing agents, who are part of the political discourse and thus can be identified (Beneš and Harnisch, 2015).

58 When an actor that is a beginner on chess, football, or a card-game sticks to it and plays one game after another, the actor will eventually be socialized in all those rules governing the game, how to behave strategically in relation to others, and what a sportsmanlike behavior would be. Against this background, the role has now emerged. If then, a ‘problematic situation’ of some kind were to occur (for the expression, see Harnisch, 2011b), it means that the rules would no longer have the same significance. Following the role theoretical perspective, such a conflict could potentially imply learning. Such a learning process starts with I having taken precedence over Me, but where Me then adds on or modifies by engaging in communication and by considering alter expectations. To Mead, this type of role enactment would originally be a result of the individual ‘self-expression’ (Mead, 1934:212). In routine situations, the self is under social control by Me over I. Then however something happens, which triggers the impulsive I to step outside of the routine situation (Mead, 1934:210-213). However, whereas such an impulsive act by I takes the self into the future, it is not learning since the Self is not really aware of the change being brought about. Neither would that be the purpose of I’s action, which rather would be about sensing freedom by responding to a social situation as interpreted in Me (ibid., 176-177). However, when Me enters the picture, it takes in the community and their attitudes. Actors could then be assumed to initiate a process where they start to argue about a norm change, thus, trying to please I through Me, Me through I. In this project, the aim is to reason around how learning in and through international negotiations may – or may not – result in a change within the self. Theoretically, an actor attempts to find a balance between the ego I and the alter Me that could lead to role changes. But also, as previously discussed in this chapter, role conflicts may come about when too many role expectations are put in practice at once. Translated into Meads’ terminology, we can additionally expect learning to possibly occur when too many Me’s are trying to interpret which social control to fall under, creating mismatches in expectations. Learning in this project is mostly understood conceptually, where it is about changes in roles resulting from interaction. To a certain degree, however, learning is also about the empirical acceptance of (environmental) norms, potentially even shared across national borders. This latter type of ‘international learning’ (Knopf, 2003) enters a more normative field of international relations by saying ‘this is good, this ought to be respected by states.’ From this perspective, learning would no longer be value-free (for a discussion, see Knopf, 2012). Returning to Mead, he sees ahead a potential progress in individuals’ reflective conduct, since this conduct constantly reconstructs the society to which they belong. If I would realize that impulses that support the self as a social being (and not as an individualist) would be the most rewarding, we would also grow as moral beings. The formula is to pay greater attention to other’s interests: “I think all of us feel that one must be ready to recognize the interests of others even when they run counter to our own, [and] that the person

59 who does that does not really sacrifice himself, but becomes a larger self” (Mead, 1934:386). In those words, Mead pins down the essence of interaction to ultimately be about making what is best for society and its common well-being. For this to happen, interaction is relying on recognition; thus, only by recognizing others can we be social and moral beings. However, in order to be aware of others and to transmit recognition and expectations amongst us, actors firstly need to communicate. Communication therefore plays a central role in all learning; it is the mechanism making scripts visible and role changes possible. In the next and final section of this chapter, we will turn to the role of arguing in interaction, where arguing is understood as the means by which common understandings are brought within reach.

Learning through (common) understanding

So far, this theoretical framework has presented learning as something to be studied through roles, based on the reasoning that actors are social beings. Norms and appropriateness are therefore argued to have an impact on the way states behave as they do in international relations, and they become aware of these norms through alter expectations. With help from Mead, it was then argued that since alter is part of each state’s role conception, states are actually carrying Others as part of their Self. This means that any learning of the role occurs against the background of norm transfer and socialization, and individual processes on having these either confirmed or resisted and changed. The last piece of the puzzle thus concerns how alter expectations become known to actors in the first place, and could have an effect on role change, operating from the outside-in. It is argued here that understanding, and even more preferably common understanding, influences states in their role-taking processes. Understanding, then, is informed through communication. Consequently, the last part of this chapter is devoted to communication, and how in arguing actors get to define – as well as become aware of – the social context.

Communicative action and common understanding Communicative action represents a way of describing human interaction as oriented toward understanding (Habermas, 1984). Should interaction result in common understanding, people would get armed with an attitude toward interaction where coordination of actions seems obvious and self-explanatory. And the opposite, should communication lead to an understanding that would halter in commonness, a conflict would arise leaving actors with three choices: turn toward individualist strategic action, walk away from interaction, or turn to discourses in order to establish what is true or false. If the latter option were to be chosen, the discursive practice

60 occurring would be a process directed toward the search for the better argument, i.e., what would be a justified understanding for everyone to accept? Thus, what Habermas is saying is that consensus amongst actors could be reached not only through compromises, but actually through good and convincing arguments. For this project, what is particularly appealing with Habermas’ theory is the inherited promise of change; if actors were searching for good arguments, they would likewise be open for re-evaluations of the mind, i.e., to learn. Many have discussed the importance of Habermas to IR theory (see for instance, Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005; Diez and Steans, 2005; Haacke, 2005; Müller, 2011). What is missing from a role theoretical perspective is the importance assigned to communicative activity based on common understanding, which is both based in norms, and possible to express as new norms. As understanding increases new norms may emerge, which then are part of forming the structure in return. Following Müller (2011) [figure 4], the likelihood for communicative action to take place stands in stark connection with the type of agency (character of actors, their roles) and the degree to which their interactive setting is institutionalized. The most beneficial situation would be represented by states that follow a script of being moral entrepreneurs, and who operate within a regulated and dense institutional environment.

Figure 4: Saliency of communicative action as a function of actor attributes and institutional setting. (Harald Müller, 2011:73)

Arguing about discourses Thomas Risse was amongst the first to capture change in IR as a result of communicative rationality. By applying Habermas’ theory of communicative action, he is set to conceptualize ‘a logic of arguing’; a logic that is often argued to be empirically present when, for instance, states negotiate. Risse presents arguing as the via media logic – the bridge – between consequentialism and appropriateness (2000;

61 2004). To him, arguing is a distinct model for social interaction, which includes processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion. “Apart from utility- maximizing action, on the one hand, and rule-guided behavior, on the other, human actors engage in truth seeking with the aim to reach a mutual understanding based on reasoned consensus, challenging the validity claims involved in any communication” (Risse, 2000:1-2). Now, there is a difference in negotiations regarding whether the interactive character is defined as bargaining or arguing. Bargaining involves searching for compromises given a set of fixed preferences, of acting strategically to realize interests and preferences. Arguing would be more inclined to common problem-solving, alluding to the context (society) to establish a joint judgment of considered appropriateness, as well as reason-giving on validity claims (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005:171). Most of the times, states do both within the same negotiation setting (Deithelhoff and Müller, 2005; Elgström and Jönsson, 2000; Müller, 2004). Although it is difficult to separate these two strategies from an empirical perspective, it is highly important from an analytical perspective. The reason is that one of them – arguing – involves the potential for complex learning. The other one – bargaining – does not. However, following Risse, bargaining would occur to the extent it has been sanctioned by arguing, and a reasoned consensus on this being the rule of the game. Strategic bargaining is therefore not a strategy chosen until arguing has enabled actors to make such a decision (Risse, 2000). It could be explained in the following words: “[i]n negotiations, it is appropriate for actors to pursue their self-interest unless it collides with a valid norm that prescribes a different behavior” (Müller, 2004:416). States that argue are thus together establishing which type of reason should govern the specific negotiation. Consequently, by arguing, states define the situation and they agree on the ‘rules of the game.’ There could be reason to believe that this arguing process would be increasingly keen to legitimize bargaining the further on in the decision-making process the actors are. In the early stages of decision-making processes, more open arguing could be expected. Uncertainty at this stage could be something good by encouraging dialogue: actors are here provided with space as well as time to learn about each others’ priorities, consider alternative policies, and search for joint problem-solving. As the actual decision-making stage gets closer, cooperation and information sharing could be expected to be less likely, due to state interests being treated in a more defensive manner (Elgström and Jönsson, 2000:692-693). This also correlates with how Habermas imagines that for common understanding to evolve, it has to pass through actors’ relations to the world in several different ways. According to Habermas, any communicative action would be built around three different validity claims that relate to the world differently: (1) the statement made by an actor has to be true (in the objective world), (2) it has to be considered right in a normative context (in the social world), and (3) the intention of the speaker and the speech act must be honest (in the subjective world) (Habermas, 1984: 99). To

62 simplify, do actors have the same beliefs regarding arrangements of the world, do they share norms, and do they trust each other to be sincere in what they are saying? The better, more transparent and long-run the arguments, the more likely it is that the rest of the members will be convinced of its validity (ibid., 1984: 42). Risse’s logic of arguing is therefore an illustration of Habermas’ concept of discourse. Because if communicative action ultimately is about rendering coordination of actions possible, there should be a common understanding on what the language – and the conveyed values – is signifying. For instance, to prevent oil pollution could mean to actually make sure a spill will never happen, using all means at one’s disposal. Such a hypothetical understanding would however first have to go through a communicative process establishing the discourse on oil pollution prevention to mean precisely this, and not for instance just an improvement of oil safety procedures. To argue in such a way that common understanding would reign requires a long process, where actors continuously question the correctness and validity of any claim being made. As Habermas explains, facts seldom speak for themselves: “[f]acts can be explained only by resource to factual statements, what is real only by appeal to what is true. Since the truth of beliefs and sentences in turn can be justified or disputed only by means of the beliefs and sentences, we – as reflecting agents – cannot step outside the circle of language” (2005: 249). This intersubjective truth-seeking process is what Risse (2000, 2004) refers to as being governed by the logic of arguing. In such a process, actors are deliberating as well as trying to be persuasive regarding ‘the facts of reality.’ Any agreement in terms of common understanding implies that some actors are being normatively persuaded to learn to think differently. Although actors could, of course, also reach the conclusion that strategic actions instead would be the more appropriate way forward, thus, withdrawing from any attempts of trying to reach a common understanding. Only if actors stay in the arguing process are they still ‘in the game,’ discursively working out differences. In so doing, they are together searching for, validating, and establishing “good reasons” to inform behavior.

Figure 5 [modified by the author]: Figure 6: Three Kinds of Learning in Social Three Logics of Social Action (Risse, 2000:4) Interaction

63 The triangle on the left hand is Risse’s triangle on the three logics of social action [figure 5]. In this triangle, arguing is following communication being a social logic of its own, which then is pushing actors toward either consequentialism or appropriateness. However, the dotted arrow added in this figure represents that any decision on bargaining or strategic action firstly passes through the logic of appropriateness to gain legitimacy. In the same manner, the triangle on the right hand departs in ego and alter learning (Self’s treatment of expectations), which then pushes learning in the direction of either adaptive or normative [figure 6]. Also, here, actors that learn adaptively need to take a quick run by appropriateness in order to get an update (and be aware of) what the situation necessitates in terms of strategies and behavior. The dotted arrow, however, represents more than that by referring to an empirical normative learning. Communication through arguing has here led to an understanding – preferably a common understanding – of some kind of ‘improvement’ regarding role performance, for instance, in relation to environmental cooperation.

Conclusion In this chapter, a theoretical framework has been presented, designed for an analysis of learning through roles and role change. A separation of an actor’s role into an ego part and an alter part, and between role conceptions, role prescriptions, and role performances was discussed, in terms of roles potentially being carriers of incoherence. This incoherence was also argued to contain conflicts that could lead to change and learning. With help from Symbolic Interactionism, a micro perspective was offered on how states then actually deliberate on these potentially incoherent parts. Finally, communication – or rather arguing – was presented as a persuasive tool used by actors to reach a consensus on how roles should be played and empirical problems solved or at least approached. This chapter started off by quoting Martha Finnemore, saying that states do not always know what they want. It was argued to be important that others’ expectations, visible through a structure of appropriateness and recognition, then could have a ‘telling-effect’ and thus teach states their wants. The idea put forward is to view the learning process in three steps: firstly (1), states do not always know what they want. Yet, they still eventually end up wanting something, where socialization will have an impact. Second, (2) states do something, i.e., they take on a role. However, what is possible to do depends on the structure, what is considered an appropriate behavior given both ego- and alter expectations, and for which behavior they will be recognized. Lastly, (3) the effect of interaction could be a learning which has gained visibility through role performance, and it could possibly go deeper into role conceptions (ego) should beliefs have changed as well. In this interactive process, argumentation has been used to persuade others of the accuracy of certain roles, thus, adding, or changing, the interactive structure back.

64 4. Cooperation and role performance in the Arctic Council

Learning – movement with direction

“The great thing in human life is not so much where we stand as in what direction we are moving,” the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen once said. In March 1895, he found himself standing on the Arctic sea ice, ice that moved in the wrong direction. Behind, he left his ship Fram, and was now headed to traverse the white landscape by feet, in an attempt to be the first man ever to reach the North Pole. For the last year and a half, Fram had been stuck in the ice, all according to the initial plan ‘on movement’ since pack ice – Nansen knew – always is in constant movement. However, rather than drifting toward the North Pole, the ice drifted elsewhere. It would take three more years of drifting, from north of the Laptev sea to Svalbard, until the ship eventually could break free and sail back home to Tromsø, with all men healthy and sound. By then, Nansen also returned from his expedition and met up with his crew in the city, pluming of being the farthest north any man previously had been at a latitude of 86.14 degrees north, although not reaching the whole way to the northern most point on earth.29 Just like Nansen’s expedition, cooperation is about movement. In the context of Arctic environmental protection, the best-case scenario would involve a common deployment of norms on new environmental standards, in addition to increased common understanding between cooperating parties. Less successful cases would instead reveal cooperation to deploy a poor common understanding, with an interaction numb on norms and with a movement going off course. Any cooperation is likely to show signs of movement. Should it be directional movement, however, it will be driven by learning. This chapter is dedicated to the development of Arctic Council cooperation, from a contextual perspective as well as from a role perspective. Context here refers to a time perspective – how AC cooperation has evolved over the years, added more situated

29 As a comfort to Nansen perhaps, his specially constructed ice-strengthened ship would some years later be the very same ship that would take his fellow compatriot Roald Amundsen to the South Pole, as the first man ever.

65 perspective on how norms, (external) events, and state understandings all have contributed to its development. The development of AC cooperation will be divided into three different time periods, where each period is imagined to represent specific cooperative characteristics and interactive logics. The main part of this chapter is however devoted to states’ roles in the AC, and presents states’ conceptions of (what characterizes) them as being Arctic, and social patterns of cooperative behavior.30 This chapter is also quite extensive. While it gives information relevant for the chapters to come, it aims for something more, to provide the reader with an analytical description on AC development and how states relate to the Arctic. A descriptive analysis of the states’ general role patterns is believed to enhance an understanding of cooperation as being more extensive than a result that solely originates from the states’ interests and capabilities. Together, these parts – the development process of the AC in addition to the states’ roles – could be read as a free-standing text on what stakes there are in the Arctic: on how states utilize cooperation trying to get the (national) best possible out from Arctic affairs, and how cooperation is a social process through which (environmental) norms evolve. Firstly, however, this chapter will turn to movement as an interplay between science and politics, as a process of change and resistance understood to represent the way the AC has developed.

Conceptualizing movement as an interplay between science and politics…

Three things are considered important in order to grasp cooperative development processes: (degree of) common understanding, norms, and roles. Together, these define the ‘knowledge’ that guides state interaction, and what states ‘want’ from cooperation. Such knowledge and wants are likely to be a combined result of science and politics; whereas politics is needed to firstly highlight a certain scientific finding over another, and then transform this into action, scientific acknowledgement of environmental problems may push solutions thereof beyond nation states as primates. Environmental science, and in this case particularly climate science, is for instance contributing with transnational actors like scientists, who ‘articulate persuasive accounts of the global nature of biological systems,’ which may undermine state-based political orders by creating new narratives on norms (Miller, 2004:47). Experts no longer have to mirror preferences of state government, which is why actors, norms, and institutions are providing for change within the nation-states (ibid.; Haas and Haas, 1995:257).

30 By revealing how states behave in terms of role patterns, and how their role seems to be constructed, it opens up an opportunity for an enhanced understanding of state learning. It is not until we know who states perceive themselves to be, and whether they act – or not – in accordance thereof that we can discuss learning as a potential effect being generated out of social interaction. Learning, then, will be the theme of following chapter.

66 Science and politics are interwoven and together form the setting through which actors try to make sense of their world, but one could yet imagine them as separated, representing parallel processes of problem-solving (Jasanoff, 2004:21). In the AC, the input for cooperation on the levels of the SAOs and the task forces is, to a high extent, given by those scientific communities that are operating within the AC. Still, this input is not treated as self-explanatory but processed through arguing, as previously discussed by Thomas Risse in chapters 1 and 3 (2000; 2004). And arguing involves politics and national ideas. The scientific inquiry itself could thus be as value- free and objective as it wishes for, but to collaboratively decide on these findings as justified and true inevitably requires actors to apply their reason (Habermas, 2005:222-223). If reason and truth are assumed to be subjective, then an understanding of each state’s position needs to consider where its arguing logic stems from. This is way roles and role performance are relevant to investigate. The way states perform their role is a result of reflection, deliberation and persuasion, between significant others, and between ego and alter. As such these reflect understanding, including the degree of common understanding, and is as such a tool to approach learning. Actors holding traditional knowledge – that is collective knowledge passed on from generation to generation, generated from lived experiences, cultural practices, observations and skills – are described to contribute “to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic,” in addition to WGs (Ottawa Declaration, 1996; Indigenous People Secretariat, 2018). These stakeholders and specialists are all exercising – implicitly or explicitly – soft power through norm production as well as norm cascading. AMAP, one of the WGs, describes its mission – similar to others – to be precisely this, i.e., to inform policy-makers and deliver sound and science-based information (amap.no, 2018). Since it often is the WGs themselves that initiate and push the research frontiers forward, they have in a sense an ‘institutional life’ of their own, producing knowledge in a cumulative manner. As explained by Haas (1992), anyone in control of knowledge also has access to power over ideas, i.e., change. Arctic Council working groups present their new knowledge in written and illustrated forms through numbers, graphs, and pictures, hoping for a successful adherence by policy-makers. Whenever states representatives, and other actors alike, engage in a discussion on the scientific findings, they are arguing about ‘what goes.’ In a book dedicated to global environmental assessments, Clark, Mitchell, and Cash (2006) discuss when an assessment is likely to influence policy, and list three variables that matter: (1) saliency – whether the assessment is understood as relevant to the specific context, (2) credibility – whether it is viewed as scientifically reliable, and (3) legitimacy – whether it is judged as politically acceptable (ibid., 2006:12 cf. see also Nilsson, 2012; Stokke, 2013). All of these variables could be translated into Habermas’ vocabulary about validity claims (1984), where the role of each state matters for how validity claims are processed and understood.

67 Roles are not static but rather a product of ego and alter expectations, partly created by (as well as creating) the social context. This implies that the interplay between science and politics (i.e., change and resistance, simplified) yet could – under optimal condition – have a ‘consensual knowledge’ developed that is relevant to, for instance, oil spill prevention, where causes and effects of the specific phenomena will be viewed as true and accurate (Haas and Haas, 1995:259). An oil spill catastrophe like Exxon Valdéz or Deepwater Horizon renders it politically motivated to increase – listen to – the scientific knowledge on oil spill prevention. However, the degree to which this listening would represent common understanding differs, and where it could be derived as both normative arguments on protecting the environment, and an applied strategy to secure future oil activities from heavy criticism. The fact that the relationship between science and politics is two-directional, is illustrated quite neatly by the Senior Arctic Officials, and when they were presented with a new report on climate change from the AMAP working group: representing ‘resistance,’ SAOs firmly reminded the WG of its responsibility ‘to interact with the SAOs in such a way that the SAOs will be comfortable with developed WG recommendations’ [emphasis added] (SAO meeting Ilulissat, 2010).

…and between change and resistance

Although it implies considerable simplification, it would help to have science and politics separated in order to conceptualize the development processes as an interplay between change and resistance. From such a perspective, science in the AC would represent change, which is driven by working groups (and to some extent, Permanent Participants (PPs)), whereas politics would represent resistance, foremost found within states’ ego conceptions. In that way, states’ role performances are the result of a leveling going on between science and change (alter expectations, also in the shape of role prescriptions) and politics and resistance (ego conceptions).

Change as progression During those 20 years that have passed since the Arctic Council was first established in 1996, a political mission has been visible amongst the Arctic states; they not only wish to cover a larger portion of environmental problems and sustainable development issues, they also seek to have this cooperation evolved as a social forum, where Arctic states are brought closer to one another. At one Ministerial meeting after another, its members have been highlighting that cooperation is getting better, that it is reaching improvement by moving forward: a widening as well as a deepening of institutional structures has created an Arctic Council that (gently) starts to demand states to follow up on the AC work – its recommendations and its agreements – and to mirror it within the national frameworks on Arctic policies and regulations. Such

68 changes in practical organization indicate a change also in states’ roles, where they have moved toward being more of ‘cooperators.’ Indeed, the deepening of the AC institutional structure also has more of a social dimension, inclined political stability and trust. The AC is described to have “matured into enhanced stability,” ready to accept and benefit from more members31 (AC Ministerial statement by Iceland, 2015). To open up the AC for more views, perspectives, and interests presupposes a certain degree of commonness to exist between the original members. There are indications of such commonness existing, illustrated by the U.S. who at the Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit 2015 identified two key strengths of the AC to be the shared sense of purpose, and the shared sense of trust amongst the members (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2015a). The combination of organizational maturity, experienced (cooperative/ environmental) purpose, and trust, signals the AC development as linked state behavior that to some have been under the influence of role prescriptions and change. To increase the possibilities for environmental cooperation to progress and a common understanding to evolve, attempts have been made to escape politics, highlighting how politics is understood to act out in a resisting manner. As an example, in relation to the presentation and publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), several of the climate active Nordic countries pressed for having science and policy recommendations separated (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000). Through such standpoint, these states in a way confirmed science to contain the ‘good arguments’ for action, whereas ‘policy’ rather was understood to constrain the same. Actually, the ACIA reveals how the pressure from others – specific states, PPs, and scientific community – had a state like the U.S., who initially was very skeptical toward climate policy recommendations and who wanted to have meetings behind closed doors, to yet reach an agreement (Nilsson, 2007:139-140). Through the ACIA and the major assessment it represents, international knowledge on Arctic climate change took a leap forward, and it is generally considered to be one of the ACs greatest achievements. Still, David Stone, the former chairman of the AMAP and highly involved in the process, described several years later how many of those working with ACIA still felt disappointment over the Arctic Council response. The document and writing agreed to by the states allowed for less political substance than hoped for32 (Stone, 2015:208), once again revealing a common understanding on

31 All members do not share this Icelandic position on observers. Both Canada and Russia were presumed to oppose an expansion of new observer members, and have therefore only reluctantly accepted such an expansion of observers (Jakobson and Lee, 2016:114). More recently, the U.S. Senior Arctic Official also expressed concerns over further expansion of observer members, rhetorically asking whether current organizational structure effectively could cope with considering up to 40 observers’ opinions (Balton, 2017). 32 At the Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik 2004, the ministers made several decisions regarding the ACIA, including policy recommendations on mitigation, adaptation, and research, but carefully

69 environmental politics to be constrained by political realities, and in the prolongation thereof, roles.

Resistance as restrained cooperation Arctic Council cooperation cannot free itself from a decision-making structure built around consensus; only a few binding commitments have been made, and state sovereignty continues to have a preeminent status. As a matter of fact, decision- shaping – to promote and foster shared values – rather than decision-making, is an AC characteristic standing firm (see for instance, Brigham et al., 2016; Granholm, 2016; AC Ministerial statement by Norway, Tromsø 2009). To “share experiences” and “exchange best practices” are generally the way forward, as put in SAO meeting minutes and declarations, and anything touching upon sovereignty has been kept away from the negotiation table. Sensitive issues have been dealt with on an informal basis, at dinners and meetings outside the AC (Nilsson, 2007:136). Thus, AC meetings are in a way ‘orchestrated spectacles’ (Geertz, 1980), staging consensus-reaching in such a way that they are laid up for success by leaving tougher issues aside – at least those who are ‘broadcasted an audience.’ (On the same token, from a long-term perspective, by constantly showing an image of actors that manage to agree, the institutional structure comprises more and more expectations on such a result, possibly acting as stepping-stones for change.) Resistance could be noticed in hands-on things, such as a flaw in implementing scientific working groups’ (WGs) recommendations. The WGs are highly productive, and they have produced extensively over the years, in what should be considered an even increasing scale. However, a problem identified by its members, states observers, and PPs alike is that many reports are passing by unnoticed, while their recommendations lack requirements on follow-up. “Sadly, many thorough and good documents produced in the Arctic Council just end up on the shelf, missing out to reach both relevant stakeholder and political implementation,” one observer representative explained (Interview, 2015b). WWFs Global Arctic Program adds: “the only entities that truly take on working group recommendations ‘are…Arctic Council working groups’” (Dubois and Tesar, 2014). Implementation of the AC recommendations are furthermore complicated by these often being formulated in a vague and general way. A joint auditing of the Arctic states’ participation in the Arctic Council, conducted by Denmark, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. identified a major challenge ahead of the AC regarding how it should ensure effective national implementation of the agreed AC recommendations

avoided implying any commitments on the GHG reductions (Stone, 2015:207; Reykjavik Declaration). At the same time, the result may have been as good as anyone could have hoped for (Stone, 2015:208). In the U.S., the George Bush administration was still quite new when they had to negotiate about this issue, and internationally hesitations and arguing still went on regarding the Kyoto ratifications. As such, climate change was too much of a ‘political hot potato,’ which is why the AC was not ready to take the ACIA one step further in moral-practical terms.

70 (Multilateral Audit, 2015). In the Swedish audit, although similar observations were made by the others as well, one pointed toward a transparency deficit running from the national level up to the Arctic Council, and back again, making it difficult to tell if, or in that case which, Arctic Council recommendations were going to be implemented, and how (Sweden National Audit office, 2013:43). The flawed follow- up that exists within the AC has thus created calls for an upgrade of the AC structure, with a focus on implementation (Dubois et al., 2016). But resistance is also more invisible. Because to produce knowledge requires decisions bringing it about: it requires the decision to order a report (and not another), it requires the decision to render to financial funds available for one specific research area (and not another), and it requires the ‘AC stamps of approval’ and attention at Ministerial meetings. As an interviewee speaking from within the AC working groups explains: ‘nothing will be released with the AC logo attached if not previously approved by the SAO’ (Interview, 2014). Moreover, ‘at the Ministerial meeting, the short amount of time – only two hours – turns working groups presentations of new reports and scientific findings into a competition for time’ (ibid.). Time, one would assume here, equalizes visibility, and is a vital prerequisite if new norms should be made available to policy-makers, and eventually recognized or even internalized as of value. In that sense, organizations that derive a lot of their work from epistemic communities still need to learn how to learn, that is, firstly learn how to engage and pay attention to the global problems, and then furthermore learn how to best have it diffused to members (Haas and Haas, 1995:259), and thereby rendering states unable to resist new norms out of old (ego) habit. At the end of the day, the eight Arctic states are individuals. They bring to AC specific issues of national interest, issues they could be more or less willing to compromise on. During Sweden’s chairmanship, critique was directed the neglect of bringing the discussion of a ban on oil drilling to the AC table (see Greenpeace, 2013; Fridolin, Ceballos, and Leander, 2013). Sweden, which had no interest in Arctic drilling operations – quite the contrary, perceived it contra-productive to bring the issue up: ‘to emphasize an issue over which coastal states enjoy sovereignty would just dampen the cooperative spirit in general’ Foreign minister Carl Bildt replied in a newspaper (Bildt, 2013). That AC cooperation entails also single-player logic could here be noticed not so much in Sweden’s behavior per se, but in its respect for those devoted such resource extraction. Indeed, oil and gas extraction, and then particularly oil, are hardly surprisingly political and economic sensitive issues, no matter what science tells of associated risks. Norway, backed up by states such as Canada, Denmark and Russia Arctic hydrocarbons of their own, expressed not that long ago dissatisfaction regarding a perceived focus on oil and gas (O&G) as environmental risks, rather than acknowledge the positive effects its extraction may bring for economic development (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016). Non-coastal states kept silent on the matter, and the example illustrates how AC development becomes constrained by the different

71 realities of each state, and claims about ‘the world’ perceived as valid. Keeping the interplay between science and politics in mind, the next section will turn to the AC development process.

Arctic Council development: three time periods

The development of the Arctic Council is a response to stimuli of various kind, including things such as scientific findings, economic considerations, political ambitions, senses of trust alongside threats of conflicts, in addition to a growing awareness of the Arctic environment and its interlinkage to climate weather systems. AC development could be divided into three time periods, that presents Arctic cooperation as somewhat different depending on context and pre-understandings of interactive logics. These periods are divided based on the combined sum of foremost information gained from SAO meeting minutes and secondary literature, but where also interviews have helped to shed light on cooperative climate and characteristics as varying over time. To firstly provide for a background, the Arctic Council is an institutionalized continuation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), agreed to by the eight Arctic states in the city of Rovaniemi in 1989, and signed two years later. The legacy of AEPS is noticed within present day AC in four different ways: it recognized the Arctic region as valuable and expressed concern on threats to its environment, it encouraged scientific work by calling for assessments of environmental impact from human activities, including climate change and oil pollution,33 it foresaw cooperation as the only viable path forward, and working groups and indigenous representation34 were considered key to provide states with important input for making decisions. AEPS is often referred to as the ‘Finnish initiative,’ due to Finland inviting states to and organizing the 1989 meeting. The initiative was clearly located in time and space, where the Chernobyl accident in 1986 represented a triggering factor for regional environmental protection (Nord, 2016a).35 Environmental awareness in general had

33 In addition to the signed declaration, which is presented as a preface, AEPS consists of well over 30 pages listing specific environmental problems and priorities, available international mechanisms, and measures and actions to be taken on these very same issues. Amongst these issues are: persistent organic contaminants, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity and acidification, together with climate change and oil pollution. 34 AEPS established four environmental programs: AMAP, CAFF, PAME, and EPPR. Present at the Rovaniemi meeting, and granted participation at the upcoming meetings, was also the indigenous associations of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), Nordic Saami Council (SC), and USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North (Raipon). Furthermore, the AEPS established the Indigenous People’s Secretariat (IPS). 35 Finland is closest to the Soviet Union, but indigenous people and ecosystems in all Arctic states were – and still are – badly suffering from radioactive contamination. For instance, reindeer pastorals

72 an upturn in the 1970s and 80s, recognizing the interdependent character of pollution. There is however more to Arctic cooperation than caring for the environment, which predominantly rests upon a wish for peace and stability. Such an objective dates back to the end of the Cold War era and Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech. In his speech, he declared the heavy militarized Arctic region – perhaps a bit surprisingly – to represent an opportunity to have it transformed into a “zone of peace” (Gorbachev, 1987). Whereas the importance of the Arctic as a nuclear-free zone was clear from a peace perspective, it was equally important from an environmental perspective. The legacy of the nuclear arms race had heavily permeated the Arctic region from nuclear reactors, accidents, and waste disposal.36 In the Arctic setting, environmental protection perhaps should not be considered a free-standing issue but rather as part of a broader political agenda aiming for regional constructiveness (Nilsson, 2012:181). The Murmansk speech could indeed be viewed as a momentum for the building of the Arctic as a region, made more explicit through interaction (Keskitalo, 2004:42). However, as pointed out by Keskitalo, building a region is not a coherent task, where different actors, interests, and perceptions of what the Arctic ‘is’, yet is put under the same Arctic cooperative umbrella. By not problematizing the Arctic as a region, conflicts (of interests/between actors) become unsolvable (ibid., 177). In the Arctic, striving for environmental protection exists side by side – and not always supportively – with the harvesting of material interests. Both of them require the presence of peace, stability, and cooperation in order to be achieved, and are in that sense strategically coupled to each other. The character of coupling looks different depending on the time-period and the actors, as will be shown next.

presently still have to check each reindeer for levels of caesium-137 before the animal can be approved to serve as food (Sametinget, 2018). 36 Although the U.S. was not innocent itself, they saw the radioactive pollution as a threat resulting from past Soviet activities, and – overall – was not that easily convinced of the benefits of Arctic cooperation (Dingman, 2015:2). However, it did not take long until Arctic pollution was recognized as even greater in magnitude and diversified concerning emission sources. AMAP has produced iterated assessment reports on human health in the Arctic. People are contaminated foremost through traditional food (living) from the oceans: whales, seals, some fish species, and polar bears. Their exposure causes, for instance, various disruptions to the brain while developing and have effects on reproductive capabilities. They also play a role in various diseases, such as cancer. Despite an ongoing global effort to reduce persistent organic pollutants, new contaminants are continuously transported to the Arctic (AMAP – Human health in the Arctic, 2015).

73 Period I – 1996-2005: Science as a regional attention maker

Spreading knowledge, awareness, and cooperative (normative) models manifests the first period of the AC cooperation, as primarily norm-producing and policy-shaping (Brigham et al., 2016; Pedersen, 2012; Vigeland Rottem, 2015). There was little interest in carrying out political activities between member states, and its loose institutional structure could best be described as a high-level forum. Deficits such as lack of budget, transparency, and communication limited cooperative ambitions further. Arctic cooperation was marked by a ‘study and talk’ mentality, with little movement from words to action (Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007:191). Evidence that the Arctic region and AC cooperation were of low-political importance is noticeable if looking at the signatories of the Ottawa Declaration upon its founding in 1996. Apart from the host country Canada who had been very active in establishing the AC, no foreign minister was present to sign the document.37 The lack of dedicated Arctic priority also took an illustrative expression prior to the second Ministerial meeting. The SAOs discussed topics for the ministers to confer about, and it was suggested that these must be of political interests “in order to get them [ministers] to come” (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000). A publicity stunt was suggested by Norway, linking the Ministerial meeting to some other reporting from Alaska: the ministerial meeting itself would not be enough as an event to attract the attention from at least the Norwegian journalists, Norway said (ibid.). In terms of specific issue areas, this period had initially one major concern: biodiversity and how it was affected by pollution. Arctic research revealed high levels of toxins and heavy metals, often originating from lower latitudes but carried northwards by air or ocean currents (AMAP – Arctic Pollution Issues, 1997). Not long thereafter, the epistemic communities within the AC also asked for a green light on what they considered to be a ‘key topic’: to monitor and assess climate change and UV-B in the Arctic. From their perspective, climate change was viewed as “an overwhelming threat to Arctic biodiversity” (SAO meeting Anchorage, 1999). The states, though, were not that overly convinced, asking for clearer and more detailed information, not least regarding budget (ibid.). A few years later, all doubts were gone. The ACIA was now congratulated for its success, and the SAOs expressed their appreciation to all member states having actively participated in the work (SAO meeting Rovaniemi, 2001). Indeed, the ACIA was described by the Arctic Ambassadors as “the most comprehensive work ever undertaken in the Arctic Council, and the most difficult” (SAO meeting Reykjavik, 2004). The main message of this flagship report, involving hundreds of scientists, was

37 The informing state here seems to be the U.S., who declared that they would not send any such minister, thereby causing Russia to also send a representative with lower diplomatic weight; the deputy Foreign Minister rather than the Foreign Minister himself. The Scandinavian countries also chose to send officials from other ministries than the foreign affairs (Pedersen, 2012:149).

74 that of the Arctic being a climatic hub inextricably linked to the rest of the world.38 At this stage of cooperation, such insight did however not rise demands for any measures to be taken by the Arctic states themselves. It was not just awareness – through science – that the AC tried to spread across the globe; it was also awareness of AC as a cooperative model. In time for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the AC organized a side event presenting the AC as a model for partnership between the government and indigenous people,39 for the rest of the world to be inspired and learn from. It was later reported that indigenous people from many parts of the world had recognized the success of Arctic cooperation. (SAO meeting Oulu, 2002; Inari, 2002). The normative dimension of the AC thus stretches beyond environmental issues per se, to constructing the Arctic region as centered on soft-law and normative awareness within a range of issues, in a global context of still being a region fairly unrecognized. Although still with some reluctance, cooperation would soon take on more of a political character.

Period II – 2006-2013: Political cooperation

Environmentally, Arctic change is closely related to global environmental changes. Politically, Arctic change is also closely related to global processes such as globalization (Young, 2012). The next phase of the AC cooperation did not have so much of an inside-out approach any longer – where AC states aimed for international visibility – but rather received strong impetus from the international sphere. The Norwegian ambition during its Chairmanship from 2006-2009 was to make the AC more “potent and politically relevant,” as the region gained importance in several ways (Pedersen, 2012:151). In 2007, IPCC released its fourth assessment report on global warming, confirming its anthropogenic origin. The same year, the International Polar Year started, gathering researchers, students, and alike in hundreds of research projects aiming for climate awareness. Suggestively, the Arctic sea ice of that year was plummeting, measuring the lowest levels of ice in September since measurements began in 1979 (National Snow & Ice Data Center (NSIDC), 2017).40

38 The report was an assessment carried out by the AMAP, CAFF, and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), and it was later merged into the 2007 IPCC fourth assessment report. The SWIPA reports from 2011/2017 have confirmed science on Arctic warming further, confirming Arctic ice- melting to be caused by human activities. 39 Since the year 2000, there have been six indigenous associations – permanent participants – represented in the Arctic Council. 40 This record would once again be broken in 2012, with sea ice minimum 18 percent below 2007, and 49 percent below the year 1979 to 2000 average (NSIDC, 2017). In 2016, the sea ice extent was again comparable to the 2007 measurement (ibid). The autumn of this same year also witnessed an extreme deviation in temperature, with a 20 degree higher average temperature over the Arctic Ocean, than would be normal (The Guardian, 161122).

75 In the AC, one tuned up the discourse on climate change into a question of Arctic destiny. At the Ministerial meeting in Tromsø in 2009, illustratively Iceland, who as a first victim of the global financial crisis had fallen deep and hard just the year before, put it into perspective: “[…] the changes we are now witnessing in the Arctic as a result of human induced climate change are of much more profound and long lasting nature than our economic difficulties which we will surely overcome in a few years” (AC Ministerial Statement by Iceland, 2009).41 One started to demand state actions on mitigation, which was introduced through short-lived climate pollutants, although it would take 6 more years until (in 2015) any kind of agreement was reached on the matter. To play with words such as the ‘Arctic is hot’ (in a dual sense) during this period made both a political, economic, and environmental/climatological sense (see for instance, Arctic Ambassador Lind, in The Economist, 120324). Applications to become an observer increased, parallel with the idea of the Arctic as increasingly accessible. In a rat race, the Arctic states started to present national Arctic strategy documents, which – if not before – now placed the Arctic on their respective foreign policy agenda (Vigeland Rottem, 2015:52); Norway was first to go in 2006,42 Russia followed in 2008, Canada and the U.S. presented their national strategies in 2009, Finland in 2010, and Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden all did so in 2011. The view on the Arctic as a potential gold mine grew strong, confirmed by the U.S. Geological Survey (2008), where the Arctic was estimated to house huge hydrocarbon reserves. For many of the Arctic states – as well as the global oil and gas market – this meant good news. In 2008, the annual average price for a barrel of oil was record high at 99 U.S. dollars/barrel, and although it dramatically fell the following year, it was again up on even higher levels between 2011 and 2014, peaking at an annual average of close to 112 U.S. dollars (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2017a). Against this context, Russia created international headlines in 2007 by planting a titanium flag on the seabed, 4,261 meters beneath the northern most point of the world. Canada was quick to condemn the flag planting, which they saw as a legally unauthorized attempt for land grabbing (Independent online, 070803).43 However,

41 Present at the Ministerial meeting was also former Vice President Al Gore. A year and half before, he and the IPCC had been in Oslo to receive the Nobel peace prize for spreading knowledge on anthropogenic climate change and how its effects could be curbed and neutralized. That Gore made an appearance now was timely, with not only a Norwegian Arctic chairmanship focusing on climate change but with a whole world awaiting Cop15 in Copenhagen later the same year, and what would happen next when the Kyoto protocol was to expire in 2012. Attuned toward this upcoming meeting was also the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, where they saw a chance to make the Arctic region even more visible in the global climate debate, in addition to providing knowledge and input to negotiators. 42 Norway revised in 2014 and again in 2017, and Finland in 2013. The same year also the U.S. further developed its Arctic Policy from 2009, and released an Arctic Strategy. 43 The area surrounding the North Pole is just one of several maritime boundary issues in the Arctic that are not yet resolved, or are disputed. Among them are claims over the Lomonosov Ridge stretching

76 the Russian explanation of a scientific investigation in parallel to a domestic election soon coming up, seemed reasonable enough to many. The phrase “[t]he Arctic is ours,” (as the expedition leader Chilingarov reportedly had said) was not interpreted by most people as a literal attempt to actually claim the north (Byers, 2013:92). Instead, during this period of time, an expectation on politics spelled out, where diplomacy, cooperation, and adherence to international law prevailed, further exemplified through a comment made by Denmark’s former Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller. In a leaked cable between him and a U.S. diplomatic official, he referred to the U.S. not yet having ratified the UNCLOS, ‘joking’: “if you stay out, then the rest of us will have more to carve up in the Arctic” (BBC, 110512). It was a joke that created attention, interpreted by some as nonetheless containing grains of truth (see Dodds, 2011).44 Within the AC, one kept calm. “Arctic is not in a legal vacuum,” Jonas Gahr Støre declared, rejecting any such thing as a ‘race for the Arctic,’ and pointed toward responsible and modern states governed under regulatory schemes such as UNCLOS, IMO rules, and various environmental and fishery regimes (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2009; 2011). However, at the same time, differentiating politics found its way into the AC, when the five coastal states, on firstly Denmark’s initiative and then on Canada’s,45 met in 2008 and 2010 to discuss Arctic ‘go abouts’ without inviting the non-littoral states or the PPs. Although these meetings resulted in agreements to commit to international law (UNCLOS), the need for such meetings were tellingly of a region gone politicized. In 2011, and from then on, the U.S. would also choose to send Secretaries of State to Ministerial meetings, adding political weight thereof. Given the new context, this second phase of the AC development was focused on preparation: to prepare the region for increased activity to come. Organizationally, this meant that one was pre-occupied with increasing the efficiency of the organization as an operating entity, and having it mature. With more activity

over the North Pole. Canada, Denmark, and Russia all claim this ridge to be a natural prolongation of their continental shelves, which would give them the right to extract any resources found in the seabed or subsoil. (The water column and the surface are still ‘high seas,’ open for shipping and fishing by any other state). Denmark and Russia (with Canada expected soon to follow) have however handed these claims to the UN Commission on the Continental Shelves, and are awaiting recommendations on how the legal status should be interpreted. To support their case, each state has conducted seismic investigations, and the Russian expedition to the North Pole in 2007 was part of such an investigation. 44 Another interpretation would instead be that it was a comment signaling trust and common understanding on how the U.S. delaying ratification should be further dealt with: through cooperation. 45 When Canada invited the other four coastal states to a follow-up meeting at the 2008 Ilulissat meeting, it was consequently met with heavy criticism (Dodds, 2010). In a speech to the closed session, Hillary Clinton was reported to have voiced support for participation by everyone with legitimate interests, and hoped the Arctic would showcase an ability to work together rather than creating new divisions (The Washington Post, 100330).

77 expected in the region, the states agreed to the first binding46 agreement ever in the history of the AC, on marine search and rescue (2011), with the primary aim of enhancing maritime coordination and cooperation amongst the Arctic states. An intensified focus on oil pollution soon led to the second binding agreement, now on oil pollution preparedness and response (2013). Although these agreements were weak, they – together with the work, for instance, on black carbon – revealed an Arctic region that becomes more regulated. In that sense, the AC now started to move from merely policy-shaping into policy-making, with policy recommendations of practical significance attached, and where politics and science in that sense become more intertwined. In the next cooperative time period, there are signs of politics complicating cooperation, with states now carrying stronger single player’s logic than before.

Period III – 2014-present: Cooperation under insecurity

If the second period was about preparing the Arctic for the change caused by more human activity, the third period represented change as an insecurity. One way this is expressed is through the economy, where Arctic resources might not be as lucrative after all, causing ‘the Arctic standard image to be somewhat challenged’ (Granholm, 2016). Beginning in the fall of 2014, the oil price had drastically fallen, reaching low levels just slightly above 30 US dollars per barrel in January 2016. Almost two years later, at the end of 2017, the price again had doubled, reaching levels of about 60-65 US dollars per barrel (ibid.; EIA, 2017a). Yet, although extraction costs differ significantly throughout the offshore Arctic, even this price – which by most analysts is not expected to rush anytime soon – is considered too low in order to boost the investments in the Arctic hydrocarbon extraction.47 Moreover, if the energy sector stands still or even detracts, shipping lanes – of which much of its logic is coupled with transportation of hydrocarbons – will most likely not be extended or developed further (Granholm, 2016:30). In 2013, about one million tons of cargo was transported along the Northern Sea Route (NSR).48 Re-calculated into transit passages, this makes a NSR record of 71

46 Since it contains no formal requirements, the ’binding component’ has been questioned; the agreement resembles more a memorandum of understanding (Vigeland Rottem, 2015: 53). 47 An exemption would be Norway, whose operating industry in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea calculates with a break-even price of 40 dollars per barrel. It could be compared to extraction in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, where conditions are less favorable with harsher weather and more ice. To extract here is normally considered to require a price of about 90 up to 100 dollars per barrel in order to be profitable (Claes and Moe, 2014; IEA Oil and Gas and Technology Conference, 2017). 48 In comparison, 700 million tons of cargo was transported along the traditional route via the Suez Canal. Savings of up to 600,000 dollars for a trip is expected between Shanghai and Rotterdam along the NSR instead of the Suez, equalizing a shortened trip by 2,800 nautical miles (Jakobson and Lee,

78 vessels – over which more than half were Russian flagged. In 2015 and 2016, the figure dropped to 18 respectively 19 vessels (Centre for High North Logistics, 2017). Many of those economic incentives expected from a more accessible Arctic has, thus, far, not yet gained ground. In the meantime, the Artic has established itself as a marine tourist destination, which by itself has intensified the need for best practices and guidelines on safety and security (PAME – Arctic Marine Tourism Project, 2015). The Norwegian shipping company Hurtigruten advertises extensively in the media, alluring tourists to become adventurers of great scale once trespassing into the ‘kingdom of polar bears.’ In the summer of 2016, the American cruise ship Chrystal Serenity headed for a momentous Northwest Passage voyage, and the Russian icebreaker 50 Years of Victory takes ‘explorers’ on an endeavor headed to the actual North Pole itself. Still, the insecurity striking the Arctic is not just about economy, but about military aggravations and unilateral state behavior as well. Russia’s rising military exercises and aggressiveness have not escaped the Arctic states’ air-space or internal waters, neither has the war against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea been kept away from also impacting upon the Arctic relations. All Arctic states have condemned Russia’s behavior and imposed the country with economic sanctions, especially targeting the oil and gas sector. Adding insecurity of another kind, President Trump in the Spring of 2017 proclaimed the U.S. to withdrew from the Paris agreement. In an interview with the Washington Post prior to the election, Trump said: “I am not a great believer in man-made climate change, […] to me the biggest risk is nuclear weapons. That’s – that is climate change” (The Washington Post, 150322). To an organization like the AC, whose backbone rests upon environmental protection and to – from there – ensure cooperation and peace, recent developments spur an insecurity regarding where the region is headed, despite some assurances made at the latest Ministerial Declaration with references to the Paris agreements and a reiterated need for global action on emission reductions (Fairbanks Declaration, 2017) However, in relation to Russia, the AC states have clinged to the idea of an Arctic peace zone, ring-fenced the rest of the world (see Ministerial meeting 2015; 2017, member statements). Sweden – similar to others – has formulated it as follows: “[t]hat the Arctic continues to be a zone of peace and stability is paramount. […] there is no problem that cannot be solved through cooperative relationships” (Ministerial Statement by Sweden, 2015). Denmark adds: “[t]he cooperation in the Arctic Council is a success story. For almost 20 years, we have managed to play by the same rules in this region and keep the Arctic as an area of cooperation and low tensions. This is not a small result in the world today” (Ministerial Statement by Denmark, 2015). Additionally, Finland explains: “[i]t is in no-one’s interest to let problems elsewhere to impact negatively on Arctic cooperation and the Arctic environment”

2016:120, 143). However, conditions are tougher, vessels are required to be ice-classified, and icebreaking escort is mandatory by Russia.

79 (Ministerial statement by Finland, 2015). The strategy chosen by members has been to separate the ‘external world’ from the ‘Arctic world,’ with the latter assumed to run by its very own logic. Perhaps Russia, the original source of why all the statements would be needed alleging cooperation and peace, best formulates this logic: “Russia sees huge potential in the Arctic Council to promote and expand a constructive agenda for our common region, built on the basis of national interests of all Arctic states […] There is no room for confrontation or aggravation of tension in the Arctic region” (Ministerial Statement by Russia, 2015). To maintain cooperation and to keep up environmental protection is – if not in all aspects, then at least in quite a few – the predominant guiding principle for any (commercial) activity in the Arctic. As such, Russian military aggressions do not seem to be enough to break the levels of trust, at least not to the extent that cooperation deters. Still, although cooperation remains as the guiding principle, what would be possible to achieve in the presence of this – in terms of increased decision-making – may yet be circumscribed by political insecurity (Vigeland Rottem, 2016:173). Some also suggest that the AC has peaked in terms of organizational development, where other multilateral regimes and co-operations instead are about to take over specific issues (Granholm, 2016).49 Still, the general trend of Arctic development is greater regulation – outside the AC as well as within. In the Arctic Council, stakes have been raised by discussing more ‘demanding’ issues such as oil pollution prevention and reduction of black carbon. A third binding agreement has also been signed, on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017). In periods of political insecurity, one seems once again to cling to science as the unifier and guiding light. ‘Science will lead the pathway forward,’ Sweden’s Foreign Minister reassured at the Ministerial meeting in Fairbank (Ministerial statement by Sweden, 2017) and Norway calls for a robust AC capable of finding “common solutions to common challenges” (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2017), followed up by Finland’s chairmanship program entitled “Exploring Common Solutions.” Following this line of thought, the Arctic would no more foremost be about opportunities and challenges, but solutions. Even more so, common solutions often require science, and they always require cooperation.

