AFTER 1989 East European States Created the Political Opportu

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ETHNIC MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PREREQUISITES The East European Gypsies

By ZOLTAN BARANY*

FTER 1989 East European states created the political opportu- A nity for ethnic minorities to mobilize themselves and gain representation in state, regional, and local legislatures through electoral competition. Albanians in Macedonia, Hungarians in Slovakia and Ro- mania, Turks in Bulgaria, and other previously marginalized ethnic minorities quickly achieved levels of representation approximating their proportion in their respective societies. Almost all of their candidates ran on their own ethnic parties’ tickets, and virtually all those who voted for them were their conationals. The approximately ﬁve million Gypsies (Roma)1 constitute by far the largest and most marginalized ethnic minority in Eastern Europe. They have coexisted with these societies since their arrival in the region some seven centuries ago, yet they have been consistently and com- prehensively marginal and marginalized politically, economically, and socially regardless of country or regime type. Their objective socioeconomic conditions, which actually improved during four decades of state-socialist rule, have rapidly and markedly deteriorated in the com- petitive economic environment of postcommunist Eastern Europe. Concomitantly, interethnic relations have worsened as long-standing anti-Gypsy prejudice has frequently found expression in overt discrimination, and the Roma’s deepening social problems and reliance on modest state resources have continued to fuel tensions. Given that in several East European states the Roma comprise a substantial percentage of the overall population (Bulgaria 8.5, Hungary

* I am grateful to Valerie Bunce, Milton J. Esman, Gary P. Freeman, Donald L. Horowitz, Rasma Karklins, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on different versions of this study and to the Ford Foundation, IREX, and the University of Texas for their ﬁnancial support of my research. 1 Some Gypsies prefer to be referred to as “Roma” (which means “men” in the Romani language), the singular of which is “Rom”; the adjective is “Romani.” I will use “Roma” and “Gypsies” inter- changeably.

World Politics 54 (April 2002), 277–307 v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 278

278 WORLD POLITICS 4.7, Romania 6.6, and Slovakia 9.5), one would expect that they, like other minority groups, would have gained a proportionate political presence once they were granted the opportunity to mobilize. This did not happen. In fact, in 2001 the Roma held a total of only six seats in East European national legislatures, and only one of them acquired his mandate as a representative of a Gypsy party. The low political efficacy of the region’s Roma is all the more surprising because they, unlike other ethnic minorities, have received a great deal of financial assistance and mobilizational advice from Western NGOs, governments, and international organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Or- ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, these and other organizations have brought intense political pressure to bear on East European states to improve their treatment of Gypsy minorities. Although there is still widespread societal discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe, state policies toward them have become considerably more progressive in the past decade. Nor can discrimination alone account for the outcome of their political mobilization, given that suppressed marginal groups all over the world manage to mobilize in spite of discrimination. What, then, explains this puzzle? In the enormous and quickly growing literature on ethnic politics, ethnic mobilization per se has received relatively scant attention. Three perspectives emerged in the early theoretical work on ethnic mobilization (1960s and 1970s).2 Developmental theories of ethnic mobilization tended to view it as a phenomenon that generally occurred in less developed societies and one that was inextricably linked to the early phases of state building.3 In contrast to the developmentalists, the structural differentiationist approach held that the modern states may in fact enhance impulses for ethnic mobilization rather than thwart it.4 Finally, the ethnic competition perspective contended that ethnic mobilization was first and foremost the result of rivalry and contention be-

2 See Charles C. Ragin, “Ethnic Political Mobilization: The Welsh Case,” American Sociological Re- view 44 (August 1979), 620–22; and Susan Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” Annual Re- view of Sociology 9 (1983), 355–63. 3 See, for instance, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), esp. 1–64; Juan J. Linz, “Early State Building and Late Peripheral Na- tionalisms against the State: The Case of Spain,” in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Building States and Nations (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973); and Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe: Group Iden- tity and Political Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). 4 See Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 147–78; Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and François Nielsen, “Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies,” American Sociological Review 50 (April 1985), 133–49. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 279

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 279 tween different ethnic groups and that the state played only a secondary role in stimulating mobilization.5 Recent studies have focused on more specific dimensions of ethnic mobilization. The work of Rasma Karklins on the final years of the So- viet Union showed that the delegitimization of the ancien régime went hand in hand with the delegitimization of old ethnic policies and that democratization was tied to ethnic power sharing.6 The mobilization efforts of noncitizen immigrant minorities who reside in Western Eu- rope but nevertheless are not entitled to the international mobility en- couraged by the EU have been the focus of innovative work in Europe.7 Other recent work integrates class-based factors with racial and ethnic factors to examine what motivates African-Americans, Latinos, and others to mobilize and become active in politics.8 My attempt to better understand ethnic mobilization differs markedly from these approaches: my objective is to learn more about the mobilizing group itself. This approach, I argue, will help us assess its chances for successful political action. I propose a model that provides a useful tool to evaluate the preparedness of ethnic and other groups for political mobilization. The model has predictive value for estimating the mobilization potential of a variety of communities, and by pinpointing strengths and deficiencies, it can also potentially help groups that are embarking on political action. I argue that successful ethnic mobilization requires a well-specified functional bundle of what I call “mobilizational prerequisites.” The model of mobilizational prerequisites can be applied to evaluate political or social movements in a variety of contexts. I take the case of the East European Roma not only because its mobilizational outcome is anomalous but also because in important respects it is the only case that endogenizes significant variation. Across a wide range of countries, political regimes, and party contexts in which the Roma have tried to 5 See for instance, Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Wiley, 1967); Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Michael T. Hannan, “The Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States,” in John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National Development and the World System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Joane Nagel and Susan Olzak, “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Exten- sion of the Competition Model,” Social Problems 30 (December 1982); and Juan Diez Medrano, “The Effects of Ethnic Segregation and Ethnic Competition on Political Mobilization in the Basque Coun- try, 1988,” American Sociological Review 59 (December 1994), 873–89. 6 Karklins, Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 7 See, for instance, John Rex and Beatrice Drury, eds., Ethnic Mobilization in a Multicultural Europe (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1994). 8 See Jan E. Leighley, Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minori- ties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 280

280 WORLD POLITICS mobilize, only the striking absence of these functional prerequisites in their arsenal of mobilizational strategies explains the latter’s deﬁciencies. In the remainder of the article I outline these independent variables and assess their relative power and then show how the lack of these mobilizational criteria has impeded Gypsy political mobilization. I conclude with a brief discussion of Romani electoral politics and behavior.

I. MOBILIZATION PREREQUISITES Susan Olzak defines ethnic mobilization as “the process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends.”9 Political mobilization, according to Charles Tilly, is “the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.”10 It denotes the deliberate activity of a group of individuals for the realization of political objectives. Mobilization is attitudinal insofar as there is a firm commitment to action and requires “means of translating this commitment into action or observed behavior.”11 These goals generally encompass enhanced interest representation; the cessation of political, social, and economic discrimination; and the improvement of the given collective’s conditions and social standing. Mobilization needs to produce and maximize political resources that will amplify the group’s influence: these typically include attracting votes, activating sympathetic third parties, and building coalitions. Such resources may also entail political goods like disruptions, protests, and vi- olence, all of which may be used as bargaining chips.12 Mobilization can be measured by the active membership of the organizations created, the amount of resources accumulated, the number of programs established, and the number and size of demonstrations and protests organized. During regime change social and political movements—whether urban, ethnic, nationalist, or environmental—typically flourish. Ethnic political activity tends to increase during political upheavals because such periods frequently coincide with the breakdown of authority, which creates favorable circumstances for activism. The end of state- socialist rule in democratizing states opened the door to the political organization of virtually all marginal populations, including the Roma.

