78S/^-/V 2/jnoo THE TRUE FACTS OF THE LEYTE OPERATION

by

MAJOR GENERAL YOSHIHARU TOMOCHIKA

TRANSLATED BY

166th LANGUAGE DETACHMENT

SPECIAL STAFF U. S. ARMY

HISTORICAL DIVISION y (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT FILE) / /

FILE NO. 8-5 3S-lll ACC. NO, 786/2-11.

Yoshiharu Tomochika ******$ ;

AGENCY OF ORIGIN 10th I&H Service, Eighth Army fgffBt vmcmo?mxwmm KEVipra -j DEWSTMENT Or THE ARMY 3ft .,-v-— WASK«i 25, D. G. W Que

41 13304 REPRODUCED BY

IOTH INFORMATION AND HISTORICAL SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY

AGO MICROFILM

lint kos,.-3/61- L 1

A \ * '4 • ' iTY CLASSIP"•iCATlON 11 (If any) IWOm I DISPOSITION FORM

FILE NO. SUBJECT CSIIIS Historical Manuscript- The True Facts of the Leyte Operations TO FROM DATE COMMENT NO. 1 Chief, Security Classification Historical Division Wioe/5955 Review Board SSTJSA 8 APK \94ft Room 53 527

1. Request that the attached historical manuscript, title as shown above, be considered for downgrading from present classification to UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE CHIEF, HISTORICAL DIVISION

1 Incl E. M. HARRIS The True Facts of the Lt. Colonel, GSC Leyte Opns Executive

AGAD 312.1/Security (49-162)

TOs Chief, Historical Division FROM: OTAG DATEs 18 April 1949 COMMENT No. 2 SSUSA, Rm 5E 867, Pentagon Mr. Parise/73255/meg

Subject document has been declassified as requested.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

L. L. CLAYTON,/Colonel, CAC, Chief, Security Classification Review Branch 1 Incl. n/c ^.k £ \

££1 16—54801-2 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE NME t°0CT 48 96 Replaces DA AGO Form 897, 1 Oct 47, which may be used. hiA 17 March 19k9

MEMORANDUM FOR! CHIEF, HISTORICAL DIVISION

SUBJECT: Review of "The True Facts of the Layte Operations" ayyt supporting tactical interrogations (Access Ho. 786/2-14)

1. a. The material covered by this review consists of 9$ pages, mimeographed, on legal-sise sheets. The classification is RESTRICTED.

b. Timet 16 October 19UU - 8 September I9h$ Placet Leyte & Mindanao, P.I. Unitt 35th Japanese Ara^

e. These notes were written by MaJ. Gen. Tomochika, Chief of Staff, 35th Japanese Any after his surrender, pins a transcript of supporting tactical interrogation.

2. Scope of the study:

This volume covers the activities of the 35th Japanese Irxqr from the opening of the Loyte Campaign until the Japanese sur­ render. It brings into sharp focus the difficulties the Japanese faced in attempting to contain the American offensive, both tacti­ cally and administratively, the gradual disintegration of the Jap aorale and command, and their eventual utter defeat.

3. Consents on source aaterial and their usei

The only sources called upon are the personal reminiscenci and opinions of the author and those interrogated.

it. Consents on presentation*

a. The whole is written in a clear, concise Banner.

b. The subject appears to be covered adequately. Key problems are noted, as well as failures and successes.

o. The approach to the subject is objective, but personal, and there appears to be evidence of some defeatism and bias. How­ ever, the accompanying interrogations bear out stueh of the author's thesis and gives support to the objectivity of the whole.

5. Appraisal of valuer

The subject is related to the Department of the Arcgr historical program. The manuscript will be extremely valuable to one writing on the Leyte Campaign or on the organization and break­ down of the Jap Army system. It gives an excellent example of poor overall organisation and planning, with emphasis on inadequacy of supply, communications, and intelligence, both tactical and admin­ istrative. It is a superb example of why the Jap Aray never won a major victory over a force of equal size.

6. Classification!

Classification should be reduced to UNCLASSIFIED.

7. Disposition recommendedt

a. File for reference.

b. This material has been sent to the naciflc Section.

8. Reviewed 17 March 19h9t byj

E. M. HOWELL Historian

2 '.CSfUS - 1st I&d* ; SO/ffl.af/3657 : . \ , Historical Division, SSUSA, Room 52-367* Pentagon, Washington 25, 0.C. ' • . . • - . 3 1 MAR ;T^49; TQi .Chief, Applied Studies Group, Historical Division, SSUSA, Washington if>, i>.C.

• 1, fhe title of this study alone ie an'-indication of the type of un- couscious bias one is eure to find i'a a snort history *rittaa by a.-defeated .mm/. It r.eesae to be essentiai that aoaa "sort of general warning about tsia. mxu& of -such studies toe- sa&d© available to uo©rs.

£..• I concur in the revi©*.

ST1TE.I COSS Acting Chief Historian ft ft t +SQ J*-jU 0002536

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 343

3 December 19/4-6

SUEJECT: Translation of Japanese Booklet, "The True Facts of the Leyte Operation" and supporting Tactical Interrogations.

TO s Historical Section, Headquarters Eighth Arry, APO 343.

1. Inclosed, for your information and file, is a translation of a recently published booklet entitled "The True Facts of the Leyte Operation" by ex-Ilajor General TOMOCriKA, former Chief of Staff of the Thirty Fifth i Japanese Artiy (equivalent to a U.S. Corps Headquarters). This arny con­ ducted the defense of the Island of Leyte and certain of the subsequent operations in Central and Southern Philippines.

2. Tactical interrogations of General TOMOCKIKA, author of the subject patrphletj HARADA, C.G. of the 100th Division, and HOROZUMI, C.G. 30th Division are inclosed as supporting documents. The interro- were conducted by officers of the G-2 Section of X Corps Headquarters immediately following the surrender of the Japanese forces on Mindanao in September 1945.

GEORGE A. A. JONES * Colonel, GSC AC of S, G-2

4 Incls. 1. Translation of Japanese Booklet, , "The True Facts of the Leyte Operation" 2. Interrogation of Torochika 3. Interrogation of Morozumi 4. Interrogation of Karada

^SgiiNO^.

REVIEWED -n By JtJfyi&ff Date TFE TRUE FACTS OF THE

LF.YTE OPERATION

BY

Major General YOSKIHARU TOMOCHIKA

Consisting of

Notes on the Mindanao and Leyte Campaigns

Translated by 166th Language Detachment

Under the supervision of AC of S, G-2

Eighth Army, APO 343

5 November 194-6

INTRODUCTION

EY

KEISUKE SAITO

FORMER DOiffil FLWS CORRESPONDENT

REPRODUCED BY

10TH Ii.FORiiATION AliD HISTORICAL SERVICE (G-2 Comment: Saito describes prison camp and relates the circum­ stances of receiving General Tomochika1s memoirs.)

There was a total of eighteen concentration camps located in DAIIAO, MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. The site covered an area two miles square and contained forty thousand Japanese, both soldiers and civilians who had fought on MINDANAO and escaped with their lives. All were eager to return to their native land.

My camp, Number 3, contained one thousand persons, arny and naval officers, and included eome civilians. Among the army officers in this camp was the former Chief of Staff of the 35th ARMY*, Major General Yoshiharu Tomochika. ^he 35th ARMY had been defeated in Leyte. Although I had known Tomochika during the IEYTE operations, I had not had the opportunity to become acquainted with him.

At the IEYTE Headquarters they had been thirty staff officers but only twelve of these arrived at the concentration camp after the surrender. Of the fourteen news correspondents in the field at IEYTE, nine were killed and one died of starvation. I was the only correspon­ dent in the concentration camp.

General Tomochika and I would sit and discuss the war, and it was at this time that he commenced writing his memoirs. When, after fifteen days, he had completed them, I asked his permission to read them.

He replied, "Yes, and when you return to the homeland, if you feel that the people there would like to read such memoirs as these, you have my permission to publish them1."

I read it at once with a reporters instinct and it 'became apparent to me that this report was tantamount to a true confession of the causes of the defeat in IEYTE. I feel that by reading these memoirs one can obtain a clear understanding of the true picture of the Japanese defeat in the PHILIPPINES. I can definitely prove that the reports of the LEYTE Operation which were disseminated in the homeland were the inventions of the TOKYO Intelligence Section and did not emanate from the MANILA Head­ quarters, The true story did not reach the homeland because the two sets of radio transmitters carried b; the fourteen correspondents, originally dispatched to IEYTE, were destroyed before they could be used. These memoirs are the first publication dealing with the LEYTE Operation that has been offered to the public.

Although certain officers in the concentration camp demanded that this r-anuscript be destroyed or turned over to them, I refused their demands and told them that I would accept full responsibility for this account.

(I have added many of my own notes and references. I repeat again that I accept all the responsibility for this publication.)

* Japanese avnty equivalent Former Domei News Correspondent to U.S. Corps Keisuke Saito

PAGE 2 INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT

BY

MAJOR GENERAL YOSFIHARU TOMOCHIKA INTRODUCTION

General Tomochika descrilbes his feelings in defeat, and explains his reasons for writing his memoirs.

\ (The subject matter is addressed to a former Domei News 1 Correspondent.)

Dear Saitc:

You, who have accompanied ny troops, have gone through many difficulties, haven't you? Those of us who escaped from IEYTE to MINDANAO saved our lives in a miraculous manner and survived only after escaping death several times. Under the circumstances, I'm sure we did not expect to be able to meet each other today. Personnally, I actually do not know whether I am living or am a ghost'. When we recall many mem­ ories of our hardships and the harrowing experiences, and our wanderings between life and death, it brings to us a full realization of our defeat

While wandering in the MINDANAO mountains with the sounds of battle constantly in my ears and subsisting on wild grasses, I began to read the teachings of Buddha. I regretted that I had not fead this type of philosophy at an early age because, while I was reading these writings, I grasped the full meaning of Buddhism in my heart. As a result, since entering this concentration camp, I have continued to study His teachings and. I feel it is having a profound influence on my character.

So it is that when I think back to the PHILIPPINE ISLAFD Operations with this new spiritual outlook, I can readily understand the reasons for our defeat. If only we had cultivated such spiritual training at an early age, we would have been better prepared spiritually for combat and our poor moral conduct would not have contributed so heavily to our defeat.

It appears that we did not grasp the full significance of the Imperial Rescript on Education which adjures us to, "Study hard, learn a vocation, gain wisdom, and then to accomplish our individual duty." It was our failure to heed this worthy counsel which caused us to expose our weakness of character by shameful actions during the fight in which we were defeated. Every officer and man who motivated by his own selfish interests and behaved as a wild man, devoid of human dignityI Even the generals, when they had lost their commands, showed their, poor character and behaved in such a deplorable manner that their subordinates deserted them.

Some patriots of the Meiji Restoration Period did not physically participate in the national affairs. Shoin and Saigo were among those who mastered ethics, however, no one gave them recognition. Eecause of the wrong steps taken in compulsory education since the Meiji Era, most of our national.figures failed to cultivate individual character. Since I became a Second Lieutenant I can remember many shameful experiences.

Since the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese people were led to believe that strength through the "Yamato Damashi" (Yamato Spirit) was legendary. Our educational system was not founded on a scientific basis but was entirely based on this false concept. They (the People) believed that a soldier imbued with "Yamato Damashi" and armed only with one small hand grenade could defeat an ene&or equipped with large cannon and tanks. This non-scientific attitude of the Japanese was manifested during the defeats we suffered in the fighting zones of DAVAO and IEYTE.

Considering these facts it is surprising that we attempted the Pacific War, and the mere thought cf it makes me tremble. To sum up, if the Japanese had cultivated virtue and developed their intellectual faculties, this war would not have occurred.

PAGE 4 While the details of the IEYTE Operations were fresh in my mind, I wrote a rough sketch of my eypericnces there. I expect to be transferred to the MANILA. Concentration camp soon, and thereafter I have no idea of what will become of me. I do not care to die, but if I do die, then I would regret it if this report failed to reach and inform others. If you read this report and are satisfied, will you please carry it with you when you return to the homeland? You have my permission to use it as you please. However, I would like to explain my teelings in the matter of certain criticisms in parts of it where I have mentioned my countrymen by name. It was unavoidable and I am sorry for them but could not help it. My hope is that they will bear up under it for the sake of others.

I will leave here by plane tomorrow morning; therefore, this is ray last farewell to you. I hope you will work hard for the reconstruction of Japan. I also would like to devote myself to the reconstruction of Japan if I ever get a chance to go back there.

2 October 194-5 At Davao Concentration Camp Yoshiha.ru Tomochika

i

PAGE 5 CHAPTER ONE

PEACH DEFENSE VFRSFS INLAND DISPENSE

In regard to the tactical concepts of island defenses around July and August of 194-4* there were two schools of thought. One was the pelicy of "Annihilation at the Beachhead" and the other was the policy of a "Battling Withdrawal".

Among the members of the staff of the Artry Headquarters (T.N. Four­ teenth Army) in MANILA, there were numerous arguments on these policies, and even the staff of the General Headquarters (T.N. GHQ, Southern Expeditionary Force) chirred in with their freely expressed views.

The theory that beach defenses constructed with an enorous amount of ?a'~or are useless because they cannot withstand naval bombardment -was fecorted in numerous documents coming down from GHQ since the SAIPAN Battle." 'The argument against this was that the fortifications on SAIPAN were only front line field fortifications and for that reason they had a difficult time. If they had been even semi-permanent fortifications they would have been able to withstand the bombardments; therefore, the prin­ ciples of "Annihilation at the Beachhead" should not be discarded permaturely.

Lt. General Kuroda, Commanding General of the Army at '•••ANIIA held the first opinoin and was absolutely against "Annihilation at the Beach­ head" and he stated this in his orders to his subordinates during the early part of July 194-4-• Thus it was that each Group (Heidan) abandoned, its' beach fortifications which had been constructed with so much effort. They immediately began construction of strong fortifications in selected areas in the interior, outside the range of naval bombardment. Group Commanders asked themselves, "Is it wise to abandon prematurely beach ogpgsition?" Most of them thought it regretable that they were required \ The group comtranders were opposed to the arguments set forth by the Staff of General Headquarters and s^id that, "There should be some beach battles since there is no need to fear naval bombardment in certain types of fortifications."'They"added, "Area ^rmys1'(T.N. Fourteenth Army) combat policy should be modified, 'here we have the proper types of fortifications, we should engage in battles along the beaches.

Since there i:as more aggressiveness in the latter line of reasoning, those group comranders favoring this opinion were inclined to follow., it. This was clearly revealed when war games were carried out by the entire army during the first part of August. The 35th Army Commander, Lt General I'unesaku Suzuki had this to say on the subject, "The main battle is fought in numerous isolated areas of our choice rather than on the ocast under naval bombardment. Nevertheless, there is some effectiveness in resistance alonr the beaches and, therefore, part o" the troops must suffer premature losses." Each sroup coriander wi+hin the army concurred in his conclusions. At the first meeting o* the 35th Army unit commanders held in CEFU during the middle part of August, all agreed that this was the best way to engage in battle. I, Major General Tomochika, think that this idea was justified after considering past operation. There will be a greater density of fire on a small island like SAIPAi" while naval bombardments•of islands the size of LEYTE and MINDANAO must necessarily be extended, with a resultant dissipation of intensity. Recently, at LFYTE, a large naval fleet shelled the island for two days. What impressed us w.:s the fact that the Americans landed with^ onlv tl-at relatively small amount c" shelling. From what we heard of the* battle of SAIPAN, the same amount of shelling had been concentrated on a small area. PAGE 6 At IEYTE, a majority of the guns eirplaced on the beach were destroyed, but defiladed and cave positions remained intact and the losses among the defending troops were surprisingly small. A con­ siderable number of our troops became scattered, but still put up a fair amount of resistance after the Americans landed.

PAGE 7 CHAPTER T.'O

PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION 0"? AIR

AND LAND FORCES

Decisive air battles loomed as a big issue and there were many ideas on the subject. The concept of General Headquarters was that in the PHILIPPINES where there are over three thousand large and small islands to be defended, the principles of destruction by land warfare would not apply. By utilizing air attacks to destroy the enemy landing forces before they strike the beaches, or at least, by conducting air attacks upon the landing forces and giving them a staggering blow before they made appreciable gs.ins, we could make it easier for the defending forces to take the offensive. The defense of the PHILIPPINES depends primarily on airplanes, therefore, it is best for the ground forces to assist the air forces by building airfields, fuel and ammunition dumps, protecting the air force units on the fround, constructing positions for land warfare, and by continuing their own training. This then was their opinion and it was incorporated in "Field Order Number 11" and distributed to the Army Groups.

However, the Fourteenth Army Commander, Lieutenant General Kuroda said, "That concept is good, but you cannot fight with concept alone. Words alone will not sink American ships and that becomes clear when you compare our airplanes with theirs. That is why the major battles have been occuring on land. We can say that the power of our air force is negligible at this time. No matter how much the-Fourteenth Ari^y devotes their efforts toward air power, in actuality, should there be a decisive fight, they must fight on land. The preparation and conduct of an operation, and the responsibilities thereof cannot be conducted by airplanes and air units. The land army should initiate its own preparations. For example, for what purpose were the group of air- bases constructed at BAVAO and at TAGIDBAN? Even though they are built, they aren't used. It amounts to construction for the use of the enemy." Such were his feelings.

Those with a negative point of view protested the opinions of General Kuroda and others, and accused him of lack of understanding^of modern warfare-. It was their opinion that by ignoring air preparations, air operations would suffer and become weaker and worse. They stated that General Kuroda should be relieved of command of the Area Army; ) The truth is, there was foresight in the ideas of General Kuroda, and he was vindicated by subsecuent actions. The issues at stake were clearly shown by actual development* It was demonstrated that in order to destroy the enemy transports, you must first destroy the American air power by air action and then destroy the American Navy. But could it be done? Some thought it could and some thought it couldn't be done and each side defended its opinion. The turning point would be whether we possessed the planes that could defeat the enemy airpower, and whether the United States Fleet could recover.

Another factor that brought a difference of opinion to the f'orfe was the estimation of the time that the Americans would commence the^ PHILIPPINE Operation. One group thought September was the logical time while others were just as sure it would be in November, islore about this later. The commander of the 35th Army, Lt General Suzuki, estimated that the American Army was going to land about 1 October. He said, "Contrary to what has been announced by General Headquarters, our air force cannot be prepared and equipped in time, nor can the combined fleet be depende upon. The situation grows worse and for this reason the. land forces preparations must be hastened, -et, in spite of that, we roust not PAG! B t

discourage the air forces and should do as much as possible to prepare aggressive aerial opposition,"

Thus it was that the Artry devoted its main effort to air power until the ead of August. After 1 September the rain efforts in prepara­ tions went to the ground forces. However, even then plans could not be completed for the ground forces because air preparations had to continue to some extent.

General Kuroda and I shared eome views, especially on the con­ troversy with regard to the establishment of coastal air bases at TACLOEAN and DAVAO. Our views on that subject were successfully opposed by the exponents of raodern scientific warfare who stated it was necessary to establish air fields near the coast in order to fly planes as far as possible over the ocean. I did not oppose the orders from higher headquarters but I conic: not share their vievs. The army compander felt the same way about this idea but aerial oporation&l arrangements of this nature continued.

As for the estimation of the tiire and locality of the American larding, one placed it in July or August, with successive establish­ ment of land and air bases from MORATAI to MANILA, and that, therefore, the first landing would be on MINDANAO ISLAM).

The other view was that the powerful and mechanized array of the Americans would not adopt such a plan, but would seek to strike UJZON in. one decisive battle. This view was strengthened by the fact that similar methods were used at SAIPAN and GUAM.

The first view was held by the greater portion of the staff of General Headquarters and the Fourteenth Area Army, while General Kuroda held the latter view. The opinions of the staff members of the various divisions were divided equally* Lt General Kuroda of the Fourteenth Area Army held the following belief: "No large number of troops is sufficient for the defense ®f the PHILIPPINES. If you intend to defend vigorously on the Island of MINDANAO, ten divisions would be necessaryt Such a thing cannot be done. For this reason, in order to prepare for the decisive battle of UJZON, the vreater portion of the Area Army will be concentrated on LUZON ISLAM). When the Americans land on the Island of MINDANAO, they will be avoided and left alone. The greater portion of the 16th Division will be recalled from IEYTE and the greater portion of the 30th Division from MINDANAO. Should the 35th Army Headquarters be activated, it will be stationed in LUZON."

The staff of the General Headquarters estimated that if the Ameri­ cans pained a foothold on MINDANAO, they would establish a strong air base. Such an air base would be a distinct disadvantage in the battle of UJZON. It would also be an excellent position to interupt communica­ tions between the Japanese homeland and the south sea areas. They con­ cluded that more stress should be placed on the defense of MINDANAO.

An order issued on the first of September by General Headquarters, ordered three unidentified battalions to move to the following locations: DAVAO, SARfiNGAI'I and IEYTE. This was done against the wishes of the Area Army commander and the 35th Army commander who found themselves in an exceedingly unpleasant situation. However, the order was carried out begrudgingly.

This meant a reshuffling of troops that had been moving and repairing defenses since the first part of August. During the movement these battalions received considerable casualties froa^ sinking at sea by attacks by American forces.

PAGE 9 CHAPTER THREE

OPERATIONAL PLANS OF THE 35TH ARMY

General Suzuki's estimate of the enemy plan was that the American Ariry might land in the VISAYANS. He believed theii4 Plan //I was to land in MINDANAO; Plan #2 at IEYTE; Plan #3 at IEYTE and MltoANAO at the same time. OR MINDANAO, he predicted that they would land in force at DAVAO Bay. On IEYTE he predicted they would land at IEYTE Gulf, and that it would be the first part of OctoberThe 35th Army's operational plans were roade accordingly. Three types of plans were established. Plan #1 was made to be adaptable to Plan #2 if it became necessary. Plan #2 was to have the mechanized strength of the 30th Division posted in the TAKAHARA zone in Northern I'dNPANAO mountain ranges.

During a meeting of the unit Commanders in pid-August they were informed of the operational plans which were based on sound principles of warfare. By order o'' the Fourteenth Army, our forces were assigned to guard the shore line of MINDANAO Island. The majority of the 30th Division were stationed along the coast. As the mechanized strength of the Army had decreased it was inevitable that we send the majority of the 30th Division to central MINDANAO.

What actually happened was that Plan #2 of the' Americans didn't materialize. If our main forces had been stationed according to Plan #1 of our army, I believe it would have been possible to assemble quickly more troops on IEYTE. The American Army landed on IEYTE to the rear of the seasoned 30th Division which was on the island of MINDANAO, it would have been much more embarrasing to the 35th Army if the Americans, had landed immediately on LUZON.

Since April 1944-> Makino, commanding the 16th Division, had directed the sain efforts of his forces in constructing positions along the DULAG j front. By the middle of October his first line of coastal defenses was 1 practically completed. The second phase of construction consisted of j strengthening positions on the third defensive line in the vicinity of j BAGA"'I. They also continued, construction of positions between the two lines and assembled the bulk of their supplies at JARQ.

There was no signal equipment at JARO. Just prior to landing of the American Army around the middle of October, they were depending on the fixed wireless stations in TACL0BAN. The double enclosed positions at DAGAr.fi were not yet equipped for signal communications between division and higher headquarters. Communications within the division to meet operational demands could not be completed.

It cannot be said that the training was sufficient, but it was gradually improved. The concentration of forces was well prepared, as previously described. At first one battalion of the 33rd Infantry Regiment was dispatched to SAMAR Island, Around 19 October the main force of the 33rd Infantry Regiment was stationed in the DULAG Area, approximately half of the 9th Regiment was stationed in the CATMON HILL district, and three Infantry Companies of the 33rd Infantry Regiment were stationed at TACLOPAN. All of the above mentioned units were posted for the oxpected battle of IEYTE. Furthermore, they were assigned the duty of patroling communication lines leading to ORMOC, to patroling the southern section of the island and to guarding the ports and coastal shipping.

The main force of the 33rd Infantry Regiment (excluding elements stationed on the island of SAMAR) had just been transferred to IEYTE from UJZON in mid-September by order of 14th ARMY. The regimental compandor and his staff neither had time enough to acquaint themselves with the new terrain nor fortify their positions. Furthermore, the regiment did not have as much training as other regiments.

PAGE 10 Realizing that the 16th Division had shortcomings, you can easily understand what happened in the other units. The 100th Division fade preparations to establish fortifications on MINDANAO. They began con­ struction work during the early part of September while forces were gradually being concentrated in the DAVAO Plains. For security of the island, guard units were dispatched to all parts. By mid-October only three battalions remained at DAVAO.

Responsibility for the preparation of defenses was evenly dis­ tributed among the units of the 30th Division in the Surigao district. The work t?as not completed however, because Division moved its irain force to the Del Monte District. The remaining units were moved to the Pikit and SARAFGANI sectors. During this period this division spent too much time in marching and changing positions, which resulted in failure to train and construct defensive positions. They called themselves the "Black Leopard Division" but failed to live up to their name and their former reputation.

The 102nd Division endeavored to concentrate its troops. It was unable to accomplish this, however, since it could not reduce its patrols or leave its food sources unprotec+.ed. It is enough to say that in mid- October they still retained a deployed formation. It is better to leave untold the condition of the 54th Independent Brigade at ZAMEOANGA, the 55th Independent Brigade on JOLO Island and the two companies of the 102nd Division on PALAWAN Island.

PAGE 11 CHAPTER FOUR

RELATIONS WITH THE NAVY

The good relationship between the army and the navy was exemplified by the splendid cooperation-between the CEEU Base compander and the Naval Air Unit commander. This close cooperation was also evidBnt dur­ ing the landing of American forces at CEEU City in the latter part of March 1945. At this time Adrriral Harada took orders from Brigadier General Manjome, his subordinate, and fought gallantly. Opposed to this was the relationship at DAVAO between the 100th Division Headquarters and the Waval B?se Headquarters which was poor to say the least * It was especially so after 10th September when there were false reports of American troops landing in DAVAO. Even after the command changed to Rear Admiral Doi, there was friction between the two services until the latter part of April 194-5 when the battles started. There might have been rany reasons, but a great deal of the discord was due to the unyielding character of Lieutenant General Harada (C.G. 100th Div.), His Chief of Staff, Hattori, made earnest eforts to promote harmony, but they were fruitless. The Bacolod Air Sector's preparations were insufficient and they were distressed by continous rain. It is a fact that the weather had dire influence upon the operations of the 35th Army. Of course, this could not be held against anyone.

The powerful drive of the American forces in the PHILIPP"f!E Cam­ paign, which materialized so early, surprised our 35th Aroy Headquarters Our forces had prepared plans to combat expected American landings early in October. The "Air battle of TAIWAN" ended in a "Glorious Victory". We concluded that the Americans lost so many carriers it would be impossible for American forces to attack us so soon thereafter, ^e had a wishful view that the American attack would be delayed. On the night of 16 October, we celebrated the "Glorious Victory I of Taiwan." The following morning we received a report that American forces had landed at SUUJAN Islands^(East of IEYTE Gulf). We consider- j ed this report, wondering whether it could be a repitition of the false| report of a landing such as that of 10 September. It was a false alarm,* nevertheless, we started to believe it was true when American planes pierced the rain and attacked us the following day about 0900. According to reports from 16th Division reconnaissance planes, no American ships were seen in IEYTE Gulf. From this we judged that they may have tried to avoid the storm which was forecast for the 18th. (There was no report from General Headquarters or from the front lines concerning the landing of American forces on SUUJAN Island so the War Correspondents submitted no stories at that time.) On the afternoon of the 19th, a radio from 16th Division reported: "Ten enerry transports sighted in IEYTE Gulf." "It is finally true", was the thoueht. It seemed higher headquarters had the same opinion. In the estimate of the enerry situation discussed at the meeting of intelligence and staff officers at MANIIA, 15 October, it was concluded that landings at MINDANAO would begin in November and that the decisive battle for LUZON would begin in March of the followirg year*, (A report of this discussion was made by Chie** of Staff Watanabe when he returned from the meeting on the 19th, It was ironic in the light of what actually took place.)

