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Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation a Leadership History of the British Royal Navy During the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919 JYU DISSERTATIONS 261

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Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation a Leadership History of the British Royal Navy During the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919 JYU DISSERTATIONS 261 JYU DISSERTATIONS 261 Henrikki Tikkanen Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation A Leadership History of the British Royal Navy during the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919 JYU DISSERTATIONS 261 Henrikki Tikkanen Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation A Leadership History of the British Royal Navy during the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919 Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston humanistis-yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Historica-rakennuksen salissa H320 syyskuun 25. päivänä 2020 kello 12. Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä, in building Historica, auditorium H320 on September 25, 2020 at 12 o’clock noon. JYVÄSKYLÄ 2020 Editors Jari Ojala Department of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä Timo Hautala Open Science Centre, University of Jyväskylä Cover: Postcard of Admiral Sir John Fisher. It is part of the WW I postcard series ‘Men of the Moment’. Source: Digital Commons @ Buffalo State. https://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/commanders_all/1/ Copyright © 2020, by University of Jyväskylä Permanent link to this publication: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-8249-2 ISBN 978-951-39-8249-2 (PDF) URN:ISBN:978-951-39-8249-2 ISSN 2489-9003 ABSTRACT Tikkanen, Henrikki Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation. A Leadership History of the British Royal Navy during the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919 Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2020, 118 p. (JYU Dissertations ISSN 2489-9003; 261) ISBN 978-951-39-8249-2 This study draws on a number of contemporary concepts of leadership to investigate strategic leadership in the British Royal Navy (RN) during the period of 1904–1919. Significant historians of the time named the period the ‘Fisher era’ in the RN. Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841–1920) has been identified as the most significant architect of the sizable technological, organizational and cultural transformation the RN underwent during the ten years before the outbreak of the First World War (WWI). The transformation continued in many ways during the war years as the RN learned to fight efficiently with new technological weapons such as the long-range guns of the novel Dreadnought-type capital ships, submarines, torpedoes and mines. This organizational transformation has often been termed ‘Sir John Fisher’s naval revolution’. The main objective of the study is to provide answers to the following research question: How does the regime in the upper echelons of an organization influence the organization’s strategic capability for learning and change? What is more, the three articles related to the focal study pose the following research questions, which overlap with the main question and pertain more specifically to the context of the Fisher-era British Royal Navy. What personal and behavioural aspects or facets of Admiral Fisher’s strategic leadership can be identified in his mission of reforming the Royal Navy in 1904–1910? In other words, what were Fisher’s personal characteristics, and how was he able to capitalize on his ‘Fishpond’, especially while facing the fierce opposition to his reforms that arose from within the RN? (Article I) What are the key personal characteristics and effectuation mechanisms of top leaders who bring about the organizational adoption of a novel concept such as the battlecruiser? How does the process of adoption unfold and change when the technology is gradually proving less efficient than predicted? How do evolving organizational schemas or gestalts emerge and moderate this process? (Article II) What was the Fishpond in relation to the official structures and institutions of the RN? Who were the most influential officers in the Fishpond? How did their careers evolve in terms of carrying out Fisher’s central reforms? All in all, how effective was the Fishpond as a tool in the process of reforming the RN, especially in the face of the fierce internal opposition to many of Fisher’s major reforms? (Article III) Overall, the results of the study indicate that the quality of strategic leadership and the ability to control the direction of the RN varied considerably across different First Lord-First Sea Lord dyads during the period under study. There was no marked difference whether the navy was at war or not: there were both effective and ineffective regimes before and during WWI, and the onset of war did not ensure the presence of an effective regime at the top