V. King Some Observations on the Samin Movement of North-Central Java

V. King Some observations on the Samin movement of North-Central Java. Suggestions for the theoretical analysis of the dynamics of rural unrest.

In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 129 (1973), no: 4, Leiden, 457-481

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMICS OF RURAL UNREST*

In recent years the Samin peasant movement of north-central Java has received a good deal of attention from students of Indonesian colonial history. In particular there is Benda and Castles' article published in this journal in 1969 1 and the series of articles by The Siauw Giap.2 Their work is based mainly on Dutch official reports written before 1930, and together it offers a fairly comprehensive view of the Samin movement. However, since it was not the intention of these authors to attempt a comparative study of peasant movements, but simply to analyse the Samin movement in detail, I feit it would be profitable to present material from other studies of rural unrest in an attempt to place the Samin movement in some sort of theoretical framework. This approach necessitates a multi-causal analysis, bringing into focus a number of factors — social, economie, political and religious.3 I also offer some additional comments on the Samin movement which may

* This article is a shortened version of a Master of Arts thesis completed at the London School of OrientaJ and African Studies (1971). The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor M. A. Jaspan of the University of Huil, and Miss Barbara E. Ward for their valuable help and guidance, and for the suggestions given by Drs. The Siauw Giap and Professor H. J. Benda when the author was writing a B.A. dissertation on the Samin at the Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Huil. 1 Benda, H. J. and L. Castles, 'The Samin Movement', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 125 (1969), pp. 207-40. 2 The Siauw Giap, 'The Samin and Samat Movements in Java: Two Examples of Peasant Resistance', Revue du sud-est asiatique (1967/2), pp. 303-310 and Revue du sud-est asiatique et de l'Extreme Oriënt (1968/1), pp. 107-113, and 'The Samin Movement in Java: Complementary Remarks', Revue du sud-est asiatique et de l'Extreme Oriënt, (1969/2), pp. 63-77. 3 See Thrupp, S. L. (ed), Millennial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study (Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement 2), (The Hague, Mouton; New York, Humanities Press), for a discussion of the

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access 458 VICTOR T. KING help to clarify points made by The Siauw Giap and Benda and Castles.4 The Siauw Giap's last article in his series was written after his reading of Benda and Castles' paper, in order to, as he says, '... concentrate mainly on those aspects of the Samin movement which had not yet received sufficient attention in the Benda-Castles paper'.5 He also decided '... to stress the minor controversial issues which are normal when independent students interpret an important social phenomenon'.8 While I agree that these differences in interpretation are more likely to occur when the data used (Dutch reports) are f ar from clear and unambiguous, I also suggest that their differing interpretations may, in part, be attributable to actual differences within the movement itself. Historical and Ethnographical Background A brief description of the Samin movement will provide a historical backdrop for the subsequent analysis. Much of this descriptive material has been taken from the above-mentioned authors' work. In Indonesia, during the colonial period, much unrest occurred, which expressed indigenous discontent with Dutch reforms and interference in village life. The origins of the Samin movement date from about 1890 when a Javanese peasant farmer, Surontiko Samin, began proselytising in Blora and Rembang regencies, north-central Java. In 1905 the movement first attracted the official attention of Dutch colonial authorities. At this time the Samin began to withdraw from village society, refusing to participate in the Dutch 'ethical policy'.7 They also made it known that the payment of taxes was not obligatory but simply voluntary contributions.

problems involved in the causal analysis of religious movements. I do not consider psychological factors, as does Margaret Mead in 'Independent Religious Movements in Three Continents; A Comment on L. P. Mair's Article', Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 1 (1959), pp. 324-9, since I have neither the relevant data nor the analytical tools to discuss this particular dimension. 4 An attempt at clarification has centred round The Siauw Giap's discussion of the social status of the Samin. See in particular his last article (1969), op. cit., pp. 63-71. Benda and Castles' discussion of the economie basis of the Samin movement, op. cit., pp. 219-24, and the relation of the Samin movement to the abangan peasantry, ibid., pp. 235 and 240 also requires further clarification. 6 The Siauw Giap, ibid., p. 64. 8 ibid., p. 64. 7 The 'ethical policy", introduced in 1901, was designed to increase the prosperity and welfare of the indigenes, and to rectify many of the inequities which had resulted from Dutch colonial rule. It included the provision of village credit banks, treasuries, Bengal breeding bulls, village council houses,