PAGE 12 /

CHAPTER FIVE NEW FOURTEENTH ART CORIANDER, GENERAL TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA ANNOUNCES HIS PUN

There is sone doubt as to whether the LFYTF operation was a decisive warfare or just a delaying action. On 10th October I was called to MANILA to hear the views of the new arcy commander, General Yamashita, He made the following statements: "Our army will attack the enemy and carry on an offensive battle everywhere on LUZON. Oh other islands the Army will momentarily pursue, engage in delaying action, and decrease the fighting power of the enemy. We will destroy and deny to the enemy the use of their air bases." General Yamashita clearly stated the above and called it the "SUSU Order #2." Following this, "MATSU Order #2", was issued. By this order it became clear that we were to engage in a decisive battle at IEYTE. An aerial battle took place on the 24th, a sea battle on the 25th, and a mass transportation of ground forces into IEYTE commenced after the 26th. This brought a sudden rise in the morale of the troops. We received unofficial reports that the 1st Division, 26th Division, 68th Independent Brigade and Corps A'-tillery were coming from UJZON. 3.5th Arey forces at that time consisted of: main strength of 30th Division at IEYTE: 102nd Division plus two additional battalions also at IEYTE, but with one original battalion dispatched from CEEU to MENADO; and one battalion of the 55th Irdepeai*»t Brigade which was stationed at ZAfBOANGA. Around 22nd October ire received a request from Fourteenth Arrry Headquarters asking us what measures were being taken to land the 26th Division and 68th Independent Brigade on IEYTE in the event we had the advantage in the decisive air and sea battle. We answered with following statement: "If we have the advantage in the decisive air and sea battle, it is ^referable to use the 26th Division and the 68th Independent Brigade to prevent the landing of the enemy. However, if we are at a disadvantage it is preferable to land these two units at CARIGARA Bay, or, depending -on conditions, counter with only the 68th Independent Brigade the landing at LFYTE- Gulf. We had hopefu.l discussions of entering TACLOEAN by the 16th of November. We were determined to take offensive after offensive and clean up landed American forces on IEYTE island according to original plans. We seriously discussed demanding the surrender or the entire American Army after seizing General MacArthur. On 29th October, Staff Officer Asaeda came to CEEU from Fourteenth Army Headquarters. 35th Army Headquarters was anxiously waiting for him. Even the combat Headquarters"(35th Army Advance Headquarters) transfer to 0RM0C was delayed while waiting for him. (Intelligence units advanced on the 26th.) From Staff Officer Asaeda we received the following message and order: "The advance echelon of the 26th Division (Mainly composed of the 12th Regiment) and the 1st Division will land at 0RM0C on the 1st •f November. The landing point of the 68th Independent Brigade must be at 0RM0C or at CARIGARA Boy, depending upon the situation. The command of the IEYTF. Operations will core under 35th Arny. Fourteenth Army will be responsible for carrying out the SAMAR Island Operation with one detachment of the 58th Independent Brigade and will coordinate during the operation with 35th Amy* { ' From this date the 35th Aray's IEYTF. Operation and the 14th Army's plans became harmonious. The following were our plans: After the 1st Cavalry Division lands in the vicinity of TACiOBAN and after the 27th Division establishes a bridgehead in the vicinity of PAGE 13 DUIAG, they will take the offensive. However, the main force of the American troops will take some time before appearing in the northwest sector of TACLOBAN Plain. If, in the meantime, we secure a concentration point as far east as possible with bulk of 16th Division assisted by Tc-.nahe Battalion of 4.1st Regiment, Nishimura Battalion and Tempei Batta­ lion, 1st Division can assemble in the -vicinity of CARIGARA and 26th Division can assemble in the vicinity of JARO. If we succeed in this concentration, the 68th Independent Brigade can land at CARIGARA Bay. Following this our base of supply can be transferred to CARIGARA Bay from QRf'OC. 35th Army had no doubt that it could carry out the above plan. But we did not dream that the Southwest sector of CARIGARA range - would become a decisive battle zone. The morning of 1 November I met Lieutenant General Katoaka, companding 1st Division, who landed at 0RI40C.' I explained to hiir that the Southwestern sector of CARIGARA range had become the main battlefield* I replied that I had not in the least, ex­ pected this sector to become a fighting zone.

PAGE U CHAPTER SIX

DESCRIPTION OF THE EARLY STAGES

OF THE BATTLE OF LSYTE

I arrived ir ORJaOC on the night of 30 October, The 35th ATW commander landed at ORMDO oh the morning of X November while the 1st Division was still in the process of landing. Staff Officer Toshitada Watanabe was dispatched to contact the 16th Division prior to landing. He succeeded in contacting their headquarters at DAGAMI and returned to ORMOC on the 30th.

According to his reports on the condition of the 16th Division, es- , pecially at the TACLOBAN front, the 33rd Regiment was annihilated on the night of the 23rd. Regimental commander Suzuki and his staff died honour­ ably. The remaining troops at the front lines were led by single remain- captain and this group stopped approximately one battalion of the enemy who were using tanks and trench mortars and utilizing a river to advance toward JARO.

On about the 28th, our 41st Infantry Regiment moved from CARIGARA toward the southeast section of JARO. Nishimura Battalion and Tempei Battalion attacked part of the enemy forces that were trying to land in CARIGARA BAY and nere last seen retreating east from CARIGARA. Tanabe Battalion was still in the vicinity of MALANGAS village on the 29th. He reported that a powerful enemy column was advancing westward toward the northern sector of DAGAMI.

(Reference notes by Saito)

About this time our Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo announced our air attacks on the American Fleet in LEYTE GULF. The reports from our 14th ARMY Headquarters ?hirh were dispatched by reporters from MANILA were, for example, as follows: Dispatch of the 28th; "The enemy forces landing at LEYTE appear to be losing their military spirit and seem discouraged after observing the defeat of their fleet. They are displaying signs of uneasiness. Since they have committed themselves to the PHILIPPINE Opera­ tion, they are desperately trying to succeed and are indicating their intentions of adhering to their plan. Having landed in the vicinity of DULAG, the enemy forces are planning to expand their key positions and are gradually advancing westward. On the 25th they advanced west to SAN, PABLO from DULAG and fierce fighting took place for the possession of the airfield." Such were the reports, (End of Saito reference)

We estimated that the 1st.Cavalry Division would soon land and ad­ vance toward the CARIGARA district, ,For this reason the operational plans of the 35th ARMY was modified on 1 November. We eliminated JARO from our plans, and planned to concentrate our efforts in the vicinity of CARIGARA. k ; Our pTan was to change the position of the 41st Infantry Regiment and as the situation developed endeavor to have it join the main forces of 16th Division in the vicinity of L'AGAi.II. The Tanabe Battalion, Nishimura Bat­ talion, and Tempei Battalion were to pass to command of Major Kaneko, staff officer from 102nd Division, to which they would be attached. Their mission would be to occupy and secure the North-South line four kilometers East of CAKIGAltA to protect the mountain advance of the 1st Divisi on, The 1st Di­ vision hadf been deployed along the East flank in the vicinity of CAPOOCAN.

The Imabori Detachment (12th Infantry Regiment) occupied lines near the foothills of the mountain® Southeast of JARO and protected the advance of the main forces of the 26th Division, After the main force of the 26th Division had advanced the"- followed them to the vicinity of JARO. Here the Imabori Detachment were to attack the American forces in the Southeast sector of CARIGARA and orders were issued accordingly.

PAGE 15 CHAPTER SEVEN THE TOTAL DEFEAT OF TEE 35TH CORPS

On the 30th of October the 4.1st Regiment contacted the American forces in the vicinity of Jaro but were overwhelmed by artillery and tank shellings and were helplessly routed. The Regiment v;as unable to reach the vicinity of CARIGARA. About the 1st of November they retreated to the mountains southwest of CaRIGARA and, at this time, the Regiment had control of only one battalion. The other battalions were disorgan­ ized or lost.

On 28 October the Nishimura F.attalion contacted American forces between CARIGARA and TUNGA, but they also were routed and lost.- The Tempei Eattalion advanced along the coast northeastward from CARIGARA. Nothing further has been beard about them since then and it is presumed they were lost. Staff Officer Kaneko of 35th Army attempted to assemble various units in the vicinity of CARIGARA but he Could not keep them under control* Te suffered continuous defeats and it was difficult to con­ tinually Reorganize. The Tanabe Battalion was unable to reach CARIGARA and, therefore, evacuated into the hills southwest of CARIGARA thus avoiding contact with American forces. On 1 November strong American forces advanced into CARIGARA. (This information was acknowledged on the 3rd after we received a message from Staff Officer Kaneko.) On 3 November the Imabori Detachment, without encountering American forces, reached their assigned position four kilometers northeast of the DANAO Mountains overlooking JARO, The American forces which were at DAGAMI learned of the arrival of the Imabori Detachment and in successive advances reached the vicinity of JARO town. Debarkation of Reinforcement Units On 1 November debarkation of 1st Division from the transports KASKI and KOTO commenced during the evening. They also had two other ships. About noon on 2 November, the ships received a bombing from •approximately thirty B-24's. Only the N0T0 was sunk and in a total of twenty-four hours we succeeded in completing debarkation. The division advanced northward on the following morning. Credit for success in debarkation was due to efforts of the 35th Army Headquarters which completed preparation of the various transport units. The reconnaissance regiment, which was an advance unit, contacted the American forces as they were landing in the vicinity of MAIANGAS. The regiment effected damages to the enemy at the beach but was unable to prevent their landing. About this time Lieutenant General Kataoka accompanied by an escort platoon went to MALANGAS for the purpose of terrain reconnaissance. When he heard o" the American landing he immediately returned to the rear area and issued orders for the 57th Regiment to attack the Americans. The Americans unit which landed at MAIANGAS was one battalion of the 24th Division. It had crossed the TACLOPAN Strait in landing barges and had landed on the beaches at MALANGAS. We eagerly awaited reports of the destruction of the battalion by our units but we never succeeded. Mistakes on the Southern Front In the southern sector of 0RM0C our Corps disregarded the BAYEAY front. It was reported that the 16th Division had systematically des­ troyed the two-lane highway leading east from EAYBAY. The ARMY commander had the firm belief that, because of our naval blockade, it was impossible for the enemy to enter tie CANICAO Straits. To our consternation, however, PAGE 16 the American forces soir.ehow crossed the mountain ranges from the South DULAG Plains and, advancing westward, entered PAIBAY. Furthermore, assisted by naval shelling, they landed successive numbers of troops there.

Since we did not desire to abandon the positions on this front and leave our right flank unprotected, a company from the Nojiri Eattalion, in reserve, was dispatched to the Southern sector of AIBUERA. The main strength of our 30th Division was expected to arrive in AIBUERA and proceed to BURAUEK. In preparation for this cove the Koizumi company wi-.s dispatched to EURAUEN and ordered to recondition,the BURAUEF Air­ fields. Big Errors in Operational Forethought

A'ter the first stapes of the LEYTE Oper.tion it became clear that we bad committed these errors in our estimate:

1. The American forces took a quick penetrating offensive action when our- units retreated toward the hills, and we underestimated the speed and strength of their attack,

2; Fe had not expected our various front line units to retreat so quickly fror the American artillery attack, and we lacked the proper understanding of American Artillery firepower.

3» We misunderstood the results of the decisive air and naval battle of October 2/th and 25th* Whereas we thought we had won seventy percent of the battles we actually lost fifty percent of the battles. The fact remains tht.t we lost. Since 3 November there were only American- planes flying over the battlefields $nd we seldom saw our own planes. There was a powerful American fleet in I1SYTE Gulf and over two hundred transport ships. The battle swelled to overwhelming odds with insuffi­ cient accurate intelligence.

4. Our military estimates of the TACLOEAN Straits were incorrect, "Te '-new it was difficult to cross this strait without a trained pilot, However, the enemy navigated this strait using water pilots on landing ' barges and reached CARIGARk Bey.

5, ^e underestimated the technical ability of the American forces, especially their skill in repairing roads, sweeping mines, and recon­ structing destro; ed bridges.

PAGE 17 CHAPTER EIGHT

ABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE UNITS

Unpredictable First Division

I will avoid writing in detail of the 1st Division's battle in the LTT0iT vicinity, but I would like to express a few words about this division's fighting ability.

The 1st Division was Activated in TOKYO and subsequently was trans­ ferred to ~;!AISCHURIA. During the CHINA Incident it was sent to CHINA but received no combat experience. It was the most well equipped division and was named "Imperial Victory Division".

it wps sent ,to the PHILIPPINE with great expectations. The per­ sonnel v/tere brave but the officers lacked sufficient training in modern warfare and it finally did not live up td the expectation of its leaders The division commander, lieutenant General Kataoka, worried about the loss of his troops, lacked brave eo&urand ability, and did not establish any set battle policy. The 1st Independent Brigade was used on the right flank in the Mt. PINA area and, therefore, the Chief of Staff, Deputjr Chief of Staff, and senior staff officers were dispatched from ARMY to Division on three diffirent occasions to urge General Kataoka to submit to these orders. (On 5 November, with the arrival of WaShi as Chief of Staff, the staff officer strength increased to twelve and I became Deputy Chief of Staff.) Regardless of how much we urged General Kataoka to change his views he would not budge. Colonel Ikeda, the Chief of Steff of the 1st- Division, was partially <5Uaf and., further, because of a former lung ailment,, he was unsuited to hold his important position.

^ 102nd Division

The division commander spent most of his time trying to control units which were scattered along the front in the PINA mountains. The Chief of Staff and his Aide by their tireless efforts succeeded in gaining control of the Tempei Battalion and of the Tanabe Battalidn of the 41st Regiment. The 24-th Division and one half of one other Division (T. N. possibly 96th Division) of the American Xth Corps attacked our 1st Division (T. N. 102nd Division?) with the steep terrain to their advante ;. But somehow the 1st Division (T. N. 102nd. Division?) managed to portect its right flank.

The division commander, Lieutenant General Fukuei, paid careful attention to the personal affairs of his men in the combat zone. He strictly reflated their rations and inspected their quarters at their posts, However he did not win the confidence of his subordinates because of his poor personality. He had no intentions of dying at the front. When I visited the divisional headquarters in the PINA mountains he asked me, "When will we be able to withdraw?" From tris, we can judge his personality and character.

Chief of Staff, Colonel Wada, was a graduate of a special course so he was skilled in tactics and administration. He supported the division commander and the staf" trusted him. Needless to say that this division owed its good points to Colonel Wada. i The Brave Imabori Detachment

Colonel Imabori had good personality and was a good leader. His subordinates were filling to join the suicide squads when the American forces increased in number. re did not have any worries about the PAGE 18 attacking Americans on this detachment's front because the suicide squads brought good results. Later we gave orders to the entire Imabori Detachment to withdraw to the ORMOC Plains. The reason given by the American forces for hesitating to attack Imabori Detachment front was that the terrain was too steep. "However, I believe it was r'ue to the ability and talent of Colonel Imabori.

PAGE 19 CHAPTER NINE

COLEAT CONDITIONS AFTER .

THE EARLY PART OF NOVEMFER

Toward the middle of November the 1st Division was engaged in heavy combat. There were times when the battle was iniheir favor and at other times it was unfavorable. 35th Army was still giving orders for 1st Division to take offensive positions and prepare for a counter' attack at CARIGAPA. We planned to have the 26th Division stand by in the JARO section, and to have the 68th Independent Brigade in advance .of the 102nd Division after it landed at 0P.M0C.

In late November it was decided we would carry out the "WA Oper­ ation" (Burauen Airvorne and Land Forces Operation). Thereafter we gradually received unfavorable reports from the 1st Division, but the corps commander continued to order offensive action by the 1st Division in line with his intentions of diverting the American forcest From 1st Division we beard rui ors that they believe^- it was impossible to con­ tinue the offensive and that the Arr-y Commander failed to tinderstand. the fighting conditions when he issued such orders. It was difficult to understand their complaints when certain measures had to be carried out.

On 11th November the main strength of 26th Division landed in QRi'OC FAY following, the successful landing of 1st Division; For means bf transportation they used three speedy transport ships. It had been planned that this division would land in twelve hours but the plan was not entirely successful. Actually it took sixteen hours to land and even then the personnel landed carrying only their indivdual equipment. It was certainly a pitiful situation. The"reasons for this were:

1. Large ships were used only until the time of the 1st Division's landing. Thereafter, since plans allowed for only small type ships, the size of S£ and smaller, 40 military landing craft were left in 0RM0C. Constant air attacks damaged rany when 20 of these landing craft were dispatched in order to transport the 102nd and 30th Divis-ion. 1l,:hile enroute, the orders were unexpectedly changed and it was decided use the large size ships again instead. In later stages the nurber of H'JJitary landing craft available was exceedingly few.

2. The waves were high on the afternoon of the 11th because of heavy rains, and the wind beached a number of landing craft. It was impossible to unload to the others from the ships until the high tide of midnight. Army was not especially concerned with the fighting strength of the 26th Tivision and did not revise previous battle plans for the CARIGARA district. It continued plans for concentrating the train strength of- 26th Division in the DOLORES vicinity and made preparations for its advance toward a position in front of the Ir:abori Detachment. Our reserve supply of provisions was low at this time and we were facing starvation.

About 20 November water transportation of the equipment and supplies of 26th Division was attempted in 4 medium size vessels but we unfor­ tunately received an air attack from approximately 300 enemy planes in ORMOC FAT and together with the destroyer escort, they were all stink. Only a few of the personnel were able to swim safely to shore.

Reference Notes by Saito

The situation in the LE'YTE Battle was growing worse but the announce­ ments from Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo seldom rentioned the battles there. When they did., however, they exaggerated reports of -the successful battle of the Karsakaze Special Attacks Units. This was done to mislead the Japanese people. All reports concerning

PAGE 20 \

our forces in IEYTE were reported by war correspondents. However, under the direction of Imperial General Headquarters, broadcasts emanating from Tokyo station were falsified. The following vas one of their broadcasts:

"Since early November our superior reinforceKents which wgre continously arriving at the front lines increased the fighting strength. The enemy is now on the defense*, Our reinforcements coordinating with the rain strength advanced toward the western part of CARIGARA. They opened hostilities with the American 24th Division. On 7 November a portion of our units using enveloping tactics advanced rapidly over rough terrain and cut o^f the avenues of retreat and dealt a severe blow. Under our pressure the enemy vainly struggled to escape." (Domei Monthly Report #" 222)

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PAGE 21 CHAPTER TEN

FLANS FOR OPERATIONAL TROOP MOVEMENT

The rear echelon of the 102nd Division and the T.ain strength of the 30th Division were expected to sail by navy transport ships and SS tyre ships. We requested the shipping from higher headquarters but t.is was refused. For this reason transportation could not be carried on smoothly. Transportation was delayed so badly that the 102nd. Division in mid-November carried out its trovement to PALOMPON by utilizing its own military landing craft and sail boats. The 30th Division carried on its transportation of personnel by ne&ns of military landing craft of the 19th Reginent and with sail boats from CEBU. The 77th Regiment of 30th Division arrived in PALOMPON in late November. The main strength of the Nonaka Battalion arrived in PAJjp>Y0N on 7 December. Remnants of the Fonaka Battalion, regimental headquarters of the 7?tb Regiment, and two unidentified battalions (together totaling five companies) finally arrived in PALOMPON on 10 December, 35th Arry Headquarters first plan was to dispatch the 30th Division from AITUERA to BURAUEN but this plan was not completed. On 12 November, Fourteenth Army issued enforcing orders dispatch­ ing 26th Division to the ALBUERA and BURAUI'N areas. Our forces there­ after ran into difficulties in the CARIC-ARA counterattack because of the delayed arrival of the 30th Division.

Concerning the BAYBAY operations, 35th Army did not jive sufficient attention to the Arerican forces located there, T«e at Army Headquarters understood the 26th Division was to be used in the BURAUEN and AIBUERA areas. For this reason the Imabori Detachment was forced to remain at CARIGARA. The tain force of the 26th Division transferred to the AiEUERA area about the 13th of November and was ordered to advance to EURAU2N. In the roeantirce the American forces at BAYEAY gradually advanced northwardU and reached a noint 6 or 7 kilometers south, ef aITUFRA. Our Army headquarters ordered one battalion of the 2oth Division to destroy these enetry forces. This mission however ended in failu'e and gave the Americans the advantage. Colonel Jiro Saito, coir: ander of the 13th Regiment and leader of this mission, was a recent arrival from the Manila Intelligence Center and was inexper­ ienced in actual comb-it. % Finally the 26th Division attacked the American force with its entire strength including Divisional Headquarters and succeeded in capturing one position in the enemy lines but this did. not improve the situation to any noticable extent. The "WA Operation" (BURAUEN Oper­ ation) was therefore postponed, While a detachment under the command of the 13th Regimental commander remained at AIBUERA, the main forces of the 26th Division commenced marching on BURAUEN.,

NOTES BY SAITO

The following report of the fighting conditions in the middle south section of IEYTE ISLAND was reported from the Philippines by dispatch to the homeland as follows:

"We can judge by their action that the enemy reinforcements plan to advance to the north from BAYBAY on the west coast. Our ground forces completed preparations to attack this enemy and attacked advance units of the American 7th Division which were further to the south in the vicinity of DAMULAAN (IS kilometers north of BAYBAY) and inflicted damages upon them. We then withdrew but our force counterattacked and forced the enemy to retreat to CARIDAD.(Omission). At that time the enemy was vigorously pushing forward to search a passage way at the foot of the coastal hills, but our main force was pushing on toward the port of BAYBAY and destroyed the enemy which retreated back and south of the hills of CARIDAD on the 27th. (Omission) Our strong advance caused the enemy to halt their advance and take defensive positions with the sea to their rear. PAGE 22* " On the night of the 28th our forces attacked agsin the enemy main line' and at last took the south sea coast position of DAIvHJIAAN which was the enemy's left flank. We are cxpocting to destroy the enemy by an envelopment movement and closing in on them."

After the end of. November the situation tended to r'row worse and our forces were unable to recapture the battle fields on IEYTE I?LA1TD. It was unbelievable that our ground and air forces attempted the abor­ tive effort to recapture the FULuUEJ? Airfield with suicide tactics in the face of what had gone before.

The roader rill readily understand what wasted effort went- into this operation, ,and see for himself what needless loss of life occurred. Gereral Totochika has v.-adc this quite clear in his detailed memoir of the inci-cnt, which follow in the succeeding pages.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

^TRAGICAL AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

( In late November, with orders from higher headquarters, "^A Oper­ ation" was initiated a second time. Major Tanaka, staff officer from 14th Army Headquarters, brought TtfA Operation" to ORMOC from MANIIA, claiming it was orders from Imperial General Headquarters* (It bad actually originated in MANIIA.) This was his statement:

"If the construction of the air bases on IEYTE is permitted to continue, the communications between the Southern areas and the home­ land will be cut and this would be a serious situation. Therefore, re must occupy Burauen Airfield as soon as possible and at the same time neutralize TACLOEAN and,DULAG Airfields. Moreover, we must annihilate the enemy's air power."

Fe continued, "If this succeeds, the operations of 35th Army will be facilitated. If 35th Army, employing the 16th and 26th Divisions can neutralize the American cround forces (T.N. 11th Airborne Division) in this area, the Takachiho Unit (3rd and 4th Regiment of parachute troops) "ill land and seize Eurauen Airfield." This was the plan of Fourteenth Army, 5th December was selected as the landing date. (35th Army had insufficient time to prepare its ground forces and requested extension of the date to the 7th, but this was not granted.) 1 The 35th Amy carried on preparations for this operation and tried to encourage the 26th Division to advance on the narrow road West of Burauen; however, it did not go according to plan because the road was nothing but a native trail parsing through the jungle. (T.N, Also, it was occupied, by the 11th Airborne Division) (14th Amy thought this road was a highway.)

The attack plan of Fourteenth Army was that the me.in force of the 16th Elvision was to occupy the northern strip on the Burauen Airfield (Buri Airstrip) and the 26th Division was to occupy the southern strip on the night of the 5th, and continue their occupation. Subsequently, depending upon the situation, they planned to Either have the division continue the occupation or to withdraw them after a short period o^ time. In order to supervise this operation the 35th Army Commander went to the front to join the 26th Division which was then in the mountains near UJBI. Since the situation of the 1st Division at the AIEUERA front was unstable, I, the deputy chief of staff, remained at ORMOC and took command of operations. The Chief of Staff, 'Vachi, and six staff officers accompanied General Suzuki to the front, ^e departed on HJFI on 1 December.

1 ~ ' " .. • • PAGE 23 The order to attack vas changed from the 5th to the 6th by Four­ teenth Army because the weather conditions on the 5th of December were not suitable for landing of paratroops. The order postponing the attack to the 6th was received by the 26th Division, but was not received by the 16th Division. The 16th Division started their attack on the 5th as first planned. The results of this error was beneficial; however, and the paratroop landing of. the Takachiho Unit and the advance of the 26th Division on the 6th were effective. The American forces were taken by surprise and we obtained the desired' results on the 6th day.

The lessons derived froir>. the above mistake was that small scale tactics are adaptable to bi*. operations and that at times mistakes on the battle front offer better opportunities. On occasions '-hen confused, do the best and leave the rest to /providence.

X v ' The 16th Division's attack on "thc:,"*5ti5 day had food results and they occupied part of the airfield. (T.N. fcubi Airstrip). On the 6th, the cuick landing of the T

The 26tl Division's attack on the 6th of November was unsuccessful, but on the 7th (T.N. 26th Division's uncoordinated attack did not mater­ ialize until the 10th after the 16th Division and Takachiho Unit had been destroyed.) They succeeded in destroying tents, which were built near the runway, and anti-airci-aft guns. It is not known whet her they reached the airstrip. The American forces (T.N. 77th Division) landed at ORMOC BAY 'on the morning of the 7th and from that day forward pressure was severe. Con­ tact with our rear elements was cut off so our operation was discontinued.

The 16th and 26th Divisions were ordered to retreat to the ORMOC• PLAINS from the IDBI SECTOR and the Army Headquarters also headed in the direction of ORMOC, The order was received by the 26th Division. Staff Officer Takahashi remained behind in an attempt to forward this same order to the 16th Division but failed. (T.N, 16th Division with less than 200 men remaining no longer existed as a unit). ' ; The retreat march from EURAUEF was most difficult, because the road was blocked by an American force w' icli landed in ORMOC DAY and who were attacking around. LUEI vicinity. (T.N. Actually units from the 11th Air­ borne Division who had advanced from BURAUIN.) As a result of this the 35th Army staff officers disbanded and scattered. On the 13th the Army Compander reached the command post at FUATOF by passing through the enemy lines. Chief of Staff, 'I'achi, arrived there on the 14-th, All contact with the Division was lost by Army Headquarters until the early part of March,

CHAPTER TWELVE

FALSE PROPAGANDA ON THE HOME FRONT

Notes by Saito

Folloving art some of the erroneous news reports published at hore about this time;

1, Or. 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters announced, the follow­ ing: "The Kaoru Airborne Unit, under the comirahd of 1st Lieutenant Nakashige, parachuted in the vicinity of DULAG and BURAUE-N Airfields PAGE 2U from four transport planes on the night of 26th November* Reports from our reconnaissance planes the following day stated that the above men­ tioned airborne unit occupied the key positions of the airfield by means of suicide tactics and that they had accomplished their mission." The above mentioned statement was not even mentioned in Major General Tomochika's notebook.

2. The Imperial General Headquarters announcement of 11:30, 7th December: "Our Tfkachiho paratroopers parachuted in force onto every enerry airfield on LLYTE ISLAND on 6th December and continued fi'htlng with the enemy at the various airfields. The Takachiho force is not only a suicide unit but is a strong infantry unit, le can expect rore action from them hereafter.

