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Project on Nuclear Issues Project on Nuclear Issues ......................................................................................................................... a collection of papers from the 2011 conference series center for strategic & international studies 1800 k street, nw, washington dc 20006 Nuclear Scholars Initiative t.202.887.0200 | f.202.775.3199 PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES [email protected] | www.csis.org/isp/poni Project on Nuclear Issues .......................................................................................................................... a collection of papers from the 2011 conference series Editors Stephanie Spies Mark Jansson Authors Justin Anderson Darci Bloyer Thomas Devine Patrick Disney Sonia Drobysz Gene Gerzhoy Rebecca Davis Gibbons Thomas Karako Kalyan Kemburi Jeff Larsen Anya Loukianova Carol Meyers Jonathan Snider Stephanie Spies Christina Vaughan Raymond B. Wolfgang Tong Zhao August 2012 Nuclear Scholars Initiative PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars con- tinue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s more than 200 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change. Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and eco- nomic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photos: Left–USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (Gold) navigates toward Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Ga. Jan. 11, 2012. The Ohio-class ballistic missile subarine returned to its southeast Georgia homeport after successfully completing sea trials, photo by James Kimber, U.S. Navy, http://www.flickr.com/photos/submarinegroupten/6679832613/; top right–ascending through the cloud of fire and smoke, a ground-based interceptor launched on January 31, 2010 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, photo by Angelina Drake, U.S. Air Force, http://www.vandenberg. af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123188302; bottom right–samples from Idaho National Laboratory’s Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) core is powered up, the fuel plates in glowing bright blue. The core is submerged in water for cooling, photo courtesy of Argonne National Laboratory, http:// www.flickr.com/photos/argonne/3954062594/. © 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org Contents Introduction iv 1. Our Own Worst Enemy: How Western Pressure Encourages Iran’s Push for a Bomb 1 Patrick Disney 2. Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency: A Double-Track Approach 12 Sonia Drobysz 3. Why Do States Abandon Nuclear Weapons Activities: Understanding the Role of Alliance Coercion 26 Gene Gerzhoy 4. Sustaining a U.S. Nuclear Deterrent after New START 39 Thomas Karako 5. Cruise Missiles in Southern Asia: Strategic Implications for China, India, and Pakistan 55 Kalyan Kemburi 6. Qualitative Considerations for the U.S. Nuclear Force at Lower Numbers vis-à-vis Peer and Near-Peer Adversaries 71 Jeff Larsen, Justin Anderson, Darci Bloyer, Thomas Devine, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, and Christina Vaughan 7. The Duma/Senate Logjam Revisited: Actions and Reactions in Russian Treaty Ratification 90 Anya Loukianova 8. Quantifying the Impact of Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Consolidation 103 Carol Meyers 9. Reconceptualizing the Case for Nuclear Disarmament 115 Jonathan Snider 10. The Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety Theme: An Introduction 126 Raymond B. Wolfgang 11. Limiting Damage or Damaging Stability: Assessing Conventional Counterforce Strikes against Theater Nuclear Forces 140 Tong Zhao STEPHANIE SPIES AND MARK JANSSON | iii Introduction Stephanie Spies The Center for Strategic and International Studies launched the Project on Nuclear Is- sues (PONI) in 2003 in order to revitalize and strengthen a community of nuclear weap- ons experts whose training and background increasingly emphasize multidisciplinary expertise, especially among younger generations. In support of this goal, the PONI con- ference series was created to provide a forum for facilitating new and innovative think- ing on how to address the evolving role of nuclear weapons in international security and to gather people from across the policy and technical communities to discuss key issues. The conference series continues to place a strong emphasis on featuring the ideas of ris- ing experts in the field, who are uniquely positioned to advance new thinking and who represent the next generation of leaders from across the nuclear enterprise. The 2011 conference series included events at the Nevada National Security Site in April, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in July, and at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in September, before concluding with a Capstone Con- ference at Offutt Air Force Base, home of the U.S. Strategic Command, in December. The papers included in this volume are a collection of some of the presentations deliv- ered at the Capstone Conference. Spanning a wide range of technical and policy issues, these selected papers hope to further discussion in their respective areas, as well as con- tribute to the success of the greater nuclear community. iv | Our Own Worst Enemy: How Western Pressure Encourages Iran’s Push for a Bomb Patrick Disney1 Abstract Western governments have expanded the campaign to pressure Iran’s nuclear program, moving beyond sanctions and isolation, and resorting to sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations. This increased Western pressure carries the risk of hardening the Iranian position and allowing a consensus to emerge in Tehran in favor of a more provocative stance—potentially including nuclear weapons acquisition. To avoid this self-defeating outcome, Western policymakers must take care not to provide Iran with a pretext for weaponization, and to keep the path open for a diplomatic resolution to the confronta- tion with Iran. Since Iran’s large-scale nuclear program became known to the public in 2002, West- ern policymakers have sought to coerce Iran’s leaders into forgoing nuclear weapons production. Living by the mantra that “all options are on the table,” these Western gov- ernments have utilized nearly every tool at their disposal, from sanctions and pressure, to diplomatic carrots and covert actions. The overarching goal of these efforts has been to convince Iran’s leaders that nuclear weapons are not worth the heavy cost they would have to pay for them. This coercive strategy is seen by many politicians as a middle- of-the-road sort of approach; it is confrontational without carrying an inordinate risk of escalation to military conflict. Perhaps without intending to, however, the Obama ad- ministration has backed itself into a corner in which its reliance on sanctions, sabotage, and covert actions to undermine Iranian nuclear progress actually makes escalation more likely.2 By Washington’s own admission, cyberattacks like the Stuxnet virus—which 1. Patrick Disney is pursuing an M.A. in international relations at Yale University, after which he will serve as a Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow in the Nonproliferation and Interna- tional Security Office of the National Nuclear Security Administration. This paper was made pos- sible by a research grant provided by the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University. 2. Suzanne Maloney, “Obama’s Counterproductive New Iran Sanctions,” Foreign Affairs, January 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137011/suzanne-maloney/obamas-coun- terproductive-new-iran-sanctions; Gary Sick, “Who’s Afraid of the Ayatollahs?” Gary’s Choices, January 4, 2012, http://garysick.tumblr.com/post/15320971562/whos-afraid-of-the-ayatollahs; | 1 was largely believed to have been orchestrated with the help of American intelligence agencies—are acts of war.3 From Iran’s perspective, the ongoing campaigns to sabotage highly sensitive equipment, to surveil Iranian facilities with American spy drones, and to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists represent a markedly aggressive approach by its Western adversaries. The Islamic Republic of Iran has demonstrated in the past that it is inclined to interpret even minor affronts as evidence of a Western cabal that threatens its existence; it should be self-evident, then, that a campaign of covert assassinations and sabotage would be interpreted by Iran’s leaders as full-fledged war. A Western strategy that blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime gives Iran a justification to
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