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The main period of Samin activity lasted from 1905 to about 1920.8 According to official reports the movement never exceeded 3,000 in number. Initially, the Samin remained obstinately non-violent, but later, outbreaks of a more aggressive nature did occur.9 Surontiko Samin was arrested in 1907, alter rumours of his possible involvement in a messianic uprising. He was exiled to Sumatra and died there in 1914. Meanwhile his disciples in particular the Samat of Pati — the founder of the Samatist cult, Surohidin and Pak Engrak continued to spread their own 'brand' of Saminism. In general followers of Samin adhered to a particular belief system which they themselves called the 'Religion of Adam' (Agama Adam). The Samin did not believe in Allah or any other divinity. They did not share the Muslim concept of God. Instead they held the belief that 'God is within me' and that each man was responsible for his own salvation. In Samin teaching there was also frequent reference to the sexual act or relationship. The Samin attached great importance to the bond of marriage and always treated their wives with great respect. The earth also occupied a central place in Samin belief. They regarded the role of the peasant as vital since it was he who tilled the soil and had close ties with 'Mother Earth'. It is therefore not surprising that the Samin were noted for their success and industry as cultivators. Their fields were always the best tended in the village. The above beliefs were accompanied by simple ethical teachings such as 'do not be idle; do not steal; if insulted remain silent; do not ask money or food from anyone, but if anyone asks money or food of you, give it'.10 The Samin were therefore credited with such traits as honesty,

schools, housing improvements, paid night-watchmen, school-teachers etc. But the cost of these services was met, in large part, by village contributions of land, money and labour (The Siauw Giap, op cit., 1968, pp. 107-113). lts benefits were therefore at best marginal. 8 An intensification in Dutch govemmental control also provoked uprisings in the Outer Provinces in the early 1900's. See J. M. van der Kroef, 'Culture Contact and Culture Conflict in Western New Guinea', Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. I. (1959), pp. 134-160 and 'Messianic Movements in the Celebes, Sumatra and Borneo', by the same author in Thrupp, S. L. (ed), op. cit., pp. 80-121. However, in Java, where Dutch control was of longer duration, agrarian unrest occurred throughout the nineteenth century. See for example Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasant's Revolt of Banten in 1888: lts Conditions, Course and Sequel; A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia (The Hague, 1966). 8 Benda and Castles, op. cit., pp. 212-13. w J. E. Jasper, The Jasper Report, Verslag betreffende het onderzoek inzake de Saminbeweging ingesteld ingevolge het Gouvernementsbeslu.it van 1 juni 1917, No. 20 (Batavia, 1918), p. 3.

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generosity, patience and industry. They also adhered to the ethic of equality and 'brotherly love'. Lastly, they regarded themselves as the upholders of true Javanese peasant culture. They were fiercely independent, the nuclear family being the key structural unit within the Samin community, and they preferred to cultivate their own fields without neighbourly help. In addition, they rejected the essentially alien belief systems of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, since these influences only served to corrupt the Javanese peasant way of life.11 They therefore dissociated themselves from the Islamic santri, the Hindu-influenced prijaji, and even from the nominally Muslim abangan peasantry.12 During the 1920's the movement was mentioned as a minor irritant to colonial authority and little was heard of it again until the early 1950's when Indonesian government reports stressed successful Samin assimilation into the newly-independent Indonesia.13 However, in 1967 interest in the Samin was revived in connection with the Mbah Suro uprising which occurred in the Samin heartland.14 Since the abortive

11 Benda and Castles, op. cit., pp. 224-31 and 235-6. 12 ibid., p. 210. The terms santri, abangan and prijaji are derived from the work of Clifford Geertz. A useful summary discussion of his model is contained within the introduction to his Religion of Java (Glencoe, 1960), pp. 1-7, and in his earlier paper entitled 'Religious Belief and Economie Behaviour in a Central Javanese Town — Some Preliminary Observations', Economie Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 4 (1955), pp. 134-58. Briefly, Geertz sees 'Javanese Religion' as syncretic. There are three main cultural types in Javanese society, defined by their religious beliefs, ethical preferences and political ideologies. The abangan tradition stresses animistic aspects of the syncretism and is mainly related to the peasant element in Java. The santri stresses Islamic aspects and is broadly related to the trading element, and the prijaji stresses Hinduist aspects and is related to the bureaucratie-aristocratie element. In a later part of my paper I have attempted to put forward a few suggestions for the improvement of Geertz's model in the light of research on the Samin. 13 See the two short reports published by the Indonesian Ministry of Information 'Masjarakat Samin (Blora)', Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa-Tengah (1952), pp. 480-2 and 'Saminisme', Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa- Timur (1953), pp. 871-2. Very little recent fieldwork has been carried out in the Samin area, and no fieldwork by a trained anthropologist has been undertaken. In 1955 a superficial 2 J/2 week survey was undertaken by Gadjah Mada University in conjunction with the Institute of Social Research and Therapy, Jogjakarta (Soehernowo Report), Golongan Masjarakat Samin (Jogjakarta, 1955). The above works should be treated with some scepticism. The government reports particularly tend to romanticise the Samin community and to minimise its resistance to government policies. 14 See Hanna, W. A. 'The Magical-Mystical Syndrome in the Indonesian Mentality, Part III: The Rise and Fall of Mbah Suro', American Universities Field Staf f Reports Service, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XV, No. 7 (Indonesia)