of the RN organization. The distinct organizational architecture of the RN did not guarantee the existence of efficient governance channels that would allow the organization to adapt swiftly to changing situations, either. The historical analysis provided in this Introduction and in the attached articles points towards the following dimensions in explaining the quality of strategic leadership in any of the regimes at the top of the RN organization: personality and leadership style, the management of organizational attention and strategic issues, and the building of management teams and networks of influence. Keywords: Leadership history, strategic leadership, the British Royal Navy, Admiral Fisher TIIVISTELMÄ Tikkanen, Henrikki Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation. A Leadership History of the British Royal Navy during the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919 (Strateginen johtajuus ja organisaation muutos. Britannian kuninkaallisen laivaston johtajuushistoria ‘Fisherin aikakaudella’ 1904–1919) Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2020 118 s. (JYU Dissertations ISSN 2489-9003; 261) ISBN 978-951-39-8249-2 Strateginen johtajuus on useimmiten määritelty ylimmän johdon kykynä auttaa organisaatiotaan oppimaan ja muuttumaan parhaalla mahdollisella tavalla ja oi- keaan aikaan. Erityisen keskeistä taitava strateginen johtajuus on voimakkaan teknologisen tai muun ympäristön muutoksen aikana. Tämä tutkimus soveltaa keskeisiä johtajuusteoreettisia käsitteitä Britannian kuninkaallisen laivaston (the British Royal Navy) strategisen johtajuuden tarkastelemiseen aikajaksolla 1904– 1919. Tätä ajanjaksoa on totuttu kutsumaan ’Fisherin aikakaudeksi’, millä viita- taan laivastoamiraali Sir John Arbuthnot Fisheriin (1841–1920). Fisher oli kym- menen vuotta ennen ensimmäisen maailmansodan puhkeamista alkaneen mer- kittävän teknologisen ja kulttuurisen organisaatiomuutoksen pääarkkitehti ja aloittaja. Kuninkaallinen laivasto jatkoi tätä organisaatiomuutosta sodan aikana opetellessaan taistelemaan sellaisilla uusilla teknologiasovelluksilla kuten Dreadnought-tyypin taistelulaivojen ja taisteluristeilijöiden pitkän kantaman ty- kit, sukellusveneet, torpedot tai merimiinat. Tätä kattavaa koko kuninkaallisen laivaston transformaatioprosessia on totuttu kutsumaan ’Sir John Fisherin laivas- tovallankumoukseksi’. Tutkimuksen tavoite on antaa vastauksia siihen pääkysymykseen, miten or- ganisaation johdossa oleva regiimi eli kulloinkin keskeisten vallassa olevien toi- mijoiden ydinjoukko vaikuttaa organisaationsa kykyyn oppia ja viedä läpi mer- kittäviä strategisia organisaatiomuutoksia? Tämän lisäksi tutkimukseen kuulu- vat kolme artikkelia keskittyvät vastaamaan seuraaviin tutkimuskysymyksiin: Mitkä johtajan henkilöön ja johtamistoimintaan liittyvät tekijät selittävät amiraali Fisherin onnistumista laivastovallankumouksensa läpiviennissä, erityisesti vah- van organisaation sisäisen muutosvastarinnan tapauksessa (artikkeli I)? Mitkä ovat ylimpien johtajien keskeiset ominaisuudet ja heidän käyttämänsä vaikutus- mekanismit, kun he haluavat organisaationsa ottavan käyttöön radikaalisti uusia teknologioita ja niille perustuvia sovelluksia kuten ensimmäisen maailmansodan aikakauden taisteluristeilijä? Mitä tapahtuu, kun teknologia osoittautuu odotet- tua heikommin toimivaksi? (artikkeli II)? Mikä oli amiraali Fisherin keskeisim- pien kannattajien joukon (jota kuvaamaan on usein negatiivisessa mielessä käy- tetty termiä ’Fishpond’) rooli suhteessa kuninkaallisen laivaston virallisiin raken- teisiin Fisherin organisaatiouudistuksen läpiviemisessä? Ketkä keskeiset laivas- toupseerit kuuluivat siihen, ja miten heidän uransa kehittyivät Fisherin aloitta- mien uudistusten ympärillä? (artikkeli III) Yleisesti tutkimus osoittaa, että strategisen johtajuuden laatu ja ylimmän johdon kyky ohjata organisaationsa suuntaa ja oppimista vaihteli voimakkaasti eri First Lord – First Sea Lord -johtajakaksikoiden ja heidän regiimiensä välillä riippumatta siitä, oliko organisaatio sodassa vai ei. Kuninkaallisen laivaston tuol- loinen organisaatioarkkitehtuuri ei myöskään taannut riittävän tehokasta ja toi- mivaa hallintarakennetta mittavan organisaation muutoksen läpiviennille, vaan johtajien oli käytettävä avainhenkilöihin ja keskeisiin eteenpäin vietäviin erityis- kysymyksiin perustuvaa epämuodollisempaa toimintamallia. Tutkimuksen joh- danto-osiossa ja artikkeleissa esitetyt johtopäätökset tunnistavat kolme avainalu- etta tässä toimintamallissa: avainjohtajien ominaisuudet ja johtamistyylit, orga- nisaation huomion ohjaaminen keskeisimpiin strategisiin kysymyksiin sekä joh- tajatiimien ja vaikuttajaverkostojen rakentaminen. Eri regiimien kyky löytää toi- mivin malli näillä osa-alueilla vaihteli suuresti tarkastelujakson aikana. Avainsanat: Johtajuushistoria, strateginen johtajuus, Britannian kuninkaallinen laivasto, amiraali Fisher Author Henrikki Tikkanen Department of History and Ethnology University of Jyväskylä [email protected] Supervisors Professor Jari Ojala Department of History
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