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Our Common Strategic Interests

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Our Common Strategic Interests UNSERE GEMEINSAMEN 我们共同的战略利益 STRATEGISCHEN Our Common Strategic Interests INTERESSEN Наши Общие Стратегические हमारेसामान्य नीतिक हित Nuestros Intereses Интересы OS NOSSOS INTERESSES Estratégicos Commúnes I NOSTRI INTERESSI ESTRATÉGICOS ORTAK STRATEJIK ÇIKARLARIMIZ STRATEGICI COMUNI COMUNS Our OUR COMMON STRATEGIC 私達に共 Common Strategic Interests 우리 공동의 전략 과제 INTERESTS 通な戦略 हमारे I NOSTRI INTERESSI STRATEGICI COMUNI 上の利益 सामान्य I NOSTRI INTERESSI नीतिक STRATEGICI COMUNI हित : Africa’s role in post G8 world НАШИ ОБЩИЕ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ИНТЕРЕСЫ हमारे NOS INTÉRÊTS STRATÉGIQUES सामान्य COMMUNS नीतिक Ortak Stratejik हित Çıkarlarımız KEPENTINGAN STRATEGIS KITA BERSAMA Thomas Cargill Our Common Strategic Interests Africa’s Role in the Post-G8 World A Chatham House Report Tom Cargill ISBN 978-1-86203-224-8 Chatham House, 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0)20 7957 5700 E: contact@chathamhouse.org.uk www.chathamhouse.org.uk F: +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org.uk Charity Registration Number: 208223 9 781862 032248 Our Common Strategic Interests Africa’s Role in the Post-G8 World A Chatham House Report Tom Cargill June 2010 www.chathamhouse.org.uk Chatham House has been the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for ninety years. Our mission is to be a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how to build a prosperous and secure world for all. © Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2010 Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London promotes the rigorous study of international questions and is independent of government and other vested interests. It is precluded by its Charter from having an institutional view. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700 F: + 44 (0) 20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org.uk Charity Registration No. 208223 ISBN 978 1 86203 224 8 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Designed and typeset by Soapbox Communications Limited www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk Printed and bound in Great Britain by Latimer Trend and Co Ltd The material selected for the printing of this report is Elemental Chlorine Free and has been sourced from sustainable forests. It has been manufactured by an ISO 14001 certified mill under EMAS. ii www.chathamhouse.org.uk Contents Preface and Acknowledgments v About the Author vi Executive Summary vii 1 The Past Effectiveness of the G8 on African Development 1 Introduction 1 The emergence of the G7, G8 and G20 1 Recent history of the G8 on Africa 2 Why Africa? 2 The Millennium Development Goals 4 NEPAD 4 The Africa Partnership Forum 5 The strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs, NEPAD and the APF 8 The decline of NEPAD and the G8 Africa agenda 10 The Outreach 5 10 The G8 as an effective forum 11 The issue of monitoring and data quality 11 What does the G8-G20 transition mean for Africa? 12 The legacy of the G8 14 A ‘spaghetti bowl’ of initiatives and targets 16 The G8 as an anchor for consensus 17 2 The Importance of Africa to the G8 and Others 19 Introduction 19 Access to resources and energy security 19 Recent changes across Africa 22 G8 responses 24 Diplomacy-led vs development-led engagement 24 The dangers of a purely diplomacy- and business-led engagement 25 The benefits of a more strategic engagement between G8 and African states 26 Economic benefits 26 Political benefits 26 Social benefits 26 iii Environmental benefits 27 www.chathamhouse.org.uk G8 country-specific interests in Africa 27 Canadian interests 27 US interests 28 Japanese interests 29 British, French, German, Italian and EU interests 29 The United Kingdom 31 France 31 Germany 32 Italy 33 Russia 34 BRIC and G20 interests in Africa 35 Brazil 35 India 35 China 36 Argentina 38 Australia 38 Indonesia 38 Mexico 39 South Korea 39 Saudi Arabia 40 South Africa 40 Turkey 42 Conclusion 42 Annex: Tracking G8 Delivery Against Promises 45 iv www.chathamhouse.org.uk Preface and Acknowledgments This report had its genesis in 2005, during the United Kingdom’s G8 presidency when it became clear that an independent reappraisal of the whole scope of interna- tional engagements with Africa was needed. On the back of a number of other smaller projects, Africa Programme staff at Chatham House began interviewing officials from African and G8 countries, NGOs and private-sector sources. The project took concrete shape from 2007, when a generous grant from the Stavros Niarchos Foundation enabled the team to pursue this as a specific research project for the next two years. The Foundation’s support is greatly appreciated, as is that of many other sponsors of the Africa Programme since its inception in 2003. Other