Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States
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Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States Weak States, Strong Elites, and Fractional Societies in Central Asia and Beyond Fredrik M. Sjöberg Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Brusewitzsalen, Department of Government, Gamla Torget 6, Uppsala, Saturday, October 1, 2011 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Abstract Sjöberg, F. M. 2011. Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States. Weak States, Strong Elites, and Fractional Societies in Central Asia and Beyond. Statsvetenskapliga institutionen. 228 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-2226-3. Why do some authoritarian states have competitive elections? This study shows that when- ever there is a balance of power between candidates, competitiveness will ensue. Electoral fraud is often widespread in autocratic states, but if no single candidate or party is in a posi- tion to monopolize electoral support, the elections will be competitive. The contribution here is to analyze the relative strength of all actors involved in a parlia- mentary election and to show that electoral returns reflect district-level balances of power, even in autocracies. Three main sources of candidate-level electoral power are identified: state, market, and society. State-affiliated candidates in authoritarian states perform well due to favorable treatment by state institutions. Market actors perform well due to financial re- sources. Market actors arise when economic reforms create a class of entrepreneurs that de- fend their interests by running for public office, often challenging state sanctioned candidates. The strength of candidates capitalizing on social cleavages, here mainly defined as ‘clan’ or ethnic, is found to be exaggerated in the literature. This study also shows that competitiveness is not necessarily caused by foreign ‘democratic interventions’ or civil society engagement in the electoral process. Furthermore, competitive elections matter because they can severely destabilize the re- gime, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. However, electoral competitiveness that is the result of an intra-elite balance of power should not be confused with democracy. This form of raw competitiveness, where clientelism is pervasive and accountability mechanisms are weak, is an affront to the democratic ideal. For those of us who advocate democracy and genuine political participation, competitive authoritarian regimes can be used as an informative cau- tionary tale. Power matters, and especially so in authoritarian states. Understanding the logic behind competitive authoritarianism helps us revise strategies for lasting democratic reforms. Keywords: electoral competitiveness, authoritarianism, parliamentary elections, candidates, clientelism, political parties, market reform, privatization, clan, ethnicity, Kyrgyzstan, Azer- baijan Fredrik M. Sjöberg, Department of Government, Box 514, Uppsala University, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. © Fredrik M Sjöberg 2011 ISBN 978-91-506-2226-3 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-156150 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-156150) Printed in Sweden by Edita Västra Aros, a climate neutral company, Västerås 2011 Acknowledgements A doctoral research project is very much a product of the environment in which the research is conducted and specifically the individuals guiding and assisting in the process. Over the years I have benefited from the insight and patience of innumerous generous individuals from all over the world. At my Alma Mater, Uppsala University, I greatly benefited from the guidance of my supervisors Li Bennich-Björkman and Sven Oskarsson. Without their professional experience and insistence on excellence, this book would not be what it is today. Axel Hadenius, who agreed to supervise the project for the Sida application back in 2005, inspired the initiation of the project while I was working for the Silk Road Studies Program. All the par- ticipants in my manuscript conference deserve special mention: Henry Hale, Elin Bjarnegård, Johan Engvall, Kåre Vernby and Jonas Linde. Thank you also to Karl-Oskar Lindgren and Gunnar Myrberg, both of who were con- structive opponents when I presented my work at the higher research semi- nar in Uppsala. The research project as such would not have been possible without gener- ous grants from The Swedish International Development Agency (Sida, grants SWE-2005-216 and SWE-2006-178). Thank you also to the British Council of Finland, the Fulbright Center in Finland (ASLA-Fulbright Graduate Grant), Svensk-Österbottniska Samfundet, Stiftelsen Söderströms donationsfond at Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien, and Borbos Erik Hanssons