49 In recent years, several AC offsprings have already been created that operate free-standing from the AC, but with the same eight Arctic states as members: the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), and the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum (AORF). Voices have been raised whether this sort of issue-delegation, which serves to separate Arctic issues from the table of the AC, really is desirable, or if it rather weakens the Arctic Council’s mission and mandate.

80 Conclusions: on course for Arctic cooperation?

Cooperation within the Arctic Council could be described as a movement with direction, where it has moved toward policy-making: it has deepened in terms of institutional structure, with a standing secretariat50 and where calls for follow-up and implementation have intensified. After 20 years of effort by the PPs to get access to a funding mechanism that would help them to more fully participate in the AC decision-making, a charitable fund has now been established, expected to increase the capacity of the PPs AC participation considerably (Gamble, 2016). The Arctic Council has also expanded, for instance, oil emergency preparedness has been broadened and specified to include oil spill prevention, and previous spreading of Arctic warming as a global threat has been complemented by demands on reductions of black carbon by Arctic states themselves. Approaches to nature, as in the need for adapting (due to environmental risks) has been transformed into a resilience approach, signaling a shift in value where nature is looked upon as capable of recovering only that much. One interviewee, with various experiences from the AC, illustrates the development of the AC to have its origin in a wish – or perceived need – to have the Arctic region protected:

It is not about putting flags in the ocean…you know, the journalists they always talk about the same thing; they talk about the explorer putting a Russian flag on the seafloor. This is not why the Arctic Council is important. The Arctic Council became important because the region is important for the earth system. And we start to understand that (Interview, 2015c).

Whether or not all Arctic states and stakeholders would fully agree, the AC cooperation is a cooperation that also seems to drift, with an identified problem of lacking requirements for implementation and follow-up mechanisms attached to political decision-making (Dubois and Tesar, 2014; Interviews 151106; 151127; 151207; Multilateral audit, 2015, Sweden’s National Audit Office, 2013). The development of the AC cooperation could be seen as driven by a correlation between science and politics, but where politics still would have the final say and could slow the cooperative pace down. Yet, also from a strictly political and material interest- perspective, deepened Arctic cooperation makes sense: on the one hand, for national interests and on the other, for signaling ‘Arctic control’ to the outside world. Arctic 5 (A5) meetings, where one gives legal supremacy to the UNCLOS to govern Arctic

50 Norway (2006-9), Denmark (2009-11), and Sweden (2011-13) agreed to share the personnel working with the secretariat issues during the time for these states to chair the Arctic Council. The Secretariat was operating from Tromsø, and it was decided at the Ministerial meeting in 2011 to have this solution standing from 2013 and onwards (Nord, 2016a:44).

81 state relations, jurisdictional claims, and fishing quotas, all portray the coastal states as taking control over the Arctic, thus, making external involvement redundant.51 Whereas order in the Arctic state relations and order in the Arctic governance in many ways is a prerequisite for revealing the Arctic (Ocean) less of a common and more of a region protected by sovereignty, science has played a big part in the AC development by providing for enhanced knowledge and understanding of the Arctic environment. As revealed, for instance, by the ACIA, environmental issues can indeed be driven by the epistemes, and then gain political influence through the results this presents. The next part of this chapter turns toward states’ behavioral patterns in the AC, where it also becomes clear that norms prescribed by, for instance, the episteme, have an effect on how states perform their roles.

Understanding patterns of behavior as role performance

The first section(s) of this chapter was dedicated to cooperative development, with an implicit understanding of such development to reach progression out of (common) understanding. The political context has been providing the background for a perceived need – or not – of environmental cooperation, and politics has also impacted upon possibilities to reach – or not – a common understanding. However, what the Arctic states have been trying to reach common understanding on is scientific findings, and Arctic science itself would also be a somewhat – although not completely – autonomous actor. Being in the leading edge when it comes to knowledge, science is capable of taking the initiative, to push it forward by revealing new perspectives, and by adding brick after brick to a more profound Arctic knowledge base. Such knowledge is dealt with – in some way and extent – by alter expectations, that is, (thoughts of) others’ expectations, through role conceptions and role prescriptions. The remaining part of this chapter will provide a descriptive analysis of what type of actor each Arctic state is when it comes to the Arctic, presented here as roles. The aim is to capture the essence of what the Arctic means for respective states, in addition to recognizing a potential interaction effect. The former will be approached through a national document like foremost national Arctic strategies, whereas the effect of social interaction is approached through the behavioral pattern that the textual analysis of the SAO meeting minutes have made visible. The structure is as follows: each Arctic

51 The wish to govern the Arctic themselves, for instance, could help explain the reluctance by Norway, Denmark, and Iceland to allow the OSPAR Commission – Protecting and Conserving the North- East Atlantic and its Resources – to create a marine protected area in the Arctic Ocean (Greenpeace, 2016b). These states argued such discussions to be designated to the Arctic Council, and no other (international) forum (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016).

82 state will be described separately, and divided into two parts. The first part (1) covers the state’s role conception, which is elaborated upon through the state’s ideas of being Arctic and its national interests in and of the Arctic, as well as how it perceives itself as being linked to the international sphere. The former is dedicated the ego component of a role, whereas the latter adds on (perceived) alter expectations regarding which type of Arctic actor it seems appropriate to be. Role prescriptions, i.e., alter expectations shaped as social pressure and norms, are also part herein. The second part (2) of each analytical description covers the Arctic states’ role performances, as they have taken expression when interacting within the AC. Now the emphasis is upon observable behavior, that is, utterances made by state representatives at foremost the SAO meetings and written down in the meeting minutes. Attitudes toward specific issues as well as behavioral characteristics in this interactive meeting setting are thus described. By dividing the descriptive analysis into one part covering role conception and the other part role performance, each state role analysis then ends with a short section on the compatibility between these two role dimensions, and thus suggests interaction to either have an impact on state behavior, or less so. A descriptive analysis of role performance here serves to highlight how roles are turned into social positions, relative to others. As stated above, the bulk of the material used consists of national Arctic strategies (to establish role conception), and meeting minutes from the SAO- meetings held twice a year (to establish role performance). Rather than understanding each role performance as a full description of state achievements, initiatives, and concerns – which would be far too extensive for this project – it should be read as an attempt to capture the behavioral patterns. By accounting for small details related to behavior, rather than major projects brought ashore, the idea of this project is to highlight the general through the specific, the official through the personal, the state through the human.

Roles and patterns – some initial and overall findings A mapping of states’ role performances in the Arctic Council reveals all eight states acting as cooperators. In general, eight states reveal few signs of acting in a cooperatively contra-productive manner or dragging their feet behind: eight states engage in cooperation and eight states cooperate. Eight states furthermore engage in interaction on the Arctic region, and eight states view the Arctic as something unique and part of their (the U.S. little less so) identity. They engage in cooperation on environmental protection and sustainable development, and they all speak vibrantly about the environment – the Arctic Ocean, land, and atmosphere – as well as the right of the indigenous populations to a secure and traditional way of living. Six states consider themselves to be coastal states, but only five are recognized by others as such (Iceland is not a recognized as an Arctic littoral state). Five recognized coastal states are placing issues of sovereignty as high, and they approach the Arctic also in a unilateral manner, whereas three states are Arctic non-coastal states, acting more like

83 followers in issues beyond their territorial and legal frames. The four biggest states, either in terms of Arctic interest and activities or area-wise – Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U.S. – are thus the most visible in meeting minutes, in terms of comments and initiatives.52 Finally, eight states all respect the cooperative foundation of the Arctic Council being a high-level forum or intergovernmental organization, playing according to the – of sovereignty respectful – rules established therein. Still, with environmental protection being such a large part of cooperation, ‘smaller’ states in the AC also have a say and occasionally take the lead in an organization that members describe to build on trust, where one should pay each other respect, and where a good ‘discussion climate’ is characterizing meetings (see AC Ministerial statements, 2015; Interviews, 160506; 150510; 151222). Roles are therefore more complex than only based upon material power, territorial sizes, and access to resources. The behavioral patterns give the following roles: Canada – Protector, Denmark – Kid-brother realist, Finland – Reserved team player, Iceland – Follower with ambitions, Norway – Restless know-how leader, Russia – Responsive informant, Sweden – Teacher on demand, and U.S. – Innate leader. Now, although the following role descriptions derive an empirical material (meeting minutes and policy documents), they have been schemed along different variables to cover thematic issues as well as behavioral characteristics in a coherent way. This was discussed in chapter 2, where the reading of the SAO meeting minutes documents was explained to center on having each state ‘anchored on’ to attitudes and mentioning specific issue areas as well as others (states, WGs, and PPs alike), in addition to the frequency at which it took on initiatives, acted as a leader, communicator, expert, etcetera. When it comes to an issue like environmental protection, this role mapping has been concentrated to attitudes and mentioning of climate change, leaving other environmental preferences behind, such as biodiversity, resilience, contamination, etcetera. Climate change has been lifted since it contains short-lived climate pollutants, which is the focus of chapter 6. It is furthermore through climate change and short-lived climate pollutants that one gets access to (implicit) attitudes toward Arctic oil and gas development.53 The following descriptive analysis does not present information on, or sum up, all the areas where the Arctic states have spoken and acted. Rather, what is lifted is partly decided in

52 See also Chater (2016), for an overview of project sponsorship, accessed through the SAO reports, where Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U.S. are the most frequent sponsors. However, as pointed out by Chater, the frequency as such does not provide information on the scope of those projects being funded, how extensive these are, i.e., the amount that the particular state has been sponsoring with. 53 Whereas oil and gas, as well as maritime safety, are important issues for especially the coastal states within the AC, any substantive accounts thereof will not be given in this section. The reason is the nature of the Arctic Council, which addresses these issues from a perspective aimed at ensured security, often driven by the coastal states themselves, and with no real contradictions to reveal at this stage.

84 relation to chapters 5 and 6, in order to add as much background information as possible. Neither is respective state role presentation a comprehensive resume of all the things states have done or said during the AC history. The decisive part of each role description is based upon what the general pattern reveals, highlighting certain things over others to forge the roles after their prominent characteristics.

Canada – Protector

National Arctic idea: to preserve the identity by protecting the North. The Arctic strategy of Canada describes a unique but fragile ecosystem, accompanied with stunning scenery to be proud of. Yet, compared to most other Arctic states, it is to a lesser degree preoccupied with environmental concerns and instead dedicated to greater social and economic development and Canadian presence in the Arctic, while yet respecting the environment within these ambitions (Arctic strategy, 2009). The Arctic identity is strong, with the Arctic described to be “fundamental to Canada’s national identity” (Canada’s Arctic foreign policy, 2010), with Canadians being ‘people from the North,’ no matter whether living on the southernmost borders or up in the cold (ibid.; Huebert, 2011). Much of the political rhetoric is thus centered on Arctic symbolism and identity (Dodds, 2010; Offerdal, 2014), illustrated through the Arctic strategy title “Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future” (2009). An explicit goal of the Arctic policy would thus be to ensure Northerners an influence over their own destiny by improving and devolving northern governance (ibid., 28).54 Canada measures as the second biggest state area-wise, and the coastline is likewise the second longest in the Arctic. Thus, it is of relevance to be able to set up rules and surveillance for shipping and transit passages.55 The Northwest passage, the shipping line from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic, goes through the Canadian archipelago. The rapid ice-melting can soon turn previously un-navigable pack-ice into open water, exposing the coast of Canada to frequent passages and increasing the need for

54 Canada has announced a new Arctic Policy Framework to be on its way, co-developed with Northerners, territorial and provincial government and indigenous people, which focuses on issues identified by the Minister for Indigenous and Foreign Affairs, in terms of education, infrastructure, and economic development (U.S.-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, December 2016). As of beginning of 2018, it is not yet available. 55 Canada and Russia are both claiming certain segments of trans-Arctic shipping routes to be their internal waters. If they are to be considered as internal waters, it means that national jurisdiction will apply, which would maintain those stricter rules on vessel construction, equipment, and manning that both Canada and Russia have adopted, compared to those established in the IMO instruments (Stokke, 2014:131-132). The U.S. contests that segments of both the Northwest passage and the Northeast passage should be considered internal waters, and rather argue the straits to be transit passages as regulated in the UNCLOS Article 38. As a transit passage, a vessel that transits is not required to ask for a permit to sail, or follow the coastal state’s national regulations (Byers, 2013:130- 131).

85 strong sovereignty. In order to legitimize national claims and jurisdictions over water, Canada has since the 70s combined an exercise of sovereignty with a protective stewardship role as well (Burke, 2017). Being a steward, covers both marine ecosystems and land-based wildlife as well as biodiversity, and is an important part of Canadian role conceptions (Arctic strategy 2009; Arctic foreign policy, 2010). Canadian waters are also estimated to have oil and gas deposits worth billions, but so far the industrial interest has however been lukewarm. To exercise strong sovereignty is the first priority area of its strategy (2009:foreword; 9). Whereas climate change is described as affecting few countries as much as Canada (Arctic strategy, 2009:8), there is discrepancy concerning Canadian perceptions of and actions on climate change. Canada was a leading actor during the Kyoto negotiations, from which they then pulled out in 2011 and is also ranked in the bottom in statistics on Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI, 2017).56 Nationally, the government is perceived as backlogging on climate measures (Earthjustice, 2013; CBC News, 150417), at the same time as heavy fossil fuel subsidies are given to its oil and gas companies (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2017). However, with a new administration in office, Canada is part of the Paris agreement, and has also – together with U.S. – stated a commitment to ensure a viable Arctic ecosystem, by making future oil and gas drilling leases off limits in the Arctic waters (U.S.-Canada Joint Arctic Leader’s Statement, 2016). It conceives itself to have been, and continues to be, very active in international climate negotiations, as well as initiatives on climate change adaptation (Arctic foreign policy, 2010). Interest in international cooperation: protecting sovereignty, promoting indigenous rights. The Canadian role conception of being a responsible actor, someone who promotes cooperation, diplomacy and international law, is a conception that contains values that sometimes collides with its emphasis also on sovereignty. In international settings, Canada has acted unilaterally to protect the interests of the indigenous population, for instance, through a continuation of unauthorized whaling,57 or a rule out of polar bears being enlisted as endangered species (Byers, 2013: 175). For reasons connected to aboriginal rights, Canada has also opposed the EU as an AC observer due to its 2009 decision to activate a seal trade ban, as it would have a negative impact on the livelihoods of Inuit sealers (EUR-Lex, 2009; CBC News, 090429). Canada, together with Russia, has contributed to rhetoric on the Arctic resource race (Nicol and Heininen, 2014). To Canada, such a race would foremost be spelled out

56 Compare, for instance, CCPI 2008, 2012, and 2017, where Canada ranked 53rd, 54th, and 55th, respectively, of a total of maximum 61 countries investigated. 57 Canada is not part of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), from which it withdrew in 1981 (The New York Times, 810628).

86 as increased territorial control,58 understood in the historic context of all past Canadian threats to have come via the Arctic. However, its tough Arctic rhetoric on, for instance, increased military spending59 should most likely be understood as directed towards a home audience (Byers, 2013; Offerdal, 2014), just as the previous Harper administration’s rhetoric on the Arctic as ‘ours’, where cooperation only should occur where ‘appropriate,’ and where Canadian Arctic sovereignty would stay “non-negotiable” (CBC News, 100823; Hilde, 2014:150). Still, in practice, when Canada is interacting with others, it is less of an individualist. Even in turbulent times of Russian and Danish flag-planting, of resource potential, and greater Arctic visibility, Prime Minister Harper uncovered in a leaked cable that the Arctic Council is the primary vehicle of solving Arctic issues of practical character (APT National News, 110511), and Canada’s role conception is furthermore to be an active member in all of the ACs working groups (Arctic strategy, 2009:34-35).60 Celebrating the Council’s 20th anniversary, Canada more recently argued that its firm commitment to science and evidence-based decision-making was something to be grateful for: the understanding of the North has proven substantially enhanced, and thanks to the AC the world would now be in better shape (Government of Canada, address by Parliamentary Secretary, 2016). As such, the Canadian role conception seems to struggle in uniting its national strife for enhanced sovereignty with Arctic prescriptions on multilateralism, causing disturbances in how to present itself.

Role performance in the Arctic Council If one has not been present at the actual AC Ministerial meeting, it is difficult to know which issue Canada currently prioritizes; contrary to most other states, Canadian statements have not been published on the AC website, with a few exceptions. This entails useful signals on role performances. In the AC, Canada is following its Arctic strategy and acts like a protector. As mentioned, within such a role lays a stark feeling of sovereignty, making it redundant to spread national remarks, visions, and concerns beyond the cohorts invited. However, cohorts are not just restricted to Arctic actors, and Canada stands out as a significant outreacher, wanting to spread the Arctic message onward to the world: they organize show case

58 Canada is involved in more legal disputes, although none of them are causing threats to security – one dispute is with Denmark over the island Hans Island; another is with the U.S. on where territorial borders should be drawn in the Beaufort Sea; and a third one concerns the Lomonosov Ridge and the North Pole (Byers, 2009; 2013). 59 Arctic investments have instead been done in ‘softer’ issue areas directed at the safety of people and environment, for instance, by greater support for the Coast Guard (Hilde, 2014:149). 60 Additionally, Canada lists a number of assessments and reports where it has taken an active leadership role up until 2009: the SDWG – Arctic Human Development Report, PAME – Oil and Gas Guidelines, and PAME – Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (Arctic strategy, 2009:35).

87 events (SAO meeting Yellowknife, 2014b), hosts Cop meetings (Conferences of the Parties to the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change) ‘to put the Arctic climate issues into the focus of the world community’ (SAO meeting Yakutsk, 2005), produces documentaries about unique Arctic relations between states and indigenous peoples, and promotes a traditional way of life (SAO meeting Khanty-Mansiysk, 2005; Yellowknife, 2014a, 2014b). If the Arctic, i.e., Canadian, conditions should be improved and protected, it takes an international audience to listen, Canada argues. Theme: sustainable development. When Canada chaired the AC during 2013-2015, Leona Aglukkaq – an Inuk politician from the Nunavut territory, led it through a program entitled “Development for the people of the North,” designed to showcase the north. Its bullet points were a direct replica of the Arctic strategy, and included safe Arctic shipping, responsible resource development, and the establishment of an Arctic Economic Council (AEC) as well as sustainable circumpolar communities (Chairmanship program, 2013-2015).61 Decisively, it took on the role of letting the voices of the Northerners be heard. “We eat what we hunt and that is not going to change,” ICC once said in the beginning of the ACs history (AC Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000). This message, similar to the PPs in general, has been taken up by Canada, who considers itself to have valuable experience and AC input to offer concerning strengthening indigenous people in their capacity to manage their own affairs, economically as well as socially (cf. Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000; SAO meeting Inari, 2002; Haparanda, 2012; Whitehorse, 2013). Such an approach could be argued to involve elements of symbolism as well: there would be no Arctic North without the people inhabiting it, and there would be no Canada without the North. Therefore, protecting the Arctic, i.e., the Canadian North, is an undertaking pertaining to the inner core of state being. Even though climate change has not been given precedence over sustainable development, Canada still considers it a threat and has done so since the outset: Inuit hunters reportedly had to start with sunscreen, and large revenues from the sale of sunscreen products in the north clearly indicated something was wrong (Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000; SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000). Thus, although Canada outside of the AC withdrew from the Kyoto protocol, it stayed committed within the AC context: together with Sweden and the U.S., they launched a project called “Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-lived Climate Pollutants” (SAO meeting Stockholm, 2012; Haparanda, 2012), and offered to co-lead a new AC task force on black carbon and methane the following year. Thus, climate is a stronger

61 More concretely, priorities were to work in partnership with the PPs and to enhance the traditional wisdom and knowledge of the Artic Council (Fairbanks, 2016), to strengthen the Arctic Council by enhancing the PPs capacity regarding financing, to promote rather than protect the traditional ways of life – i.e., to respect the autonomy of people and the creation of the tracking tool ‘Amarok’ (wolf in Inuktitut), which would help the Northerners to know about the AC commitment and thus what to hold it responsible for (SAO meeting Whitehorse, 2013; Whitehorse 2015; Ministerial statement by Canada, 2015).

88 part of the Canadian role performance than its national climate commitment at first would indicate. Characteristics as an AC partner. The Arctic Council was created out of Canada’s proposal, and Canada is a confident actor that is keen to initiate things and to take on leadership. It is also keen to voice its opinion: for instance, it firmly encourages, as well as requires, fellow members to make reference to the Arctic in UN negotiations on mercury (SAO meeting Haparanda, 2012). A state that conceives itself as Arctic to its fingertips would also get access to a greater arena from which its Arctic message could be spread, should more states and organizations be granted observer status. In AC, Canada is amongst the leaders who take on projects, who is keen to apply an “evidence-based decision-making” (arctic-council.org; section on Canada, 2017), and who does not act fearfully in informing about the rest of the achievements (see for instance, SAO meeting Stockholm, 2013). Canada seems to reason that rationality rather than feelings should guide behavior. Whereas Canada is an active AC member when it comes to leadership, organization, and administration, it is also an actor that stands out as favoring justified and reputable behavior. For instance, when Sweden criticized Russia for having too strict legal regimes for anyone being able to do research in the Russian Arctic, Canada responded by clarifying such obstacles as existing not only in Russia but also in other states (SAO meeting Khanty-Mansiysk, 2005). Thus, Canada is sensitive toward injustices and wants to promote “good values,” and often acts as a motivator trying to encourage everyone else to follow, especially its AC compatriot the U.S., in the early days but also Russia (Nord, 2016a; 2016b). Comments from the AC colleagues are numerous and positive, especially from the two afore- mentioned, and Canada express its gratefulness. Although not overly appraised by the PPs, Canada is – compared to the other Arctic states– standing quite well off.

What social interaction has brought about With the positive exception of short-lived climate pollutants, Canada is performing a role that is close to what is prescribed issue-wise by the Arctic strategy, with ‘economy’ as a capacity builder high on the agenda, and where sovereignty and control are in the center. As the behavioral pattern, the role – once again following the strategy – is one of protector, but its meaning is diversified: it is attached to sovereignty, sustainable development, and issues of fair and responsible manner on the global scene, alike. Still, whereas Canada’s role conception could be described as a ‘tough’ protector of the North, in the AC this turns into a role performance that is more of a ‘soft’ ditto. The Canadian role conception struggles in juggling the different meanings attached to being a ‘protector,’ which is revealed in tensions between rhetoric and practice: rhetorically, there has been an element of orchestrated spectacles on tough sovereignty, but in the AC setting a reputable behavior built around gratitude and encouragement seems closer at heart as cooperative guiding

89 principles. As shown in the case of Canada, its role performance seems less dependent on political administration than what the latter’s rhetoric might suggest.

Denmark – Kid-brother realist

National Arctic idea: to protect the environment while creating development. Access to the Arctic is in Denmark’s case – or rather the Kingdom of Denmark62 – granted through Greenland. Since 1953, when Greenland’s status changed from a colony to a constituency of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has sought greater autonomy. If full Greenlandic sovereignty is to be reached, increased GDP is a necessity.63 A not unimportant but rather possible trajectory to such autonomy runs via resource exploitation, with promising oil and gas reserves found in the offshore sediments (Government of Greenland, 2017a). Denmark’s Arctic strategy (2011) center around peacefulness and safety, and where self-sustaining growth and development are allowed to thrive under close environmental supervision and protection. Focus is not on state security but on societal security, where the indigenous populations of Greenland are articulated and supported. The environment lays imbedded within this social security approach, linked to all other issues of importance such as marine shipping and oil and gas development. The strategy explains climate change, in particular, as key, together with other issues such as biodiversity and reaching a global agreement on mercury (ibid:50). Indeed, Denmark follows the same pattern as the rest of the Nordic states in its focus on the environment, and in a global context Denmark repeatedly leads the climate change performances index list (CCPI, 2017). Adding alter: Denmark as a global Arctic player. To Denmark, Greenland generates a warm and proud feeling of heritage, adding another dimension to Danish foreign policy, by having the state to escape being “just another small state” (Offerdal, 2014:81). Because of Greenland, Denmark is sitting at the same table as big nations like Canada, Russia, and the U.S., and “punches above its weight” (Jacobsen, 2016).

62 In the Arctic Council, the Kingdom of Denmark represents the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Denmark. To speak and act as ‘Denmark’ is therefore a result of these three entities’ combined perspectives and motivations, and discrepancies between them cannot be ruled out as complicating Danish role performance. 63 A political motivation of Greenland has for quite some time been to gain independence, although it seems that the younger population nowadays is in less favor of such a future path (High North News, 161207). However, with a population of little less than 57,000 inhabitants, but yet with a land area big enough to place it amongst the largest top 15 countries and surrounded by water, as well as with an economy mainly built around fishing (almost half of the export revenues stems from shrimps), Greenland is continuously dependent on Denmark for financial backing-up, but also on personnel too, for instance, patrolling internal waters. Political areas such as defense and security policy, foreign affairs, and monetary systems are for now kept under Danish jurisdiction (Government of Greenland, 2017a; 2017b).

90 To strengthen its status as a global player in the Arctic is an explicit objective of Denmark (Arctic strategy, 2011:11). Although Denmark wishes for enhanced AC cooperation, it is also keen on acting as a sovereign Arctic nation. Surveillance and territorial claims become important tools thereof. In 2014, Denmark presented its claim to the CLCS regarding a large area surrounding the North Pole, partly overlapping the Canadian and Russian claim,64 and it has since before a territorial dispute with Canada regarding the tiny Hans Island. Concerning surveillance, the Arctic Command has been patrolling the coast of Greenland and Faroe Islands since 2012, on a mandate to guarantee social security, for instance, by ensuring marine pollution prevention, search and rescue, and fishing vessel inspection (Defense Command Denmark, 2017; Hilde, 2014:151). Regardless of how important sovereignty may be, Denmark pays close attention to the ‘signals sent’ through its actions. To describe itself as “an Arctic great power” (in relative terms), while also foreseeing an upgrade of its Arctic strength (Taksøe-Jensen, 2016)65 could indeed be interpreted as Denmark is moving away from cooperation (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2016). However, to upgrade strength could also be about defending cooperation (Fogh Rasmussen, 2015). This latter would be Denmark’s objective, why it was keen to make sure that no misleading signals would be sent, leading to escalatory measures (ibid.). Similarly, the Arctic 5 Ilulissat meeting in 2008 was believed to have sent ‘strong signals’ on coastal states’ commitment for a responsible development of the Arctic (Arctic strategy, 2011:14). Flag-planting episodes on Hans Island – in 2002, 2003, and 2004 – has been interpreted not as much as signals sent to the international sphere, as to represent a staged performance on power, broadcasted to the home audience close to elections (in 2005) (Byers, 2013:14). The role conception of Denmark is one of being a global Arctic player, and who wants to have control. Environmental protection is part of this wish, which aims for social security. In particular, Arctic climate change becomes a way for Denmark to pursue an ‘active climate diplomacy,’ consistent with an already established pursuit of having an active internationalism on the matter. With international cooperation as well as sovereignty both being key to Arctic development, Denmark seems preoccupied with clarity in order to eradicate misunderstandings that could arise from unilateral behavior.

64 Denmark has been mapping and collected data about Arctic continental shelves since 2002, albeit with increased efforts starting in 2006 (Arctic strategy, 2011:15). The dispute on Hans Island constitutes the only dispute over land in the Arctic, and is an island consisting of 1.3 km2 rock located in the Kennedy Channel between Canada and Greenland. 65 The background was the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which already had called for a Denmark that could handle a possibly more assertive Russia in the Arctic as well (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2015).

91 Role performance in the Arctic Council Denmark’s role performance is pragmatic. To initiate, envision cooperation, or apply visionary schemes for the future is distant: rather than a departure in what could be, Denmark departs from what is. From a perspective based on here and now, for the people living in the Arctic, development is a priority that also entails oil and gas.66 Denmark claims that: ‘even though such extracting is not without risks: whenever humans are involved risks are associated and cannot be fully avoided’ (Ministerial statement on behalf of Denmark, by Premier of Greenland 2011). Such reasoning represents Denmark fairly well in the AC as a state mirroring cooperation in a conscientious way, and who is not carried away with big words on improvement. However, when the oil spill agreement was signed in 2013, the Danish minister for foreign affairs commented that it perhaps could have been more ambitious. He also remembered that “we must not forget that sometimes perfect can be the enemy of good” (Ministerial statement by Denmark, 2013). Reality rather than visions would be the guiding principle for a Denmark that in the AC context performs as the kid- brother realist. What is? Melting ice and sustainable development. In the AC, Denmark is amongst the states pushing for regional and international actions on climate change, as well as other airborne Arctic pollutions. As a single issue, it has resulted in more comments from Denmark than for instance marine safety and oil and gas, issues that for sure are also of high interest and where ‘the benefits of oil and gas development to small self- governing areas of the Arctic’ has been raised more than once (for instance, SAO meeting Kautokeino, 2008). Climate change enjoys specific attention though, and when the ACIA report was under process, Denmark hoped it would be “as extensive as a scientific report could be” (SAO meeting Oulu, 2002). With Greenland housing one of the biggest ice sheets in the world, second after the Antarctic ice sheet, Denmark has taken a particular interest in climate sub projects on this matter (SAO meeting Narvik, 2007; Tromsø 2007). In general, Denmark has attempted to reach out internationally on the issue of climate change, and ACs scientific cooperation has offered an opportunity, for instance, to call out for action regarding the Arctic ice melting (SAO meeting Ilulissat, 2010; Tórshavn, 2010), or to attempt to link international climate negotiations to AC Ministerial meetings (SAO meeting Whitehorse, 2015). Denmark has been willing to raise the stakes by actually mitigating global warming with reference to how Arctic states should both respond to the ACIA-findings, and take responsibility for its “large share of global greenhouse emissions” (Ministerial statement by Denmark, 2009). Denmark seems to reason that

66 The right to development by the people living in the Arctic is a message repeated with continuity, where Faroe Island and Greenland stress the fundamental “right to develop our own resources, living as well as non-living resources” (Ministerial statement on behalf of Denmark, by Premier of Greenland 2011).

92 problems are there to be solved, but it has yet been a bit careful when it comes to short-lived climate pollutants. Characteristics as an AC partner. The quite realistic/pragmatic approach to cooperation is reflected in rather explicit expectations, where Denmark expects others to do their part: Denmark agrees to provide financial assistance and expects at the same time others to follow (SAO meeting Anchorage, 1999); it has signed the LRTAP (Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution) and is shocked that only Canada has followed (SAO meeting Washington, 1999); moreover, Denmark rhetorically asks why it is so difficult for some countries to make a commitment on pollution reductions, when contaminants can certainly only be reduced through international cooperation (Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000). This more pragmatic stance on Arctic cooperation – that one is willing to contribute but equally wants others to do their part – resonates well with why Denmark only quite rarely speaks about or presents expectations of other states: if you require something of someone else, you might be targeted by expectations and requirements in return. And a Danish role performance seems keen on not promising more than it can achieve. Having one foot in sovereignty gives strength and confidence, which may explain the unconcerned attitude toward comments made by others, for instance, Iceland’s concerned critique over being excluded from the Ilulissat Arctic 5 meeting was met with the remark “capacity at the venue might be an issue” (SAO meeting Narvik, 2007). But respect for sovereignty could, in an interactive setting, also be translated into ‘integrity,’ and meeting minutes from Denmark’s chairmanship period from 2009-2011 reveals a note taker that to a high extent was decoding actors, thus, preserving their integrity. This goes as well for the AC; when Denmark organized an Arctic Information Day during its chairmanship, the press was not invited, despite a Danish chairmanship objective of ‘international outreach’ (Bergman Rosamond, 2011: 52-53) However, at that particular time, the context was one where the AC had lost its Arctic voice, when the Arctic 5 again had met separately, and where the AC members noted with concern how a consensus was no longer as successfully obtained as in the past (Ilulissat, 2010). A wish to protect the integrity – the imagery – of Arctic cooperation from outside critique could have impinged upon the Danish reluctance to invite the press. The more certain Denmark has been on ‘what is,’ as the AC cooperation has ‘proved itself,’ the more encouraged it has been to take on leadership. To have a realistic and pragmatic perspective on cooperation however is not the same as not cooperating, and Denmark is generally considered as a good and trustworthy partner and a good problem solver, who, for instance, has criticized the U.S. for limiting the role of the AC (Offerdal, 2016:81). Together with Norway and Sweden, Denmark also acted to significantly strengthen the AC having the region’s best interests in mind, without losing sight of the needs of the international community (Nord, 2016b:48-49).

93 What social interaction has brought about Denmark’s role performance, just like its role conception, reveals a state worried about climate change and socio-economic conditions for its population. It is a state that views itself as an operating littoral state, with all the responsibility that comes along regarding protection of sovereignty. Performance-wise, Denmark also seems to play this role with quite some portion of confidence, realism, and pragmatism suitable for ‘an Arctic power.’ At the same time, in the Arctic strategy, Canada, Norway, Iceland, and USA are identified as close partners in a multitude of Arctic areas. These are all states similar to Denmark when it comes to interests and challenges associated with the Arctic Ocean. When performing in the AC, however, it is not clear that these states are supported to any particular degree by Denmark, or that Denmark is being supported by them. Although its role conception reveals an actor equal to a global player on societal security, Denmark’s AC performance is more of pragmatic kid-brother. Identification might be an issue for Denmark, where playing the roles of ‘a great Arctic state’ does not always comes naturally, and it remains the least visible amongst the Arctic5. Even though environmental cooperation (and prescribed norms) is very welcome by Denmark, social interaction does not really reveal – or confirm – Denmark to have the weight it foresees within its role conception.

Finland – Reserved team player

National Arctic idea: providing tools to achieve sustainable development. Just like Iceland and Sweden, Finland is a coastal state. However, it borders the Baltic Sea to the west, rather than the Arctic Ocean to the north, and is therefore not an Arctic littoral state. Finland, just like Sweden, lacks many of those national interests that come along on the Arctic coastline. Nonetheless, the identity as Arctic is strong, where one-third of the population lives above 60 degrees north (Arctic strategy, 2013). It considers itself to have reconciliatory competences to offer Arctic activities, capable of uniting business development and environmental sustainability. Indeed, regarding the Finnish role conception, the Arctic strategy identifies Finland as an actor that truly understands, respects, and operates within the conditions dictated by the Arctic environment (2013:17). The Arctic strategy was presented in 2010, and revised again only three years later, in 2013. The context had changed, Finland explained, and referred both to the region as having increased in significance, and a growing perception of Finland as a country within that context (Arctic strategy, 2013:7). With implicit reference to its diversified expertise, Finland considers itself as a state with legitimacy to engage in the future development of the region. Whereas the first strategy from 2010 was focused on external relations, the second strategy elaborated on national challenges and opportunities, all falling back on Arctic sustainable development as the primary driver.

94 Sustainable development, climate change, and environmental protection would be the overarching key issues in the strategy, i.e., the goal for Arctic development, Finland has the tools and knowledge to ease such a transition, and invests in research and education to “increase its appeal as a world-class expert on the Arctic” (ibid., 2013:24). It views itself as an active Arctic actor that knows how to make use of the Arctic transition, where it can also contribute in business sectors directed for instance energy efficiency and renewable energy. Furthermore, the sector where Finland has established itself among the world’s leading nations is within marine shipping, for instance, as regards the manufacturing of icebreakers where it has one of the best capacities in the world (Bergh and Klimenko, 2016:62). Marine technology in general would be a Finnish cutting edge sector, through, for instance, winter navigation systems, offshore oil and gas drilling technologies, and technology on oil spill recovery in ice-covered waters (Arctic strategy, 2013:26-27). International cooperation as part of the Finnish national interest. Security is of high importance to Finland, bordering as it is to Russia, but it does not dwell upon security and sovereignty issues in the strategy (Offerdal, 2014:87). Instead, Finland advances the importance of cooperation, cooperation of all kinds,67 but with the Arctic Council as the primary forum, which should also be strengthened (Chairmanship program, 2017-2019). Furthermore, Finland is dedicated to the task of bringing the EU closer to the Arctic, and pushes for the Union to be granted observer status within the Council. Such a status would serve to create a clearer and reinforced Arctic strategy on behalf of the EU (Arctic strategy, 2013:15). It is through cooperation and international affairs that Finland exerts its national interest, since Finland itself does not naturally navigate the Arctic waters or possess any natural resources therein. In a press release from the Finnish government, Finland declared an overall Arctic objective to be about showcasing Finnish leadership (as being solution minded) in international Arctic politics (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2016). One dimension of this leadership is supported by technical know-how; another dimension is more symbolic and relates to Finland’s history of bringing attention to the region’s environmental needs; and Arctic (higher) education is important. It was Finland who in 1989 invited the seven other Arctic states to the meeting later leading up to the Rovaniemi Declaration (i.e., AEPS); and Finland made use of its EU chairmanship in 2006 to push for a Northern Dimension perspective within the Union (Ministerial statement by Finland, 2006). As such, there is a proud history of Arctic promotion – centered on the Arctic environmental protection – within Finland. The Arctic strategy also reveals Finland to once again take the initiative and push for more

67 Other co-operations of relevance would be: the Barents-Euro Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension of partnerships, and Nordic Council of Ministers, which are viewed as adding potential for opportunities in the Arctic region. In 2010, Finland also launched a Partnership initiative with Russia, which serves to be responsive to the needs of commercial enterprises.

95 deepened and institutionalized cooperation, by supporting the move of the AC into a treaty-based organization (2013:14; 44).

Role performance in the Arctic Council In the AC, Finland performs a quite low-voiced role and is not among the loudest and most frequent talkers. To speak, highlight, and inform about national activities is not part of the Finnish role. In the same vein, to criticize how other states approach Arctic issues or perform uncooperatively is also distant to Finland’s behavior. It is furthermore a performance of being a respectful cooperative partner: Finland is not skeptical or keeps its feet on the brakes, but rather delivers in a punctual manner. International protector of eco-systems. Finland has distinguished itself as the state talking the least about climate change in the SAO settings. Now, this says little for a state with more introvert characteristics, and who also distinguishes itself as the state talking the least about maritime security and safety, despite this being a field of big expertise. But rather than climate change specifically, Finland prefers a more inclusive approach to environmental protection. At the last Ministerial meeting in Anchorage, the foreign minister explained that challenges from climate change cannot be solved one by one or in isolation (Ministerial statement by Finland, 2017). Environmental protection, and very much so the marine life, have been the core of Finland’s Arctic approach as well as of the AC cooperation ever since the first meeting was held in Rovaniemi in 1991. To bring up Rovaniemi, as Finland occasionally has done (see for instance, Ministerial statements, 2013; Iqaluit, 2015; and Chairmanship program 2017-2019) could represent a way for Finland to add weight to its words, to prove to be a justified and foresighted actor that understands and knows about the Arctic. To emphasize more scientific knowledge would also be a recurrent pattern, for instance, on marine ecosystems. At Ministerial meetings, Finland has stressed the importance of science as a guide to policy drafting (Ministerial statements by Finland, 2002; 2013; 2015). Science should guide the principle of decision-making when conclusions based upon working groups are considered, and any plans to exploit natural resources should be guided by environmental assessments. However, it was also Finland who in 2001 showed the way (as it did with AEPS) by initiating a new approach to Arctic relations by introducing gender equality (SAO meeting Rovaniemi, 2001). This would develop into a recurrent theme within the AC, eagerly cheered on by Sweden, followed by Iceland and Norway. Characteristics as an AC partner. Within the reserved team player role is imbedded high integrity and respect for other members. It does not come naturally to judge others, neither positive nor negative, which also brings forward a low frequency regarding motivating, commenting on, or appraising others’ behavior. However, when it happens, Canada and Russia are paid positive attention, in addition to working groups and not least the PPs. A reserved role also does not attract any negative judgments from the Arctic member states, working groups, or PPs, in that it signals reliability. As a state, it has taken its fair share of organizing events, but

96 reliability is also spelled out when the state withdraws its offer to act as a leader on a CAFF project on Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, with reference to other states as having more profound experience on the matter (SAO meeting Tromsø, 2007). Since ‘leader’ would be amongst the behavioral characteristics most frequently applied by Finland, viewed relatively, we could understand Finland as a state keen on performing where they have thorough knowledge and capacity, but who feels uncomfortable in the leadership role per se.

What social interaction has brought about Nationally, Finland wants to ensure Arctic sustainable development through offering its competence, leadership, and know-how, and its role conception is one of being an Arctic expert. Although Finland applied much of such an expert role for the first ten years of cooperation, it diminished in parallel to the Arctic becoming more politicized. The second time period in the ACs history made Finland – just like Iceland – less active (or possibly less visible) in the cooperation. When the Arctic region increased in strategic importance, Finland might have expected the Arctic 5 to view non-coastal states as itself to keep more of a low profile. The Finnish role conception is not reflected in high vocals on its competence. Rather, Finland performs as a reserved and low-voiced team player, confident that the rest will search for the competence when needed. Similarly, Finland does not talk in issues pertaining to economy, such as oil and gas or marine transportation/safety, which could be seen as an expression of not wanting to encroach upon states in their private domain: just as Finland respects the Arctic environment, it also respects Arctic state sovereignty. The ‘solutions’ offered by Finland are thus only given if asked for, and to act as an expert is only part of the role as long as Finland can sense that others are requesting it. Only then would it also be a value add-on to Finland.

Iceland – Follower with ambitions

National Arctic idea – to take advantage of its location. Iceland borders just south of the Arctic Circle, but is not recognized as an Arctic littoral state.68 Neither does its population have a strong Arctic identity, or any Arctic indigenous communities to support a sense thereof (Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, 2017). Surrounded by water though, the sea is of great importance. The top export product is fish, where Iceland is the fifth largest fish exporter to the EU. However, fish and fish products are declining as export products, whereas things such as equipment, technology, and

68 The Icelandic government considers Iceland to be a fully valid coastal state due to its territorial waters reaching into the Greenland Sea by the Arctic Ocean (Arctic policy, 2011; Dodds and Ingimundarson, 2012). Contrary to Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., Iceland does not claim any territorial rights in the Arctic Ocean.

97 instruments relating to navigation at sea have increased (European Commission, 2017a). Together with Russia, Iceland opposes the Norwegian Fishery Protection zone that runs around the coast of Svalbard, by referring to the water as international.69 Iceland has started to investigate its oil- and gas assets, and submitted a report open for public debate in 2007 regarding issuing licenses for explorative oil and gas drilling in the Dragon area on the Jan Mayen Ridge (Ministry of Industry, 2007). Leases were issued in 2013, but oil and gas exploration in the Icelandic continental shelf is described to still be in an early phase (National Energy Authority, 2017). Iceland has also reached a friendly settlement with Norway regarding the island of Jan Mayen, located halfway between Iceland and Norway. The island is Norwegian territory, but Norway has struck a deal with Iceland on any potential natural resources (oil and gas) found around its coast; specifically, 25 percent of the revenues will go to Iceland for resources extracted by Norway, with a similar take on any resources found in the area by Iceland (Byers, 2013:37-38). International ambition – visibility. With fishing being a fundamental part of Icelandic economy, history, and identity, a growing concern for climate change is the disturbance it might have on migratory fishing patterns. Global warming and ice- melting are nonetheless viewed with some reassurance, where a new trans-Arctic shipping route could bring economic opportunities, not least via Chinese cargos and shippers (Bergh and Klimenko, 2016; Offerdal, 2014). However, a higher frequency of shipments in and close to the Icelandic EEZ would also increase the need for a well-functioning Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity. Iceland does not have a naval fleet, and it will be the task for the coast guard to tackle both the SAR and illegal fishing (Bergh and Klimenko, 2016:64). Here, there is a need for good cooperation. Overall, Iceland’s presentation of itself as a coastal state would be more directed toward the international sphere, and not least the Arctic Council cooperation, to gain more influence (Dodds and Ingimundarsson, 2012). Iceland’s official policy for the Arctic is basically a compound strategy for Icelandic visibility. Visibility is sought after in three different dimensions of the Arctic relations: (1) to strengthen the AC cooperation and promote international discussions on the AC decisions, (2) to safeguard opportunities for the Icelandic people by pushing for recognition as a coastal state, while simultaneously securing the possibility to influence the Arctic development within issues of legal, economic as well as ecological

69 The Spitsbergen Treaty from 1920 establishes the – until then – terra nullius archipelago of Svalbard to fall under Norwegian sovereignty. However, the treaty at the same time made sure that the territory could not be used for military purposes and naval bases, while also providing other states the right to continue with economic activities on Svalbard, as well as in its territorial water (Byers, 2013; Numminen, 2011). However, some diplomatic friction has arisen since Norway argues that the rights of other states to resources such as fish, minerals, and possible oil and gas does not extend to the whole of EEZ, or continental shelves. Iceland has therefore not been accorded fishing quotas, despite being part of the Spitsbergen Treaty (Byers, 2013:19).

98 character, and (3) to bring Iceland to the international field by promoting the involvement of Icelandic scholars within international research, and to bring the international community to Iceland by hosting and organizing meetings and conferences (Arctic Policy, 2011). In relation to the last objective, Iceland initiated a conference in 2013 to be held annually in Reykjavik called The Arctic Circle, with the explicit goal of encouraging dialogue and cooperation between multitudes of stakeholders on the Arctic future.

Role performance in the Arctic Council Also in the Arctic Council, Iceland works to gain visibility and influence. Due to being a small country population-wise, with no extraction of offshore energy resources and no national defense forces, it struggles in its achievement. Its role performance is telling of a low-key state that: is not a big and frequent talker (or whose comments are not ‘loud enough’ to be picked up by the secretary taking notes), does not initiate new projects on any greater scale, take on an expert role or at all moments declare itself leader. Instead, Iceland operates quite silently, having its intent on increased AC efficiency and good governance. Iceland performs the role of someone who is following rather than leading the way. Performance on multilateral issues. With all passages to Iceland going by the sea, marine environment and protection are also highly prioritized issues, raised and pushed.70 Since water is of fundamental importance, it makes it even more important to strive for coastal state recognition. Just like Iceland strived to gain international recognition for the AC from the beginning (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000), it does the same for itself. Following its Arctic strategy, it tries to take up space, something it recently has linked to its work on black carbon. At Cop 21, Iceland offered the AC its booth in order to increase its visibility in climate negotiations (SAO meeting Anchorage, 2015), and it also offered to host the side-events at future Cop’s (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016). Within the AC, such Icelandic initiatives would be seen as reflective of Iceland taking up space. Multilateral climate change (and marine environment and maritime safety), rather than unilateral oil, gas, or fishing would have been Iceland´s overall AC focus. Characteristics as an AC partner. The Icelandic role has been centered around being a communicator and an administrator that cherishes values such as transparency, order, and efficiency. Iceland would be a constructive and contributing partner. After its chairmanship period, which ended in 2006, Iceland became close to invisible in meeting documents, for a period of time. Whereas part of this could be explained by

70 The AC working group PAME – Protection of the Marine Environment – for instance, opened its secretariat in Akureyri, Iceland in 1999. Located in the same city is also the CAFF’s secretariat – Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna.

99 an overall change in the AC toward a more anonymous note-taking style,71 the financial crisis that struck Iceland in 2008 and onward possibly had an impact as well. Already in 2005, Iceland reported concerns about the budgetary issues in the AC, where the working group CAFF, with secretariat on Iceland, had a value drop in contributions equivalent to 21 percent due to a fall in the U.S. dollar compared to the Icelandic Kroner (SAO meeting Yakutsk, 2005). However, a third explanation for reduced visibility – which most likely then later gave rise to a national strategy on visibility – reflects the years around 2007-2011 as the big player years. When Denmark arranged the Ilulissat meeting in 2008, Iceland was not invited. Iceland expressed concern, and saw in the Arctic 5 a possible competitor to the AC. ‘The issues to be discussed in Ilulissat were of general importance to all AC members,’ Iceland argued, and requested everyone to be invited (SAO meeting Narvik, 2007). Despite Iceland’s objection, the meeting was not only held but also followed by another meeting in 2010, this time with Canada as the organizer. Together with Sweden, Finland, and the PPs, Iceland pointed toward a lack of inclusiveness, and expressed disappointment over the fact that one more Arctic 5 meeting had taken place (SAO meeting Ilulissat, 2010). A third meeting in 2015, this time on unregulated fishing, once again told Iceland – through a lack of recognition – what it was not: an Arctic coastal state. The sense of belonging for Iceland in the AC is a tricky question. Iceland is often linked together with Sweden and Finland, due to the three of them being perceived as ‘small’ states, with lower expectations on leadership (Nord, 2016b). A certain degree of modesty therefore could be expected from these states. When Iceland ended its AC chairmanship in 2006, the opening statement by the minister of foreign affairs thanked all for support, and declared itself privileged in being able to build on the outstanding work of its predecessors: “[i]f we have succeeded, it is largely on account of the unselfish contribution of people too numerous to mention by name” (Ministerial statement by Iceland, 2006). Just like Finland, and to a high degree also Sweden, Iceland does not attract any negative judgments or expectations from other members. Not unimportantly in this context, one may assume the coastal states to perceive these states as moderately threatening in that they are assumed not to – taking fishing out from Iceland – represent too colored interests.