9 See Olzak (fn. 2), 355. 10 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), 69. 11 J. P. Nettl, Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 32–33. 12 Michael Lipsky, “Protest as Political Resource,” American Political Science Review 62 (December 1968), 1144–58. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 281

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 281 In mature democracies, where universal suffrage ensures that nearly all citizens enjoy the right to affect political outcomes, marginal groups have been able to gain political recognition. Ethnic mobilization does not occur in a vacuum, however. It needs a number of ingredients, or prerequisites, in order to succeed. These are, from most important to least important: (1) political opportunity, (2) ethnic identity and its formation, (3) leadership, (4) organizational capacity, (5) ideology, proﬁle, and program, (6) ﬁnancial resources, (7) communications, and (8) symbols.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY If the authorities representing the dominant group do not grant marginal groups the chance to pursue their political mobilization, even the ethnic group possessing all other mobilizational criteria will fail. Doug McAdam, Herbert Kitschelt, Sidney Tarrow, and others associated with the political opportunity structure approach have called attention to the critical importance of the external environment (broadly speaking, the state and the political system) to social movements.13 The state’s perception of the ethnic group’s capacity to mobilize, the potential threat it poses to the state’s stability, and the resources it marshals to support or oppose state policies are always important to ethnic movements. Nonetheless, as Tarrow cautions, political opportunity is not a single variable but rather is a cluster of several, such as the presence or absence of influential allies and realignments in the party system.14 Political opportunities are sometimes extended by the state to specific communities, while at other times the entire population may bene- fit from them. Kitschelt has noted that social movement organizations (and, by extension, ethnic-based organizations) are much more influential in open and strong political systems than in closed and weak ones.15 The provision of new mobilizational opportunities might signal a weakening state that is forced to make compromises, or it might be indicative of systemic crisis and transition. Such was the case in most East European countries after 1989. “[P]olitical opportunities,” writes Tarrow, “provide the major incentives for transforming mobilization potentials into action.”16 13 See, for instance, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspec- tives of Social Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 14 Tarrow, “Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article,” American Political Science Review 90 (December 1996), 880. 15 Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 16 ( January 1986), 63–67. 16 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 99. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 282

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ETHNIC IDENTITY AND ITS FORMATION The second fundamental requirement of political mobilization is a clearly formulated identity that members of the ethnic group share, accept, and uphold. Ethnicity, like all identities, is relational; it attests to an awareness of collective identity consisting of several attributes like shared history, traditions, culture, and language. Though the importance of ethnicity among the other factors that constitute identity17 is contextually determined, for most people ethnic belonging tends to be one of the most important—if not the most momentous—marker of identity. In Joseph Rothschild’s words, the great advantage of ethnicity over other emblems of personal identity is “its capacity to arouse and to engage the most intense, deep, and private emotional sentiments.”18 This very real emotional element of identity is precisely what is missing from many contemporary studies on the subject. Though it is difficult to quantify, without it, the tenacity of ethnic identity is difficult to explain. David Laitin’s recent book, for instance, basically equates “language communities” with ethnic communities, in effect reducing identity to linguistic identity.19 The example of the Gypsies belies such a simple equivalency, as do a host of other cases. (Think only of the millions of Jews who speak neither Yiddish nor Hebrew.) Such reductionism of ethnic identity may serve methodological objectives, but it sheds little light on a complex subject. Ethnicity is one of a cluster of identity options whose value is enhanced in some circumstances and diminished in others. Thus, many ethnic groups throughout history have vanished as they gradually lost their identity and were absorbed by other ethnic groups. Yet many ethnic groups have survived, as they maintain spatial, social, and cultural distance from other ethnic groups and refuse to assimilate and inte- grate. Ethnic identity “is developed, displayed, manipulated, or ignored in accordance with the demands of particular situations.”20 The common presumption that an ethnic group by definition pos- sesses a well-formed identity is erroneous, particularly in the cases of

17 Daniel Bell lists ﬁve key markers of individual and group identity: national, religious, ethnic, class, and gender. See Bell, “Ethnicity and Social Change,” in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P.Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 152–58. 18 Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 60. 19 See Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). For an insightful review of Laitin’s book, see Alexander J. Motyl, “Imagined Communities, Rational Choosers, Invented Ethnicities,” Comparative Politics 34 ( January 2002), 237–41. 20 Anya Peterson Smith, Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 1. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 283

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 283 populations marked by cultural, social, and linguistic diversity. In order to flourish, ethnic identity must be consciously preserved, sustained, and strengthened. A number of methods support this goal, including the celebration of a historical personality, the commemoration of piv- otal past events whether fortunate (a victorious battle) or cataclysmic (the Holocaust), and the organization of festivals to preserve the ethnic group’s traditions and culture. The chief objective of these endeavors is to impart substance and depth specifically to an individual’s ethnic identity, as opposed to other components—for example, geographic, occupational, gender—of his or her identity. The persistence of ethnic identity is an important factor in a group’s success in coping with adaptation to outside forces and circumstances. For a heterogeneous ethnic group like the Gypsies, however, marked as it is by geographic, cultural, tribal, or linguistic diversity, the formation and articulation of its identity is more difficult than for more cohesive ethnic communities. Identity is closely connected with collective memory; therefore, literate cultures with written sources chronicling a common past are usually more successful in formulating their identity than preliterate ones.21 Whether or not members of an ethnic group are aware of their shared ethnic identity, by definition they possess such an identity. The purpose of identity formation, preservation, confirmation, and articulation is precisely to make members of the ethnic group cognizant of their common identity, in other words, to make them appreciate their collective past. “Wherever the memory of the origin of a community . . . remains for some reason alive,” wrote Max Weber, “there undoubtedly exists a very specific and often extremely powerful sense of ethnic identity.”22 For Weber, shared political memories constitute a vital component of ethnic identity and thus are extremely important for ethnic group membership. While the political mobilization of an ethnic group is extremely difficult without a well-rounded collective identity, the mobilization process itself contributes to the formation of the ethnic group’s political identity. Ultimately, ethnic mobilization is the politi- cization of ethnic identity. An ethnic community’s prior experience in political activism bolsters its ethnic identity and, ultimately, its chances of successful mobilization, because the community can draw upon and learn from its mobilizational history. Memories of past independence or autonomy may

21 See Isaacs (fn. 3), 115–43. 22 Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of Califor- nia Press, 1978), 390. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 284

284 WORLD POLITICS also propel the ethnic group toward political activism. (Think only of the Albanian community in Kosovo in the late 1990s.) Ethnic solidarity is another important aspect of ethnic identity. This ethnic fellowship may develop as the result of numerous factors: mobilization is often promoted, for instance, by prejudicial state policies in housing, welfare, education, and taxation. In many developing societies where labor markets are segregated by ethnicity, ethnic solidarity in- creases in tandem with the propensity of disadvantaged ethnic groups to mobilize. A less tangible ingredient of mobilization may be de- scribed as social capital. That is, the chances for successful mobilization increase if members of the mobilizing community trust one another, have confidence in their neighbors, live by commonly accepted social norms and values, and engage in coordinated collective activities. Ordi- narily, groups that do not possess such resources will find it more difficult to organize collective action.

LEADERSHIP Another indispensable component of the standard equipment ethnic groups need to make credible political claims is a pool of potential leaders who enjoy authority in their community and are capable of giving organizational form to the group. Ordinarily individuals who are qual- iﬁed for leadership come from the ranks of the intelligentsia; therefore, it is helpful if the overall educational level of the ethnic community allows the formation of a critical mass of educated individuals. The quality of leadership may determine the success or failure of the organization or movement. Those heading the ethnic movement might be natural leaders whose academic qualiﬁcations, economic position, social standing, and political background make them obvious candidates for leadership. Alternatively, leaders may emerge by way of a deliberate selection mechanism based on criteria such as the capacity to interact successfully with the given ethnic group as well as with other (particularly the dominant) ethnic group(s), politicians, or business leaders. If the group is divided, leaders need to negotiate compromises and achieve a consensus on at least the elemental goals and tactics of the mobilization process. Rifts within ethnic elites generally impede, while cooperation fosters, the ethnic group’s chances for mobilization.23 One of the key tasks of leaders is to forge links with elements of the population hitherto uninvolved in politics.24 How successful the individual

23 Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), 25–30. 24 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 19. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 285