3. Imperial General Headquarters publication, 9 December. A. Our cround forces which are situated west of BURAUEN on IEYTE ISIA1T entered enemy positions on the mornirr-: of 6 December. On the ni.vht of the Sc.me day they entered north and south airfield of BURAUEN and continued the fir ht, with the Takachiho Unit making counterattacks,

B. Since the morning o£ 7 December, approximately one enemy divi­ sion had landed on the coast vest of ALBUERA on IEYTE ISLAND. Before the landing of the T_l:achiho troops, our ground unit rade preparations to march to the west section of BURAUEN. On the morning of the 6th trey starter their attack. This round unit succeeded in contacting the Takachiho Unit the morning after the latter arrived and on the same night the two units occupied the north airfield. Later the two occupied the south airfield, Fighting in the airfield district increased. The enemy which has its stronghold in the etst foothills of IEYTE mountains is in a confused condition due to our sudden attacks. Attemnting to rerain the offensive, they started to land new forces near ALBUERA, approx­ imately eight kilometers distant from the southern sector of 0RK0C on the morning of the 7th. So far they have unloaded approximately ore division from transport vessels. ' , ,

Weekly report of battle news, l6-2?.nd December, by the Imperial General Headquarters states the following: "The Takachiho Unit and our ground forces still hold and occupy the BURAUEN and SAW PABLO Airfields. The small deployment tactics used at 0RM0C and the large deployment tactics used, in the rest of IEYTE and. MINDANAO ISLANDS have put the enemy at a disadvantage and they are attempting to regain their positions. I { • (T.N. The above paragraph probably means that the Americans were fooled by deceptive deployment tactics in that there was no strength in 0RM0C ' while the Japs were really deployed in strength where we.least expected it

—5. ' eekly report from 23rd to 29th December: , "Our forces are still holding the BURAUI.N and SAN PABiD Airfields and continue to attack the enemy positions. Our forces are fighting fiercely on the eastern mountain slopes near 0RM0C and ALBUERA."

( . CHAPTER THIRTEEN

AMERICAN COUNTERATTACK AT 0RM0C

On December 6, Staff Officer Doi of the 1st Division came to 0RM0C. He reported the following: "The 1st Division has reached the stage of collapse." After he explained the results of the fighting I decided to change the mission of the 1st Division to one of defense. At the same time, I ordered the Imabori Detachment to withdraw from the bills and attached the; to the 1st Division. The 1st Division was relieved to hear that it v;as being reinforced. The Im&bori Detachment started its withdrawal on the morning of the 7th. The order, was given by Colonel Imabori with quick and wise judgement and on the night of the ^th, two of his companies were able to reinforce the 1st Division front. PAGE 25 The 68th Independent Brigade was expected to land at ORMOC on the evening of the 6th but the landing was delayed one day because the Burauen Operation was being carried out that day. We decided that, if the 68th Independent Brigade succeeded in landing we would use them to attack the American forces in the south of AIBUTRA. This was included in the plans for the all out counter attack against the American forces on land and sea.

At dawn of the 7th, a naval lookout station at ORMOC reported that approximately 4-0 enemy ships were sighted south of NEGROS (7.0.) Island. It seemed that their landing area was to be in the vicinity of AIFUERA. The evening of the 7th vas quiet in the ORMOC sector but ten or more enemy ships were sunk by our naval air force at sea.

The situation at AIEUERA was unknown and we were surprised when Ameri­ can forces suddenly appeared at IPIL the evening of the same day. Several of our shipping units, under tYe direction of Colonel Mitsui, defended from prepared positions' on the northeast side of IPIL. On the morning of the 7th, the American forces appeared confused because of the landing of two companies of the Nonaka Battalion of the 77th Regiment at IPIL and ORMOC. The two companies were later attached to Colonel Mitsui's shipping unit and bought bravely as a nucleous of the shipping units. Their actions while supporting the Mitsui Unit were highly praised. They remained at that position until the end of December. Previously, we estimated the American landing force to be approximately ore regiment and, at any rate, not over one division. Imabori Detachment, which was assigned,to the 1st Division, together m.th other shipping units attacked American forces which were in ALBUERA. This action was taken for the purpose of gaining closer contact.

\ The Imabori Detachment had planned to destroy the American forces by counterattack, but this plan was changed after the Kamijo Battalion had been annihilated while attacking on the 8th. The ARMY Headquarters decided to have defensive positions constructed along the coast road near the town of ORMOC and along the right flank of the shipping unit. The shipping unit, while attacking the American forces and looking for an opportunity, decided to attack in the direction of ALEUFRA. Fortunately, the Takachiho and Kashima Units landed in VALENCIA Air Field in the northern part of OR "OC on the 8th. 35th ARMY ordered the assignment of these two units (Commander of the two units was Lieut­ enant Colonel Saida) to the Imabori Detachment upon the latter's arrival. 35th ARITY and the Imabori Detachment were glad to receive these reinforce­ ments.:

The American forces, following the main highway, entered ORMOC on the 11th. On the night of the 11th, the Talcahashi Detachment while land­ ing at PALOlvIPON lost all their boats from enemy bombing. However, no personnel were lost and they were able to unload four artillery pieces onto the beach. The same nirht, the Japanese naval landing party made an opposed landing on the western beach of ORMOC Bay. t The Naval Landing Party Commander, Lieutenant Commander Ito, at a later date stated: "We thought ORMOC was in our hands and could land there under the protection of our forces but on landinr discovered it T?ts quite the opposite." This naval landing part was composed of four hundred members with nine amphibious tanks and over twenty mortars. We thought that'if this party landed"and then advanced to ORMOC it would save the Imabori Detachment. Instead it concentrated its forces near the seashore and the commander on the 12th reported to Imabori Detachment Headquarters. Subsequently, this party never ^ought but retreated north being busied back by the American forces and was unable to march toward VAIENCIA. It finally appeared in the north sector of PALOMPON. re were ' unable to get any information of the 77th Regiment which we had been ex­ pecting, However, on the 15th, we finally contacted them at FUATON. The 77th Regiment landed at PALO-TON and came to FUATON through LIMPUFGAO after assembling their force at the latter place. -

PAGE 26 Retreat and Reassembly

If the Imabori Regiment, 77th Regiment, and the Naval Landing Party succeeded in attacking the American forces, they were to recapture 0RJ10C. On 17th December, before this task was attempted, the American forces attacked and destroyed the TateisM Battalion of the Imabori Regiment, The 77th Re^'irent was also attacked while deploying. On the night of • the 17th, part of the Imabori Regiment advanced to the southern sector of ORMOC on an attack mission but failed. After this, the Imabori Regi­ ment held their positions to the west of the highway.

The same night of 17 December, 35th ARMY Headquarters at FUATON was attacked by an American force.of four hundred or five hundred. Our guard units defended us remarkably. In spite of this defense, our commander and staff were forced xo move to BOCKAON through the American lines. This move severed all communication with the several units still at ORMOC.

On the 18th of December, we learned that, the Takahashi Detachment reached the vicinity of MATA&OB. We expected this unit to march to the vicinity of LIBUNGAO, protect LIBUNGAO depot, and attack the southern sector of the American force. Instead, on the 19th, they retreated west­ ward because the American forces attacked them in the vicinity of LIBUNGAO. On the 18th our ARMY Headquarters was again attacked by the American forces and there were many casualties among the officers and men. On the 20th, the ARMY Commander moved his headquarters to KAfTPISAO, north sector of PALOMPON, Our military supplies in LIBUNGAO were lost within a day. The Chief of Ordnance Section, Lt Colonel Takata, and Chief of Freight Sectiori, Lt Colonel Takaoka died in the attack.

The situation was very grave and ARMY ordered a conference of the staff officers of the 1st Division and the 102d Division,at UBUNCAO on the 19th of December. ARMY ordered the divisions to retreat to PALOMPON in case the situation grev worse. At the same time ARMY'order­ ed the 1st Division to retreat to the northern sector of MATAGOB, and the 102d Division to retreat to the southern sector of MATAGOB and re­ organize for a counter-attack. .The order did not state any specific time for this, each division taking action according to the situation. Unfortunately, in the afternoon we received a hdavy attack from the American forces, and this confused th» situation entirely.

While the 68th Independent Brigade was being transported across the sea, they received an air attack. The commander of the escort ships ordered the brirade to 3 and on 9 December at SAN ISIDORO. The brigade was under the command of Major General Kurisu and was once known as the best trained and equipped Japanese unit. While landing on 9 December nearly everything was lost because of an air raid. Two artillery pieces were put ashore but they were left at the beach, and the brigade advanced toward the left flank of the 1st Division with only two infantry guns. We attempted to send them orders by means of air dropped messages but we were unsuccessful.

There are many notes on our fighting retreat, but I will only relate a few facts for future reference. The objective of the above retreat was carefully explained to the troops and was accomplished successfully. Even while retreating through enemy lines, if the objective of the retreat is clearly explained to the troops, reorganization can be effected even in face of heavy casualties, and plans can be successful.

The 68th Independent Brigade contacted the retreating 1st Division in the southeast sector of UMOF about 23 December. After that these two units retreated together toward VILLABA but the American forces stopped their retreat by a flank attack and did not allow them to, enter VILIAFA. Our forces continued fighting with the American forces and at PANAMA received enemy artillery shelling. During the early part of January our forces completed the assembly outside the VTiLABA sector.

PAGE 27 The 102d Division assembled in the south sector of i-i-TAGOP in late November but they were unable to contact the ARMY though they waited for two or three days. On 29 December the 102d Division unexpectedly con­ tacted AR'."!Y at the eastern sector of KAi'tPOKPOK while they were advancing toward the beach south o* VILLABA. Captain Eanetritsu, who was dispatched to the Imabori Re irent Headquarters in the early part of January, reached this headquarters with orders from APJ'Y while they were fight­ ing in the "oothills of Fountains northeast of OR'OC. The Imabori Repirent contacted the -itsui Transport Unit in the southern sector of MATIIGOB in late January and both units assembled near KA'.'POKPOK early in February. '

In mid-February, !he 16th Division car-te to the northeast sector of II:'PUNCTA0. About the 23rd of February they ire+ an ordnance unit in the northwest sector o^ LI BUNG. This ordnance unit had been dispatched from ATT Headquarters and had cashed through the eastern sector of VALENCIA. It .guided the 16th Division to KAi'VOKPOK about the- middle of March.

A ~reat deal o? equipment, large quantities of ammunition and rations *ere abandoned by the 1st Division aIon P the 0R10C and LIi'-'ON roads. The 26th Division and deserted and. wounded soldiers passing this road later benefited °rom this abandoned material. ARJ,TY Headquarters, while re­ treating along the Matagov road j was able to use materials discarded by the 5th regiment. ,rhen the American forces routed ARMY Headquarters I , was left without any clothing. However, I picked up a new uniform and sufficient "oor while on the road. Deserted and wounded soldiers did not assemble with their units as hoped for and attempts were ma^e to gather them together. Commanders, employirr persuasive language, frequently requested seriously wounded soldiers at the front to commit suicide. This was particularly common among personnel of the 1st Division and it was pitiful. However, the majority died willingly. Only Japanese could have dore a thing like this and yet I could not bear to see the sight. The slightly wounded soldiers that were not able to walk with the healthier ones uarched b"~ themselves. They were always separated from the units. Some of these, although able, became deserters rather than return to their units and. carry out their duties at the dangerous front lines. They depended for food upon the disposed supplies and a few arong them depended upon food ^rom the natives. There were many deserters in the eastern foothills of VAIFFCIA but even they asserbled when they heard rumors that AHMY was going to evac­ uate 1EYTE on the 11th o^ February by boats. '•any soldiers retreated ^rotr. the front lines even with light wounds ard did not return to their units giving their wounds as reason. ARMY decided that it would recognize oniv the seriously wounded. Under this policy, many were sent back to the front lines. Tfe formed a reserve unit at VALENCIA from among the mounded. There were rumors that there "as plenty of food at VALENCIA and many went there. The runsor T?as learned by the American "orces and they believed our headquarters was stationed there. There were many units, such r.s the Uatsui Transport Unit, that retreated without fighting the enemy. *hey claimed that they «ere service troops and. not trained for combat duty. The Ifetsui Transport was ordered to' defend the right flank of the Mitsui Detachment at ORMQC BAY, but they retreated against orders. They asserted, "Our duty is to corduct landing operations and. to assist in the operations at PAL0MP0N".

The air corps ground unit at TACIOBAN which was dispatched from DAGAMT to transport the 16th Division's r tions and supplies to 0RM0C by order of the 16th Division Compander, arrived at 0RII0C after ten days. This unit was unwilling to return to MGAMI end stated that it. was merely PAGE 28 trained for air technical jobs and nothing else. Even the artillery and anti-aircraft units retreated without facing the enengr, Their excuse was that they were not trained to fight as infantry and were useless without their guns. /

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

POOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE

FUKUE INCIDENT

There was an estimated forty or fifty deserters, including some junior officers, that escaped to CEBU and NEGROS on self-built boats. Those that,were apprehended were courts rartialed and the serious offenders were executed. It is difficult to believe in "Yamato Dashi" (Japanese Spirit) when there are cases like those. Such patters have been hidden from the general public since the time of the Sino-Japanese and Russian-Japanese wars. The propagandists have claimed that our soldiers are inspired with "Yamato Dashi" since birth. This is a foolish and. dangerous belief.

I will tell you the story of General Fukue and you can judge for yourself whether or not "Yamato Dashi" was a compelling force in this case.

We had been out of contact with the 102nd Division for days. Quite by chance, one of our staff officers, while gathering carabao near the foothills of KiJTOKPOK, contacted their headquarters which was on the move toward the northwest. The staff officers, Major Sugimoto, sent us a message by a veterinarian captain returning to our headquarters, that he would stay where he was to get the information we desired.

Major Sugimoto returned, to Army on the night of the 29th. fe had thought he would be accompanied by a liaison officer from the 102nd, but he came alone. However, he brougfrt a letter from the Chief of Staff, Wada. ^he latter stated: ,

"We have been unable to contact you since the ^T. PIfTA incident. General Fukie has exercised his own judgement, and has decided to evac­ uate to CEBU, to the locality we originally occupied. 'He intends to defend the BACOLOD Airfield sector and to establish a base of supplies for the remaining troops on IEYTE. The Nishimura Battalion will accompany the division and assume their original positions, fe will board fishing . and sailboats on the night of the 30th. Please inform the General." ~ I I notified General Suzuki and questioned Major Sugimoto who claim­ ed he had no further knowledge of the mtter. The General discussed. this matter with his staff, and all agreed that General Fukue was vio­ lating the Military Code 'in taking these steps without consent. The General considered courts irattial, but satisfied himself at this time with sending the following messages*

"Lt General Fukue and his headquarters will remain in IEYTE and at the same time I am attaching other units and groups in the VISAYAN and MINDANAO sectors to your Division. General Fukue and his Chief of Staff will report to me in person at ARMY Headquarters*"

We received a reply from the Chief of Staff, "We appreciate the efforts of ARMY but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to ARMY Headquarters." ,

PAGE 29 My acquaintance with Colonel Wada dated back to Military Junior Acade try at Hiroshima, where we had been intimate friends. I was sur­ prised at his actions. The fact that no liaison officer had been sent to ARMY had displeased us. We did finally receive an officer messenger on the 31st, who brought the following messages

"AH boats that were prepared for the retreat were destroyed by American planes on the night of the 30th, therefore delaying our depar­ ture. Would it be possible for you to send an armored craft to aid the departure of the division commander?11

I was angry about this message and replied that it would be impossible to do so. Another ^ess.tge arrived from V'ada, "The division commander has decided to cross by banca. This may be ny last message to you. Take care of yourself." This was only a personal latter and we received no official report of the matter* General Suzuki was entirely displeased;

On the night of the 31st, 35th ARMY Chief of Staff Wachi returned from SAN ISIDRO. He had been dispatched to FOURTEENTH ARMY for liaison work on the present/ operation. He had to chance his plan of boarding a boat at SAF ISIDRO due to the enemy landing there. On his return journey, he visited VTLLARA and had a discussion with General Fukue. This dis­ cussion revealed that the general had taken a very philosophical view of the situation, "'"acri reported the conversation to General Suzuki who immediately became enraged and broke relations with Fukue. For several days I had a difficult time consoling the General.

By way of making a personal investigation, I asked to be allowed to visit VILIAEA. Permission was granted providing I wou.:d return with all the information possible to get about the division, and I set out on my trip. I reached the beach at VILLABA without incident and tret Staff Officer Kaneko.

He reported that General Fukue departed the previous night for CEBU, accompanied by his chief of staff.. Also in his party were some rembers ' of headquarters, C.O. of Nishiraura Battalion and two of the company commanders, also, a few soldiersv These people consititued his guard. Kaneko's boat had been sunk and he and his party had swum ashore that morning. He was planning to attempt it again and was searching for a boat. It was his opinion that the general had succeeded in reaching CEBU.

Ey having the personnel of the Nishimura Battalion accompany him on this trip, General Kaneko had violated the military code, I was appalled at his actions and returned immediately to ARMY Headquarters where I re­ ported to the companding general. He was furious and immediately sub­ mitted a request to higher headquarters to have Fukue reduced in command at once and further asked that he be apprehended and punished by courts msrtial.

Fukue succeeded in escaping from IEYTE but he and his Chief of Staff, flada, were wounded in the shoulder by rifle fire from guerrillas as they were passing the shore near P0G0 on CIP-U Island the next morning. Evi­ dently they had run into heavy opDosition and, although the general succeeded in reaching CFPU, our report of the incident stated that the battalion commander was missing and thp.t the two companjr commanders and a few soldiers returned to LEYTE, »

General Suzuki then contacted General Fukue and ordered him relieved of his command-of the 102nd Division.and together with his chief of staff, to remain at CEBU Island until he received further orders,

Fulue: replied to this in an attempt to explain his action. The message read as follows: "The members of the Nishimura Battalion and other members of my party assisted me in my departure and accompanied me as my body guards. I take full responsibility for the entire action. I had received a personal letter from Chief of Staff Tomochika in which he

PAGE 30 permitted me to take along a few guards." (I had written him a personal letter and had stated that it »aa permissable to use a few guards but I erased that portion of the letter after reading Army Regulations.) Around the riddle of February, since we had received no answer from Higher Headquarters to our recuest for action in this case, General Suzuki decided to take matters into his own hands. It was his opinion that there should be no delay in taking action on svch •?. breach of discipline on the part of a high ranking officer. Ee sent me to CEBU and on the night of 25 March, I contacted General Fukue and the Chief of Staff * I handed ther orders from Arny reprimanding them and sen­ tencing their to thirty- days confinement. I discussed the affair with them and the discussion revealed some interesting facts.

Staff Officer Sugiivoto of 35th ARIIY Headquarters, during a. visit to ore of the 102rid Division Headquarters at VILIABA, had. been advised of the division colander!s plans and had agreed to it. In fact, he even re­ quested that the general bring him along on the trip to CEBU. It was division com ander's understanding that when Suzuki returned to ARMY Heocquarters at that ti.tre he was to make an oral report to the AR";1Y Commander. He was to report that the division had arrived at the posi­ tion designated by ARMY at the south portion of MATAGOB but that for three days they had been unable to contact ARMY. v'ithout contact, General Fukue had decided to cake his own plans which would not be based on a personal interests but interests of all concerned. Ee was to make it cleai • to the ARMX Commander1 that he planned to move to CEBU and. that he would post­ pone these plans if it was the ARM Commander's desire,

I had been suspicious of Sugimoto prior to hearing this story and was quite sure he had not communicated the message. He probably knew that ARMY would not grant permission for General Fukiut*s departure and that this would deprive him of a good chance to escape IFYTE ISLAND.

General Suzuki arrived at CEBU City on the night of 27 March and. was rret by General Fukuo. Fukue was severely reprimanded and he then apolo­ gized to t'-e corfanding general. Although the general had sentenced Fukue and Wada to thirty days confinement he later returned Fukue to command of.the 102nd Division, ^his action closed-the entire matter.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

HISSIOF REVISED TO SFLF SUSTAINING WAR

About the middle of November, 35th ARMY received a radio message from FOURTEENTH ARMY. The message was badly garbled but we interpreted it to read as follows: "Redeploy your trooos to fight extended holding action in areas of your choice. Select areas such, as EACALOD on FEGP.0S which are highly suitable for self sustaining action. This message relieves you of your assigned mission."

Fefore making any plans to move, Suzuki decided to dispatch Chief of Staff wachi to ?!AHIIA to confer with higher authorities regarding the evacuation of troops from IBYTE. Suzuki planned to make his decision following the return of ' achi. This caused a further delay because the Chief of Staff never returned.

• Wachi was- unable to board ship at BIN ISID0R0, and therefore, departed from AEIJAO by armored boat about the 3d of December. After stopping at IAC0L0D he finally reached "AGIO on LUZON in late January and reported to the Commanding General of Fourteenth ARMY. That was the last seen or heard of Wachi who was transferred, to SAIGOF as a staff officer attached to the Supreme Headquarters of the Southern Expeditionary ARMY. As a result, Suzuki initiated plans without further delay and I again assumed the posi­ tion -of Chief of Staff.

PAGE 31 In the interim we had planned to make PiiLOMPON the base of oper­ ations for the self sustaining action. In order to keep the road and line o^ communications between MATAGOB and PAIOtTPON open, we attempted to establish our headquarters at KAMPISAO. Tl:e American forces changed our plans on 25 December by landing at PALOMPON. We therefore selected as a ba^e of operations a position in the vicinity of KAvIPOKPOK (T.N. JIMABTJYAN) to the north of the main road.

T'is nfew site was in the higher terrain with an elevation of about three hundred meters; The terraih wis thickly wooded and combined with rocky slopes on both the east and west to make it a natural fortress. We commanded a view of the ORMOC Plains to the east and the CAI'OTES Sea and the Island of CEFU to the west. In the area were a few native huts, cultivated fields and coconut groves along the beach, "and interspersed among the coconut groves were numerous salt beds. This area wag admir­ able for an extended period of defensive action. The Supply Officer announced that there was sufficient rations remaininp to surrly fifteen thousand troops for only two more weeks. We had plans to evacuate our forces from IEYTE and transfeif the headquarters to CEPU Island to avoid starvation* The troops were Actually able to subsist until the middle of March by harvesting rice, corn and larre quantities of camotes that bad been planted by the natives. The VISAYAN sector of IEYTE has numer­ ous local farm products and we were able to subsist (Longer than if we had moved to CEEU Island. It was my opinion that we could live here for some time with all these lu^rious food sources, yet certain high officers were claroring for evacuation.

In order to subsist, we cultivated the land within the base section o* operations and forager" the outside areas. We also conducted raids on the enemy to obtain American rations with some success. However, it became evident over a period of time that it paid us to grow our own food or secure food from the natives, thus avoiding going through the American lines. The sweet potato production was more than we expected and from the homes of the natives we secured rice and corn. Further­ more, there were many carabao and were able to salt the meat from these with salt which was available in the district.

Until the middle of March the food situation was not so bad as anticipated, although liquor and sugar we~e unattainable. The quantity of food was sufficient but the calorie content of the food was in­ sufficient for fighting. Powever, no one starved to death. Some con­ scientious unit comranders made reserve stocks of corn to last for from 3 to 5 months. For vegetable we ate the leaves of potatotes, • flowering ferns, wild spinach, coconut buds, roots of papaya, and certain nutritious products from the coconut trees.

The American forces attacked our base section of operation twice, the first of these attacks lasting "or ten days until the end of January. The second lasted for more than -fifteen days from the end of February. These attacks by the Americans were an attenpt to blockade the area on land and sea and stop the importation of food. Since we were self-suf­ ficing on food at tve tine we were not in too great difficulties. Each of our units took independent action against the enemy blockade lines. In the meantime we continued to make salt in our spare time. Our terri­ tory was getting smaller but at that time we were able to continue sea traffic to CEPU. About this time we destroyed enemy cannons by means of a sudden attack, and broke through American lines to their bivouac area. It alleviated our food problem when American rations were brought back.

The American forces shelled us do.y and night. (It seemed to me that there were 12 guns at MATAGOB and PAIAIA, A- guns at PAIOI'.IPON F L, runs at VILLABA. They all seemed to be 10cm howitzers and guns.) Te suffered many casualties as a result of this shelling. '?e could do nothing for the patients since medical supplies were almost gone. It was pitiful to hear patients shouting, "It will make us rest tiiore easily if a doctor examined, us." There was nothing we could do. The critical situation^ became worse. All the soldiers lost their fighting spirit sudoenly witA

PAGE 32 the accompanying food shortage. It became impossible to maintain good morale among the troops. Even members of the staff section, who should set examples in soldier morale, started complaining and voicing pessi­ mistic views. Due to starvation men started displaying unstable mental behaviorism. It was a pitiful sight. In the future it will be necessary to give more realistic attention to proper education and development of nan's character and behavior. It is useless to give lectures consisting of meaningless proverbs.. They are of no value in desperate situations or dangerous moments. This collapse o.f morale was foxind to be even rore serious in the MINDANAO Operation than in LEYTE.

v

PAGE 33 PART II

THE MINDANAO OPERATIONS

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

EVACUATION OF LEYTE

Plans had been completed early in January for evacuating LEYTE Island. Later in the month the plans were put into operation. A general outline is given below.

The remaining units which had the strength to resist and carry on further fighting on IEYTE I?LAND planned to shift to the VISAYANS and MINDANAO areas and take up new defensive positions there. The trans­ ferred personnel was to consist of those with good morale and physical condition, able to withstand the rigors of a long fight; therefore, the sick, weak and wounded were oiritted from those units to be transferred. After the transfer of the majority of the forces including the Army Independent Unit, Headquarters was to leave IEYTE and transfer to CEBU. After that, Headquarters must quickly move into MINDANAO and make future plans for prolonged combat. The raverent of the forces started during the middle part of January. -?"hen this plan was announced, many of the troops rushed to join this movement and Staff Officer Nakamura exper­ ienced difficulty in controlling them. However, quite a number of men succeeded in transferring without the commander's orders. The commander was displeased because only a small number of staff officers were willing to stay on IEYTE ISLAND. Toward the middle of January, amidst continual attacks by Americaii torpedo craft, the majority of the 1st Division was transferred to CEBU by lar"e landing barges. Many round trips were made in spite of the attack and the success of the operation exceeded our expectations. At anv rate, Army Group Headquarters appeared satisfied and praised this tasv in a radio message. Supplies were brought to us from IEYTE to CI.BU in limited quantities. However, rany of the barges returned empty and the army commander was not entirely satisfied with the success o^ efforts to resupply the forces remaining on IEYTE.

This was handled by staff officers of the advance echelon who had left IEYTE earlier and who, it appeared, gave more attention to matters pertaining to CEBU, NF.C-ROS and MINDANAO. I expected to transfer to CEBU by a boat which was to arrive on January 20th. However, the boat failed,to arrive although I waited on the beach for a period of four days.

I tried to leave a'ain on February 20th and again I waited on the beach for several days for a boat that never arrived. Further evacuation became extremely difficult now since the American forces had discovered our plans and reinforced the sea blockade. There was much destruction on the beaches at both IEYTE and CEBU and the enemy naval vessels almost destroyed us. The morale of the soldiers on IFYTE ISLAND became very low and many rren plunged into the depths of despair. (Staff Officer Osone, who had a similar e::pcrience on GUADALCANAL stated that the con­ ditions on IEYTE were better than GUADALCANAL in that there was more food on IEYTE, but later on he changed his opinion and declared that, "Not even GUADALCANAL was as bad as this. There, at least,.some effort was made to supply us~."

Time passed in this manner until the middle of March and we still had not been apprised when the headquarters would move. The situation in the CEBU sector was growing worse under pressure of.the American attacks and. the headquarters corm ander decided to start the r ovenent as soon as boats became available. The embarkation point was to be at a strip of beach four kilometers north of ABIJAO and final preparations were

PAGE .34 completed. The boat which was to be dispatched by the Headquarters on CIFU was expected to come •'"or us around the 7th of March* The members of the Headquarters went to the embarkation point on the 6th to wait for the boat, but it was not until the night of the 17th that we Bade our miraculous escape by two large type boats and reached TABOCOF off CEPU Island. (Departure time was 0030, 18th January and the arrival tire was 0500 on 19th. January.)

Around 0£00, 19th Jmuary these t?;o boats wore damaged, by American torpedoes and as a result there fas no boat that night for the Headquar- ers Comm -nder. Even sof the transport unit repaired the large tyoe boats with great efforts and went out on their mission on the 22nd day. Our party left TAF0G0N on the 21st day and safely arrived in CEPU T0*N by traveling overland, on the 24th. On the night of the 22nd, this large type boat had some trouble and cou3d not rove '"hen it arrived, on IEYTE, so the Headquarters Commander decided to start with life boats to escape. On the same niht, they stayed, over night on uninhabited island and sailing all night on the 23rd they finally arrived r.t TABOGON on the morning of the 24-th. The following ?5th day they arrived at CE1 U rOCK* YARDS at 2100 with the Assistance of the Naval Special Submarine Units from. TABOGON while the American forces were still landing.