Stiftelse. My fieldwork would have been impossible without help from all of my local assistants Lira Ajikova, Ilgiz Kambar, Iliyas Mamadiyarov, Diana Mamatova, Yryzbek Choibalsan, Munozhat Tashbaeva, and later Eraliden Payziev and Aida Aidarova. I would not know what I know today about society in Kyrgyzstan without the help of these ambitious young profession- als. What made the work in the field enjoyable as an intellectual exercise owes much to Edil Baisalov, Keneshbek Sainazarov, Emil Juraev, Shairbek Juraev, Joomart Saparbaev, Kumar Bekbolotov, Dinara Oshurakhunova, Marat Tazabekov, and Kairat Osmonaliev. I also want to thank the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, American University of Central Asia (AUCA), Peter Sondergaard, Jeff Lilley and Nurlan Nabiev at IRI, Scott Kearin at NDI, Dan Malinovich and David Mikosz at IFES, and Oskar Lehner at UNDP. A spe- cial thanks goes to all my taxi drivers, especially Murat and his reliable Kia jeep that challenged the mountains in Kara-Kulja and Alai. Finally, in terms 5 of the fieldwork I was lucky to have a few compatriots in Kyrgyzstan: Taru Kernisalo and Tapio Naula. I started my doctoral work at London School of Economics (LSE) and I especially want to thank my brilliant supervisor James Hughes and my advi- sor Roy Allison. Also Patrick Dunleavy, Bob Hancké, Bill Kissane, and David Held deserve a mention. I would also like to thank the TLC staff for all their inspiring workshops on different phases of the dissertation project. Both of my MPhil viva examiners, Timothy Colton (Harvard University) and John Sidel (LSE), were very valuable for the completion of the PhD disserta- tion. During my time at Harvard University and the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, I profited from the comments by John Schoeberlein, Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt, and Pippa Norris. I also thank the Central Asia and Caucasus working group, the Comparative Politics workshop, and the Post-Communist Politics and Economics workshop for valuable feed- back. I am also grateful to the Harriman Institute at Columbia University and especially Timothy Frye, Rafis Abazov, and Alex Cooley. The exposure to the brilliance of comparativists at Columbia really opened my mind and Israel Marques and David Szakonyi were very helpful for the completion of the book. For help with using GIS technology, I am indebted to the Elec- tronic Data Service at Columbia and especially Jeremiah Trinidad- Christensen. I also want to thank one of the most experienced election ob- servers, Anders Eriksson, who provided me with some unique OSCE data about election observation missions. Over the years I have benefited greatly from discussions with friends and colleagues Dave Gullette, Scott Radnitz, Eric McGlinchey, Sally Cummings, Ed Schatz, Erica Marat, Bhavna Dave, Niklas Schmidt, Madeleine Reeves, Alexander Wolters, Magnus Lundgren, Philipp Schröder, to mention a few. Sections of the book in earlier versions have been presented at MPSA, ASN, AAASS, CESS, ESCAS conferences. Panel participants at all of these events have provided valuable feedback that prepared me for the final test of pub- licly defending my work. Lastly, I want to thank my friends and family, and especially my parents who to this day probably do not know what I have been up to for the last five years. Most of all, of course, I am indebted to my understanding and patient wife, Ida, without whom my life would be utterly miserable. Being married to an academic nomad like me cannot be easy. At the end of the project I was distracted by the arrival of my little angel Saskia, which by any measure is the best thing that has ever happened in my life. 6 Note on Transliteration and Names For transliteration in this book I have used The United States Board on Geo- graphic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use (BGN/PCGN) system. The BGN/PCGN system is rela- tively intuitive for Anglophones to read and pronounce. I use a simplified form of the system to render English versions of Russian names, typically converting ë to yo, simplifying -iy and -yy endings to -y, and omitting apos- trophes for ъ and ь. However, for some frequently occurring words I decided to keep the apostrophe, like in oblast’. 7 Table of contents Acknowledgements......................................................................................... 5 Note on Transliteration and Names ................................................................ 7 Chapter 1: Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States............................ 13 Institutional pre-conditions and electoral outcomes ................................ 17 Beyond aggregate level measures ............................................................ 21 Summary and structure of the book ......................................................... 23 Chapter