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 285 leader will be in enlisting the participation of the population depends to a large extent not only on the level of popular support he receives but also on the number of rivals who challenge him.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY The institutional form that a mobilization takes is one of the most sig- niﬁcant issues to be decided. Would an exclusive, elite-type organization serve the group’s objectives better, or do circumstances require a mass party or movement? Should the main proﬁle of the organization be political, economic, or cultural? A principal condition of any ethnic organization’s political effectiveness is raising the communal conscious- ness of its members.25 Mobilizing groups must also identify the people (for example, businessmen, intellectuals, women) whom the group wants to attract to the organization and the method of their recruitment. Ethnic parties do not exist in all multiethnic political systems. Nonetheless, as Donald Horowitz notes, in many ethnically divided societies parties tend to organize along ethnic lines.26 The number of institutions involved in an ethnic group’s political representation is also a decisive organizational issue. It would appear logical that a single organization that acts as the sole representative of the ethnic group would increase cohesion in the community. In fact, Paul Brass has argued that it is essential “that one political organization be dominant in representing the demands of the ethnic group against its rivals.”27 Still, some ethnic communities, like the Roma, are so deeply split along occupational, tribal, or other lines that one organization could not possibly ar- ticulate all their interests. Conversely, a relatively homogeneous ethnic population might create a large number of organizations owing to ri- valries within its leadership or dissimilar political views among its members. The key question then is under what conditions a single organization is able to assert itself and under what conditions organizational fragmentation is fostered instead. The answers may depend on numerous related variables such as leadership competition, generational disputes, interfamilial and clan tensions, ideological cleavages, and class differences. If more than one party represents an ethnic group, it behooves these parties to cooperate, particularly come election time. The establishment of an umbrella organization or electoral coalition that represents the entire ethnic community can be very effective in increasing the ethnic

25 Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conﬂict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 160. 26 See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conﬂict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 291–97. 27 Brass (fn. 23), 49. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 286

286 WORLD POLITICS group’s political voice. Alternatively, an ethnic party may need the political and organizational assistance of mainstream parties. Although al- liance structures are often governed by the political conditions of the moment, they can nevertheless yield increased political representation, stability, support, and strength for the ethnic party.28

IDEOLOGY,PROFILE, AND PROGRAM As Milton Esman notes, “Ethnic mobilization is facilitated by and indeed usually requires an ideology, a coherent set of articulated beliefs” about collective identity, interests, and aspirations—the reasons that justify collective action.29 Although such a group credo is useful in shaping the movement and encourages cohesiveness, successful ethnic mobilization can occur even in its absence. More important is how a mobilizing ethnic group chooses to define the profile of its activities. It might, for example, concern itself primarily with cultural, economic, political, or other issues. Mobilization also requires the identification of the collectivity’s shared objective. Such aims might be general (for example, the improvement of the group’s economic conditions) and/or specific (for example, the halting of discriminatory practices against members of the group in a given school district). Consensus about certain goals can be expected to increase an ethnic group’s ability to take united action.30 Ordinarily, gauging the effectiveness of the movement’s activities is easier as their mobilizational goals become more specific. Identifying realistic goals is critical for the success of ethnic mobilization and for achieving these aims. The reasonableness of an objective is primarily determined by situational factors. In exceptional cases, however, setting unrealistic goals or exploiting the appeal of an archaic, mythic past can be essential to mobilization and can even be more effective than the identification of a more practical goal.31

FINANCIAL RESOURCES Mobilizing ethnic groups are rarely rich in resources. Indeed, the reason for mobilizing is often to reverse their economic deprivation. It takes money to publicize activities, print newspapers and campaign materials, maintain ofﬁces and lines of communication, and pay employees. No

28 Hanspeter Kriesi et al., New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Perspective (Min- neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 53. 29 Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 34. 30 Enloe (fn. 25), 183. 31 See Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 287

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 287 active organization can exist therefore without identifying sources of ﬁ- nancial support—whether state or foundation patronage, private donations, membership fees, or external resources, such as an emigré community. This is a dilemma that is best tackled early on.

COMMUNICATIONS Clearly, the mobilizing group must get its message out to the community. This requirement presupposes a number of factors. In order to be receptive, the population in question should have high literacy rates and share a common language. Given that the dominant group usually su- pervises media that typically are prejudiced toward ethnic minorities, it is particularly important that the group control (and, preferably, own) media outlets (newspapers, radio and television stations) or at the very least maintain connections to sympathetic media agencies. Ideally, the group should also enjoy a certain minimum living standard that permits access to radios, television sets, books, and newspapers.

SYMBOLS The mobilizing group is assisted by shared symbols that are widely recognized and esteemed by the community.32 The ﬂag, monuments, and public spaces endowed with historical meaning, poems, anthems, and anniversaries of historical events—all meaningful tokens of the community’s commitment to collective action—can also be used to cement the group’s cohesion. When there is no such symbol or tradition read- ily available to the ethnic group (because, for instance, they have not been preserved in popular memory or in written or pictoral form), it must be “invented,” that is, it has to be created afresh.33 The precise weight of mobilizational prerequisites is impossible to ascertain because to a considerable degree they are contextually determined. Nonetheless, it is possible to make broad generalizations about their relative weight. I contend that the ﬁrst four prerequisites (political opportunity, ethnic identity, leadership, and organizations) are essential; without them ethnic groups will not be able to mobilize. Of these four, political opportunity is both the only factor exogenous to the mobilizing community and the one that is indispensable. Bluntly put, as long as the political environment can effectively block ethnic mobilization, it will not occur. Think, for a moment, of the peasant insurgents in

32 See, for instance, Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985); and Ulf Hedetoft, ed., Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics (Brookﬁeld, Vt.: Ashgate, 1998). 33 See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1983). v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 288

288 WORLD POLITICS the Mexican state of Chiapas. They share a strong ethnic identity (in- digenous Mayan groups like the Lacandon and the Chamulas); have an assertive and well-educated leadership (a hierarchy of leaders with Co- mandante Marcos at its head); have developed a clear organizational capacity; advance a focused program (self-determination with attend- ant political representation and control of land); possess ﬁnancial resources (donations from locals and from abroad); enjoy access to the media; and can rally around widely recognized symbols (such as the historical icon Emiliano Zapata). Still, the insurgents are unable to compete in local, state, or national elections because the Mexican government denies them that opportunity. Strong ethnic identity, effective leadership, and an organizational proﬁle are the endogenous prerequisites essential for mobilization. Pre- requisites 5–8 (ideology, resources, communications, and symbols) can be extremely useful for mobilization, but positive mobilizational outcomes can be realized in their absence. In other words, though shared symbols and/or a coherent plan of action will indisputably facilitate the ethnic group’s political mobilization, they are rarely critical to its success. And it bears reiterating that the particular setting is key in deter- mining the weight of individual prerequisites in a given mobilization. In an area densely populated by members of the ethnic group, for instance, access to the media may not be as crucial to successful mobilization as in regions where the group’s concentration is low.

II. GYPSY POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND ITS DEFICIENCIES

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY The one signiﬁcant gain East European Gypsies made from the postcommunist transition was the opportunity to freely organize themselves. As a rule after 1989 the state no longer restrained Romani mobilization, although in some cases it divided and played off Gypsy organizations against one another.

THE WEAKNESS OF ROMANI IDENTITY Gypsy ethnic identity is weak. According to a recent monograph, “With the exception of Gypsy intellectuals who run the Rom(ani) political parties, the Rom(a) do not have an ethnic identity” at all.34 The Gypsies do have a distinctive identity, but their diversity makes it difﬁ-

34 Michael Stewart, The Time of the Gypsies (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), 28. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 289

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 289 cult to define. Fundamentally, all Roma share the same origins, culture, and traumatic historical experiences in Europe. The problem is that many do not consider themselves part of a cohesive ethnic group but identify instead with the tribe or other subgroup to which they belong. The absence of a strong ethnic identity has been a key reason for the deficiencies of Romani mobilization.35 Many Gypsies refuse to identify themselves with their ethnic background. A recent Slovak study found that educated Gypsies were especially likely to deny their ethnic identity.36 Many of them want to leave their Gypsiness behind, try to marry gadje (non-Roma), and hide their identity from the children resulting from these mixed marriages. The next generation is usually assimi- lated.37 According to a Czech expert, most Roma have lost their ethnic identity and “don’t want to be Gypsies.” Those who identify themselves as Roma tend to be of either very low social status who hope for increased social benefits or of the highest social status who possess political aspirations.38 There is an enormous cultural distance between the tiny Romani intelligentsia and the masses of undereducated and often apathetic ordinary Gypsies, which contributes to the poor political communication in the Romani community. The strengthening of a Gypsy national identity necessarily involves the invention of tradition because the Roma—lacking their own written historical tradition—have little to draw on.39 The tremendous diversity of Gypsy communities has made the unfolding of the Romani movement all the more difficult. Intra- community cleavages further split an already small potential constituency, impede political organization, and suggest the unlikelihood of a single, united, Gypsy political party being established in any one country. These divisions partly explain the rapid proliferation of Ro- mani organizations in the postsocialist era. The fact that there is little ethnic solidarity among the Roma con- stitutes a further impediment to their political mobilization. Gypsies do