This Naval Submarine Unit had performed a p-reat sorvice by ex­ pediting' the escape of the commander. They sent out a special sub­ marine three times for him but it did not work out successfully until the fourth time when the submarine succeeded in negotiating the trip between TABOGON and CEBU. Thus the Naval Submarine Unit accomplished their purpose. ' i

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN i

HAZARDOUS VOYAGE TO ittNDANAO

On 26 March, the American forces landed in CEBU T01S?N and stopped our movement fror- CFEU to i-?TNDANA0. Fe were not able to cross to EACOLOr and fly over to MINDANAO, so we dccided to attempt a crossing by banca as a last resort. We left CEPU CITY on the 2£th and. arrived >' at TABOGON on the 31st. The American forces again landed, in BACOLOP anr1 then our banca crossing became necessary. We understood crossing by banca was almost impossible and that the chance of success was some­ thing like one percent. For thi's reason, many staff officers expressed the opinion that we should abandon the movement to MINDANAO and make plans to remain in the northern sector of CEBU ISLAND, at least for the time bring.

Staff Officcr Osono also felt that it was foolish to attempt such a journey. The Amy Compandor, who was strong willed, wouj.d not change his mind and adhered to his original plan.

Ho then wrote the following two poems i

Memory For Departure •

Do not starve to death, Go out into the fields; Even though we die bravely, It will not stop the forward advance, For I am the Commander, and Fortunately I am still able to servej Give me many lories.

PAGE 35 A Farewell Poerr

Every soldier rust expect to sacrifice his life in War, Only then has his duty been done; Be thankful that you can die at the front, Rather than an inglorious death at hoire.

Suzuki. Please read these poems, dear brother Tomochika.

On April 10th, we were ready to move to MEDFLUN with five boats. The Headquarters Commander rode on the first boat, I was on the second bof.t and the other staff officers and the remaining officers and men,of the Takachiho Units were in the others.

After the nieht of the 10th, the wind calmed down temporarily, so we rode at anchor until dawn o" the 11th. On the 12th night, the wind blew strongly and the speed of our boat increased so that we arrived at the southern point of ESCARINITE at dawn of the 13th. When we reached this point we met General Suzuki's boat. Fc were gfod to learn that he 'fas safe and suggested to him the advisability of moving together for the remainder of the trip. On the same day, as we lay at anchor there, the natives attacked us killing one of our men. We sailed out again before sunset and anchored at the southern island off the shore of SAN CARLOS ISiAFD. (T.N. Small island off northeast coast of MEGROS ISIAND.) At this point we were surprised bv a large number of natives who attacked us from the land while American armored craft attacked us from the sea. Staff Officer Osone and five men became casualties but our boats did not receive much damage ajid v;e were able to sail again, with favorable winds around 2000. All throurh the night, we received fierce enemy fire but we were fortunate in th t no heavy weapons were employed against us. On the night of the 15th, we anchored at the south beach of" EAIS, Having ieerned by experience, v/e did not remain here long but set out again at 1300. T~'e saw a boat in BAIS, which, although it hoisted the American flo.&, did not attack us. However, in our baste to get away, our boat got caught several times on the reef. On the morning of the 16th, re anchored, at the south section of DUI'AGUETF BEACH (Enemy patrol planes flew over regularly every two hours on EEGRCS STRAIT but they failed to recognize us.)- Fhen we asked the natives about,the situation of the garrison at DUMAGUETE, we learned that the garrison was fighting the American and Filipino groups in the mountains. re altered our plans with regard to stopping at PUMAGUETE and decided, to continue our sailinr to MINDANAO ISIAND past SIQUIJ0R ISLAND without further delay. Around 1100 of the same day the natives attacked us rdth trench mortar fire and the fighting was very dangerous. The members of Takachiho Unit fought bravely and fortunately there was only one casualty. After sunset we escaped, from there but the enemy continued firing on us until we were 200 meters (T.N. The distance is exactly translated as given.) distant. Fortunately we received little damage.

The crossing of the strait on the night of the 16th was the rost difficult part of the voyage. There was no -wind and the tide was running against us, but after much hard nulling we we^e able to ride on the train current off the island of CEF.U. Around midnight we passed the southern section o^ CFBU ISIAND and entered the MINDANAO SEA. Here ve could, make good progress by sailing with the current. In the early morning of the 17th we had already passed DA'iAGUETE and sailed toward the open sea south of SIQUIJOTi ISIAND. It «as on the night of the 16th th-t wc last saw the Army Commander, General Suzuki. Our #1 and. our :!:2 boats failed to ride on the main current and the jf'l boat became separated from us in the far distance. The last we saw of them was at 2200 on the 16th. After we surrendered oficiariy in the early part of September and v?hile at the Headquarters of the American PAGE 36 X Corps at DEL MONTE. American officers notified me that General Suzuki was killed during an attack by U. S. planes off the shore of NECROS ISLAND,

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

SINGIE BOAT ARRIVES AT MINDANAO

On the 17th, «ur number 2 bo~t sailed southward into the center of MINDANAO SEA, with favorable winds, and ground 1500 in the afternoon we were a>le to.see the southeast cape of SIQUIJOR ISLAND. If we could have maintained this speed we would have beer in the vicinity of C&GAYAN on the 19th. However, the rind subsided around 3.600 and we had. to depend only on the flow of the current for there was no other method to proceed. There was no wind at all during the night of the 17th, but we reached MIRAY CAPE in the northwest corner of MINDANAO ISLAND during the early dawn of the 18th. After this the wind grew in velocity and v.'o were forced to fight large waves. It was fortunate that we did not sink at that time. We were able to advance only by long tedious tacks. All the members of our party did their best to row and with much difficulty we succeeded in ^ anchoring in SAWANGU BAY after sailing around SIUA POINT that afternoon.'

On the evening of the 18th the wind came up strongly off EtlRARO GAPE, and brought with it a he vy tropical rain* The rain poured down heavily . and the boat was Unable to advance. We spend an uncorrfortable night but toward morning the winds were again favorable and on the 19th wo were off the shor'e of PLARIDEL town. On this day there was no wind so we spent our tine in ropairir.g the sails and rudder until that afternoon when we again had fresh winds. Then we sailed east in IUGAN BAY and spent the night in the middle of the Bay.

On the night of the 20th, we had reached SULAUAN POINT. When we advanced toward the tip of SULAUAN POINT, favorable northeast wind and ocean current increased the speed of our boat so that it sped on like a torpedo.

We encountered disaster after a while when wo ran aground on DESPUJOIS BEACH. At about 2300 that evening we received carbine and automatic rifle fire from land. Without hesitation, all members of the party did their be'st to bail out the water and release the boat. Every­ one finally jumped into the water and pulled the boat free from the shore. *e spent the night shivering in our wet clothes. Eventually the wind and the waves calmed down and after repairing the damaged sail, we started again for the south.

21st April mxp, memorable for it was - then that ra finally/ reached our destination, •'•he wind was blowing slightly to the southeast and re sailed alonp smoothly. There had been no American landing in the CAGAYAN area and there were only a few barges in MACAJALAR BAY. We picked up coconuts floating in the CAGAYAN River and quenched our thirst with coco­ nut milk. When we reached AGUSAN EEACH around 1400 in the afternoon the Reconnaissance Regiment of the 30th Division t;et us and we embraced each other and shed unmanly tears. There was no news of the ,fl boat nor of the other three boats. I expected the #1 boat to arrive a day later with General Suzuki and waited but soon lost hope for him.

When I think of it, the idea of making such a voyage in life boats was high impractical. It can be said that this venture was almost a complete failure but the determined 35th Army Commander, Suzuki, had refused to change his original plan and insisted on conducting a last ditch stand on MINDANAO. It crust be admitted that General Suzuki dis­ played great courage and determination in attempting to carry out his original plan regardless of obstacles. The only part of his plan that was a success was the arrival of the on© boat which reach MINDANAO.

PAGE 37 Before carrying out this plan, the commander told me that, "If only you or I should reach MINDANAO, our objective would be accom­ plished, In case you alone should arrive, you must take my place as 35th Amy Commander and carry on until finding out about my safety." Generally speaking the plans for the MINDANAO operation had been for' mulated before leaving IEYTE.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

SELF-SUSTAINING WARFARE- PLANNED

(SUZUKI'S DREAM KINGDOM)

While on IEYTE, General Suzuki and I discussed our plans for Army after the loss of IEYTE, Higher Headquarters had already stated their policy with regard to a prolonged "Self-Supported War of Independent Actions". We could not depend on this type of operation to defend against a full scale landing of American forcesi Moreover, in this sort of operation it is first ne&essary to secure control over the native people. (We commonly called this plan, "The Establishment of a Suzuki Kingdom.") When we say "Suzuki Kingdom", we, of course, do not nean a kingdoir separate from the Japanese Enpire but only isolated from the Empire. We were still under the direction of the Commander in Chief of the ARtT GROUP, General Yamashita.

MINDANAO Island appeared to be the most ideally suited area for this plan. There were some 12,000 of our Nationals in MINDANAO and be­ sides this there were t e Moro, Ada and ^e.gobo groups who were our sympathizers.

We had two Divisions on MINDANAO; the 100th Division and the 30th Division. Therefore, we had sufficient force for a determined defense and needed only to determine the best area to establish our headquarters * From the standpoint of defense, the KIBA?E vicinity in central MINDANAO was the most suitable place to concentrate the 30th Division and the 100th Division. If we established headquarters there we could easily manage our nationals in DAVA0 and coordinate with the Moros, Twelve thousand of our Nationals could support us strongly. With their co­ operation we could keep up self-supported independent war for a pro­ longed period §,nd succeed in establishing the "Suzuki Empire,"

We did not know how much progress has been made in enlisting the aid of the Ada and Pacobo Races so for this reason, too, we felt the DAVA0 Plains was the most suitable place to establish our headquarters. At the same time, this site was close to MAIABAL&Y and KAEAKAN roads which led. into the PAVAO Plains. For this reason, the hills in central DAVAO-PAIMA was the best place, although we did not know much about the general terrain. 1'he location was to be decided upon after we reached ' MINDANAO and after a more detailed study of the area. This plan was previously discussed before we moved to CEVU from IEYTE during the early- part of January.

CHAPTER TWENTY

30TH DIVISION DISPUYS JAt.K 0? PUNNING

When I reached the Army Intelligence Headquarters in INPABUGAO I received very disappointing reports from Watanabe, a staff officer of the 30th Division, The reports fell far short of what I had expected.

PAGE 38 Our forces were located generally fror CAGAYAN to SURIGAO in the north and C0TABAM0 to SARANGaNI to the south. They were widely scattered in these areas and were not properly disposed in defense. At COTAFATO they did not >ave any plans to oppose a landing by Airerican forces and it appeared that they were just waiting for American forces to come.

They had cultivated fields in order to support themselves, but they did not have any adequate storage area for the rations nor even for ammunition within their sector. I wondered, "What have they been doing here ^or the last half year?" I was incensed to learn that they had veen loading while tve force on IEYTE were engaged in a death struggle!

The Division commanded Ltt Gen; MofOzutoi and his staff had not reached any definite decision and had nothing but complaints to present.

This was on 26 April, six months after the invasion of ITXTE1.

On 26 April I flew to DiiVAO and called on the 100th Division Commander^ Lt. General Harada, to inquire about the situation in his area and. the condition of his division. He replied with confidence that the 100th Division was fully prepared to defend against landings and there was no cause to worry. I discussed fully with him the details concerning the defense plans, training, fortifications, and supplies. I was generally satisfied with the situation. There was one about which I was doubtful. That was the cuestion in regard to cooperation with the navy and the local Japanese Nationals. When I visited his Chief of Staf", who was then in the hospital, he told me that Lt. General Harada had given considerable attention to the operation plans and to training, but he had not been interested in military administration, handling the Japanese Nationals, and the native population. The Chief of Staff explained further that, although be had wanted to do more toward administration of Japanese Nationals and natives there was not' much that he could do in his present capafeity. General Haradafs personality was not agreeable to the Navy and the relationship between the services was poor. Staff Officer Kawazoe had good relations with Admiral Doi, *rho had com anded the naval forces at D&VAO during the ^ighting there.

100th Division had done a better job than the 30th Division in t: eir preparations and in carrying out the plans for the "Suzuki Empire." The division agreed to our pl&ns and pledged their full cooperation in the field. I was therefore satisfied and returned to IMPAHJTAO on the evening of the same day. ^

CHAPTER TWENTY ONE

A FAULTY ESTIMATE OF THF AMERICAN PIAN

Initially, I estimated that the American forces were not going to lc.nd large forces on MINDANAO. At that time the main forces of the Amer­ ican and Japanese were fighting a decisive battle on OKINAWA and I felt the American could not spare any large amount of strength to MINDANAO. I believed thit the Americans were to use their forces in BORNEO in an effort to cut off the communications betveen the southern areas and Japtn proper.

Considering the overall situation in the Philippines, MINDjJ'AO appeared to te only a trifling matter as compared to the reoccupation of LUZON and MANIIA. I thought the Americans would rely on the Phili­ ppine forces against MINDANAO. When I first heard that the American forces had landed at C0TABAT0, I thought they would merely occupy the harbor. I thought of leaving the operational plans up to the divisions ' PAGE 39 and let the Army take care of the permanent operations and plans, how-r ever, when the American forces began advancing through PIKIT and KIBAWE, I decided to supervise the defense and leave administrative matter wait, I estimated the American forces ?rhich landed at COIV-BATO to be not less- than one division, and that after reaching KIBAKE they would probably advance through the DAVAO PLAINS toward MALAYBALiY. I felt they would not elect to fight along the DAVAO coastline. If a strong force should land later at CAGAYAN, we could retreat to the northwestern portion of the DAVAO PLAINS and place our Headquarters in the mountains. The 30th Division stubbornly held their troops at CAGAYAN and did not move their troops south to the COTABATO sector. The commander of the 31st Division would, not budge nor would he listen to iry plans. As a result, a'ter the landing at CAGAYAN, his front lines were defeated and pushed back by the American forces to the vicinity of MALAYBAIAY.

About this time the Americans landed at CAGAYAN and established contact with their troops to the south. After that blow the 31st Divi­ sion retreated into the mountains east of flAIAYBALAY. Owing to the lack of preparations, they were forced to retreat still further to the AGUSAN River Valley after one month.

CHAPTER TTDFTY T"R0

I INSPECT SOWE UNITS

Oh 30 April, I left IMPALUTAO and on the 15th of May reached ElAO through PALMA* The American forces approaching from the southern sector had already arrived about one kilometer from PAIMA. When the commander of the post on the line of communications heard this, he deserted to BIAO after my departure. It was hard to believe that a comirander would do such a foolish thing. While I was marching along the right bank of the PULANGI RIVER I gave orders to Colonel Hirayama, comnander of the Hirayama Road Construction Force, which was stationed along the banks of the PULANGI RIVER, to defend this sector with all his strength.

Staff Officer Watanable and his party left IMPALUTAO two days later and arrived, in EIA0 tw weeks later. This delay Iras caused, not only by the advancing American forces, but by our forces having des­ troyed all the bridges.

I would like to write about some of the fighting conditions in the western section, (Palma district). The defense of this section was the responsibility of the Hirayama Force which was originally a road construction battalion consisting of three rifle companies, two engineer companies, from the 100th Division, one transport engineer company, and two advance combat engineer companies. Their total strength was about 800. Most of them expressed the attitude that "We are not a combat unit." Even so they fought the American forces at the western sector of PULANGI River for a month and during the next month they fought in the vicinity of PINA VILLAGE and in the eastern section of the PULANGI RIVER.

Colonel Hirayama had the ability to carry out his duty of defend­ ing the western sector of the Corps base of operations. Colonel Hira­ yama was known as a "Saga Samurai" and was connected with the "2-26 Incident" (T.N. February 26th Incident. An assassination of government officials by the Army clique in 1936.) As a result of the incident he wis discharged from the Regular Arr

Durin? combat, be strictly enforced food rationing and proper rest periods for his ovn con, but at the same time, he almost ignored his attached units. As a result, irony of the men in the attached units

PAGE 40 ran a-ay without fighting. It is.rumored that some men in his unit deserted because of his poor leadership. Colonel Hirayama was per­ sonally responsible for these desertions which added much to the already crumbling discipline and combat efficiency o^ 4.he Array,

In middle of June, Nakao Company of ^hizuru Battalion of the 100th Division, and Bugisan Company of the Yamada Pattation reinforced the Hirayama Force from which many men had deserted. Colonel.Hirayama con­ tinued to fail to give proper attention to these newly attached units in regard to food rationing and rest. When the Americans attacked, they began to desert and straggled back along the main highway* They , complained that they could not firht if they were not given proper food. Colonel Hirayama's report was always concerned about the food problem and failed to mention the combat situation. Army had issued sufficient rations and I felt very sorry for the iren who did not receive the re­ quired rations as a result of the faulty distribution within his. command.

In the early part of July, the Yamada Battalion was also transferred to the Western section of the base of operations and tbok up positions along +he main highway. Captain Yamada, the battalion commander, command­ ed the entire Hirayama Unit and Colonel Hirayama commanded a single unit and was stationed in SAPAKG in the south of the main highway.

Although Yamada held only the rank of captain, he was very capable. Amorg the eight battalion commanders of the 100th Division he was the most expert on tactics and had had experience in commanding a corrpany in Central China. He had numerous awards and decorations. He was devoted to his duties and '-ave great attention to his men. Many desert­ ers came back to his unit and were willing to ficht courageously. He displayed the essentials of leadership even in minor things. He had the ability to handle the natives and the nationals in that vicinity. The people volunteered to help them, the men by engaging in construction jobs and the women by washing and cooking for them. Fror" the middle of July to the middle of August, this battalion commander did a fine job in dealing with the food crisis and at the same time his subordinates did not desert as they did before. His' hungry and weakened units now did their best to defend the western front.

THE OPERATION THAT FAILED

* IN DISORDERLY FIGHTING

Until the American forces advanced to the DAVAQ PLAINS from KAFACAN, our fighting in the v'VAO District was a failure, but our fipht in the main zone of DAVAO PLAINS was quite a success. The battle between Culaman and Banos was also a failure and the "Self-Supported War" in the north section of Fanos was crushed and went to pieces. There were several reasons for this.

Lt. General Harada lacked ability and leadership. Fls Chief of Staff, Hattori, suffered from serious attacks of malaria and had been on the verse of death since February., He was unable to carry out his duties until the early part of September. General Harada attempted to handle the Division entirely by himsel^, but failed to make proper use of his staff and handled, things poorly. (We learned Inter that fewer than one-tenth of his combat reports were factual.) Although this division had shown good results when the situation was favorable it failed miserably under adverse conditions.

During the main battle in DAVAO PLAIN, our forces lacked the skill to stop the enemy forces at our front lines. Although we knew that the American forces were marching from KABACAK, we failed to resist them along the narrow road west of DIGOS and neglected to destroy the highway.

PAGE 41 It was a serious error for our forces not to take any defensive action against the enemy between DIGOS and DAVAO PLAIN. It was a narrow zone situated between the mountain and the sea and was the most suitable place for defense. # When I asked the Division commander about this error he replied: "I gave the order to defend this territory but my order was not carried out." He offered other excuses for this error such as, "Our front line units feared the shelling by the American forces and many of the person­ nel deserted their units and hid in the mountains;" or "^e believed that a pov«'erpul American forces was going to land on the DAVAO BEACH, and therefore gave so much attention to t\at area that we could not carry ®ut fully the defense of front lines."

In spite of this failure the battle of the main zone was quite a success. There \¥as an amazing amount of resistance in two months fighting in the DAVAO PLAINS. The 1st Division which had been con­ sidered the best division on IEYTE was finally annihilated in the mountain battles in the vicinity of KILONGHIIOTTG, within a period of a month. If the 100th Division were compared with the 1st Division, the former did better fighting. Though the 100th was less known, -the majority of its battalions fought amazingly well. Although the Divi­ sion compander's previous reputation was unfavorable, he showrd his ability and ^air leadership during this battle.

CHAPTER TWENTY THREE

POOR CONTROL OF RATIONS •'

AFP OTHER SUPPLIES

The delaying actions between the south section of CALINAN and the vicinity of BANOS was a total failure. This resulted from insufficient preparations and poor leadership.- The 100th Division Commander failed to make any definite future plans against the shifting of the American advance toward the TULI vicinity to the south of TAI'OGAN. In the mean­ time, communications between the Division and Brigade Compander and his subordinate Battalions were improperly handled and, for one week,there ' was no communications between them at all. The movement of the hospital was fairly successful but the patients who we^e in serious condition had to be "eft behind.

A large portion of the rations and ammunition were abandoned, in the southern section of TAMOGAN. The American forces captured part of the rations and ammunition in the TULI vicinity. Sore units "took with them rations to last ten days or more, depending upon the decision of the unit commanders. Until the early part of June, the rations of ARMY Headquarters and other attached units were supplied from the PALMA DISTRICT, but this was later charged and supplies were received from the DAVAO section. Fortunately, a sufficient amaunt had been carried south of 7ANOS. The 100th Division units grabbed the important rations and the salt (which weighed about lA- tons) and eventually transported them north to BANOS. For this reason, the supply of ARMY Headquarters was insufficient and. the Hirayama units ®nd the Yatnada units, which were fighting at the western section, fought without sufficient rations from the early part of July. This incident was deplorable. It goes without saying that each unit realized that centralized rations control was necessary at this titfie.

ARMY had planned to control the supply depots and hospitals under one administrative unit. This had been discussed with the divisions, and they agreed to a centralized control plan for the hospitals, but

PAGE U2 they did n*t agree to such a plan for the supplies and it was there­ fore a failrre.

The division compander? apparently thought that ARMY would with' hold the rations from them if a centralized control plan for the sup^ plies- was adopted. ARMY'S idea was that the divisions should devote their entire time to fighting and be freed from administrative worries of handling supply of rations. They misunderstood our motives and balked when we tried to organize "this plan. ARMY had desired to re­ lease the direct operational control of various units to the divisions but retain the control of supplies for all the units. The failure of the division commanders to comply with ARMY'S desires in this matter was the most reprehensible and without precedent.

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR

DISAGREE''EFT BETWEEN ARMY AND DIVISION

It appeared evident to the division comrpander that the American forces would cross the PAIMA.-D.to.VAO Road and they were pessimistic. They asserted that the units under division had become extremely low on strength from previous battles and that it was impossilbe for them to fight against strong American forces. The;*- stated that we must open our avenue of retreat to UFIAN district.

I disagreed with them and stated that the American forces would not cross the PA.L'A-DAV^.0 Road. I told them that the eneisy wot1Id not repair the main road and station themselves permanently there since they already have a good road between KIEME and DAVAO. Even though the American forces arrived at DAVAO Plains from their beachhead, they would be able to keep secure their surply lines on this road, ^he enemy would continue their offensive action temporarily and would unite with tbeir forces from the east and west. A*"ter they united they would return to R---VAO Plain. Why would they waste their manpower effort and supplies attempting to cross rugged and inpenetrable mountain roads where even tanks could not travel. For these reasons, they will not continue to advance., When they start temporary offensive action our units rust hide from the main road. After the enemy departs our units must again return to their former positions.

As the situation for the division sank into adversity the fight­ ing power of the units became further weakened. It was pessimistically judged by them as a hopeless situation but it was really not necessary to worry about fighting ability since there still remained 300 or 4-00 men. From experience at KAI5P0KP0K in IEYTE of a self-supporting war we were confident we had a much greater fifhting strength here. The division commander, however did not have confidence in us. He stated, "ARMY takes an optimistic view point and does not consider this rratter seriously."

From the stand point of a self-support, ARMY had advised the division that the main force of the division would encounter disad­ vantages and difficulties if they assembled in the vicinity of ¥,"IT IAN* Therefore, in compliance with our desire, the division commander ordered the Kawazoe Brigade to the Mbian District, Tochigi Erigade to LUAYAN and OJCAS District, and the division headquarters to SIMIO and SITANAO District. However, the division attempted to abandon entirely their positions along the main highway section and position in the northern foothills at MT. APO where thej couJd cultivate many crops.

ARMY'S previous plan was as follows: The division will have tMrir base of operation at VILLANUE7A in the west and FANOS in the east and must secure tiese positions. Within these bases of operation it must establish self-supporting areas by cooperating with the Ada and Bacolod

PAGE A3 natives. Besides this, it must set collecting points from which our troops can obtt.in large quantities of food from rice growing districts of CAVAO Plain, These collecting points must be suitably situated so that supplies can be easily transported inland. The self-supporting areas must include salt producing areas po that our salt needs can be satisfied. Unless the above measures are taken, the division will eventually be weakened by starvation.

In mid-July we ordered the above plan be executed by the division commander but the latter would not apree with this plan in all its respects. Later when the American forces established themselves near the main highway district he finally agreed to our plan in its entire­ ty. He thought the American forces bar1 no intentions of using the main highway and therefore it was unnecessary for the main force of the division to secure this area. Finally the division commander carried out our orders.

Struggle for Food.

Fhen ARMY Headquarters arrived at BAIO in the early part of Kay, our forces had 300 grabs of rations per soldier. This was supple­ mented with vald grasses and frequently potatoes. In the early part of June, his ration dropped to 250 grams per soldier. By the early ptrt of July, the soldiers were becoming weaker day by day but I urged, them to do their best until the end of August when the new grain crop would be ready. I, my66If^ was willing to eat the same food as the men.

In the middle of July, unhealthy lassitude had permeated among our forces. When we moved into the northern part of BAIO, this atmos­ phere had spread into our ARMY Headquarters. A few men of the attached. ARI1Y Signal unit started to desert when the food shortage became seriouA.

There were a fer cultivated fields in the EACODDD area and by Grace of Heaven, the rice harvest was two weeks earlier than expected. Usually, the harvest was not expected until end of August. Then around t}e 5th of the same month, two camote patches were discovered quite by accident. Everyone regained his strength as a result of the large' rice harvest and the discovery of these car«x>tes.

Eeginning in the middle of August, every member of Headquarters went to the fields each day to harvest rice. The daily food ration became ever 300 grams and it was increased to 600 grams by the end of August. For this reason the fields were filled with joyful sing­ ing voices during the harvest and, in the camp area, there was the happy sound of the rice hulling machines. Everyone quickly regained their normal health.

The most serious period of the food shortage lasted about twenty days, from the middle.of July to the early part of August. During this period, I made daily reports on the status of the expected har­ vest in an effort to bolster the morale of the troops. Fe were also able to let them have a few extra rations of rice packages. Fortunate­ ly,by Grace of Heaven, Headquarters did not have any deserters. Prob­ ably it ^as due to the early harvest and the discovery of the camote patches. It was really a strike of good, fortune.

CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE

THE FINAL DISSOLUTION OF THE 100TH DIVISION

Because of poor administrative ability on the part of General Harada, food shortages rose in the 100th Division and the morale of the soldiers fell dangerously low. (The higher officers, who previously led a

PAGE UU luxurious life, suffered more than anyone else.) Discipline among the personnel vanished and I could scarcely believe that they were soldiers of the Japanese Army. The Army was scattered and disorganized. The deserters behaved in a shameful and inhuman manner and there was no way to control them.

Harada gave his full attention to the problem, of securing each day's ration and made no effort to formulate a long range plan to solve the food problems. From Harada down to the privates, each thought only of his own food problem and many officers did not give proper attention to the welfare of their men.

The suicide patrol tactics, which were developed by the division, were unsuccessful. The employment of these patrols served only to increase the number of desertions. Military discipline suffered and frequent unpleasant incidents arose.