What social interaction has brought about In the AC, the Icelandic role faces a conflict of expectations, located in its own conceptions of how it should behave. Clearly, Iceland wants to be recognized as a littoral state, and in the Arctic strategy (2011) it states itself to have knowledge and experience to fit the conditions of the region. It also identifies, for instance, shipping and resource utilization as opportunities – but also challenges – facing the Icelandic

71 As the region became more politicized, together with a more established cooperation, it attracted greater international interest.

100 people. Iceland’s role conception is therefore somewhat similar to the rest of the coastal states. Yet, in AC, this role conception cannot operate freely, since alter expectations do not correlate with ego ditto. This is not only due to a lack of inclusion by others in practice (role prescriptions) but also derived from Iceland’s own alter conceptions: not even Iceland truly expects the rest of the states to view it as a coastal state, with power. ‘Iceland has a small population, no oil industry and technological know-how’, an AC representative from this country explains (Interview, 2015d). Thus, Iceland may await recognition as a coastal state, but in the AC it performs as a follower, and believes in it.

Norway – Restless know-how leader

National Arctic idea: to act as a rescuer while making the most of its potentials. The Arctic policy from 2014 starts off with an illustrated overview of the Norwegian Arctic, showing a variety of Arctic activities that Norway is in some way involved in or affected by; there is a fishing vessel and a fish farm, LNG tanker and a rig, a tourist ferry and polar bears; a reindeer and some tents, to mention a few. The headline reads “The Arctic. Important for Norway, important for the world” (Arctic policy, 2014:6- 7; for the same message, see also Arctic strategy from 201772). The text is dually constructed: a reading of the Arctic as important to Norway and the world points toward an interest in protecting the region; a reading of the Arctic as important for Norway and from here, that is, from what Norway produces here, points toward Norway’s ownership over a resource base sought after by the world. Both readings would be equally true. The Arctic, or the High North as called by Norway, is, as explained by former Foreign Minister Børge Brende, part of the Norwegian identity. Fishermen and seafarers are the signatories of the nation, and “[t]he Arctic waters are our natural home” (Brende, 2015). It has been and continues to be a shipping nation, with the fourth largest fleet in the world. In addition, offshore oil and gas rigs have established themselves within the Norwegian ‘home,’73 and it ranks as a global top five exporter of crude oil, where it also supplies the EU with about 20 percent of the Union’s gas consumption (European Commission, 2017b). Although less than three percent of all

72 This 2017 strategy is entitled Between geopolitics and social development . This latter strategy keeps intact prior overarching Arctic goals from strategies and policies (from 2006 and 2014) but elaborates and builds more on sustainable development and achieving regional balance throughout the country, including the rural areas (2017:15). As explained by Prime Minister Erna Solberg in the foreword, “drawing up this strategy, it has been important to listen to the voices of those who live in the north”. 73 About 22 percent of Norwegian gross domestic product (GDP) stems from the oil and gas sector, and it makes about two-thirds of all of its export (European Commission, 2017b). A large, and continuously increasing, portion of the remaining export is constituted by fish, both from fishing and farming (Norwegian Seafood Council, 2017).

101 recoverable oil and gas in 2011 came from the Arctic shelf,74 this figure is increasing: in 2016, the Eni-operated oil field Goliat went on stream (ENI, 2016), and three more oil fields are additionally preparing for production. One of them became accessible as a result of Norway re-calculating the latitude of the average Norwegian ice-edge with reference to climate change and ice-melting, with the decision to draw the line further north (Government of Norway, 2015b).75 A fundamental aspect of Norway’s Arctic policies has been ‘to take environmental and climate considerations into account in everything that is done,’ and ‘to be a leading nation as regards environmental policy’ (Arctic strategy, 2006:foreword; 45; Arcitc policy, 2014). Indeed, climate ambitions are high in Norway; moreover, after the Paris agreement, Norway took immediate action and put the date 20 years closer in time for when climate neutrality should be achieved, by 2030 (Stortinget, 2016). Norway would also be the state in the world with the highest per capita share of non- emitting cars, where the electricity is generated from wind and water rather than fossil fuels, and where many Norwegians spend their weekends close to nature, skiing or hiking. Despite this, Norway is currently ranked as number 38 out of 61 by CCPI (2017). It is a large fossil fuel exporter, and should national emissions also include the emission from the carbon being exported, emission levels would be more than ten times higher (Davis, Peters, and Kaldeira, 2011). To avoid having these values of energy (business opportunities) and environmental protection be contradictory and instead be complementary, Norway has combined them into a role conception of being a leader within green technology. Because, as Prime Minister Erna Sohlberg explains, a harvesting of Arctic resources requires green and innovative solutions (Sohlberg, 2017). Norway has the competence and is ranked as a world leader, not least when considering safety standards on offshore drilling (Byers, 2013:205), and where its efficient technology renders Norway as one of the most carbon efficient

74 Whereas the majority of petroleum has been extracted in the Northern Sea and the Norwegian Sea, explorative drilling in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea started, however, as early as 1980. Soon thereafter, one found the Snøhvit gas fields, albeit production did not start until 2007. The gas fields consist of three related fields: Snøhvit, Albatross, and Askeladd (the latter will come on stream after 2020). Once extracted, the gas is piped onshore (140 km) to Melkøya outside Hammerfest, before it is turned into liquefied natural gas (LNG) and transported to Europe. It is the northernmost located LNG facility (Statoil, 2017a). 75 The three fields preparing for production are Alta/Gotha, Wisting, and the highly prospective field Johan Castberg. Norwegian safety precaution measures assure that all offshore petroleum activity occurs with no less than 50 km distance to the imagined ice-edge. Johan Castberg, located 100 km north of Snøhvit, makes it just within the new ice-edge. The 24th License Round (2017) included 93 new blocks in the Arctic waters, of which 10 are located above the 74 degrees north. Never before has that many blocks been available for the oil industry to submit bids on (Barents Observer, 170621). However, at the end of 2017, it stood clear that only 11 companies were interested to bid for licenses, which is more than a 50 percent reduction compared to the previous year. That no successful oil discoveries had been made during 2017 is a plausible reason for the decline in interest (ibid: 171207).

102 producers of oil and gas in the world (Statoil, 2017b). Norwegian resource extraction is governed by a discourse similar to “drilling for the environment”, where Norway, in comparison, is considering itself to have the competence to extract in a responsible and environmentally safe way (Jensen, 2012). Norway’s ambition is also no less than to be a “leader in knowledge” (2014:26), not least with regard to the responsible management of resources. Linking the national to the international. Another folio of the Arctic policy (2014) shows Børge Brende, standing on a cliff somewhere along the Norwegian coast against a scenery of sharp mountains. Dressed in a suit, he signals the Arctic, or perhaps rather Norway, to be more than nature: to also be about politics. The political message sent however is one of cooperation, and goes: “It is in everyone’s interest that the Arctic remains a peaceful and stable region” (Arctic policy, 2014:8-9). Norway does not have any unresolved legal disputes in the Arctic,76 but it has yet a somewhat exposed position in the Arctic as well as strategic interests thereof. One is a strong advocate of NATO, but it is also keen on having good relations with its neighbor Russia where, for instance, navies regularly exercise together (Bergh and Klimenko, 2016:64-65). However, relations could only be good to the degree they do not impact negatively on the Western relations, and it is a relationship furthermore built on Russia as being the significant other, that is, different Norway (Offerdal, 2014:83; Jensen, 2017). Despite ‘resource muscles,’ Norway is still a small state fostered to cherish values of diplomacy and mediation. When the Arctic strategy is about to define Norway’s role in international settings, it turns to the rest of the world: the former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, and Rajendra Pachauri, Chair of IPCC, present the Arctic as a region where states and others should be united in a concern for the region, promises and challenges alike, and where technological capabilities are sought after. But Norway also turns to actors outside Norway to confirm that they are performing a key role in the Arctic. Other voices explicitly mention Norway as being knowledgeable and environmentally pro-active, as well as shouldering cooperative leadership and raising awareness (Arctic policy, 2014:14). To be a distinguished Arctic state is important to Norway, and Prime Minister Erna Sohlberg describes Norway as playing a leading role in international Arctic diplomacy (ibid.). A confirmation of this role conception is actively sought through recognition from others, thus, strengthening the role further. Norway considers itself to be the responsible leader in taking the Arctic forward, relying on its long Arctic experience, its polar science, and its technological know- how. It frames itself as a nation helping out and who wants to do good; each day it ‘feeds a lot of people’ by producing well over 30 million meals of fish (Brende, 2017).

76 Svalbard would be an exception, where Norway has kept away from establishing an EEZ and exclusively harvesting resources within the archipelago, since several countries oppose such territorial demarcation (Jensen, 2017:129).

103 Arctic gas is an environmentally friendly alternative to coal (Statoil, 2017b), and the Barents Sea deposit can improve energy poverty and help the world meet its growing energy demand (Arctic strategy, 2014). As such, the Norwegian role conception finds it important to link national material interests to something that also would benefit everyone. The selling point of the argument regarding fossil fuels would thus become a presented argument of environmental benefit for all. As such, the Norwegian role conception also manages to overcome the difficulty of explaining how the only activity literally standing still in the Arctic Ocean – i.e., offshore oil-and gas extraction – still could represent a ‘responsible move forward’ toward greater environmental protection.

Role performance in the Arctic Council In the Arctic Council, Norway signals activity: ‘the AC should deliver,’ and Norway would be the helping hand. If one truly knows something, like Norway conceives itself to do, then it is not that farfetched to also believe one could positively contribute to cooperation. Experience and knowledge obligates, and Norway would thus constitute a ‘restless know-how leader’ within the AC context that wants to see things move forward. Salient performance rates. Norway has high performance rates on all issues of national interest, such as climate change/short-lived climate pollutants, oil and gas, marine safety, and – compared to others – fishing. Early on in the AC cooperation, Norway was quick to identify future development of oil and gas as a source for increased maritime transport, thus, also identifying a need for enhanced safety precautions regarding transport (SAO meeting Rovaniemi, 2001). Equally early on, Norway realized the presence – and effect – of climate change in the Arctic, pushing for it being the main theme in the 2002 Ministerial declaration (Ministerial Meeting Barrow, 2000; SAO meeting Oulu, 2002). “Global warming is a fact”, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre said when acting as the AC Chair, as well as proclaiming its man-made dimensions as beyond doubt (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2006a). Indeed, within climate change, Norway has performed vividly,77 for instance, urging the other states “[t]here are things we can do and actually have to do – here in this region […]” (ibid., 2013). One such thing that Norway has informed the rest to do, in the name of a cutback in global warming emissions, is the prohibition of routine gas flaring (Fairbanks, 2016). According to the government, about 40 percent of the black carbon in the Arctic is generated from gas flaring (Government of Norway, 2015a). Oil and gas are high on the agenda, at the same time as the improvement of safety clauses, implementation of oil and gas guidelines, and oil spill prevention are deemed vital

77 Symbolically (i.e., theatrically), at the Ministerial meeting in Tromsø 2009, Norway invited former Vice President Al Gore – well-known for his demands for action on climate change – to give a presentation at its opening (SAO meeting Copenhagen, 2009a).

104 (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2009; SAO meeting Copenhagen, 2011. Recently, Norway has revealed indignation over what is perceived to be a one-sided portrayal of oil and gas as simply involving risks (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016). It should not be excluded that a fallen oil price and lowered interest in Arctic oil has caused Norway to step up its defense of Arctic energy resources. That transport and maritime safety, environmental protection, oil and gas extraction as well as fishing can operate side by side in the Arctic is evidenced by Norway, as they argued (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016). This is also visible through the encouraging results from Snøhvit gas field, where the precautionary principle is guiding when extracting (ibid.; Oulu, 2002). Environment and energy are interrelated, as Norway sees it, and such an approach can be supported through ‘integrated resource management,’ the theme of Norway’s chairmanship: all future economic activity must take account of the fragile eco-systems, and thus represents an opportunity to show how modern management and technology allow for commercial moving ahead while still protecting the environment (Ministerial statement, 2006a, 2006b). Characteristics as an AC partner. A guiding principle for Norway would be to ‘grasp opportunities in a responsible manner’ (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2013; Iqaluit, 2015). By referring to ‘responsible,’ Norway is signaling value-laden expectations on appropriate behavior. An agreement like Search and Rescue was partly appealed to by Norway by precisely this – expectations to live up to – for Norway, the AC, and external actors (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2011). Although positive to new observers, “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” the Norwegian Minister let them know upon their granted observer status, simultaneously calling for their active recognition of environmental protection, the inclusion of permanent representatives, and striking a sound balance between commercial interests on the one hand, and social and environmental on the other (ibid., 2013). As a state with plenty of Arctic knowledge, and plenty of Arctic interests, Norway can afford to act in a firm manner, take the floor to voice opinions, and, in general, take on leadership. Canada and Russia are the states receiving, as well as providing Norway with, the most amount of positive comments, where especially Russia is encouraged and commended when performing ‘well’ in the cooperation. The U.S., in contrast, is the state that occasionally has received admonitions, although minor. At the same time, in other contexts, Norway is not a major (material) state but a small (normative) Scandinavian state, which also could help explain why Norway decided to stay silent on the matter of Arctic 5, and did not, in contrast to Russia and Canada, express its support thereof in the AC context. It has also, similar to the Scandinavian countries, been keen on enhancing communication and eradicating misunderstandings and giving suggestions on how to render the AC cooperation as more efficient (see Ministerial statement by Norway, 2009). It has dedicated a fair share of its chairmanship to increase efficiency and institutional structure.

105 Norway wants the AC projects to “move forward” and to “[set] bold targets” (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2006a; 2006b). To avoid duplication and overlap in projects has become the Norwegian trademark (see for instance, SAO meeting Tromsø, 2007; Svolvaer, 2008; Copenhagen, 2009b). Furthermore, political decisions should be moved [emphasis added] with help from evidence, facts, and insights (ibid.), something that resonates well with the industrial parlance of best practices, harmonization, and exchange of experiences. This type of knowledge production claims to be objective and free of emotions.78 Hence, shouldering leadership, Norway does so through a vocabulary appealing to ‘reason and rationality’ rather than softer notions of feelings. This would also characterize a state that asks the U.S. to clarify why data on resources at risk for oil spill has not been delivered on time (SAO meeting Rovaniemi, 2001), or who quickly corrects the U.S. voiced assumption that the AC is being an expert on oil and gas. ‘Wrong’ was the message from Norway: ‘the experts,’ Norway said, ‘are found within states with petroleum production and their national authorities and research institutions’ (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016). In those words, Norway described and legitimized itself as an Arctic state of weight.

What social interaction has brought about Norway views itself as an Arctic rescuer who knows how to manage Arctic activities in a responsible manner, and its role performance is also consistent thereof: it performs as someone who wants something for the Arctic and out of the Arctic, and behaves like a restless know-how leader. The Norwegian role conception is at the same time formulated quite loosely, leaving room for flexibility and adaptation to occur when interacting socially: the things it knows of and has an interest in are many. In addition, the leader position upheld in the Arctic Council is not so much due to Norway naturally considering itself to be leader, unless one speaks about the Arctic, which Norway happens to know. Rather, one acts as a leader since one has knowledge to contribute, this both ego- and alter expectations confirm, and one is searching for recognition from others that confirm the role to be as such. Moreover, knowledge to Norway entails environmental considerations to be applied such as responsible harvesting of resources. To act as a leader is perhaps less natural than it is practical, and its incentives seems therefore less to be an absolute control over the cooperative direction, and more to make sure that the very same direction is a justified result of balanced movement between energy/resources and environment protection.

78 This is a conclusion based upon the participations as an observer in a number of industry conferences, where science relied upon by the industry was repeatedly cherished for its objectivity and reliance on ‘hard’ facts (an argumentation thus derived from what it was perceived not to be, that is, not driven by emotions).

106 Russia – Responsive informant

National Arctic idea: the Arctic as a strategic resource base. With the Barents Sea just within reach, Murmansk is home to just over 300,000 people. It inhabits less than during the Soviet days, but still vivid enough to signal a profound Russian Arctic interest. The city is the home port for many fishing and shipping vessels, as well as some of the 40 icebreakers that Russia so far has built and possesses.79 Also located here is a Search and Rescue (SAR) center – the first out of ten along the Northern Sea Route. This route, used partly for transporting products to and from plants, mines, and oil and gas fields – for instance, the giant LNG (liquefied natural gas) Yamal project – is envisioned as a future commercial opportunity should it turn into an international shipping lane for trade, with Russia employing its icebreaker capacity escorting foreign vessels through80 (Granholm, 2016; Sergunin and Konyshev, 2016: 82; Arctic strategy 2008: paragraph 4d; 7d). Nearby Murmansk, in Severomorsk, the naval fleet has its headquarters, whose underwater vessels may be docked in 16 different deep-water ports, spread along the northern coast of Russia (Gramer, 2017). The Sea, its surface (transportation/escort), its water column (fishing), and not least the shelves underneath (oil/gas) are all of strategic importance to Russia (Arctic strategy, 2008). The Arctic, is viewed by Russia as “provid[ing] the solution for problems of social and economic development of the country” (Arctic strategy 2008, paragraph 4a). The solution is strategic raw materials – like hydrocarbons – which would turn the Arctic into a fully developed resource base by 2020 (ibid.). Already now, two-thirds of Russian oil and gas comes from the Arctic, (Claes and Moe, 2014:105), and it is estimated that as much as 95 percent of Russia´s remaining gas, and 60 percent of its oil, is deposited in the Arctic zone (Bergh and Klimenko, 2016:48-49: Keil, 2015:24). With 40 percent of federal revenues coming from oil and gas, and with some of the major non-Arctic fields starting to decline, it is thus likely that Russia will turn even more toward the north and technologically challenging onshore and offshore areas (Conley and Rohloff, 2015:23-24; (EIA, 2017b).81

79 Within Russia’s icebreaker fleet, four vessels are nuclear powered and thus stronger than any diesel- powered vessels. Nuclear powered icebreakers are unique to Russia, which already has commissioned the building of a fifth one: a ‘monster icebreaker,’ which will be 205 meters long and capable of breaking through five meters of thick ice, and which will escort ships and LNG carriers through the Northern Sea Route (Barents Observer, 161216). Previously, in 2016, the icebreaker Arktika was launched, currently ranked as the world’s most powerful, and named after the vessel which in 1977 became the first to break its way to the North Pole (ibid: 160616). 80 Transit passages are so far modest: in 2012, 46 vessels transited, to decrease to 18 transits in 2015 and 19 in 2016 (Centre of High North Logistics, 2017). 81 With an economy highly built around petroleum related resources, Russia is the world’s largest crude oil producer and second largest natural gas producer (EIA, 2017b).

107 In December 2013, Russia became the first state to come on stream with an Arctic offshore oilfield; the Prirazlomnoye field located 60 km off the shore in the Pechora Sea, operated by the state-owned company Gazprom (Gazprom, 2017).82 With a salient track record of accidents and spills, where the minister for Natural Resources and Environment reports oil leakages equivalent to more than two Deepwater Horizon-leaks being spilled every year (Bachman, 2010; The Guardian, 160805),83 increased oil production – not least offshore – increases environmental risks further. Clean up and preservation of unique ecological systems would therefore be the main environmental priority for Russia, who for long has been heavily engaged in resource extraction (Arctic strategy, 2013: paragraph 16; 2008, paragraph 4c).84 The indigenous communities have criticized Russia’s resource extraction activities, arguing that environmental control has been lost to a third party, i.e., business interests.85 A follow-up Arctic strategy has been elaborated, dedicated to economic and social development (2013), and although it has not resolved the situation, the indigenous population might yet have a somewhat – relatively – stronger position than expected from an autocratic state (Hough, 2013:92-93). This is because although a Russian interest in the Arctic would be highly practical – born more out of nature as an asset rather than a sanctuary – the Arctic is also highly symbolic. The Arctic strategy explains how mass media and culture could serve to nationally form a positive image of Russia, telling the story of Arctic development through Russian explorers (2008:10d). As has been suggested, Russians are neither people of the west nor the east, but the north (Sergunin and Konyshev, 2016:35). They are hyperboreans, ‘beyond the North wind,’ following their own ideals of morals and patriotism (ibid.). The Arctic, then, becomes an area where Russia can broadcast its national audience a demonstration of strength and creativity, where the Arctic works as a national unifier, and which needs to be protected.

82 The Pechora Sea is an icy area, and oil extraction is carried out from an ice-resistant platform, which produces an annual average of about 5.5 million tons of oil (over 100,000 barrels/day) (Gazprom, 2017). 83 About 500,000 tons of these spills are calculated to annually end up in the Arctic Ocean (Vasileyeva, 2011; Greenpeace 2017). 84 For instance, since the Spitsbergen Treaty gave signatory parties the right to mine resources on the island, Russia has been present on the island mining: through the ‘Pyramid’-settlement – abandoned in 1998 but prior to that a settlement housing, schools, and hospital – and Barentsburg (Byers, 2013; Numminen, 2011). 85 It has been speculated that the decision made by the Ministry of Justice to suspend Raipon from participating in the Arctic Council for six months had less to do with the official explanation of irregularities found in Raipon’s organizational statutes, and more to do with Raipon’s critique of resource extraction in the North (Conley and Rohloff, 2015:99; Barents Observer, 121112). The Arctic Council, including the Russian SAO, jointly called for a reinstatement of the organization, in order to have it fulfill its important role in the AC (Nunatsiaq News, 121115). Raipon was permitted to reopen in March the following year, but there was suspicion of Moscow having interfered regarding the election of the new organization president (Conley and Rohloff, 2015:99).

108 ‘Orchestrated spectacle’ on international strength. Russia has a grand vision of the Arctic, but in order to get there, the Arctic strategy identifies things to overcome such as underdevelopment and lack of basic infrastructure, monitoring, and technology (Arctic strategy 2013; paragraph 5b). Many of these things need to be imported, and in relation to Russia’s offshore industry, the majority of the technology used came from abroad prior to the Ukraine crisis. In addition, Russia also requires guidance and expertise from foreign specialists, through sub-contractors and operators. The economic sanctions that have been imposed by the EU and others are therefore directly targeting Russia’s oil and gas sector, and not least its offshore activities (European Council, 2018; Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017:5). Over the last couple of years, Russia has increased its Arctic military strength and visibility. To give a glimpse of what has been going on military-wise,86 in 2017, the Defense Ministry welcomed website visitors to take a virtual tour of the recently built military base – the second, with four more soon-to-be-built – on the ice-covered island of Franz Josef, located far north in the Arctic Ocean. It is planned that 150 soldiers will be here on duty for periods stretching over 18 months, and in temperatures as low as minus 40 degrees Celsius (BBC, 170418). That this military build-up should be used to expand territory however is unlikely.87 Armament should rather be read in the context of orchestrated spectacle on strength, possibly aimed at an audience outside the Arctic context. It might be that the larger international power-political picture has more recently revealed “irreconcilable differences” between Russia and the West (Carlsson and Winnerstig, 2016), with possibly even a “geopolitical chill” sensed in the Arctic (Conley and Rohloff, 2015). However, differences here might not be that irreconcilable after all, due to a presence of common interests. This is because, just like the other states, Russia emphasizes the importance of stability and strengthened relations in the Arctic (Arctic strategy, 2008:paragraph 6f; 7c). Illustrative, in 2010, marking the entry of more political cooperation, President Putin – then Prime Minister – declared “we should maintain the Arctic as a region for peace and cooperation” (The Guardian, 100923). The reason was nature, which makes all the states interdependent on each other, why Putin continued: “if you stand alone, you

86 In 2014, Russia, for instance, established the Joint Arctic Strategic Command, adding an extra dimension to its Arctic surveillance system as well as extending the Northern fleet to include air defense – with 9 operative air fields planned for 2018 (Barents Observer, 151023; 160201). 87 Russia has claims to the Lomonosov Ridge just like Canada and Denmark, but there have been no indications that Russia will solve this dispute in any other way than through UNCLOS. The Arctic strategy also refers to international law as a means for delimitation of maritime areas (2008: paragraph 7a). There is a tradition on relying and promoting jurisdiction and international law in the Arctic, previously adhered to, for instance, in 1990 when the U.S. and Russia settled a maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. In 2010, Russia reached a similar agreement with Norway in the Barents Sea, which allows for fishermen to fish on both sides of the border as long as the total fishing quota is not exceeded. (Treaty between Norway and Russia, 2010).

109 can’t survive in the Arctic” (ibid.). This standpoint has since been repeated by Russian officials (see for instance, Vasiliev, Arctic Ambassador, 2012). Russia envisions a more regulated Arctic Council with more permanent structure and legally binding agreements. Although, rather than transferring power and authority to the Arctic Council, the idea with a strengthened organization would be to increase control by “reconfirm(ing) sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states, as defined by the law of the sea” (Zagorski, 2014:104). To Russia, the Arctic is needed for: economic reasons, symbolical reason, and possibly for larger power-political reasons. While Russia acknowledges it cannot act alone, its role conception is yet one of being a leader, a ‘powerful actor’ materially, but who is acting out on symbolism to reinforce the message: really, anyone who can master ice of three meter thickness, perhaps even five, resembles someone acting as in control of the ‘top of the world,’ so Russia seems to argue.

Role performance in the Arctic Council Russia’s Arctic policy differs somewhat from the rest of the states in its ‘harder’ tone of national interests, sovereignty, and security, as well as an explicit linkage between notions of leadership and material power. Still, Russia is not there yet, but rather in what could be described as “a temporary low, between a glorious past and promising future” (Hønneland, 2016:176). The Arctic is a Russian drama, more Russian than Russia itself, and presents a picture to the world based more upon visions than real practice (ibid: 177). In the Arctic Council, national interests and respect for sovereignty are highly cherished by Russia, but rather than spell them out through tough demands in line with role conceptions, they are verbalized when Russia acts as an ‘informant’ – telling the others about Russian national activities and competencies, and thus presenting itself (and its ideals) as an actor. As such, Russia attempts to take control over the drama, and how it is presented therein. Over the last few years, Russia has toned down its informant characteristics however and in general become less visible and vocal in the AC, possible as a way to present itself in a less unilateral manner. If so, this could be a way to balance its more assertive Arctic politics outside the AC. Nevertheless, Russia is a responsive informant, adapting to the context. Environmental cooperation as a national clean-up. Russia acts in support of oil and gas and maritime security, where its AC chairmanship resulted in an undertaking of ensuring future sustainable oil and gas production in the Arctic (Ministerial statement by Russia, 2006). Perhaps more surprisingly then, at least for a state hardly mentioning climate change in its Arctic strategies,88 would be Russia’s continuing support for climate change-related projects. Still, with the bulk of the work conducted by the WGs, in terms of climate and environmental projects, being directed to Russia,

88 The 2008 strategy does not include any referral to climate change, but rather climatic conditions. In the second strategy from 2013, climate change is referred to as expanding why different measures should be taken pertaining to a conservation of biological diversity (paragraph 16).

110 scientific AC cooperation would also be highly beneficial to the state. The fact that Russia was, and is, marked out as especially contaminated, made Russia to express gratitude early on to working groups and states for understanding the importance of finding solutions for its environmental problems (SAO meeting Oulu, 2002). Within the area of climate change, Russia has even expressed a restless attitude on things going too slow: how would ACIA deal with thawing permafrost and its considerable problems caused to infrastructure (SAO meeting Inari, 2002); should not the AMAP also include the Russian proposal of the effect of climate change on the flow of Russian rivers within the current project (SAO meeting Svartsengi, 2003); and would not climate adaptation be the way forward for AC related work (SAO meeting Stockholm, 2013)? However, to support scientific projects on climate change is not the same thing as supporting national emission reductions or other forms of comprehensive political actions on it. Climate change is difficult for Russia, who prefers to talk about sustainable development. However, recently, the Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, confirmed that the Arctic Council should not avoid problems of black carbon (Ministerial statement by Russia, 2013), while Russia has also declared that they are committed to the task (SAO meeting Whitehorse, 2015). As such, Russia is on-board regarding emission reduction of black carbon, although the process hitherto has been long. Characteristics as an AC partner. In some ways, Russia is a leader, just as the Arctic strategies envision. This concerns, in particular, a project-type of leader within projects on maritime safety. However, in other aspects, like leading discussions, attracting followers, or employing organizational skills, Russia would not be a leader. Neither would Russia be an administrator, keeping track of and distributing things. Instead, Russia is pragmatic and restless, wanting things to happen within projects of interest. Foremost, Russia is an informant who prepares everything to be said and done at home, and to inform the rest at the next meeting. ‘Control’ would be the key word, which also means to, under no circumstances, voice an opinion revealing some sort of discontent with any other actor. Instead, Russia maintains a ‘high moral,’ as should a hyperborean. Russia sometimes falls behind, not always performing in the same speed and with the same commitment as the rest. ‘[The Stockholm convention] will be ratified when everything is in place,’ Russia responded to Sweden, when the latter voiced concerns over Russia’s possible lack of priorities regarding obsolete pesticides (SAO meeting Yakutsk, 2005). ‘Things are complicated,’ Russia implicitly stated, often referring to a lack of funds or national laws and regulations as reasons for not yet being able – or willing – to deliver an answer or standpoint. Sometimes, however, Russia promises repercussions, like assuring that its state company Rostechnadzor’s inappropriate waste disposal in the heavy polluted Komi Republic will not occur again (SAO meeting Svolvær, 2008). At other times, cooperation is understood as going too far, and Russia turns toward sovereignty. When Oran Young suggested at a SAO meeting to have enhanced Arctic governance, for instance, on sustainable development, this

111 was questioningly met by Russia who instead warned: ‘one should be careful to bring potential divisive ideas in the future AC (SAO meeting Copenhagen, 2009b). In a similar way, Russia opposes phrases such as “strengthening governance of Arctic,” since translated into Russian it has an “unintentional meaning” (SAO meeting Ilulissat, 2010). Cooperation could thus never trespass the border where Russia will lose national control. Compared to other states, Russia is treated a bit differently: positive steps are noticed and paid attention to by others, and its environmental situation is treated with patience. For instance, the U.S. is appreciative of Russia’s “expanded and vigorous participation in the AC” (SAO meeting Washington, 1999); Norway congratulates Russia in progressing on PCBs (polychlorinated Biphenyls), noting it as an important member of the Council, and stressing the importance of having Russia become a member of the Arctic Offshore Regulator’s Forum (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000; 2016); and Finland highlights Russia’s work on marine protection as being of importance to all of the Arctic (SAO meeting Reykjavik, 2003). States – most notable Norway, and the U.S. – are trying to boost Russia´s cooperative commitment by confirming and recognizing it as important. Such a strategy toward Russia also reveals perceptions of that state as being somewhat unclear in its behavior, possibly in need of support to stay present and calm, and guide it toward a cooperative role.

What social interaction has brought about Russia’s role conception is someone who is ‘soon-to-be leader of top of the world.’ In the Arctic Council, however, it performs less like a leader and more like a (sovereign) informant, someone who wants to be in control when interacting with others. Since cooperation is key to national interests and future leadership ambitions, a twist is added through being a ‘responsive’ informant that is rather adaptive in the context. Within the ‘informant’ role performance also lies embedded what has been referred to as Russian story-telling89 (see Hønneland, 2016). The importance of hosting a major Arctic event like the International Polar year makes sense if understood as confirming Russia as a major Arctic state and scientist (SAO meeting Svartsengi, 2003; Yakutsk, 2005). An even more symbolic story-telling episode played out when the SAOs, together with a Russian state official as well as the well-known explorer Chilingarov, are depicted standing on the North Pole. Foreign Minister Lavrov explains: “[i]t is hard to overestimate the value for the history of the photos at the background of flags

89 This phrase ‘story-telling’ is used by Hønneland (2016) when describing how all actors change and modify real events into stories. Since the story told – how it is received upon by those listening – is the one that provides actors with legitimacy, and not the actions or events per se, actors may sometimes try to adapt their actions to fit the (legitimate) story. In this project, the phenomenon of story-telling is believed to be played out when actors modify roles to fit expectations on appropriateness, resulting either from role conceptions or role prescriptions. Whenever an actor is thinking of how to be perceived, the possibility of story-telling would arise.

112 of our eight countries and the flag of the Arctic Council made by them” (Ministerial statement by Russia, 2013). To Russia, performance on cooperation is needed if its Arctic role conception on leadership should come true. This requires a toning down on unilateral behavior, also when performed by others. Because ‘good cooperation’ was also how Russia chose to highlight the episode when a Canadian crewless barge had drifted from the coast of Canada, through the U.S. and into Russian waters, where it was stranded for a while (SAO meeting Anchorage, 2015). It would take nine months of drifting until it was back in Canada, with little or no efforts by Canada to track and tow it. It was in the middle of the Ukraine crisis and all the political cold it brought about. To tell stories and present (positive) images on for instance good cooperation – true or false – is however a way for Russia to strike the correct balance between cooperation and national interests, by convincing the rest that they are performing the role of a reliable cooperative partner.

Sweden – Teacher on demand

National Arctic idea: to enhance knowledge through science. With just some 100 major icebreakers in the world, Sweden with its five state-owned vessels is ranked just as high globally as Finland – top three – with regard to icebreaking capacity (U.S. Coast Guard, 2014). Last year, in 2016, Finland added to its icebreaking fleet the first LNG powered icebreaker in the world (Arctica, 2017), considered the most environmentally friendly to operate in icy waters.90 Amongst Sweden’s icebreakers, one instead finds Oden, one of the most powerful ice-breakers and designated to polar waters. It is foremost a research platform firstly available to the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, and often in cooperation with other countries, for instance, the U.S. who considers it an important polar research component (Svenska Dagbladet, 160406). Previously, however, Oden has also been chartered for oil-and gas prospecting through mapping of Arctic sediments. Although such leasing activities significantly increased revenues, it has been decided that no more leasing should occur whatsoever for purposes involving oil prospecting (Swedish Maritime Administration, 2012). For Sweden, the Arctic is not a window of economic opportunity, but rather research. The Swedish Government describes the country as ‘conducting Arctic

90 Most of Finland’s (as well as Sweden’s) icebreakers operate in the Baltic Sea. However, two of Finland’s vessels – Fennica and Nordica – have been operating in Arctic waters like the Chukchi Sea, Barents Sea, and outside the coast of Greenland. These two ships are used for commercial purposes as well, where oil- and gas companies have them chartered. In 2012, Greenpeace boarded the ship Fennica in a protest against its participation in Arctic oil extraction. In 2015, environmental activists again – the so called ‘kayaktivisits’ – protested against the ship being headed for Alaska under the Shell logo, thus, preventing the icebreaker to head north (Arctica, 2017; The Guardian, 150731).

113 research of highest rank’ (Arctic strategy, 2011), even to be ‘world leading in polar research’ (Government offices of Sweden, 2016). Oden’s operating days are however reaching an end. The polar research authority assesses a future without Swedish icebreaking research “to cause irreparable damage to Swedish polar research and Sweden’s participation as well as reputation within the international research area” [author’s translation] (Swedish Polar Research Secretariat 2016). The Swedish Maritime Administration has already announced the process that has started on replacing the rest of the icebreaking fleet, a process expected to take until 2030 approximately, at an estimated cost of SEK 1-1.5 billion per vessel (Sveriges Radio, 160105). Sweden did not have a clear Arctic strategy policy until it was time for them to chair the AC in 2013, and they developed the chairmanship program and the strategy in parallel (Nord, 2016b). Three key priority areas are elaborated within the strategy, covering climate and environment, economic development (foremost, forestry and mining),91 and the human dimension. Concerning the latter, Sweden – just like Finland and Norway – is firmly committed to preserving and developing the possibilities for the Sami people to maintain their traditional livelihood and express their culture (Arctic strategy, 2011: 42). The negative impact of climate change on reindeer husbandry is extensive, and augmented pressure on human health is furthermore a risk effect from high levels of organic toxics, like PCB and heavy metals (mercury). Russian industries in the Arctic are pointed out as the main pollutants (ibid: 44). Science – linking the national to the international. The Arctic region represents an arena where Sweden can perform within its general interests of climate and environmental research. Within these areas, the country has a proper chance to – via the Arctic region – contribute internationally, and to – one may assume – strengthen its reputation as an advanced green state. As a state, Sweden consistently ranks high on the CCPI, and was recently appointed as the winner when Carbon Market Watch (2017) presented its results on the level of state ambition in sustaining the Paris Agreement. Thus, the environmental know-how of Sweden would be its main selling point in the Arctic operations, even though it also identifies a competitive edge within the maritime industry. Nonetheless, the environmental field is an area where it furthermore states itself as a world leader and whose key priority would be to keep such a position (Arctic strategy, 2011). The strategy explicitly lists four areas that Sweden should work for in the Arctic Council: substantially reduced emissions of global greenhouse gas emissions and short-lived climate pollutants, increased knowledge and suggestions on measures to strengthen Arctic resilience and

91 Sweden does not have any direct interests in Arctic energy extraction, but it has businesses that could be involved as sub-contractors. In addition, on an operating level, the privately owned shipping company Viking Supply Ship (former Transatlantica) is focused toward the harsh environment offshore market, and has vessels classified as polar icebreakers. In the Arctic, it has been chartered by, amongst others, Shell US, Statoil, and Cairn Energy (Viking supply ships, 2017).

114 adaptation, increased use of environmental assessments and environmental mappings, and reductions of transboundary pollutants. In an environmental policy for the Arctic, from 2016, Sweden confirms and reinforce this approach by ensuring to work to strengthen the environmental dimension of the Arctic Council. Through research, Sweden has generated a global understanding of, not least, processes linked to climate change, starting with measurements herein almost 100 years ago. Sweden, just like Finland, views itself as being a knowledgeable actor, who can contribute internationally.

Role performance in the Arctic Council The role performance of Sweden in the AC is one of an environmental teacher. Albeit, it is a role that is only performed as long as there are pupils willing to learn. Such a role becomes tangible in the context and notions of appropriateness, indicating Sweden to be a teacher on demand. There is a clear break in Sweden’s role performance associated with its chairmanship, where Sweden took a giant step forward in terms of leadership, visibility, and determination. According to Douglas Nord, prior to the chairmanship, several member states had openly wondered what Sweden’s stance on different issues actually might be, being very much in the background and providing few contributions in terms of clear opinions and perspectives on AC priorities (2016b:57). After its chairmanship, visibility dropped again. What happened in between though would be the shouldering of a role and script Sweden knew well from before, namely, to lead through chairmanship. As Nord argues, Sweden has a long and successful record in global diplomacy, and although its weak Arctic approach had several who doubted if Sweden would take any initiatives on its own, others expected it to play a significant role. Sweden did the latter, and followed prescriptions of what is expected from a ‘good’ chairman (ibid., 58-59). Salient performance rates. Sweden follows the general pattern as the other two non- coastal states, and in the SAO meetings, reveals a less active/visible performance and lower frequency rates on issues spoken about: it is (almost) all about the Arctic environment, where Sweden during its chairmanship wanted to see progress on such things as short-lived climate pollutants, biodiversity, and Arctic resilience92 (SAO meeting Haparanda, 2012). On climate change, Sweden has called out for “an even stronger environmental dimension in the Council” (Ministerial meeting by Sweden, 2015), and they quite early referred to short-lived climate pollutants as an area “where we, the Arctic countries, can take measures that will directly benefit the Arctic region” (ibid., 2011). Within the AC context, climate change and oil extraction are

92 These are environmental issues shared by all the Arctic members, but the mentioning of ‘resilience’ – a system’s ability to cope with stress and shock without losing its main functions – was quite new. As one of its first initiatives, which was received enthusiastically, Sweden presented a flagship project on Arctic resilience (SAO meeting Luleå, 2011).

115 considered as a “dilemma” (ibid., 2009). As Carl Bildt expressed, at the time the foreign minister, there is a causal linkage between them: “oil and gas extraction in the Arctic contributes to global warming” (ibid.). Obviously, everyone knows this linkage, and recognizing their relationship as a ‘dilemma’ does not make oil and gas obsolete in Arctic affairs; not even from a Swedish perspective. Rather, to label it as a dilemma is telling of a pragmatic and mediating perspective on how to cope with economic reality while still moving forward environmentally. Characteristics as an AC partner. As explained by Gustaf Lind, former SAO and moreover Chair during Sweden’s chairmanship, the task for the chairmanship is to search for commonness and things that unite. The logic behind international cooperation then becomes to respect those different positions that cannot be reached – or at least seems impossible to reach – agreement on, and instead focus on pushing the common agenda forward (Lind, 2011). The chair here has an important function, relating to packaging and presenting the route forward, in terms of ‘commonness.’ Here, Sweden succeeded quite well in terms of continuing the work started by Norway and Denmark in strengthening the Council’s institutional structure, but also in moving specific issue areas forward, e.g., resilience. As pointed out by Bergh and Klimenko (2016:66), the lack of Arctic Ocean territory made the other states view Sweden as lacking a bias, since no strong interests were expected to color its leadership. As such, the state was ‘harmless.’ However, to act and be perceived as an honest broker also legitimized Sweden’s attempt to realize its Arctic ambitions on creating an enhanced understanding of Arctic issues – to teach, that is. The role as the AC Chair suited Sweden’s role conception particularly well, just presenting Sweden with a bigger arena to play out its own ego and alter expectations. Sweden is not an AC member that speaks more than necessary. Rather, it is often situated in the background. However, if the issue at hand is familiar and the country feels that it can contribute, it also takes action. For instance, it is active in resilience since this is something that Sweden knows well; it includes (amongst others) leading issue-specific task forces on short-lived climate forces, as well as scientific cooperation, because this Sweden knows how to do; they also advocate for making women heard in scientific as well as political processes (cf. SAO meeting Espoo, 2001; Ministerial meeting 2000; Ministerial statement 2015). These are all signatory issues where Sweden represents the stance of taking environmental cooperation a normative step forward. But to act where one senses a call for expert-knowledge also pertains to issue-areas outside the environmental field. As an example; in the first available transcript of a SAO meeting, Sweden kept a low profile. When the remark eventually came, it was information on an upcoming icebreaker project on “Tundra northwest” (SAO meeting Anchorage, 1999). In the following meetings, Sweden then continued to show ‘expert-knowledge’ on this, not that far from Norway, Russia, and the U.S. To lean on what one knew became a safe haven when uncertain on its role, and how one could or should contribute. That Sweden was uncertain regarding its role could also

116 be noticed in its offer to contribute with icebreaker expertise and experience regarding the ACs attempt to improve search and rescue in the Arctic Ocean, a ‘bold’ offer quickly balanced by soon thereafter pointing out that shared experiences in the Arctic is necessary, and that “we can learn a lot from each other” (Ministerial statement by Sweden, 2009). What Sweden offers the AC is mainly knowledge, and it is less active when it comes to activities pertaining to organizing and hosting meetings or conferences. Within its role performance lays also a reluctance to act prior to there being a sense of common understanding. Moreover, since common understanding grows out from communication, communication is central for any outreach activity as ‘facts do not speak for themselves’ (Ministerial statement by Sweden, 2011; SAO meeting Copenhagen, 2011). It is no coincidence that Sweden, at a time when the Internet was still new, was hesitant to the launch of a new AC webpage as an information hub: ‘if people do not get a paper in their hand, they will not read it,’ Sweden warned (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000). Efficiency, transparency, and clarity have been highly ranked, for instance, by developing reporting templates for working groups; to launch a new reporting system called ‘two-pager’ to allow the public to be aware of the AC discussions; and to urge for meeting agendas to be ‘short and focused’ (SAO meeting Luleå, 2011; Haparanda, 2012). Furthermore, to make sure everyone understands and avoids confusions by presenting clear information on meeting structure, as well as information on why it is important to understand resilience (SAO meeting Stockholm, 2013), gave Sweden the role of a teacher wanting its class to progress.

What social interaction has brought about Sweden does not want to exert pressure on other states. Its role conception is that of being a teacher, but its role performance reveals that teacher to be highly attentive toward others’ wishes for ‘education.’ For a state lacking material power in the Arctic, influence in the AC context comes from finding – and communicating – convincing arguments. To be knowledgeable is therefore helpful. To care for the environment, believe in science and how it can be shared, and to know the topic spoken about illustrates quite well how Sweden views itself. Illustrative, when the U.S. presented a discussion paper on climate change, noting “ACs potential role in educating the world about the Arctic and climate,” Sweden would be the first to offer support (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016; SAO discussion paper, 2016b). To act as a ‘teacher on demand’ implies being sensitive to when it is appropriate to teach, and when others are susceptible to be taught. One seems to follow – or perhaps rather work with - rules, implicit as well as explicit, instead of pushing its agenda through. This could also be an explanation as to why Sweden saved its critique against Russia as a major source of pollution in Sweden until Russia chaired the AC, that is, until the state could take critique being ‘the one in power.’ In a series of demands, Sweden wanted Russia to ratify the Stockholm convention, i.e., to contribute

117 financially and to develop a regime allowing sample species to be carried out from Russian territories (SAO meeting Yakutsk, 2005; Khanty-Mansiysk, 2005). The timing of the critique however could also have more of profound personal dimension than just Russia being the AC chair. Because, in a timely context, Russia’s strict control over its Arctic passages had made it difficult for Sweden to go through with its research expedition: samples could not be taken out from Russia, and Oden was required an escort by the Russian icebreakers (ibid.). If Sweden could not pursue research from a research platform like Oden, Sweden would be deprived of what makes the country unique in international settings, and would risk losing the confirmation from others of being a knowledgeable actor. As such, the Swedish role conception would also be in jeopardy.

The United States – Innate leader

National idea: a major maritime nation (but not necessarily ‘Arctic’). The U.S. gained status as an ‘Arctic state’ through its purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867.93 Such a – in the context – recent Arctic acquisition also renders the American feeling of being Arctic rather weak. As reported by the Alaskan media, there is a national apathy toward the U.S. Arctic identity, which also leaves those living94 in the Arctic Alaska alone in their ‘Arctic reality’ (The Bristol Bay Times, 150828). Illustrative, when former President Obama travelled to Alaska in 2015, he became the first President in office to officially visit Alaska (the White House, 2015). Although his visit would also be indicative of the region as climbed up the political agenda,95 not least in relation to climate change, U.S. would still have one of the least committed and clearly formulated Arctic policies (David, 2013; Offerdal, 2014; Byers, 2013). Rather than the Arctic, the U.S. is a maritime nation that focuses on security, safety, and stewardship at sea, including the safeguarding of living marine resources (Arctic strategy 2009; 2013). More than 5,000 large vessels and cargo ships each year

93 Russia was reported to fear a possible war breaking out between itself and the U.K., where Alaska was expected to be seized. Driven by a power-political consideration rather than economic gains (Hough, 2013:38), Russia saw a way to secure some finances from the region by selling it to the U.S., who viewed its forests, animals, and geographical location as strategically beneficial. 94 Alaska is a sparsely populated area, representing a modest 0.23 percent of the U.S. population (The Bristol Bay Times, 150828). 95 As an indicator of the interest going up, the U.S. Department of Defense quite recently released a more concrete Arctic strategy – based upon the National Strategy for the Arctic from 2013, on how to protect U.S. national interests in the Arctic, indicating the Arctic defense issues to have risen (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016). The U.S. Department of Transport also ordered an extensive investigation of Arctic infrastructure needs deemed necessary for safe and secure maritime transportation. Less than two percent of all navigationally significant waters has been charted and surveyed to modern standards by the U.S. Government (U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, 2016:11).

118 pass the Unimak Pass at Alaska’s Aleutian Islands, including heavy oil transportation from Canada. The Bering Sea just above is also home to USAs biggest commercial fishing asset, valued two billion US dollars annually (Byers, 2013:159-160). From a resource perspective, the onshore oil field, Prudhoe Bay, discovered in the late 70s and located south of Barrow facing the Beaufort Sea, is one of the most productive oil fields in North America, and the Arctic in total. Still, since production peaked about ten years later, it has dropped by more than two-thirds and since long been bypassed by oil fields in the southern states (Keil, 2015:24).96 An oil boost might become available through a new discovery made by a Texas based oil company: an offshore deposit big enough to sustain the Alaskan oil industry for the next three or four decades (Consumer News and Business Channel, 161005). Environmental protection is prioritized in the Arctic agenda, where Arctic activities should proceed on the basis of the best available information and respond effectively to increased pollutants and other environmental challenges (Arctic policy, 2009: paragraph H3; H6a; 2013:pages 7-8). However, if this is to be linked to a broader context of climate change and environmental threats caused by resource extraction, a discrepancy in the administration’s interpretations can be noticed: while President Clinton signed the Kyoto protocol, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it; whereas President Obama advocated a strong Paris agreement, President Trump based his election campaign on questioning climate change as anthropogenic and withdrew from the Paris Agreement once in office; whereas Obama – as one of his last deeds – enacted a law to protect virtually all (98 percent) of the U.S. Arctic Ocean from an oil spill by invoking an indefinite ban on offshore oil and gas drilling (The Washington Post, 161220), President Trump four months later signed an executive order declaring the area once again reopened (The Telegraph, 170428). The vagueness within the Arctic approach could partly be explained thereof. The U.S. Arctic policy is a policy for Alaska. The people living in Alaska, outside the urban areas, have experienced the negative effects of climate change and environmental pollution for a long time, while also searching for infrastructure, development and economic stability (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2017; Papp, 2011). The oil industry sees it as filling an important function here, where about one-third of all jobs in Alaska are connected to the oil and gas industry, whose oil tax revenues furthermore fund the absolute majority of the Alaskan government services (Alaska Oil and Gas Associations, 2017). To scale down fossil oil extraction in a region estimated to hold not only the highest quantity of deposits but also

96 At its peak in 1988, two million barrels/day were produced, compared to the current production of 600,000 barrels/day. Yet, this declining figure would be put in perspective if compared to the so far only operating oil field in the Arctic Norway, the Goliat oil field, which produces 100,000 barrels/day (Alaska Oil and Gas Association, 2017). Furthermore, the Arctic natural gas production has since long turned out to be commercially unfeasible due to lack of transportation routes, and indeed uncompetitive, if compared to the ‘shale gas boom’ taking place elsewhere in U.S. states.