35 See Zoltan Barany, “Ethnic Mobilization and the State: The East European Roma,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21 (March 1998), 312–13. 36 Cited by Arne B. Mann, “The Formation of the Ethnic Identity of the Romany in Slovakia,” in Jana Plichtová, ed., Minorities in Politics (Bratislava: Czechoslovak Committee of the European Cul- tural Foundation, 1992), 264. 37 Author interview with Ágnes Horváthová, head of Secretariat, Slovak Helsinki Commission, Bratislava, September 8, 1999. 38 Author interview with Jirˇina Sˇiklová, professor of sociology, Charles University, Prague, August 31, 1999. 39 Slawomir Kapralski, “Identity Building and the Holocaust: Roma Political Nationalism,” Nation- alities Papers 25, no. 2 (1997), 273. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 290

290 WORLD POLITICS not presently share an “imagined community” or the personal and cultural feelings of belonging to a nation. They comprise an extremely diverse ethnic group that can be differentiated according to lifestyle (peripatetic or sedentary), tribal affiliation, occupation, language, reli- gion, and the date of arrival in a given country. In several East Euro- pean states, such as Bulgaria and Romania, tribal identity—primarily rooted in the traditional economic activity of a group—remains a significant bond. Even in relatively small regions a dozen distinctive tribes may coexist. Intertribal marriage is highly unusual, even more so than intermarriage with gadje.40 The Romani population is vertically rather than horizontally differentiated and is becoming increasingly hierarchi- cal due to expanding economic opportunities. Hence, groups that are more successful tend to distance themselves from those they leave behind.41 In addition to traditional cleavages the Romani population is increasingly divided not only by the differences in their economic conditions but also by their disparate types of residency status and by the attitudes of the majority population. Gypsy migration splits the Ro- mani population further yet. Romani mobilization, little more than a decade old, is still in its in- fancy. In terms of mobilizational experience, the Gypsies have extremely little to draw on that could bolster their identity. In imperial and authoritarian states a few Roma managed to organize several short-lived Gypsy associations, but in nearly every case these were frag- mented by infighting. Hardly anyone among contemporary Roma is aware of these mobilizational attempts, however. Even though the state succeeded in keeping ethnic activism down during the socialist period, a handful of activist Gypsy intellectuals managed to emerge from the state-controlled Romani organizations. These are the individuals who have become the backbone of the Romani elite in postcommunist East- ern Europe.

DIVIDED LEADERSHIP Leadership is particularly important in the case of Gypsy organizations because Romani mobilization is elite centered, elite driven, and extremely paternalistic. Not surprisingly, the minuscule Gypsy intelligentsia and middle class have not generated a large pool of leaders. Consequently, Gypsy politics has become the bailiwick of a small group of intellectuals and activists. They have tried desperately but usually un-

40 Péter Szuhay, “Arson on Gypsy Row,” Hungarian Quarterly 36 (Winter 1995), 84. 41 See, for instance, Romove v Cˇeske republice (Prague: Socioklub, 1999), 540–41. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 291

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 291 successfully to prove that they do represent “their people” and that they do have a constituency, but they have been unable to influence or draw the Romani masses into politics. Romani elites have been plagued by a number of problems that have cost the East European Gypsies dearly. The history of Romani politics is best understood as a rapid succession of arcane quarrels between personalities and the corresponding birth and demise of their organizations. The most important leadership problem facing Roma has been what one activist calls “our national disease, hamishagos (to meddle or to disturb)” that “makes us want to hinder, instead of help, our own who are getting ahead.”42 Ironically, substantive differences between feuding Romani activists are often negligible, and the main source of contention is their personal ambition to supplant one another. Many Gypsy leaders are hypersensitive, taken to calling well-intentioned col- leagues, observers, and politicians “racists” if they disagree with them. Few Romani politicians concede the legitimacy of any approaches and views other than their own. Those who do not accept the position of the given leader are often ostracized from the organization. One of the most important shortcomings of many Romani activists and leaders is their inability to work well with state authorities. To be sure, both in the state-socialist period and since 1989 state officials have often succeeded in manipulating and dividing Romani leaders—neu- tralizing the most outspoken ones—in order to decrease ethnic pressures on the government and to promote the chances of their preferred Romani leaders and organizations in intraethnic competition. None- theless, Gypsy leaders often dismiss the genuinely good intentions of government officials, insist that a given ministry deal exclusively with them and not other Romani leaders, or let personal innuendo dominate their dealings with the authorities. Some moderate Gypsy leaders admit that the Roma’s own inability to harness the goodwill of the government has been a major weakness of their mobilization.43 In addition, Romani elites are split along two major axes, with the most important division being between traditional and modern leaders. The former tend to be rooted in their communities and typically have little formal education but have been successful in business or some other respected endeavor. Some traditional leaders are self-promoting “ethnic entrepreneurs” who use family influence to create momentary political spectacles, while others have actually worked hard for Gypsy

42 Cited by Isabel Fonseca, Bury Me Standing (New York: Knopf, 1995), 296. 43 Author interview with Klára Orgovánová, a program director at the Open Society Foundation, Bratislava, September 7, 1999. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 292

292 WORLD POLITICS causes. Although traditional leaders often claim to represent the entire Romani community of their country, they seldom command respect or authority outside their immediate surroundings. New-style activists, by contrast, tend to be younger, more dynamic, well-educated, and more clearly focused on practical objectives. Modern leaders are also more at home in gadje society and communicate more easily with state officials than do traditional leaders. Not surprisingly, government bureaucrats and foundation officials tend to prefer dealing with new-style activists. The other important split is between leaders of different tempera- ment or approach—between the “radicals,” or “extremists,” and those who are more moderate. Both types have advanced the Roma’s cause in different ways. Radical activists have been instrumental in keeping the Roma on the government’s agenda and in public focus. They often wildly exaggerate their points and unfairly accuse state organizations and others of ignoring the Gypsies’ conditions. Objectivity and a bal- anced approach may be missing from their political toolbox, but those are not the things they find helpful in their mission. Moderates are more open to compromise and view their own communities in a critical if compassionate manner. Indeed, moderate activists tend to be more successful in accomplishing pragmatic goals and completing tangible projects, yet those who finance their programs may well have been motivated to give by extremist leaders.

A MULTITUDE OF INCOMPETENT ORGANIZATIONS Gypsy organizations receive poor grades when evaluated against Hunt- ington’s criteria of institutionalization:44 they tend to be rigid and un- adaptable; have simple structure and few, often ill-deﬁned, objectives; and are marked by disunity. The most conspicuous attribute of Romani mobilization is the large number of organizations created throughout the 1990s (see Table 1). Why are there so many Romani groups? First, after decades of pro- hibition, the opportunity to establish independent organizations was tempting for Gypsy and non-Gypsy activists alike. Second, the region’s new association laws made it relatively easy to register formal groups. Third, the increasing availability of public and private ﬁnancial support for Gypsy-related organizations motivated more and more activists to set up formal bodies. Finally, like others, many Roma activists wanted to be in leadership positions and this was only possible if they established their own organizations. 44 See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12–24. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 293

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 293 TABLE 1 NUMBER OF GYPSY ORGANIZATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE (BY COUNTRY AND YEAR) Country 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 Bulgaria 50 75+ Czechoslovakia 44 Czech Republic 30+ 75+ Hungary 18 96 210+ 240 250+ Macedonia 2 36+ Poland 5 7+ Romania 25+ 42 58+ Slovakia 36 92+ Slovenia 7+

SOURCE: Adapted from Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 207. Data are available only for the years provided.