Africa Programme staff made significant contri- butions to the writing, research and editing of this report, in particular Elizabeth Donnelly and Alex Vines, as well as Markus Weimer, Adjoa Anyimadu and Fiona Bannert. v www.chathamhouse.org.uk About the Author Tom Cargill is Assistant Head of the Africa Programme at Chatham House. He has worked at Chatham House since 2004 and specializes in political foreign policy issues related to Africa, particularly those of the US and EU. He previously spent time in East Africa and worked for a number of public- and private-sector organizations. vi www.chathamhouse.org.uk expressed via a sense of amorphous threat to Western interests. Yet China’s re-engagement is for the most part welcome, as is that of the increasing numbers of emerging powers such as Turkey, South Korea and Brazil that have forced Africa’s traditional partners to think again Executive Summary about the mutual value of investing in the continent’s growing consumer and skills base. Crucially, however, this approach needs to be balanced with respect and support for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments deliver long-term benefits to all. Too often Africa’s emerging partners pay lip service to African countries are playing a more strategic role in inter- the rhetoric of ‘win-win’ and ‘South-South cooperation’ national affairs. Global players that understand this and while reproducing the worst excesses of colonial and neo- develop greater diplomatic and trade relations with African colonial exploitation. states will be greatly advantaged. For many countries, The G8 has played a valuable role in clarifying and particularly those that have framed their relations with anchoring a more strategic, coordinated and consulta- Africa largely in humanitarian terms, this will require tive approach to Africa’s development needs among most an uncomfortable shift in public and policy perceptions. Western countries. This approach grew out of the failures Without this shift, many of Africa’s traditional partners, of the 1990s and from the vision and determination of a especially in Europe and North America, will lose global few African leaders – President Thabo Mbeki of South influence and trade advantages to the emerging powers Africa, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, President in Asia, Africa and South America. Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and President Abdoulaye A strong diplomatic and trade engagement with Africa Wade of Senegal. They recognized that African states matters. Africa is the foundation of the global supply needed to change both their approach to international chain – a strategic source of almost 40 per cent of the raw engagement and their domestic agendas, and they worked materials, agriculture, fresh water and energy essential to build an international consensus around this. for global growth. Its rainforests play a central role in The consensus exists around the need to develop a the planet’s climate. Its population of one billion are system of mutual obligations and incentives between increasingly important consumers. Africa is strategically African governments and their international partners to placed between time zones, continents and hemispheres. foster good governance and democratic reform in return However, the overwhelmingly humanitarian interest of for the financial and political support necessary to pull many Western countries and traditional partners has African countries out of poverty. Whatever the contro- led to stereotyped perceptions of Africa in terms only versy around their domestic records, these leaders deserve of problems. These views are increasingly patronizing, recognition for having achieved this consensus, which recursive, out of touch, and a deterrent to serious business has lasted for almost 10 years and delivered much-needed interest. Meanwhile the emerging economic powers of change to the lives of many people across Africa. the G20 see Africa in terms of opportunities – as a place Yet in recent years G8 progress on Africa has slowed, in which to invest, gain market share and win access and discussing Africa as a separate stream at G8 summits to resources. has increasingly become a substitute for meaningful The re-emergence of China as a principal partner of action. The over-promising of what aid can deliver, and many African states has renewed interest in engage- the emphasis placed on aid to the exclusion and deter- ment with Africa among many business people and rence of considerations of business and private-sector vii politicians in the West. Sometimes this interest has been links, have diminished the relevance of the G8 for Africa, www.chathamhouse.org.uk Our Common Strategic Interests: Africa’s Role in the Post-G8 World mirroring the more general shift in the global balance of by strong diplomatic support from outside.
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