119 highest amount of easy extraction (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008), therefore, is not necessarily supported by the people. ‘Science as international unifier.’ The U.S. Arctic strategies place national security as a top priority. The security approach, however, is not reflected in any profound way regarding strategic investment: Alaska does not have any military installations north of the Arctic Circle, nor any Search and Rescue centers bordering the Arctic or the Chukchi sea (Hilde, 2014:156-157; Alaska Rescue Coordination Center, 2017); and the six new icebreakers requested by the Coast Guard to fulfill its polar missions are so far limited to a reliance on two (of which one is broken) vessels, soon to pass their expiry dates (Conley, 2015; Hsu, 2017; Gramer, 2017). The former Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp, later U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic, describes a change in attitude toward the Arctic Ocean from “hard water” to “soft water” (Papp, 2011), where security interests are now linked to issues of commercial and scientific (environmental) character, in addition to defense (Arctic strategy, 2013:2). Consequently, if Arctic waters are ‘soft,’ then cooperation seems more attractive. Signifying this, in 2009, a leaked cable from the U.S. Embassy in Russia to the State Department read that “increased scientific cooperation, particularly on climate change, could increase trust and build confidence,” thereby revealing the U.S. to move closer to its Arctic neighbors, which in this case was Russia (Byers, 2013: 158; Joint U.S.-Russian Statement, 110526). Parallel with improved relations, the AC also gained importance in Arctic strategies. The AC should not be too institutionalized but kept as a high-level forum. The U.S. is a great power, keen on accessibility and movability, and they do not want to – in a too intimate manner – engage in cooperation around issues of national importance (Arctic policy, 2009; strategy, 2013). There are some disturbances97 caused by other nations, which are perceived to hinder a global and active power like the U.S. to exert that type of full sovereignty it wishes for. Freedom of navigation and the possibility of over flight are vital to its national security, and that goes for the Arctic as well (Offerdal, 2014:79). When the U.S. reaches out to the other Arctic nations, it acts as a scientific leader, an “Arctic science power” that dedicates its resources toward greater understanding of climate change and weather (Conley and Rohloff, 2015:xiv). With a vague Arctic policy, or at least vague Arctic interests that

97 In the hydrocarbon rich Beaufort Sea, there is an unresolved disagreement with Canada over the location of the territorial boundary. The Department of Defense (2016) furthermore refers to “friction points,” as spelled out in the way Russia and Canada regulate navigation in the Arctic waters. Whereas both of these states claim the Northwest passage and the Northern Sea Route as internal waters, transiting vessels are required to report in advance as well as receive permission to enter (ibid:6). The U.S. views these claims as inconsistent with international law, and wants the passages to get the jurisdictional status of international waters where freedom of navigation would apply. The U.S., furthermore, is standing outside UNCLOS, which means it cannot relegate the conflict - and solution - to the UN. At the same time, it should be noted, which also is pointed out by the EUs Institute for Security Studies (Runge Olesen, 2015:44) that ratified or not U.S. behavior in the Arctic is in accordance with the UNCLOS.

120 are manifested equally regardless of the administration, to conceive itself as a scientific leader becomes a way to present itself in a coherent way.

Role performance in the Arctic Council Although its role conception may not be clear on interests, its AC role performance has still been significant. The U.S. acts a visible actor, not afraid of voicing opinions and aware of how to organize meeting procedures. As a project initiator and visionary, it has been less active, straightforward, and assertive. This reflects an actor that for sure performs as a leader, but less so because of a clear direction on Arctic issues. Instead, the U.S. role performance seems to rely more on a past experience as a global leader, resulting in it performing the role of an ‘innate leader’ within the AC. In its Arctic relations, the U.S. seems to have activated more of its ‘me’ part than letting the ego-part stemming from (unclear) Arctic interests decide. Issue-specific performance: late awakening but increasing. Initially, the U.S. level of activity was held back within the AC, where one was a reluctant member who constrained the design of the cooperation, and caused some nervousness on behalf of others regarding their level of commitment (Finkler and Kadas, 2016; Pedersen, 2012:153; Nord, 2016b:45). However, during its first chairmanship, ‘it yet delivered’ (Finkler and Kadas, 2016), and its Arctic awakening started to come about, to reach full levels a few years into the more political phase of the AC development (see also Pedersen, 2012; Chater, 2016). In time for its second chairmanship between 2015 and 2017, the U.S. viewed positively on the AC being the forum to meet the rising issues facing the Arctic, both in terms of number and significance, and perceived itself as an active and constructive part therein (Balton, 2016). Following the path of being a maritime nation that in various ways is concerned over its security – the theme of the chairmanship linked the Arctic Ocean to ‘safety, security and stewardship.’ Still, although active, looking at the frequency of coastal related issues, the U.S. would not stand out as the most active state, once again indicating its Arctic interests to be less straightforward than others. If one looks at climate change, this would however be an issue gone from ‘quite clear’ to clarity. Actually, when the U.S. chaired the AC for the first time in 1998- 2000, it had emphasized a particularly strong commitment on climate change research (SAO meeting Washington, 2000).98 Climate change was something for the rest of the world to be aware of, the U.S. argued (Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000). After ACIA, the U.S. did however enter a period of less climate mentioning, which correlates with a new conservative administration that chooses to pull-back from the Kyoto protocol. It did correlate, although not completely. Because it was during the

98 However, as shown by Nilsson (2007), U.S. behavior ‘behind the scenes’ was, at least in the beginning, less convincing, where the state rather was considered to put the ACIA process in jeopardy. This would also be telling of a U.S. that used public meetings as a theatrical act on performance, while yet having ego to struggling with its doubts.

121 conservative Bush administration that the U.S. became – together with Russia – the first country to present initiatives on black carbon within the Arctic Council. It also offered the U.S. EPA to provide assistance in any AC work on black carbon, and presented a concrete proposal for the AC action (SAO meeting Svolvær, 2008; Kautokeino, 2008). In that sense, it might be that Arctic climate change would be different from global negotiations on it, opening up the former for cooperation, to a higher degree. Yet, the Obama administration stepped up climate stakes considerably. Consequently, when Secretary of State John Kerry spoke at the Ministerial meeting in Kiruna 2013, he confirmed climate science as the guiding principle for action (representing facts on the table), while calling out for everyone to do more – urgently (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2013). Climate change would also be one of top three priorities for the United States when assuming the AC chairmanship in 2015, as it was understood as an ominous threat jeopardizing communities and ecosystems’ ability to adapt and prosper. The U.S. had moved from an actor linking its climate initiatives to scientific actions, to a state that moved beyond science as self-written. “It does not take a PhD to know that the combination of heat and ice produces melting,” Kerry said, and recommended the meeting to take a look in the mirror to know where the problems began (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2015a). Since the exercised Arctic policy has turned out to remain almost the same no matter who is in office, the U.S. Chairman during its AC presidency, David Balton, assured a continued U.S. climate work within Arctic cooperation despite a shift in the U.S. administration at home. The U.S. state policy is dedicated to a stable Arctic, and to achieve this the indigenous communities and Alaskan peoples’ Arctic interest are key perspectives. ‘Within this picture,’ Balton said, ‘also climate change by necessity will have a self-written place, since it will be too compelling to ignore it in the Arctic’ (Anchorage Daily News, 170126; Balton, 2017) Characteristics as an AC partner. As the Arctic strategies reveal, to have ‘facts on the table’ is important to the U.S., who does not want to rush into something unproven and assumptive. Indeed, in the Arctic Council, the U.S. is a pragmatic and realistic leader who rather than having vision concentrates on what is possible to achieve, often with reference to itself as an actor: Finland has been thanked for its initiative in relation to the WSSD in Johannesburg, but it is unlikely that the U.S. will agree to have its name on the document (Rovaniemi, 2001); and the otherwise consensual support on Norway’s climate project was stalled by the U.S. due to Norway’s late distribution and obscure project formulations of the project (SAO meeting 2007, Tromsø). As an innate leader, the U.S. is not afraid of bringing forward constructive criticism or to instruct – rather than give suggestions – on how things should be carried out. Whereas the PPs are excepted from criticism, working groups – although many more times commended – are recurrently faced with a ventilated U.S. concern: working groups have failed to include corrections in the reports, information delivered has been unclear, or issues have been addressed beyond their mandate (SAO

122 meeting Inari, 2002; Tromsø, 2007). Science, in the U.S. opinion, is political dynamite to be handled with care. To act like an innate leader does not mean that one does not care for its reputation, on the contrary: to be recognized for its leadership role is fundamental to have its role conception – the I through Me – to thrive. Thus, when Canada in the beginning exerted considerable pressure on the U.S. to take on the chairmanship, i.e., to contribute and show good faith (Nord, 2016a: 25-26), the U.S. proved itself tangible toward such expectations and took on leadership. ‘To be an innate leader obliges,’ the U.S. could be argued to have thought, and albeit reluctantly, they still chaired the AC in such a way that progress occurred. Still, having accepted out of obligation the commitment was not perceived as full-hearted, which is why Norway restlessly commented on the long period of time that passed between the U.S. organized meetings. The U.S. replied in what would be a characteristic statement for its role performance to come: “United States would evaluate its success as Chair not by the frequency of meetings but by the progress on the Council’s program of work” (SAO meeting Anchorage, 1999). The ego I of the U.S. role conception considers itself a leader, revealing an actor that does not like to be told what to do. With that said, one still aims for cooperative progress and with an ambition to ‘take learned AC lessons into account’ (SAO meeting Anchorage, 2015), and who ascribes some of the positive AC results of its own agencies and scientific input (Arctic strategy, 2009; 2013:9). One could assume that U.S. leadership is thought of as expected by others. An innate leader can afford to be a righteous leader, i.e., someone who encourages others rather than offers criticism, and who by its own Arctic measures holds “hopes of inspiring other Arctic states to do the same” (SAO meeting Anchorage, 2015). The U.S. role performance has also gone from revealing more signs of pragmatism and skepticism to, in an increasing scale, acting like a unifying motivator. A part of this could most likely be linked to the AC having made the U.S. aware of its Arctic reality, its role, and wants. As John Kerry said at the Iqaluit Ministerial, commenting on the AC success: “the council’s created a great shared sense of purpose […]” [emphasis added]. And yet, there is one more possibility to the witnessed role change: the longer AC members have cooperated without disturbances, the lower guard one may keep. The quote by Kerry continues: “ […] but it´s also created a sense of trust” [emphasis added] (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2015a).

What social interaction has brought about Compared to Norway who has a very active and elaborated Arctic policy, the United States is a leader that is not really sure of what it wants in, and for, the Arctic. The leadership style taken on by the U.S. is therefore less issue-specific and more appealing to the act of cooperating: the U.S. is keen on having clear communication, order within the administration, harmonization and coordination, and feasible projects. The U.S. considers itself as a great power, both materially and normatively,

123 and its role conception is telling of a major maritime nation. It does however not necessarily attach any identity to being ‘Arctic,’ and its AC role performance is more like a leader out of habit than a result of dedicated Arctic interest. The U.S. role performance – especially in relation to chairmanship – is one dedicated to listening, and where everyone should be ‘onboard’: “[w]e talked, we listened, and we listened more,” Kerry describes the process of putting together the chairmanship program (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2015a.). To be an explicit leader in the Arctic context, as the U.S. understands the situation, requires considerations taken (or at least in a roundabout way) to a larger picture than the national. At the same time, there is a line sometimes to be crossed when firm opinions must be voiced and the breaks pushed. It seems though this line has been moved further and further back as cooperation proceeds and has been given a direction, and the U.S. has stepped forward on particular issues such as marine safety and maritime cooperation, and black carbon, and become an issue-specific leader in increasing scale.

The stability of roles in the Arctic Council cooperation

In this last part of the chapter, the behavior of the Arctic Council states has been approached as roles. Apart from a wish to add an understanding on the Arctic states’ roles in the AC – their issue specific interests as well as cooperative interests and state characteristics – a motivation has been to provide for reasoning around social interaction, and how this adds layer(s) to state interests and wants. Each country analysis was conducted according to the following structure: a role conception was developed that intended to give a suggestion of the ego and alter dimension of each role, by tentatively separating the national from the international. This role conception was then linked with the behavior witnessed in the Arctic Council. The behavior here is conceptually as well as, to some extent, practically, different from role conceptions, in such a way that it is exercised under the potential impact of socialization – transforming ego into I and alter into Me. To engage in real interaction, rather than to simply conceive of it, is having an effect on role performances that stretched beyond alter expectations on to socially experiencing these expectations, as well as on to senses of self-esteem and recognition. The role performance dimension was thus adding more interactive flesh to state learning (their behavior) as originating in social expectations of various kinds. Although there are some differences, this chapter did not reveal any distinct discrepancies between role performance and role conceptions, which could show role prescriptions (structural expectations) to have a stark effect on the way states behave. Although, one could, of course, argue that these prescriptions already have been taken in by states when they view themselves through others, integrated as they are into role conceptions. In most cases, states’ role performances and role conceptions come out

124 close to synonymous, indicating role behavior to be less based upon impulsive ‘here and now’ and more rooted in reflections and perceptions of this being the proper behavior for state X. However, when there are differences in role performance and role conceptions, these tend to give the upper hand to a toning down of national rhetoric or interests on behalf of its social position amongst Arctic relations, providing the state with a more low-key role performance in comparison. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this would be Russia’s active role performance during the political phase of the AC development, and then have it compared to its more withdrawn performance during the present phase ‘AC cooperation under insecurity.’ Since much of this insecurity would be a result of Russia’s behavior outside of the Arctic, Russia’s behavior within the Arctic and the AC could be read as an attempt by the state to adapt to a context governed by a common understanding on the necessity of cooperation. This furthermore suggests that interacting states, and then not just Russia but all of the Arctic states, over a long period of time have been socialized to the notion of ‘cooperation’ as representing the (only) appropriate way of organizing Arctic relations, i.e., the Arctic states have all learnt how to perform the role of an Arctic (cooperating) state. This mapping of role performances has found state behavior to show a lot of continuity, and less so change. Roles, so it seems, are stable, and no state takes on a fundamentally different behavior, breaking with previous one. Since new thematic issues have been added, roles are flexible to the degree they manage to adopt to these new norms that are being introduced, for instance, no state opposes either oil and gas activities, or climate cooperation, despite a role conception favoring one over another. For instance, Sweden is a teacher on demand, Russia acts like a responsive informant, Iceland would be a follower with ambition, and so on. Roles, therefore, are designed to allow for flexibility. The role characteristics given precedence are rather context bound, and depending on whether these make sense after consulting ego and alter expectations. Roles, in that sense, are much bigger than the particular behavior often associated with, and understood to characterize, a particular state. Another type of illustration where role performance seems to grow out of interaction would be the U.S. understanding of what it means to be a leader within the AC: as the state – through interaction – has become more aware of its Arctic interests, it has employed a leadership that has moved beyond the initial focus of organizing qualities, onto leadership with issue-specific substance where one as an innate leader also has become more of an active Arctic nation. Similarly, once Sweden was sure of which rules applied to the Arctic cooperation (knew of the rules governing the game), it became a more visible actor trying to push things through: consequently, Sweden then was aware of when a ‘teacher’ would be welcome or not. Moreover, as all chairmanship periods showed, a state holding the chair reveals ‘more of its role,’ i.e., it gears up on its role characteristics, thereby responding to prescriptions of what to expect from a Chairmanship.

125 Roles have also turned out to be flexible in that different dimensions of the role are exercised in different contexts or issue-areas. Sometimes, for instance, Denmark would be more like a ‘kid-brother’ than a realist, Finland more ‘reserved’ than a team player, Russia more ‘responsive’ than an informant, and the U.S. more ‘innate’ than an (issue-specific) leader. Roles (as part of role-sets) are more refined than always following the same script, as befitting a social – and socially attentive – behavioral construction.

126 5. Negotiating oil spill prevention – higher expectations, lower ambitions

We are in a little bit of danger. There is less focus now on oil and gas because the prices have fallen so much. Exploration has fallen, particularly in the marine environment, which is tremendously costly. Probably no one thinks that is going to continue over the long run, but expects increased activity once again. So now would be the time to get a good handle on prevention in the Arctic (TFOPP participant, representing the indigenous people, 2015).

Preventing oil spills through an exchange of experiences

The theme of this chapter is oil pollution, or rather prevention of oil spills. The specific empirical focus is the negotiation process carried out by the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (hereinafter TFOPP). For five meetings, between January 2014 and November 2014, the Arctic states – with input provided from national experts and advisors within coast guards, industries, and shipping, as well as from PPs, – met to develop an “action plan or other arrangement on oil pollution prevention” (Kiruna Declaration, 2013). This non-legal agreement which became the result, was entitled Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic (hereinafter Framework plan), and it states preventive measures for Arctic petroleum operators and maritime transporters to consider. This includes increasing safety and precaution levels on things such as weather forecasts and mapping surveys, but also different types of exchanges of experiences. The general feeling amongst the task force participants, as described in hindsight, would be a negotiating process that started off with quite high expectations (topic prevention), but where ambitions lowered as interaction went on. The chapter has the following ambition: to reveal how arguing is making states aware of who they are and what they want; to show how this sometimes leads the way toward common understanding, and sometimes astray, and to provide input to

127 whether and how states could be explained as behaviorally sensitive toward (others’) expectations on who they are. The analysis will be structured according to the following parameters found within state interaction: (1) common understanding, (2) arguing, and (3) ego and alter learning. Through such a structure, the process of learning will be conceptually approached in line with what has been described in chapter 2, where norms, appropriateness, and expectations provide for interpretative input to interaction processes. Overall, this chapter aims to show that expectations matter as a formative dimension of state behavior, which then contains information on learning processes. However, prior to the investigation of TFOPP and the roles that states play herein, a background on the issue of oil pollution within the AC will be provided. This part serves to shed light on the directional movement of oil pollution cooperation, as well as to provide for a contextual background to those discussions held in TFOPP.

Oil pollution and AC cooperation on its prevention: a background

Oil and polar bears – Arctic symbols Oil and the Arctic have since long an established bond. Russia struck oil already in 1915, and started its onshore development in the 1930s. A significant intensification – now also with gas discoveries – occurred in the 1960s throughout the 80s (Kontorovich, 2015). In the U.S., the breakthrough discovery of Prudhoe occurred in the 1960s, and Canada, who had discovered oil in its Northwest territories already in 1920, went offshore in the Beaufort Sea in the early 70s (Hough, 2013:21). By the 1980s, all current hydrocarbon developers in the Arctic, such as Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U.S. had gone offshore in their search for oil and gas,99 and also made discoveries. Natural resources have represented an economic gateway to the Arctic, which soon became as closely related to Arctic opportunities, as polar bears have popularly been depicted as symbols of what is now threatened: Arctic wilderness, nature’s strength, and endless icy landscapes. Both polar bears and the Arctic energy industry represent the two giants of the Arctic, although one more symbolically than the other, and where both are self-written as regional value-adders; the former as representing the untouched nature, and the latter for economic reasons. Thus, if polar bears in the popular discourse is the Arctic, then it would make practical sense that the Arctic governance regime of the 70s – when the first oil boom struck the region – included a

99 Norway discovered Snøhvit gas field in 1984. Shtokman, the giant Russian gas field, also that in the Barents Sea, was discovered in 1988, and the Prirazlomnoye oil field in the Pechora Sea in 1989.

128 1973 agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears, but everything else was practically left environmentally unregulated.100 International agreements on oil pollution however were quick to follow on oil operating activities, having three conventions that entered into force within a period of five years, directed toward: civil liability and international interventions in case of oil pollution causalities (1969), and prevention of marine pollution through waste dumping (1972) as well as land-based sources (1974).101 In 1990, the International Maritime Organization adopted international regulations calling for ships and offshore units to have oil pollution emergency plans, reports incidents, and stockpile emergency equipment (International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990). In addition, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) set out to, in over 200 pages, establish the jurisdictional basis for maritime activities, including limits for territorial sea, transit passages, and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The convention is not Arctic specific, but a particular article – Article 234 – deals with ice-covered areas, and provides upgraded sovereignty to coastal states to develop and administer maritime regulations of choice, given these types of risky waters. This is not least considered important by Canada and Russia, with their long coastal lines and exposure to transit passages. Lastly, requirements on ship construction and equipment for transporting dangerous goods were introduced through the MARPOL convention (1973/78), requirements that recently have been further elaborated and made more extensive through the Polar Code (2014). Early conventions were mostly dedicated to a prohibition of careless environmental- as well as safety behavior; the discourse on oil pollution has over the years been broadened to include variables pertaining to the question of ‘if’: what to do if an accident occurs, what to do if oil is spilled? Once again, polar bears were, and are, symbolically used to portray a threatened future – a general threat as represented by a carbon dioxide driven (foremost) climate change,102 and a specific threat through oil extraction and transportation, where the fact – and imagery – of polar bears

100 The following landmark conventions, for instance, were still not heard of: the UN ECE (Economic Commission for Europe) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, signed in 1979; the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), following the Chernobyl accident; the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, recognizing a state responsibility to conserve resources and use them in a sustainable manner; its sister convention UNFCCC, Framework Convention on Climate Change, aiming for prevention of any damaging human interference with the climate system; and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which signed in 2001 brought light on the need for protection of human health from chemicals. 101 This was later replaced by the OSPAR convention, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, in 1992. 102 For instance, the symbolical link between polar bears and climate change reportedly made George W. Bush Jr. seriously consider a deregulation of the Endangered Species Act, fearing that a listing of polar bear as endangered would cause greater debate and more forceful demands on reduced greenhouse gas emissions (The Guardian, 090116).

129 grooming in oil is an image no one wants to have caused. When the EPPR presented its first Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in Arctic Waters in 1998, the cover picture was of little surprise that of a great polar bear. Yet, the vulnerability of the Arctic environment toward an oil spill accident is, of course, more extensive than polar bears. Symbols are nonetheless important since they appeal to understandings of a certain phenomenon, and what to consider appropriate behavior. Within the Arctic Council, discussions have reached a point where preparedness and response are not sufficient: the if-question has thus been replaced, or at least complemented, by the even more demanding question of what to do to prevent oil accidents? The issue of oil pollution development within the Arctic Council thus shows signs of directional movement.

Oil pollution and the Arctic Council – prior to expecting a 21st century ‘Arctic boom’ When Arctic oil pollution cooperation begun in 1991, through the AEPS, the international legal framework covering the issue was described as insufficient. The Arctic states pointed toward the Arctic as a special case within pollution regulation: the Arctic would be one of the areas mostly vulnerable to oil pollution, where low temperatures, darkness, and cold were described to lead to slower decomposition of oil compared to tempered regions, and where oil on feathers and fur made animals lose their insulation properties, in addition to being toxic if ingested. Transportation, especially on rivers; oil production, and to a lesser extent, oil exploration, were considered the greatest risk activities (AEPS, 1991:14-15). More information and possibly more adequate regulations given the Arctic context were perceived to be needed (ibid.). The concern from the Arctic states came partly from experience. In 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdéz left the Prudhoe Bay oil field, fully loaded. Soon, came the ship radio call: "Yeah, this is Valdez. […] We've fetched up, hard aground, north of Goose Island off Bligh Reef and ... evidently ... leaking some oil..." (National Ocean Service, 2014). Eleven million gallons of crude oil were spilled into the sea, damaging 28 species of animals and plants in what up until then would count as the worst oil spill catastrophe in the U.S. history, as well as the Arctic.103 When the Arctic states started to cooperate on oil pollution, through AEPS, a common understanding of the need thereof was though not only perceived, but also experienced. It was decided to establish the working group EPPR, short for Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response, with its purpose directed responses to environmental emergencies in the Arctic, where it should facilitate cooperation and information sharing amongst the Arctic states. In one of its first reports, an environmental risk analysis report, EPPR found transportation and storage of oil as the greatest Arctic threats. The probability of an

103 It would take more than ten years until the first species had recovered, whereas others – still after more than 25 years – still have not experienced recovery (National Ocean Service, 2014).

130 oil spill was here assessed as highly probable, with greatest risks found in Russia in relation to both oil production and exploration, and harboring and transport. Other states were also subjected to substantial risk activities (EPPR, 1998:vi). However, it was, and is, not just EPPR that was engaged in work on oil and gas issues: the working group PAME presented in 1997 – on a U.S. initiative – its Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. These were guidelines intended for the regulator’s community, those responsible for regulation of oil and gas activities, with the aim of developing a set of practices to be used in a consistent way across the Arctic states. Principles such as precautionary approach, polluter pays, and sustainable development should be the foundation of all oil and gas activities, so the guidelines read (PAME, 1997:6). These guidelines were revised again in 2002 and 2009. The AC episteme, as well as states and other actors, were thus aware early on of the oil issues, but not yet ready to cooperate beyond their national jurisdictions. To go back to Exxon Valdéz, this accident was an environmental catastrophe that put the spotlight on risks associated with Arctic oil activities. But it was also an accident that showed the industry responding in a responsible manner, at least this was how the mayor of North Slope Borough district understood it. ‘The industry has learned from its mistakes,’ he said, ‘and oil revenues contribute to improved life for the Far North’ (Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000).104 As such social and economic benefits were considered to outweigh environmental risks. Still, more accidents did happen thereafter, and constant leakages continued as well. Learning had therefore not been sufficient after all, as the AC understood it, leading to the next phase of oil pollution cooperation.

Expecting the strike of ‘an oil boom’ In early 2016, the U.S. presented that the Arctic Council had made some 238 recommendations on oil and gas activities (SAO discussion paper, 2016a). Since oil pollution is a cross-cutting issue, one finds these recommendations spread across the AC reports, relating to such things as human development, shipping,105 and

104 The perspective from the Arctic Athabaskan Council was a bit different, where oil and gas as well as other forms of resource extraction simply had left a mess, leaving people to live in the remaining waste (Ministerial meeting Barrow, 2000:1-2). In contrast to climate change, where all Permanent Participants have shared the view on urgent need for actions, oil spill prevention has been less unison. For instance, the Aleutian Island societies are a mixed economy: located along the heavy trafficked North Pacific great circle route, one fears the risk of oil spills. At the same time, one wants to have the economic opportunities of the region safely provided for, like fishing (interview, 151221). Indigenous groups at other places are of different opinions. To save and protect the Arctic does not, from an indigenous perspective, have to about decreased human activities. But it could. 105 A key delivery on shipping would be PAME’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) from 2009, ordered by the Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik 2004. Apart from describing the current and past shipping, the report looks ahead and presents future shipping challenges as originating from a new climate and decreasing sea ice. Increased oil and gas transportation increases the risk of a spill, while making marine life vulnerable to oil spills and disturbances. However, no accident needs to occur in

131 biodiversity assessments. The majority however is found in defined reports on oil and gas. As described by the U.S., in the early days of drafting reports and recommendations within Arctic cooperation, Arctic states had just entered commercial oil and gas activities. Some ten years later though, one expected markedly increased activity levels within this field, both onshore and offshore (ibid.). An intensity could be noticed in the reports, with AMAPs Assessment of Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic (2007) first to go. ‘Pollution cannot be reduced to zero’ the report said, ‘only be minimized,’ concluding that with more activity expected, an increasingly significant proportion of human hydrocarbon input to Arctic pollution would be expected as well (ibid: v-vi). Working groups’ all called for more cooperation and greater carefulness from operators, and also the Arctic states were highly attentive toward the risk for an Arctic oil spill.106 There is however a difference between having guidelines developed and assessments compiling information and statistics, and to practically do something. Then, in 2010, states were once again given a wake-up call: the blowout of the Macondo oil well clearly revealed the dangers with offshore oil extraction. In addition to 11 causalities, it was considerably more extensive than the Exxon Valdéz, in terms of spill, leaking at least 130 million gallons of oil straight into the Gulf of Mexico (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2017), compared to 11 million gallons in the Exxon Valdéz equivalent. The blowout caused President Obama to call it “the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced,” an epidemic to be fought for years107 (Obama, 2010). Yet, the exploding rig was ‘luckily’ based in the Mexican Gulf with more favorable conditions regarding clean up, compared to colder waters. Here, an offshore accident could be much worse in terms of effects on people and ecosystems, as well as longer lasting (PAME – Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 2014). The industry invests increasing amounts in new technology,108 but

order to threaten the marine life: discharged oil sludge from tanks – which should be stored on board – are still released, typically 1-5 percent of the amount fuel consumed (AMSA, 2009:139). 106 Not just working groups but also the Arctic states – the SAOs – had brought the issue up on numerous occasions: Canada had informed on prevention strategies, Norway had conducted mapping on resources at risk from spills, and Russia had sent invitations and project proposals on marine accident prevention; all of them received positive feedback in return where cooperation has been understood as beneficial (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2000; Narvik, 2007). 107 The Macondo blowout, when a BP-operated oil rig exploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico, caused a three month constant flow from the oil well, which would take four years to clean up with help from huge amounts of chemical dispersants. At its peak, close to 50,000 people and 6,500 vessels were assisting in the clean-up (BP, report 2015). In the Arctic, conditions are different with few oil- eating micro-organisms compared to tempered waters, and where technology has a hard time functioning properly when the cold, i.e., ice, sets in. And, it is dark for many months out of the year. 108 A task force participant explains that the O&G industry also identifies weaknesses in its response capacity, and acknowledges the substantial risks and costs associated with oil spills. According to for instance WWF, more proven technology therefore is needed that has the capacity to function properly also under Arctic conditions. Because, as this interviewee descriptively explains: “the Arctic

132 it is yet not considered enough to be able to successfully respond to an accident: current technology and equipment would not allow for a successful clean-up in cold temperatures and icy conditions, and infrastructure would not be sufficient – for instance would it be practically impossible to find the amount of personnel and vessels needed (potentially with ice breaking capacities), that also are capable of operating in the icy water (Interview 141208; 141210c; 150521a; EPPR – Recommendations on Marine oil Pollution Prevention, 2013.) To the environmental movement, what is considered a lack of reliable technology as well as sufficient knowledge on the Arctic and how to have it managed, signals that there are knowledge gaps to fill prior to any Arctic operations (Kakabadse, 2015). The year after Macondo, in 2011, the Arctic Council mandated a task force, led by Norway, Russia, and the U.S., to negotiate how to enhance safety and security regarding marine oil pollution. The result was a binding Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA, 2013). The idea was to establish a normative framework on how to act should an oil spill occur, for instance, by notifying as well as assisting other states, and promoting information exchange by suggestively conducting joint exercises (MOSPA, 2013). The agreement, however, has been criticized for providing little guidance on how mutual assistance should be carried out in practice, how the formal structure of information exchange should look like, or what is required by states in terms of oil spill recovery – which technology or what regulator schemes they need to have put in place (Vigeland Rottem, 2015:55; 2016:164-165). As pointed out by Vigeland Rottem, it is difficult to identify any operational consequences of the agreement, which “is more important as a symbol for Arctic cooperation than as a practical mechanism” (2015:55). Therefore, although the concept of ‘prevention’ signals raised levels of ambitions, its use may be more about theatrical maneuvers on safety measures than practically achievable. Prevention, in the AC case, does not mean to close down potential risk activities, but to operate within current legal frameworks, knowledge structures, and technological opportunities, to lower the probability of an oil spill. Still, by encouraging an exchange of information and mutual assistance in case of accidents, one could understand the agreement as a speech-act that despite strong regulatory mechanisms yet helps to govern the world by establishing the ‘conduct of conduct’ regarding responsible oil activities. Furthermore, to have this agreement put in place was considered necessary in order to take the next step, toward oil pollution prevention. It was logical, since entering the more demanding task of prevention (compared to preparedness) required a confirmation of each other being dedicated to the cause (Interview, 150623a). As such, the step-wise negotiation process involved a search for elements of trust building. When TFOPP was created, it was the third task force in a row dedicated to

and an ice-covered swimming pool are two completely different things, even if waves would be added” (interview, 151207).

133 marine safety and security operations, after Search and Rescue (2011) and MOSPA (2013), where the Arctic states, of course, being economically compensated, agreed to assist each other in case of accidents. Several TFOPP participants knew each other from these processes. Although MOSPA had been a process that participants entered with low expectations due to an expected difficulty of reaching an agreement in the presence of ‘a range of implicated players’ (SAO meeting Luleå, 2011), the task force had managed to reach a binding agreement, and it was a process praised by the SAOs (SAO meeting Haparanda, 2012).109 This positive feeling was consequently brought into TFOPP. With Deepwater in mind, preventive measures would at that time be politically – as well as industrially – sanctioned and motivated, creating notions on prevention as salient – that is, a relevant topic given the Arctic context as particularly vulnerable to oil spills.110 Following Clark et. al., (2006), oil spill prevention would furthermore be a legitimate topic, given the ‘empirical evidence’ as represented by Deepwater Horizon. And lastly, it would be a credible topic given that emergency preparedness and response all had been dealt with for 20 years, adding trustworthy and useful knowledge on how to enhance safety and security regarding oil and gas activities. Consequently, it signals oil and gas activities as no longer fully protected under strict perceptions on sovereignty. Such a (common) understanding could thus also help to explain why the Arctic states felt ready to expand cooperation further, and initiate negotiations on the even more demanding area of oil pollution prevention.

TFOPP: reaching a consensus through (avoiding) arguing

TFOPP held its first meeting in Oslo, in mid-January 2014. The atmosphere was good, with great interest and a general feeling of something important about to happen (Two-pager, first meeting in Oslo, 2014). Although expectations perhaps were not as high and dedicated as in previous task forces on oil preparedness and response, the successful history of experiencing both Search and Rescue in Nuuk 2011,

109 However, as already mentioned, the practical and operational significance of the agreement is yet not clear. The final ratification was not completed until March 2016, indicating that states still require some time to think through the decision to enter cooperation on the issue. That the agreement is considered as one of the milestones in the AC rather lies in its potential for cooperation, that is, states, at least partly, chose cooperation prior to unilateralism. The practical importance is therefore added symbolical significance, theatrical performances on cooperation, which also increase expectations on cooperation to come. 110 Parallell in time, EPPR and PAME both presented thorough information of use for the Arctic states, as a response to the oil spill in the Mexican Gulf: PAME Safety Systems Management and Safety Culture Guidelines (2014) and EPPR Recommended Best Practices for Arctic Oil Spill Prevention (2013).

134 and MOSPA in Kiruna 2013, made delegations reportedly arrive at the TFOPP- process quite open minded. One Head of Delegation (HoD) explained it as a general feeling prevailed, signaling “ok, we are making progress, the Arctic Council is getting stronger” (interview 150626). Four meetings later, when the process was to be concluded, the tone was somewhat different and the co-chairs urged delegates to not be too caught up in particular details, but rather be consensus-oriented toward a more concrete document (Two-pager, fifth meeting in Helsinki, 2014). Compared to the beginning, TFOPP left behind a process with lowered ambitions and somewhat stalled enthusiasm: opinions on oil spill prevention as well as jurisdictional preferences had been divergent, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in Spring 2014 had had diplomatic spill-over also into the AC. With the document in hand, two things yet stood clear: firstly, all Arctic states had been committed to the task of reaching an agreement; and secondly, what to write – and read – into the document had been trickier. The development of TFOPP was thus characterized by two parallel processes, involving, on the one hand, common understanding (on the importance of bringing TFOPP ashore) and, on the other hand, arguing (on topical substance). Cooperative dedications were in that sense separated between the former act of cooperating, and the latter act of agreeing, without necessarily responding to the same sort of stimuli. The remaining part of this chapter will present and discuss TFOPP and its process on consensus reaching regarding oil pollution prevention, structured around the following three concepts pertaining to social learning: common understanding, arguing, and role performance.

Common understanding on the need for cooperation

Oil spills as Arctic threats; the importance to have them prevented TFOPP and its different state delegations were united in two different ways: in a wish to cooperate, and in a perception of accuracy – i.e., it being a valid claim – that oil spills constitute Arctic threats. One of the co-chairs, Ambassador (SAO) Vasiliev, explained in an interview (see the AC web, 2014) the underlying motivation for cooperation on the matter in the following way:

Last year [2013] the first Arctic oil from the offshore ice-covered area was extracted. So actually there is no more discussion of whether we should produce Arctic oil or not – we are. Still, the Arctic is the Arctic, and there are so many challenges - climatic, technological, ice, etc. And the most important risk with oil production is the risk of a spill. Thanks to work done in the Arctic Council, we know what the consequences could be in the Arctic from an oil spill. There, it could be much more dangerous than in other parts of the world (A. Vasiliev, Senior Arctic Official, Russian Federation, Co- chair TFOPP, 2014)

135 As Habermas would have put it, in relation to the objective world – where science and experts had contributed with knowledge on consequences – the Arctic states shared a common understanding on oil spills as in need of prevention. Whereas a normative value could be found in the bottom, backed by scientific environmental assessments and other international norms as part of the objective world, the common understanding also had its fair share of strategy involved. Interview accounts were telling of a need to act before the area “is crowded with activities” and to “agree before things happen” (interview 150506; 151221). This describes a cooperative logic derived from a wish to escape those economic interests that are expected to render a consensus significantly more difficult. Another delegate explains:

Since conditions change rapidly in the Arctic, it is important to do something well in advance to regulate and protect what possibly can be protected. It is easier to make up rules now before any great economic activity will take place. There are currently large economic interests, but no economic activity. Therefore, now is the time to speed up the process drawing lines for activity (Adviser 6).

The O&G industry was also present in TFOPP, and it was reported that several suggestions on preventive measures came from this group of representatives. However, several state representatives found that the industry seemed to prefer as little involvement as possible by the states. The reason, one representative explained, was that most of the work already is coming from the industry: funding on projects, research, and standards. But the bulk of this work passed by largely unseen, without any recognition of all the industrial expertise engaged in the matter: the industry is engaged, this interviewee stated, rhetorically continuing, “think of all the interests the oil industry has of preventing oil pollution…” (interview 150324). Indeed, from an industrial perspective, there would be a strategic interest of minimizing accidents. Also, among state delegates, there was a strategic way of reasoning involved, where the Arctic states were described to be in the same boat should an accident occur:

If a spill happens in the Arctic, no matter where, then it will affect the whole of the Arctic activity. Environmentalist groups will strongly call on a ban on drilling in the Arctic, no matter where the accident happens (Negotiator 11).

The incentives for oil pollution prevention cooperation was thus laid bare, and represented a common understanding of oil pollution being the critical issue for the Arctic future to come. The past had taught the Arctic states about the viable way forward: “[…] everybody there was very attuned toward what had happened in the Gulf 3-4 years earlier [the Macondo blowout in 2010]. And the understanding that such a thing could never happen in the Arctic, and the understanding of… you know, we all have different legal schemes to work under but we all have to work toward preventing that” (interview 150521b). When engaging in the TFOPP, any oil

136 accident in the Arctic would mean a tremendous challenge – environmentally, socially, and economically, on this the Arctic states all agreed.

Common understanding on the ‘act of cooperating’ When the task force participants were asked to point out the most important factor for states coming to an agreement, a common answer would be that ‘we were all dedicated to the task.’ With this, they do not only refer to the prevention task per se, but perhaps above all the task of cooperating: to engage in and enhance cooperation seems to be derived from a common understanding of how the AC member states should behave. Indeed, not reaching an agreement in the TFOPP, despite circumstances where, for instance, political turmoil had seven states imposing sanctions on the eight, was never an option since – it is here argued – the structure of expectations was such that reaching a consensus was the only viable goal understood as appropriate. ‘In the AC one agrees,’ participants reasoned, and followed the same strategy as for MOSPA where “nothing would be agreed until everything was agreed” (SAO meeting Luleå, 2012). Equally, the establishment of the TFOPP originated from an approximately 25 year old institutional structure always aiming forward, on to greater harmonization, exchange of experiences and data, joint exercises, and other things encouraging interaction based upon senses of commonness. One agreed, furthermore, because this was ‘a want’ expected to be shared by all. A head of delegation explains the underlying motivation for reaching an agreement in the TFOPP:

Of crucial importance is that all eight Arctic states want, want to have cooperation. No state wants to leave the cooperation. Even Russia, who currently is very critical of much of the things carried out by the West, still wants to have this cooperation continuously. The same goes for Canada. We know that Russia foresees an Arctic Council into the future to cope with the Arctic issues. These state ‘wants’ are superior to everything else (Negotiator 7).

This negotiator does not only speak about other actors’ preferences for cooperation, as he has experienced it, but signals such wants to reflect the sole basis for the AC interaction. Another delegate explains it further:

If you look back at the creation of the Arctic Council throughout today, we can see the level of cooperation is rising. Political cooperation. If we look at other regions, our countries have gone through better and worse, but the Arctic is always a peaceful, secure region with no conflicts. […] I think this is pushing Arctic relations, the understanding of us having something that is peaceful and secure (Negotiator 11).

Through such an understanding, we will arrive at a structure of expectations that not only involves a firm commitment to cooperation, but also to a cooperation that

137 contains certain values to be cherished. It should be ‘good cooperation,’ and it should take place amongst peaceful members in a secure setting. It calls for trust among members, where appropriate behavior would be a behavior that does not violate peaceful and secure relations, and where everyone can count on others to follow. Whereas this entails expectations, and as such is part of role prescriptions, the Arctic states are also actively reinforcing any such structures, by dedicating one speech after another on commonness, trust, and shared interests and challenges. Through speeches, one explicitly places expectations on others. One such role is to be a ‘good co-operator,’ and following this, delegates describe a process where all states have a say, and where everyone is making an effort to give and take. This would also be viewed as a general AC characteristic:

My general feeling working on the Arctic Council is that everybody is more or less solution minded, trying to find solutions rather than creating confrontations. And working in that way you kind of get mutual respect for other views […] If you have sound proposals, are well-argued and with documented information to back it up, then you get results. But you also have to be able to respect others’ views and not throw them away even though they do not fit your own view (Adviser 5)

Similar to George Herbert Mead’s play- and game analogy, the Arctic states are engaged in a game of Arctic appropriateness. Here states learn to draw a connection between appropriateness and multilateralism. To not cooperate, that is, to deviate, is not an option within an institutional setting constructed around finding solutions. Instead, states stay put. Perhaps not so much because they have learned something new normatively on, for instance, oil pollution prevention, but since each Arctic state reflects upon its Self as an effect of social interaction. For commercial purposes, it is strategically important to stay in cooperation, and thus to act appropriate on that account. But being a trustworthy cooperative AC partner is also part of role conceptions, which means that states cannot deviate from cooperation without causing a conflict in role conceptions: if not an Arctic co-operator, then a state’s role – in relation to the Arctic – would fall apart. Really, in all of their Arctic strategies, the Arctic states are emphasizing them as ‘being’ Arctic, while drawing causal links between a well-being of the region and ensured cooperation. Therefore, to preserve the Arctic and keep it relatively healthy is a normative value also reflected in role conceptions, where it works to reinforce notions of the Self accordingly. However, to be oriented toward a common and general goal of cooperating, and toward a specific goal of oil spill prevention, does not mean there is a shared attitude regarding what substance to give the cooperation. In the next section, some dimensions of arguing processes in the TFOPP will be described.

138 Arguing, and the many different worldviews of oil pollution prevention

The mandate upon which the TFOPP was founded was not a very concrete one. The Ministers handed over an assignment for the negotiators to “develop an Arctic Council Action Plan or other arrangement on oil pollution prevention” (Kiruna Declaration, 2013). Actors then faced the task of deciding what type of document they were going to negotiate, and what they should include in the words and practice of prevention? Doing that, actors turned to arguing. One delegate describes the negotiating process in the following metaphorical way, centered on precisely this, arguing:

You know, you may have heard of the term ‘forming’? You form a group, and then it is ‘storming’ after the group has been formed and people meet each other and its opinions, individual strategies, or stakeholder’s perspective that are coming out and you storm through the process: I might have a different opinion from you and somebody else might have a different opinion from both of us, and we are going to disagree initially but by disagreeing, we eventually come to an agreement [norming]. And… …is it always smooth? No, it is not always smooth. Is it what to be expected? Absolutely! (Negotiator 9).

As it would turn out, states argued, in particular, on three things: (1) how far ‘prevention’ was about to stretch; (2) whether any legal obligations should be attached to the document; and (3) the significant other, which in the TFOPP would be represented by Russia. Common understanding, which guided the TFOPP in relation to the objective world, was substantially dampened as states turned to arguing in order to establish the discourse on Arctic oil spill prevention cooperation, in parallel acting as a revelator of their disparate realities and understandings.

Arguing on prevention Although there are Arctic stakeholders that argue prevention would equalize a ban on Arctic oil production, most notably Greenpeace through its still ongoing Save the Arctic campaign launched in 2012, projecting an oil ban was not how prevention was approached in the TFOPP. The TFOPP result, i.e., the framework plan for cooperation on prevention of oil pollution, stated: “recognizing that the prevention of incidents leading to the release of oil into the Arctic marine environment is one of the most effective measures to protect the Arctic marine environment” (2015). Prevention, according to the TFOPP, is a means rather than a goal, preventing incidents and not oil related activities per se. This TFOPP perspective gets support from both the WWF and the industry, even though their understanding on what this in practice implies for Arctic activities differs quite significantly. WWF, which also is the environmental stakeholder that often gets to provide information to governments on environmental issues, (Interview 141210c;

139 150318b; 151207) calls for an avoidance of oil-related activities in especially sensitive areas. Furthermore, they desiderate technology and clean-up methods that actually can handle oil accidents when they occur – because accidents will occur, for which the industry currently is not considered fully equipped (WWF, 2017). The oil and gas industry, on the other hand, claims such technology to already exist, and considers itself to invest huge amounts in continuously developing new ones (Arctic Response Technology, 2017; Arctic Technology Conference 2015). In TFOPP, states were positioned along the above spectrum. A delegate with long experience working with oil and gas regulations, also within the industry, highlights the interpretative aspects of prevention:

You will get back to the question of how safe is safe. The guy who is paying the bill will have one level of what he thinks is safe enough, whereas people who are going to be protected will have another level of what is safe enough. It is never going to be safe enough for the organizations who, you know, have an interest in just preserving the environment and it is always going to be too expensive for the regulator community. But our job is to walk the middle line and you know; the truth is almost always between those opposing points (Negotiator 3).

With input from the EPPR and PAME, and the industrial community through presentations from International Oil and Gas Producers Associations, Gazprom, Rosneft, and Statoil, task force negotiators already at the first meeting agreed that prevention, i.e., lowered risk of incidents, should be dealt with through cooperation, identification of challenges in Arctic operations, and bridging gaps in measures (Two- pager, first meeting in Oslo, 2014). For the next meeting, they had decided to work with prevention within marine petroleum activities, and marine traffic (Two-pager, second meeting in Reykjavik, 2014; SAO meeting Yellowknife, 2014a). One of the co-chairs, the Norwegian Ambassador (SAO) Else-Berit Eikeland, (see interview conducted by the AC, 2014), elaborated on prevention as regulated differently depending on the sector: maritime transport would be internationally regulated (through IMO and its different conventions), whereas petroleum would be nationally regulated, more closed for insight.111 Eikeland thus suggested:

111 A TFOPP delegate described maritime transport and petroleum extraction as such that they are operating on different levels when it comes to legal schemes. Regarding maritime transport, there is an extensive international regime, due to ships and vessels being able to sail around the world flagged differently. It thus requires a coherent set of norms to follow. Within petroleum, no such international cooperation exists regarding development of an international regime, since oil extraction is taking place on a continental shelf. This is an area regulated by the individual state, where, as a state, you are ‘in control’ of the activity (Interview 150318b).

140 Perhaps, when it comes to petroleum, the Arctic states have an interest in learning about our separate efforts, and then learning how we can exchange information and data, arrange meetings between our regulators, and examine safety culture…all the different elements in the prevention strategy. (E-B Eikeland, Senior Arctic Official, Norway. Co-chair TFOPP, 2014).