Dozens of Gypsy organizations have been formed around leaders who appeal to a specific constituency. As none of them are willing to share power,45 a leadership rift usually occurs, resulting in splinter groups and parties that do their best to undermine each other. Many Romani parties have been created amid great fanfare, only to fade into oblivion a few months later. Tracking them is therefore very difficult. Some Gypsy leaders have argued that many of the organizations that claim “national” status actually consist of single families, have been founded purely for financial gain, or are essentially phantom groups.46 With the maturation of Romani activism and the increasingly rigorous fiscal monitoring of funding agencies, however, the number of new organizations being founded has begun to taper off and more of them have been successful in pursuing projects useful for the Roma. Should we then conclude, along with many observers and Romani activists, that there are too many Gypsy organizations in Eastern Eu- rope? Not necessarily. A growing number of organizations are effective and have served as a training ground for thousands of Gypsies across the region, thereby directly contributing to Romani mobilization. The fact that the majority of East European settlements with substantial Romani communities now are home to some sort of independent

45 Zoltan Barany, “Living on the Edge: The East European Roma in Postcommunist Politics and Societies,” Slavic Review 53 (Summer 1994), 334. 46 Aladár Horváth in Budapest Week, September 9–15, 1993; and Béla Osztojkán, Megkérdezem Önt is (Budapest: Phralipe, 1994), 71. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 294

294 WORLD POLITICS Gypsy organizations or their branches (whether a political party, dance club, soccer team, or self-help group) is an important accomplishment. The majority of Romani organizations are loosely structured and elite driven. Although most of them are strictly local, there is also a growing number of regional and national ones with community branches. For instance, Partida Romilor (Roma Party, PR), the most important Romanian Gypsy political organization, has established active branches in nearly every county of the country, and Lungo Drom, a Hungarian sociopolitical organization, claims to have as many as six hundred local groups. The question of how many active members these organizations have is a basic one but the answer seldom reveals much about their real strengths or support base. First, even though state support in many cases is proportionate to membership, making it useful therefore to maintain membership rosters, most Romani groups do not keep even rough membership data. This is because of the high turnover and small number of actual members. Second, membership ﬁgures Roma leaders are wont to give often sound overstated and thus lack credence. One of the few exceptions is Karel Holomek, leader of the Association of Roma in Moravia, based in Brno (Czech Republic); he claims one thousand documented members. Membership fees are 10 crowns (US$ 0.30) per month, though Holomek concedes that few actually pay.47 The majority of Gypsy associations remain ineffective. They are poorly organized and have difﬁculty getting along with each other let alone working together—in large part because of their intense competition for scarce resources. At the same time, it is important to look at Romani mobilization in evolutionary terms. The number of Gypsy organizations that have positively affected the Roma has grown over time. Many of their projects now actually make a difference in the lives of Gypsies, and a growing number of activists have matured, gained experience, and focused their efforts on practical, worthwhile endeavors. Although the number of Gypsy socioeconomic NGOs is far larger than those focusing on political participation, Romani activists have organized a few dozen political parties and NGOs across the region. It is important to note that in countries like Romania, the state allows minority organizations to participate in local and national elections even if they are not registered as regular political parties. The reason is that electoral laws generally require regular parties to have a national presence (that is, branches in at least half of the counties) in order to par- 47 Author interview with Karel Holomek, former member of parliament, president of the Associa- tion of Roma in Moravia, Brno, September 1, 1999. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 295

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 295 ticipate in national elections. In the case of geographically compact minorities, such stature could not easily be achieved. In Bulgaria parties based on ethnic identity are constitutionally forbidden to register. Nonetheless, as the case of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms— a party with a predominantly Turkish membership—has shown, it is possible to register as a political party if the organization does not ex- plicitly disclose its ethnic focus.

THE PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ROMANI ORGANIZATIONS Few Romani organizations were able to devise realistic, coherent, and pragmatic programs during most of the 1990s, though in this respect, too, the situation had improved by the end of the decade.48 The political programs of Romani parties are often determined by the aspirations of individuals who may quarrel about specific points, and it is often un- clear which leader advocates which goal. Often there is little agreement on specific points. One of the most divisive has been Romani-language education. Some Gypsy leaders support it because they believe that it would strengthen the ethnic identity of their communities. Others are opposed to offering classes in Romani, believing that it would further widen the social gap between Gypsies and gadje and that it would di- minish the Roma’s prospects on the labor market.49 Unfortunately, however, substantive issues like this have been relegated to the background of Gypsy politics, which has been dominated by personality conflicts. The general aims of Romani organizations are similar across the region and much like those of other marginalized ethnic minorities. They include full recognition and effective enforcement of minority and civil rights, the promulgation of strong antidiscrimination laws, the imple- mentation of affirmative action programs in education, housing, em- ployment, and social welfare, and the receipt of broadcast time in the state-owned media proportionate to the size of the Romani population and its fair portrayal therein. The programs and demands of Gypsy groups have frequently been unreasonable—either unattainable, not warranted, or both—and the inevitable failures have increased the political apathy of many Roma

48 See, for instance, Anna Jurová, “Cigányok-romák Szlovákiában 1945 után,” Regio 7, no. 2 (1996), 50–51. 49 Author interviews with Gheorghe Raducanu, member of parliament and of the Council of Na- tional Minorities and a leader of the Partida Romilor, Bucharest, March 14, 1995; and Emilija Simoska, director of the Center for Ethnic Relations at the Institute for Sociological, Political, and Ju- ridical Research, Skopje, November 23, 1999. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 296

296 WORLD POLITICS and eroded support for their organizations. For instance, Gypsy parties routinely promise their supporters that they will place a specific number of their politicians in the local, regional, and state legislatures and nearly always fall far short of their pledges. More sensible objectives have been crowned with some successes such as, for example, the Hun- garian Roma’s peaceful demonstrations against discrimination, the translation of schoolbooks into the Romani language in Romania, and securing state financial support for privately organized Romani-language schools in Poland. What makes goals “reasonable” and, to a large extent, then, whether or not they are achieved depends on specific local conditions: the power and authority of the Romani organization, but even more importantly the priorities, possibilities, and especially the attitudes and policies of the pertinent local, regional, or state authorities. For instance, increasing Romani-language radio and/or television broadcast time for Mace- donian and Romanian Gypsy parties was a realistic goal; for their Bulgarian counterparts it was not, despite the fact that the objective conditions existed in all three states.

MEAGER FINANCIAL RESOURCES To a large extent, Gypsy mobilization has been paid for by non-Roma. The Gypsies’ own contributions remain minimal on the whole, because most Roma have very little disposable income and because most wealthy Gypsies prefer not to support Romani causes. To be sure, there are a handful of activists who have committed considerable amounts of their personal resources to Roma-related events, activities, and programs. And a few wealthy businessmen with political aspirations— among them Amdi Bajram (Macedonia), Florin Cioaba˘ (Romania), and Kyril Rashkov (Bulgaria)—not only bankroll their own parties but also support a number of other Gypsy-related causes. Across the region the bulk of the ﬁnancial support for Gypsy groups and activities has come from the state. Governments in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia have fully or partially ﬁnanced hundreds of Romani organizations and NGOs. In some cases the state provides support in proportion to the membership of the given organization; in other cases it provides funds only if the group can raise a certain percentage of the requested amount from other sources. Frequently, however, the state has not been an impartial grantor of its favors, and its political preferences rather than the relative merits of Gypsy organizations have determined how much is dis- bursed. Domestic and international foundations and, in some cases, v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 297