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CEXTRAL JAVA 461 coup of 1965 a number of sects have flourished in Indonesia, and Suharto's 'New Order' has shown concern at rumours of possible alliances between holy men (orang sakti), the rural poor and Communist dissidents. A Framework for the Causal Analysis of Rural Unrest Benda and Casdes emphasise the causal importance of economie grievanees in agrarian unrest. They say, 'The Saminist movement, especially insofar as it came into conflict with higher authorities, was clearly a manifestation of resistance to economie grievanees, a matter of taxes, corvées, land, water and wood'.15 However, they give very litde information or comment on the status and position in Javanese village society of those individuals who joined the Samin ranks. They imply that poverty was a subsidiary factor in the movement, yet for them economie grievanees appear to be the main cause.10 They state, 'More important perhaps than poverty in spawning a movement of this kind was a sense of grievance, of subjection to remediable injustices'.17 I am not convinced that material deprivation is die most important factor in rural unrest, although certainly it must be taken into account. The emphasis on economie problems, associated widi the burden of excessive taxation, heavy labour services and rural indebtedness, is easily explained. If peasants become articulate at all, they do so in terms of specific grievanees, and material hardship is the most easily observed and apparent grievance. In addition, Western scholars, particularly social scientists, are familiar with and are influenced by Marx's economie determinism. Being brought up in an industrial society where die economie structure is reified, and where economie well-being is avidly sought af ter, they tend to give causal priori ty to economie factors. Worsley's study of Melanesian cargo cults is a good example of the Marxist approach.18 Jarvie's criticism diat '(Worsley) ... sees cargo

(1967); Ramelan, Mbah Suro Nginggil (Kisah Hantjurnja Petualangan Dukun Klenik Mbah Suro), Djakarta 1967 (Usaha Penerbit "Matoa"); Mitchell, D., 'Communiste, Mystics and Sukarnoism', Dissent (Melbourne, 1968), pp. 28-32 and Akkeren, P. van, 'Hammer and Sickle among the Mystics', Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Vol. 2 (1968), pp. 60-1. 15 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 219. 16 This is not to imply that Benda and Castles neglect other factors, see for example ibid., pp. 224 and 234-5. « ibid., p. 219. 18 Worsley, P. M., 'Cargo Cults', Scientific American, CC, No. 5 (1959), pp. 117-28, and by the same author The Trumpet Shall Sound. A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, 2nd. edition (Paladin, 1970).

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access 462 VICTOR T. KING cults as the products of economie forces acting on the Melanesians',*8 is rather extreme, since Worsley does consider factors other than the purely economie in his explanatory framework. Yet it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Worsley regards these other factors as secondary, indeterminate forces in cargo cult formation.20 Interestingly, in a recent defence of his earlier work, Worsley recognises the inadequacy of a too deterministic economie orientation.21 D. R. Sturtevant, in his two studies of Philippine peasant movements also shifts the orientation in his more recent study.22 In his explanation of the Sakdalist movement of the mid-1930's he relies essentially on quotations from secondary material, mainly government reports and newspaper articles. By implication he supports Hartendorp's assertion that Sakdalism is a manifestation of class conflict, '. .. a movement of the dispossessed, of the exploited, of those who are given no chance'.23 However, in his later comparative and analytical paper on peasant movements, he states, 'Most analysts have attributed rural discord to soaring tenancy percentages, inequitable income distribution, and mounting demographic pressure. . . these are important factors . . . but they are not primary sources of discontent',M (my emphasis). Thus economie factors are important but are often overemphasised. However, in the case of the Samin movement two sets of economie factors deserve consideration. Firstly, the Dutch creation of Hout- vesterijen, forests reserved exclusively for government exploitation, deprived the peasantry of an important resource for its domestic needs. Significantly, the Samin area contained the highest percentage of land under teak forest in Java.25 Therefore, the peasantry in this area would have been proportionately more affected by these restrictive measures. However, on the basis of the historica! material available it is difficult

