AFTER 1989 East European States Created the Political Opportu

v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 277 ETHNIC MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PREREQUISITES The East European Gypsies By ZOLTAN BARANY* FTER 1989 East European states created the political opportu- A nity for ethnic minorities to mobilize themselves and gain representation in state, regional, and local legislatures through electoral competition. Albanians in Macedonia, Hungarians in Slovakia and Ro- mania, Turks in Bulgaria, and other previously marginalized ethnic minorities quickly achieved levels of representation approximating their proportion in their respective societies. Almost all of their candidates ran on their own ethnic parties’ tickets, and virtually all those who voted for them were their conationals. The approximately five million Gypsies (Roma)1 constitute by far the largest and most marginalized ethnic minority in Eastern Europe. They have coexisted with these societies since their arrival in the region some seven centuries ago, yet they have been consistently and com- prehensively marginal and marginalized politically, economically, and socially regardless of country or regime type. Their objective socio- economic conditions, which actually improved during four decades of state-socialist rule, have rapidly and markedly deteriorated in the com- petitive economic environment of postcommunist Eastern Europe. Concomitantly, interethnic relations have worsened as long-standing anti-Gypsy prejudice has frequently found expression in overt discrimination, and the Roma’s deepening social problems and reliance on modest state resources have continued to fuel tensions. Given that in several East European states the Roma comprise a substantial percentage of the overall population (Bulgaria 8.5, Hungary * I am grateful to Valerie Bunce, Milton J. Esman, Gary P. Freeman, Donald L. Horowitz, Rasma Karklins, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on different versions of this study and to the Ford Foundation, IREX, and the University of Texas for their financial support of my research. 1 Some Gypsies prefer to be referred to as “Roma” (which means “men” in the Romani language), the singular of which is “Rom”; the adjective is “Romani.” I will use “Roma” and “Gypsies” inter- changeably. World Politics 54 (April 2002), 277–307 v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 278 278 WORLD POLITICS 4.7, Romania 6.6, and Slovakia 9.5), one would expect that they, like other minority groups, would have gained a proportionate political presence once they were granted the opportunity to mobilize. This did not happen. In fact, in 2001 the Roma held a total of only six seats in East European national legislatures, and only one of them acquired his mandate as a representative of a Gypsy party. The low political efficacy of the region’s Roma is all the more surprising because they, unlike other ethnic minorities, have received a great deal of financial assistance and mobilizational advice from Western NGOs, governments, and international organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Or- ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, these and other organizations have brought intense political pressure to bear on East European states to improve their treatment of Gypsy minorities. Although there is still widespread societal discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe, state policies toward them have become considerably more progressive in the past decade. Nor can discrimination alone account for the outcome of their political mobilization, given that suppressed marginal groups all over the world manage to mobilize in spite of discrimination. What, then, explains this puzzle? In the enormous and quickly growing literature on ethnic politics, ethnic mobilization per se has received relatively scant attention. Three perspectives emerged in the early theoretical work on ethnic mobilization (1960s and 1970s).2 Developmental theories of ethnic mobilization tended to view it as a phenomenon that generally occurred in less de- veloped societies and one that was inextricably linked to the early phases of state building.3 In contrast to the developmentalists, the structural differentiationist approach held that the modern states may in fact enhance impulses for ethnic mobilization rather than thwart it.4 Finally, the ethnic competition perspective contended that ethnic mobilization was first and foremost the result of rivalry and contention be- 2 See Charles C. Ragin, “Ethnic Political Mobilization: The Welsh Case,” American Sociological Re- view 44 (August 1979), 620–22; and Susan Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” Annual Re- view of Sociology 9 (1983), 355–63. 3 See, for instance, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), esp. 1–64; Juan J. Linz, “Early State Building and Late Peripheral Na- tionalisms against the State: The Case of Spain,” in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Building States and Nations (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973); and Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe: Group Iden- tity and Political Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). 4 See Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 147–78; Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and François Nielsen, “Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies,” American Sociological Review 50 (April 1985), 133–49. v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 279 ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GYPSIES 279 tween different ethnic groups and that the state played only a secondary role in stimulating mobilization.5 Recent studies have focused on more specific dimensions of ethnic mobilization. The work of Rasma Karklins on the final years of the So- viet Union showed that the delegitimization of the ancien régime went hand in hand with the delegitimization of old ethnic policies and that democratization was tied to ethnic power sharing.6 The mobilization efforts of noncitizen immigrant minorities who reside in Western Eu- rope but nevertheless are not entitled to the international mobility en- couraged by the EU have been the focus of innovative work in Europe.7 Other recent work integrates class-based factors with racial and ethnic factors to examine what motivates African-Americans, Latinos, and others to mobilize and become active in politics.8 My attempt to better understand ethnic mobilization differs markedly from these approaches: my objective is to learn more about the mobi- lizing group itself. This approach, I argue, will help us assess its chances for successful political action. I propose a model that provides a useful tool to evaluate the preparedness of ethnic and other groups for political mobilization. The model has predictive value for estimating the mobilization potential of a variety of communities, and by pinpointing strengths and deficiencies, it can also potentially help groups that are embarking on political action. I argue that successful ethnic mobilization requires a well-specified functional bundle of what I call “mobilizational prerequisites.” The model of mobilizational prerequisites can be applied to evaluate political or social movements in a variety of contexts. I take the case of the East European Roma not only because its mobilizational outcome is anomalous but also because in important respects it is the only case that endogenizes significant variation. Across a wide range of countries, political regimes, and party contexts in which the Roma have tried to 5 See for instance, Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Wiley, 1967); Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Michael T. Hannan, “The Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States,” in John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National Development and the World System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Joane Nagel and Susan Olzak, “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Exten- sion of the Competition Model,” Social Problems 30 (December 1982); and Juan Diez Medrano, “The Effects of Ethnic Segregation and Ethnic Competition on Political Mobilization in the Basque Coun- try, 1988,” American Sociological Review 59 (December 1994), 873–89. 6 Karklins, Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 7 See, for instance, John Rex and Beatrice Drury, eds., Ethnic Mobilization in a Multicultural Europe (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1994). 8 See Jan E. Leighley, Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minori- ties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). v54.3.1.barany.277-307.cx.sb 8/1/02 4:29 PM Page 280 280 WORLD POLITICS mobilize, only the striking absence of these functional prerequisites in their arsenal of mobilizational strategies explains the latter’s deficiencies. In the remainder of the article I outline these independent variables and assess their relative power and then show how the lack of these mobilizational criteria has impeded Gypsy political mobilization. I con- clude with a brief discussion of Romani electoral politics and behavior. I. MOBILIZATION PREREQUISITES Susan Olzak defines ethnic mobilization as “the process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends.”9 Political mobilization, according to

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