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THE ECONOMIC LEGACY of COMRADE MUGABE the Decline of Zimbabwe Is a Classic Case of How Bad Government Can Ruin a Country, Argues David Gadiel*

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THE ECONOMIC LEGACY of COMRADE MUGABE the Decline of Zimbabwe Is a Classic Case of How Bad Government Can Ruin a Country, Argues David Gadiel* COMMENT THE ECONOMIC LEGACY OF COMRADE MUGABE The decline of Zimbabwe is a classic case of how bad government can ruin a country, argues David Gadiel* iolence experienced by commercial 1991. Greater priority shifted to issues such as the farmers in South Africa has been war on terrorism. reported widely in Australia and has The history of Zimbabwe is a portrait of decay called attention to the plight of white and mismanagement that ruined a once-thriving minoritiesV in Southern Africa. White minorities economy. With its sophisticated institutions, a have cause for apprehension after what occurred stable banking system, a manufacturing base and in Zimbabwe both before and after the Lancaster a highly-capitalised farming industry, Zimbabwe House Conference of 1979 that preceded inherited the richest, most developed land in recognition of Zimbabwe’s independence and Africa after South Africa. An economic history of coerced their capitulation—at the behest of Britain’s Zimbabwe thereafter provides a classic example of new Conservative government amongst others—to how populism can trump reason; how readily world a government led by Robert Mugabe. leaders who should have known better became Hundreds were murdered on farms; many of so easily beguiled; and how a false god became a all races were slaughtered and maimed during the liberation icon to fellow African leaders. Rhodesian Bush War (in which between 1964 and 1979 the Soviet Union and China competed to arm False dawn rival black factions)—as well as in the aftermath Mugabe triumphed at first with conciliatory associated with Mugabe’s ZANU-PF brutal and overtones both at the conclusion of the Lancaster paranoid misrule and fraudulent mismanagement House conference and after the election stitched of elections. up in 1980. And even in the next decade, during Thousands of black and white refugees fled which Mugabe reluctantly kept Zimbabwe with little to their name, including an undertaking to Britain to place many who settled in Australia. It is a sad story a moratorium on land reform often neglected, partly because ‘optimists’ in the (a major obstacle at Lancaster West, who had enthusiastically greeted the birth of House), some perceived an Zimbabwe and the incumbency of Mugabe, became atmosphere of racial cooperation reluctant to accept their error. It became expedient and fair-mindedness. too to leave Zimbabwe to its own devices, especially after Southern Africa lost strategic importance when the Soviet Union collapsed in December David Gadiel is a Senior Fellow in the Health Program at The Centre for Independent Studies. He emigrated from * The author has benefited from helpful discussions with Clive Puzey, Zimbabwe in the 1960s (then Southern Rhodesia) and is a former Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) senior official and a former development economist. Zimbabwean businessman. POLICY • Vol. 34 No. 2 • Winter 2018 35 THE ECONOMIC LEGACY OF COMRADE MUGABE The Independence Constitution effectively flood). This was instigated by Mugabe to secure reserved 20% of seats in Parliament for whites, domination of his Shona ZANU-PF faction and although with fateful support of four white orchestrated by Emmerson Mnangagwa, at that opposition parliamentarians in 1987 this provision time Minister of State Security and now President. was abolished. Former Prime Minister Ian Smith World opinion paid little heed to murder in remained in Parliament until then and spoke Matabeleland (unlike the odium attracted by his mind freely. Mugabe personally encouraged Rhodesian authorities). Mugabe was perceived moderates such as David Coltart (later a founding bizarrely as a defender of human rights. Universities member of the opposition Movement for competed to confer honorary degrees upon him. As Democratic Change) to return from exile. the clouded vision of one citation in 1986 remarked: In the interests of reconciliation, as provided ‘Your gentle firmness in the face of anger, and your under the Lancaster House Agreement1 and with intellectual approach to matters which inflame the £50 million in British assistance, about 2,000 emotions of others, are hallmarks of your quiet farms (2.7 million hectares or 16% of commercial integrity . We salute you for your enduring and farmland) changed hands during the 1980s from effective translation of a moral ethic into a strong, white to black owners on a ‘willing buyer, willing popular voice for freedom.’7 seller’ basis. By 1996 this had created some 71,000 Britain’s Conservative governments seemed smallholdings similar to communal holdings in reluctant to interfere in