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The Ghost in the Machine Being Human in the Age of AI and Machine Learning

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The Ghost in the Machine Being Human in the Age of AI and Machine Learning View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by HIØ Brage Human Arenas https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-018-0039-1 ARENA OF CHANGING The Ghost in the Machine Being Human in the Age of AI and Machine Learning Henrik Skaug Sætra1 Received: 30 July 2018 /Revised: 7 September 2018 /Accepted: 10 September 2018 # The Author(s) 2018 Abstract Human beings have used technology to improve their efficiency throughout history. We continue to do so today, but we are no longer only using technology to perform physical tasks. Today, we make computers that are smart enough to challenge, and even surpass, us in many areas. Artificial intelligence—embodied or not—now drive our cars, trade stocks, socialise with our children, keep the elderly company and the lonely warm. At the same time, we use technology to gather vast amounts of data on ourselves. This, in turn, we use to train intelligent computers that ease and customise ever more of our lives. The change that occurs in our relations to other people, and computers, change both how we act and how we are.What sort of challenges does this development pose for human beings? I argue that we are seeing an emerging challenge to the concept of what it means to be human, as (a) we struggle to define what makes us special and try to come to terms with being surpassed in various ways by computers, and (b) the way we use and interact with technology changes us in ways we do not yet fully understand. Keywords Artificialintelligence.Machinelearning.Socialrelations.Cognition.Humanidentity Introduction Our present age is characterised by rapid progress in the field of digital technology. Techno- logical change has always been an important part of human development, but today’schange may be different. Throughout the ages, we have exchanged human labour with other sources of energy: animal power, steam power and then electrical power. We are in the midst of another great alleviation of human labour, but now, we are replacing the need for human mental powers, instead of just the physical. Parts of it involves combining artificial intelligence with * Henrik Skaug Sætra [email protected] 1 Faculty of Business, Languages, and Social Sciences, Østfold University College, P.O. Box 700, 1757 Halden, Norway Sætra physical machines—furthering the automation of industrial tasks previously performed by human beings. Other parts, however, concern replacing the human intellect. Machines help us drive, trade stocks in the stock markets, decide who gets loans, help us choose movies, guide our missiles, and smart systems keep track of just about every move we make and makes us more effective. The game of chess was conquered by the machine long ago, and in 2017, one of the final frontiers of human superiority in games was broken. Google’s artificial intelligence AlphaGo proved able to beat the best humans in the ancient game of Go. Furthermore, machines increasingly complement, and even replace, humans as social companions—even lovers. Our children bond with sociable robots, our elderly get therapy from robotic seals and our lonely ones can find companionship in robots designed for intimacy. The last part of this equation is the connection between how we employ technology and the way we gather and use vast amounts of data. All kinds of data are collected, and our every move—yes, even the beats of our hearts—can be monitored and analysed. In modern society, it may at the same time be both impossible to hide and difficult to really connect to other people. Big data lets machines learn what we like, and even what we are likely to in the future. Many now point out that the way we consume both data and, in a sense, other people, are changing us. Not just change the way we view ourselves and struggle to find our place, but how we function. Our plastic brains adapt to how it is used, and the way we use it has changed, both in relation to information and other beings. In this article, I argue that we are seeing an emerging challenge to the concept of what it means to be human, due to the developments just described. Firstly, what it means to be human, what defines us and makes us special, may change when we are surpassed in various ways by computers. Secondly, what it means to be human is by necessity influenced by the fact that we are changed by the technologies we employ. Understanding how technologies change us will be important both because we will need to understand the consequences of such changes, and we may want to prevent certain changes, or at least properly debate the desirability of them. Artificial Intelligence in Today’sSociety The Promethean myth has acquired an ugly twist: the giant reaching out to steal the lightning from the gods is insane (Koestler 1967, p. 331). First things first: what is artificial intelligence (AI)? In a report detailing the potential malicious use of AI, the authors define it as systems “capable of performing tasks commonly thought to require intelligence” (Brundage et al. 2018,p.9).Machine learning refers to systems that can “improve their performance on a given task over time through experience” (Brundage et al. 2018, p. 9). A related concept is big data, which refers to the use of the vast amounts of data that we now have available and how we analyse it (McAfee et al. 2012). AI has long existed, and the quest for intelligent machines started with Alan Turing’s Computing machinery and intelligence,releasedin1950(Turing2009). In this article, he describes a test to determine whether or not a machine is intelligent. The test is known as the Turing test and is passed by a computer that can make a human being think that it is not a computer when interacting with it (through a chat, for example). Turing himself worked on The Ghost in the Machine intelligent machines. During the Second World War, he attempted to crack the German “Enigma”-code and succeeded, by using a computer (Copeland 2014). Since Turing, machines have accomplished various daunting tasks. For the general public, a major milestone was when Deep Blue beat Garry Kasparov in chess in 1997 (Campbell et al. 2002). Deep Blue was a computer developed by IBM. Only 5 years earlier, Kasparov had “scorned the pathetic state of computer chess” (Kurzweil 2015, p. 148). Chess is widely considered a worthy intellectual pursuit, and when a computer now proved to be better than the best of humans, its intelligence could hardly be questioned. Its superiority to human beings, however, could still be challenged. After all, chess is chess, but we still had the game of Go! Go is an ancient board game, widespread in Asia in particular. When Deep Blue beat Kasparov, even a novice human Go player could beat the best Go computer. This game was far more complex, and the brute force approach of Deep Blue and early AI was no match for the more advanced cognitive approach of human beings. Then, in 2016, the comfort some may have taken in the fact that human intuition beat computer intelligence in Go was shattered. AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol, widely considered one of the best Go players of recent times (Chouard 2016). AlphaGo is Go-playing adaption of Google’s DeepMind AI, the self-titled “world leader in artificial intelligence research and its application for positive impact” (Google 2018). While these prominent peaks of AI achievements may be important, it is even more important to examine the widespread and low-key proliferation of the use of AI and machine learning in today’s society. We face its applications every day, through “speech recognition, machine translation, spam filters, and search engines” (Brundage et al. 2018). Computers are “flying and landing airplanes, controlling the tactical decisions of automated weapons, making credit and financial decisions, and being given responsibility for many other tasks that used to require human intelligence” (Kurzweil 2015, p. 148). Cars driven by computers, machines helping doctors, phones that recognise us while drones can be programmed to plant trees, give aid, or deliver bombs. In many respects, the future is already here. Our children are playing with computers from infancy, both on screen, and with robots like Furby, Zhu Zhu Pets, Tamagotchi and the like; even our elderly get care through robotic seals. When online, we often get help from chatbots that appear human, and people even talk to their watches and phones. Siri, they call her, or something else if they use another system. Even love is found in the computer. At least the more superficial kind, though sex robots like Roxxxy, in addition to providing physical love, also carries conversations (Scheutz and Arnold 2016). There are now brothels staffed by robots, looking to go global (Lockett 2017). The possible applications of intelligent machines are practically limitless. What we decide to let the computers do, however, is still up to human beings. Thus far, it may be argued that we are not showing much restraint. In the future, “advanced AI holds out the promise of reducing the need for unwanted labor, greatly expediting scientific research, and improving the quality of governance” (Brundage et al. 2018). Reducing the need for labour, while possibly increasing the opportunities for love and companionship? What is not to love? Considering the rapid proliferation of the use of AI, more and more now highlight the potential malicious use of AI. Some of these dangers are threats to digital security, physical security and political security (Brundage et al.
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