A regime on petroleum starts off with national authorities that decide on those overarching rules that apply for extracting resources on their continental shelves; thereafter, it is for the industry – together with the authorities – to develop into industry standards (interview 150318b). To have these industry standards harmonized over national borders was a key objective of Arctic cooperation on oil spill prevention, and of the TFOPP (ibid.; 150521b; 151208). In the final Framework plan, preventive measures were listed, both in relation to petroleum and maritime activities. The latter constituted more of an Arctic specific complement to an already established international governance structure (foremost through IMO), and 16 preventive measures were agreed upon. These add to a harmonization of regulations, that are not covered by the Polar Code, which has its focus on vessel construction as well as how these vessels are manned and equipped. The objective of the TFOPP and its preventive measures was therefore to add traffic management in relation to maritime activities, and to consider how vessels could interact with each other to enhance safety precautions to prevent oil spills (interview 150709). In relation to the newer and nationally governed field of petroleum, the Arctic states agreed on five preventive measures.112 Most of the measures listed in the TFOPP pertain to different kinds of information sharing across borders, and areas where states are encouraged to communicate are several. Although it should be noted that information sharing should be in accordance with the respective state’s national legislation, giving states the right to withhold information should it be unreasonably difficult or costly to provide (Framework plan, paragraphs, 1.3-1.4). Prevention, as defined by the TFOPP, is therefore something that occurs between fully sovereign nation states. “We were not asking people to change how they conducted business” a delegate recalled, “it was just how to make it safer – nobody wanted to say to another state “look, you have to do it better”” (interview 150626). Consequently, certainly, oil pollution prevention is about environmental protection, but it also has a strong dimension of state willingness

112 Within the area of petroleum activity, safety measures and equipment are in focus, in addition to promoting and strengthening cooperation between the national authorities, i.e., ‘the regulator´s community´ (Framework plan, paragraph 2-2.3). The maritime area covers exchange of experiences, best practices, and lessons learned within areas such as: maritime traffic, the possible coordination of hydrography and mapping surveys, improved meteorological and oceanographic forecasts, improved satellite communication, icebreaking services, and developing catalogues of existing resources (tug boats, ship arrestors, etc.). A preventive measure with a direct link to environmental protection is the measure to explore and pursue ways to reduce environmental risks posed by transportation, storage, or use of heavy fuel oil ships in the Arctic (ibid: paragraphs 3.3).

141 included: how much are states prepared to reveal, exchange, and learn from each other for the environmental protection cause? According to one delegate, such willingness did not stretch very far: “[it became] absolutely clear that [states] were not ready to include anything in the agreement that went outside the national legislation or conventions that they already had signed up for […], sad, of course” (interview 151207). A pragmatic account of what to consider as a viable achievement is provided for in the following:

Prevention… What it is really about is best practices and safe operating guidelines, and it is how the industry looks at health and that sort of safety culture. So, it is not so much what the governments are doing between themselves as how governments are regulating their industries within their national borders. We realized we were looking for a framework that would develop these best practices and that potentially would get national governments talking to each other about what they were doing, sharing information (date 151221).

Listening to this delegate, which also gets support from the Framework agreement, arguing carried out by the TFOPP participants established the oil spill prevention discourse to be about sharing information through enhanced communication channels, and not about putting restrictions on the oil and gas sector. Through such an understanding on prevention, the Arctic states simultaneously managed to avoid having to deal with the topic of oil related activities per se, a discussion that would turn cooperation more political. Because, based on the oil spill prevention discourse, a conclusion could be drawn that with regard to Arctic fossil extraction, the Arctic states relate a bit too differently to the social world (and the value of oil extraction) to manage to point out a common route on preventing oil spills by going at the source.

Arguing on the legal status of the agreed document As previously mentioned, expectations were initially high on what to achieve in the task force. At the first meeting, Norway and Russia took on the leadership role and presented a draft on prevention measures and a suggestion for agreement, respectively (Two-pager, first meeting in Oslo, 2014). At the second meeting, the U.S. also presented a draft document of a regulator’s forum, aiming for exchange of best practices within the oil and gas industry113 (Two-pager, second meeting in Reykjavik, 2014). Whereas Norway’s draft on prevention (preventive measures) was an area where arguing, meeting after meeting, led toward greater agreement and finally consensus, Russia’s draft ‘framework for agreement’ was trickier (Two-pagers, meeting two-five; interviews 2014-2015). Because, what type of document were they

113 The Arctic Offshore Regulator’s Forum (AORF) is a concrete result of the TFOPP although free- standing from the AC, it is dedicated to information sharing and best practices regarding offshore regulation.

142 set to negotiate – a framework plan, an action plan, a memorandum of understanding, or perhaps an instrument to be legally binding? It would take until the fourth meeting before delegates had agreed that the preferred legal status of the document would be non-legal (Two-pager, fifth meeting in Helsinki, 2014). Contrary to the principle of oil spill prevention, a common understanding reflected a disconnect on what measures and what type of jurisdiction would be needed to get the Arctic states in agreement. Delegates gave witness of a process suffering from a lack of clear direction. As one delegate explains, “the legal status of the document is part of a superordinate discussion that also governs content” (Interview 150510). ‘Once the final decision on title was made, discussion became more goal-oriented,’ the interviewee continued. Another delegate explains the process as becoming more and more drained on ambitions as a direction could not be settled:

To reach a consensual agreement, we realized we needed to adapt and make adjustments that would also lower our ambitions. That is, if we had emphasized our national position the whole way through, it would have been very difficult to come to conclusions. Gradually, it became more important to actually get an agreement, then what de facto was to be in it (Adviser 3).

The insecurities brought about by the negotiation process, of not knowing where it was headed, consequently led to lowered ambitions, where rather than wanting to achieve something specific, in the end actors merely wanted to achieve something. Many participants witnessed others wishing for more. Still, given the situation, the result was quite good, they also continued, if just a proper follow-up on implementation would follow. With ‘given the situation,’ participants are partly referring to the storming surrounding the legal status of the document. And yet, this was a storming that – for many – not necessarily would have had to be a storming in the first place. As it turned out, most delegations seemed keen on following a consensus, whatever a consensus would imply. Initially, states did not really know what to prefer. The only thing that was for sure was that Russia was understood by all delegations as the state with the clearest ambition of signing a legally binding agreement at the end of the TFOPP process. For instance, Iceland, understood by others as initially searching for a legally binding agreement, explains its position to be a result of open-mindedness, that is, it does not want to decide on the matter before knowing what would be included in the document. Similarly, Finland, who at the Kiruna Ministerial spoke in favor of a binding agreement (Ministerial statement by Finland, 2013), took on a different approach as it became clear what the majority preferred: “[i]n the beginning, it was not that much of a difference. But, when we first noticed there would not be a binding document, we also referred to not having the mandate to negotiate a legally binding agreement” (interview, 150521a). Norway was perhaps the state that was most ambivalent to the issue – or – as the delegation explained it – lacked any strong

143 preference in either direction but wanted to follow a consensus: “in that discussion, we kept in the background. Those who had strong emotions, strong wishes from their home country, those were instead controlling the discussion” (interview, 150318a). What is interesting here is not to decide which state held which position, but that most states gave an account of being willing to listen to the ‘general view,’ to take in arguments on the issue, and to see what others – in this particular case – preferred. One expects to turn to discourses in order to establish a consensus on the issue. However, the discourse turned out to be established and fixed already in an early stage: to most states, the issue was solved prior to the second meeting:

The night before the second meeting, we had a meeting together with other delegations. It was Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the U.S. And we sort of mapped out where do we have common interests and common views? The core finding was that we actually see things similarly in most cases. […] We wanted to map out the view of other countries regarding the legal status of the document (Negotiator 4).

There might be several different reasons as to why these states preferred a non- binding agreement; a practical reason of simply lacking the mandate to negotiate judicial matters would be one; not having sufficiently strong interests in the negotiated topic could be another. However, a third reason seems to be that by not attaching any legal obligations to the document, it would be possible to go further in ambitions. A common thread in the interviewees’ reasoning around a non-binding agreement was normatively motivated by a belief of it going to benefit the cause of oil prevention. If the agreement should carry a legal status as binding, the eight Arctic states would only be capable of agreeing on a minimum level for prevention, they said. However, if the legal status would be loosened up, it would instead be possible to be more proactive and forward looking, and where perhaps also the industry would be more willing to engage (interview 150506; 151127; 151221). As one delegate explained, the issues are complex and the task force mainly touched the surface, but being a first step taken, it might yet evolve further, as talks are continuing (interview, 150626). Yet, there is one more plausible reason – not provided for by delegates themselves, but which has to do with Arctic relations. Next, it will be argued that relations with Russia also guided the position on the legal status of the document.

Arguing due to the significant other The self-image of the Arctic states is that they are all cooperating and contributing actors. This is part of their role conceptions, and it can only be preserved as such as long as others are recognizing them for this behavior. In the TFOPP, expectations of how a good AC partner should behave represented the view of the ‘generalized others,’ that is, it was a prescribed behavior that informed states of being in interaction with equals. Against this background, Russia’s violation against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in February 2014 revealed this Arctic state as different

144 from the rest, despite these events happening outside of the Arctic. In the TFOPP, Russia became the significant other, a state that did not represent the same values as the rest. As a consequence, the others distanced themselves – foremost by not backing up Russia in its key ambition regarding reaching a legally binding agreement on oil spill prevention. The identification against Russia should be understood in the context of timing. At the first TFOPP meeting, delegations were given the homework for the next meeting, i.e., to have clarified their national positions on which legal status should be attached to the document. (Two-pager, first meeting in Oslo, 2014). For the next meeting, they all knew what they preferred. Because the previously mentioned informal meeting, which took place prior to the second TFOPP meeting, happened in close connection to the Russian annexation of Crimea. The same day that this meeting was held, the EU and many Western countries also implemented strong sanctions against Russia (European Council, 2018; Global Affairs Canada, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2016). At least, the Russian delegation itself linked Sweden’s, the United States,’ and Canada’s negative attitudes to a binding agreement to what had just happened in Ukraine. The political situation, rather than explanations for the lack of a mandate and similar, was interpreted as the reason.114 The violent acts in Ukraine were internationally condemned, and gave rise to strong reactions. Although negotiations in the TFOPP continued as ‘business as usual,’ these actions found their way into the TFOPP by telling the other Arctic states what they wanted in relation to the legal status of the document, namely, they did not want what Russia wanted. Within the interactive structure in the Arctic Council, there is a strong support for peace and security. To violate this, also if it takes place outside of the Arctic Council per se, is to gravely violate what is considered appropriate, as in legitimate and justified. The alter part of the roles played by the Arctic states, therefore, quickly became aware of the prevalent expectations on taking a distance from such behavior. Thus, rather than preferences on the specific issue per se, social relations helped to guide the Arctic states to their ‘wants’ in the TFOPP. Russia, who already views itself as somewhat different from the rest, as someone who – although dependent on cooperation – follows its own route toward future Arctic leadership, can cope with being the significant other without causing too much of a disturbance in its role. In chapter 3, it was discussed how Habermas (1984) approached understanding as divided into three separate parts, where understanding and knowledge related to the world in an objective, social, and subjective sense. The chances of arriving at a stage where there is a willingness amongst actors to take firm action increases the more common understanding there is in relation to the different worlds. If ‘staying put’ and

114 This TFOPP meeting was the first international negotiation meeting for Russian civilians after the annexation of Crimea, happening only two days after Ukraine ‘joined’ the state – as it was described by Russia.

145 perceiving oil spill prevention as important represented a fairly shared common understanding in the objective world, then interpretations of what prevention should mean and how it should be achieved revealed less commonness in relation to the social world. With Russia as the significant other a subjective world was also revealed, where lack of trust impacted upon cooperative ambitions. If you do not understand the background from where a certain position stems, it will be harder to interpret that statement based on a common understanding. Russia’s strong emphasis on a binding agreement and reluctance to let this ambition go, together with its Arctic policy and interests, made other states question the sincerity of Russia, not knowing what to expect. One could assume the Arctic states to reflect on Russian motives for engaging in oil pollution prevention, and whether words expressed could be trusted? This had not only to do with Ukraine, but with a poor environmental track record with as much as several thousands of small-scale leaks annually, where technology and infrastructure are insufficient, and leaking pipes remain in the ground for too long (Vasileyeva, 2011; Greenpeace, 2017). Furthermore, it could not be ruled out that other political state interests were hiding underneath oil pollution prevention, similar to what has been suggested to govern Russia’s earlier active participation in negotiations on the Polar Code (Bognar, 2016).115 One delegate illustrates a careful attitude toward Russia in the following:

There are countries with higher tolerance levels [on dangerous spills], like Russia, even though they, of course, would never admit it. It then becomes difficult when trying to implement preventive measures that require change, inference with current regulations. Above all, [prevention] is very much about access to information, like exchange of satellite information, weather forecast, and similar. And, if then a suspicious…if one is sort of suspicious regarding what the information will be used for, then obviously one will be very careful regarding what to agree to. What is written on paper? Because one might think the information will be used in some other way, for instance (Adviser, 2).

Although the Arctic state delegations appeal to reason and professionalism as a way to distance Arctic cooperation from external happenings, political conflicts were lurking behind the surface, making Arctic states cautious: “[…] at the end of the TFOPP, we thought we could notice the tension, even though it was not that big, but one could notice a slight deterioration with regard to the atmosphere. More suspicious than in the beginning” (interview 150521a). Despite this, social relations were united in a common understanding on ‘staying put,’ which fought back on political turmoil and wanted to keep the focus on oil spill prevention. As such, it was a negotiation process that state representatives above all wanted to describe as good and constructive.

115 Russia has an interest in upholding its jurisdictional claims and legal control over the Northern Sea Route, and the vessels sailing through, which is why its proposals for the Polar Code when under negotiation mainly served to – in various ways - ease its future as an Arctic state (Bognar, 2016).

146 Continuity and change in role performances

The state performances in the TFOPP followed the role pattern discussed in chapter 4, providing for little support that they would have changed due to any substantive learning. Roles revealed continuity in patterns, and in the TFOPP it was the coastal states that had front positions. Above all, it was Norway and Russia, who both acted as leaders. Norway was the know-how leader that wanted to spread its competencies, and who could sense alter expectations to prioritize safety and security, and who had prepared working material and ideas prior to the meetings, thus, leading the way. Russia, on the other hand, was the active and highly interested leader, whose suggestions were understood as being less clear or purposive, but who in the TFOPP found a way to inform on how cooperation most suitably could be organized with respect paid to sovereignty. The U.S. also acted like a leader, although to a lesser issue-specific extent and instead more ‘innate’ to its character, assuring everyone as being equals and by cherishing best practices for everyone to learn from, and Canada followed its role of being a protector. The other four states were less visible. However, they also revealed more continuity than change in their roles: Denmark took on its kid-brother realist role, with emphasis on kid-brother by not revealing any clear goals, and who did not attract any attention, in terms of being mentioned by others; Iceland was the follower with ambitions, who wanted to listen to a consensus but felt pleased over its ideas being well accepted; whereas Sweden and Finland took on low-key positions within an area they felt was not for them to direct. That continuity rather than change marked states’ role performances should not lead to the conclusion that states were not subjected to learning. Because, although states did not reveal any significant empirical learning regarding oil pollution prevention, the argument underpinning this thesis is that environmental protection is less determined by the persuasiveness within the negotiated issue per se, and more by the social relations guiding the negotiations. Following this line of thought, a modest result regarding the environmentally protective strength of the agreement, could yet have been followed by conflicts or learning in the social field. In the remaining part of this chapter, three examples will be given where states have shown sensitivity to others’ expectations: not because they lack a complete will of their own, but because they need these others’ expectations in order to make sense of their own role.

Confirmative role behavior by Finland and Sweden

Had it not been for knowing about Finland and Sweden’s and role performance in the AC, one could have expected these two states to push for strong oil spill prevention measures, due to being environmental norm entrepreneurs not directly involved in the Arctic oil and gas extraction. Such behavior would however go against

147 the prescribed AC behavior, where sovereignty is to be respected. In relation to discussions on petroleum measures, a negotiator explains their position:

We made a conscious decision that when the Task force discussed the petroleum part, then we were mostly to follow discussions. [Sweden/Finland] did the same, which is very wise because we are not oil producers so we really should not go there and say “well, we think you should do this or that”. […] You know, there is a term called ‘besserwisser,’, from German. Why should one go and comment and criticize on anything one does not really have responsibility for in real life? (date 150603).

Both Sweden and Finland played the roles of supporting others; they spoke when they had knowledge to contribute, and remained silent in between. They were team- players, respecting the sovereignty of others while being ready to contribute and teach insofar as there was a request thereof. As another delegate expressed, there is a general expectation within the AC to shoulder responsibility within areas that one knows about: “I believe expectations are the same for all members, namely, to contribute with those things one knows of” (interview 150510). This was a prescription both Sweden and Finland followed. By the same token, they received positive recognition:

We had strong opinions within those issue areas where we knew we were skillful. Maybe equally skillful as the big nations, least. Like ice-breakers, for example. We are in the front edge there. We cooperate on ice management issues and act basically as one big organization during winter time, and environmental surveillance by air where we are world leading, for instance. Those are the things we have brought up, instantly having received positive feedback: “this is good, this is something we can work into our common document.” It is there we have focused, on things we know we are good at (date 141218).

Another delegate continues by describing what would be noticed as expectations on how to act: “[w]e had the feeling that whenever there was a need for something constructive or for a peacemaker, we were asked for a comment or view” (interview 150603). Interaction thus confirmed these states to be what they themselves expected and conceived to be, indicating no need for a role change. Rather, their roles were firmly rooted in a social structure where others’ recognition boosted their importance as actors (if playing their roles correctly).

A Canadian attempt for alter-casting?

In the Arctic Council, Canada performs as the ‘Protector.’ Generally, this role concerns the indigenous population, but it also moves beyond that to a protection of important principles. In the TFOPP, injustice came knocking on the door through the Ukraine crisis, calling for the need to protect international law. As an expression

148 of its role, Canada activated a role performance on standing firm against grave violations of international law. Outside of the TFOPP, but yet within the AC, Canada together with the U.S. and North American based indigenous organizations boycotted a task force meeting on the reduction of black carbon and methane, hosted by Russia. Canada also chose to cancel a showcase event planned to take place in Ottawa in April 2015, just a day prior to the big Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit marking the end of the Canadian Chairmanship period. The showcase event was organized with the purpose of getting the public to know about all the work carried out in the Arctic council, and had previously been prioritized by Canada as an outreach activity. Working groups were supposed to present their work, which is why the sudden cancellation caused surprise and irritation (interview 150510). Whereas no official explanation was given for the cancellation, it was reported in media as having to do with the continuing tensions over Ukraine, and a worry over the symbolism of having senior Russian officials wandering the streets of Ottawa (CBC News, 150424;). A person with insight into the showcase event confirmed: “the last government [Harper government] was really sensitive about Russia, and did not want to have you know, media coverage of Canadians and Russians together, in Ottawa” (interview 151127). In a response to the boycotted task force meeting and the cancelled showcase event, Russia sent an answer back in similar style: less than two weeks prior to the Ministerial meeting, it was announced that Sergey Lavrov – attendee at the Arctic Council Ministerial meetings since 2004 – was unable to come due to “prior commitments” (Arctic Yearbook, 2015). In both of the cases, the meeting scene was politically orchestrated, spectacles in the sense of not wishing to – presenting imageries of – friendly partaking. The diplomatic turmoil could also be noticed within the TFOPP. While strengthening its own role as a protector, Canada, in parallel, attempted to alter-cast Russia the role as the un-trustworthy, so it at least could be argued. Indications of this was expressed in two different ways. Firstly, a common thread found in the interviews is the informal aspect of negotiations, those more personal meetings where even if trust is not developed, there is at least a common understanding. To have dinner or a beer is understood as a good setting for discussions to thrive and understandings to increase. However, to engage in such activities with Russia was not seen as appropriate by Canada, who did not want relations to appeal to “commonness” but rather differences. A delegate explains:

The Canadian negotiators had clear restrictions regarding how to behave when leaving Ottawa. They were, for instance, told not to associate with Russian representatives, even on an informal basis. And that is quite unusual. And then, we had a negotiation in Ottawa a year ago, when it took a very long time before the Russian representatives were permitted a Canadian visa. I think these were things done deliberately, to provoke (Negotiator 7).

149 The second way to signal Russia as being different from the rest was to simply not agree with the state, signaling it as coming from a different ‘world.’ At least, this was how it was understood by Russia, who interpreted sources of disagreement in the TFOPP to originate in politics rather than the oil pollution prevention topic per se. For instance, since a legal agreement turned out impossible, Russia held on strongly to its last bedding straw, of having Ministers at least sign the document, although it would not be binding. However, Canada refused any such signing, so it was understood. Again, the importance of story-telling and ‘optics’ should not be underestimated, due to the signals it would send of friendship, which Canada at that moment did not want to emphasize or orchestrate. For Russia, however, story-telling on trust and partnership – through signatures – would indeed have been valuable. For similar reason, Russia also avoided to take on the offender role, and kept promoting values of cooperation, mutual trust, and unique relations. This role also found support all the way to the Ministerial level. When the Canadian Chairman declared to bring Ukraine up with the Russian Minister at the Ministerial meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had a different approach: although concerned over the security situation, he referred to a recent phone call with Foreign Minister Lavrov: “[…] he made it crystal clear to me that Russia wants the council to be successful, that they want this to be a cooperative entity that is geared towards peaceful purposes, and that it’s their intent to cooperate with us on the protection of the environment on the agenda we have set forth […]” (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2015b). By offering Russia trust, the state was included within Arctic commonness. By offering trust, the state was also presented with expectations of what now would be an appropriate behavior: peaceful and cooperative manner. That Russia chooses to play this role – and not deviate when they meet resistance – indicates a socialization process at play in the Arctic Council, continuously strengthening cooperation as appropriateness, no matter which (material) interests one has of the Arctic. Also, in the TFOPP, Russia had to give and take and its impact was described as less then could be expected. In addition, it also brought an environmental language to the draft, pushing for ecological risk analysis and similar (interview 150318b; 150521a; 151127). Nonetheless, it could be argued that Russia responded somewhat to those offender expectations being put forward in the TFOPP. Delegates give an account of a Russia that became more self-confident than before, whose delegation started to act in a disturbing manner with little consideration for others, who jumped back and forth between paragraphs, and proposed silly changes to minor things. The irrational behavior, as it was understood to be, made delegates start to question the purpose, even reflecting on whether this small micro-behavior would be a power demonstration of being ‘back on the international scene’ (interview 150603; 160623a)? Russia considers itself different from the West and the rest, and foresees itself as becoming an Arctic leader already in the years 2016-2020, making full use of its

150 strategic resource base (Arctic strategy, 2008:11a-c). To phase setbacks in strategically important issue areas could, for a leader with hyperborean origin, very well activate a behavior that is perceived as annoying and self-assertive by others, no matter how important cooperation – as a means – yet may be. Following Mead (1925, 1934), the cooperative disturbing behavior could be a response (by I) to those alter expectations that also expected such a behavior. With an interactive structure allowing for differences rather than commonness, appropriate behavior would not necessarily any longer be (mostly/only) associated with the value of Arctic cooperation.

Norwegian role incoherence, or, ‘who should do the role – is it Me or Me?’

Norway is an Arctic state characterized by being both environmentally proactive and a major oil and gas producer. In the TFOPP, the Norwegian state delegation’s representation came from ministries such as transport and communication, labor, foreign affairs, trade, industry and fisheries, etc., as well as from the petroleum safety authority, and the industry. This is telling of a Norway that within the TFOPP context aimed to play the role of a knowledgeable oil producer and maritime actor. Yet, due to others’ expectations, Norway came to suffer – for a short while – of a role incoherence, allowing for a short guest performance by its environmental Me. The concrete situation concerned ecological mapping: was this a good preventive activity to be included within the otherwise industrial-focused measures listed? Norway was described to be clearly opposed to such a measure, something the state itself explained with reference to the content of the topic being negotiated: oil pollution prevention was not about environmental protection activities, but about measures related to regulators, industries, and shippers’ ordinary activities. A delegate from another state explains: “First, they did not want to have anything written about the vulnerability of the Arctic environment. They stated it was not the idea of the whole paper to talk about how vulnerable the nature is” (HoD 4). Other reactions on Norway’s reluctance to bring the environmental aspect in centered on a position that not drilling close to environmentally sensitive areas indeed would be a prevention measure (150521a; 151127). Then, however, Norway suddenly changed its mind:

They [Norway] said, “it will never be in the document, never ever, over my dead body.” But for the next meeting, they had changed their views and were collaborating on this. They even had done a lot of background work to phrase sentences on this topic in such a way that they could accept it. I don’t know what had happened there in the background, between meetings, but obviously something (Negotiator 4).

What is interesting here is foremost two things. Firstly, the initial disappointment on Norway’s reluctance to incorporate writings on ecological mapping is telling of which expectations others had on the country: to not explicitly promote the environment

151 was not among them. Secondly, when confronted with these expectations of being someone who should be acting in the name of the environment, Norway did change its position. The Norwegian delegation explains the change to be a concession of being in a negotiation setting where a consensus would be the guiding principle:

I think some may have perceived us as being a bit stiff, in that particular issue [ecological mapping and environmental risk analysis]. But, it was simply those formulations that were on the table, they would be problematic for us to handle within our system, a system that we argue is very good at providing for environmental considerations. […] In the beginning, we therefore were against it, it breached the structure of our document – it did not belong there. But, since it was important to some and since we had to reach a consensus…in dialogue with our Senior Arctic Official, we therefore chose to stand back on that one as well (Adviser 3).

To Norway, it was an adaptive sacrifice, logical to do in order to bring the agreement ashore and keep relations smooth. However, there might be more to this change in position than simply strategic reasoning. Being one of the world’s top suppliers and producers of oil, Norway is an important player at the global energy market; furthermore, it has much to thank the oil sector for its national welfare (Jensen, 2016). Whereas the Norwegian oil production in general was declining between 2001 -2013, the years between 2014 and 2016 instead witnessed an increase. Energy extraction and activity in the coming 50 years is also expected to be high, with over 50 percent of all resources still expected to be recoverable. Of these undiscovered resources, more than half (63 percent) is located in the Barents Sea (Norwegian Petroleum, 2017). Yet, Norway may be as important a petroleum nation as it may wish, but delegations within the TFOPP expected it to include more things than a self-interested attitude towards oil and gas, such as a promotion of environmental values. By not behaving in that way, Norway caused notions of an odd behavior, illustrated by the following quote where a delegate gives voice for the surprising factor within the TFOPP:

…It is always Norway. Norway is framing the discourse that “it is not the Arctic, we are not really Arctic, we can drill.” And, it is always very surprising to me how the Norwegian government is very clear about “we can drill and the measures are in place and we will sponsor piles of report that will show it […]”116 (Adviser 9)

If Norway had just been about petroleum, it should have come as no surprise that such a state wanted to drill. With Norway, however, there are other expectations as well, stemming from the domestic sphere. To compare Norway and the U.S., for

116 The vast majority of Norway’s oil and gas production has so far been extracted in the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea. The entry into Arctic drilling, through the Barents Sea, is thus a new activity.

152 instance, far less Norwegians support Arctic fossil extraction than their counterparts in Alaska (Langhelle and Hansen, 2008). Similarly, to explore the Barents Sea might be described by Statoil as a “safe and responsible thing to do” (Statoil, 2017c), but where one at the same recognizes there to be “skepticism and opposition” toward such activities (ibid.). The decision by the Norwegian Government to open up the Barents Sea was also met by political criticism, as well as a lawsuit from parts of the environmental movement (Greenpeace, 2016a; High North News, 150120). There is, thus, a Norwegian role incoherence, concerning not only alter but also ego. Norway’s sudden change in the TFOPP could therefore be a result of colliding Me’s. If Me is the part of the Self that views itself through the eyes of others (Mead, 1925), then the situation became problematic since it challenged core understandings on what type of actor Norway would be. Whereas it was Norway as a petroleum nation (and Arctic maritime actor, in general) that acted in the TFOPP, it met expectations that targeted Norway as a leading normative power within the environmental field. Although Norway was not playing this role in the TFOPP (it was perceived the wrong forum, environment was not what they discussed here), one could not walk freely from these alter expectations. One could not walk free from them since they were also part of the Norwegian Self. The wrongly targeted environmental Me, as Norway understood it, caused the impulsive and inner I to react as it had been the normative doing good-state who responded. When Norway viewed itself through the eyes of others, it became aware of expectations linked to the “green” version of its’ social Me. Although the forum was wrong, the I to make sense of Me quickly stepped in, correcting the role behavior by taking on a slightly different – and more flexible (i.e., appropriate in relation to expectations) role.

Conclusion: a process dedicated (to show) cooperativeness

The discussion within this chapter has centered on oil pollution prevention – its cooperative background, and how the TFOPP went through the process to reach a consensus on the matter. It has been argued that a common understanding marked state interaction regarding the topical importance – to cooperate and find an agreement on oil spill prevention was a goal, i.e., a value, shared by all. More difficult was the issue of which measures should take them toward this goal, and how? Settling this, actors turned to arguing in order to define the prevention discourse, and how it should be approached legally. Arguing did not lead the actors cooperatively astray, but it revealed different understandings, in relation to actors’ social and subjective worlds. Socially, experiences were not shared to the degree that just one appropriate approach to oil extraction and environmental protection was viewed as valid. Subjectively, also trust was failing.

153 From a longitudinal perspective, the fact that the AC has arrived at cooperation on oil pollution prevention is in itself indicative of learning, of a progression regarding environmental norms. But as the micro-perspective in this chapter revealed, this is a norm that is controlled for differently, depending on the specific national context and prerequisites found therein, which give rise to different interpretations of prevention. But when it comes to reaching a consensus, social interaction also has an impact, possibly to the extent that change (or resistance) will be called out for by appealing to the actors’ senses of Self. This chapter has dealt with (alter) expectations and recognition, partly illustrated using three examples of how states’ role performances are decided (somewhat) in accordance with others expectations, and prescriptions of a cooperative behavior. In the first case, alter and ego expectations coalesced, causing little friction in roles. In the second case, alter expectations emphasized differences over commonness, extending the interactive structure to ‘appropriately’ also include unilateral behavior. In the last case, others expectations led to a changed (adapted) position in relation to a specific issue, in order not to be understood by others – as well as the Self – incorrectly. Therefore, by considering alter expectations, actors have highlighted those aspects of themselves that are perceived to fit the current interactive structure the best. In the beginning of this chapter, the TFOPP was framed as a process where cooperative expectations initially were high, whereas ambitions were lower and got even lower as interactions proceeded. A relevant question to ask then is: high (and low) in relation to what? In the TFOPP, expectations were as high as cooperation around a politically sensitive area such as oil activities and maritime transport could allow for. To agree to measures that would spur communication is, in a way, to expect a lot should relations not be good. Having high expectations on everyone gathering around the rules of the game (oil pollution as equalizing environmental bad), using rhetoric on equality and commonness, is in line with high expectations on the potential for cooperating. However, the fact that ambitions are still lower is connected to another part of cooperation, the part that covers the topical substance through the act of agreeing. In the TFOPP, this latter was secondary to show a united front through an acceptance of oil pollution prevention cooperation: to show cooperative willingness on this topic was in much the interactive focus. As will be shown in the next chapter, the starting point for interaction in the TFBCM was close to the opposite, where one instead had concrete ambitions, but lower expectations of achieving them.

154 6. Reducing black carbon and methane – high ambitions, lower expectations

[W]hat these rising temperatures mean is that the resilience of our communities and our ecosystems, the ability of future generations to be able to adapt and live and prosper in the Arctic in the way people have for thousands of years is tragically but actually in jeopardy (J. Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, 2015).

The Arctic Council can do more on climate change (Ibid.).

The AC as oriented toward actions on emission reductions

When assuming the Arctic Council Chairmanship for the period 2015-2017, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry explained climate change to be one of the top three priorities for the United States, a priority that everything else in Arctic cooperation and activities sort of fell back at. He explained how a decrease in sea ice causes flooding and makes coastal villages vulnerable to storms, how thawing permafrost is linked to wildfires and collapsing infrastructures, and how it may release methane, a gas 20 times more potent than carbon dioxide. ‘There is no such thing as a future challenge – that challenge is already here, happening right now,’ Kerry said, urging the Council members and observers to do more (Ministerial statement by the U.S., 2015a). Illustrative of the wish to “do more,” the Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit in 2015 adopted an agreement entitled Enhanced Black carbon and Methane Reductions – An Arctic Council Framework for Action (hereinafter the Framework Agreement). It had been negotiated by the Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (hereinafter the TFBCM), and it moved scientific knowledge and recommendations on emissions reduction into the domain of political action-taking. In principal, the agreement listed three different key commitments for the states – three ‘to do’s’: (1) take enhanced, ambitious, national and collective action to reduce emissions on black carbon, and significantly reduce methane emission, (2) adopt an aspirational

155 quantitative collective goal on black carbon by 2017, and (3) carry out national inventories of the frequency and spread of these pollutants, and send biannual reports on existing and planned actions on emission reductions (Framework Agreement, 2015; Expert group on Black Carbon and Methane, 2017). Shaped as a non-legal framework document, the agreement is not really stringent regarding who should do what, when and how, in terms of emission reductions. Yet, it was considered an improvement on earlier soft law instruments, by the institutionalization of (flexible) follow-up mechanisms (Shapovalova, 2016). In iterative two-year processes, states agree to report on their – through the TFBCM established Expert group for action on black carbon and methane – levels of emissions and mitigation strategies (Framework Agreement, 2015). The Director of the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Michael Stickman, described the commitment by states through the initiative as the most important achievement during the Canadian chairmanship. ‘Why do I say this when it is only a Framework Agreement lacking legal obligations?’ he rhetorically asked, providing an answer himself: ‘because as a symbolical value, it may push normative frontiers on what is considered to be necessary environmental protective measures’ (AAC, 2015). This also seems to be a motivation behind the agreement, where the Arctic states were unanimous in the understanding of the AC to take regional leadership on emission reductions, while sending a “strong political signal” to international climate negotiations on action- taking (TFBCM Two-pager, sixth meeting in Tromsø, 2014). Still, based upon how the negotiation process evolved, it was a process characterized as ‘high ambitions but low expectations.’ For the task force result, this means that many delegations would have wished for more, but yet considered the result satisfactory enough since a route toward future emission reductions was now established. This chapter will elaborate on the TFBCM process as incorporating two parallel rationalities: one that concerns the ‘benefit of all’ if arriving at an enhanced Arctic environmental governance structure (generating high ambitions); and another one which departs in unilateral cost analysis of the reasonable levels of what can be afforded to take them there (resulting in ow expectations). This chapter follows the same structure and ambition as was presented in chapter 5, and is devoted discussions on: (1) the consensual dimension of Arctic climate mitigation, (2) the arguing dimension on how and why such mitigation should occur, and (3) how roles and ego and alter learning would be the guiding torch in any of the two above. However, just like the previous chapter, it will start with a background on the climate issue as well as how it found its way onto the AC agenda.

A background on the Arctic Council’s climate change work

When John Kerry urged the Arctic states to do more on climate change, this was a rhetoric known from before. Already in 1988, when campaigning for the U.S.

156 presidency, George W. Bush Sr. told the Boston audience that “those who think we’re powerless to do something about the greenhouse effect are forgetting about the White House effect” (Hecht and Tirpak, 1995:383). In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its first scientific assessment report, pointing toward human activities as having an enhanced effect on rising global- average mean temperatures,117 quickly followed by the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) that turned climate change into a legal regime. The U.S. was the first country to sign in 1992, and by 1994 all Arctic states had ratified as well. Still, in relation to achieved results of decreased levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, not much seems to have happened between Bush Sr.’s words in 1988 and Kerry’s utterances more than 25 years later, where the atmospheric carbon intensity has increased for each year (World Meteorological Organization, 2017). From a normative perspective though, climate change has been more firmly anchored in the ground. Present day climate change is recognized as a global urgent threat, of concern to all of humankind (see Paris Agreement, 2015). Within the Arctic context, the 1990s global rise in climate attention was not reflected in the governance structure. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) mentioned climate change, but only in terms of its significance for the global climate (AEPS, 1991: principle 2.2 iiic), and it was not listed as a prioritized environmental problem. Neither the first AC Ministerial meeting does mention climate change with any real vigor118 (see Iqaluit Declaration, 1998) despite, one should say, the timely context of the Kyoto Protocol and binding emission reduction targets for developed countries. However, operating in the outskirts, the AMAP had worked on its own to produce an Environmental Assessment Report, where climate change was included (1998). Science on Arctic climate change, AMAP was convinced, would fill an important knowledge gap in IPCC’s work (Stone, 2015: 206-207). The Chair of AMAP at that time, David Stone, later described how the author119 of the climate change section was owed a great debt since she made “the Arctic Council and the circumpolar science community to take notion” (Stone, 2015:207). As a result, the Arctic Council now started to request more information, including ordering an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), to a large extent, funded by the U.S. (ibid.; SAO Report to Ministers, 1998). The ACIA, even prior to its release in 2004, became a success in terms of Arctic showcasing: it offered the Arctic states a way to present an Arctic imagery – produced

117 In this first report, the greenhouse effect caused by humans and the natural greenhouse effect was yet a relationship in need of further research (IPCC, 1990). The causal linkage between climate change and anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions was established in the fourth IPCC report (2007). 118 It welcomes the overview and assessment of the CAFF and AMAP regarding changes in the Arctic ecosystems, including the effect of climate change and UV-B radiation on these ecosystems (Iqaluit Declaration, 1998: paragraph 21). 119 Elizabeth C. Weatherhead

157 by the Arctic itself – to the rest of the world (SAO meeting Espoo, 2001). Through the ACIA, the Arctic states approached the region as a global common, in the sense of highlighting the need for responsibility: ‘the whole of the world ought to protect the Arctic in order to protect themselves’ so the Arctic argument reasoned. And the Arctic states, through the AC, succeeded in their dramaturgy, for instance, Dr. Robert Corell, Chair of the steering committee of the ACIA, appreciatively noted how the exhibition hall of the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development was “impossible to pass without seeing a reference to the Arctic” (SAO meeting Inari, 2002). From now on, and starting with the Inari Declaration the same year, climate change was introduced as a standing AC priority issue, repeatedly noted as of grave Arctic concern. Since the ACIA, the Arctic states have encouraged Arctic scientific findings to be implemented under the UNFCCC (Reykjavik Declaration, 2004), approached greenhouse gases in a united manner through, for instance, statements to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (Cop),120 and started to take action through short lived climate pollutants. The ACIA could be argued to have awoken the Arctic political attention on environmental issues,121 but since then numerous other scientific reports relating to the Arctic climate have been produced. Amongst these are: CAFF’s Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (2013), PAME’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (2009), AMAP’s Arctic Oceans Acidification Assessment (2013) as well as AMAP’s Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (2011; 2017). In 2016, the Arctic Resilience Report was published, focusing on the importance of building resilience and slowing down Arctic change, justified for the sake of the Arctic but also for the rest of the world. In parallel to an episteme gone more focused on Arctic climate change, the SAO meetings, ministerial statements, and declarations also reveal a climate tone gone sharpened, identifying a pressing and increasing need for mitigation actions (see for instance, Fairbanks Declaration, 2017). With climate change nowadays being a standing item on the AC agenda, it has positioned itself as an integral part of both those two objectives being the founding pillars of the AC: environmental protection and sustainable development.

120 Whereas the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) offered the first window of opportunity regarding showcasing the linkages between Arctic warming and global climate change, other occasions have followed since then. One statement was made, for instance, in 2012, in relation to Cop 18 in Doha, where the Artic Council stressed that climate change was a major global concern, and that the Arctic Council would continue its work to observe and improve understanding of the effects – regionally as well as globally. Similar messages have been sent at other Cop meetings as well, where the Arctic Council, for example, has put up Arctic booths for educational purpose (SAO meeting Anchorage, 2015; Fairbanks, 2015). 121 The ACIA is understood to represent a clear before and after, regarding environmental focus, which brought more political attention (and funding) to the AC (interview, 141210a; 151222).

158 Introducing black carbon and methane

When short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) entered the agenda in 2008, it raised the stakes for the Arctic states: the AC was no longer a global climate enlightener, but a regional climate actor with action-oriented goals of its own. The attention to pollutants others than a greenhouse gas like carbon dioxide had been brought by the episteme (SAO meeting Svolvaer, 2008), and although states feared that an introduction of short-lived climate pollutants would increase the emission reduction burden on the Arctic states compared to the rest of the world, while also detracting global focus away from carbon dioxide, the SAOs were generally supportive (SAO meeting Kautokeino, 2008).122 The following year, climate change moved up the political agenda to the point where it was said to represent the threat against the Arctic, as well as global stability (see Ministerial statements, Tromsø 2009). It was explained how the success of humanity in addressing climate change lingered on a knowledge of Arctic climate dynamics and causes (Ministerial statement by Norway, 2009). On the same occasion, a task force was mandated to deliver a report by 2011 with measures and actions leading to emission reductions on short-lived climate pollutants (SLCP) (Tromsø Declaration 2009).123 In AC, the (political) focus has been on black carbon and methane. Methane is a short-lived climate pollutant, with a life-length of about nine years. It is also a greenhouse gas – it traps heat in the atmosphere – many times more potent than carbon dioxide. Currently, methane is approximated to be the second biggest contributor to global warming, only outnumbered by – long after – carbon dioxide (AMAP – Arctic Climate Issues 2015). The Arctic is a region highly exposed to methane emissions in a number of different ways. Firstly, since methane is the main component – main gas – in natural gas, it is a lucrative energy source drilled for and extracted in the Arctic, or in the Arctic vicinity. When extracted and transported, leakages can, and do, occur. Secondly, since methane enhances the process where organic material becomes decomposed, it is also a bi-product in oil extraction. For oil

122 For instance, the same year in 2008 in Stockholm, the Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum was held, in order to find ways to strengthen international cooperation on airborne polluters, where it was highlighted the climate benefits of reducing polluters with short lifetimes. Later, in 2012, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition was created to reduce black carbon and methane. Three of the six founders were Arctic states: Canada, USA and Sweden (Stockholm Environmental Institute, 2014). 123 In the report from the SAOs prior to the Ministerial meeting, SAOs recommended Ministers to: “Establish a task force on short‐lived climate forcers reporting directly to the SAOs, drawing on AMAP and other relevant expertise, and inviting the active participation of all members of the Arctic Council, to exchange information on existing national policies, regulations and opportunities for immediate voluntary action in the Arctic States to reduce emissions of short‐lived climate forcers, to develop recommendations for further immediate national and international actions, including joint proposals for the SAOs to consider for submission to relevant international bodies, and to review progress and re‐examine the need for and mandate of this task force at the next Ministerial Meeting.” (SAO Report to Ministers, Tromsø 2009).

159 rig operators, methane causes trouble, being highly explosive. Often, rather than to restore or cap, the gas is vented. It could also be lit on fire – flared – turned into less potent carbon dioxide, and soot. Thirdly, methane is trapped in the permafrost and the frozen seabed. Should the Arctic temperature rise high enough, there is a potential risk of enormous amounts of methane getting released. And fourthly, agriculture, food waste, and sewage sludge are other sources generating methane emissions in the Arctic (ibid.; task force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCF), 2011; 2013) Black carbon is the other short-lived climate pollutant of high interest in the AC, not to say of highest interest.124 This is not a gas but a particle shaped as soot. Being black, it absorbs heat, and therefore contributes to a general global warming as well as a specific Arctic ice-melting (the Albedo-effect). It is an extremely potent particle, creating a warming result that is much bigger than its size would imply, which also has a negative impact on people’s health. Black carbon is derived from incomplete and inadequate combustion of fossil fuels: it could be generated from diesel engines running ships, from long-distance trucks and cars, and from wood burners and saunas. It is also generated when methane is flared, when wildfires occur, or when volcanoes erupt. Now, it is not that all emissions from black carbon (or methane) found in the Arctic actually are emitted by the Arctic states themselves. Ship-owning businesses with home addresses far away from the Arctic, for instance, are sailing the Arctic waters, and particles are additionally travelling with ocean- and wind currents from far away – for instance, heavy-coal burning industries in China and elsewhere. Nonetheless, it has been established that emission-releasing sources within the Arctic nations have a greater warming impact, due to a higher effect per unit of emissions (AMAP – Arctic Climate Issues 2015; Task force on SLCF, 2011; 2013:5).

Suggestions on action: how a warming trend could be slowed-down The TFBCM was not the first task force mandated to work on short-lived climate pollutants. The first one was led by the U.S. and Norway between 2009-2011, and had a focus on the technologies and economics of black carbon reductions. An expected increase in marine shipping qualified this source together with gas flaring as of special importance in the Arctic context. (Task force on SLCF, 2011). The scientific evidence of the causal connection between the black carbon and Arctic warming seemed compelling, and Sweden’s SAO was cited in The Washington Post, saying “[t]he Arctic Council is very much about sustainability. Every country, they have to do their homework on black carbon” (The Washington Post, 110511).

124 In the AC context, black carbon was from the onset recognized as playing a unique role in the Arctic and should therefore be studied “as a frontier area of science” (task force on SLCF, progress report 2011). However, the task force carefully explained that a focus on black carbon should not be read to represent a judgment of this pollutant being of greater importance than methane or any other climate forcers.

160 Still, in 2011, the Arctic states were not ready for a common approach on black carbon reductions. Some SAOs voiced concerns over the task force recommendations to develop emission inventories and replace older vehicles and equipment with new technology having more efficient combustion. The SAOs found too little considerations to have been devoted to all of those different economic and regulatory realities that the Arctic states faced (SAO meeting Copenhagen, 2011). More information was necessary, and the task force was asked to continue its work for a second run. With the key messages intact from 2011, the second task force delivery in 2013 clarified that the Arctic – less so global – anthropogenic methane emissions are likely to impact human health and Arctic climate. The U.S., Canada, and Russia were confirmed as global top emitters, and emission projections for the Arctic in total also led in the direction of increased levels in the coming decades. A reason could be found in the oil and gas sector, which was listed as the largest anthropogenic source of methane. In total, 60-75 percent of all potential methane emission reductions were located in the oil and gas sector, and recommendations therefore included such things as use of new equipment and improved operational practices within this sector, to foremost minimize the leaks. Instead of flaring, which produces large quantities of soot, the task force also encouraged states to either recover the gas (use it or sell on the market), or have it re-injected into underground reservoirs, so called cap and store125 (Task force on SLCF, 2013:7-9). This may be troublesome, in particular, for Russia, who not so flattering ranks as the absolute number one in the world when it comes to flaring, and who continues to show increased quantities of gas being flared126 (interview, 151207; World Bank, 2017a). The articulated recommendations from the task force on SLCF, both in 2011 and 2013, pointed the way forward. But recommendations were not in their own right – or standing – political. However, as a political response to the Arctic climate change, the Swedish chairmanship – although outside the AC context per se – invited the Arctic states’ environmental ministers to a meeting in Jukkasjärvi, in Spring 2013. The ambition was to have the environmental dimension strengthened in the Arctic Council, and together with the other Arctic states, Sweden stood united in a perceived necessity of urgent and decisive actions on emission reductions (Ministry of Environment Sweden, 2013). At the Kiruna Ministerial that later followed, the recommendation from the environmental ministers on political action was adhered. The next part of this chapter will discuss how the frame for political AC action was set up through the TFBCM process.

125 Other recommendations centered on the Arctic states to develop, share, and improve emission inventories, and to submit periodic progress reports with established indictors to measure emission reduction success (Task force on SLCF, 2013). 126 Amongst the Arctic states, the U.S. comes second to Russia, in terms of flaring, although it has significantly decreased its quantities in the last few years. In 2016, Russia flared 21 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, compared to 12 bcm by the United States (World Bank, 2016),

161 TFBCM: reaching a consensus through arguing

Between September 2013 and November 2014, the TFBCM gathered for six meetings. One of the co-chairs retrospectively said “It has been rewarding to see how all states – USA, Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark Finland, Iceland and Sweden, determinedly worked towards a concrete result” (Kahn, 2014b). The achieved result, in a concrete sense, is the staking out of the route toward emission reductions and creating an institutional structure around it, by requesting states to develop inventories over their emissions and declaring measures taken and lessons learned in iterative national reports (Framework Agreement, 2015). The co-chair stated, “Not least have we promised to set up emission reductions target” (Kahn, 2014b). At the same time, it was acknowledged how opinions had been many and the uncertainty big regarding the possibility to succeed within the time frames (ibid.). When emission reductions are to be discussed, sectors and stakeholders outside the immediate realm will be affected, just as costs – financial or cultural – will be added. The mandate upon which the TFBCM rested, thus, had taken height for a certain amount of resistance, using careful wording that would not cause any fright of joining in (interview 150318c). The parallel processes of quite low expectations but yet a strive toward environmental ambitions, and how these affected states in their TFBCM position, will be investigated further under the headings of common understanding, arguing, and role performance.

Common understanding on soot, as well as ‘staying put’

Common understanding on the need for reduced particles of black carbon As a starting signal for the TFBCM’s establishment, the Senior Arctic Officials had confirmed the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants to be an AC priority, and informed the Ministers in writing:

SAOs have considered the appropriateness [italics added] of moving forward on SLCP to bolster efforts to achieve substantial SLCP emissions reductions and encourage information sharing and recommend that the Ministers establish a Task Force to develop arrangements on actions to achieve enhanced reductions of black carbon and, in some cases, methane emissions in the Arctic, and report at the next Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in 2015 (SAO Report to Ministers, Kiruna 2013).

That “substantial SLCP emission reductions” of primarily black carbon but also methane would be aligned the wording ‘appropriateness,’ indicates a somewhat changed normative context, where passivity on emission reductions now come to result in an understanding of the inappropriateness thereof. As a delegate explained, a

162 significant increase in knowledge had occurred over just the last five years, culminating in the establishment of the TFBCM, not least due to all the work conducted by previous task force(s) as well as the AMAP organization (interview 150623b). The time was perceived as ready to turn this knowledge into cooperation with a political focus, with science considered as being adequate enough to guide actions (Two-pager, first meeting Whitehorse; second meeting Stockholm, 2013). The first TFBCM meeting, a scoping session where views and expectations were shared, made it apparent that similar attitudes existed amongst the participants on emission reductions as important for Arctic communities. The general view foresaw a political agreement or arrangement, which also should be ambitious (Two-pager, first meeting Whitehorse, 2013). The meeting was described as friction-free: “[w]e did not even have to use all of the time that was dedicated, which is how concerted the understanding was (interview, 150320). Also at the last and final meeting, delegations stood unanimous in an “ambitious, politically aspirational collective vision” on emission reductions (Two-pager, sixth meeting Tromsø, 2014). The two co-chairs were pleased with the result, a result that is described to derive from the commitment and ambition of all countries (Jacovella and Kahn, interview on the AC web, 2015). Elaborating on this commitment, referral is made to a common understanding, as illustrated in the following words by a TFBCM participant:

[we agreed due to] the pretty obvious acknowledgement that what we were trying to do made a lot of sense [laughing]. It was obvious that we needed better information on black carbon in the Arctic, and it was obvious that all of the countries should be showing the Arctic Council what they were doing, in terms of mitigation measures for black carbon. So, there was a general buying of the concept behind the Framework, that we were addressing an obvious need and not doing something that would have little value (Adviser 8).