Zimbabwe’s affairs: they had Tribal Trust Areas.2 The new government saw this rid themselves of a festering problem that bedevilled resettlement as necessary to ‘neutralise a looming Harold Wilson during the 1960s and Thatcher was crisis of expectation on the part of a land hungry preoccupied elsewhere. population’.3 Partly because of their small size and partly Pathway to perdition because the new owners never gained proper title, By the mid-1990s Zimbabwe’s economic condition this land soon lapsed into an unproductive state.4 deteriorated. During 1991-92 the most severe Food production was never in jeopardy because drought in living memory ravaged agriculture; commercial farming thankfully remained resilient livestock losses destroyed the legendary 600 sq and between 1982 and 1996 showed considerable km Devuli ranch. Inflation was developing as growth.5 During these early years real growth in GDP expenditure expanded on the army, the bureaucracy averaged 4.3%6. The economy seemed attractive to and patronage for Mugabe’s cronies. International private investment and it became the beneficiary of lenders were wary of funding more political assistance programs from international agencies. adventures such as bonuses for war veterans and While Mugabe was acclaimed and applauded as buying out a further 4,500 commercial farmers. By a liberation hero by African nations, he had to be 1999 Mugabe was also waging a ruinous military mindful—at least until May 1994—of the potential campaign in the Congo by printing money. destabilising influence of South Africa, where the Although Zimbabwe is rich in minerals, National Party prevailed, and on which Zimbabwe agriculture was the backbone of its economy. It remained economically dependent. During the accounted for some 20% of GDP, employed about Cold War the West still furtively regarded blemished 70% of the population and contributed about half South Africa as a bulwark against communism and its export earnings.8 Correct economic settings for Zimbabwe had to coexist with this. The change of agriculture were critical. mood in South Africa with Mandela after 1994 Zimbabwe’s Land Acquisition Act of 1996 emboldened Mugabe to show his true colours, sought the compulsory purchase of remaining which became evident especially under Mandela’s commercial farms. In 1997 Tony Blair resisted successors whom Mugabe skilfully manipulated. Mugabe’s request to finance further land acquisition In the meantime Zimbabwe’s honeymoon was to which Mugabe laid claim under the Lancaster marred by a massacre of Ndebele between 1983 House Agreement. A conference with donors and 1987—known as the Gukurahundi (a cleansing in September 1998, however, elicited offers of 36 POLICY • Vol. 34 No. 2 • Winter 2018 DAVID GADIEL support from Britain and others to fund land The pity of this recklessness lay in its failure to reform contingent upon its fair and transparent achieve any pretention of contributing to equity or redistribution. Mugabe rejected this and accused eradicating poverty. Farms looted were occupied by Britain of repudiating the Lancaster House terms. the ZANU-PF hierarchy and well-placed members In reality the conditions did not satisfy Mugabe’s of the Politburo. They understood nothing of political objectives, in particular buying political farming. The more educated amongst these favours from Chenjerai Hunzvi, leader of the neophytes wanted farms as rural retreats. Many Bush War veterans. Hunzvi demanded immediate lands fell into disuse. New owners sold off farming access to land for war veterans. equipment and excavated irrigation pipes for scrap. In 2000 ZANU-PF lost a crucial referendum In other cases buildings were wantonly burnt and that sought to entrench executive power. The looted. Dispossessed white and black farm workers referendum also included a clause obliging Britain, lost their livelihoods and homes. as former colonial power, to pay compensation for compulsory land acquisition. Despite this apparent setback, war veterans spearheaded Econometric estimates indicate that the occupations of commercial farms. Occupations independent effect of the land reforms led were represented as restitution of ancestral land. to an annual 12.5% decline in real GDP Violence proceeded as a backdrop to a dubious growth between 2000 and 2003. electoral win for ZANU-PF in 2000 and Mugabe’s 2002 presidential campaign—assisted too by verbal stoushes with British Labour ministers that High quality commercial farmland transformed Mugabe skilfully exploited to electoral advantage.9 into dusty, unproductive tracts characteristic of communal land where farmers lacked property Chaos and poverty rights. Deterioration of common property occurred Police ignored the violence, giving invaders as pastures eroded and became desert to an extent confidence of government support. They closed greater than could be explained by soil quality or farm roads, felled trees, stole and mutilated cattle,
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