The suicide tactics consisted of sending able-bodied soldiers from every unit to the areas occupied by the American forces in DAVAO Plains. The soldiers who went out on these missions should have been able to procure food for themselves but they generally carried off the rations which were intended for those who remained behind. As a result they hesitated to come back to the mountains; Soire of them overstayed their time, and others stayed out permanently, Saying, "Who cares to return to an unkind compander who doesn't give us enough food" or words to that effecti At first the men stayed with the patrol leaders but later they deserted along the way*

Some of the ilien who had formerly lived in MINDANAO went back to their homes as though they were already discharged from the service« Others made friends with the local Japanese and lived with them, fur* nishing them protection in return for food. Still others forced them­ selves into raping, or attacking civilians traveling on the roads. Fy feigning sickness they stayed away from their units. Some of them le^t the suicide squads without permission. Even some staff officers deserted with a few men and left the division commander behind.

The Surgeon General and the entire staff of the hospital gave more attention to their food problems than to administering to the needs of their patients. Disgraceful incidents happened at the hos­ pital. It -contained the sick and wounded patients who could not go out with suicide squads nor procure their own food. They suffered terribly from hunger. Many patients died without any doctor or nurse to attend to them and no one to dispose of their dead bodies. It was most inhuman. Even within headquartes building man;' dead bodies were carried out and it became known as "The Ghost House."

CHAPTER TWENTY SIX

THE. CONTESTABLE BEHAVIOR OF GENERAL HARADA

I would like to discuss the private life of Division Commander Lt. General Harada in the field. Harada led a most luxurious life. While in field headquarters at IAPUY he strictly enjoined his sub­ ordinates to observe the food rationing, but he, himself, had ample food every day and ate it together with his personal friends. He raised over 100 chickens and ate many of them, not once did he share even one egg with his subordinates. When headquarters moved to TAMOGAN from IAPUY his personal belongings were shipped out on trucks earlier than the headquarters equipment. He also used over 20' men to transport his personal belongings when they were moving on foot into the mountains of North TA'IOGAN. PAGE U5 During the middle of July, he had a tremendous amount of rice which was carried to BIAO for his own personal use. It was estimated that there was sufficient rice to last him for over two years. Yet, regardless of the sufferings of his subordinates, he never released a handful. While this condition existed he actually sent out staff officers to various headquarters and units to correct abuse of food rationing.

Out of sympathy, I once gave him some of our rations, but I he^rd later that he paid no attention to it and did not appreciate our offer­ ings. *(ot only nyself, but many others received the same kind of treat­ ment from Harrd',.

During the retreat he refused to give food to the officers visit­ ing his headquarters. There were several other incidents of this type which served to accelerate the ill-feeling which his subordinates har­ bored against him. In other instances he complained bitterly about his mode of transportation which was horse back riding or basket litters. In all ways he behaved most selfishly. It is no wonder that his aide- dc-cqmps, down to his privates, heartily despised him.

As a result of his poor character he was not able to control his subordinate units during po litical situations. After we surrendered and and entered the concentration cairp, the junior officers and non-com­ missioned officers criticized him severely and some of them even tried to kill him. Many wrote letters to the American forces accusing him as a war criminal.- Many facts about his character were already known to the American forces. We could scarcely consider him a human beir.g.

Eventually no one respected him no matter how much he cajoled or threatened them. They wo;ild not obey him. He resorted to the use of military police and threats of courts martial but this did not turn out as expected, and instead, only made the situation worse. He still retained command and continued to direct his Division. When he lost the faith of his subordinates the situation deteriorated and became uncortrolable. Fortunately, because of the early harvest of the rice, there were not many deaths by starvation.

CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY

AND THE LOCAL JAPANESE RESIDENTS

Since the spring of 194A> the Ariy and the Navy had exploited the local Japanese resident labor in order to rush the construction of air­ fields. The local residents put forth much effort with manual labor and the Army benefited greatly from their services. When the Army started the construction of defensive positions in September, again the local residents willingly assisted; disregarding the Autumn harvest. Their households were managed by the women and. children while all the ti men went out to help the Army. Many local Japanese volunteered for the Army or offered their services as laborers for the Army and never complained. . ,

On the 10th and 11th of September, the American mechanized units started to attack them and the local resident were terrorized. Pre­ viously the Army had assured them that the American forces would not land in this area. The Arr>y and Navy evacuated inland without consider­ ing the evacuation of the local residents, who were non-combatants. The local residents complained that the Army had used their services when they sorely needed but now, in an emorgcncy, they did not consider their safety. This alienated the affection of our nationals for the Japanese Army.

PAGE /,6 Lieutenant General Harada had no interest in the problems of the local Japanese, but the chicf of staff gave his personal attention to their problems and everything proceeded smoothly rhile he was control­ ling it. After the chief of staf° went to the hospital in February, the situation deteriorated, ?'hen the Americans attacked, the division did not have any plan of evacuating the Japanese residents nor was there any effort to coordinate an evacuation plan with the ARMY'S general plan. The local Japanese associations and the consular General were unable to make plans without arny assistance and there was no definite policy. When the American forces appeared in the DIGOS area at the end of April, the array and navy took their defensive positions but they again made no effort to care for the residents. At this time> the local Japanese complained bitterly about their neglect.

It was after this complaint that the division commander assigned his engineer officer^ Nagasaki to care for the local Japanese, However, the latter did not initiate any definite plans for them either.

Nagasaki was formerly the chief clerk at the liaison office which haridled political ahd transportation problems of the Philippines. He had rio interest in the problems of the local Japanese residents. The chief of the military police units was detailed to assist Nagasaki. Division headquarters suddenly issued evacuation orders to the local Japanese who were residing near the fighting zones. The local Japan­ ese evacuated to the north section of TAilOGAN and r-any of them to the TULI section without any food or clothing* When time permitted, some of the Tapanese returned to their homes in an effort to obtain their household goods and food supplies. This happened in early May,

Formerly, Army had planned to establish the "Suzuki Kingdom" with the backing of the local people. Under this plan, we moved several families from the PAVAO PLAIN to KABAKAN and KIBAWE areas to develop settlements in the interior. Arrry ordered the 100th Division to carry out this plan but before it could be accomplished the local Japanese residents had evacuated.

After our combat headquarters reached BIAO, Nagasaki was attached directly to Army Headquarters and given the assignment of permanently moving the Japanese residents. Array dispatched some staff officers to make a study of the proposed settlement. When I received their report, I decided to carry out this plan for resettling the local Japanese and notified Nagasaki and the local Japanese Association.

However, the plan of administrating the local affairs, it ws.s believed, would require a great length of time to accomplish and could not be immediately carried out. The people, who could not grasp the meaning, could not understand the plan. The main point of it was that if furnished the residents with all the necessary materials and collected "rom them the products. At first, the arny should give them the most critical materials. Then, the arny was to collect the products after leaving enoueh food for subsistence. Arry gavo a.uy n.rry rations to the local Japanese v

While the Army subsisted on 90 grams of rations per man per day, local Japanese subsisted on the same ration and did good work without ' complaint. They remained with the headquarters until the very end, and they expressed the desire to go back to the homeland with us. Chief of the medical unit of Arny, Lieutenant Colonel Kamiyama, and Captain Kuriyama gave good medical care to the local Japanese, and the civilians appreciated their kindly efforts.

PAGF 47 CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT

THE BEWIIDERED FLIGHT OF fc,000-JAPANESE

The local Japanese Association, under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, Nagasaki, and the Military Police Headquarters, directed the majority (Approximately 8,000) of the local Japanese to evacuate into the interior.. They were divided into groups and distributed to uni\o of the division. In the meantime, the majority of them bivouacked temporarily in the vicinity of TULI where many had transferred their food and household goods from the DAVAO Plains.

In the middle of June-, when the battle situation was getting serious at the north sector of CALINAN, all were evacuated from the TULI vicinity and moved into the interior. The various -roups which were under good guidance carried out their movements smoothly, but the evacuation of other groups where leadership was poor was badly confused. From June 24-th to the end of the month, heavy fire was received from the American forces and many casualties resulted. Beginning in July, the local Japanese association could no longer control the majority of the loc:.l residents and some evacuated to the NULAN section of north SAIASALA. without any organization. After that there were many cases of people returning to their former homes or to homes of friends in DAVAO Plain. Some of them cooperated with the soldiers when they came down from the mountains. At the end of July, there were not many civilians left in the mountains except for the sick and wounded. Army Headquarters could no longer take any measures to control them and permitted them to come and go as they pleased.

CHAPTER TWENTY NINE • REFLECTIONS AND CRITICISMS OF THE PAST OPERATIONS

When I recall the MINDANAO Operation, I find there are many valuable lessons to be learned by comparing it with the IEYTE Operation:

1. Army's operational plan, which existed ir. name only, was not suited to the 30th and the 100th Divisions. This plan was a great failure, and when I arrived in MINDANAO, I did not have sufficient time to study the details of the units and there was no way of check­ ing- on them. Furthermore, I did not expect the 30th Division would be so easily and unexpectedly defeated by the American forces.

2. In a critical situation, it is of rajor importance that a comirander should have the trust and faith of his subordinates, This is especially true in situations where the food problem is severe. The commander should give rore attention to his subordinates in regard to their recuperation and health problems, and in such cases, the lead­ ers should devote- eighty percent of their duties to this end. The "Self- Supported ^ar" of the 100th Division "became uncontrolable, due to GenersL Harada losing the faith of his subordinates through his poor personality. In favorable situatiors, General Harada did not she* his weakness. How­ ever, when the situation became unfavorable end his subordinates learn­ ed his true character, they lost faith in him, finally deserting from his command.

Unconditional Surrender

On lPth of August, a special messenger from Takahashi, who was a staff officer stationed at UBAftt, delivered a special message which stated that Japan bad accepted the "Potsdam Declaration". Included

PAGE in this message was a letter from the Xtfc Corps Comrander setting the terms "»f the surrender. Major General Seibert had addressed the letter to the 100th Division commander, Lieutenant General Harada, and to the the Chief of Staff of the 35th ARMY, General Tomochika.

I took the necessary action to determine the validity of this message and then ordered all Japanese forces on MIKDANAO ISLAM) to "Cease fire" and directed them to observe military discipline and to keep the organization intact. The 100th Division Commander, Lieutenant General Harada, acknowledged the surrender terms at LAUYAN on the 20th and notified Army Headquarters that he was rreparing to meet the truce tear;:. Army decided to dispatch a truce tearr to the American forces,

'eanwhile, I discussed surrender plan with General Harada at the 100th Division Headquarters in EIA0 on 26th of August. We agreed on the following points: 1. Army had the responsibility of dispatching the first truce party for the purpose of discussing the general teras of surrender, However, the 100th Division may also dispatch a truce party but will discuss dnly matter pertaining to their own affairs in the DAVA0 PLAINS.

2. Army will request the Americans not to treat our forces as - prisoners of wai" until we arrive at their designated positions. There we will follow with disarmament. r:e will ask them to give us per­ mission to command our Arry with its original formation until depar­ ture from MINDA8AC.

3. The Americans will be asked to allow the officers to retain their swords.

4. Army will request the Americans to assist us with communi­ cations to carry on liaison between the Japanese and the American forces.

We planned to dispatch our truce team the early part of September. Eesides the above request, General Harada had asked for food, medical supplies, vehicles, and radio sets. However, our 35th Army did not forward his request. After meeting with Hare da, I met Lt. Colonel Matsuzaki of the DAVA0 Military Police at MUTUL, on the 28th. Matsuzaki had an official letter from the 24-th Division Commander, Major General Woodruff, to Lt, General Harada concerning the dispatch­ ing of a truce tearr. When I met Matsuzaki, he showed me a radi® report1 w>ich the naval forces had received from Japan. This radio told of the Imperial Rescript to the Japanese people on the surrender. In this manner I learned the real facts of the surrender terms. We decided to dispatch our staff officer, Lt. Colonel Takahashi, on the truce team, accompanied .by Lt. Colonel Matsuzaki and expected them to reach TAM0GAN on August 31st. Lt. Colonel Takahashi arrived at T0M0GAN on the expect­ ed date. On the "oliowing day, September 1st, he met the American Commander and they signed the preliminary arrangements. The rain agree­ ments were as follows:

1. All the Japanese Army personnel and citizens must immediately surrender as soon as possible to the American forces at DAVA0 and report to the concentration camps.

2. Chief of Staff, Tomochika and Lt. General Harada (or their representatives) must arrive at TAM0GAN by the 7th of September and should sign the surrender agreement on the £th.

3. Retention of swords will not be permitted, until permission is granted by General MacArthur. Until then, all the swords will be . kept by the American forces.

I agreed to carry out the above mentioned agreement without making any other additional demands and I decided to surrender as soon as possible. I was accompanied by Staff Officer Ono and a few other staff

PAGE 49 officers of the i'Oth Division (who were representing the 100th Division Commander)* We arrived at the designated position at TOHOGKN, where our truce teato had agreed to feet the American advance echelon at 1500 hours, 7th December* Staff Officer Ono and I immediately met the American 167th Regimental Commander and we signed the surrender documents, which were furnished "by the American forces! We took the necessary measures to assemble our military personnel and citizenl and proceed to the designated concentration camps. Filled v/ith emotions I became a prisoner of war at the Deliao Concentration Camp on this datei

(END)

PAGE 50 HEADQUARTERS X CORPS Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 310 (Kure, Honshu)

10-11 September 194-5

INTERROGATION OF «AJ0R GENERAL TOMOCHIKA BY OFFICERS OF THE G-? SECTION, REPRESENTING THE SECTION Ov TT*E FIRST DAY FERE COLONEL DALY, MAJOR JORGENSEN AND LIEUTENANT EEPNER, THE UTTER ACTING AS INTERPRETER. ON THE SECOND DAY HL'UTENANT KODOMOTO.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT BY COLONEL DALY:

General Tomochika, Chief of Staff, 35th Army, 45 years old, was, prior to July 1944 the deputy chief of staff of the 14th Area. Army. In July of 1944, he was appointed chief of staff, 35th Arcy. The 35th Army Headquarters moved to Leyte at the end of October and its command post was in an area slightly north of Ormoc. When the 1st and 26th Divisions were ordered from Manila to Leyte, the Japanese considered that a higher ranking officer should be chief of staff, so Lieutenant General ^atehi was appointed to that position and General Tomochika became deputy chief of staff of the 35th Army. Towards the end of December, the 35th Army received an order from General Yamashita dir­ ecting all troops on Leyte to endeavor to reach other islands. (This will be discussed in greater detail later.) On the 17th of March, 35th Arny Headquarters left Palompdn for Tabogan, on Cebu, traveling at night and barely escaping discovery by a FT boat whose lights they saw but did not see them. They went to Cebu City and left Cebu City on 27 March, two days after the landing of our troops. They reached Tabogan on 31 March, which they had. left previously, destination Medellin, where they arrived April 8. On 10 April they left Medellin by banca, travel­ ing at night, to islands north of Fabrica, where they remained for two days. They then traveled by boat along the east coast of Negros to San Carlos which they reached on 14 April, On 16 April, the party arrived at Dumaguette, General Suzuki in his boat was still with General Tomo­ chika's party at thrt time. From there they went to Bugo, losing General Suzuki and his boat enroute, After the 17th of April, they no longer saw General Suzuki. Thsy arrived at Cagayan on the 21st of ' April.

Q. ?'? en the U.S. troops landed on Leyte there were 15 to 16,000 Japan­ ese Army and Navy troops on the Island. When did the situation first appear hopeless? \ A. The end of November.

Q. Where were they?

A. In Dagami there were still 12 to 1300.

Q. When did the Japanese /.rmy first order reinformcements to Leyte and when did they first arrive?

A. Well, on November 1st,, the 1st Division landed at Ormoc.

Q. Eefore the 1st Division landed, the 41st Infantry landed, the Tempei Eutai were on the island, and that's all? « A. That wasn't reinforcements because they were 35th Arcy troops.

Q. 's'hen did the 35th Army first order reinforcements to the Island?

A. They never requested them.

1 Q, They had the 16th Division on Leyte, the 30th Divison* Now, they sent the Tempei Butai into Leyte and also the 41st Regiment to Leyte. Now, when did they reach the decision to order reinforcements into Leyte. rhat units did they order in and where did they land?

A. On October 22 the arry ordered the 41st Regiment to Leyte..

Q* Did they order the 77th to reinforce and was it a matter of forming that decision to ship in?

A. On the 22nd of October the 35th Army Headquarters ordered the 30th Division commander to move as many troops as possible under his comrand to Leyte.

Q. Was the 41st Regireni minus one battalion in Artty reserve?

A* No eonnectioh» "^hey came tinder the 35th Army when they landed - that is, when they embarked on the ships Uo go to Leyte. Then they carre -under the comrrander of the 35th Arrry to be attached to the 16th Division.

(Note: It should be noted at this that the Tempei Butai was con­ firmed by General Tomochika as being a body of replacements that was at Cebu enroute to the CeJobes at the time of the Leyte landing. This body of replacements was formed into a provisional battalion called the Tercpei Bettalion, meaning "Heaven Sent", and was rushed to Leyte.)

A. Re made a mistake on this. They were directly under - all three battalions of the 41st Regiment were in 35th Army reserve at the time of the Leyte landing and were ordered to Leyte. However, the battalion that was stationed at Surigao was unable to comply with the orders due to lack o4* shipping.

Q. Did the 35th Army consider that Leyte was the point that we would land when we invaded the •Philippines?

A. They knew that we would land in the Philippines, but they thought it was most probable that we would land in Davao rather than Leyte, but Leyte vr.a the second posibility.

Q. In the event of a landing at Leyte, what were the orders that the 16th Division commander received? T'as he told to hold on the beaches or was he to retire inland in the face of a superior force?

A. Orders ere to fight a delaying action and not strive to reach any decisive battle.

Q. T here were they to fall back to?

A. Orders were given to the 16th Division to retreat as far as — fight as delaying action as far as Limon, Further retreat orders were not gi-ren. In other words, they were going back thr.t fcr and were to stop tfiere.

Q. Fas the whole division to move back to Limon or part of them to go to Baybay?

A. The original plan was this: The 35th Army told the 16th Division that they would not fight a decisive battle - have a holding line and fight a withdrawing action reaching up towards Limon in the hills around Limon. The Americans, who would have occupied air fields by that time, were to be harassed. In the meantime, *™fcile the 16th Division was hold­ ing the hills around Limon, the 41st Regiment and two or more battalions of the 102d Division in Cebu would core in as reserve - as reinforcements. That was the original plan, but the course of events trade the original plan impracticable. Orders were received from General Yatoashita that a decisive battle was to be fought on Leyte and that he "?as going to send

- 2 - reinforcements; therefore, the original holding plan was given up. Rather than fight a delaying action hieh the 35th Army wanted to fight, General Yamashita said, "You will stand there and fight the decisive •battle."

Q. Where?

A. On Leyte. On October 28th, this staff officer from General Yama- shita's headquarters in Luzon came to Cebu and said that a decisive battle on Leyte wou?.d be fought on the plains, flat ground around Tacloban or in Carigara, but it had not been decided at that timei

Q. In other words, he had to fall back to the mountains to wait for those reinforcements to get in?

A. Already in the mountains on Octobcr 28th were two independent . infantry battalions of the 102nd Division, the 169th and 171st, plus the 41st Inf ntry Rerirncnt minus one battalion. They were up in the hills where they were met. Fe doesn't know the exact location on October 28th. He says he thinks they were retreating from Jaro.

Q. That's right.

At The two infantry battalions, independent' infantry battaliohs were between Jaro and Carigara on October 28th, as veil as he can remefober » ,Tow the idea, the plan on the 28th of October was that with these re­ inforcements they would repulse the enemy, I mean repluse U.S. troops and retake Tacloban and made a final and decisive victory there.

Q, Ya» the 41st Infantry also along that road?

A. That's right. He remembers that the 41st Infantry Regiment was engaged in battle in the vicinity of Jaro that day,

Q. On 1 November how many Japs were in Carigara and that vicinity?

A. In Carigara town itself?

Q. In that area.

A. To the best of General Tomochika's knowledge, elements of the 41st Infantry Regiment, elements of one independent infantry battalion, elements of the Twpci Battalion, and elements of the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the 16th Division.

Q, On Fovembcr 1, according to General Tomochika, there were 300 to 400 Japanese soldiers in the town of Carigara and the outskirts of Cari'ara. 300 to 400.

Q. Tell him we figured about Z,000.

A. Fe doesn't know in exact numbers, but the main strength of the Fishimura Battalion, 169th IIP, was between Tunga and Carl'ara on November 1. He does not know the exact numbers.

Q. Whero were the 41st Regiment and 171st and the Tempei Butai?

A. He believes they were between Jaro and Tunga.

C;. At this time, were the Japanese troops under order to attack, to drive us back?

A. On November 1 the Japanese dispositions were as follows: Between J&ro and Tunga was the 41st Infantry; between Tunga and Carigara the 169th IIB; between Carigara and Farugo was the Tempei Battalion. The 171st was at Malangas, with 300 to 400 troops in the Carigara vicinity. The plan was for the Tompei Battalion to move east to Burago River,

- 3 - six kilometers cast of Carigara, and hold against the attack of the U.S. forced approaching from the east. The main strength of the 4.1st, the 169th and 171st was to move to Jaro and establish a defensive pos­ ition in that area to cover the debouchment of the 1st Division which was enroute from Ormoc. When the 26th Division arrived, it was to move over the Dolores-Jaro Trail.

Q. What date did the 1st Division land at Ormoc?

A. November 1,

Q .1 And the 26th Division?

A. Sane date. • On November 1, the 1st Division landed at Ormoc in 4 large transports. At the same time the 12th Independent Regiment of the 26th Division landed and they were the ones to move across the Dolores-Jaro Trail,

Q. P'hat i*ade them changc their minds about this attack? What made them fall fcadlrt

A. Eecause they lost. They lost and. they had to pull back,. \ Q. What de.te? 1

A, He thinks they came around here on November 2. That's not abso­ lutely certain - approximately the same date. November 2, query. Because they \irere forced to fall back, the 41st Infantry fell back to ft• Finon and tho 169th Infantry fell back to Mt. Badian, and thence to Hill 690. The 171st Infantry took up defensive positions in the vicinity of Cappocan. The Tcmpei Battalion fell back through Carigara and into the hills and merged with the 4.1st Infantry Regiment,

Q. '"hen did the 1st Division reach Limon?

A. On the 2d of November the 1st Division, the head of the 1st Div reached Limon in the following order of march: The Reconnaissance Repiment, the 57th Regiment, the 49th Regiment, and the artillery and the 1st Regiment.

C. What happener1 there? Did they run into U.S. troops?

/ A. This reconnaissance regiment with a staff officer attached reached Malangas and encountered U.S. troops who made a landing in that area on November 2.

Q, Then what happened? •

A•^When that Reconnaissance Regiment engaged in battle with the U.S. forces, the divisional commander plus his guard unit went up forward to reconnoitcr the situation. Seeing that the U.S. troops were being victorious, he returned to his divisional headquarters which was still south of Limon. He left a platoon of twenty men from his guard unit when he returned to his divisional headcuarters. He then committed the 57th Regiment in support of his Reconnaissance Regiment. The whole regiment wt.s committed. Although he ordered it committed in full, the 57th Infantry Regiment did not arrive on the 2d of November. In other words,-there was a time space there,

Q, Did ho evor know what American units were against him?

A. Ho knew the X Corps. . ~

Q, Who was Commanding the X Corps? Did ho know?

A. He did not know the name of the commander. He also thought it was the 24th Division.

- u - Q. ?hat was the disposition of his troops when we had the big fight that lasted two weeks? That was north of Limon.

A* The Reconnaissance Regiment retreated from Malangas over Hill 525. The 57th Regiment camc up the road from Limon and encountered our forces, elements of which, had reached the high point north of Limon, Freakneck Ridge. They didn't have time to make hasty fortifications because as soon as they got up to the top of the hill, we started peppering; artillery at them.

0# Then rhat did they do?

A. They came down the hill, fell back off the first slope, then came back up. He's talking only about November 3. On November 4 he gave an order to the 49th Infantry Regiment to go to the right flank of the 57th Regiment and cut off the road to the rear of the U.S. forces going toward Capoocan. On November 4 he gave an order to the 49th, Regiment to go via the right flank of the 57th Infantry Regiment to the hill imnediitely west of Capoocan* In this vtxy the Japanese believed they could cut o:>f U.S. forces between - hemmed in between the 49th and the 57th Infantry Regiments. The 1st Infmtry Regiment VK.S to advance via ft. Pina but did not carry out the plan and got as far as Pina.

Q. vhat did they do about the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry as they approached their left flank?

A» First sent a recbrnaissancc patrol and then sent one company of the 1st Infantry Regiment in that direction.

Q. How large a force did he think this rras?

A. According to the Japanese reconnaissance plane,there v/ere 12 to 13 American landing cra**t, and making computations on that basis, the Jap­ anese- estimated that a little less than one battalion -ms being landed on Loytc Pay.

Q. Why did he send only one company against a battalion?

A. B- that time, already the main elements of the 1st Infantry Regi­ ment had been used to reinforce the 57th and 49th Infantry Regiments. , They had no troops.

r. After this company r.'as killed, v/hat did he vise to flight with?

A. The company that went up there had orders to dig themselves in and fight to the death to hold that battalion,

Q. They did. Then what did he do?

A.' He thinks that transportation troops were used there.

Q. *,Then did the 35th Army consider that the 1st Division had been defeated?

•A. On December 6 a staff officer of the 1st Division came to 35th Army Headquarters at Ormoc and c;rplained the hopeless situation of the 1st Division. The 35th Arn$* then decided to '.withdraw the 12th Infantry Regiment from Jaro to reinforce the 1st Division, to go via Ormoc; but on December 7 the 77th U.S. Division landed at Ormoc and the 12th Infantry Regiment was committed in the Ormoc area.

Q. What ::.bout the troops' thrt landed at San Isidro, the Hoshi Fn?

A. .That was according to plans made by higher headquarters.

Q. Did he ever made contact with them?

A. They had contact. - 5. Q. Why didn't the arty headquarters leave Leyte sooner than March?

A, Although orders had been given by General Yamashita for troops on Leyte to evacuate to other islands, adjoining islands, no specific date for this evacuation x?as given in the general order that car.t from Luzon. It was left up to the discretion o^ the 35th Army Headquarters, At the beginning of January 194-5 approximately half of the 35th Arrry Headquarters had moved to Cebu., The 35th Arry Headquarters decided that remnants of troops that had originally been on Leyte before U.S. 6ccu- pr.tion, which also included the 4.1st Infantry Regiment and the Tcmpci Battalion and the two independent infantry battalion, ,wcro to remain on Leyte, "hile remnants of the 1st Oivision, 26th Division, Koshi Brigade were to evacuate to adjoining islands* After the evacuation '•'as c""footed, the 3-5tb Army Headquarters was to transferred in toto to CcVu. Horevcr, difficulties in evacuation occurred which grcntly postponed the transfer of the 35th Army Headquarters from Lcytr.

Q. When did he lose control over the units? Then did he lose corrrun- ication vdth all the various sub-headquarters on Leyte? * A. '"hen he left Leyte, he was still in communication with 35th Army Headquarters in Cebu. They had communication right along with all the different elements under his command,

Q. what kind of^communication?

A. Telegraph.

C. Telegraph or runner?

A. That's correct - runner.

Q. Hotr many troops were left on Leyte on the 25th of December?

A. He calculated 20,000,including patients and all units, everything ' together.

Q. Fow many effectives?

A. It's impossible for him to tell hov many were effectives and how many inef'octives.

Q. Ask him which broke their back the X or XXIV'Corps?

A, 7 Corps that fought in the mountains, the northern mountains. % •Q. Fhy?

A. He's absolutely not putting on anything - truthfully saying.

Q. Ask him *tfay? ^

A. Now, this is what he said. Kno'./ing th: t the X Corps wes the strong outfit, they committed the finest division they had in Japan, the 1st Division, to oppose troops of the X Corps, ^hey also had the newest equipment, the best equipment. Nov, the 26th Division had fought in the XXIV Corps area had lost almost all their equipment on landing and were very poorly equipped - machine guns and artillery particularly. So he believes tin t the 1st Division not being able to hold the X Corps at bay up in the mountains "or more than one month proves that the X Corps was a first class fighting outfit.

• Q. Of course, the XXIV Corps had a different type of terrain to come over. They had mountains to cross. Ask him who killed the most Japs.