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 297 foreign governments and international organizations are another major source of financial support for Romani NGOs. In a few instances Gypsy political organizations have received funding from mainstream parties in exchange for campaigning efforts on their behalf in Romani communities or for entering into political alliances. Notwithstanding the various sources of financial support, most Ro- mani organizations are poorly funded. There are simply too many groups competing for the finite amount of available money. Some Gypsy activists concede that they have been ineffective lobbyists.50 An- other, more important problem has been what one might politely call the lackluster financial management practices of a large number of Ro- mani organizations. Gypsy leaders frequently lament that finding col- leagues who are “reliable with money” is exceedingly difficult.51 Both the mainstream and the Romani media are full of reports of missing millions, dubious accounting schemes, corruption, and bribery in Gypsy NGOs and parties.52 Rival Romani leaders often publicly accuse each other of mismanaging funds. According to a recent project examining the financial affairs of sixty- five Romani NGOs in the Czech Republic, the vast majority of them cannot account for the money they receive. Monies that were supposed to be spent on self-help projects or educational programs often end up supporting the leaders’ families and, in some cases, financing their em- igration to Western Europe and North America.53 The lack of proper financial oversight by many governments and funding institutions is partly responsible for this state of affairs. Even a major national Gypsy organization like Lungo Drom, which receives substantial amounts of taxpayer money annually, has been able to get away with financial impro- prieties because the rules governing its fiscal affairs are remarkably lax.54

COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA The press, television, and radio are potentially important tools for Ro- mani mobilization. Gypsy activists have long recognized the persistent biases of the mainstream media and have campaigned for the creation

50 Author interviews with Costel Vasile, leader of the Young Generation Society of the Roma, Bucharest, March 14, 1995; and Orgovánová (fn. 43). 51 Author interview with Holomek (fn. 47). 52 Some examples from Hungary: “Hiányosságot igen, visszaélést nem talált a számvevo˝szék,” and “Az elnökség és a központi hivatal tevékenysége elleno˝rizhetetlen,” Amaro Drom, April 1996, 12–13; and “Lelassult a romák szociális lakásprogramja,” Magyar Hírlap, April 14, 1998; “Képviselo˝k árulása,” Amaro Drom, February 1999, 10–11. 53 Author interview with Sˇiklová (fn. 38), who directed the project. 54 See the articles in Phralipe, December 1996, 3–8; and author interview with Antal Heizer, chief adviser at the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, Budapest, May 28, 1998. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 298

298 WORLD POLITICS of independent Gypsy media outlets since 1989. Many considered independent Romani newspapers, radio stations, and television channels especially desirable because they would have allowed the Roma to control programming and enjoy freer access to broadcast time. Gypsy activists have succeeded in establishing and supporting dozens of periodicals in the region. This is no mean feat considering the obstacles Romani publications constantly face. First, funding, usually provided by the state and foundations, is scarce and there is vigor- ous competition among applicants. In addition, advertising revenue is extremely low because potential advertisers are put off by the small cir- culation of Gypsy magazines and the low purchasing power of most Roma. Second, Gypsy periodicals have a limited readership because many Roma are illiterate or read little. More importantly, the large majority of even those Roma who read are either not interested in Gypsy periodicals or cannot afford them.55 Third, typically, the distribution of Romani magazines is a difficult task. Subscribers are few (primarily rel- evant NGOs and government agencies, prisons, and so on but few ordinary Roma), and street vendors, because of their prejudices or the anticipation of low sales, are in most cases unwilling to carry Romani papers.56 Fourth, editors have encountered problems in recruiting and retaining qualified journalists. In spite of a number of recent NGO- designed training programs, there are few Gypsy journalists. Finally, in many areas only a minority of Gypsies can speak or read Romani, so it is not useful as a language of publication. Thus, Gypsy communities fail to reap the benefits of intimacy, exclusivity, and pride that can be de- rived from publications in their own language. Given the problems associated with Romani newspapers, their effectiveness as an instrument of communication for Gypsy mobilization has been decidedly limited. Radio and television broadcasts for and about the Roma can have a much larger impact because the proportion of Gypsies who use these media outlets is much higher than those who read newspapers. Since 1989 most East European state radio and television companies have introduced programs for the Gypsies and, in some cases, continued those that originated in the socialist period. However, the time allocated for Roma-related broadcasts is nowhere

55 See a 1998 research project on the Romanian Roma directed by Catalin and Elena Zamﬁr; they found that only 7.3 percent read newspapers “often” and 56 percent “never” (Manuscript, 1999). See also The Media and the Roma in Contemporary Europe (Princeton: Project on Ethnic Relations, 1996), 14–16, 23. 56 Author interviews with Judit Horváth, editor-in-chief of Amaro Drom, Austin, March 31, 1995, and Ivan Vesely´, an ofﬁcial of the Romani Civic Initiative (Romská Obcˇanská Iniciativa), Prague, Au- gust 24, 1999. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 299

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 299 more than one hour per week. Gypsy activists have frequently com- plained that programs tend to contain too much music and dance and not enough treatments of substantive political and socioeconomic issues.57 In addition, in many cases programs are aired in the early morn- ing or late at night, when the potential audience is limited.

SYMBOLS The absence of a written Romani tradition means that Gypsies have few symbols to inspire their mobilization. Gypsy culture and history are preserved only in the Roma’s rich oral tradition; there are no monuments, memoirs of the Gypsy Holocaust, or other symbols around which activists can rally their people. History has been an alien concept in Ro- mani culture, where the dead are rarely mentioned and seldom become the objects of commemoration.58 In recent years international Gypsy organizations, seeking to create enduring symbols that could undergird Gypsy identity, have chosen a Romani ﬂag and anthem. Unfortunately, the vast majority of ordinary Gypsies are entirely unaware of them. The weaknesses of Romani mobilization—in contrast to the strengths of other East European ethnic minorities (for example, Alba- nians in Macedonia and Turks in Bulgaria) in engaging in collective political action—is all the more noteworthy, because they, unlike other minorities, have received substantial help from external sources. Liter- ally hundreds of domestic and foreign nongovernmental organizations and foundations have designated the alleviation of the Romani predica- ment as their principal objective. Dozens of NGOs have established hundreds of social and economic programs to assist Gypsy communities in meeting their everyday challenges. Furthermore, many NGOs have assisted Gypsy organizations ﬁnancially, and their political con- sultants have provided advice on a large spectrum of issues, from how to cast a ballot to how to prepare campaign materials.

III. GYPSY ELECTORAL POLITICS AND BEHAVIOR

FACTORS HINDERING ELECTORAL SUCCESS Some of the reasons for the Roma’s lackluster electoral performance are rooted in the occasional efforts by East European states to contain

57 Author interview with Jarka Balázˇová, editor of the Roma radio program in Prague, Prague, Au- gust 14, 1996. 58 See Andrzej Mirga and Lech Mróz, Cyganie: Odmiennos´c´ i nietolerancja (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1994), 31–32. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 300

300 WORLD POLITICS Gypsy mobilization. Especially in the early 1990s, when Romani activists were inexperienced and ordinary Gypsies were easily deceived, state authorities and mainstream party officials frequently intimidated would-be Gypsy voters. During the June 1990 Bulgarian parliamentary elections, for instance, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) successfully manipulated the Gypsy community by spreading rumors and influenc- ing their voting.59 More recently Slovak officials managed to deceive Romani candidates at the 1998 mayoral election in the Gypsy-majority district Lunik 9 in the city of Kos˘ice.60 The fact that Gypsy political organizations routinely divide up the Romani vote has reduced their parliamentary representation. For instance, in the September 1992 Romanian elections five different Ro- mani organizations split the nearly 120,000 votes that could have translated into four seats in the legislature. As a result, Gypsies had to settle for the one seat guaranteed by the constitution. (Romania is the only East European state where all ethnic minorities have a guaranteed seat in the legislature.) No fewer than thirteen Gypsy parties registered prior to the 1998 Slovak national elections, but eventually none could run candidates for parliament on their own. They were unable to form effective electoral coalitions with each other or with mainstream parties. Although the Roma constitute nearly one-tenth of Slovakia’s population, they failed to place a single MP in the Bratislava legislature. In order to combine their strength, Romani groups in every East European state have repeatedly formed or tried to form electoral coalitions and umbrella organizations with other Gypsy organizations. Here I mention just two of the dozens of examples. As early as December 1990 diverse Romani groups in Hungary rallied in the Romaparla- ment, with the explicit goal of gaining parliamentary seats. In 1993 seventeen Slovak Gypsy parties and groups formed the Union of Slo- vak Roma. The majority of these bodies have come up against the very same problems as individual Gypsy associations: mutual disdain and suspicion, infighting, and a marked inability to reach a compromise.

RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANI AND MAJORITY POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS Building relations with mainstream political parties has been an objective of several East European Gypsy organizations, given their failures

59 See, for instance, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Gypsies of Bulgaria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 43; and author interviews with Rumyana Kolarova and Nikolay Gentchev, professors of political science and history, respectively, at the University of Soﬁa, Soﬁa, March 6–7, 1995. 60 Jakob Hurrle, “On the Outskirts of Kosice,” Newsletter of the HCAR, no. 6 (1998), 13–15. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 301

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 301 to gain political representation on their own. Such parties, however, have seldom entered into electoral coalitions with Gypsy parties, for two reasons. First, the proportion of the Roma in the general population is relatively small and their voting participation has typically been far below that of the majority. Second and more important, putting a Gypsy on a party’s list has been widely recognized as a liability because of widespread societal bias against Roma. Therefore, offering individual Roma, however well known and admired, spots on electoral lists takes courage that few parties have. In a few cases Gypsy politicians have been put on mainstream party rosters, but they were placed so low on the list that they had little chance of winning. Parties have often shied away from disclosing that one of their fair-skinned candidates was a Rom lest potential voters be scared away. According to László Lengyel, a noted Hungarian political analyst, for mainstream parties one Ro- mani vote means the loss of two others.61 Mainstream parties have found other ways of courting Gypsy voters. They have tried to appeal to Romani groups on the local level and have asked well-known Romani personalities to campaign for them in their communities. For instance, during the 1996 national elections Ion Ili- escu’s then ruling Party of Democratic Socialism in Romania (PDSR) used a local Gypsy chief, Ion Cioaba˘, to garner the substantial Romani vote in the city of Sibiu.62 Several East European parties resorted to the more direct approach of buying the Romani vote. Many observers claim that parties of all political hues have paid for Gypsy votes with cash, food supplies, or festivals. Given the nature of these acts they are difﬁcult to prove, but reports are especially widespread concerning the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the BSP.63 In general, mainstream parties seek to co-opt the Roma through short-term political calculations rather than a prospective electoral program. The average politician’s view is that s/he cannot rely on Gypsy votes because the Roma are easily manipulated. Thus, it does not make sense to devise long-term electoral strategies aimed at the Roma, because two days before the election the rival party’s representative can show up in the Romani community to distribute some money or food

61 “Ki bazsevál jövo˝re a cigányoknak?” Népszava, August 24, 1993. 62 OMRI Daily Digest 2, no. 6 ( January 9, 1996). 63 Author interviews with Kolarova (fn. 59); Krassimir Kanev of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Sofia, March 6, 1995; Elena Marushiakova, an ethnographer at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, March 9, 1995; Yonko Grozev, legal adviser to the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Sofia, No- vember 11, 1999; Orgovánová (fn. 43), Presˇov, June 13, 1994, and Bratislava, September 7, 1999; Péter Huncˇik, president of the Sándor Máray Foundation, Bratislava, August 15, 1996; Michal Vasécˇka, Roma specialist at the Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, August 15, 1996; and Ingrid Bauman- nová, a consultant to the Foundation for Civic Society, Bratislava, September 6, 1999. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 302

302 WORLD POLITICS or promise a festival and the Gypsies will vote for his party. At times these electoral machinations have actually backfired. For instance, prior to the 1998 national elections and the 1999 presidential campaign workers of two major parties distributed food in the Romani suburb Shuto Orizari in Macedonia, but the Gypsies voted for another party, the social democrats, which had totally ignored them in their campaigns.64 The first serious electoral agreement between a major political party and a prominent Romani organization was the “protocol” targeting the December 2000 national elections between the PDSR and the Partida Romilor, concluded at the latter’s October 1999 national congress.65 According to the PDSR-PR concord, the PR would support the PDSR’s campaign and encourage Roma to vote for Iliescu’s party. In return, the PDSR offered to extend social help to the Roma and involve the PR in policy-making. Critics of the agreement were quick to point out that the Gypsies’ conditions under Iliescu’s six-year reign (1990–96) were far worse than they were afterward.66 In contrast, PR president Nicolae Paun contended that the pact was beneficial for the Roma for three reasons. First, for the first time in their history, a major political party was willing to engage the Romanian Gypsies in substantive discussions and to sign a policy agreement with them. Second, the PDSR committed itself to solve the Roma’s social problems through a national strategy to be elaborated by the PR. Finally, the PDSR agreed to co-opt the PR into the governing process and promised two influential places in the government: a councillor at the President’s Office and a governmental minister responsible for dealing with the Gypsy affairs.67 Within weeks of its December 2000 electoral victory PDSR delivered, appointing two PR leaders to the promised posts. Moreover, an additional PR leader be- came an MP in the PDSR’s colors.

GYPSY VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL RESULTS Some aspects of the Romani organizations’ electoral campaigns have been fairly similar to those of mainstream parties. Gypsy activists visit Romani communities, organize meetings and speak with constituents, put up electoral posters, and advertise themselves and their organizations in the Gypsy media. In exceptional cases wealthy Romani candi-

64 Author interview with Simoska (fn. 49). 65 See “Iliescut támogatják a romák,” Szabadság (Cluj), October 25, 1999; and the text of the protocol, published in the PR’s newspaper, Asul de treﬂa 80 (1999), 17–19. 66 Author interview with Dan Pavel, director of the Project on Ethnic Relations Bucharest ofﬁce, Bucharest, November 2, 1999. 67 Author interview with Nicolae Paun, president of Partida Romilor, Bucharest, November 5, 1999. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 303

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 303 dates, like Amdi Bajram in Macedonia in 1997, might distribute food or money among their constituents. The majority of campaigns have been fairly disorganized, however, lacking focus, cohesive leadership, and money. In recent years, as Romani mobilization has matured in some states, like Romania, campaigns have become more sophisticated and attracted more volunteer campaign workers.68 In the case of those Romani political organizations affiliated with mainstream parties, campaigning for that party—or against a particularly objectionable rival party—has been at the center of preelection activities. Traditionally the Roma have kept their distance from politics, which many perceive to be a gadje concern and endeavor. Gypsy leaders often complain of how difficult it is to convince Roma to cast their ballots because most of them have no confidence in the electoral system. Another problem, partly the fault of Romani leaders, is that a large percentage of ordinary Gypsies are unaware of their organizations (90 percent in 1994 in Hungary).69 Yet another difficulty is that many Roma simply do not know how to cast a ballot properly. Activists have documented numerous cases in Romania of the local Gypsy leader going to vote for the entire Romani community.70 There have also been many instances when the Gypsies’ votes were invalid because they voted for all, rather than for one, Gypsy organizations on the ballot. In addition, Roma who are illiterate or do not possess registration cards attesting to their permanent residency are not allowed to vote. Several patterns of Romani voting behavior can be identified. First, the majority of Gypsies tend to cast their votes for the party in power at the time of the election or for the party that is expected to win.71 Sec- ond, a disproportionately large number of Roma have voted for the suc- cessors of former communist parties—reflecting their nostalgia for the relative security and prosperity they associate with the socialist era. Third, though other large ethnic minorities like Hungarians in Roma- nia and Slovakia tend to vote along ethnic lines, Gypsies often do not because they have little confidence in their own. According to a recent analysis, “A Romani candidate is likely to receive only about a third of

68 Author interviews with Nora Costache, an activist with the Young Generation Society of the Roma, Bucharest, May 23, 1996; and Ivan Gheorghe, secretary general of Partida Romilor, Bucharest, November 5, 1999. 69 Gábor Havas, Gábor Kertesi, and István Kemény, “The Statistics of Deprivation: The Roma in Hungary,” Hungarian Quarterly 36 (Summer 1995), 80. 70 Author interviews with Nicoleta Bit¸u of Romani CRISS, Bucharest, May 23, 1996; and Géza Ötvös, head of the Wassdas Foundation, Cluj, October 26, 1999. 71 “Gypsies Miss Out as Eastern Europe’s Democratic Caravan Hits the Road,” Guardian, June 21, 1990; “A Parlamentbe készül a Magyarországi Cigánypárt,” Népszabadság, June 15, 1992; “Cigányvok- sok,” Magyar Narancs, September 23, 1993. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 304