18 Jarvie, I. C, The Revolution in Anthropology (London, 1964), p. 91. 20 For a general summary of causal factors underlying Melanesian Cargo Cults, including a brief summary of Worsley's work see Watters, R. F., 'Cargo Cults and Social Change in Melanesia', Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 1 (1960), pp. 104-7. 21 Worsley, op. cit., p. 335. 22 Sturtevant, D. R., 'Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism', Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 21 (1962), pp. 199-215, and Agrarian Unrest in the Philippines, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 8 (Ohio), 1969). 23 This is quoted from Hartendorp, A. V. H., 'The Sakdal Protest', Philippine Magazine, Vol. 32 (1935), p. 233. 24 Sturtevant, op. cit. (1969), p. 29. However, Sturtevant's conclusions on the nature of rural unrest are rather different from mine, as I point out later. In his later paper he states that he has not yet expounded his ideas in full. Therefore his conclusions await further clarification. 25 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 221.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 463 to agree with Benda and Castles' somewhat vague statement that these forestry restrictions '... may help to explain the movement's unique character'.26 The second feature, associated with the agricultural economy, was the prevalence of dry rice fields in the Blora and Rembang areas, resulting from infertility of the soil and lack of irrigation facilities.27 The rigid application of the Dutch 'ethical policy', regardless of variations in local economie and environmental circumstances, led to many difficulties, particularly for the Javanese in the Samin area. The small percentage of sawah here and the consequent less labour-intensive agriculture, coupled with the absence of Dutch sugar 'plantations', which usually employed much Javanese labour, meant a high level of rural under-employment and a lack of opportunity to earn money. The Dutch 'ethical policy', and other measures exacerbated this situation by pro- gressively replacing the traditional corvée system by money taxation and by confiscating part of the village land and its rice production to help finance village treasuries. In Blora and Rembang regencies, where money and arable land was scarce, these measures resulted in greater economie hardship. Even before the introduction of this comprehensive policy, the Dutch had increased taxation. In 1882 a new poll tax was levied on the owners of farm land which Sartono Kartodirdjo regards as contributing to the Tjilegon rebellion of 1888. Just two years later Surontiko Samin began his preaching in Blora.28 Again in 1906 and 1914, further taxation increases saw a corresponding increase in Samin activity. However, these economie burdens fail to explain satisfactorily why many of the poorer peasantry did not join the Samin movement.29 I argue that economie factors only become more analytically meaningful when placed in their social structural context, particularly in the context of status differentiation in Javanese village society. This Benda and Castles do not do, although The Siauw Giap moves some way towards this kind of analysis.

26 ibid., p. 221. The correlation between wood-stealing, villages situated near forests and Saminism is by no means absolute. Many peasants in villages near forest margins were not Samin, and many non-Samin peasants also stole large quantities of wood, particularly in the depression years of the 1930's when official interest in the Samin had apparently declined. 27 The Siauw Giap, op. cit. (1967), pp. 305-10. 28 Sartono Kartodirdjo also recognises the inadequacy of analyses in terms of economie grievance. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 20 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 224.

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As the above authors point out Surontiko Sainin was not a poor farmer.30 He owned 3 bau of sawah, one bau of dry field, and 6 cows.31 The Samin leader in Medalem village owned 8 bau of sawah. If it is also realised that land rent and cash levies were imposed on the 'haves' rather than the 'have-nots', then it is obvious that the village landowning class (gogol) shouldered the main financial burden of the 'ethical policy' and Dutch taxation.32 It is for this reason that The Siauw Giap puts forward an hypothesis that the landowning villagers were the prime-movers in the Samin movement.33 Official statistics also indicate that in the Samin area an exceptionally large percentage of village land was individually owned by gogol. The latter were also entitled to a share in the communal land which was redivided every year.34 However, as The Siauw Giap points out, in Rembang residency there was a tendency for rotating shares in communal land to become fixed shares and the inhabitants themselves '... were keen on individual ownership of land'.33 He also suggests that the Dutch 'ethical policy', particularly the Village Community Regula- tion of 1906, strengthened the communal ties of the village under the authority of the village headman, and tended to inhibit the fixing of shares in communal land.30 Thus, he concludes that the Samin movement '. . . was apparently not only a movement of opposition to increased taxes and stringent forestry laws ... it was also a movement of opposition to the communal approach in the 'ethical policy' welfare measures (which) ... ran counter to the prevailing trend, in Rembang residency at least, towards individualistic terms of landownership. . .'.3T This interpretation makes sense, yet the Samin movement was not comprised solely of landowning villagers. The Siauw Giap concentrates on the individualistic gogol in his analysis. Yet Benda and Castles draw attention to the fact that 'Saminism was not a homogeneous movement'.38 This is one of the main reasons for their rather different inter-