The scientific foundation to support the mitigation of polluters, predominantly black carbon, had passed as ‘conventional knowledge.’ Following Habermas, a good starting point for cooperation would be to establish ‘what we know.’ As one delegate explained, the TFBCM could contribute here: “sometimes a task force is needed to establish what the facts are” (interview 150623b). Through interaction, a common understanding was identified where one saw the need for closer cooperation as ‘a fact’: “everyone agreed that something had to be done on black carbon and methane” (interview 141209).

Common understanding on ‘staying put’ Although all states in the TFBCM agreed to the need for having black carbon reduced, there was no real consensus on why such action should be desirable, what the positive consequences brought about would be. To reduce especially black carbon would be beneficial for more reasons than those pertaining to Arctic warming,

163 especially to human health.127 This means that actors could share a common understanding on emission reduction without necessarily confirming all science – climate science – to be correct. One delegate expresses a consensual disapproval concerning science, saying: [“t]he idea to form this task force was that science has been more or less established, done. I personally do not believe that science is finished within this area […] I tried to ask people to be sober about some conclusions, and not rely too much on slogans which after some checking might not be entirely correct (interview 151222). The TFBCM identifies actors that do not necessarily need to share the same driving forces or to view the same reasons for cooperation as ‘objectively true,’ as long as the value attached to cooperation is somewhat similar. On the contrary, and following Habermas (1984), a generous approach to a certain issue reveals more opportunities for states to justify actions on emissions reductions, since states are allowed to legitimize it (i.e., emission reduction) in those ways that would be most suitable given their respective social world. As a matter of fact, the notion that soot entailed different benefits if reduced was understood to spur cooperation:

Some countries do not primarily engage in this for the climate effect, but for the health effect. That’s not less good, it’s just as good. We find new ways to cooperate – different reasons to cooperate. That was a signal for us to move forward, that we knew – in the Arctic and in other contexts – that this was an area where we had a bit different interests but with the common interest of us all wanting to do something about it (Negotiator 2).

To justify environmental protection could more easily be done if it would be linked with health impacts or economic savings (interview, 150611). Yet, there might be more to cooperation on soot and methane than a practical environmental- or health benefits. In meeting minutes and in the Framework Agreement, the task force adhered to prescriptions that acknowledged knowledge to be qualified enough to represent an objective understanding of how the world is related, not only by referring to previous working groups and task force(s), but by linking it to the international climate regime of the UNFCCC (Two-pager, sixth meeting Tromsø, 2014). Also, those that had their scientific doubts regarding how the TFBCM lined things and orders together accepted such linkages. And more importantly, they engaged in interaction that enhanced a dialogue amongst countries. One delegate describes the negotiation process to have unpacked “a greater will to think

127 Although not questioning the positive effects of emission reductions, Russia, for instance, employed a line of reasoning where black carbon and methane reductions not necessarily followed the same logic concerning benefits: whereas black carbon would be bad for health, and methane for environment, one could not draw conclusions in reverse, saying the same causal impact would be valid no matter which short-lived climate pollutant. Denmark raised similar objections, in the sense of warning that political ambitions and decision-making would anticipate science, being, at worst, contra-productive.

164 collectively, to do things together” (interview 150318c). Another delegate describes how it was “very constructive, in good spirit compared to climate negotiations” (interview 150521c). A willingness to cooperate should also have impacted on how the task force evolved. The wish to ‘stay put’ superseded the Russian conflict with Ukraine. The TFBCM found itself in the midst of diplomatic turbulence when several delegations chose to boycott the third TFBCM meeting, held in Moscow, due to the Russian invasion of Crimea.128 After the meeting, the Swedish co-chair reported: ‘Moscow was warm, although with an atmosphere that was affected by the situation between Russia and Ukraine’ (Kahn, 2014a). Another delegate explained the situation prior to the meeting as colored by diplomatic incidents: “the U.S. State department phoned the Canadian Foreign Affairs who phoned the Swedish Foreign Ministry…so no, the Moscow meeting did not turn out well” (interview, 141012b). But yet, states did not withdraw from negotiations:

It [Crimea] certainly did not help the process. Quite the contrary […]. But, we still have a process and we managed to keep a dialogue throughout. After all, Russia wanted to commit in the Arctic issues together with the other Arctic states (Negotiator 2).

Therefore, states may not necessarily have trusted Russia per se, but they trusted a certain level of commitment in relation to black carbon and methane. In Moscow, Russia was also confirmed to be supportive of engaging in the TFBCM (Kahn, 2014a), and on a general level, a sense of feeling appeared similar to the following: “[a] good thing in this process was that we all wanted to reach a consensus, and accept consensus” (interview, 150521c). Communicative action in the TFBCM seemed headed toward the values of Arctic cooperation, in addition to concrete values associated with emission reductions.

128 Interviewees give an account of a very long waiting period between meeting number two in Stockholm in December 2013, and meeting number three in Moscow in April 2014, which caused the process to lose momentum. A contributing reason for the long period of time between the meetings was a re-scheduling of meeting sites, where the meeting initially was planned to be held at the American Embassy in Helsinki but had to be cancelled due to Crimea, and instead moved to Moscow. Since neither Canada or the U.S., nor the permanent participants AIA, were present at the Moscow meeting (Two-pager, third meeting Moscow 2014), the following meeting in Helsinki was described as a bit of a re-cap meeting. The decision to boycott carries dramaturgical signs, where the meeting becomes an orchestrated spectacle directed at an audience.

165 Arguing on commitment, sector reductions, and the AC dramaturgy

Negotiations seldom come without arguing, and in the TFBCM it was also expected. Jokingly, a negotiator described it as: “negotiations are not always smooth, and one should not get the picture that it was all angels with their harps, singing” (Interview 151106). After the first meeting in Whitehorse, Canada, two Swedish representatives summed up the process ahead of them, declaring that “a negotiation journey has begun of which the distance to travel is yet unknown” (Markovic and Hannerz, 2013). That hurdles could arise during that journey was a possibility to be counted for (Kahn, 2014a). As previously discussed, arguing did not center on whether emission reductions would receive national support or not. Instead, arguing centered on how to do it, and what to include, things that pertained to the Arctic states’ understanding in relation to their different social and subjective worlds. Predominantly, two things were argued about, with a third added: (1) level of (national) commitment, and (2) how commitment (socially) relates to certain emission-generating sectors. A third (3) reason to argue did sort of manifest itself as an overarching discussion on whether or not there would be a political value – if it would be beneficial to send a political message – of telling the story of the Arctic region as highly cooperative on short-lived climate pollutants.

Arguing on the level of commitment The task force struggled with low expectations in two different ways: how emission reductions should occur practically and be distributed amongst members, and how states viewed others’ anticipated levels of commitment. There was thus a discrepancy between what was needed the Arctic – i.e., reduced emission levels – and the amount of costs that actors were assumed to bear willingly. Subjectively, although Russia was not the only state expected to reveal a resistance to (too demanding) commitments, this state clearly represented ‘the specific’ other. A constant concern was echoing amongst delegations, illustrated in the following: “the biggest and most difficult task was to know whether the Russians were on board” (interview, 141210b). The concern had its origin, at least partly, in past experiences from previous task force(s), experiences that now spilled over into the TFBCM and caused doubts therein, “especially in the beginning, regarding how far a certain state would stretch in order to commit to anything at all’ (interview, 150318c). However, it was not just certain singled out states that dampened expectations on realizable ambitions, but also the Arctic states’ lived realities and their different political positions. One delegate describes the positions as rather locked:

It becomes purely political, where one at the end punches each other’s heads, arguing ‘don’t you understand what I’m saying?’ Norway says ‘let’s do even more!’; Denmark says ‘no we won’t’; and Russia is lying in wait, saying ‘no, we cannot do more than we already do, otherwise we will not be part’ (Negotiator 6).

166 Cooperation in the Arctic Council is cooperation highly respectful of sovereignty, where sovereignty represents a line of appropriateness never to trespass. That each state’s social world impacts on what would be possible to achieve is therefore expected, and that consensus could not be reached on legally binding agreement with specific national emissions would also be in line thereof. Yet, acknowledging this, the TFBCM gave expression for a cooperative strategy where small steps rather than ultimate outcomes were sought – step-by-step expectations on cooperative behavior (i.e.. emission reductions) would be integrated into prescriptions on appropriate AC behavior. To agree on information sharing over borders and to develop emission inventories would not in itself reduce emissions, but as illustrated by the following quote, it is a step on the way:

If you are reporting your pollution levels, you will then have an incentive [small laughter] to reduce those pollution levels. […] I think we knew early on that negotiating a legally binding agreement would not be the right first step for the Arctic Council. It would have been maybe too much too soon, and it could have a lost opportunity to create this very basic but very important reporting function that we now have (Advsier 8).

At the same time, although better information on current emission levels is a solid entry-point to reductions – of knowing reductions to have occurred, practical hurdles (and not just economic or cultural hurdles) still constrain actors’ possibilities to adhere. One gives voice to a social understanding of states entering the field of emission reduction cooperation unequally:

The greater territory you have, the more problems you will have with such things [emission inventories and regulatory reports]. If you have a minor territory with a single source of black carbon, you can easily describe it and you can easily include it in other pictures. But when half of the picture [laughing] is your responsibility, then you are in more trouble than others (Adviser 10).

With different capabilities, territorial sizes, driving forces, and involved stake-holders, an essential divide is found between delegations concerning the type of emission reduction target to aim for. Most countries, including Finland, Norway, and Sweden, strongly advocated the idea of having a quantitative target, where one should agree to a specified figure equivalent to what in percentages should be reduced, for instance, a 50 percent reduction by year x (Two-pager, fifth meeting Iqaluit, 2014). One head of delegation motivates this by reference to the importance of explicit expectations:

167 It was many many years ago that politicians said that nitrogen emissions [from shipping] had to be reduced by 50 percent.129 Scientists thought it was a terrible mistake because we did not know if it would be achievable. But after 30 years, it has been reached. […] It is like a guiding thing. For example, if we have agreed on numbers in international processes – it is not mandatory, it is not binding, but we have still said to obey it – then on the national level, we can justify the means, what we need. In relation to leaking, or this sauna, or whatever we [as states] have. This was the idea: it is good to have numbers if you are trying to achieve something (Negotiator 5).

Some Nordic states even brought up the need for national targets on emission reduction, but such an ambition these states soon had to abandon (interview, 150320). However, also a quantitative target was considered too difficult; not all states had their emission inventories ready, and others saw specified targets as premature – almost arbitrary rather than rationally anchored in reality. “It is great to be talking about a target,” a representative said, “whether it is qualitative or quantitative. But in order for that goal or target to be credible, you’ve got to base it on credible and robust inventories” (interview, 151106). Despite concerns of these kinds, the last meeting still reached a consensus on a “collective quantitative aspirational goal,” although not set to be decided until 2017. The result was described as a pragmatic leveling between those who felt uncomfortable with targets and specified obligations, and those who strongly advocated national actions on emission reductions. In line with what was said above regarding explicit expectations, the result also represented a plan forward: “[w]e have created a vision about a target, and doing that we are pushing politics further although one is not committed to – in concrete terms – do this or that” (interview, 150318c). To have arrived at such a consensus- oriented approach where a target was accepted, was furthermore described to be new compared to previous task force(s):

[T]he dynamic changed, and there were no significant voices going against suggestions on closer cooperation. No vetoes against entering the ‘new room’ […] Nobody was opposed, and that was a new language. That is silence; silence was a new language (Negotiator 1).

That the ‘Arctic majors,’ such as the U.S., Canada, and Russia, employed a greater will to join the Nordic countries in their climate ambitions – and showed a greater flexibility than one would have reason to believe – was understood in the task force as progress. Following Habermas (1984), it is furthermore an illustration of communicative action that is oriented toward enhanced understanding – of each other as well as the cooperative topic. To increase the understanding of each other

129 Referral is made to the Helsinki Convention, which is a regional environmental convention from 1974/1992 for states in the Baltic sea area, cooperating under the supervision of Helcom (Helsinki Commission).

168 would be a driving motivator for all negotiations, explained by one of the participants in the following wording: “the sole basis for each negotiation is to understand the opponent’s wants. Otherwise, negotiations will stand still. Therefore, one has to try to learn why a certain actor is doing a certain thing” (interview, 141209). In the TFBCM, arguing generally led to improved communication between participating actors, which resulted in a better (subjective) understanding of each other. As such, it seems that some of this interaction regarding emission reductions was leading toward greater commitments in cooperation, than initial expectations would have suggested.

Arguing on sector reductions Whereas previous task force(s) had directed light on certain sectors where national emission reductions should occur, the TFBCM passed any such discussions. Instead, it aimed to arrive at more information regarding the levels of Arctic emissions, and agreed on a vision for target reduction. Discussions on national sectors were at this stage, as the Framework Agreement later came to specify, more for the Expert group that followed once the agreement was adopted by the Ministers. Still, in relation to black carbon, in particular, three different arguments were put forward as restraining joint decisions on how to move forward with visions and targets: a lack of statistics, knowledge, and common measurements (on foremost wildfires and gas flaring); the restraining component of cultural habits; and economical costs (through investments). Finland and Sweden, for instance, described their emission task located in cultural habits of wood combustion. A delegate explained how it would be the issue to tackle for the coming five to ten years, while not being without difficulties: “[i]t is a very challenging sector because it goes to peoples,’ somehow, everyday life. And there are strong feelings” (interview, 150521c). For other states, a lack of statistics had an affect, as well as costs associated with the emission reductions. A sector such as oil and gas, for instance, had been brought up by previous task force(s), since it represented the largest source of anthropogenic methane emissions. Through flaring, it also represented a significant source of black carbon particles (task force on SLCF, 2013:5-6). But in the TFBCM, the close relationship between gas flaring and coastal states’ energy production was considered a particularly aggravating economic circumstance for achieving emission reductions:

One should know, some of the major sources relates to the energy system: production, distribution, and of course combustion. But if we think of production, then quite some black carbon emissions stem from flaring. And…this has been a bit difficult. Partly due to us having too little knowledge about these emissions, but also because they are tightly associated with gas extraction (Negotiator 2).

To decrease the usage of flaring as a neutralizer of explosive gas requires energy stakeholders to be involved. And it is furthermore costly: “to reduce flaring would take investments, which are not always welcome” (interview, 160623b). However, in

169 the TFBCM, talk on sectors was – as previously mentioned – redundant. Accounts of the impact from the energy-political field became dichotomous, where energy-politics was understood to have little effect on negotiations because it was left out from discussions. Delegates talked about negotiations that were not concrete enough, where one avoided to speak about who should do what and when, where visions rather than practice were the guiding torch. One head of delegation from a non- littoral state identified oil and gas interests to form a hidden agenda. As something that had an influence on the final paper but without being openly discussed (interview, Negotiator 5). From a social perspective, arriving at emission reductions was thus more difficult than acknowledging it as relevant in relation to the objective world. And yet, if just allowing for time to progress, another delegate explains how gas flaring was a topic that advanced on the agenda: “[i]t is not that anyone has a closed discussion, put the brakes on the task force work [on flaring]. Instead it has now been prioritized as perhaps the most important issue – or at least the first issue to deal with, perhaps not the most important one” (interview, 150623b). The quote signals states to be attentive to environmental norms, even though these go against material interests, as long as they have the time on their side.

Arguing on the AC dramaturgy The common understanding that existed in the TFBCM regarding the relevance of emission reductions (and staying cooperative) indicates a norm internalization to have occurred. Following Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), no state could afford to question the relevance of reducing the emissions from black carbon and methane. Norms were however not internalized to the point where they were taken for granted, which could be linked to a lack of common understanding in the social as well as the subjective world. As such, delegations questioned those ‘speedy conclusions’ that specific environmental entrepreneurs in the TFBCM seemed to represent, in their preferences for far-reaching targets and commitments. Thus, there was no consensus on how to ‘package’ the cooperation on black carbon and methane: should it – as the majority supported – be a political cooperation (and statement), or should it be a cooperation driven by science, where more knowledge was needed in order to see the full picture of pollutants’ cause and effect (Two-pager, first meeting Whitehorse, second meeting Stockholm, 2013)? A quote illustrating one such voice where the process was understood as too political, is the following:

Those who worked with the Arctic were mostly politically focused; they were focused on the political significance of what more we should do to reduce, of the cooperation as such. They were not interested in practical national politics, of having things implemented, and they had not focused on whether it would have a sound effect or co- benefit in other areas. It was just politically isolated, ‘let us have requirements on reductions of black carbon and methane’ (Negotiator 6).

170 To this actor, the TFBCM negotiations did not let science be the prerogative, but rather had politics to act as the normative driver. In the opposite ‘ring corner,’ several other delegations expressed impatience over having to debate and discuss science (and not politics), since this was not the professional role most of them had (interview 150611). Especially those delegations who emphasized a quantitative emission reduction target and viewed themselves as being environmental norm entrepreneurs, interpreted the mandate as an opportunity to push norms closer to environmental protection. In the same token, they deliberately tried to change notions on what to consider as Arctic environmental appropriateness. In that way, the TFBCM shared resemblances with ‘theatrical acts’ of state performances and spectacles that served to manifest political ideas as real, in a convincing manner (see Geertz, 1980). In the same vein, but more inclined toward what would be an imagined audience, the Arctic states made reference to a ‘common understanding’ that was not fully established concerning what to include in the national progress reports and the reviewing thereof, while they instead found it better to highlight the “Arctic story” when it came to emission reductions of black carbon and methane (Two-pager, second meeting Stockholm, 2013). Indeed, interaction in the TFBCM was also ‘orchestrated spectacles’ directed at an external audience outside of the Arctic. Previous task force(s), for instance, had identified black carbon and methane emission reductions to offer the AC an important leadership opportunity, where a “common Arctic voice” could convey and demonstrate to external actors and observer states the importance of Arctic climate protection (Task force SLCF, 2011:10; 2013:13). Arriving at the last task force meeting, a feeling of achievement was described as being present, which also staged an international message of emission reductions: “all delegations were unanimous in underlining the Arctic Council should send a strong political signal [italics added] in the form of an ambitious, politically aspirational collective vision” (Two-pager, sixth meeting Tromsø, 2014). Similarly, to create a solid base where observers could join in beneficially was a high priority for many delegations, in interviews referring to the Arctic as in a symbiotic relation with the rest of the world. At the same time, observers – being there to observe and nothing else – did not have the right to partake in negotiations. With few concrete ‘carrots’ to offer, the last task force meeting was partly devoted to the issue of motivating observer countries to join in: “the door is open and we hope for really good cooperation, but how do we do that and how do we convince others that it is a good thing?” (Interview, 150521c) A start, one could assume, would be to present a consensus-oriented Arctic dramaturgy on emission reductions, where the Arctic states all seemed dedicated to the task.

171 Continuity and change in role performances

Those with the high(est) ambitions did not get to see all of their ambitions be realized in the TFBCM, but they also did not get to see them abandoned: the task force established an institutionalized structure around future emission reductions. This implies that expectations on what would be possible to achieve were somewhat unwarranted low, also summarized by the representative of the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC): the framework ended up “less than we would have hoped for, but more than many expected” (Rosenthal, 2015). It has previously been suggested that a reason for why many delegates had low expectations had to do with the level of resistance – economic, practical, and cultural – that cooperation on emission reductions would expectedly activate. These low expectations also accompanied several delegations after the work of the TFBCM had been completed and handed over to the SAOs, where they expressed doubts on whether the agreement would be signed by the Ministers in the end. However, in the following, it will be argued that a take on expectations as quite low failed to fully consider the impact of alter, and actors’ tendency to also follow role prescriptions. Roles within the TFBCM followed the role pattern as descried in chapter 4. Compared to the TFOPP, states still activated different dimensions of their roles. For instance, whereas Russia was vocal and informative in the TFOPP, they were silent in the TFBCM; whereas Sweden and Finland held low positions in the TFOPP, they were active and outspoken in the TFBCM; whereas Denmark was a kid-brother emphasizing cooperation in the TFOPP, they became the realist who above all searched for pragmatic environmental efficiency in the TFBCM. Furthermore, this time it was not coastal states that acted as the leading nations, but environmental norm entrepreneurs. It is here suggested that those states that were acting as leaders and were vocal about visions, also were those who were the least affected by, or submissive toward, alter and others expectations. In the last part of this chapter, it will be illustrated how role performances have been elaborated in relation to the social context, and those alter expectations found therein in three different ways.

When Me confirms I: the leaders – Norway, Sweden and the U.S.

Norway. In the TFBCM, Norway was a leader who wanted to see a strong agreement, and had farfetched ambitions for the cooperation. An important issue for Norway was to make sure that methane stayed in the agreement. A negotiator from another Nordic country explains how this greenhouse gas was met with resistance: “I understood it was too early. […] They said very clearly, that this is…they can accept black carbon but they cannot accept methane” (interview 150611). Compared to black carbon, a shared understanding on this climate forcer was less obvious, less held

172 in common (interview 150623b). However, with methane being estimated as the second most important greenhouse gas after carbon dioxide, and where the Arctic states were responsible for about 20 percent of global emissions,130 Norway was considered to be in the frontline regarding methane’s inclusion in the agreement, preferably with visions on reductions attached. ‘The focus on methane had though nothing to do with Norway as a petroleum nation,’ Norway jokingly explained. Departing from an understanding of the Norwegian ego, it would however be a truth with modification. Whereas it illustrates Norway to be well familiar with its duality in roles (environmental protector/petroleum nation), Norway as a petroleum nation still gains legitimacy from its environmental pro-active role. Contributing to it being an ‘environmental petroleum nation’ are things such as: a since long ban on routine gas flaring, financial support for the World Bank’s initiative to eliminate routine flaring (amongst others) by 2030, decreased amounts of gas being flared due to security incidents, and decreased levels of methane emission ever since 1990 (Norway’s National Report on Black carbon and Methane, 2015; Government of Norway, 2015a; Carbon Limits, 2014:28-29). To Norway, who has its ego built around both petroleum and environment, taking strong actions within a task force on short-lived climate pollutants is in line with how I would act. The fact that the rest of the TFBCM participants also recognized Norway as such an active and progressive environmental leader is then of great importance. It was also what happened in the task force where interaction gave rise to a Norwegian social Me, boosting its ego role conception further. Sweden. The TFBCM discussed issues that Sweden knows well from before. Therefore, everyone participating expected environmental entrepreneurs to push the agenda, providing Sweden with the mandate to express – and confirm – its role of being a teacher as well as a leader. Nationally, Sweden had come far regarding emission inventories, as well as real cuts in emissions of black carbon and methane (Sweden’s National report on Black Carbon and Methane, 2015; interviews), which is why it considered itself to be able to act as a trustworthy teacher. What is more, Sweden also felt that others had expectations of them to take on such a role:

There were expectations on us leading and pushing the process forward, absolutely. But there were times where we moderated to let others – or to get others… the negotiation dynamic will not be good if one is pushing too hard. There must be a possibility for reaching an agreement as well (Swedish delegate, 2015).

130 Norway, here, foremost highlighted the high share of methane emissions within the oil and gas sector, where the potential for reductions was embedded within things such as upgraded equipment and changes in operational practices. Engines, compressors, pipelines, storage tanks, wells, etcetera are examples of those components listed as relevant mitigation measures (Task force on SLCF, 2013:7).

173 That a small, otherwise often silent, non-coastal state like Sweden took on a leadership role in the TFBCM was still in line with role continuity, and not change. Climate change, and not least short-lived climate pollutants, is an area where Sweden has good national command and also an international reputation. When Me senses a demand for teaching, then I does boost. “Some countries were in better shape,” a delegate recalled, continuing: “I remember Sweden was pretty – how to say – aggressive and ready for many things” (interview, 151222). In the TFBCM, it was not only that others expected Sweden to lead and push, but that the TFBCM mandate called for progression on short-lived climate pollutants. To take on the lead and be in the forefront regarding emission commitments would therefore be highly appropriate given the interactive structure, and in line with Sweden’s role conception. Indeed, together with Norway, Sweden was described as a “very vocal participant” (interview, 151106). That there is a cohesion in expectations between ego and alter, between I and Me is important for Sweden when attempting to exert social power, since it provides a social context ready for a teacher and ready for norm entrepreneurial behavior. Thus, neither Sweden nor Norway had to adapt their role performance, in terms of a leveling between ego and alter, since these rather had each other confirmed. USA. The United States also confirmed ego through alter, I through Me. In chapter 4, it was discussed how the U.S. was more of an innate leader than an ‘Arctic’ leader with clear Arctic goals and interests set out. The first half of its AC membership was carried out a bit reluctantly, which also included climate change work in general and ACIA in particular, which for long was held in contingency (Nilsson, 2007; Nord, 2016a). Then, however, from 2009 and onwards, the U.S. revealed a change in attitude toward the AC cooperation, where its cooperation through the AC was understood as key to responding to the Arctic challenges (Byers, 2013:155; Pedersen, 2012). Such challenges included the climate, and the change in attitude was timely related to becoming a leading actor within the area of short-lived climate pollutants. Within the TFBCM, a delegate describes the U.S. role as being both an innate leader, as well as climate aware:

[A state that was] very active, which also put a lot of resources in work, was the U.S. Its delegation was very good, also in developing the document toward a good aim and end. They were listening closely to what the other countries wanted to express, and they came up with constructive solutions to the text, which incorporated those aspects (Adviser 7).

However, some noticed the activity level to increase after negotiations had continued for a while, making the role pattern in the TFBCM similar to the bigger AC role pattern, where it moves from innate leader on to issue-specific leader. A delegate describes how one had been ready to give up on quantitative targets due to tough discussions with the U.S., when the country changed position: “they could agree to

174 quantitative targets of some kind. From having opposed such a discussion, they became a leading actor in the same discussion” (interview 150320). Others did not pay attention to a change in the U.S. behavior, but to a leadership based upon its previous co-chairing of the task force(s) on short-lived climate pollutants (2009- 2013), and its good scientific expertise. The fact that the U.S. was next concerning the Arctic chairmanship, in 2015, was understood to further spur leadership ambitions. References were made to the U.S. as realizing as well as planning to administer cooperation on short-lived climate pollutants during its chairmanship, keen on arriving at some good solutions to present when hosting the Ministerial meeting in 2017. Delegates also noticed the U.S. as displaying a new level of climate commitments in its international politics outside of the Arctic (interview 141210b; 150318c; 150320). It could be argued that for a state keen on acting as an innate leader, to not push hard for an agreement on emission reductions on black carbon was not what characterized an Arctic leader. For the U.S., it seems like its ego I – which views itself as a leader – had to meet its alter Me who directed light on to environmental norms, expressed as prescriptions on how a true Arctic leader should act. In that sense, I was confirmed by adhering to Me.

A problematic situation allowing for Denmark’s I to decide

The Danish AC role is similar to a kid-brother realist. However, due to Denmark’s good track record regarding climate change and airborne pollutants, there was no need to include the ‘kid-brother’ in the TFBCM. ‘Realist’ was though part of the performance, which mostly was derived from ego role conceptions: in the TFBCM, Denmark chose to disregard much of the alter expectations, since these were believed to move the TFBCM process in the wrong direction – a direction that would not generate the most efficient and high quantities of emission reductions. As such, the role performance of Denmark resembles an agent-driven behavior, where actors are less keen on letting others exercise influence over the chosen behavior. A reason could be found in Denmark’s ego expectations, which rely on environmental pro-activeness, not least in climate issues, and provides Denmark with confidence – a confidence in knowing that others also view Denmark in such a way. To activate its pragmatic reasoning and behavior, in that sense, did not violate Denmark’s (or others’) understanding of the state as caring for the Arctic environment. Instead, in interviews with others, the state was described similar to the following: ‘dedicated to matters of fact, not visionary but keen on arriving at a good agreement that would make a difference.’ Denmark was concerned over climate efficiency: was there not a risk that the TFBCM would duplicate already established regimes such as LRTAP – Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, and did the Arctic states really know all there was to know about black carbon and how it behaves when transported over long and short

175 distances alike? It also expressed concerns over the risk for free-riding, and an analysis that is flawed regarding what emission reductions targets would do for each state’s competitive advantage. As such, Denmark did not appreciate the political take on the TFBCM, which failed to keep in mind efficient emission reductions and what emission reductions would mean, in terms of (economical/practical) consequences for each state, but would have preferred a more science-oriented take. These concerns could all be connected to the Danish role of chairing environmental protection and climate work, while also keeping sovereignty and integrity high on the agenda. In relation to climate change, the Danish perspective would therefore be that of achieving as much of global emission cuts as possible, to as high efficiency as possible. The fact that not all of the Arctic states were expected to contribute with emission reductions was thus considered problematic. This could explain why national targets were not a viable option, not included in the Danish mandate. It could also provide some understanding on Denmark’s reluctance to high ambition levels on methane reductions, as advocated for by Norway, for instance. For a state that has done a lot on climate change and expects to achieve considerably higher percentages of emission reductions than the EU average (Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate, 2018), further targets on methane emissions was explained by the Danish delegation to have little left to target than agriculture, and then more precisely, a reduction in livestock – the number of cows. The absolute vast majority of methane emissions in Denmark stem from agriculture and cattle; furthermore, Denmark expects an increase in animals for the years to come (Denmark’s National Report on Black Carbon and Methane Emissions, 2015:9). At the same time, Denmark is already working, according to an EU regulation, to achieve a 40 percent reduction in emissions from agriculture by 2030 (Hansen, 2016). To an agricultural nation like Denmark, the cultural and economic value that is protected through having livestock preserved would be considerable. Illustrative, research is carried out on emission reduction efficiency, to develop a grass that would cause cows less belching when having it digested (BBC, 161011). Thus, whereas other environmentally proactive states, to some extent, had their hopes high on Denmark joining the Nordic states in their attempts to reach ambitious targets, the Danish position proved impervious to any such expectations, despite ‘matey’ appeals of acting as supportive, or an expressed surprise over what was considered a Danish retrogressive behavior (interviews 150318c; 150611; 150612). Denmark’s immunity to alter expectations could here be understood in relation to its quite positive track record concerning climate commitment, where its genuine interest in improved emission situation for the Arctic was also understood to be known by others. Denmark’s social Me was therefore less concerned with prescriptions on environmental norms, and more devoted to its role character of being pragmatic and a realist. The Danish environmental conscious is – one could assume – considered to be clean and expected to be recognized by others, which is why Denmark could take on a more pragmatic role in the TFBCM, centered on

176 efficiency and (national) fairness, without having to risk their credibility becoming lost to the climate issue per se.

Feeling misunderstood? Two territorial giants reconsidered

Both Canada and Russia, the two states with the biggest territory to monitor, were viewed as dragging their feet a bit, whose level of commitment was unsure, and who seemed to find support in each other. ‘It was often that Russia voiced its opinion in favor of Canadian arguments’ a delegate said, ‘although it felt unscripted’ (interview, 141210b). However, as participants in the TFBCM, they were not immune from alter expectations revealing them as being less committed. Rather, they gave evidence for quite some concern thereof, suggesting I to be glanced through Me, revealing the importance of being considered a cooperative Arctic state. Canada. As shown in chapter 4, the ego-part of the Canadian role conception includes two dimensions pertaining to protection: safeguarding the region through value-laden stewardship, and ensuring self-determination in order to stand firm against external pressure on sovereignty. These two components also echoed when France Jacovella (see interview on the AC web), Co-Chair of the TFBCM, in content wording declared the TFBCM result to be a result with which they were pleased:

The Task Force’s outcome signals the commitment of the Arctic Council to lead in taking enhanced action to reduce emissions of black carbon and methane within its borders. At the same time, the Task Force signals that cooperation with partners outside of the Arctic region, including contributions by Arctic Council Observers, will be essential to tackle the issue effectively and reduce the impact on the Arctic and its peoples of black carbon and methane that is emitted beyond the borders of Arctic States (F. Jacovella, Canada, Co-chair TFBCM, 2015).

Through the work conducted by the TFBCM, the AC signals to take the lead: i.e., Canada is acting as a steward protecting the region. Canada foresaw a document that would make a difference for communities on the ground, relevant from both a health perspective and an environmental perspective, and something that would be more than a report sitting on the shelf. The work on short-lived climate pollutants was declared a highly prioritized work for Canada and its government, an exciting task and a chance to come up with concrete measures that would benefit the North (Two- pager, first meeting Whitehorse, 2013; interviews). And yet, this was not how other delegations understood the Canadian role performance; they rather saw a not very active state that attempted to resist. Responding to a question on whether Canada could notice any expectations from others regarding how to act, the answer touched upon a role conflict:

177 We have always played a strong role in the Arctic Council initiatives. And whatever others might think of Canada in the climate change world, that is a different story. This initiative is not Canada negotiating global climate change. It is initiated by Canada being engaged in what we can do regionally through the Arctic Council to move the issue of short-lived climate pollutants along (date 151106).

Canada here seems to wrestle with others’ expectations of the Canadian role, expectations they frame as misunderstandings. Canada is keen to separate its international climate behavior from the Arctic stewardship behavior on short-lived climate pollutants, which is described to be ‘something else’. Regarding the latter, Canada explains how the country has always been very supportive of the ACs work on short-lived climate pollutants. What the quote above illustrates therefore seems be an attempt by Canada to get others’ expectations to move beyond perceptions of Canadian role performance on climate change and look to the bigger stewardship picture: global climate change negotiations (and for instance Canadian withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol) is only a small fraction of social and environmental acts carried out by Canada, and in the AC context Canada rather has a history – for others to see – of strong AC commitment. However, if Canada identified misunderstanding in alter expectations, they could expect I to respond in some way trying to create a more linear relationship between I and Me, where Canada would prove expectations wrong. Rhetorically, at the Ministerial level, this is what happened, where Canada described the Framework Agreement as a document to support the Arctic states to move forward on emission reductions, and where the Canadian chairmanship showed leadership (Ministerial statement by Canada, 2015). However, within the TFBCM process as such, there are no clear indications from the interactions that this happened. Instead, interviewees give an account of Canada acting a bit retrogressively, whose comments were picked up upon by Russia, and who did not distinguish itself as environmentally proactive. “I don’t know their reason for why they were trying to make this agreement so weak,” a delegate expressed (interview, 150611). Although it could not be ruled out that these understandings are colored by Canadian role performances in global climate settings, the TFBCM took place in a context of Canadian AC chairmanship that – although successful in other areas – received criticism for its low priority of environmental issues, as well as its hard line with Russia (Exner-Pirot, 2016). The appointed Chair, Leona Aglukkaq, also created some headlines when she, prior to the chairmanship period, proclaimed Arctic warming – although clarifications were made later – as debatable (Canada.com, 131003). Therefore, it could be that the role conflict identified in the TFBCM was not only manifested in others expectations, but, even more troublesome, was located in the Canadian I. Thus, although Canada is keen to be understood as a cooperator, and reacts toward alter expectations, incoherence in ego role conceptions makes it difficult to find solutions to please them all.

178 Russia. Amongst the different states, Russia would be explained as the one to cause the highest degree of uncertainty regarding commitment. It would also be the state giving rise to most diverging understandings: ‘Russia did their best,’ one delegate said and attached positive connotations thereof; ‘Russia is lying await,’ another one stated ‘ready to withdraw should anything be too demanding, too concrete.’ ‘Russia is silent,’ a third perspective went, interpreting a lack of thematic interest and poor political anchoring; and “Russia is silent!’ a fourth perspective noted, referring to a new negotiation climate of (normative) acceptance and political willingness. The fact that the state did not participate in the first scoping session, where expectations and perspectives on the process to come was ventilated (Two-pager, first meeting Whitehorse, 2013), did not help to provide more information on what to expect from Russia. “To negotiate with Russia is always difficult,” a delegate with long AC experience mentioned (interview 141210a). What all this indicates is a lack of understanding, and perhaps foremost a lack of subjective trust regarding the Russian character. The same interviewee who described negotiations with Russia to be difficult, refers this to a different type of culture: a culture to some extent linked to a negotiation style, but also understandings of Russia’s interests and behavior in the Arctic, where a lion share of the AC projects has furthermore been dedicated to clean-up on Russian territory (ibid.). At the same time, large-scale pollution has continued, for instance, through industries and pipes of low standard (Blokov, 2011; Greenpeace, 2017; WWF, 2014). In that sense, others’ environmental expectations were low. As the TFBCM process went on, expectations did however go up:

Russia was less prepared for this issue than other countries. They do not have an emission inventory yet. As a result, they have been more hesitant than others to commit. …Even committing to the idea of submitting a national inventory was not an easy decision for them. But they have come around, and I think they do want to be constructive, so I’m optimistic (Adviser 8).

Retrospectively, one could establish the Russian role in the TFBCM to be a low voice performance, who for sure pushed the brakes by cherishing ‘thoughtfulness’ and reminding others of the importance of having science to support any actions. But it also was subjected to political boycotts, while it yet signed the agreement and also promptly handed the national inventory report in, as requested in the Framework Agreement. If Russia itself would provide an answer on why it was doing all this, the answer would be self-explanatory: “had the topic not been important to Russia, we would not have participated in this” (Russian delegate, 2015). If we accept this account, and consider Russia as being convinced of the good that would result in the Arctic should short-lived climate pollutants be reduced, others’ expectations would seem to have turned out – at least partly – wrong. They were wrong because they either failed to account for a change in attitude regarding Russia’s

179 perceived value of emission reductions, or because they miscalculated Russia’s willingness to adapt to the interactive structure; most likely both. One interpretation of Russia’s TFBCM behavior could rely on socialization and adaptive learning: the state has come to learn AC appropriateness to linger on consensus reaching as the only viable result, especially if one wishes to be viewed as a proper Arctic state. That Russia has a social Me that does not want to be too impossible to deal with, is manifested in the strategy used by others, i.e., ‘having everyone participate in order to get Russia to join’ (interview, 150612). As such, Russia is not immune to alter expectations, although it takes everyone else to contribute first. But it is yet a state that is somewhat accommodative, someone who could be persuaded and who also follows the consensus. One could assume Russia, just like the other states, to care for its reputation. Such caring is manifested in the open structure of the agreement, that is encouraging everyone to join, which one delegate explains in the following:

[It will be] no Kyoto, and no one who should be able to say you have not fulfilled your obligations! But within those limits, one can yet create something more active than wishful thinking on doing the best we can (Negotiator 1).

Russia is a storyteller. Someone who wants to write the manuscript by presenting images of a grand Arctic state or a grand Arctic cooperation, and who acts as an active informant on national undertakings. Despite this, the not so vocal way that Russia acted in the TFBCM still fitted the picture: with a task force process described as revealing silence as a new language, then a lowered voice becomes an expression for Me in a context where I have no clear informative role or national story to tell. It becomes the language of the ‘black sheep’ who battles with negative alter expectations, but whose ego still expects of itself to prove to be a cooperative Arctic state. For a state with major Arctic ambitions, one cannot afford losing respectability by failing an issue described as fateful to the Arctic future. For that reason, it may be that Russia, as the only state, uses the Ministerial meeting as a platform to inform about its national undertakings of preparing an emission inventory report, which it announces to be “part of fulfilling its international commitment under the Arctic Council” (Ministerial statement by Russia, 2015). Although a change in words from ‘do not want to commit’ to ‘is afraid to fail’ does not render states like Russia more willing to accept national emission reduction targets, it could show such a state as being susceptible toward social interaction and alter expectations. It would suggest that others’ low expectations on Russia, mainly departing from prior experiences and material costs associated with emission reductions, did not fully consider the impact of interaction on state positions. Following this, a suggestion is that states acting more retrogressively in the TFBCM possibly are more considerate to alter expectations and interactive structures prescribing the behavior of ‘a good cooperator,’ than would apply to climate proactive states. These latter states can afford a gamble on ambitious reduction targets since

180 their role conception would not be forsaken should a failure occur: they would still be in the climate front lead. For states being less proactive, a failure would potentially threaten their role conception in such a way that they would be confirmed as bad cooperators, i.e., as ‘bad Arctic states,’ a price possibly too high to pay.

Conclusion: a process attentive to climate prescriptions

The heading of this chapter was ‘high ambitions, lower expectations.’ Low expectations could perhaps even better be explained as careful expectations: states shared a high ambition for Arctic emission reductions, but did not want to put their hopes up too high. With the result in hand, although still knowing little about the situation for actual emission cuts, all of the Arctic states have felt morally obliged to deliver, as requested by the Framework Agreement. A first deliverance has been to send in national emission inventories to the Expert group that was created through the TFBCM, followed by national reports on emissions and measures (Framework, Agreement 2015). In Fairbanks 2017, the Expert group delivered its recommendations to the Ministers, where the Arctic states were recommended to collectively lower their black carbon emissions by at least 25-33 percent below 2013 levels by 2025 (Expert group on Black Carbon and Methane, 2017:5). This collective goal has been adopted, sealed by Ministers in the Fairbanks Declaration (2017). In relation to methane, the Expert group recommended reduced emissions in oil and gas production (as well as waste disposal), and explicitly mentioned the need to stop routine gas flaring. Actually, all Arctic petroleum nations have now ratified the World Bank routine flaring initiative, furthermore, revealing some progress on the matter. The interactive structure in the TFBCM was one that allowed for resistance: state capabilities, resources, and national material interests were expected to constrain the outcome. It was however also a structure that had to cope with the change that socialization brought afore: any state serious about its Arctic commitment had to recognize short-lived climate pollutants as a threat toward the Arctic. One could question bits and pieces – hence, much of the TFBCM arguing – but one could not question the overall scientific message about these pollutants being bad for the Arctic climate as well as people’s health.131 With all of the Arctic states’ roles being constructed around a notion of, in different ways, protecting and promoting themselves as Arctic nations, any such role conception relies on their ability to reach

131 Since then, working groups such as the ACAP and AMAP has added even more scientific input. For instance, AMAP has finalized its 2015 Assessments of Short-lived Climate Pollutants, consisting of altogether three reports, on respectively, methane, black carbon, and ozone; moreover, ACAP has finalized a report on black carbon emission from residential wood combustion (2015). Since the TFBCM, the normative structure prescribing actions on emission reductions should thus – if anything – have grown stronger in its behavioral prescriptions.

181 out to others. Only by joining in with other Arctic nations can they construct a region over which they possess ownership, reap the benefits from, and not least, view themselves as Arctic. This chapter has, just like the previous chapter did, pointed toward alter to matter, i.e., others as mattering. Others matter since social interaction carries incentives for the Arctic states to preserve their ego as Arctic. To do as Nordic countries, like Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and politically pushing for a quantitative and visionary target could therefore be a way to speed things up. Ambitions – although not scientifically approved yet – become part of the interactive structure, part of the theatrical setting if one may, in such a way that others make their acquaintance. The possibility for socialization to occur then arises, changing expectations on what type of behavior could be demanded from a state claiming to be not just any state, but an Arctic state. This chapter has also discussed how it may be that those states who are perceived as less environmentally proactive, are not immune to such alter expectations.

182 7. Conclusion

This thesis has had an interest in learning. Primarily, it has been focused on contributing with an understanding of the process of norm internalization. As part of this, an ambition has been to add knowledge on ‘international learning’ (Knopf, 2003), the equivalent of when norms not only are subjectively internalized but shared across actors and territorial borders. Following the ‘life cycles of norms’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), this thesis has especially had an interest in the stage prior to that of norm internalization; the stage when norms are cascaded in search for a general acceptance. Chapters 5 and 6 offered a micro perspective on negotiations, where negotiations on oil spill prevention respectively, a reduction on black carbon and methane were investigated. Arguing, as a social and betweenwhiles consensus oriented mechanism (Risse, 2000, 2004), has here acted as a revelator of the degree to which socialization has led to an acceptance of norms, whereas ego and alter learning has shed light on how such a learning process may come about. In order to operationalize learning, this thesis has utilized Arctic states’ roles and role performances (Holsti, 1970; Walker 1992 (in Thies, 2010b); 2013; Harnisch, 2011a; Harnisch, 2015). It has viewed such performances as a combined result of states’ ego and alter expectations, approaching states as not only driven by material interests or strategic power political reasoning, but as actors being attentive to their social context. Components such as role conceptions and role prescriptions are designed to capture an understanding of a state’s Self, impacted by, and leveled against, social surrounding. The bulk of attention has been directed toward the meeting and interplay between opposing forces, like expectations, norms and ideas, that are revealed by interaction. When these forces meet, ego and alter expectations may collide, giving rise to a behavior that is fitted to the specific context of interaction. That is, collisions could result in learning. On the theoretical level, collision is tracked to ego as representing behavioral continuity, and alter as representing change. On the empirical level, energy interests are representing resistance, and environmental protection change. Ego conceptions would be for change what energy interests are for environmental protection – something that attempts to resist, anchored as it is in conventional knowledge. And yet, sometimes it loses its grip. The task for this conclusive chapter is to provide for an understanding of how – and to some extent why – change occurs. The first and main part is theoretically focused and suggests roles and learning to be in an intricate relationship of mutuality,

183 where role conceptions attempt to stay preserved while adapting to the context. The second part is more empirically oriented in its ambition to – tentatively – discuss normative learning in relation to fossil energy interests and climate change mitigation. The last part of this chapter and book will provide a few suggestions directed to practitioners involved in Arctic environmental cooperation, as well as some general notes on the Arctic Council’s environmental prospective-ness into the future.

Roles and their uncovering potential for learning

In chapter 3, Martha Finnemore was referenced as saying, “states do not always know what they want” (1996:128). It is a theoretical assumption that presupposes that a state’s want is – sometimes – intangible. At the same time, states in social interaction quickly take on a specific position: the social context adds information, structures, and expectations in such a way that a state’s ‘want’ moves toward tangibility, where it is relational social complexities and layers of understandings. One of the participants interviewed for this thesis described that the distance between actors decreased as understanding increased:

[after some negotiation], there is improved understanding. Not that one is adjusting to each other, that one is more faithful to the process than the country…Sometimes one may think that is the case, but no. No, it is about understanding, improved understanding of each others’ arguments (date 141209).

This actor confirms the theoretical approach taken in this study, where understanding (partly) is a result of social interaction. However, according to the perspective put forward here, the same participants seem to separate a wish for staying loyal to its own country, and the potential impact from social interaction. The theoretical perspective that has been applied throughout this thesis has rather been that any decision faithful to the country needs to take into account ‘the rules governing the game,’ that is, social interaction. ‘How will my state be affected if doing A, B, or C’, is a question whose answer takes alter expectations into account: in a process like a negotiation, alter expectations are by necessity always involved should ego – and its wants – be truly elucidated. The notion that negotiating states stay loyal to the norm on sovereignty adheres to what Müller (2004:416) describes to be a benchmark within interactive logics: it is ‘appropriate to pursue self-interest.’ However, Müller also concurs this ad hoc relationship between appropriateness and self-interest to change should it collide with a valid [emphasis added] norm that prescribes behavior differently (ibid.). The empirical investigations in this thesis, conducted in chapters 4, 5, and 6, have in particular found one such collision to be precipitated by a strong norm on

184 cooperation, acted upon as valid by the Arctic states. Therefore, and to go back to the quote by the co-chair, remaining loyal to one’s own country can therefore not be separated, or different from, an improved understanding that comes from social re- evaluations. Theoretically, movement and progression have throughout this book been approached as forces manifested in role playing. This thesis suggests roles to have an empirical bearing on Arctic environmental cooperation, and that states filter norms against their role conceptions in search for appropriate behavior. The theoretical conclusions to be discussed next are as follows: first, roles are stable but flexible. Secondly, understanding activates the flexible dimensions within the roles. And thirdly, states cannot learn in a speedier and more thorough manner than the role allows for flexing. This tripartite suggestion will together shed light on how learning is expressed as a role flexibility, where flexibility becomes a mean for ego- and alter expectations to handle tensions between, on the one hand, norms and structures pushing for change, and on the other hand, actors’ preferences for continuity.