304 WORLD POLITICS the votes of Romani voters and is unlikely to gain many votes at all from the majority population.”72 Fourth, the voting participation rate of Gypsies—given the factors outlined above—is far below that of the majority population. According to reliable estimates, less than 15 percent of Roma participate in elections.73 Considering their proportion in the general population, there should be dozens of Romani MPs across the region. Instead, in 2001 there were six: Monika Horáková in the Czech Republic, Madalin Voicu and Nicolae Paun in Romania, Asen Hristov in Bulgaria, and Amdi Bajram and Djulistana Markovska in Macedonia. Of the six, Bajram was elected on his own, Horáková, Hristov, Markovska, and Voicu were on the lists of mainstream parties, and Paun held the seat guaranteed by the Romanian constitution to the Gypsy minority. An often overlooked yet important point is that there might actually be quite a few more Roma in East European legislatures who do not openly identify themselves with their ethnic heritage. There has been progress in Gypsy mobilization, as seen, in particular, in the growing number of Romani elected local officials. On the local level—especially in areas where Gypsies make up a substantial proportion of voters—Romani activists have improved their electoral record with each successive local election. In Romania, for instance, voters elected 106 Gypsies as local council members in 1992, 136 in 1996, and 160 (and 4 county councilpersons) in 2000.74 In Macedonia their number had increased from 15 in the 1990 municipal elections to 23 in 1996.75 In Slovakia Roma elected 56 Gypsy council members and 6 mayors in the 1998 local elections.76 In Bulgaria relatively few Romani local officials were elected until the October 1999 local elections. For the first time, two Gypsy parties (Svobodna Bulgariya and the Demo- cratic Congress Party)—though not registered as ethnic parties—man-

72 Political Participation and the Roma in Hungary and Slovakia (Princeton: Project on Ethnic Rela- tions, 1999), 5. 73 See, for instance, author interviews with János Báthory, an official at the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Budapest, June 9, 1994; Raducanu (fn. 49); András Bíró, president of the Au- tonómia Foundation, Budapest, July 26, 1996; and Ivan Gabal of Gabal Analysis and Consulting, Prague, August 24, 1999. 74 The Legislative and Institutional Framework for the National Minorities of Romania (Bucharest: Ro- manian Institute for Human Rights, 1994), 100; and author interview with Dan Oprescu, head of Na- tional Office for the Roma, Department for the Protection of National Minorities, Government of Romania, Bucharest, November 2, 1999. 75 Basic Statistical Data for the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Statistical Office of Macedonia, 1992), 48; and Basic Statistical Data for the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Statistical Office of Macedonia, 1998), 66–69. 76 Michal Vasˇecˇka, “The Roma,” in Gregoríj Mesˇeznikov et al., eds., Slovakia, 1998–1999: A Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute of Public Affairs, 1999), 404. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 305

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 305 aged to get 92 of their candidates elected.77 Again, in addition to these Roma, dozens of others have succeeded in local elections representing mainstream parties and, quite likely, dozens more who do not openly identify themselves as Roma. In sum, there are now hundreds of Gypsy local councilpersons and perhaps a dozen municipal mayors and sub- mayors across Eastern Europe. Poland, where there are no known Romani council members, and the Czech Republic—where there are at most five—add little to this total. Poland’s small (0.09 percent of the overall population) Romani community is so widely dispersed that it makes up only a tiny proportion of the electorate in most electoral districts. The deficiencies of Gypsy mobilization, combined with more acute anti-Romani prejudices and the low geographical concentration of Gypsies, are the most important reasons for the small number of elected Romani officials in the Czech Republic. Hungary is a special case given its minority self-government system that provides opportunities for minorities to form their own adminis- trative bodies locally and nationally. In the three elections held for minority self-government since 1994, Hungarian Roma elected an increasing number of local assemblies: 416 in 1994, an additional 61 in 1995 (supplemental elections had to be held because some localities were not prepared), and 765 in 1998.78 As a result, thousands of Hun- garian Roma have not only been involved in the electoral process but have also served their own self-governments in different capacities. The foregoing analysis identified some of the reasons for the differences in the Romani experience of mobilization across the region. Gen- erally speaking, Gypsy political activism tends to be most effective in countries (Hungary and Romania) where the Romani community is substantial in both absolute terms and as a percentage of the overall population and where state policies have been at least somewhat sup- portive both politically and financially, regardless of the government in power. In countries where the Romani population is relatively small and/or widely dispersed (Czech Republic, Macedonia, Poland) or where state policies have impeded Gypsy political activism (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia) Romani mobilization is less likely to succeed. It is also worth noting that Hungarian and Romanian Gypsy

77 Author interview with Petar Atanasov, secretary of the National Council on Ethnic and Demo- graphic Issues at the Council of Ministers, Soﬁa, November 15, 1999. 78 After 1998 two self-governments ceased to exist; therefore, their number in 2000 was 763. See Csaba Tabajdi, Látlelet a magyarországi cigányság helyzetéro˝l (Budapest: Miniszterelnöki Hivatal, 1996), 12; “Helyi nyero˝k,” Amaro Drom, November 1998, 3. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 306

306 WORLD POLITICS mobilization beneﬁted from better leadership and more sophisticated organizations than Romani political activism elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

CONCLUSION The regime change from socialism to democracy afforded the Roma the opportunity to alleviate their political marginality. Nonetheless, by virtually all criteria of successful ethnic mobilization discussed above, their preparation for collective political action is lacking. After a decade of mobilization the Gypsies remain woefully underrepresented in East- ern Europe’s polities. Weak ethnic identity, poor leadership, the proliferation of organizations, the absence of substantial resources, and low voter participation have thwarted their collective action and impeded their ability to affect state policies. Given the diversity of Gypsy communities and their minimal political experience and financial resources, the initial failings of Romani politics should not come as a surprise. As Gypsy associations and their leaders mature by virtue of their pro- tracted participation in political processes, they are likely to become more effective. One of the fundamental objectives of ethnic political mobilization is to exert pressure on the state to formulate and implement policies favorable to the ethnic group. Since the fall of the ancien régime, the policies of East European states toward the Gypsies have become much more progressive, even if tangible changes in the Roma’s conditions have been unremarkable. These shifts in policy have been due not to the largely ineffective work of Gypsy activists, however, but in large part to the relentless pressure of international organizations like the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and especially, the European Union. It is often difficult to firmly establish direct correlation between international pressures and changes in domestic policies, because governments are rarely keen to admit their vulnerability to such pressures. There can be no doubt, however, that the policy changes governments have implemented regarding minorities in general and the Roma in particular are motivated in large part by external factors, such as a desire to join the EU. To this end, the EU has repeatedly made it clear to East European governments that a fundamental criterion of membership is substantial improvement in the Gypsies’ situation. Another reason for the leverage of international organizations vis-à-vis the East European v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 307

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 307 states is the nascent democracies’ increasing sensitivity to the importance of projecting a positive international image. The model of mobilizational prerequisites detailed here and illus- trated through the Romani experience is broadly applicable not only to cases of ethnic mobilization but also to social and political movements in a variety of contexts. This model should be especially useful for comparative studies of social and political movements. Looking at cases of ethnic and other types of mobilization through the lens of mobilizational prerequisites should facilitate the rigorous evaluation of these movements and their chances for success. To be sure, although some prerequisites—political opportunity, strong ethnic identity, effective leadership, and a clear organizational profile—are critical to mobilizational success, the weight of other variables will depend to a degree on the particulars of each case. Not all prerequisites need be positive in order to produce desired mobilizational outcomes; but clearly, a group’s chances of success increase as more of the prerequisites are met. The shortcomings of Romani mobilization underscore the signifi- cance and explanatory power of mobilizational prerequisites. The foregoing analysis of one key prerequisite—a coherent ethnic identity —also highlights a number of ways that reductionism in the analysis sacrifices accuracy on the altar of methodological clarity. Understand- ing ethnic identity and the success or failure of ethnic mobilization in- escapably requires that serious attention be paid to the contextual importance of the variables that endow this subject with such conceptual richness.