- 6 - A, He says the most casualties were suffered in the Limon area. Out of approximately 15,000 soldiers of the 1st Division that landed on Leyte, there were approximately 900 survivors as of January 15.

Q*. How cany?

A. 900 out of 15,000, and of that 900, 800 went to Cebu, were evacuated to Cebu. -

Q, What does he think of the casualties - how many casualties were suffered by the Japanese up to March 17?

(FOTE: The following table was compiled by General Tomochika to show the number of Japanese that were on Lcyte, the number that survived, and the number that were killed as of the 17th March.)

ARRIVED UNIT LEYTE SURVIVORS K.I.A. Parachute Troops 600 300 300 1st Division 15,000 1,200 13,800 26th Division 8,000 600 7,400 16th Division 12,000 800 11,200 68th Brigade 4,000 • 2,500 1,500 I02d Division 4,000 2,200 1,800 *41st Infantry 2,500 200 2,300 77th Infantry 1,200 900 300 5th Infantry 6,000 4,000 2,000 Navy 1,500 800 700 Air Service 3,000 1,500 1,500 Shipping Engrs 1,500 4

TOTAL 61,800 13*010 48,790 *Includes Tempei and 364th HE

Q. Ask him why the Japanese are so brutal to their prisoners?

A. He gives tv/o reasons. One, insufficient training of troops by higher commanders. Second, spirit of revenge which originated from medieval Japan-,

Q, Tell him the higher commanders order the prisoners be killed,

A. He said th-1 the higher officers were ignorant of such things, that information on such cruelties never came to him.

Q. Tell hirn th. t General Yamashita ordered that prisoners be killed; the 100th Division commander ordered that prisoners be killed.

A. He's never bad any experience in 35th Arryj he doesn't know '.hat happened in Luzon, but in the 35th Army Headquarters he never heard about it,

Q. Has he ever seen an American prisoner?

A. Fe saw "2 Allied H?s in Cebu and they .were sent to Manila a year ago. He said that he has had no experience or heard of higher command­ ers ordering prisoners to be killed, but it's quite possible that a company commander or battalion commander vsould give orders without letting his superiors know about it.

- 7 - Q« I have nothing further on Leyte, Q« When did he first learn that the American troops were going to ihvade Mindanao?.

At He heard the beginning of March while he was still in Leyte that UiS, troops had landed on Zamboanga. Qi When did he first learn that we were going to land some other place than Zamboanga? A. Ke first heard that U.S* iroops had landed at Cotabato on 21 April when he arrived in Cagayen* Q, How many Japanese troops v?ere there on the island of Mindanao, less Zamboanga, at that time? A. 31,000 to 35,000. Qi Ask him if he's sure of his miscellaneous troops * A. Very few, Q« Tell him they had them up here in Cagayan and also in Davao. (NOTE: General Tomochika rade the following estimate of strengths.) Original Present Unit ' Strength Strength 100th Division 12,000 5,000 30th Division 9,000 ? Signal Unit 300 200 Valencia Sector 1,800 to 3,4-00 1 Davao Air Sector 2,000 ? Davao Naval Troops 6,000 ? Medical and Miscellaneous 800 700 TOTAL 31,900 C. How many civilians?

A. There were about 12,000 before. He believes there are about 8,000 left now. That's already included in the military. The civilians were conscripted and these are not included in the 8,000 but are in­ cluded in the 12,000 figure, and they're included in the figures of armed strength, . , ,

Q. Ask him if he can give us an accurate estimate on the number of Jape remaining on the island today? A, This is an absolute estimate. The only figure he can give us on the remaining Japanese on the island is 5,000 remaining of the 100th Division.

Q, what was the Japanese command situation in central Mindanao? Was General Harada under General Morozumi prior to the landing, or what was the situation,. '

A, General Harada was directly under 35th Artsy for administrative purposes, but for tactical purposes ho was under the command of General Morozumi and continued communication directly with General Suzuki.

Q, What was Admiral Doi's position? A,. Admiral Doi in land warfare was under the command of General Harada.- Since the surrender, the naval troops are not under control of the Army. , There's a differentiation now. , That's on General Yamashita's orders.

- 8 • The Naval Commander in Luzon now gives orders to Admiral Doi. In other words> there no longer a connection between the ttfo.

Q. When was the 35th Army Headquarters last in communication with General Yamashita?

A. The beginning of March. There were no communications from Manila but from Saigon and Tokyo,

Q. When were they last in communication with Saigon? • A. The middle of June they had communication with Saigon. A^ter that there was no communication anywhere off the island. The only news they had was the Domei broadcast from Tokyo,

Q, Why was that?

A. ?fireless sets were all rusted, corroded.

Q, In that case, how did they get the orders after fcurfrenclerj the order on the Army and Navy?

A, On September 7 when he came and surrendered at Tamogan, a staff officer of General Yamashita, a Major Taguchi, was there. He had been sent fr»m Luzon presumabley, and he told Major General Tomochika What had taken place,

Q, How did General Morozumi and General Harada get along with each other?

A. They got along fairly well, although they weren't particularly- friendly because they didn't krow each other very well,

Q. Why didn't General Morozumi stay with his 35th Arngr Headquarters and retain command of his forces on the island rather than sending his headquarters away and just retaining command of his division?

A, General Morozumi - this is rather difficult to explain. General Morozumi was not appointed by the emperor as the commanding general of the 35th Army, Since General Suzuki was missing, they had to have some­ body on this island in charge of the 35th Army Headquarters, so in other words he was acting as a substitute for General Suzuki, but his command had not originated from the emperor, so in other words although he had the power on this island of commanding general of the 35th Arr/y troops on this island, since he had not received a direct order from the emperor as commanding general, He status as a divisional commander -•'as his primary duty. In other words, he had been appointed directly by the emperor as a commanding general, his status as a divisional commander was his primary duty. In other words, he had been, appointed directly by the emperor as a divisional commander and his first re­ sponsibility was to his division rather than to the arrry.

Q. Doesn't he believe there was rather a loose or decentralized command?

A. He admits that was very inefficient from that standpoint that he didn't coordinate,

Q, If General Morozumi was in command of the island for operational purposes, as be aaid before, even though the 35th Army was not here, why did he not try to exercise a more coordinated command? \ i. General Morozumi figured that he would be of more use as commanding general of his division and leave the coordination to General Tomochika, In other words, he told General Tomochika he would aurthorize him to give orders in his name.

Q. rell, why did they not try to bring the two divisions together so that they could have the combined weight to fight the Americans. I - 9 - A, He said the original idea was to have the 100th Division and the 30th Division adjoining.

(General Tomochika then drew his plan of defense for central Mindanao)

Q. Who made this plan?

A. After our landingj General Tomochika drew up a plan for the defense of the island. The 100th Division vas to hold the entrances to the Kibawe-Talomo Trail from the Davao side and the 30th Division was to hold the other end of the trail in the vicinity of Kibawe and the Pulangi River crossing. The Yamano group was to withdraw into the Tigua River and block the .northern entrances to this defensive position. General Morozumi approved this plan and on the 26th of April General Tomochika flew from Valencia to Davao and conferred with General Harada and showed those orders to him.

Q. Why did not the 30th Division carry out its part of the plan?

A. ^he plan was not ordered. By the time the orders could be given, time and space factors prevented their being carried out by the 30th Division and moving them south to Kibawe prior to the arrival of our troops at Kibawe, General Morozumi therefore decided to stay with his division and sent General Tomochika down the Kibawe-Talomo trail with army headquarters to be established at Bashio, with authority to issue orders in his name.*

Q. v;as he ordered' to fall back *r fight a delaying action? This is General Harada. k4 The general order fr«m General Morozunrf. was that General Harada's forces would annihilate the enemy in the open area around Davao, In case that was not practicable, General Harada's forces would withdraw gradually in successive stages to the mountainous area back of Davao and fight a delaying action.

Q. Did they believe we would advance on Digos by land or sea? That is, advance by land or make a shore to shore movement?

A, General Tomochika believed th t U.S. forces would go overland to Digos but after U.S. forces would reach Digos, supplies would be routed to Digos by water. ^

Q. Where did he go to school?

A, The Military University. War College. Something like the rar College.

Q. Has he been to school in Germany?

A. He's been to Germany,

Q. In school?

A. He went to the artillery school in Germany,

Q, Did he go to school in France?

A. He was attached to the Japanese Military Attache's Office in Germany.

Q. Did the Japanese surrender come as a surprise to General Tomochika?

A. He did not believe that the surrender would come this soon because he knew nothing about the bombing of Japan, the terrific bombing of Japan, and the annihilation of the Japanese Navyj therefore, he thought the Japanese could hang on and the war be prolonged.

- 10 - Q. Didn't he read the news we dropped to him?

A. He reed the news now and then. He didn't know whether it was pro­ paganda or truth.

Q. It was the truth.

A. On the 18th he picked up a propaganda leaflet and he immediately- called his staff officers together and they read over this leaflet and be believed it was 60$ true, 4-0$ not true, so he decided that un­ less he got orders from higher headquarters he would not surrender. But on the 19th, he.issued an order on his own initiative to his troops to cease fightinf, to await further developments, * Q. When in his own mind did he think that Japan had lost the war? Not when t)ey surrendered by when they lost the war?

A. The battle of Okinawa.

Q, What was the decisive battle of the Philippines?

A. Leyte, it was all over at Leyte.

Q. Well, when he lost the Philippines, didn't he figure he'd lose the war?

A. Even after that he still believed that Japan still had enough sea power and enough strength, in the homeland to carry on; but now -."hen he gets to thinking about it, he believes thr.t it was an error in judge­ ment. He believes now when he thinks back from a tactical point that the decision had already been reached at Leyte. In other words, the decisive battle of the war had been fought on Leyte, when he thinks back.

Q. Foes he feel that the Japanese will cooperate in the peace with us or are they going to start getting ready for another war?

A. He doesn't believe that the Japanese will try to make a comeback. He now expresses his personal view. He said it matters little to him whether Japan has less area and less people than before; the primary mission that the Japanese people have is to carry out the wishes of the emperor in retaining a people. This is purely Japanese psychology; it's hard to express in a way because our minds don't w6rk in the same way. That's about what he said. He said it in two or three ways to emphasize the point that the primary mission is to keep the country as a whole, and for the people to be contented in the desire of the emperor.

Q. Fill we find occupation easy? Will the Japanese cooperate with us?

A. He thinks the cooperation will be good between the Japanese and the Americans, He believes that because the Japanese have had various American influences during the past years, but they have a certain amount of - well, you can sny respect for the Americans. He said that in our propaganda leaflets we were talking about the military clique. He said actually the military clique as a clique had disappeared many years ago, and when he and his men and officers read the "military clique" in the propaganda leaflets, the question arose as to what was the military clique, so they did not believe everything that was said.

11 September

0. What did General Morozurri and General Tomochika talk about last night?

A. He m»re or less made the report of his actions since he lost con­ tact with Morozumi.

- 11 - Q, Was General Morozumi pleased 'vith his actions?

He said he was satisfied.

Q* Did the Japanese know that we had Nisei personnel working for us?

A. Yes, they knew that we had but did not know how many.

Q< When did the Japanese realize that we had Nesei interpreters working for us?

A, He had heard rumors before in Leyte, but he did not know anything definite until April when he first came to this island. The reason he thought it was definite is that his front line troops made a report saying there were Nisei working.

Q. Tell him that we organized a battalion of American-born Japanese to fight in Italy and they made one of the most outstanding records of the war.

/•. He heard about it. When he was home in Japan he heard that there were troops in Italy i

Q. r'"hert did he leave Japan?

A. End of June 19AA*

Q. What record did the Japanese have of our troops? Did they have a list of all units in the army with names of their commanders, and were they able to identify our troops by front line identification?

A. He says in general they could not identify even though they got dog tags, but the only way they could identify is to get prisoners. However, they had few prisoners and no way of identifying.

C. Eut for their long range planning did they know that we had.so many divisions and the names of the divisions and the names of the commanders and the regiments?

A. The only way he knew was over the broadcast. Otherwise he didn't know very much about it; but since they had contact in Leyte, he knew some of them over there.

Q. Contact with whom?

A. The American forces.

Q. How did he obtain th t information, from prisoners?

A. He iust found out through radio.

Q. Fid our prisoners talk when they were captured?

A. He says he didn't see any on Leyte.

Q. Did ho see any prisoners?

A. He says the prisoners they captured over in Cebu prior to our landing spoke pretty freely and were cooperative,

^ . r Q. Of their, own free and v&lition? ' ~

A.- Just answered the questions, ^'hey were very cooperative and spoke freely.

Q. What happened to the fliers?

- 12 - ' A, He says they kept them over there two days arid during that time they interrogated them. They slept at the officer's quarters. They didn't beat them because they spoke freely* Then sent them on to Luzon by plane,

Q. Her1 they not talked freely, would they have be&tsn them?

A, He says among the officers they never spoke about it or heard about it, but among the soldiers, they may do that because they don't understand the language.

Q, Tell him •' at we have pictures of Japanese officers executing American officers. These were taken from Japanese prisoner dead.

A. Ke says he's never heard of it and to the question whether he has ever ordurer1 the men not to do that, he says he has given orders not to harm the prisoners. He says the prisoner is the best source of informationj therefore they usually treat them good. As far as he's concerned, he's done no harm with any of them.

Q. Where %r,s he when Doolittle bombed Tokyo?

A. Ke vrs in north China.

Qi Hhy did the Japanese execute the American fliers?

A i He never heard anything official but what he thought was, and the rumdrs vere that school buildings were bopbed* That's why they executed them. Ho doesn't krow what happened,

Q. Did the Japanese know that we had pretty complete information on the locations of their units, the strengths on the islands, commanders of battalions, regiments, and divisions?

A. They were aw.re of it all the time, due to the fact that they knew the Americans had a better intelligence than they had, and if they knew as Rich as they did, the Americans would know a lot more.

Q. ^hy did they not instruct their soldiers when they were captured not to talk? 1 A. They took for granted, that their ordinary instructions would cover all of that. They relied on the soldiers that they would follow those v instructions.

Q. T'hr.t were those instructions?

A. Not to give military information to the enemy, but they didn't say specifically not to speak after they were captured or what to do after they were captured.

Q, T'"hy did they allow their soldiers to carry diaries, pay books, indentifications tags, and the likes into the front lines. Copies of Field Orders. Tell him that we captured the 35th Army Field Order ordering the offensive of the 1st Division up in north Leyte on November 10 anc" the offensive was to take place on November /15. ^e knew that was cotrrng merely because SOFC staff officer carried that order into the front lines.

A. He says that the men were all(instructed t'o tear up all identifi­ cations or anything that would identify unit or name just before they went into battle, but he said they just took for granted that they would obey those orders. He didif't think thoy would ever carry them in. And about this operation order, he didn't know anything about it until one month afterward when they got a radiogram .from Tokyo via General Yama- shita str ting th~t the enemy had captured an order giving the disposi­ tions. He said thet this officer should have known better than to go in tb'

- 13 - Q. I'd like "to ask him this question. Has he himself noticed a ten­ dency for subordinate commanders reporting to higher commanders to gloss over the situation, and thus a highfer staff officer who had to make decisions was sometimes misled by that tendency?

A. Ke says that he was aware of it and made all deductions before he issued any orders.

Q. Does he think on occasion they pislead higher headquarters? After all, he says he makes decisions, deducting the sum they exaggerate. Wouldn't it have been better to report strictly accurately? For in­ stance, a Company would report that it was attacking, but we would know it was down to a strength of 30 men, yet they were trying to carry out the mission of a"full strength company. .

A. Fe said th t there were instances where they made mistakes, due to the fact that they sent out false reports. They were strictly ordered to make an accurate report, but for the glorification of the officers in front, they tried to cover up their bad side and show they bad side of the enemy.

Q. He told us yesterday that the original plan in case of an invasion of Leyte was for the 16th Division to fall back from the beach towards Limon. When we landed on the beach, we found a great many weapons, artillery pieces, left on the beach. Why were they not evacuated prior to our landing?

A. Their orders were to make a delaying action all the way down the lines and back up toward Limon. The power of the Americans caused them to leave some of their weapons behind..

Q. Well, were they supposed to do any fighting at all on the heach?

A.. Their plans were not to defend the coastal area from the experience on Saipan and the other islands because they get heavy bombardment there; therefore, their plan is to establish themselves behind where they won't get artillery, and annihilate the enemy coming up. I asked him how he expects to annihilate the enemy with their weapons and he said with their bodies.

Q. Why did not the Japanese not attempt to heavily shell Pinamopoon when they knew we were using it as an advance supply base?

A. He had no guns that be brought back with him from the front, and the guns that came from Ormoc were not established well enough to fire.

Q, Tell him that they did fire at Pinamopoon and they hit Pinamopoon and Colasian Point. They hit our division CP but they only put a few shells into each place and just as they were getting effect, they stopped firing. Pour or five shells was the usual round.

A. He thinks that the ammunition train was not very good and they just fired what they were able to get.

Q,, Tell him when we got down and captured the artillery positions, we found that they had hundredsof rounds of ammunition stored there that they didn't fire, along the road in caves,.

A. . He doesn't know for sure but he thinks that the ammuntion either arrived there after the gun wss broken or arrived there just in time for the Americans to get there.

Q, 'bat does he say about the breakdown of his horse and motor trans­ port?

A. . He says they were using horse-drawn transportation but it wasn't

- H - very capable; therefore they had a tractor company to move up the artillery, then go back and take up the ammunition. That's the reason the guns were up first and then ammunition later.

Q. Is he an artillery man? -

A. Yes.

Q. What was the effect of the large amount of artillery fire we placed on Carigara Fovember 1?

A. At the time he vas busy unloading and he bad not noticed anything.

Q. "'hat was the effect of our artillery fire on Oriiloc?

A. He noticed that the firing from Jaro was pretty accurate, but for the amount of fire they received, there was a comparatively small amount of casualties. After the bombardment most of the building- were destroyed but some of their rations and ammunition were still left. 20 per cent.

Q. That did the Japanese fear most, mortar fire, Artillery, or air?

A. The front line trocps feared the mortars and the rear troops feared the artillery.

Q. More than air?

A. Yes, more than air.

Q. phat did they think of our artillery planes?

A. In his opinion, he learned that that was a very effective way. Re learned that in this war. At the present day they have a lot of autogiros to use for this purpose, but they weren't "able to use it because the Americans had air superiority, but they did use these in the homeland to look at the waters for submarines. He says in all the Japanese Army forces more or less, a fear exists for these observation planes because they believed that those observation planes were rade out of a certain kind of steel thcvt could not be penetrated by bullets and they had. a special kind of binocular that could see anything on the ground and had a good sound detector that could hear the speaking voices down below, so when the airplane was over, they were not allowed to even talk or fire or anything. Just fear. The soldiers' stories were that the binocular was 75-magnification, and even though the plane was 3,000 feet in the air, voices were lowered. He said from a mathematical standpoint, he tried to explain that it couldn't be possible, but that wds the average soldiers' belief,

Q, Now, why didn't the Japanese pull back to the hills east of Palompon sooner rather than stay in position and become split?

A. He gave an order on the 19th of December, but the Americans were so fast that they couldn't organize themselves. The^order was to assemble in this area.

Q. How many artillery picces by type were on Leyte?

A. Fine 155 Howitzers in the 1st Division, eighteen 10-centimeter Howitzers, nine 75 field-guns, two 10-centimeters guns. These are excluding the number the'16th Division had. Each regiment had four 75 mountain guns with a total of 22 on Leyte, and thirty 37-milimeter . antitank guns. The 26th Division didn't have any artillery and these figures do not include those o^ the 16th Division which had been lost. Howevrr, the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment had four 75-mountn in guns included' in the above figures.

- 15 - Q. What was the Japanese plan for a defense against a landing on Mindanao?

A.. The landing was anticipated around the middle of October. In the middle of October the areas of responsibility were as follows: Northern Mindanao to include Bukidnon and Surigao and Misarois Oriental provinces were under Army Headquarters, with the 41st Infantry acting as army troops; this forces was composed of three battalions of the 41st Infantry, with one of thesd at Surigao, one at Bugo, and one at Malaybalay, with headquarters at Cagayan. There were other troops in the area but they "•ere not considered combat troops and they figured that they only had 3,500 in that area to defend, of which 1,500 were in Surigao and were not available fbr the defense of central Pukidon. The 54th Independent Miked Brigade h&d no'Responsibility.for Jolo> the Sulu Archipelago, and Zarrhoanga and l&nao provinces* In lanao there was one company of the 166th Independent Infantry Battalion less one corpany at Cotabato, two battalions of the 77th Regiment between Kabacan and Pikit, with the third battalion of the 77th Regiment attached to the 100th Division and stationed at Digos, and the 74th Regiment at Sarangani. One battalion of the 30th Div Arty was at Sarangani, and two battalions of the 30th Div Arty attached to the 100th Div, one stationed at Digos and the other at Davao. The 100th Division had an area of responsibility of Davao province and were disposed between Bunawan and Daliao. As noted above, they had one batta­ lion of the r?7th Infantry attached to them and stationed at Digos, and two battalions of the 30th Div Arty. Headquarters of the 100th Division was at Davao. The naval troops at Davao were attached to the 100th Divi­ sion for land operational purposes only. The strength in Davao area, including naval troops and air, and the Digos area was 4,000 with service troops. In the Sarangani area were 5,000, and the Cotabato area was 1,000.

I 0. Tell him our estimated strength of the island was 34,500. How many troops went from Mindanao to Leyte?

A. About 5,000. However, General Torcochika has not inducted the above figures air and. service troops in northern Mindanao, as he does not know their strengths.

Q. Now prior to our invasion of the Philippines, where was it thought by the 14th Area Army that the invasion would take place?

A.. He says that their first estimation was that the Americans WQuld come to Davao, and next Leyte, later Leyte.

Q. How many troops did the Japanese estimate we could muster for the invasion of the Philippines?

A. The Japanese estimate of the coning invasion was as follows: That the first landing would take place on Mindanao with the major effort being directed at Davao and a secondary effort being aimed at Sarangani Bay. They estimated that the invasion of Mindanao would include tv?o divisions, with two n-ore division being set aside for a later invasion of Leyte.

Q. After we invaded Leyte, when was it estimated that we would attack Mindanao?

A. In his own opinion, he thought the Americans would never hit Mindanao.

Q. Fut if we invaded Mindanao, which they must have considered, where did they think we would hit?

A. They had no plan whatsoever until we came here on the 21st of April and heard that the Americans had landed on Cotabato.-

Q. Does he mean to tell me that there Were no plans made to defend • Mindanao?

- 16 - A. Ke took it for granted that the Americ ins would le

Q. ,f,hy did he leave troops here then?

A. His plan was to take all the 30th Division to Leyte, but due to boat shortage, he couldn't take them., He intended to leave the 100th Division for garrison troops.

Q. After Leyte and Luzon had fallen, didn't they anticipate, in view of our landings on other Philippine Islands that there would be an attack on Mindanao?

A, He thought from a strategic point of view Mindanao had no value to the Americans, and if they had any troops to send to Mindanao, they would send them to Okinawa or Bdtneo »

Q t Didn't he consider the political reason for invading Mindanao?

A. He figured that since Luzon was in American hands, that actually they would control the islands without invading. That was wherb the governs ment of the Philippines was. Having captured that, there were more im­ portant points, Borneo and Okinawa. If we had enough'troops after invad­ ing Borneo and Okinawa and more important point and could spare more troops, then the invasion might be considered.

Q. Tell him that General Morozumi on this island had no other mission than to defend the island regardless of what was going on elsewhere in the world. This was General I'orozumi's sole job. What were General Jforozumi's plans in the remote event that there would be an invasion of Mindanao?

A. He said that General Morozumi had control and bad given orders, but since he had not chance to discuss it, he doesn't know.

Q. rhen he arrived on this iaObid we had already landed. Did. General Morozumi explain to him his plan xor the defense of the Island?

(NOTE; It should be noted that this attitude of General Tomochika regard­ ing the non-belief in our invasion of Mindanao can be eyplained by the fact that General Tomochika from the time of the invasion of Leyte was extremely busy on Leyte and later moving to Cebu and traveling to Mindanao hence he had no opportunity to discuss with General Morozumi his plans for the defense of Mindanao. In previous conversations with General Morozumi, his plan for the defense was noted.)

A. On the 23d of April General Morozumi explained his plan to General Tomochika, which was to have the 166th Independent Inf Battalion fight a delaying action towards Midsayapj when they reached Midsayap, withdraw to the northeast in the direction of Omonay by moving across country. The 74th Infantry in the meantime was to move to Omonay and defend against our northward movement up the Sayre Highway. The remained of the 30th Division was to remain in northern Bukidonon to defend against an antic­ ipated landed by an American Division in Cagayan. General Tomochika ob­ jected to this plan, recommending that the entire 30th Division move down to the Kibawe vicinity to defend against movement from the north, and if an attack cane from the north, the 30th Division would place a block across the Kibawe-Pulangi River crossing on the Kibawe-Talomo Trail, and the Yamano force would withdraw to the Gigua river to defend. The 35th Army Headquarters was to be located at Bashio, The 100th Division was to defend the Davao region and defend against the movement of our forces south from Kabacan. The troops in Sarangani Bay were to move north across the mcuntains to Digos and ultimately Davao. General Morozumi overruled General Tomochika1s plan and continued with his ideas.

Q. When did the 35th Army Headquarters move to Bashio? 17 - At May 5.

Q. Was it still considered feasible to stop our advance north from Kabacan?

A. He said in his plan the American troops would be delayed here because of the terrain if the • Japanese used it intelligently, but it was unexpect­ ed, the rapid advance of the American troops. The Americans moved up too fast and the artillery was too accurate, so they Couldn't defend the road, which opend it all the way,

Q. Did. they expect the Americans to use the Mindanao river to move to Pikit?

A. In his experience, he'd have sent his men up to Dulauan and across country to Sarangani Bayj therefore, he expected the Americans to use the river, but by that time the Americans were already up there.

Q, What was the food situation oh Mindanao at thfe time of the landing?

A, On the 26th of April he flew down to see General Harada and General Harada told him definitely he had two year's supply of rations in the Davao area.

Q. In the Davao area or back in the mountains? "

A. Ke had the rations in the Davao plain, but his big mistake was when he didn't find out definitely where the rations were stored. If he had known that and they had been stored in the mountains, the rations would have held them. He said even if the 30th Division got together with the1 100th Division with amount of rations they had, which was salt and rice, they could have lasted one year.

Q. How was the 30th Division fixed for rations?

A. Their plan was to transport the rice from the Cotabato area back to Malaybalay. However, when the Americans landed in Cotabato, where they had bought and stored the rice, their line of communication was cut off and they lost all their rice. He's not sure but he thinks that there were two months' food supply at I'alaybalay for the 30th Division.

Q. How about medical supplies?

A. When he asked the medical officer at the 100th Division he told him he had one year's supply of medical equipment, but the 30th Division he did not ask.

Q. He did ask Harada point"blank, "Suppose the 30th Division came in this same area, how long could we supply them?" and Harada said, "With my present supply for the 30th Division - for the 100th Division and navy, we have supplies for one year." That's all types of supplies.

A, Rations.

Q. How were they fixed for ammunition supply? / A. Ore unit of fire - that's the way he puts it - which is 1,500 rounds per rifle.

Q. That's all they had?

A. Yes.

Q. Ask him if the 100th Division had been roving supplies back to Calanan and Tomogan, storing them there since December 1944?

- 18 - A. Fe says the eastern Davao plain between Tamagan and Calinan - he moved the rations there. All supplies were moved there. They took more to Lapuy which was primarily for the navy. The first plan was for the main army personnel to move to Lapuy, but they changed and moved the navy personnel.

Q. Fhy did the 100th Division not attempt to delay bur advance down this road west of Digos?

A, At the time he went down here on April 26, General Harada showed him the order for the Digos sector unit to move up the road, destroy the road, and put a defensive area there, but in his opinion they had no time or disregarded the order. He said it was a Very serious- error. ') Q. Tell him th*t all through this discuSsion he's been talking about very serious errors in judgerent of the lower commanders. Was there no attempt trade by "the division and higher commanders to check to see that the drderfe were being carried out?