Roles are stable, but flexible

The finding that roles are stable is in line with how Stephen G. Walker in chapter 3 described roles to be “repertories of behavior” (1992, cited in Thies, 2010: 6336), that is, something that includes continuity, performing the role as rehearsed. In chapter 4, the meso-level investigation of Arctic states also confirmed stability in their behavioral repertories. Changes were not so large as would be warranted to talk about states adopting a new role in the AC interaction, i.e., to significantly change their role sets and behavioral characteristics. Rather, the Arctic states seem to have adapted their role performance to a context that is under constant development, in turn, spurring the development of new role strategies of those interacting. For instance, Norway’s leadership has become more restless with less listening as its know-how has been confirmed and its wish to see results – both environmentally and energy extraction wise; Russia’s (sovereignty based) informative component has been toned down as Arctic cooperation has moved into a period of more political insecurity; and Finland is keen on taking responsibility but, contrary to the – in comparison quite unpolitical – beginning, no more as a leader. These are all role performance modifications that signal adaptive learning to have occurred: the context has changed, and actors have adjusted their behavior – strategies – in order to make the most out of the situation and in relation to respective (ego) role conception. However, at the same time, the AC has moved from (only) normative decision- shaping and political awareness-raising, to more political decision-making and increased Arctic governance. Role prescriptions, therefore, involve a larger element of norms on cooperation and the adherence to common rules, implicit but also increasingly explicit ones. In addition, the Arctic states have also been introduced to,

185 aware of, and socialized to different environmental issues such as Arctic warming, oil spill prevention, and resilience, to mention a few. As such, a normative learning could not be ruled out to have an impact as well on the way that the Arctic Council has developed, and the Arctic states’ role performances specifically. For instance, the fact that the U.S. has started to become a leader on short-lived climate pollutants could be all about strategic reasoning on what was perceived to be requested out of a great leader, but it could also have elements involved that concern the accredited value of the norm itself. This goes for much of the AC cooperation and states’ role performances, although the degree to which specific Arctic states has transformed norms into personal beliefs, made environmental protection as part of themselves, most certainly is variable. ‘That roles are stable’ is a finding that Sebastian Harnisch captures through the somewhat parallel and yet intertwined process of norm development and role stability, by describing roles as social positions that are “constituted by ego- and alter- expectation regarding the purpose [italics added] of an actor in an organized group” (Harnisch, 2015:5). As context changes, actors may have to change their behavior should the purpose – its role characteristics expressed as social position – be kept intact. An even more central finding of this thesis, therefore, is that although roles are stable, they are flexible. This thesis suggests that being able to flex the role is an expression for all states and actors wanting to have their role (social position) preserved in accordance with role (ego) conceptions. The argument brought forward is the need of a micro-perspective when studying learning, in order to catch cognitive processes. Because, whereas behavior would be sufficient to study as a role performance, understanding of learning processes grows from what is considered an appropriate synopsis of ego role conceptions and alter role prescriptions alike. The observation of a state behaving in a certain way, similar or different in a new or changed context, is not sufficient to provide for an understanding of how this behavior came to represent that state. To capture those cognitive deliberations generally associated with learning, the interesting thing is not to depart from what the eye can see, but which beliefs are held. George Herbert Mead (1925; 1933) offered a social-psychological perspective on the mind, which was added to social interaction and role playing in chapters 5 and 6. This micro-perspective shed light on reflections, which type of appropriateness delegates considered as governing the social context, and how they interpreted their own role in a relational manner, suggestive of roles representing ‘social positions’ as identified by Harnisch (2011a; 2015). The micro-level investigation conducted in chapters 5 and 6 supports the assumptions on alter and others’ expectations to have an impact on role-taking. The role-suit that dress a state is big to wear. The most telling example of the role repertoire as encompassing multiple dimensions becomes visible when comparing the Arctic state’s AC role patterns with role behavior outside of the Arctic. Internationally, the U.S. and Russia are described as suffering from ‘irreconcilable differences,’ something that renders cooperation and mutual understanding difficult

186 (Carlsson and Winnerstig, 2016). Likewise, the EU and other Western states condemn a Russia who not only acts in militarily aggressive manner, is disrespectful of territorial borders or airspace, but who also is viewed as politically dishonest by infiltrating national election campaigns (European Council, 2018; U.S. Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2017). The Nordic states, furthermore, are generally all small states who gain in size through normative entrepreneurship (Ingebritsen, 2002; Magnúsdottir and Thorhallsson, 2011). In the Arctic Council, roles differ somewhat: small states become ‘big’; big become ‘small’; and ‘enemies’ become allies. That the Arctic is unique, in terms of bringing forward cooperativeness among actors that are not always acting cooperatively, has since before been referred to by the attempt of the AC to cultivate common interests (Heininen and Nicol, 2013; Heininen, 2015; Albert and Vasilache, 2017). Arctic kinship, be it materially or normatively informed, seems to shrink the role suit considerably to make it fit a region of mutual interests and concerns. However, that the Arctic states share an interest of cooperation does not spare roles from conflicts and tensions. Chapters 5 and 6 revealed how role prescriptions and alter expectations could activate the flexibility within roles. In the TFOPP, states that were materially and territorially big acted as leaders, raised their voices, and had their role performances to reflect upon them having ‘claims’ in the Arctic; territorial or resource wise. To act, for instance, like the Responsive informant, Protector, and Know-how leader in this setting pertained to sovereignty, and to oil extraction and maritime transport. The ‘meeting dramaturgy’ dictated what would be possible to say and by whom (Campbell et al., 2014), in such a way that the rules of the game – role prescriptions – left non-littoral states to play a less visible role: to be a Reserved team- player like Finland, or Teacher on demand like Sweden, in the TFOPP context signifying keeping a low profile, to for sure providing guidance and expertise when requested, but without going against the prescription on respect for (littoral states’) sovereignty. In the TFBCM, a somewhat different behavior was prescribed, which increased the demand for action and made it possible for Sweden ‘to grow’ and act like a progressive teacher. Norway and the U.S., furthermore, tilted their leadership to fit this issue, where they could provide the know-how and scientific leadership in a confident manner; Canada protected its inhabitants against unfair distribution of commitments; and Russia had little to inform on regarding environmental progress and thus remained silent. Whereas Canada and Russia had voiced political disparity in the TFOPP, the topic discussed in the TFBCM had them consigned into something close to understanding. Role incoherence could also activate role flexibility by deriving from what in this thesis has been referred to as I, or ‘ego.’ Norway, for instance, faced un TFOPP difficulties when the ‘environmental I’ was targeted by others’ expectations and yielded in, despite the fact that the prescribed behavior on preventive oil spill know- how had made it sufficient to keep focus on the Norwegian I of being a knowledgeable energy and maritime actor. But one did so because both of these I’s –

187 environmental protector and resource extractor– are part of the Self, and here collided. States like Canada, Denmark, and Russia also all dedicated their efforts at trying to strike the correct balance between being a good cooperator while still protecting sovereignty and ensuring security for the inhabitants. Role flexibility, therefore, is a means of social response.

Understanding – the mechanism activating role-flexing

A central argument put forward in this thesis is that role performance is a reflective process centered on understanding. Environmental cooperation in the AC has been aligned in two different dimensions of understanding: one on ‘cooperation,’ and one on ‘environment.’ The latter has more room for interpretation, and therefore causes more arguing, less stringency in prescriptions. To have them separated, to the extent possible, adds information on learning processes, by providing input on how states understand – and possibly flex – their roles.

A common understanding oriented at cooperation Chapters 5 and 6 illustrated how consensus reaching guided relations, for instance, through accounts such as: ‘everybody was trying to find solutions rather than confrontations’; ‘[it pushed Arctic relations] the understanding of us having something peaceful and unique’; and ‘with four years of work behind us, we were many who thought it was time to progress.’ Even when the incident in Crimea deteriorated the relations, when boycotting occurred and the negotiation climate went worsened, states stayed committed to reaching a consensus. “Gradually, it became more important to get an agreement, than what, de facto, was in it,” a TFOPP participant explained. For sovereign states, with strong interests in the Arctic, strategic action should not be excluded as the driver for cooperation. Acknowledging that, however, does not mean to preclude any other interactive logics to guide cooperation and negotiations in the AC. Rather, ‘to get an agreement’ is an interactive objective that describes negation to prioritize the act of reaching an understanding. In that sense, it profoundly differs from strategic action in its recognition of social interaction to have an impact. This thesis suggests that some of this understanding-reaching was oriented toward a common understanding on the norms of cooperation. In chapter 3, Harald Müller (2011) depicted the likelihood of communicative action as a graph [figure 4]: the thicker the institutional environment and the more moral entrepreneurs that are present, the more salient communicative action would be, and vice versa. In the Arctic Council, as outside, several states are acting like moral entrepreneurs. Other actors, however, are not. In the Arctic Council, some policy- making has been accounted for, and three agreements provided with legally committed substance, but the institutional structure cannot be defined as thick. Yet, the empirical investigations done in chapters 4, 5, and 6 have revealed eight states –

188 or eight roles – to care for cooperation. Also, states not actively taking on roles as norm entrepreneurs enshrine cooperativeness. A reason could be that implicit rules, rather than explicit ones, are significantly thicker to their character. “It is an equal process,” a Scandinavian delegate explained, “everyone is acting concessively for the sake of the greater task.” The greater task would be cooperation, since Arctic interest, normative as well as material, requires this to become materialized. “To reach an agreement in the AC is an easier forum, more common interests between these states,” another delegate concluded, comparing the AC to other international forums. Yet, although communicative action has been oriented toward a common understanding of the benefits of having cooperation guide relation, cooperation has not reached a stage where it is completely self-explanatory. In the TFBCM, one had doubts the whole way through regarding states’ true level of commitment. In the TFOPP, one identified itself against specific actors (i.e., Russia). The understanding of ‘rogues’ being part of the process has therefore been constraining cooperation, questioning the sincerity of the actors involved.

Settling the discourse on ‘environment’ In the introductory chapter of this book, it was discussed how the Arctic future would be seen without predestination: as subordinated politics rather than scientific findings, and where actors fight over getting to determine its outcome (Wormbs and Sörlin, 2013). The environment, and thereto threats to one’s belonging, is provided with values through political understandings on ‘what goes.’ Oil spills and short-lived climate pollutants illustrate such understandings to be manifested as well as constituted in the arguing processes. In the TFBCM, actors managed to get a consensus quite far – one framed the environmental problem and its solutions more in detail, despite a quite high level of uncertainty regarding others’ sincerity to commit. TFOPP, on the other hand, had lower ambitions while relations generally were described as good. It is suggested that the difference between the TFOPP and the TFBCM, to a high extent, depends on the latter being willing to introduce ego in the discussions – the social reality of each state – allowing for more resistance but also for more opportunities to change. ‘Communicative rationality’ (Habermas, 1984) refers to understandings of knowledge as sprung from a trisected validation process in relation to the objective, social, and subjective world. The constellation of validation defines ‘what goes.’ Both task forces recognized their respective environmental problem as objective knowledge, and agreed to think of it as a threat: “the common nominator between us was the will to do something about it [short-lived climate pollutants] or, “the best response to [oil] pollution is to never have it happen in the first place.” Both task forces also revealed communication to be faulty in that subjective knowledge – understandings of who the other actors are – did not validate knowledge on oil spills and short lived climate pollutants to justify a common approach. A lack of perceived sincerity amongst participants in the TFBCM caused concerns about others’ emission reduction

189 commitment: would they take measures, or would they try to get a free-ride, or even depart? In the TFOPP, a lack of sincerity ultimately made actors doubt the reasons behind cooperative ambitions. Participants questioned the frenzy with which Russia pushed for a legal agreement, and as signified in the following quote, there was hesitation toward sharing information across the border: “if one is sort of suspicious regarding what the information will be used for then, obviously, one will be very careful regarding what to agree to.” Arguing, so it seems, therefore mostly differed in the two task forces in relation to how understandings related to the social world, being affected by each states economic and political reality. The big difference lies in the TFOPPs applied strategy of here avoiding arguing to the extent possible. With arguing being a social undertaking to define the situations and the rules of the game (Risse, 2000), a plausible interpretation would be that the TFOPP expected negotiations (due to national interests) to become tension-filled. This was illustrated by one participant, saying: ‘it is important to act now, while there are only economic interests to constrain and not yet any real economic activities.’ Consequently, interaction attempted to circumvent the platform from where resistance (i.e., ego) could pinion any attempts to reach a consensus. The term ‘prevention’ – or as one interviewee described it: “how safe is safe?” – was therefore not really argued, at least not in sense of challenging oil extracting activities or maritime transport. To list activities and measures as all voluntary, and to not require any national reporting back on measures taken, should be indicative of an understanding of oil spill prevention as for sure validated as true in the objective world, but without a correlating validation in the social world. In the TFBCM, arguing went deeper into the state’s social relations to the world, allowing for greater space for the ego to partake in discussions. Territories were ‘too big to overlook and control for emissions,’ ‘specific states already contributed more than others,’ and ‘flaring was too linked to the energy sector for us to decide on here.’ These illustrate a prevalent resistance to validate knowledge as true in the social world. Concurrently though, by allowing for a deeper arguing on norms and rules, cooperative prescriptions may become subjected to modification, providing ‘change’ with an opportunity to challenge ‘continuity.’ It should therefore be seen as no paradox that the more ambitious results the states are after, the more conflicting the process could be.

Summing environmental cooperation up, and the role of flexing within A difference between the TFBCM and the TFOPP lies in what is being promoted: cooperation or environmental protection. In the TFOPP, the focus was on the former; therefore, it was strategically relevant to not have too much arguing on the cooperative topic: any such arguing would risk pushing the state further away from the goal of cooperation and being united. In the TFBCM, one argued more on things pertaining to understandings in the social world, since the terms of reference also

190 mandated change, to a higher degree: behind the arguing logic was an idea of agreeing on some normative rules for how a collective action would lessen the problem in the Arctic. In this thesis, the prospects for validating knowledge as true in all three ‘worlds’ (Habermas, 1984) are suggested to be shaped as a funnel: to accept norms as objectively true comes first. To then arrive at a claim being validated in the social world is less present and tricky to achieve. Validation of knowledge in the subjective world seems, to quite a high degree, to be hindered by a lack of sincerity, throwing a shadow over cooperative ambitions. The level where interaction and arguing is mostly centered is suggested to activate different dimensions of the role. The more accessible understanding provided for in the objective world correlates with role prescriptions, that is, actors are made aware of expectations and rules of the game: they should cooperate without questioning its environmental value. These prescriptions are picked up in the social world, illustrated as a negotiation. When arguing, role conceptions are partaking, and could either try to push for continuity or for change, depending on the issue area and depending on how much time and space is allowed for arguing. It is here suggested that conceptions of being a good cooperator is the constant, against which environmental norms – like routine gas flaring or oil spills – are attempted to challenge the understandings of what constitute such an actor. As revealed, especially in chapter 4, all Arctic states consider cooperation to be vital for their interests in the Arctic, normative or material. All Arctic states also have within their role conceptions an understanding of themselves as good cooperators. The environment, as being ‘environmental protectors,’ does not enjoy such a clear position: the environmental discourse is less established, less common, than the cooperative ditto. This signifies the dependent variable for role-flexing to depart from the notion of what is considered to be an appropriate behavior for a cooperator, and thus acknowledging environmental protection to the extent it is contained therein. For that reason, the TFOPP revealed a process where Finland and Sweden took a back stage on ‘environment’ and any calls on stricter definitions of prevention, and instead chose to promote cooperation. ‘Why should we go around and act like wiseacres in an area we are not industrially operating within,’ they reasoned, and gave priority to the act of cooperating over oil spill consequences. In the TFBCM, they flexed their role back to the environment, and requested for change through progressive environmental commitments. In contrast, several coastal states in the TFBCM agreed to emission reduction measures that others had not really expected them to do, or at least not did take for granted. When it comes to common understanding, subjective understandings are not linked to governance rules, but to expectations. Expectations include perceptions of others; they are imagined previews of what will happen. States, so it seems, behave like rule-followers. In the subjective world, however, states, until proven wrong, tend to perceive others as not (following rules). This indicates experience – long-during and trustworthy behavior – to be a beneficial component within environmental

191 cooperation, should it be progressive with actors more readily to establish discourses on environmental commitment.

The correlation between roles and learning

Social interaction affects positions taken by states. Positions in negotiations cannot be locked, should not be locked, since that is the heart of negotiations. For that reason, it includes the potential for learning. In this thesis, learning has been discussed in relation to behavior, norms, and self-reflection. In chapter 1, a triangle was introduced to depict these types of learning as, respectively, adaptive (or simple learning, cf. Levy, 1994), normative (or complex learning, cf. Haas, 1990; Levy, 1994; Nye, 1987), and ego and alter learning (Breuning, 2011; Harnisch, 2011a, 2012, 2015; Walker, 2013). Based on the findings of this study, a complemented triangle on how states learn is presented below, linking learning to different components – and expressions – of the role:

Figure 7: The correlation between roles and learning

In the middle of the triangle, you have the engine for learning: arguing. Arguing gives rise to understanding (and vice versa), which in turn would be central – the motor – for roles and role performance. By arguing, actors attempt to settle contestations on norms, to arrive at a stage of reasoned consensus that would go for ‘understanding’ (Risse, 2000; 2004). Operating from the outside, norms, rules, scientific findings, traditional knowledge, etcetera, feed into the arguing process, thereby providing the potential for movement within the process. At the top of the triangle, there is ego and alter learning, representing each actor’s attempt to deliberate on all things it comes to know of, in terms of expectations, prescriptions, interests, and self-conceptions, and

192 then identify, the most appropriate social position to obtain. Such a deliberation as well involves a reflection on the extent to which ‘new knowledge’ can be validated as true, and in relation to which ‘worlds.’ The ongoing process of ego- and alter learning is expressed as role flexibility. At the left corner of the triangle is adaptive learning, which is expressed through role performance, and at the right corner normative learning – targeting beliefs – expressed as role conception. However, if we think of a role as a combined sum of different ego- and alter expectations, it means that both role conceptions and role performance are equally involved in state learning. Thus, it is not the case that an actor that has learned something normatively would not have that reflected in its role performance – it would. But rather, what the triangle and its depicted distinction between learning and role performance, on the one hand, and learning and role conception, on the other hand, is trying to tell us, it that adaptive and normative learning are different when it comes to depth of understanding. An actor can for strategic reasons choose to behave in accordance with environmental norms without necessarily understanding – share the belief of – these values as true: to learn in an adaptive way does not require any profound changes in role conceptions, especially not ego ones, but suffices to be somewhat attentive to prescriptions. That is, it would be sufficient to have the social Me to respond to the structure in what would be – from an interactive perspective – in line with rules of the game. Adaptive learning thus is a means used to cope with new knowledge incorporated into the objective world, which the specific actor may or may not hold to be true, but yet acts upon as being true. Normative learning, on the other hand, is expressed as soon as the objective knowledge becomes validated as true, and is as such also part of adaptive learning in that it makes actors aware of new prescriptions. However, it will not be a very profound learning going deep into the role conceptions, if it is not also supported in the social world. As learning moves down the ‘funnel of understanding,’ more layers of understanding and thickness in learning will be added, to the degree where it eventually becomes absorbed by the actors’ ego and alter conceptions in such a way that it becomes part of the I. Whereas different types of learning could be crystalized in theory, they are difficult to differentiate empirically – what would be a result of normative learning and what is not? Learning, just like understanding and just like roles, is intertwined in social processes lacking clear beginnings as well as ends. Still, on a general level, it could be suggested that the amount of time dedicated to a task force process – five to six meetings during one to two years – is too short if substantial normative learning is to occur. In the short run, states seem to learn in an adaptive manner, as evident from the interview accounts. Normative learning instead is linked to the way that the Arctic Council has developed, and how the states have chosen to follow up, for instance, on working group recommendations. The thing with normative learning is that it cannot happen quickly should ego conceptions agree: normative learning presupposes time and repetition where the role is allowed to adapt step-by-step to the extent where ‘change’ becomes transformed

193 into ‘continuity.’ Because through such a stepwise approach, roles are allowed to change the content – be flexible – without losing sight of their position (i.e., conceptions of who they are) in international relations. A hypothetical but illustrative example would be Norway: that this state would ban Arctic oil extraction because those sitting at a negotiation table would demand thereof should be held unlikely. I would react violently and impulsively against such a demand. Instead, there needs to be enough time for a strategy to be developed, where the role – the state’s social position – as a knowledgeable and a great (that is big) know-how leader – could be stretched enough to be maintained, despite one of its sources to such role input having gone missing. Empirically, to be able to observe learning on environmental norms – whether adaptive or normative – takes a change, a before and after, in international relations: should, for instance, the price of coal be drastically dumped, attracting a lot of new investments while investments in renewable energy as a consequence would stagnate or detract, it seems like international learning on climate change afterall would not have been that significant. Industrial talk and action on climate change would then not have its base in beliefs and strong convictions on this representing an environmental threat, but rather it would be a result of strategic adaption to a governance structure that prescribes considerations taken thereof. Yet, an empirical distinction may not be that important, after all. The environment does not care if cooperation is executed with nature’s best in mind, or if it is a strategic decision based upon utility maximization: the only thing cared for by the environment is having an interactive result to provide for enhanced protection. Also, adaptive learning may serve to confirm environment with values, which eventually could lead to normative learning, as the pressure from prescriptions would increase.

Language and communication – key components to understanding When it comes to learning of the environment, the problem that needs to be overcome is convincing the social and subjective world. When interviewees were talking about their respective task force process as involving learning, the subjective understanding was mostly in mind. Words could here both ease and freeze. Task force processes revealed, for instance, a process where linguistic details were big. To some, the obsession with words were ‘silly’ attempts for power, to others it was dead serious. Words, in this sense, can turn into a prolongation of performance, a protest in the small when the ‘big’ is calling for a consensus. Also, small words have a bearing on how the world is socially understood, which one of the delegates signified in the following way: “sometimes people get stuck with little words. A word means something to one person, but it means something different to someone else. …It is a word, but words mean a lot” (interview 151106). Language, how words are used, is also suggested to have the effect of creating more harmony since misunderstandings became erased. Interviewees talked about a greater understanding that arose once they had figured out the true essence in other delegates’

194 choice of words, been acquainted with their body language, and learned to use correct phrases similar to others. “It becomes more constructive at the end, after one has gotten to know each other. In the beginning – then, it is difficult,” one delegate explained (interview 150510). Subjective understandings of others’ sincerity, so it seems, is therefore not disconnected from how language – words – are used. In the TFOPP, in particular, the communicative rationality was in many ways directed toward cooperation on commonness: everyone spoke the ‘Arctic language,’ that is, were similar to each other. Within such a setting, actors who argued did not only establish some sense of contextually anchored appropriateness on normative values, but it is also through communication that actors became aware of what ‘a good cooperator’ is meant to be:

One adapts to the allocated role. Not like being told what to think, but one yet [adapts] at informal meetings. I give my view on something, and get feedback – ‘this is good, we should bring that up, let us present it like this’…Not that I had to think differently, that has not been the case. I have been able to think or say whatever I want, but it has been acted upon differently (date 141218).

This quote points toward recognition as a socializing tool. The adviser is free to think whatever he or she wants, but while thinking freely he or she still learns which opinions are appropriate (as in doable), given the context and given the role as upholding a certain social position. Following the human need for self-esteem, the thing the actor is recognized for – if attached positive values – would likely be a thing that the actor then also would learn to repeat. In that sense, communication does for ego and alter learning what values do for environmental norms: they bring the substance about.

Learning about the Arctic environment: restrained progression

Environmental protection – belief and strategy combined According to Falkner (2012), there is an ongoing greening process in international society. For actors with ambitions of being recognized as legitimate, environmental norms cannot be completely disregarded. The Arctic states, who care for being perceived as good cooperative partners, could then reasonably be believed socialized – on a general level – to this norm. The collusion and contestation of governance norms that occur at different scales in international society (Zelli, Gupta and van Asselt, 2012) has created, in the Arctic context, a specific version of ‘greening,’ where appropriateness obliges states to pay attention to oil spills and Arctic warming.

195 Working groups, Ministerial statements, and Declarations have in an iterated manner pushed for knowledge and understanding of these issues: oil spills dating back to the AEPS; short-lived climate pollutants, drawing on work on Arctic climate change for the last, almost, 20 years. The PPs have also added information and knowledge, from a local perspective, and their influx to actions on Arctic warming has been consequent from the very beginning. Quite recently, in a joint statement, they voiced their “sincere concerns” over a lack of concrete actions in the ACs work on carbon dioxide (Letter from PPs, 2014). To view and incorporate traditional local knowledge (TLK) has increased in frequency during the ACs development, and constitutes, alongside science, nowadays also Arctic expert knowledge.132 If this trend continues, the influence from the indigenous communities could be expected to grow in the future. Over the years, the tone on Arctic states’ responsibility to do something – not least in relation to Arctic warming – has become considerably sharpened also within the Arctic states. An argumentation on the Arctic as valuable, not as a resource but as a common good, has gained stronger ground. A good illustration thereof is found in the below Ministerial statement from 2017:

What would the planet say if she had a seat at the Ministerial table? Perhaps, she would admit to being as concerned as the scientific community. As worried as the local and indigenous communities who live on the life-support systems it offers. […] Perhaps our planet would say: I have been your best friend since the Industrial revolution. I have done all I can to dampen and absorb. I have tried to keep Greenland and the permafrost in Siberia intact. I have sent you no invoices. But this is about to change (M. Wallström, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministerial meeting Fairbanks, 2017).

This quote signifies a general ‘greening’ trend, an acceptance of norms as conventional knowledge. When climate change was introduced to the Arctic Council in the late 1990s, most states did not feel compelled to accept immediately. Twenty years later, it has been rooted as deep in the beliefs of the Arctic states, such that a foreign minister takes on rhetoric where nature is described as superior to the Ministerial table, as someone who – justly, so the quote says – criticizes past and current exploitation. That normative learning is involved in this greening process is furthermore supported by the break – the ‘before and after’ – that came in 2008, when the U.S. Geological Survey estimations of the Arctic as a global resource winner could have altered Arctic interaction toward full focus on resources. Instead, environmental cooperation stood firm, and even became intensified by the same year as U.S. Geological Survey’s findings were released, by introducing short-lived climate pollutants. However, the most telling example of normative learning is perhaps the amount of adaptive learning at play in the Arctic: had it not been for prescriptions on

132 See for instance, the SAO meeting Maine, 2016; Agreements on enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation, 2017.

196 following new norms, adaptive learning would not have been necessary in the first place. The growth of environmental norms is, amongst others, visible in the ACs stewardship role (Pedersen, 2012; Wilson, 2016), which has gained increased attention. All Arctic space is not territorially exclusive or even bonds the Arctic states: not the majority of the surface of the Arctic Ocean, neither all of the polar areas yet covered in ice, and not the atmosphere. In one way, the Arctic is a regional common; in another way, it is a global common. An TFOPP interviewee, gives an account of ‘the importance of showing the global community an Arctic willingness to take on a specific environmental responsibility in the Arctic’ (interview 150523a) This could be interpreted as ‘leading by example’ and is also applicable to the adoption of the convention banning unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean (2015), and the establishment of Arctic Offshore Regulator’s Forum (2015). Regional leadership and approaching the Arctic as a common comes at the expense of sovereignty getting slightly weakened, but at the same time global signals are sent of the Arctic states as legitimate actors who act out on Arctic responsibility, who on their own sets out rules to govern, and who exercises Arctic ownership. In this sense, stewardship could be understood as strategic and adaptive learning to maintain the Arctic as a regional common that is under control.

The future of Arctic oil and gas: time to “expect the unexpected”? Throughout the world, international ‘greening’ is tuning in calls for emission reductions and divestments in the fossil fuel sector. Peak oil is debated, but the tipping point has now been reached where solar and wind production has had volumes big enough to reach lower costs per unity produced, than had oil and gas (World Economic Forum, 2016). Illustrative, a company like DONG (Danish Oil and Natural Gas), which for over 40 years has had its base in fossil fuels, is now the recognized owner of the world’s largest offshore wind farms. Specifically, all of its oil and gas businesses were planned to be sold by the end of 2017 (Financial Times, 170717). China, but also India, is investing heavily in solar panels, as a way to ensure good development into the future (The Guardian, 171004). In December 2017, the World Bank announced that in line with the implementations of the Paris Agreement, it will no longer finance upstream oil and gas, i.e., exploratory or extraction activities (World Bank Group, 2017b). Recommendations have also been intensified to have the fossil fuel industry scale down future demand scenarios, and instead start to “expect the unexpected” – that fossil energy could rapidly become dated (Grantham Institute, 2017). Obviously, the oil and gas industry is of another opinion and foresees fossil fuels to represent the dominant energy source well into the future., However, they are still adapting to an international greening on climate change, and do what they can to – also visually – not be perceived as standing in contrast: Canada’s Oil Sand Innovation Alliance ranks greenhouse gases as their primary priority (2017); the logo for IEA Gas

197 and Oil Technology, is one of planet earth, surrounded by fresh leaves; and Exxon Mobile was recently revealed to advertise in a way emphasizing doubts associated with climate change – advertisement messages that were contradictory compared to findings by its own extensive research on the anthropogenic dimension of climate change (Supran and Oreskes, 2017). Also within Arctic industries, these adaptive strategies are clearly noticed, for instance, Statoil’s marketing of its entry into the Barents Sea petroleum exploration as an act of responsibility, given their advanced and safe drilling operations in a time where people globally suffer from energy poverty (Statoil, 2017c). The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association agrees, describing climate change as one of the most important issues to solve, just as important as it is to increase the energy supply to encompass those two billion people still lacking electricity (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, 2017). The oil industry is also investing large amounts in research, for instance, on oil spills prevention, which – in the case of the TFOPP – provided the oil and gas industry with the opportunity to let the information and all their work be visible for those outside (Arctic Technology Conference ATC, 2015; IEA Gas and Oil Technology, 2017). The industry’s interest in oil spill prevention is explained in this thesis by a referral to self-interest: in essence, just the existence of the TFOPP depicts greening to exist, by making commercial activities in the Arctic – like oil extraction and maritime transport – conditional upon no accidents to (preferably) occur. That this learning (also) is adaptive and influenced by strategic reasoning was noticed in the way that the task force participants reasoned that the whole of the Arctic would be affected by an oil spill – pollution wise but also by the response for the environmental groups – independently of where the spill occurs (interviews TFOPP). The industry agrees to this reasoning, itself approaching accidents as bad business – costly to clean up and bad for future investments, and where one accident can shut down the whole of Arctic O&G activities (Arctic Technology Conference, 2015). Scientific findings and other types of expert knowledge have changed the way costs in the Arctic are measured. Some of these costs are related to environmental security and how much pollution the region could take. In 2017, the AMAP released a report where the consequences of Arctic warming were also measured in real costs: the minimum figure calculated was astonishing with seven trillion U.S. dollars by the year 2100, in damages to homes, infrastructures and businesses (SWIPA, 2017).133 However, costs have more connotations than environmental degradation. In the Arctic, the cost argument is also vital for the decision to drill. For some time, the oil price has been so low that it generally is perceived as driving states to abstain from

133 The 2017 SWIPA report found the Arctic to be warming more than twice as rapidly as the global average for the last 50 years, in what seems to be an even escalating speed. Global sea-level rise, influences on monsoons far south of the Arctic, and changes in the mid-latitude weather, all tie the rest of the world to what is happening in the Arctic. The estimated cost of seven trillion dollars by the year 2100 is in the low range, stretching up to 90 trillion U.S. dollars.

198 Arctic activities. Only Norway is currently moving forward in its position, but Norway would also be the state with the lowest extraction costs and most favorable climate concerning drilling conditions. However, from an environmental protection perspective, to pause drilling as an effect of a low global price on oil is not a stable learning outcome. Indeed, the Arctic O&G industry is providing a positive attitude on future drilling. It is a business that refers to ‘hard facts’ and ‘good science,’ relying less on environmental norms and more on pragmatism regarding what is possible to achieve, and where investment strategies are based on a demand-side expected to remain for at least another 20-30 years. A not too farsighted suggestion would therefore be to expect intensified activities – more prospecting, more extraction – should the oil price significantly rise. However, other things seem to be restraining the Arctic resource extraction, for instance, insurance companies warn of the high (and potentially unmanageable) risks – operational and environmental – of Arctic drilling (Emmerson and Lahn, 2012); the oil sector in Norway reports of a difficulty in attracting personnel due to a bad reputation for the industry (IEA Gas and Oil Technology, 2017), the French oil major Total presented a new development strategy excluding operating in the Arctic pack ice, with reference to the environment and climate change (Barents Observer, 160530); and Shell, after having spent seven billion U.S. dollars, has put an indefinite ban on Arctic drilling due to too marginal findings (The Guardian, 150928).134 Then, again, there is the other side of the story, where fossil fuels currently constitute the source of about 80 percent of all energy consumed globally, and the demand for oil and even more so natural gas is expected to grow until the year 2040 (IEA, 2017). The Arctic environment is not altogether subordinated energy interests. But its protection is constrained by an industry whose activities linger on, to various extents, its capability to resist environmental norms. Change will not happen suddenly. Rather, as the O&G industry itself explains: “our industry is very conservative.”135 Just like ego- and alter learning is acting through roles, the energy- environment intertwinement acts like a flexing movement between change and continuity.

134 However, opposition from the American people also should have an impact, where the ‘kayaktivists’ mentioned elsewhere in this thesis is a symbolic illustration of how an icebreaker under the Shell logo was hindered to steer north to extraction sites. Thousands of walruses on pack ice as well as broken drilling equipment caused further delays. Most important of all is possibly the difficulties with equipment. “[I]t crushed like a beer can,” U.S. Director for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (2012) reported, on board Shell Oil’s barge the Arctic Challenger, during its sea trials before heading to the Arctic in search for oil, in 2012. What the director witnessed was how the underwater steel containment dome, safety equipment supposed to cap a blown-out oil well, suddenly imploded. 135 Explicit message delivered at the O&G conferences.

199 What is there to learn then?

What the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contradiction in humanity’s use of resources; what our economic model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered expansion. Only one of these sets of rules can be changed, and it’s not the laws of nature (Klein, 2014:37).

For more than 20 years, the Arctic Council has gathered around issues on environmental protection and sustainable development. Two decades have passed, but no conclusion has yet been reached on how to balance the values of environmental, social, and economic character. “In general, delegates appear to want a balance between environmental protection and sustainable development, but there is not yet broad agreement about what that means in this area,” the SAO chair summarized in a quite recent discussion in the AC on oil and gas work (SAO meeting Fairbanks, 2016). Whereas some delegations focused on the negative impact of O&G activities, others thought that there was too little focus on the economic benefits of O&G. As such, sustainable development is an illustrative example of a social world that is lacking a consensus on values. It is also an illustrative example of a reluctance to incorporate change at the expense of profit and economic development, and that a positive climate change effect takes time to establish. But according to climate predictions presented, for instance, through the IPCC, there is only so much time left until the environmental costs will be too significant to bear. For the policy-maker or practitioner in the field, the question then arises of what could be done to speed up the process? From the Arctic micro-perspective investigated in this thesis, a few suggestions can be provided. First, any change wished for should take into account actors’ parallel wish for continuity. These two are foundational components in any environmental progression. To have continuity in relations therefore is a way to ensure some stability in an unsettled future. Interaction, where delegates know each other from before or have previous experiences from the AC cooperation, seems generally to generate a more positive attitude toward negotiations and possible outcomes, than if any such experience is lacking. “I guess, it is not a too shocking conclusion that personal relationships do matter,” an interviewee laughingly said (interview 150623b). A short answer to why it matters is ‘understanding.’ Although state representatives are professionals, there to represent the state and not itself, they search for behavioral meaning amongst their peer negotiators: why are these other state representatives behaving the way they do? Trust – which increases the closer the bonds – is another watchword for successful cooperation, which also increases the possibilities for a common understanding. Clearly, such measure alone cannot change a state’s willingness, for instance, to regulate its energy sector, but it can decrease the likelihood of misunderstandings and falsely held expectations.

200 Secondly, the AC states ought to expect things from each other, things that benefit environmental protection. The flexibility in roles gives room for somewhat changed approaches, without having to abandon its own ego conception. On the contrary, alter expectations reveal new interactive rules, and they reveal what kind of behavior would be considered appropriate. To do as several of the Nordic states did in the TFBCM, or as was done toward Norway in the TFOPP, and express expectations aiming high for actions on environmental protection, is a norm entrepreneurial strategy that forces others to actively reflect upon how important it is to keep a certain social position. To think about how a certain approach is affecting the current social position, how Me will be recognized if doing A or B, is a reflection that has to be more active the more change, i.e., new rules, states become introduced to. Thirdly, to focus on goals of cooperation, rather than reasons for cooperation, could allow for negotiations and cooperation to put emphasis on where actors share the most commonness, and bypass some of the difficulties where social realities differentiate. For instance, to establish cooperation on behalf of health or climate change may require actors to allude to specific national justifications originating from actors’ different social life worlds, and thereby cause higher amount of arguing. To do as the TFBCM did, and focus on cooperative goals – less pollutants are beneficial for people, animals, and nature alike – and skip some of the discourses surrounding it, therefore, is a strategy that addresses change through an objective and social world space where continuity seems less present. Fourthly, in a truly theatrical vein, the AC should ‘bring out the plumes’ and be bold on Arctic environmental protection. The two negotiation processes studied in this thesis have both originated from a row of previous work conducted by the AC working groups and task forces, where many recommendations stemming from this work have also been incorporated in the TFOPP respective TFBCM, agreement. Since normative learning takes time as well as iterated interaction, so this thesis has argued, environmental goals and objectives that might in the onset be experienced as too high or unrealistic, will yet be perceived as more achievable and realistic as time and socialization has done its part. To have high expectations and be bold on Arctic environmental protection would also be relevant in relation to the ACs outreach ambitions. Indeed, with the AC being a policy-shaping organization, rather than a policy-making one, aiming for sovereign states to bend for its decisions, it operates through normative influence regionally as well as globally. Environmental policy has a dramaturgical element of speech-making, and this would be symptomatic of the AC cooperation through its dedicated efforts to present the Arctic to the rest of the world. It is a staged presentation, where the AC members, through foremost speech-making on scientific findings, try to reach global adherence for the difficulties facing the Arctic region. A policy-shaping organization contains not less important cooperation compared to a policy-making one, but makes a good complement. As the international understanding on the urgency of climate change mitigation currently seems to increase, the AC would have much to win to

201 take advantage of this and thereby give climate socialization a further push forward. Given the ACs past behavior, it could be written into the AC script without causing any significant disturbances thereto, while signal the Arctic states as committedly rising to the challenge of avoiding the worst climate effects.

Looking ahead As far as the Arctic goes, what makes the AC cooperation impervious to state discord and conflicts boils down to a recognition of Arctic states’ interdependence: in relation to environment, in relation to interests, and in relation to securing Arctic governance. The last few years has sowed dissension and doubts between the member states, possibly threatening to change conditions for Arctic cooperation, in the direction of lowered feelings of mutuality. Russia has here played a significant role; however, from an environmental perspective, the recent U.S. administration has caused doubts on international climate change cooperation by withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Yet, based upon the last 20 years record of AC cooperation, such uncertainties do not by necessity imply any fundamental changes to neither its Arctic policies, nor to Arctic Council cooperation. Supportive of this, the Secretary of State, R. Tillerson, chaired the Ministerial meeting in Fairbanks just days before President Trump announced the Paris withdrawal, and confirmed a continuous commitment to protect the fragile environment, including climate change (Ministerial statement by U.S., 2017). At least for now, there are reasons to believe that the Arctic Council’s institutions, its interactive structure and social expectations, should work to lock members on to their respective role known from before, and keep them on a cooperative track. So, will there be a future story told on Arctic preservation? The Arctic drama is still a vivid one, with no evident direction. What Klein (2014) in the beginning of this section viewed as an impossible juxtaposition on expanded usage of natural resources, alongside climate change improvements, is a description that most Arctic states do not agree to. There is no such thing as one paradox, but rather two stories to be told, both equally relevant to the Arctic. These stories, so this thesis would suggest, however, seem less likely to be performed on an Arctic arena filled with major conflicts, than a cooperative one. There is much at stake in the Arctic – of economic values, but also of social and cultural value. Through the people inhabiting the region, its history, culture, and its wildlife, the Arctic states have added a dimension of uniqueness. They are Arctic – ‘Northerners,’ ‘leaders and protectors of the top of the world.’ It is a region that in a way is differentiated from the international, where Arctic dramaturgy includes story-telling on an extraordinary part of the world and of – somewhat – unique Arctic relations illustrated through the Arctic Council cooperation. Albeit speculative on the Arctic future, the thing speaking mostly in favor of enhanced environmental protection would possibly be precisely this: in their wish to stay Arctic, the Arctic states also need the support of a region being sufficiently preserved.

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217 CBC News – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (150425). By M. McDiarmid. Arctic Council tensions threaten environment as Canada exits chair. ____ (150417). By S. Lunn. Leona Aglukkaq says letter to provinces on emissions targets wasn't an attack. ____ (100823). Arctic sovereignty a priority: Harper. ____ (090429). Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban. Consumer News and Business Channel – BNBC. (161005). Texas oil company announces big offshore Alaska discovery. Financial Times. (170717). By P. Clark. Denmark’s Dong Energy shifts from fossil fuels to renewables. High North News. (161207). By K. McGwin. Solid majority favours Greenland independence. ____ (150120). By A.F. Finne. Regjeringen provoserer: Åpner omstridte leteområder og flytter iskanten. Independent Online. (070803). Canada rejects flag-planting as ‘just a show’. Nunatsiaq News. (121115). By J. George. Arctic Council officials call for reinstatement of Russian indigenous org.“Every member of the Arctic Council has stated their support of Raipon”. ____ (061215) By J. George. ICC Climate Change Petition Rejected. Radio Canada International. (160503). By L. Sevunts. Canada to submit its Arctic continental shelf claim in 2018. Svenska Dagbladet – SvD. (160406). By J. Majlard. Polarforskning kräver efterträdare till Oden. Sveriges Radio. (160105). By U. Larsson. Den svenska isbrytarflottan ska bytas ut. The Bristol Bay Times. (150828). By C. Restino. OPINION: Federal lawmakers must tackle America's Arctic identity crisis. The Economist. (120324). Arctic politics. Cosy amid the thaw. The Arctic Council works well – because of the region’s riches. The Guardian. (171004). By A. Vaughan. Time to shine: Solar power is fastest-growing source of new energy. ____ (161122). By J. Vidal. “Extraordinarily hot” Arctic temperatures alarm scientists. ____ (160805). By A. Luhn. The Town that Reveals how Russia Spills Two Deepwater Horizons of Oil Each Year. ____ (151016). By S. Goldenberg. Obama administration blocks new oil drilling in the Arctic. ____ (150928). By T. Macalister. Shell abandons Alaska Arctic drilling. ____ (150731). By E. Brait. Portland’s bridge-hangers and ‘kayaktivists’ claim win in shell protest. ____ (100923). By L. Harding. Vladimir Putin calls for Arctic claims to be resolved under UN law.

218 ____ (090116). By S. Goldenberg. The worst of times: Bush’s environmental legacy examined. The Independent Barents Observer. (171207). By A. Staalesen. New license round reveals a declining interest in Norway’s oil. ____ (170621). By A. Staalesen. Norway offers companies 93 new blocks in Arctic waters. ____ (161216). By A. Staalesen. Government says new monster ice breaker will become reality. ____ (160616). By A. Staalesen. World’s biggest icebreaker on water. ____ (160530). By A. Staalesen. Arctic drilling not compatible with Arctic drilling – Total. ____ (160201). By T. Pettersen. Northern Fleet gets own air force, air defense forces. ____ (151023). By A. Staalesen. Russian military builds four more Arctic bases. ____ (150804). By A. Staalesen. Russia submits claim for North Pole. ____ (141215). By T. Pettersen. Denmark claims North Pole. ____ (121112). By A. Staalesen and T. Nilsen. Moscow orders closure of indigenous peoples organization. The New York Times. (150721). By the editorial board. 'No Fishing' at the North Pole. ____ (810628). Around the world: Canadians Withdraw from Whaling Commission. The Telegraph. (170428). By Reuters News Agency. Donald Trump signs executive order aimed at lifting bans on Arctic drilling. The Wall Street Journal. (150626). By C. Dawson. Exxon Mobil, BP Suspend Canadian Arctic Exploratory Drilling Program in the Beaufort Sea. The Washington Post. (161220). By D. Fears and J. Eilperin. President Obama bans oil drilling in large areas of Atlantic and Arctic oceans. ____ (150322). By D. Brady. Trump: ‘I’m not a big believer in man-made climate change.’ ____ (110511). By J. Warrick and J. Eilperin. Arctic Council to address role of soot in global warming. ____ (100330). By M-B. Sheridan. Clinton Rebukes Canada at Arctic meeting.