A. I asked him that question and he said tfiey probably didn't have time to do it•

Q. Who didn't have time to do it? J A.- The men down in the lower echelons.

C. Why weren't staff officers sent forward to find out what was going on so that they would know what the story was?

A, When he went down there, he saw this order saying definitely that the?* would defend this road west of Digosj therefore, he took for granted everything would be carried out and the division comtrander would give orders to Digos sector commander to back up on this Digos-Davao road, de­ laying the American advance. Since he returned to the 30th Division Head­ quarters, he had no, further contact. They had prepared for the American landing in Digos, ihcy had a position just west of the road to defend the road as well as the beach.

Q. Did they expect the American forces to advance overland fror Cotabato to Digos?

A. The order of which he was just speaking was before the Americans landed. After they landed, in his memory of the order, he thinks they had orders to defend this place, and if it fell they were to.gradually come down from Davao road to Davao, delaying the American advance as they retreated. In other words, after we reached Kabacan, the Japanese ex­ pected that we would advance overland to Digos and issued orders for the Digos sector command to defend the Apo Mountain crossing west of Digos, and as that force became overpowered, it was to fight a delaying action back along the road to Davao. There was no check uade by higher head­ quarters to see whether the Digos sector commander complied with this order, and General Tomochika feels that this was a big mistake since the Dipos commander withdrew towards Gumu instead of following out his orders of defending along the road. He suggested talking to General Karada about this area because he may have not understood his statement.

Q. Tell him General Harada has not cocie in yet.

A. Before he c?.me in he talked to General Harada and General Harada told him he would be in on the 11th.

Q. In what physical condition is General Harada?

A. He saw him on the 28th of August and his physical condition was good, and he was to take a horse at Bashio and in a two day's trip was to make it to Tamogan.

/ - 19 - Q, Did General Harada still consider himself to be under the orders of the 35th Army and did he continue to accept orders in spite of the fact that communications with General Morozumi had! been lost?

A, Due to the fact that Communication between the 30th Division and 35th Army was out, the 30th Division acted independently. However, the 100th Division commander took orders from the 35th Army Commander and toek thero willingly. General Tomochjtka acted in the capacity of army commander. \ Q. Did Admiral Doi continue to receive and obey orders from General Harada?

A. Yes, there was no difficulty between the Army and Navy,

Q* The,t's unusual.

A. He in this bperation the navy cooperated very well with the army.

Q. Does he know Rosario Matsuo?

A. He doesn't remember.

Q. He doesn't remember?

A. He hes heard of Major Matsuzaki using a girl but never heard of the name.

Q. where was General Tomochika's headcuarters when our forces reached Davao?

A. He was coining to Bashio.

Q. When did he reach Bashio?

A. 5th of May,

Q. Was he in telephone communication with General Harada at that time?

A. He didn't have communication up until somtime between the 10th and the 15th of May with General Harada by telephone.

Q. Did he know that General Harada was fighting around Ula, Hill 550, Davao and Lapuy?

A. He had an advance party which left Impalutao before he did and. the messenger had been down to sec Harada and returned by the time he reached Bashio and reported the situation.

Q. vhy did the 100th Division contirueto fight down here instead of withdrawing back to the hills?

A. He says they had eight battalions an"1 figured not more than one Division of American troops would be coming up, so they could eventually annihilate them.

Q. Tell him that at no time were we in actual cootnet with more than than three battalions. Why wasn't the mass of the Japanese effort used?

A, He says he had to defend, a wide area; he had to have them scattered out, due to the fact that he was defending and didn't know where he'd be attacked next. >

Q. Did be expect to defeat our forces by remaining spread out?

A. He said they had a permanent position there and that they had been building for the past two years and if they had used that, they could eventually have annihilated, the enemy when they approached the position. Q. But how about their east flank? What was to present us from going around the east of Calinan and cutting them off, coming in the rear - his right flank.

A. They had a position in Bayabas area and another right behind, it, but the division couldn't make up its mind which one should be used for the main-position. The 168th had established a permanent, position in the vicinity of Bayabas and had all their rations and ammunition there and General Moruzumi hestitated about withdrawing that to their second posi­ tion. (NOTE: Probably General Hf.rada is meant.) However, when the Americans•arrived there, they had to withdraw without their rations or ammunition, and as far as he knows, this battalion defended this place.

Q. : When the 100th Division started withdrawing to the mountains, why didn't they have the navy withdraw with them?

A. He doesn't know why# but he knows that the division compander gave orders for the navy troops to move lip, to withdraw toward Lapuy. He doesn't know why it wasn't coordinated.

Q. Why didn't he find out why it wasn't,coordinated?

A. He figured that,the less ten went with the division, the less men there would be to feed. Furthermore, the navy didn't have much fire po^er which wouldn't have been of much help, to the division if they went along.

Q. What was the food situation up on the trail in the last days? What was he eating?

A. He said they all had rice and salt.

Q. Plenty of food back there?

A. Yes.

Q. Ask him if he knows about the fighting that took place on Panay, Negros, Cebu and Palawan?

A. He lost communication with them and just heard that the Americans had landed.

Q. How trany troops were there on Cebu when the Americans landed?

A. The chief of staff and comnanding officer and a few officers got over to Cevu. He had a CP there and then he evacuated whatever he could.

Q. What troops did he have under his comrcand? What troops did the commanding general of the 102nd Division have under his command on Leyte?

A, The 171st, 169th, sorte artillery and transportation troops.

Q. Kow about Tempei?

A. After they left Leyte, they went under their command. i • ,

\ Q. Under the command of the 102nd?

A. They received orders from them.

Q. Did the 41st receive orders from them?

A. Right.

Q. Now, how '-.any soldiers were there on Cebu at the time of our landings?

A. 3,500. including 2,000 navyi ^

- 21 - Q. That's the entire number of Japanese that were on Cebu, every kind of Japanese?

A. Yes.

0. How irsry Japanese were on Negros?

A, He said there were about 15,000 just before we hit Leyte.

C. How about Panay?

A. He has no idea of the strength on this strip because there was an air training unit there and the student number always changed, but the troops stationed there were approximately 3,000 and two companies on Palawan fror the 102nd.

Q. Eohol?

A, One corrpany.

Q. Other than the two companies on Palawan, were there any more troops there?

A. No.

Q. No air, no navy?

A. No.

Q. Tell him that we killed 9,565 Japanese on Cebu and have taken 190 prisoners of war.

A. That impossible, he says it's impossible to have that many, even including the civilians that were working in the factory.

Q. Let's see, we had two battalions of the 102nd there, didn't we? And there were a hell of a lot of air troops as I remember. Is he including the air troops that were on Cebu? I A. There's a naval air training school there. He doesn't know the number. It changes. '

Q. Why was the artsy headquarters on Cebu if there were only a small num­ ber of troops there? Why wasn't the army headquarters located where the majority of the troops were?

A. Eecause of the centralized location".

Q, What was this garrison doing at Piso Point?

A. A naval unit. He's not sure but he thinks it's a torpedo unit, torpedo boat base.

Q. Why did the Japanese allow us to come all the way into Davao with scarcely any opposition when they had troops on the hills overlooking Davao? They didn't start fighting us in a hard way until we started to turn north, V A. He had this Digos unit as advance party for the flank unit while they were fortifying their positions stronger. The reason they didn't send ' this one up forward is that they'd have to establish a position where there's nothing,

Q» That's time, but why did they let us go by Talomo vrhen there was a hill overlooking the road where they could have denied us the use of the road.

- 22 - /

A. He realized that point also, but he says due to the fact that all the. troops were afraid of the American artillery and air bombing. They could not have taken advantage of the terrain if they had not established a position prior to that time.

Q, Did thoy rave trouble with the discipline of the troops? Were they afraid the troops would run?

A. Ke said there were no occasions done purposely. The one in Digos he thinks was unavoidable.

Q. ?'hy did they leave their troops on the east of the Davao River ivhen ve were attacking up this way, when it would seetr that it would be better tactics for them to pull them back?

A. Their intention was to move back up, toward Lapuy but since they found out the Americans were coming up this road) the division dispatced the 75th Brigade) drew them from the least side of the Davao River around to the right flaftk to hold against the American advance north*

Q1 Fhy wasn't the navy brought hack at the same time, Why was the navy left in ah exposed flank? \ A. Thejr navy had its supply dump on thiis Side* therefore they left it close to the dump.

Q. Why wasn't the dump fixed so that they could retain centralized control?

A. It was under General Harada's control; however, due to the lack of transportation they had to leave certain things up to Admiral Doi".

Q. Yes-, but Wouldn't it hafo boon t>etter to hare lofit'his.supplier rather than to how lost the tren and uso the Artry's supplies for Admiral Doi?

A. He says since they would be fighting long, they thought rations were more important,

Q. Did he expect to continue fighting or merely to withdraw to the hills and try to outwait us, fight guerrilla warfare? \ A. It was a delaying action here for the rest of the troops, the main body of troops to move ^ack in the hills.

Q. Why weren't the navy pulled back into the hills instead of being shot off this way?

A, He covered that point last time - due to ration trouble.

Q. Then all they were thinking aKout at that time was just to pull back into the hills and try to exist?

A. It was their own ration and not for feeding the navy.

Q. Cut the navy loose?

A, That's right, They were worrying about the rations. If th^took the navy along, they had that many more to feed.

Q. Many prisoners that we took told us that they had been informed that something big was to happen in August, Some of them inferred from that that reinforcements were coming from Japan, He had ever heard that rumor and what was the basis for it? / A. He says that one of the soldiers saw a fortune teller somewhere who said that something big would happen in August, Just vaguely, and all the soldiers with common education believed that and spread the rumor; but he himself didn't believe that. Also, at the same time he did not believe that he had been beaten. - 23 - Q. When did he think he would have been beaten if the emperor hadn't surrendered?

A. They intended to fight till the last man* or their rations ran out and they died.

Q. Were many men dying wheh ihey surrendered because of lack of food or disease?

A, He says it was pretty bad up to the early part of August when they started harvesting rice in that area, and all the malnutrition stopped.

Q. How many men were dying a day?

A. He bad no idea.

Q. How many Japanese were left in the 100th Division Area?

A. He can't say anything definite but he thinks about 5,00b including the Air force.

Q. How many Japanese would be say are left on the island now after talk­ ing '/;ith General Morozumi?

A, General Morozumi doesn't know his situation very well; therefor®,' he couldn't se-y anything definite, but he thinks about 20,000.

Q. I think we have covered it all as far as they specific situation is concerned, except for one more question. I'd like to know how many 35th Army Headquarters troops were :;ith hir. on the island and how they got •here.

A. They had some special men assigned from these units over here. 140 came dora either with him or were an advance detail before him.

Q. What would he do differently in the defense of this island if he had to do it over again?

A. He says if the Americans landed here at Malabang, he would move all the forccs down to Daw.o - no, down to Kabacan and have a decisive battle there rather than a delaying action. Bring all the 100th Division men and the 30th Division men together. If they lose, they lose all the men, but if they ~in, they push the Americans back out in the opean. That is, if he were here before the Americans landed.

Q. If he didn't know where the Americans were going to land?

A. He'd hive the disposition so that he could move from all three points.

Q. Now why didn't the Japanese improve the roads on the island so that they could move troops?

A. The only orders given to General Morozumi were to improve the Kibawe- Taiomo Trail, but he took for granted that General Morozumi would have all ) these roads repaired, by the time he got here. Mien he found out that they weren't he was pretty sore, but he says there was no sense in raising a stink about it because they could't be improved in a day or two.

Q. Hadn't the Japanese improved the roads in the t'X) years here? Hadn't he seen it before?

A, . He saw it orly by air.

Q. What kind of road were they going to build between Davao and Kibawe?

A. The orders were given just to make it so a horse pack or horse-drawn wagon could go by.

- -24 - *

Q» Were they going to build bridges?

A. Yes, build bridges,

Q * Was there ever a bridge across the Puiangi River?

A; He says this 58th Road Construction Unit had been ordered tci improve this road and build, bridges; however, during the past yoar they hadn't done that. He thinks they had some other work ordered by General Moro- zumi. He was busy on Leyte.

Q. Were they much concerned about the guerrilla organization oft this island?

A. They were, they were quite annoyed at them.

Q. Did he think they would ever be strong enough to fight the Japanese?

A. He said that if the Americans gave them the weapons, they probably couM have been strong enough to fight them. He also knew that the Americans were bringing in weapons.

Q. "Fas the decision of the Imperial Headquarters to start the war on 7 December a correct one in his opinion?

A. He was in China. He doesn't know for sui*e but he thinks it was the Imperial General Headquarters only.

Q. ^'as that the time to start the war? Was it a *ise time?

A. From a strategic point of view it was good but from Other political considerations he doesn't know,

Q. Did the Russian ability to defeat the Gerirans come as a surprise to him?

A. He thinks it wasn't Russia alone that did it.

Q. Let's put it this v;ay, the ability of Russia to absorb the force of Germany by herself and then to push the Germans back, not to win the War.

A, In his opinion, it was the Germans' mistake to start war with Russia, Hitler's mistake; and I asked him if it wasn't the Japanese mistake to start a war with America and he said he didn't think so at the time.

Q. Has he ever fought the Russians?

A, No.

Q. What impression did the Japanese Imperial Staff have of the Russian strength after the two incidents with Russia?

A. They decided that they have changed completely from the last war and that Russian is really a powerful nation.

Q. Ncw that the war is over, what is to prevent these retired officers from stimulating the spirit of revenge and make a later effort to attack the United States. How does he think these.staff officers will conduct themselves? Will they try secretly to keep'the spirit of revenge, resent­ ment alive, or does he think they'll say, "We'll have to try to start off in another vay.

A. He hasn't decided that far, but as far as the nation's losing, it's human nature for them to feel pretty bitter about it for a long time to come.

- 25 - Q, In other words, he thinks that every person, including himself, will take the emperor's orders regardless of what they are and there will be no underground activity?

A. He does not think there will be underground activity.

\

(

* 26 - HEADQUARTERS X CORPS Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 310

9 September 1946

INTERROGATION OF II GEN MOROZUMI EY OFFICERS OF THE G-2 SECTION. REPRESENT­ ING THE SECTION WERE COLONEL DALY, MAJOR JORGENSEN, AND LIEUTENANT KEPNER. UNIFSS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED, ALL INTERBOGATORIES WERE BY COLONEL DALY, WITH LT HEPNER, THE INTERPRETER, ANSWERING.

Q, General Marozumi confirms that the number of troops that had come down from Eutuan was approximately 1,300. These were in the vicinity of -'aloe when he arrived in the Agusen Valley with 300 advance elements of the division. There were 4-00 who were bringing up the rear who, as far as he knows never reached Waloe. General Morozumi surrendered with 200 others and was brought into Eugo.

Q. When did Genera.1 Morozumi assume command of all troops on Mindanao?

A. General Suzuki left Leyte approximately in April and he went in a junk and the ship was probably sunk because he never reached Mindanao - only his chief of staff. Major General Tomochika left on one boat, General Suzuki le^t on the other. In a storm they got apert and General Suzuki did not reach Mindanao. After the whereabouts of General Suzuki became unknown, General Morozumi took over command,

Q. Was that on orders of higher headquarters?

A. No, it wasn't on orders of General Yamashita, but Lt General Suzuki, before he left Leyte, had arranged that in case anything happened to him on the island of Mindanao, General Morozumi wa® to be highest commander of the 35th Army.

Q. Tell him General Suzuki was killed. Before General Suzuki le^t Cebu, was General Morozumi in command of all the troops on Mindanao?

A. He had control of the 100th Division and the 30th Division. General Morozumi had control of both these divisions because he had cormunication vith them but he had no control over the independent mixed brigade that was at Zamboanga because he bad no liaison, communication with them.

Q. But he had command before General Suzuki was killed - he was in command of all troops on Mindanao exclusive of Zamboanga?

A, That's right, sir, Lt General Terrada was in charge of an air division.

Q. The Second Air Division? A, The Second Air Division which had its headquarters in Singapore, but he sas sometimes here in Valencia, Also elements of two divisions which were here onMindanao under General Morozumi's command. The day before US troops got to Valencia, Lt General Terrada flew to Singapore.

Q. We knew that he went to Siagon, ^ -

A. Saigon, yes. .

Q. What control did General Morozumi exercise over Admiral Doi?

A, Admiral Doi was attached to General Harada. In other words, his . troops were under the control of General Harada* The Naval troops in Surigao, being in General Morozumi1s area, were directly under General '"orozumi, and the troops which were attached to Harada in turn were tinder control of General Moroauroi,

Q. What communication did General Morozumi have with General Harada? 1 A. The last time he had communication with General Karada was rhen he was at Silae. Q. Was it radio?

A. It was by radio. But after leaving Silae, the radio having gone out of order, cormunication with General Harada was lost.

Q. Did he have communication with anybody on the other side? Did he have communication with General Yaraashita or Saigon?

A, None at all.

Q. Ishen was the last day he had communication with higher headquarters outside the island?

A, Since General Karada's divisions were originally on Mindanao, the installations that he had at Davao were superior. General Morozumi's forces having come to Mindanao later, and it being necessary for them to move to various places on the island without any fixed area of command, their installations were not Food. They only had two and five-code radio installations, so therefore General Morozumi never had direct communica­ tion with any of the other islands but always relayed messages through General Harada'.s command at Davao. Before the Leyte conflict •* in other words, before October 20th when the 35th Army Headquarters was on Cebu, General Morozumi's outfit was at Impalutao near Malaybalay. At that time General Morozumi had direct contact frith 35th Arty Headquarters on Cebu. After General Suzuki, 35th Arcy Headquarters, mov-id to Ley+e, direct communication was lost, and thenceforth his communication were routed through General Earada at Dav?o. Because the Japanese forces were in dire straits on Leyte, communication between Mindanao and 35th Army Headquarters was disrupted and the only communications that emanated from Davao were to Saigon anc! Gener-.1 YamasMta's Headquarters on Luzon.

Q. Did General Suzuki's headquarters go-over to Leyte?

A. They moved to Leyte.

Q. Was that an advance or sort of a command echelon, leaving a rather large installation in Cebu, rear echelon?

A. The commanding general, the chief of staff, the principal staff officers of the 35th Army Headquarters moved to Leyte at the time of the Leyte conflict and only a very small echelon of the 35th Arny Headquarters was left in Cebu,

Q. When did the 35th Amy Headquarters leave Leyte? How many got away?

A, He doesn't know, He doesn't kno^ very well because there was no communication.

Q, Did he know that the Japanese were taking such a terrific betting on Leyte?

A. He knows very well,

Q. Did be know at th?.t time? A. *V»il, since two of his regiments went to Leyte and he was still main­ taining communications with Leyte till the middle of the Leyte conflict, he knew very well that the Japanese forces were disintegrating; and also stragglers were, coming back. He also heard from Major General Tomochika, chief of staff of the 35th Army, who later came to Mindanao in April 194-5, the whole story of the Leyte debacle. Before the Leyte conflict began, General Morozumi was at Pikit. -hile at Pikit, General fcorozumi received an urgent message from Lieutenant General Suzuki at Cebu'ordering him to take his division to Cagay&n and at that time he sent the 41st Regiment and the main strength of the 77th Regiment to Leyte*

- 2 - Q. Wait a minute now. He sent just two battalions of the 4lst;-he left one battalion here?

A. That's the one at Surigao. There vtere two battalions of the 4.1st in this area, Kibawe area, which were 35th Army reserve troops, and they were immediately ordered to Leyte. The third battalion was supposed to follow, but because of severe American air assaults, submarine attacks, they were not able to get away to Leyte.

Q. The third battalion was not able to getaway?

A. That's right. In the meantime it appeared that the decision had been reached on Leyte and General Suzuki ordered the remaining troops of the 30th Division to remain on Mindanao and take control of the whole island with the exception of Zamboanga.

Q. In the Army reserve did they have the 77th Regiment and two battalions of the ^1st?. Is that the way it was?

A. At the time of the landing on Leyte, the 41st Regiment less one battalion which was at Surigao was in the 35th Army reserve and quartered in the Kibawe-»ialaybalay area. When the U.S. troops landed on Leyte, the army reserve was ordered to Leyte.

Q. When did they decide to take the 77th Regiment less one battalion taken away from the 30th Division and otdered to Leyte?

A. The 74th was at Sarangani Bay. The 77th was at Kabacan, with one battalion at Digos. The artillery was at Digos.

Q. And a battalion of the 77th also?

A. One battalion of the 77th Infantry and one battalion of artillery, 30th Division Artillery, were at Digos, and another battalion of the 30th Div Field Artillery was attached to General Harada. Then the 77th Regiment being at Kabacan was ordered to Cagayan. Now, the reason that the 74th Regiment was not moved from Sarangani was because of fear of U.S. inva­ sion at Sarangani Bay, Also, the troops in the Davao area were left there because of the possibility of U.S. invasion in that area.

Q. Now, when the 35th Army Headquarters came down from Malaybalay to go down the K bare-Talomo Trail, why didn't General Morozumi go with them since he t.t.s in command, of all the forces in central Mindanao?

A. The theory is that as a divisional commander he could not dalegate that responsibility to anybody else.

Q. >Fhat responsibility?

A. The responsibility of division commander; therefore, he told General Tomoehika to go down here and if there were any problems that came up, they wou'd communicate with each other by radio. In other words, General Morozumi co ild give his orders to other troops on the island through radio to the 35th Artty Headquarters who would further relay the orders.

Q. Why didn't the 30th Division go down the Kibawe-Talomo Trail?

A, General Morozumi expected the U.S. troops to land here at Cagayan. Now, if he'd have pulled his division down here (Kibawe) he'd have had two divisions concentrated in a very small area, so rather than do that, he was going to hold his division up there so we couldn't get down here to join forces. If he'd moved his division down with the 100th Division he wouldn't have been able to block up there.

Q, But we were coming into Kabacan OTS sending a division north and another south, and by retaining that*?)Ian his forces would be split.

- 3 - A. Well, his strategy was this: He had the 166th Independent Infantry Battalion disposed in the Cotabato area? one battalion, Hayashi Battalion of the 74th Infantry Regiment, that was the 30th Division Engineers, at Kabacan. The plan was to hold* In case the U.S. troops advanced toward Kabacan, the 166th IIB and the one battalion of the 74-th Infantry Regiment an*3 the 30th Division Engineers were to fight a delaying action up the Sayre Highway between Kabacan and Kibawe. General Horozurri, knowing that this road was very poor and mountainous and easy to defend, believed that he could ston us in that area. By retaining control of the Kibawe-Kabacan roed, his troops would still be adjoining the 100th Division in the Davao area. The rapid advance of U.S. forces from Parang to Kabacan was totally unexpected by General Morozumi, and the consequent further advance up toward Omo^ay nade his position at ••alaybalay very precarious. General I'orozumi did not have time to transfer his ammunition dumps to Silae from Malaybalay before U.S. troops captured these dumps.

Tid General Morozumi consider the possibility of U»S. troops advancing Up the J'indanad River by bckvt to Kabacan?

A. The 166th IIB commander felt that the U.S. troops might go up the "lindanao River to Pikit and he tried to stop this to the best of his c.bility, but lacking troops, he was not a"Me to successfully stop the advance of U.S. forces up the Mindanao River.

Q, Wen did General Morozurci anticipate we would lapd on -Mindanao?

A, Arcording to the native reports, he had definitely concluded U.S. forces would land on Mindanao during the beginning 10-day peri»d of April»

Q. Y'-'here did he expect them to land?

A. There were three alternative expectations. General Morozumi believed t'* at Davao would probably be the area in which U.S. forces would land, If Davao was not the e.rea selected by U.S. forces, he believed that Cagayan '"as the next area where the U.S. forces would land. And the third choice was believe' to be the Cotabato area.

Q. What did he think of Sarangani?

A. He also thought of Sarangani, He believed that U.S. forces might have a plan to first land at Sarangani Bay, securing Sarangani Peninsula, and then the pain forces of the U.S. t^oCps landing in the Davao area, being covered by the U.S. forces in control of the Saran-ani Peninsula.

Q. r'hen did he first definitely suspect that our rain landing was to take place in the- Cotabato area?

A. On the 20th of April he heard that elements of U.S. forces had landed at Malabang, anr even then he was not certain of it, that we had landed troops at Malabang.

Q* Did he have anything to suggest that that was that area, other than he did suspect that these were the particular places we would land? Did he have any indication that finally crystalized and made him think that was the place?

A. No, he didn't have that.

MAJOR JORGEFSEN: ask him if the guerrilla activity at Malabang which became quite narked from 1 April on didn't sugpest that we were anxious to secure an airfield there and might make our first landing there.

A. He knew that great activity was going on in this area, but he believed that that activity was because U.S. troops were going to invade the Sulus and stop in this area on their vray to the Sulus. In other words, it would be a staging area for the attack on Sulu; therefore, he believed that these guerrilla troops were guarding this area, but as far as U.S. troops landing in this area, he had no idea thereof.

- U - Q. Why did he think re were going to come all the way into Malabang when we already had Zamboanga as a base?

A. He did not believe that U.S. troops would take the trouble of attack­ ing Mindanao because he thought that U.S. forces would immediately attack Borneo and the southern areas. In other words, he could not conceive the U.S. forces casting their troops on the total occupation of Mindanao.

Q, How pany Japanese soldiers and sailors were there on Mindanao, ex­ clusive of Zarboanga? That's as of 20 April. Tell hit?. to show the num­ ber at each location while he's doing it,

A. He says he's not his own chief of staff. About 30,000, arny, and he doesn't know exactly about navy trooos because they were in Davao. 28,000 to 30,000.

Q. Doesn't he think there were, including the various naval labor troops they had, there were approximately 3,000 or 4,000 or more in the Davco area - naval troops plus naval construction troops?

A» He's never been to Davao so he krpws absolutely nothing about the Navy. Hers asking you how many you tnink were there*

Q. Tell hiir we thought there were 35,000 i'.rny and Navy.

A. He said maybe there were about 5,000 navy - he's not sure, but he believes there were about 5,000, so 35,000 he believes is very accurate. He expressed grert surprise and said it was exactly according to your judgment.

Q. Ask him if he can make on a map the disposition of his troops, or at least the major units thereof. In other words, can he put a goose egg around an area and say there were so many troops there composed princi­ pally of the 74th Infantry and so on?

A. He would like you to do this if it's convenient for you. His Chief of Staff is coming in today to Bugo. His Chief of Staff knows all the dispositions in great detail, so he suggests that you call the Chief of staff here, his chief of staff, and he can give you the real disposition,

Q. Will he instruct him to do so?

A. Ke will instruct him to do so.

Q. Tell him that we had information that their plan in the event of an ..ttack around Malaybalay and Kabacan was to bring a brigade of the 100th Division over this trail to attack our troops when they reached Malay­ balay; and ask him. if that was the plan and why they didn't do it. They were coming up this trail and a battalion was coming up to K&bacan,

A. At one time it came in the plans that they would send three independent infantry battalions up here to Malaybalay but they decided that it wouldn't be feasible and therefore General Morozumi and General Parada agreed only to take charge of their own areas. In other words, each area would be independent, this being division responsibility as of the time we landed,,

Q. That's rhy one battalion of the 100th moved down to Sarangani, so the 74th could come back up this way?

A. This one battalion came 1 down here to take the place of the 74th. The Americans got to Pigos, the Japanese pulled back all but one company of the independent infantry battalion that was at Sarangani Bay,

0, How many were left there after they pulled the battalion less one company out?

- 5 - A. They had one battalion of the 30th Division Artillery and this one company of the independent infantry battalion, the 167th. They tried to come up this road but the Americans landed here and blocked it. The road from Sarangani Bay, highway 5, was very bad, so they weren't able to make it all the way to Duluan, so they went back to Sarangani. Now, they had also at Sarangani patients of the 74th Infantry Regiment x*ho had been left there when the 74th Infantry Regiment changed places with tbte 167th Independent Infantry Battalion.

Q. So they turned around,' Doesn't he know about the fighting In the Sarangani Bay area?

A. No. First, when we landed at Parang, at Sarangani Bay there was one battalion, the 167th IIB, plus 270 patients of the 74th Infantry Regiment who had been left there when the 74th Infantry Regiment - when the 167th IIB took the place of the 74th Infantry Regiment, plus one battalion of the 30th Division Field Artillery plus naval troops. When our troops reached Digos, approached Digos, the 100th Division recalled all but one company of the 167th IIB from Sarangani. Finally, it was decided that the one battalion of the 30th Division FA plus the one company of the 167th IIB plus patients of the 74th jtnfantry Regiment would try to reach Duluan, and also highway 5 £cing in a very bad condition, the one company of the force returned to Sarangani. General Mor«zumi gave an order that the battalion of the 30th Division FA was to concentrate in the Mt. Matutum area and defend from there. With reference to the one company of the 167th IIB, since that was not under his control, directly under his control,, he does not know any details about them.

Q. I'd like to check - does he say Mt. Matutum or a mountain in that area?

A. Around a mountain, very high.

Q. In other words, he doesn't know the name of the mountain to which he told them to retire?

A. No.

Q. So that battalion of the 167th did come out, less one company?

A. He doesn't know what happened to that company.

Q. Ask him if they had instruction from higher headquarters when their position became untenable to withdraw to the hills and fight a guerrilla action. In other words, you've got an outfit that came in here, Sarangani the outfit that was at Parang went into the hilisj the outfit at Pikit went into the hills; his outfit went into the hills,

A. There were, no direct orders for guerrilla warfare from General Yama- shita in Luzon, but General Morozumi laid out a plan for the troops under his command in the following manners Troops in the Davao area were going to retreat into the mountains in back of Davao and fight as long as possible. Troops in the Malaybalay-Kabacan - I moan Kalaybalay-Kibawe area were to rctr< at into the mountains in the Agusan area and fight as long a war as possible, thereby exhausting American forces to their utmost ability.

Q, Did he expect any aid from Japan or other Japanese forces? Did he now how precarious the situation was in the Philippines of the Japanese at that time?

A, Be did not have a feeling that there would be any r©info|roements from Japan. General Morozumi, although he did not expect any reinforcements from Japan, believed that maybe in two or three years the Japanese would be c.ble to stage a comeback in other areas, and therefore he was deter­ mined to.hold out five, even ten years, the area under his command. In other words, to hold American forces from redeployment in other areas. He knew in the plains he would be beaten; in the mountains he would al­ ways be a threat.

Q. Ask Genferal Morozumi how he's feeling.

A. He said thanks to you he's healthy« His kidneys are giving him a little trouble. ,

Q. Why did he leave these forces at Malaybalay and Parang and Cota- bato to just fool around in there When thtey were going to get cat off; Why didn't he pull them back to Kabacan or Pikit Whe"'Q they could concentrate?

A. The first line of defense for the Takumi Battalion was here, the high ground in the vicinity of Midsayap. The second line of defense was the River crossing at Pikit; and the third line of defense at Kabacan and the plans were to go up the Sayre Highway or to retreat down High­ way No. 1, but because of the rapid advance of -U.S. forces, they were cut off and made ineffective.

Q. . Why did they not defend the approaches to Digos?

A, That's General Harada's area.

Q. You mean be had command of the island but he told Harada he bad his half and he wouldn't fool around with him, is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. Ask him how he and Harada got along personally?

A. The relationship was not very close because of the difference in ages. Although he had acquaintance ?jith General Harada and met him on several occasions, they were not very closely associated,

Q. Did General Harada, ever visit him on Mindanao?

A. At Surigao. "^hey met quite a few times, at Surigao once, at Manila twice, at Davao once.

Qi He was at Davao?

A. Yes, sir. i Q, I thought he said he msn't?

A. No, sir, he didn't say that. Once at Cebu, and that's all.

Q« It wasn't a very close command, was it? Did they have telephone communication between Malaybalay and Davao?

A. Only wireless; no telephonic communication.

Q. You mean radio?

A. Only radio. General Morozumi ordered the 166th IIB to go from the vicinity of Midsayap, cross-country to the Kibawe-Taloro Trail to guard it against the Americans who he figured would go down the Kibawe-Taloao Trail. The battalion was not able to do it because of bad roads and mountainous terrain; therefore he sent the 74th Infantry Regiment toward the Kibawe-Talomo Trail, but they also were not able to get there, and that left this route open for the Americans to go down to the Kibawe- Talomo Trail.

Q. What is the present strength of the Japa on Mindanao?

- 7 - A. Approximately 15,000, he believes. He's not certain at all, not at all sure of his figlares. 15,000 without naval troops. Ke said maybe 10,000. He said it might not even be 10,000, he's not at all sure. Very uncertain.

Q. Can he locate the general areas of the Japanese forces that are re­ fraining that he knows about? For instance, he knows there are a certain number here in Agusan and a certain number over in here. Can he locate any of the grouos?

A. Fe sayd he believes there are 300 to 4-00 troons of the 30th Division Reconnaissance Regiment in this Silae vicinity, and also he believes that there are about 1,200 in the Agusan Valley.

Q. Put he's not sure of any of that?

A. Hot sure of any of it. Be said the reason he's not able to know . ahrut all these elements is that he didn't have any communication with them, so it's quite reasonable to assume he doesn't know where they are. He says that about three-quarters of the troops have been annihilated or have died of disease and only one-quarter was left. In other words, a figure of 2,200 approximates abbut one-quarter of the troops he had in that area.

Q. He had about 5,000 troops under him at the start?

A. Between ?,000 and 10,000.

Q. Were the air forces on Mindanao - that is, the 2d Air Division troops on '-indanao under bis command, under General Ilorozumi's command?

A. All his command, all the air troops on this island. There were at Valencia and toward the Pulangi River, Tigua.

Q. Does he know Colonel Yamano lias surrendered?

A. Fe went to Leyte today. He said the air troops lost the least amount of troops so therefore he believes 3,000 to 3,500 air troops will come in. He said they bad the least casualties.

Q. Ask him if he had very rany Filipino informers who gave the information concerning our movements?

A. He said the natives weren't very cooperative, but his means of in­ telligence were the front line troops and the Kempei units, but as far as the natives giving much information, it was very disappointing.

Q. Why didn't the Japs make any attempt to improve the road net along the Sayre Hiehway?

A. He said although he had three co-^panies of engineers and General Karada had given him two companies of engineers, because of lack of machinery and labor the amount of repair they could do on the highway was very limited and consisted principally of making the roads as even as possible. Although he made repairs to the road, they were not per­ manent repairs and the roads soen became bad again. He didn't have the machinery or the facilities to make permanent repairs.

Q. Where is his home in Japan?

A. In Fagano.

Q. Where is that?

A. Na«;ono is 90 miles north of Tokyo. " . „ \ Q. Has he ever been to Kure?

k\ Only went once to Kure.

Q. He doesn't know much about it then?

A. Mo.

Q'. How about Shikoku?

A, He's never been to Shikoku.

Q. did the Japs keep pouring troops into Leyte piecemeal, to get their, cut off?

A. Transportation, boat transportation,

Q. What do you mean, boat transportation?

A. Due to Shipping difficultiesi

Qi Yes, but why did they keep pouring them in'to get them killed off?

A* He says he doesn't know. Q. What does he consider the decisive battle of the Philippines?

A. Leyte, the battle of Leyte. Q. ?.'hy?

A. He considers the Leyte battle the decisive battle of the Philippines because of the creation of an American base. In other words, the Japanese high command believed that Davao or Leyte would be invaded and that's why the 30th Division was a floating division - in other words, not a permanent division. The idea was, if the Americans landed in Leyte to ship the 30th Division to Leyte; if the Americans landed in Davao, they would reinforce the lCOth Division at Davao, but because of superior American air power, the transportation facilities were severely dis­ rupted and troops could not be concentrated fast enough. Q. If he had to fight this Mindanao battle over again, would he try concentrating his forces or would he fight it the way he did this time?

A. He would make a few changes, but he would fight it on the whole - if he had to do it over again, he would do it the same way.

Q. Whet does he think was the factor that decided the battle against him here, the speed of the advance or the engineer effort or what?

A. Speed of advance which the Japanese never thought possible because of the bad roadsj but the Americans immediately repaired the roads, built roads; in that way their equipment, their guns could move up to forward areas with exceptional speed. Also, the superior equipment and armament weapons were the reasons for the supeess of U.S. forces. Speed of advance. >

GENERAL MOROZUMI: Speedo

Q. Do you understand English: Av He doesn't understand it. He just ,rnows that, speed. That's almost a Japanese word now, speedo.

Q. How when we go into Japan, ask him whrvt he feels the reaction of the people will be and how can re best accomplish our mission of disarming the Japanese and reestablishing them in a peaceful economy.

A. He said he's not certain but he feels that U.S. occupation forces should not try to irritate the Japanese. In other words -

- 9<- Q. Coerce?

A. Coerce them coerce them - that's right. Because he said the Japan­ ese are very sensitive and we should try to understand them.

* Q. Does he think the Japanese will see that we get their fecosds and will turn in all their arms or will they resort to subterfuge?

A. He does not know but he does not believe they will resort to subter­ fuge or conceal wisapohs*

Q. Does hfe hfive anything further he wished to tell us?

A* His greatest worry is for his troops who are still in the mountains. He said He's asking a great favor* of the U.S. forces but hte would appre­ ciate tremendously if we will do everything in our power tfc assemble his soldiers and induce their to surrender. In other words, let them know that peace has come about and that they should surrender. He says that there are lots of the^ in the mountains enduring untold suffering with­ out maybe knowing that there is peace now, and his greatest desire is to save as much suffering among the troops that he had as possible.

Q. Tell him that we are doing everything we possibly can to get them in, that we're sending Japanese soldiers into the mountains whenever we hear that there is a group to tell them that the war is over; that we're dropping leaflets to them and we're bringing them in as fast as we can, and that a great many of them are coming now.

A. He would like to meet Major General Tomochika if there's any possi­ bility of doing it?

Q. Yes, Yes, he will later - I'm not sure just when, I think ^omochika comes in tomorrow.

A. He said it would be very embarrassing for him if he doesn't meet him;.

Q. Why?

A. He said according to the Japanese arr^y regulations, the Chief of Staff and the commanding general have to be together, and because they both have responsibility toward their troops. The way he explained it is that although he is commanding general, the fact is the his Chief of Staff isn't with hir or in communication with him would be very embarrassing to explain when he got back to the home country. It's just a custom.

Q. Well, it may be a custom, but he said it was regulation that he had to stay with the division and he didn't want to take his division down the trail and sent his Chief of Staff down.

A. That's just his view; that's just what he said.

Q. Did he realize that his troops were carrying orders up into the front lines, identification tags and all those means of intelligence?

A. He never thought of that. He said he should have done it, taken away the pay books, diaries, but there wasn't time to do all that, and he frankly admits that it was his mistake; he should have done it. He real­ izes now that it was his mistake.

Q. What became of his saber?

A, He left it at Sugunto.

Q. He turned it over to American forces?

A. ?/!ajor Jackson, S-2, 105th Regiment. He handed it to Colonel Atkins. Major Jackson was the go-between between him and Colonel Atkins, and the sword handed to Colonel Atkins and Colonel Atkins gave it to Major Jackson,

Q, Ask him which chief of Staff will have the detailed information on the disposition of the troops when we landed, and from then on - was it the chief of staff of the 35th Army or the chief of staff of the 30th Division?

A. His chief of staff, the 30th Division chief of staff, is the one wh6 knows.

Q. The 30th Division chief of staff. Does he know about the 100th Divi­ sion also? -

A,. Most of them. For the most part,

Q. '.'hen will he be in?

A. Tonight, He's supposed to be in tonight, 6:30 the boat left Butuan.

Q. Tell him that we will send an officer down to Bugo tomorrow to talk to his chief of staff, and ask him if he will instruct his chief of staff to give us all the information that we require?

A, He will do it.

Q, Tell him, "Thank y«u very nrnch."

- 11- HEADQUARTERS X CORPS Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 310 (Kure,Honshu)

15 September 1945

Questioning of General HARADA. CG 100th Div.. by Officers of G-2 Section. X Corps

Q. How old are you, General?

A. 52 years.

Q. When did you expect the Americans -to land on Mindanao?

A. last September, 1944*

Q. Where did you expect the landing to take place?

A. I judged that the American troops would either land at Davao or Leyte.

Q, If the landed on Mindanao, where did you e>-pect them to land?

Ak At Davao.

Q. After we had gained possession of Leyte and Luzon, where and when did you expect the U.S. troops would attack' Mindanao2

A. I believed that after the U.S. troops would land on Leyte and Luz»n, and that they would clean up the Visayan group and then land on Mindanao.

Q. Did you have any advance information that we were coming in here?

A. I did not, but my judgement was that they would.

Q. When did you ezpect that would take place?

A. I theught it would be on 10 April, 194.5, I thought you would land on Mindanao after Cebu.

Q. Did you eypect it would be 10 April?

A. Yes.

Q. Why 10 April?

A. I knew that since the Philippines were American territory, you would eventually hit this territory. 10 April was just try guess.

Q. Where did you expect that landing to take place?

A. I thought it would be at Cagayan.

Q. Why at .Cagayan? i Q. I thought that if this was a small island like Leyte there would be no question that American troops would make landings wherever Japanese troops were, but on a big island like this I thought you would not risk your troops by sending them into an area where the Japanese tr»ops were in force, unless the Americans had enough forces to land directly on Cagayan, and then they would do so because it was a shorter distance from Leyte to bring supplies,

Q. Why did you think we would land at Davao in September 1944, as you stated before?

- 1 - A. Because there were so many airfields and the terrific air poundings of Davao, the natural reaction to previous American landings was to expect aerial poundings of the area to be landed on*

Q. Did you know about the guerrilla organization at Malabang?

A. I knew about it.

Q. Did that arouse your suspicions as to the place of landing?

A. There were always guerrillas around there, it arouse^ my suspicions a little.

Q. Ask the General to locate on the map his disposition of forces on 20 April 1945.

Ai (General Harada wa6 unable to state the location or strength of his troopsi The area under his Command was Davao province and boundaries.)

Q. General Farada had command of all troops in the Davao Province and the southern half Cotabato Province, the area runs roughly east and west through Digos. Mow many troops did you have under your command at the time of our landings?

A. Ten thousand Army troops and ten thousand Navy troops.

Q. Does that include the air forces and attached troops from the 30th Division? * A. That includes everything.

Q. Wore you familiar with the plan Genera'l Morozumi had for stopping our advance inland?

A. I wasn't told about that, because the U S. troops went too fast, the situation was too fluid.

Q. Did. you know when we reached Kabacan?

A. I didn't, receive the news until 21 April.

Q. HOT; many troops did you anticipate were coming down the road to Digos?

A, I didn't know.

Q, rhi.t steps did you take to stop our advance?

A. I thought that you would come by vrater to Digos. When the troops came do^n toward Digos, we made a withdrawal to Guma, our objective then vas to disrupt communications and try to harass your advance.

Q. How many troops were there in the Digos sector?

A. Three companies of the 163rd IIP totalling about 400 menj one battery of the 30th Division FA consisting of approximately 1,000-2,000 naval troops of miscellaneous air field units in the area; of these troops were under the command of Colonel Shizuru, 163rd HE, the total about 2,500 troops.

Q, What troops were in the Sarangani Bay area at this time and what in­ struction did they have?

A. On orders from General Morozumi, General Harada sent the 167th IIB to take the place of the 74th Regiment in March of this year. When the 167th got to Sarangani it was decided by General Morozumi that there was no reason to keep so many troops in that area, in April before we landed, so all troops with the exception of 1 Rifle Co and 1 Machine Gun platoon

- 2 - of the 167th IIB were recalled to the Davao area. The last order that General Morozumi gave this unit was to defend the air field* Later when the Americans landed on 17 April, General Harada felt that it was not worth while to keep this one company and one machine gun platoon of the 167th HE in Sarangani, and he wanted to rccall them to the Davao area, but since there -rere approximately 200 patients from the 74-th Infantry Regiment left in Sarangani it was felt that they could not withdraw this riflo company and machine gun platoon. Before this, the naval troops, who were very numerous in the Sarangani Bay area were recalled to the Davao area, and as of 20 April there were only 700 naval troops left in the Sarangani Bay area*

Q. ••'hat became of the battalion of field artillery that was in here?

A. They tried to join General Morozumi, but because the American troops were in the Dikit area and the roads were bad, they retraced'their steps.

Q. what battalion was that?

A. Takatsuka (CO 1st Bn> 30th PA)

Q. How cany guns did they have?

A. I don't know but there weren't very many.

Q. How many troops were there left in the Sarangani Bay area after you pulled the other troops out?

A. Approximately 600.

(Note: The figures that General Harada is giving are inaccurate by his own admission. He has a surprising lack of detailed information).

Q. r'hen we advanced toward Digos, why didn't the 163rd IIB atterpt to delay our advance in the Apo mountain range?

A. Fecausc I thought you might come in by water if we were entrenched there. x

Q. By pulling them back to Guma you were not able to cover the road and thus were not able to cover to advance,

A. Since I had so few troops I didn't feel I could commit them in bulk.

Q. Then why didn't you pull them back to Davao instead of sending them up to the mountains where they could do no good?

A. I did do that afterwards; after I realised it would do no good, and could not stop your advance, I pulled them back to Davao,.

Q. Why was no attempt made to stop our advance toward Davao?

A. I ordered it and it made me angry when nothing was done. I sent two telegrams because it was a very good place to defend, but the subordinate comirandor to me disobeyed my order.

Q. Who is the subordinate commander?

A. Colonel Shizuru.

C;. How many guns did Colonel Shizuru have in that area?

A. Four 37mm guns, ttfo or three ten centimeter guns.

Q. What battery of the 30th Division Artillery was at Digos?

A, The 7th Battery under command of Major Nakajima. (CO 3d Bn, 30th FA)

- 3 - Q. /Were they able to evacuate any of these guns from Digos to Davao?

A. They destroyed them because they were too heavy.

Q. Pid you see Colonel Shimru after you got back to Davao? t

A. Fo, I never saw him again.

Q. When did you know that Colonel Shieuru did not obey your orders?

A. V'hen I reconsidered, I believe that Colonel Shizuru did not mean to disobey that order but that it was practically impossible to carry it out because of the rapid advance of the U.S. troops.

Q. Fhy didn't you send a staff officer to Digos to find out what, was going on? A. I did send a staff officer in the very beginning.

Q. ^'hr.t report did the staff officer make to you? A. With reference to defending those roads, that a defense position had been taken up.

Q. Tf'hy didn't you send troops from Davad to stop our movement from Digos?

A. I didn't have them, I was constructing positions in Davao, and didn't have time to stop fortifying Dav^o to send these units out.

Q. Have you any maps comparable to this one, 1 to 50,000?

A. I had 1/50,000; 1/20,000 and 1/25,000. / 0. What had you and Doi agreed upon in case of an amphibious landing by U.S. forces?

A. I rould have t;.ken Doi's opinion. I left the beach defenses up to him.

Q. What was Doi's duty as far as defense goes?

A. The point is that although the American forces did not make an amphibious landing, there were transports in there, and his duty was to attack them with landing craft loaded with explosives*

Q. Where was the C.P. of -the 75th Frigade?

A. At Mandog. Q. Pon't you think that your division was on an excessively wide front to put up any extensive defense of that area?

A. I realize that it was too wide a front for a division but I had. orders to guarr? the air fields and harbors.

Q. When you realized this, why did you not try to contact your forces?

A. They just gave me that order, and I had no specific plan of with­ drawal. Q. Where was the 167th. IIB? , A. At Lapuy,

Q. Did you have any division reserve?

A. Just troops inducted from the civilians in this area. X don't know how many.

- A - (Statement: As v;e advanced from Digos the location of troops of the 100th Div was-..as. fellows: Three Co's of the 167th were ,in position in Bnyabas; the 12th Air Field Fattalion at Manampulanj the 14-th Air Field Battalion along the road east of Mulig; the 353rd between Mintal and. the Talomo River; the 352nd east of the Talomo River astride the road and extend­ ing to include the ridge west of the Talomo River * The Higuchi (3d) naval battalion, 550 troops were under the command of General Tochigi of the 76th Brigade had its headquarters 3000 yards east of Togbuk. This battalion had the responsibilty of defending the Davao area wast •f the Davao River. The 75th Brigade had headquarters at Mandog and had a battalion of naval troops in reserve here* The 165th IIB on a 4000 yard front was eest and north of this battalion, with one company of this battalion on Samal Island. One naval battalion was disposed to the north of this, 4.000 yards southwest of Panakaft; the l6/+th IIP was disposed along the high ground 5000 yards east; of Mandog. The 13th Air Sector was disposed on the high ground 6000 yards west of Tokbuk. The 167th Fattalion, minus one company at Sp.rangani Bay,was at Bayabas, and one company of the 163rd IIB was in the vicinity of Lapuy. One company of the 167th w&s at Kateel Bay* and one company of the 168th was at Mati. These two companies bh thfe east coafct were later pulled beck to Piso Point whei'e they were prevented froti; going into DaVao by water. The 100th Divi­ sion Headquarters about 1 May was in the Mintal area and oil that date moved to the vicinity of lapuy. The division reserve consisted of armed civi­ lians (General Harada did not know the number).

Q. As we approached here, what orders were given to the 76th Brigade?

A. I ordered this brigade to remain in position until the U.S. forces were annihilated.

Q. What were the orders to these other groups, the 168th and the air field units?

A. The same orders.

Q. Did you think it was possible for them to carry out that order? Did you think it was possible for a battalion to (destroy a division?

A. I didn't anticipate a division to..attack on battalion front.

Q. Didn't you expect we would move north along the Mital Road and move to cut off your rear?

A. Due to the fact that I did not know where the Americans would attack, I left the battalions in position, but after they came I withdrew the 168th, the 12th and 14th Air Field Battalions to Tugbok.

Q. Why didn't the Japanese forces all withdraw to Calinin and stay there?

A. About 4 May the 75th Brigade troops were withdrawn to the Biao area.

Q. Why didn't you bring the air and naval troops at the same time?

i ! A. I didn't move the naval and air troops as I did not consider that they were able to wove on foot, but had to be left in a permanent position. At this time the naval and air troops were under Doi.

Q, .At the same time was the 100th Division drawing back to the north?

A. The 100th Division was now fighting a delaying action back toward the mountains.

Q. Why dir1 you not defend at Mt. Maooy?

A. Because of your rapid advance to that area.

Q. Had any supplies, rice etc., been moved back to' the Apo mountain area prior to our landings? - 5 - A. None at all.

Q. Didn't you anticipate that you would eventually have to fall back to the ADO mountains?

A, I did not anticipate that until May 2, then I decided to battle in the area north of Malgos,

Q. Did you move supplies in at that time?

A. I had the rations stored in the area afoUrtd Malagos and east ^rom that area to the Davao River.

Q. Eow many rations did you have?

A. About 4 months supply "'hen the Americans landed in Parang. I had farming area that could have taken care of us for a year.

Q. General Tomochika said that the orders given you were to defend the southern approach to the Kibawe-Talomo trail in the vicinity of the Apo mountains. Why didn't the division move >ack to that point and ofcey those orders? «

A. I have no memory of those orders. «

Q. On 26 April do you remember talking to General Torrochika?

A, Yes.

Q. What did General Tomochika tell you at that time?

A. At that time I was sick and we didn't discuss" much about the oper­ ation, and General Tomochika was satisfied that everything was perfect.

Q. General Tomochika told me th?.t he hed given you the mission of de­ fending in the Baguio-Malagos area astride the Kibawe-Talomo Trail and the Yamano forces were to go into position in the Tigua River Valley. Do you recall that?

A. I did redeive orders to defend in the vicinity of Xibangay about the end of June or the first of July.

Q. On 26 April did General Tomochika give you any other orders?

A. He g'ave r>e no orders whatsoever.

Q. What artillery did you have in the 100th Division?

A. Each infantry battalion had five or six guns smaller than 75's. The Division Artillery had three 75mm mountain guns and two mourtain guns. The 8th Company of the 30th Division Artillery had two or three ten centimeter howitzers and one 75mm mountain gun. The naval forces had more than that but I don't know just how many.

Q. Where was your artillery located? '

A. The 8th Battery of the 30th FA was east of Mintal and east of the Talomo River* Two guns were emplaced on the hill east of the Talomo River to fire on Libby. Two guns were at Bayabas,

Q. Are you in the Artillery?

A. The Infantry-.

Q. Did our artillery destroy these guns?

A. Most of them were destroyed.

- 6 - Q. What was the effect of our artillery fire?

A. Very accurate.

Q. Did it kill many men?

A, As far as personnel it was suprisingly low,

Q. What, was the main effect of our artillery?

A. The loss of machine guns fron- artillery fire was pretty high.

Q. What did you fear most, the air bursts or the ground bursts?

A. The mortars came'just like beating a drum, but the planes, they could always hear them.

Q. Which was most feared from artillery fire, bursts in the air or on the ground?

A. .Ground bursts. The air bursts are less accurate, but they feared the ground bursts because of the noise.

Q. Where you surprised at having a great deal of artillery coir® down on 1 you all at once?

A. At first they were surprised but eventually then knew just about when it would fall.

Q. Fhat was the effect of our night firing? \

A. We suspected that it was directed against our moving at night, and it was ineffective. ,

Q. Did it blow up many of the dumps at night?

A. Not so many.

Q. What were your orders in regard to our observation planes?

A. I had given orders to fire on them.

/ Q. Wore our observation planes feared by the soldiers?

A, Usually they were because they knew that when an observation plane came over, artillery fire was imminent. I bad,given orders to them to to conceal themselves,

Q. ,phat was the effect of our dive bombers?

A. Unexpectedly low, 1 Q. What did you think of our fire bombs?

A. Especially in the Wangan area they were feared because they "burned out all the abaca.

Q. How many men do you think you have left in the division?

A. 7,000, not including navy personnel.

C. How many when they started?

A. 10,000 in the beginning.

Q. Did many men died,from starvation?

- 7 - A. I have no idea how many, but there were some.

Q. From sickness?

A. I h-ve had no report on it. * Q. If you had to fight this campaign over again, how would you fight it differently?

A. I could not have done any better. There was no area to defend in there,

Q. ?e found an airplane storage warehouse at Malagos with plane parts. What was its purpose?

A. This is the first time I had heard.about it, ,

Q. Fid the guerrillas give you much trouble?

A. We never had any trouble 'sdth them. I had heard reports arout it in the rear areas. . • \ Q. What communications did you have with your forces?

A. Telephone and wireless between brigades and the brigades had the ss.ire between themselves and their units.

Q. What was the effect of artillery fire on motor parks and supply areas?

A. I haven't received any reports. . '

Q. Trhy did you allow your troops to carry identification tags and Haps?

A. I had never given them orders to remove them.

Q. Did you know what unit we had fighting against you? ,

A. Not until I heard over the San Francisco radio that the 24th and 31st-Divisions landed on Mindanao.

Q. What school did you go to? \ A. Military Academy and war college.

Q. Any foreign school? . .' > • ' 1

A. No. '

Q. HOT/ long have you been a general?

A. I wns a m^jor general for 3 years and a Lt. General one year.

Q, We captured a map that showed maneuvers of the Americans landing at Daliao, Mat5.no and Davc.o and advancing toward Mintal.

A. I think there was such a cap, that is all*

Q. Why didn't you try such a plan against our attack?

A. I thought the Americans would land at Pavao.

Q. Did you give orders to your men to avoid capture?

A. He had given them orders not to be captured',

Q. Did they try to capture prisoners of ours?

A. I had given orders to capture prisoners,. Q*. What would they have done to them?

A. They would have been questioned but not maltreated.

Q. Why did your men kill our wounded?

A. I never heard of it. \

Q. by do the Japanese capture prisoners?

A. I h vc- never received the orders to do it but have not given orders not to do that. ,

i Q. Pore there any American prisoners on the island?

A. About 1,000. ( •

Q. Were they under your care? n. Under the 14th Area ^rny.

'2. lid you know that men were being maltreated in the prison colony?

A. He had never heard of such things.

Q. Did you know we had Klsei?

A. I had no idea until 15 August, ct that time I learned that you had interpreters.

Q. 7'here is your home? I A. Kyushu.

Q. Have you ever served at Kochi?

A. Fourteen years ago I was- at Kure and also Hiroshima, but never in Kochi.

Q. How long were you there? I *

A, Just a three day visit.

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