Reports, statistics, web-page information, and related

Alaska Oil and Gas Association. (2017). Facts and Figures. Accessed on May 17, 2017 from http://www.aoga.org/facts-and-figures Alaska Rescue Coordination Center. (2017). Search and Rescue contacts. Accessed on December 22, 2017 from https://sarcontacts.info/contacts/alaska-rescue-coordination- center/ American Society of Civil Engineers. (2017). 2017 Infrastructure Report Card: Report Card for Alaska’s Infrastructure. Report card for America’s infrastructure. 2017. Reston, Virginia: American Society of Civil Engineers

219 Arctica. (2017). LNG Icebreaker IB Polaris. Accessed on April 25, 2017 from http://arctia.fi/en/ship/polaris/ Arctic Report Card. (2017). By J. Richter-Menge, J-E Overland, J.T. Mathias, and E. Osborne. Arctic Report Card 2017. Executive Summary. National oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Arctic Programme. Arctic Response Technology. (2017). Arctic oil spill response technology joint industry programme. Under the auspice of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP). May 3, 2017. BP – British Petroleum. (2015). Gulf of Mexico. Environmental Recovery and Restoration. Five Years Report: March 2015. Prepared by BP Exploration & Production Inc. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement – BSSE. (2012). BSSE Response to KUOW FOIA. Contributed by Ryan, John, KUOW Public Radio, November 29, 2012. Accessed on 22 May 2015 from https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/526393- bsee-foia-kuow-initial-response.html#document/p1 Carbon Limits. (2014). Assessment of flare strategies, techniques for reduction of flaring and associated emissions, emission factors and methods for determination of emissions from flaring. By. A. Pederstad, J. D. Smith, R. Jackson, S. Saunier and T. Holm. Final report, M-312 (English). Norwegian Environment Agency Carbon Market Watch. (2017). EU Climate Leader Board – where countries stand on the effort sharing regulations – Europe’s largest climate tool. Policy briefing, March 2017. Transport and Environment; Carbon Market Watch CCPI. (2017). Climate Change Performance Index. Results 2017. A Comparison of the 58 top CO2 Emitting Nations. Publication by Germanwatch and Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe) Centre for High North Logistics. (2017). CHNL Information Office: Transit statistics. Accessed on June 12, 2017, from http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits Canada’s Oil Sand Innovation Alliance. (2017). Delivering Environmental Performance. Accessed on June 2, 2017, from http://www.cosia.ca Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate. (2018). The Climate initiative in Denmark. Accessed on January 9, 2018, from http://en.efkm.dk/climate-and-weather/the-climate- initiative-in-denmark/ Defense Command Denmark. (2017). Joint Arctic Command. Last updated November 8, 2017 accessed on November 22, 2017, from http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/ArcticCommand/Pages/ArcticCommand Earthjustice. (2013). Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations of the Right of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada. Summary. Submitted April 23, 2013, on behalf of Arctic Athabaskan Council. EIA – U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2017a). Petroleum and Other Liquids. Europe Brent sport price FOB. Accessed on December 25, 2017, from https://www.eia.gov

220 ____ (2017b). Russia. Last updated October 31, 2017, accessed on December 8, 2017, from https://www.eia.gov ENI Norge. (2016). Eni starts production of Goliat. News Archive. Accessed July 17, 2017, from http://www.eninorge.com/en/News--Media/News-Archive/2016/Eni-starts- production-of-Goliat-/ EUR-Lex. (2009). EU law. Regulation No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products. European Commission. (2017a). Countries and Regions: Iceland. Last updated December 15, 2017, accessed on December 22, 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries- and-regions/countries/iceland/ ____ (2017b). Countries and Regions; Norway. Last updated February 22, 2017, accessed on May 4, 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and- regions/countries/norway/ European Council. (2018). Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Last reviewed January 8, 2018, accessed on January 13, 2018, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine- crisis/ Gazprom. (2017). Prirazlomnoye Field. Accessed on August 20, 2017, from http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/deposits/pnm/ Global Affairs Canada. (2016). Canadian Sanctions Related to Ukraine. Government of Canada. Accessed from http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries- pays/ukraine.aspx?lang=eng Government of Canada (2016). Modification - Address by Parliamentary Secretary Pamela Goldsmith-Jones on behalf of Minister Dión, marking the 20th anniversary of the Arctic Council. September 29, 2016, Ottawa, Ontari. Government of Greenland. (2017a). Economy and industry in Greenland. Accessed on May 5, 2017, from http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About- Greenland/Economy-and-Industry-in-Greenland ____ (2017b). Politics in Greenland. Accessed May 5, 2017, from http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Politics- in-Greenland Government of Norway. (2015a). Norway support efforts to eliminate gas flaring by 2030. News, April 17, 2015. Accessed from https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/eliminate_flaring/id2407055/ ____ (2015b) Oppdatering av forvaltningsplanen for Barentshavet – Lofoten. News, published April 25, 2015. Accessed from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/oppdatering-av- forvaltningsplanen-for-barentshavet--lofoten/id2408548/ Government Offices of Sweden. (2016). Press message. Statens behov av ny forskningsisbrytare utreds. April 7, 2016. Accessed from

221 http://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2016/04/statens-behov-av-en-ny- forskningsisbrytare-utreds/ Grantham Institute. (2017). Expect the Unexpected. The Disruptive Power of Low-Carbon Technology. Carbon Tracker Initiative, and Grantham Institute. February, 2017 Greenpeace. (2017). Russian Oil Disaster. The Ongoing Arctic Oil Spill Crisis. Accessed on June 12, 2017, from http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate- change/arctic-impacts/The-dangers-of-Arctic-oil/Black-ice--Russian-oil-spill-disaster/ ____ (2016a). Historic Lawsuit against Arctic Oil. Press release October 18, 2016. Accessed from http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/2016/lawsuit-arctic-oil- norway-historic/ ____ (2016b). Norway, Denmark and Iceland prevent protection of unique Arctic area. Press release June 24, 2016. Accessed from http://archivo- es.greenpeace.org/espana/es/news/2016/Junio/Norway-Denmark-and-Iceland-prevent- protection-of-unique-Arctic-Area-/ ____ (2013). Greenpeaceprotest mot oljeborrning i Arktis. Press release, May 15, 2013. Accessed from http://www.greenpeace.org/sweden/se/press/pressmeddelanden/Greenpeaceprotest- mot-oljeborrning-i-Arktis-/ ICC Canada – Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada. (2005). Inuit Petition Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the United States of America. Petition of December 7, 2005. IEA – International Energy Agency. (2017). World Energy Outlook 2017. Executive Summary. OECD/IEA Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat. (2018). Our Work. Accessed on February 23, 2018, from https://www.arcticpeoples.com/our-work-2/#new-page ____ (2017). We are the indigenous people of the Arctic. Accessed on December 15, 2017, from https://www.arcticpeoples.com/#hike International Institute for Sustainable Development. (2017). Unpacking Canada’s Fossil Fuels Subsidies. Their size, impacts, and what should happen next. Accessed on April 18, 2017, from http://www.iisd.org/faq/unpacking-canadas-fossil-fuel-subsidies/ International Oil and Gas Producers – IOGP. (2017). Arctic Environment. Accessed on April 11, 2017, from http://www.iogp.org/arctic-environment/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – IPPC. (2007). Climate Change 2007. Synthesis report. Geneva: IPCC ____ (1990). Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment. Summary for Policy-makers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Joint statement of the United States of America and the Russian Federation (2011). Joint Statement of the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region. May 26, 2011. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

222 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2016). Finland promotes environment, stability, vitality and viability in the Arctic region. Press release 419/2016, October 5, 2016. Government Communications Department. Ministry of Environment Sweden. (2013). Chair’s conclusions from the Arctic Environment Ministers meeting: Arctic change – global effects. Jukkasjärvi, Sweden, February 5-6, 2013. Ministry of Industry of Iceland (2007). Report on oil exploration: oil exploration in the Draki area on the Jan Mayen ridge. March 2007: Ministry of Industry Multilateral audit (2015). The Arctic Council: Perspectives on a Changing Arctic, The Council’s Work, and Key Challenges. A Joint Memorandum of a Multilateral Audit on the Arctic States’ national authorities’ work with the Arctic Council. Conducted by the Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America. Published May 5, 2015 National Energy Authority of Iceland. (2017). Oil and Gas Exploration. Accessed on July 27, 2017, from http://www.nea.is/oil-and-gas-exploration/ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – NOAA. (2017). U.S. Department of Commerce. Gulf Oil Spill. Last updated March 2013, accessed on December 30, 2017, from http://www.noaa.gov/resource-collections/gulf-oil-spill National Ocean Service. (2014). The Exxon Valdez, 25 Years later. Podcast. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; U.S Department of Commerce. National Snow and Ice Data Center – NSIDC. (2017). Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis. Accessed from http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/ Nordic Centre for Spatial Development. (2017). Indigenous Population in the Arctic. Accessed April 4, 2017, from http://www.nordregio.se Norwegian Oil and Gas Association/Norsk Olje og Gass. (2017). Climate. Published December 15, 2010, accessed 26 November 2017, from https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/Facts/The-environment/Climate/ Norwegian Petroleum. (2017). Exploration Activity. Last updated February 21, 2017, accessed on December 17, 2017, from http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/exploration/exploration-activity/ Norwegian Seafood Council. (2017). Norwegian seafood exports for 2017 exceed last year’s level by a clear margin. Last updated December 5, 2017, accessed December 22, 2017, from https://en.seafood.no/news-and-media/news-archive/norwegian-seafood-exports-for- 2017-exceed-last-years-level-by-a-clear-margin/ Sametinget. (2018). Tjernobyl. Last updated August 21, 2017, accessed from https://www.sametinget.se/tjernobyleidish Statoil. (2017a). Snøhvit. Accessed on July 17, 2017, from https://www.statoil.com/en/what- we-do/norwegian-continental-shelf-platforms/snohvit.html ____ (2017b). Climate. Accessed on July 17, 2017, from https://www.statoil.com/en/how- and-why/climate-change.html

223 ____ (2017c). Why it’s responsible to explore the Barents Sea. Accessed on July 17, 2017, from https://www.statoil.com/en/what-we-do/responsible-drilling-in-the-barents-sea.html Stockholm Environmental Institute. (2014). The multiple air quality and climate benefits of tackling shortly-lived climate pollutants. SEI factsheet. Accessed from https://www.york.ac.uk/media/sei/documents/factsheets2014/SEI%20Factsheet%20- %20slcfs.pdf Stortinget. (2016). Innstilling fra energi- og miljøkomiteen om Samtykke til ratifikasjon av Paris- avtalen av 12. desember 2015 under FNs rammekonvensjon om klimaendring av 9. mai 1992. Inst. 407. S. Prop. 115 S (2015-2016). Energi- of Miljøkomiteen Swedish Maritime Administration – SMA. (2012). Sjöfartsverkets treårsplan, 2013-2015. March 1, 2012 Swedish National Audit Office. (2013). Sverige i Arktiska Rådet – effektivt utbyte av medlemskapet? RiR 2013:9. Stockholm: Riksdagens intertryckeri Swedish Polar Research Secretariat. (2016). Utredning om hur statens behov av ett forskningsfartyg med isbrytande kapacitet avsett för vetenskapliga expeditioner bäst ska kunna tillgodoses. Slutrapport, dnr 2016-74, December 30, 2016. Stockholm: Polarforskningssekretariatet The White House. (2015). President Obama’s Trip to Alaska. Accessed on June 14, 2016, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov U.S.-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement. (2016). The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. December 20, 2016. Accessed from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov U.S. Coast Guard. (2014). Major Icebreakers of the World. Chart. Accessed April 26 2017 from https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg552/images/20140626%20Major%20Icebreaker%20C hart.pdf U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (2016). A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic. A Report to the President. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region. December 2016, Department of Defense U.S. Department of State. (2016). Ukraine and Russia sanctions. Accessed on April 11, 2016, from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia U.S. Geological Survey. (2008). Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. U.S. Department of the Interior. USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049 U.S. Office of Director of National Intelligence. (2017). Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. Intelligence Community Agency, ICA 2017-01D, January 6, 2017 Viking Supply Ships. (2017). What we do. Accessed on April 26, 2017, from http://www.vikingsupply.com/whatwedo

224 World Bank. (2017a). New Gas Flaring Data Shows Mixed Results. Feature story, July 10, 2017. Accessed from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/07/10/new-gas- flaring-data-shows-mixed-results ____ (2017b). World Bank Group Announcement at One Planet Summit. Press release no. 2018/087/CGC, December 12, 2017. ____ (2016). New Data Reveals Upstick in Global Gas Flaring. Press release, December 12, 2016. Accessed from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- release/2016/12/12/new-data-reveals-uptick-in-global-gas-flaring World Economic Forum. (2016). Renewable Infrastructure Investment Handbook: A Guide for Institutional Investors. Industry Agenda. Ref 040117, December 2016. Geneva: World Economic Forum World Meteorological Organization. (2017). Greenhouse Gas Bulletin. The state of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere based on global observations through 2016. World Meteorological Organization and Global Atmosphere Watch. No. 13, October 30, 2017 WWF – World Wildlife Fund. (2017). Threats: oil and gas development. Accessed on August 18, 2017, from https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/oil-and-gas-development ____ (2014). Modeling Oil Spills in the Beaufort, Bering and Barents Seas. WWF Arctic factsheet.

Declarations and agreements (a selection)

Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue on the Arctic. Signed May 12, 2011. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution and Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA). Signed May 15, 2013. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat Agreement on Enhanced International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. Signed May 11, 2017. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy – AEPS. (1991). Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment. June 14, 1991, Rovaniemi, Finland Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions: An Arctic Council Framework for Action. (2015). Annex 4: Iqaluit 2015 SAO Report to Ministers. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat Fairbanks Declaration. (2017). Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Arctic States at the 10th Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, held in Fairbanks, Alaska, May 10-11, 2017 Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic. (2015). Annex 3: Iqaluit 2015 SAO Report to Ministers. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat

225 Iqaluit Declaration. (1998). The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, held in Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998 Kiruna Declaration. (2013). Declaration of the eight Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, held in Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 Ottawa Declaration. (1996). Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council. Signed by the Arctic States on September 19, 1996 The Polar Code – International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters. (2014). International Maritime Organization. Res. MCS.385(94), adopted November 21, 2014 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS. (1982). UN General Assembly, December 10, 1982

National Arctic strategies and submissions to the AC

Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. (2010). Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty, and Promoting Northern Strategy Abroad. Ottawa: Government of Canada Canada’s Arctic Strategy. (2009). Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, our Heritage, our Future. Published under the authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. Government of Canada. Ottawa: Government of Canada Denmark: National Report on Black carbon and Methane. (2015). National Report by Denmark, September 2015. Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions – An Arctic Council Framework for Action. National Submission to the Black Carbon and Methane Expert Group, the Arctic Council Denmark’s Arctic Strategy. (2011). Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Kingdom of Denmark: Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Copenhagen, Nuuk, Tórshavn: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Finland’s Arctic Strategy. (2013). Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013. Government resolution on August 23, 2013. Prime Minister’s Office Publications 16/2013. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office Iceland’s Arctic Strategy. (2011). A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy. Approved by Althingi at the 139th legislative session, March 28, 2011 Norway: National Report on Black Carbon and Methane. (2015). National Report by Norway, September 2015. Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions – An Arctic Council Framework for Action. September 1, 2015. National submission to the Black Carbon and Methane Expert Group, the Arctic Council Norway’s Arctic Strategy. (2017). Norway’s Arctic Strategy. Between geopolitics and social development. Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Local government and Modernization

226 ____ (2014). Norway’s Arctic policy. Creating value, managing resources, confronting climate change and fostering knowledge. Developments in the Arctic concern us all. Published by Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ____ (2006). The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy. Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia’s Arctic Strategy. (2013). The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone for the Russian Federation. Approved by President V. Putin ____ (2008). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020. Adopted by President D. Medvedev on September 18, 2008 Sweden: National Report on Black Carbon and Methane. (2015). National report by Sweden, September 2015. Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions – An Arctic Council Framework for Action. National submission to the Black Carbon and Methane Expert Group, the Arctic Council Sweden’s Arctic Strategy. (2011). Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region. Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs U.S. Arctic Strategy. (2013). National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Approved by President B. Obama, May 2013 ____ (2009). National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive. Approved by President G. W. Bush January 9, 2009

Arctic Council related material: reports, statements, etc.

AAC – Arctic Athabaskan Council. (2015). Remarks by Michael Stickman at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 AMAP. (2017). Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic. Summary for policy-makers. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, pp ____ (2015). AMAP Assessment 2015: Human Health in the Arctic. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway ____ (2015). AMAP Assessment 2015: Methane as an Arctic Climate Forcer. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway ____ (2015). Summary for Policy-makers: Arctic Climate Issues 2015. Short-lived Climate Pollutants. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway ____ (2011). SWIPA 2011: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic. Climate change in the Arctic – a hot topic. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, pp. 1-17

227 ____ (2007). Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway ____ (1997). Arctic Pollution issues: The state of the Environment Report 1997. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, (AMAP) amap.no. (2018). The AMAP Programme. Accessed on January 11, 2018, from https://www.amap.no/about/the-amap-programme arctic-council.org. (2017). Canada and the Arctic region. Last updated December 1, 2016, accessed on August 7, 2017, from http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about- us/member-states/canada Arctic Council. (2004). ACIA – Impacts of a Warming Arctic. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. ACIA Overview Report. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-140 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. (2000). Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting. 2nd Ministerial Meeting. Barrow, Alaska, U.S.A., October 12-13, 2000 Canada: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2015). Address by Minister Aglukkaq to Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting on Canada’s Chairmanships Achievements. 10th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 Canada’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council, 2013-2015. (2013). Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council Program during Canada’s Chairmanship (2013-15). Cat. No. FR5-83/2013-pdf. Government of Canada Denmark: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2015). Ministerial meeting in the Arctic Council – Intervention by the Danish Foreign Minister. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2013). Ministerial Meeting in the Arctic Council – Intervention by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Villy Søvndal. 8th Ministerial Meeting. Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 ____ (2011). Address. By Premier of Greenland, Kuupik Kleist: On Behalf of Denmark, Faroe Island and Greenland. 7th Ministerial Meeting. Nuuk, Greenland, May 12, 2011 ____ (2009). Speech by Denmark’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. 6th Ministerial meeting in the Arctic Council. Tromsø, Norway, April 29, 2009 EPPR. (2013). Recommended Best Practices for Arctic Oil Spill Prevention. O. K. Bjerkemo (ed.), prepared by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) on behalf of the Norwegian Coastal Administration. Published by Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Technical report ____ (1998). Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in Arctic Waters 1998. Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Environment Canada, Yellowknife, NT Canada ____ (1998). Environmental Risk Analysis of Arctic Activities. Risk analysis report 2. Emergency, Preparedness, Prevention and Response (EPPR) Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane. (2017). Summary of Progress and recommendations 2017. Summary Report

228 Finland: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2017). Statement by Minister Timo Soini. 10th Ministerial Meeting. Fairbanks, Alaska, May 11, 2017 ____ (2015). Statement by Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2013). Statement by Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 8th Ministerial Meeting. Kiruna, Sweden, May 12, 2013 ____ (2006). Statement by Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 5th Ministerial Meeting. Salekhard, Russia, October 26, 2006 ____ (2002). Opening Speech by Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 3rd Ministerial Meeting. Inari, Finland, October 9-10, 2002 Finland’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council, 2017-2019. (2017). Exploring Common Solutions. Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Finland Iceland: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2015). Statement by Iceland. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2009). Address by H.E. Ásta Ragnheiður Jóhannesdóttir, Minister of Social Affairs of Iceland. Ministerial Roundtable on Climate Change: Opportunities and Challenges Created by a More Accessible Arctic. Tromsø, Norway, April 29, 2009 ____ (2006). Address by H.E. Valger∂ur Sverrisdóttir. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland. 5th Ministerial Meeting. Salekhard, Russia, October 26, 2006 Joint Statement from the Arctic States. (2016). The Arctic Council: A Forum for Peace and Cooperation. A joint statement from Ministers of the Arctic States on the occasion of the Arctic Council’s 20th anniversary, on September 19, 2016 Letter from PP’s. (2014). Letter from PP’s regarding CO2 emissions. Doc 8.1. Oct 2014. Arctic Council Permanent Participants Norway: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement (2017). Statement by Mr. Børge Brende, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. 10th Ministerial Meeting. Fairbanks, Alaska, May 11, 2017 ____ (2015). Arktisk Råds ministermøte. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2013). National Statement by Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Eide. 8th Ministerial Meeting. Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 ____ (2011). Inlegg på Arktisk Råds møte på Grønland. 7th Ministerial Meeting. Nuuk, Greenland, May 12, 2011 ____ (2009). Norwegian MFA Jonas Gahr Støres welcoming remarks at the sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council. 6th Ministerial Meeting. Tromsø, Norway, April 29, 2009 ____ (2006a). Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre. 5th Ministerial Meeting. October 26, 2006 ____ (2006b). Concluding statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre. 5th Ministerial Meeting. Salekhard, Russia, October 26, 2006

229 PAME. (2015). Arctic Marine Tourism Project 2015. Best Practice Guidelines. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME): Iceland ____ (2014). Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines: Systems Safety Management and Safety Culture. Avoiding Major disasters in Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Operations. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME): Iceland ____ (2009). Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME): Iceland ____ (1997). Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME): Iceland Russia: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2015). Statement by Mr. S.E. Donskoy at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2013. Speech of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Eight Ministerial Session of the Arctic Council. 8th Ministerial Meeting. Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 ____ (2006). Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov at the Fifth Ministerial Session of the Arctic Council. 5th Ministerial Meeting. Salekhard, Russia, October 26, 2006 SAO discussion paper. (2016a). Discussion paper on the Arctic Council’s Work on Oil and Gas Issues. Submitted by United States of America. Arctic Council SAO plenary meeting, Fairbanks, Alaska, March 16-17, 2016 ____ (2016b). Discussion paper on Climate Change Activity in the Arctic Council. Submitted by United States of America. Arctic Council SAO plenary meeting, Fairbanks, Alaska, March 16-17, 2016 SAO report to Ministers. (2013). Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council Ministers. Summary report. Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 ____ (2009). Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council Ministers. Summary report. Tromsø, Norway, April 2009 ____ (1998). Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council Ministers. Summary report. Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998 Sweden: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2017). Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström. 10th Ministerial Meeting. Fairbanks, Alaska, May 11, 2017 ____ (2015). Statement by Sweden. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2013). Statement by Sweden. 8th Ministerial Meeting. Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 ____ (2011). Presentation by the Minister for foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Carl Bildt, on the Swedish Programme for the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. 7th Ministerial Meeting. Nuuk, Greenland, May 12, 2011 ____ (2009). Remarks by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Carl Bildt, at the 6th Session of the Arctic Council in Tromsø on 29 April 2009. 6th Ministerial Meeting. Tromsø, Norway, April 29, 2009

230 Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers. (2013). Recommendations to Reduce Black Carbon and Methane Emission to Slow Arctic Climate change. Summary Report ____ (2011). An Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for Black Caron for the Arctic Council. Technical Report USA: Arctic Council Ministerial Statement. (2017). Remarks at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson. 10th Ministerial Meeting. Fairbanks, Alaska, May 11, 2017 ____ (2015a). Remarks at the Presentation of the U.S. Chairmanship Program at the Arctic Council Ministerial. 9th Ministerial Meeting. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2015b). Press Availability Following the Arctic Council Ministerial, Secretary of State John Kerry. Iqaluit, Canada, April 24, 2015 ____ (2013). Remarks at the Arctic Council Ministerial Session, Secretary of State John Kerry. 8th Ministerial Meeting. Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013

Meeting minutes from SAOs and task forces

Senior Arctic Officials Meeting minutes. (2016). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Fairbanks, Alaska, U.S.A. March 16-17, 2016, plenary meeting, pp. 1-27 ____ (2016). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Portland, Maine, U.S.A. October 5- 6, 2016, plenary meeting, pp. 1-25 ____ (2015). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Whitehorse, Canada. March 4-5, 2015, final report, pp. 1-21 ____ (2015). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A. October 21-22, 2015, plenary meeting, final report, pp. 1-24 ____ (2014). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Yellowknife, Canada. March 26-27, 2014, final report, pp. 1-16 ____ (2014). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Yellowknife, Canada. October 22- 23, 2014, final draft report, pp. 1-19 ____ (2013). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Stockholm, Sweden. March 20-21, 2013, final report, pp.1-9 ____ (2013). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada. October 22-23, 2013, plenary meeting, final report, pp. 1-17 ____ (2012). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Stockholm, Sweden. March 28-29, 2012, final report, pp.1-6 ____ (2012). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Haparanda, Sweden. November 14- 15, 2012, final report, pp. 1-11

231 ____ (2011). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Copenhagen, Denmark. March 16- 17, 2011, final report, pp. 1-13 ____ (2011). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Luleå, Sweden. November 8-9, 2011, final report, pp.1-13 ____ (2010). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Ilulissat, Greenland. April 28-29, 2010, final report, pp. 1-23 ____ (2010). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Torshavn, Faroe Islands. October 19-20, 2010, final report, pp. 1-17 ____ (2009a). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Copenhagen, Denmark. February 10, 2009, final report, pp. 1-4 ____ (2009b). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Copenhagen, Denmark. November 12-13, 2009, final report, pp. 1-15 ____ (2008). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Svolvœr, Norway. April 23-24, 2008, final report, pp. 1-17 ____ (2008). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Kautokeino, Norway. November 19- 20, 2008, final report, pp.1-16 ____ (2007). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Tromsø, Norway. April 12-13, 2007, draft minutes, pp. 1-12 ____ (2007). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Narvik, Norway. November 28-29, 2007, final report, pp. 1-21 ____ (2005). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Yakutsk, Russia. April 6-7, 2005, draft minutes, pp. 1-15 ____ (2005). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Khanty-Mansiysk, Russia. October 12-14, 2005, draft minutes, pp. 1-19 ____ (2004). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Reykjavik, Iceland. November 22- 23, 2004, draft minutes, pp. 1-13 ____ (2003). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Reykjavik, Iceland. April 9-10, 2003, pp. 1-17 ____ (2003). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Svartsengi, Iceland. October 23-24, 2003, draft minutes, pp. 1-15 ____ (2002). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Oulu, Finland. May 15-16, 2002, pp. 1-22 ____ (2002). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Inari, Finland. October 7-8, 2002, pp. 1-15 ____ (2001). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Rovaniemi, Finland. June 12-13, 2001, SAO/2001/B/4, pp. 1-13 ____ (2001). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Espoo, Finland. November 6-7, 2001, pp. 1-24

232 ____ (2000). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Fairbanks, Alaska, U.S.A. April 27- 28, 2000, revised – 10/03/00, pp. 1-37 ____ (1999). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Washington, D.C., U.S.A. November 18-19, 1999, draft – 4/12/00, pp. 1-22 ____ (1999). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A. May 5-6, 1999, revised – 28/09/99, pp. 1-17 TFBCM Two-pager. (2014). Summary report. Task force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane. 6th Meeting, Tromsø, November 17-18, 2014 ____ (2014). Summary report. Task force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane. 5th Meeting, Iqaluit, September29 - October 1, 2014 ____ (2014). Summary report. Task force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane. 4th Meeting, Helsinki, May 22-23, 2014 ____ (2014). Summary report. Task force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane. 3rd Meeting, Moscow, April 14, 2014 ____ (2013). Summary report. Task force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane. 2nd Meeting, Stockholm, December 11-13, 2013 ____ (2013). Summary report. Task force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane. Introductory Meeting and Scoping Session, Whitehorse, Yukon, September 17-19, 2013 TFOPP Two-pager (2014). Summary two pager. Task Force on Oil Pollution Prevention. 5th meeting, Helsinki, November 24-25, 2014 ____ (2014). Summary two pager. Task Force on Oil Pollution Prevention. 4th meeting, Nuuk, September 10-11, 2014 ____ (2014). Summary two pager. Task Force on Oil Pollution Prevention. 3rd meeting, Ottawa, June 12-13, 2014 ____ (2014). Two pager submitted by the co-chairs. Task Force on Oil Pollution Prevention. 2nd meeting, Reykjavik, March 18-19, 2014 ____ (2014). Two pager submitted by the co-chairs. Task Force on Oil Pollution Prevention. 1st meeting, Oslo, January 16-17, 2014

Interviews, 2014-2015

Anonymous interview. Representative from environmental non-governmental organization Anonymous interview. Representative from Ministry of Transport Anonymous interview. Representative from Ministry of Environment Anonymous interview. Representative from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anonymous interview. Representative from indigenous association

233 Anonymous interview, Representative from research institute Arnbom, Tom. Senior Adviser/Arctic Expert; WWF Sweden Babenko, Mikhail. Former oil and gas officer; WWF Global Arctic Programme/Head of Green Economy; WWF Russia DeAngelo, Benjamin. Senior Analyst for Climate Change; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Dubois, Marc-André. Adviser; WWF Global Arctic Programme Fesmire, Mark. Regional Director; Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Department of Interior Forsgren, Anna. Senior Adviser; Swedish Environmental Protection Agency Gamble, Jim. Executive Director; Aleut International Association (AIA) Jahre-Nilsen, Catherine. Arctic Portfolio and Technology Manager; Statoil ASA Haga-Skånland, Øystein. Adviser; Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communication Hannerz, Fredrik. Senior Political Adviser; Ministry of the Environment and Energy Holst-Andersen, Jens Peter. Commander; Defense Command Denmark Israelsson, Ann-Sofi. Senior Adviser; Swedish Environmental Protection Agency Jensson, Helgi. Senior Consultant; Environment Agency of Iceland. Kahn, Jon. Director; Ministry of the Environment and Energy Kupiainen, Kaarle. Senior Research Scientist; Centre for Sustainable Consumption and Production, Finnish Environment Institute Meier, Petter. Deputy Director General; Maritime Safety and Preparedness Section, Ministry of Transport and Communication Moberg-Larsen, Carsten. Deputy Head of Department; Danish Environmental Protection Agency Nyström, Magnus. Senior Specialist; Environmental Safety and Damages, Ministry of the Environment Panichkin, Ivan. Deputy Head of Division of International Agreements; Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. Rautalahti, Elina. Senior Environmental Adviser; Environmental Protection Department, Ministry of the Environment Finland Stedt, Bernt. Head of Response; Swedish Coast Guard Head Quarter Toresen, Håvard. Deputy Director General; Department for Climate Change and Pollution Control, Ministry of Climate and Environment Zlomek, Mark. Liaison Officer; Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, U.S. Department of State Østre, Anders. Senior Adviser; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

234 Industrial conferences

Arctic Oil and Gas Conference. November 3-4, 2014. Lillestrøm, Norway Arctic Technology Conference. An event part of OTC (Offshore Technology Conference). March 23-25, 2015. Copenhagen, Denmark IEA Gas & Oil Technology. At Arctic Frontiers. White Space – Blue Future: The Offshore Arctic under Low Oil Prices. January 25-26, 2017. Tromsø, Norge

235

236 Appendix

Interview guide

Part one – role and function of the interviewee, and key message of state X

• Delegate function; background/reason for task force participation? • From your state perspective: in which aspects is a cooperation on oil spill prevention/short-lived climate pollutants relevant? • Key message from state X when entering the task force process? How did others accept this message?

Part two – on the negotiation process

• Expectation for the task force? First meeting compared to the last – any changes? • Describe the cooperative process – down-/uphill, hurdles to overcome, if and when? • Did any external events have an impact on the negotiation process? Which and how? • The presence of energy political considerations, noticeably how and when?

Part three – about state X as an actor (its role) within the task force

• Describe your state X as an actor. What differentiated your state from others? • Expectations (if any) from other delegations on your state X? Describe • Held expectations on other state delegations? Did they cause surprise? If so, why? • An example of when your state X managed to reach through to others? The opposite, when you felt compelled to/had to listen to other delegations?

Part four – lessons learned

• The common denominator, if any, that made the task force reach an agreement? • What is the biggest achievement, and what remains a challenge? • If you are ever part of a similar process, what are the lessons learnt?

237 Map of the Arctic region

Map of the Arctic region. Accessed from University of Texas Libraries (The Arctic Circle is the dotted line)

238 Lund Political Studies

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239 16. Bjurulf, Bo. A Dynamic Analysis of Scandinavian Roll-Call Behavior. A Test of a Prediction Model of Ten Minority Situations in Three Countries. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1974. 17. Hermerén, Henrik. Regeringsbildningen i flerpartisystem, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975. 18. Johannesson, Conny. Studier över Svenska metallindustriarbetarförbundets förhandlingsorganisation vid förbundsförhandlingar – med samordning. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975. 19. Peterson, Carl-Gunnar. Ungdom och politik. En studie av Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund. Stockholm: Frihets förlag, 1975. 20. Bryder, Tom. Power and Responsibility. Contending Approaches to Industrial Relations and Decision Making in Britain 1963-1971. Lund: Gleerups, 1975. 21. Jönsson, Christer. The Soviet Union and the Test Ban: A Study in Soviet Negotiation Behavior. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975. 22. Kronvall, Kai. Politisk masskommunikation i ett flerpartisystem. Sverige – en fallstudie. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975. 23. Liljequist, Gunnar. Distribution av kommunal service. Lund: Liber, 1977. 24. Lartey, George W. The Fourth Dimension: the argument against the theory of evolutionary stages of social development. Malmö: Gotab, 1977. 25. Weston, David. Realism, Language and Social Theories. Studies in the Relation of the Epistemology of Science and Politics. Lund, 1978. 26. Hagström, Bo. 1971 års länsförvaltningsreform. En utvärdering. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1978. 27. Skogmar, Gunnar. Atompolitik. Sambandet mellan militärt och civilt utnyttjande av atomenergi i amerikansk utrikespolitik 1945-1973. Malmö: Stenvalls Förlag, 1979. 28. Sannerstedt, Anders. Fri konkurrens eller politisk styrning? 1963 års trafikpolitiska beslut – debatten om innehåll, tillämpning och effekter. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1979. 29. Lidén, Anders. Security and Recognition. A Study of Change in Israel’s Official Doctrine 1967-1974. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1979. 30. Magnusson, Håkan. Kommunerna och den regionala planeringen. En analys av länsplaneringen och den fysiska riksplaneringen. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1980. 31. Stenelo, Lars-Göran. Foreign Policy Predictions. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1980. 32. Lundell, Bengt. MBL utan avtal. Kommunerna och MBL. Helsingborg, 1981. 33. Norrving, Bengt. Kommunerna och bostadsförsörjningen. En analys av bostadsplaneringen. Lund: Liber, 1981.

240 34. Linderoth, Sven. Från konkurrens till monopol. En studie av lokal politisk och ekonomisk journalistik. Malmö: Dialog, 1981. 35. Forje, John. The One and Indivisible Cameroon: Political Integration and Socio- Economic Development in a Fragmented Society. Lund, 1981. 36. Adebo, Tarekegn. Ideological Trends in the Political Thinking of the Developing Regions: The Case of Sub Saharan Africa. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1982. 37. Elgström, Ole. Aktiv utrikespolitik. En jämförelse mellan svensk och dansk parlamentarisk utrikesdebatt 1962-1978. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1982. 38. Lindkvist, Kent. Program och parti: principprogram och partiideologi inom den kommunistiska rörelsen i Sverige 1917-1972. Lund: Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 1982. 39. Bergström, Tomas och Lundell, Bengt. Från MBL till MBA. Kommunerna och MBL. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1982. 40. Hörberg, Thomas. Prediktion, osäkerhet och risk i internationella förhandlingar. En studie av svenskt förhandlingsbeteende vid förhandlingarna med Sovjetunionen 1940-41 om ett handelsavtal. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1983. 41. Geraedts, Henry. The People’s Republic of China: Foreign Economic Relations and Technology Acquisition 1972-1981. Lund: Forskningspolitiska institutet, 1983. 42. Jerneck, Magnus. Kritik som utrikespolitiskt medel. En studie av de amerikanska reaktionerna på den svenska Vietnamkritiken Lund: Dialogos, 1983. 43. Stenelo, Lars-Göran. The International Critic. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1984. 44. Bergström, Thomas och Lundell, Bengt. Lokalt medbestämmande. Kommunerna och MBL. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1984. 45. Sjölin, Mats. Kommunalpolitiken i massmediernas spegel. En studie av dagspressen och lokalradions bevakning av fem kommuner. Lund: Dialogos, 1985. 46. Albinsson, Per. Skiftningar i blått. Förändringar inom Moderata Samlingspartiets riksorganisation 1960-1985. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1986. 47. Jonsson, Rolf. De okända förhandlingarna. Statens förhandlingsråd och regeringens MBL- förhandlingar. Lund: Dialogos, 1986. 48. Polak, Jiri. Dependence Patterns in the Soviet Bloc: The Case of Romania and East Germany. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1986. 49. Lundell, Bengt. Kommunerna och MBL. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1986. 50. Rothstein, Bo. Den socialdemokratiska staten. Reformer och förvaltning inom svensk arbetsmarknads- och skolpolitik. Lund: Arkiv, 1986.

241 51. Pierre, Jon. Partikongresser och regeringspolitik. En studie av den socialdemokratiska partikongressens beslutsfattande och inflytande 1948-1978. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1986. 52. Schmidt, Stephan. Pionjärer, efterföljare och avvaktare. Innovationer och deras spridning bland svenska primärkommuner. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1986. 53. Westerlund, Ulf. Superpower Roles. A Comparative Analysis of United States and Soviet Foreign Policy. Lund: Department of Political Science, 1987. 54. Lundquist, Lennart. Implementation Steering. An Actor-Structure Approach. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1987. 55. Stenelo, Lars-Göran, red. Statsvetenskapens mångfald. Festskrift till Nils Stjernquist. Lund: Lund University Press, 1987. 56. Nilsson, Ann-Sofie. Political Uses of International Law. Lund: Dialogos, 1987. 57. Bergström, Tomas. Konkurrerande eller kompletterande demokrati? Om företagsdemokrati i de svenska kommunerna. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1988. 58. Lindell, Ulf. Modern Multinational Negotiation: The Consensus Rule and Its Implications in International Conferences. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1988. 59. Stenelo, Lars-Göran, red. Makten över den decentraliserade skolan. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1988. 60. Lundquist, Lennart. Byråkratisk etik. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1988 61. Petersson, Harry, red. Vem styr förändringarna inom sjukvården – politikerna eller de medicinska professionerna? En studie av subspecialiseringen inom ortopedin. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1989. 62. Jonsson, Rolf. Fackligt inflytande och politisk demokrati. En analys av regeringens MBL- förhandlingar. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1989. 63. Johannesson, Bengt. Kommunal bostadspolitik. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1989. 64. Aronson, Torbjörn. Konservatism och demokrati. En rekonstruktion av fem svenska högerledares styrelsedoktriner. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1990. 65. Petersson, Bo. The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe. A Study of Soviet Political Language. Göteborg: MH Publishing, 1990. 66. Lundquist, Lennart. Förvaltning och demokrati. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1991. 67. Höjelid, Stefan. Sovjetbilden i nordisk press. Svenska, norska och finländska reaktioner på sovjetiskt agerande. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1991. 68. Jansson, Per. Säkerhetspolitikens språk: Myt och metafor i svensk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs 1919-1939. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1991.

242 69. Johansson, Jörgen. Offentligt och privat i regionalpolitiken. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1991. 70. Lundquist, Lennart. Förvaltning, stat och samhälle. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992. 71. Håkansson, Anders. Konsten att vinna ett val. En studie av fram- och tillbakagångar för socialdemokraterna i kommunalvalet 1988. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1992. 72. Ternblad, Klas. Planering i norm och handling. Studier av en epok av landstingsplanering. Lund: Wi, 1992. 73. Persson, Stefan. Dödlägen i internationella förhandlingar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1992. 74. Sannerstedt, Anders. Förhandlingar i riksdagen. Lund: Lund University Press, 1992. 75. Lundquist, Lennart. Ämbetsman eller direktör? Förvaltningschefens roll i demokratin. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1993. 76. Gynnerstedt, Kerstin. Etik i hemtjänst. En studie av förvaltnings- och professionsetik. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1993. 77. Schartau, Mai-Brith. The Public Sector Middle Manager: The Puppet who Pulls the Strings? Lund: Wi, 1993. 78. Sjölin, Mats. Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Power. Lund: Lund University Press, 1993. 79. Stenelo, Lars-Göran och Norrving, Bengt, red. Lokal Makt. Lund: Lund University Press, 1993. 80. Iwanaga, Kazuki. Images, Decisions and Consequences in Japan’s Foreign Policy. Lund: Lund University Press, 1993. 81. Tita-Ghebdinga, Legala. African and O.A.U. Diplomacy on Dual Paradigms of Self- Determination 1945-1985. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1993. 82. Lundquist, Lennart. Statsvetenskaplig förvaltningsanalys. Problem, trender och program. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1994. 83. Blom, Agneta P. Kommunalt chefskap – en studie om ansvar, ledarskap och demokrati. Lund: Dialogos, 1994. 84. Agevall, Lena. Beslutsfattandets rutinisering. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1994. 85. Andersson, Jan A. Nordiskt samarbete: aktörer, idéer och organisering 1919-1953. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1994. 86. Bengtsson, Hans. Förskolereformen. En studie i implementering av svensk välfärdspolitik 1985-1991. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1995.

243 87. Uhlin, Anders. Democracy and Diffusion. Transnational Lesson-Drawing among Indonesian Pro-Democracy Actors. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1995. 88. Kinnvall, Catarina. Cultural Diffusion and Political Learning. The Democratization of China. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1995. 89. Westlind, Dennis. The Politics of Popular Identity. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996. 90. Stubbergaard, Ylva. Stat, kris och demokrati. Lapporörelsens inflytande i Finland 1929- 1932. Lund: Arkiv, 1996. 91. Sendabo, Teferi. Foreign Aid and State Sovereignty: The Ethio-Swedish Aid Co- operation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1996. 92. Mattson, Ingvar. Förhandlingsparlamentarism. En jämförande studie av riksdagen och folketinget. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996. 93. Larsson, Per. Regimförhandlingar på miljöområdet. En studie av för¬hand¬lingarna om LRTAP-konventionen. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1996. 94. Stenelo, Lars-Göran och Jerneck, Magnus, red. The Bargaining Democracy. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996. 95. McKnight, Utz Lars. Political Liberalism and the Politics of Race. Beyond Perfectionism and Culture. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996. 96. Steiner, Kristian. Strategies for International Legitimacy. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996. 97. Lundquist, Lennart. Fattigvårdsfolket. Ett nätverk i den sociala frågan 1900-1920. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997. 98. Andersson, Ronny. Medborgarna, politikerna och sjukvården. En studie av attityder och demokrati. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1997. 99. Kronsell, Annica. Greening the EU: Power practices, resistances and agenda setting. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997. 100. Thunborg, Annika. Public and Non-Profit Interaction: U.S. Assistance to Eastern European Media 1989-1995. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997. 101. Johansson, Karl Magnus. Transnational Party Alliances: Analysing the Hard-Won Alliance Between Conservatives and Christian Democrats in the European Parliament. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997. 102. Badom, Ted Gogote. Foreign Intervention in Internal Wars. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1997. 103. Söderholm, Peter. Global Governance of AIDS: Partnerships with Civil Society. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997.

244 104. Lundquist, Lennart. Demokratins väktare. Ämbetsmännen och vårt offentliga etos. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1998. 105. Gustavsson, Jakob. The Politics of Foreign Policy Change. Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership. Lund: Lund University Press, 1998. 106. Hall, Patrik. The Social Construction of Nationalism: Sweden as an Example. Lund: Lund University Press, 1998. 107. Sönne, Maria. Administrative Reforms and the Quest for Foreign Investment in China – The Case of Shenzhen. Lund: Lund University Press, 1999. 108. Aggestam, Karin. Reframing and Resolving Conflict. Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998. Lund: Lund University Press, 1999. 109. Tallberg, Jonas. Making States Comply: The European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the Enforcement of the Internal Market. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1999. 110. Hall, Martin. Constructing Historical Realism: International Relations as Comparative History. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1999. 111. Spång, Mikael. Justice and Society: Problems of Reformist Politics. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1999. 112. Svedberg, Erika. The “Other” Recreated: A Relational Approach to East-West Negotiations. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2000. 113. Ericson, Magnus. A Realist Stable Peace: Power, Threat and the Development of a Shared Norwegian-Swedish Democratic Security Identity 1905-1940. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2000. 114. Bengtsson, Rikard. Trust, Threat, and Stable Peace: Swedish Great Power Perceptions 1905-1939. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2000. 115. Stoltz, Pauline. About Being (T)here and Making a Difference? Black Women and the Paradox of Visibility. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2000. 116. Bäckstrand, Karin. What Can Nature Withstand? Science, Politics and Discourses in Transboundary Air Pollution Diplomacy. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2001. 117. Lundquist, Lennart. Medborgardemokratin och eliterna. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2001. 118. Hedin, Astrid. The Politics of Social Networks: Interpersonal Trust and Institutional Change in Post-Communist East Germany. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2001. 119. Sundström, Mikael. Connecting Social Science and Information Technology. Democratic Privacy in the Information Age. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2001.

245 120. Jönsson, Christer, Jerneck, Magnus och Stenelo, Lars-Göran, red. Politik i globaliseringens tid. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2001. 121. Gustafsson, Rune. Syntes och design. Den intellektuelle politikern som konstnär. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2001. 122. Danjoux, Olivier. L’Etat, C’est Pas Moi. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2002. 123. Jönsson, Kristina. Translating Foreign Ideas into Domestic Practices. Pharmaceutical Policies in Laos and Vietnam. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2002. 124. Bengtsson, Marie. Stat och kommun i makt(o)balans. En studie av flyktingmottagandet. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2002. 125. Björkdahl, Annika. From Idea to Norm. Promoting Conflict Prevention. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2002. 126. Badersten, Björn. Medborgardygd. Den europeiska staden och det offentliga rummets etos. Stockholm: Bokförlaget natur och kultur, 2002. 127. Boussard, Caroline. Crafting Democracy. Civil Society in Post-Transition Honduras. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2003. 128. Janson, Per. ”Den huvudlösa idén”: Medborgarlön, välfärdspolitik och en blockerad debatt. Lund: Arkiv, 2003. 129. Santesson-Wilson, Peter. Studier i symbolpolitik. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2003. 130. Johnson, Björn. Policyspridning som översättning. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen och Arbetslivsinstitutet, 2003. 131. Sundström, Mikael, Rosén, Malena och Hall, Martin. En guide till mellanstatliga organisationer. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2004. 132. Sjövik, Kristian. Demokrati bortom nationalstaten? Lund: Department of Political Science, 2004. 133. Hellström, Lennart. Brandts politiska tänkande. En studie i kontinuiteten i Brandts politiska tänkande. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2004. 134. Lindberg, Staffan. The Power of Elections – Democratic Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2004. 135. Bexell, Magdalena. Exploring Responsibility. Public and Private in Human Rights Protection. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 136. Jerre, Ulrika. Conflicting Logics? Implementing Capacity and EU Adaptation in a Postcommunist Context. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.

246 137. Rindefjäll, Teresia. Democracy Beyond the Ballot Box. Citizen Participation and Social Rights in Post-Transition Chile. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 138. Fernandez, Christian. Medborgarskap efter nationalstaten? Ett konstruktivt förslag. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 139. Nilsson, Tom. Till vilken nytta? Om det lokala politiska deltagandets karaktär, komplexitet och konsekvenser. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 140. Stripple, Johannes. Climate Change after the International: Rethinking Security, Territory and Authority. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 141. Erlingsson, Gissur. Varför bildas nya partier? Om kollektivt handlande och partientreprenörer. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 142. Strömvik, Maria. To Act as a Union. Explaining the Development of the EU’s Collective Foreign Policy. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005. 143. Niklasson, Tomas. Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956-1994. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2006. 144. Hellström, Anders. Bringing Europe Down to Earth. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2006. 145. Melander, Fredrik. Lokal Forskningspolitik: Institutionell dynamik och organisatorisk omvandling vid Lunds Universitet 1980-2005. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2006. 146. Hegeland, Hans. Nationell EU-parlamentarism. Riksdagens arbete med EU-frågorna. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press, 2006. 147. Lundquist, Lennart. Att hantera humanvetenskapens tudelning. Malmö: Liber, 2006. 148. Ahrnens, Anette. A Quest for Legitimacy. Debating UN Security Council Rules on Terrorism and Non-proliferation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2007. 149. Alasfoor, Reyadh. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Achievements and Challenges. A Political Analysis to the Study of Regional Integration of the GCC States. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2007. 150. Hedlund, Maria. Demokratiska genvägar: Expertinflytande i den svenska lagstiftningsprocessen om medicinsk genteknik. Lund: Statsveten¬skapliga institutionen, 2007. 151. Bolin, Anna. The military profession in change – the case of Sweden. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2008. 152. Broman, Matilda. Taking Advantage of Institutional Possibilities and Network Opportunities. Analyzing Swedish Strategic Action in EU Negotiations. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2008.

247 153. Kalm, Sara. Governing Global Migration. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2008. 154. Rosén Sundström, Malena. Förankring av socialdemokratisk EU-politik. Med rum för demokratisk debatt? Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2008. 155. Dannestam, Tove. Stadspolitik i Malmö. Politikens meningsskapande och materialitet. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009. 156. Knaggård, Åsa. Vetenskaplig osäkerhet i policyprocessen. En studie av svensk klimatpolitik. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009. 157. Uçarlar, Nesrin. Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009. 158. Conrad, Maximilian. Between Communication and Community. EU Constitution- Making, a European Public Sphere and the (Un-)likelihood of Transnational Political Debate. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009. 159. Scuzzarello, Sarah. Caring Multiculturalism. Local Immigrant Policies and Narratives of Integration in Malmö, Birmingham and Bologna. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010. 160. Strömbom, Lisa. Revisiting the Past. Israeli identity, thick recognition and conflict transformation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010. 161. Fägersten, Björn. Sharing Secrets. Explaining International Intelligence Cooperation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010. 162. Karlsson, Rasmus. Three essays on our planetary future. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010. 163. Lundquist, Lennart. Flocken i massamhället. Den politiska ordningens villkor och uttryck. Lund: Arkiv, 2011. 164. Lundquist, Lennart. Slutet på yttrandefriheten (och demokratin?). Stockholm: Carlssons, 2012. 165. Wahman, Michael. Uniting Against Autocrats. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2012. 166. Hultén, John. Ny väg till nya vägar och järnvägar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2012. 167. Mukhtar-Landgren, Dalia. Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala utvecklingsplaneringens idémässiga förutsättningar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2012. 168. Lund, Emma. Hybrid Governance in Practice – Public and Private Actors in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2013.

248 169. Gustafsson, Nils. Leetocracy: Political participation, social network sites and inequality. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2013. 170. Persson, Anders. Defining, Securing and Building a Just Peace: The EU and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2013. 171. Melander, Stina. Kassakultur i förändring. Samspelet mellan organisationskultur och administrativa reformer på Försäkringskassan. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen 2013. 172. Hildingsson, Roger. Governing Decarbonization: The State and the New Politics of Climate Change. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014. 173. Narby, Petter. Time of Crisis: Order, Politics, Temporality. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014. 174. Pettersson, Jonna. Incalculable Community. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2015. 175. Rennick, Sarah Anne. The Practice of Politics and Revolution: Egypt’s Revolutionary Youth Social Movement. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2015. 176. Fredén, Annika. Strategic Voting under Coalition Governments. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 177. Edenborg, Emil. Nothing more to see: Contestation of belonging and visibility in Russian media. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen och Malmö: Institutionen för globala politiska studier, 2016. 178. Nielsen, Tobias D. Words Matter in the Woods: Discourses on Deforestation in Global Climate Politics. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 179. Ingesson, Tony. The Politics of Combat: the Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical- Level Subcultures, 1939-1995. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 180. Altermark, Niklas. After Inclusion: Intellectual Disability as Biopolitics. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 181. von Schéele, Cecilia. The Void. Urban wasteland as political space. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 182. Gustafsson, Sofie. Medborgarskapande på olika villkor. Självbilder, skolkoder och syn på kunskap i den svenska gymnasieskolan. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 183. Knotz, Carlo. Getting Tough on Unemployment: Essays on the politics of unemployment benefit reform in affluent democracies. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016. 184. Nilsson, Klas. The Money of Monarchs: The importance of nontax revenue for autocratic rule in early modern Sweden. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017.

249 185. Nyberg, Linda. Market Bureaucracy: Neoliberalism, Competition and EU State Aid Policy? Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017. 186. Andersson, Per. Essays on the Politics of Taxation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017. 187. Gusic, Ivan. War, peace & the city: Urban conflicts over peace(s) in postwar Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017. 188. Fred, Mats. Projectification. The Trojan Horse of Local Government. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018. 189. Waaranperä, Ulrika. Histories of land. Politicization, property and belonging in Molo, Kenya. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018. 190. Engstrand, Sandra. State Learning and Role Playing – International environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.

250 Malmö Studies in Global Politics

1. Emil Edenborg. Nothing more to see: contestations of belonging and visibility in Russian media, Malmö: Department of Global Political Studies, 2016. 2. Mats Fred. Projectification, the Trojan horse of local government. Malmö: Department of Global Political Studies, 2018 3. Ulrika Waaranperä. Histories of land. Politicization, property and belonging in Molo, Kenya. Malmö: Department of Global Political Studies, 2018 4. Sandra Engstrand. State Learning and Role Playing – International environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council. Malmö: Department of Global Political Studies, 2018

251

State LearningState Playing and Role International environmental in the cooperation Arctic Council SANDRA ENGSTRAND UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITYMALMÖ AND LUND

SANDRA ENGSTRAND State Learning and Role Playing

817536185 789177 9 Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund 2018 NORDIC SWAN ECOLABEL 3041 0903 0903 3041 ECOLABEL SWAN NORDIC 2018 Lund Media-Tryck, by Printed - -

ISSN 0460-0037 LUND UNIVERSITYLUND MALMÖ UNIVERSITYMALMÖ ISBN 978-91-7753-618-5 ISBN 978-91-7104-908-7 Faculty of Social Sciences Lund Political Studies 190 Faculty of Culture and Society Malmö Studies in Global Politics 4 tion,which turns towards the Arctic give to an illustration. Here, the effect from global warming is big and ice-melting rapid, while economic opportunities grow as natural resources, oil and like gas, are lying increasingly bare. The theme is addressed in a case study of the Arcticand Council, more specifically through two negotiation processes dedicatedArctic to oil spill prevention and reduction of short-lived climate pollutants. It is suggested that(the potential international for) cooperation on environmental protectionhas its base in more things than recognized a value of environmental norms per se. The author sheds light on how interacting states, through engaging in arguing and com munication, learn about their social roles, as well Not as their only ‘wants’. nationalideas and interests are here important, but others’ expectations.In this book, it is explored how wishespreserve to its social role in a group, and be to perceived as an Arctic are also drivers ‘cooperator,’ for state learning of norms. environmental State LearningState Playing and Role International environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council How do states learn of environmental This norms? is the theme of this disserta