30 Ibid., p. 210, and The Siauw Giap, op. cit. (1969), p. 63. 31 One bau is equivalent to 7,096.49 m2. 32 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Het Saminisme: Rapport uitgebracht aan de Ver- eeniging 'Insulinde' (Semarang, 1918), p. 15, and The Siauw Giap, op. cit. (1969), p. 64-5. 33 Ibid., pp. 64, 71 and 73. 34 These official statistics are cited by The Siauw Giap. He adapted them from the relevant Koloniale Verslagen. Ibid., pp. .68-9. 35 Ibid., p. 69. 38 Ibid., pp. 70-1. 37 Ibid., p. 71. 38 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 215.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 465 pretations, and Benda and Castles' lack of attention to the landowning element which seems to have been present in the movement. All Samin were obviously not gogol, nor were Samin adherents and orientations at all times the same. Much of The Siauw Giap's information on landownership relates to the period before and up to 1907. In 1914, the new land tax, which made previously exempt owners of less than one quarter bau of pekarangan (house plot) liable to payment of the tax, seems to have resulted in renewed Samin activity. In addition, earlier Samin adherents had little interest in messianic teaching and resorted mainly to passive resistance against the Dutch. However, between 1910 and 1920 in particular, aggression was more evident and messianism seems to have had more appeal.38 It is tempting to suggest that initial Samin activity was largely dominated by the landowning element, but that later taxation increases led to its spread to the relatively poorer peasantry. This variation in time also had its spatial expression. In the core area of Blora the movement was noted for its lack of hostility towards the authorities and its followers adhered more strictly to Samin teachings.40 However, in peripheral areas, such as the rice-field area of Madiun, Samin teaching had little success, and in Pati regency, the messianic appeal of Samatism scon disappeared. Variations in teachings and adherents are even more likely given the multi-leadership of the movement and the absence of a written doctrine. Different leaders may have stressed different doctrinal principles, perhaps in response to the different audiences that they hoped to convert. It seems that the self-assured, more rationally-oriented gogol in Blora and Rembang formed a hard core of Samin adherents who reached a modus vivendi with the Dutch authorities during the 1920's and 1930's. This fact may account for the lack of interest shown in the Samin during this period. Poorer, more violent fringe elements, susceptible to messianic teaching, probably lost faith in the movement when their

89 Jasper, op. cit., pp. 6-7. Messianism certainly had more appeal in Pati regency. See Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 215, and Blumberger, P. J. T., De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië (Haarlem, 1931), pp. 9-10. In addition, the article by Blumberger on 'Saminisme' in the Encyclo- paedie van Nederlandsch-Indië (Sd. Stibbe, O. G. et al., The Hague and Leiden), Vol. III, pp. 683-4. 40 Jasper also mentions the spatial variation in the movement (see reference above). The more recent report in Republik Indonesia, Propinsi Djawa- Tengah, op. cit., pp. 480-2, again distinguishes different groups among the Samin. In this case the more aggressive 'Samin Sangkak' and the more patiënt 'Samin Lugu' are separated.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access 466 VICTOR T. KING leaders were imprisoned or when the millennium failed to materialise. The above thesis is supported by evidence from N. Cohn's study of millenary movements in Medieval Europe.41 He found that the more violent, quickly suppressed movements were associated with the 'rootless poor', whereas middle class, integrated members of society resorted to more rational, passive methods of protest.42 They also had less need of a charismatic leader to co-ordinate their activities. In the case of the Samin movement too, their leader, Surontiko Samin, was exiled with eight of his followers to places in the Outer Provinces. Yet the movement continued and exists to this day. In connection with The Siauw Giap's thesis, some further comments can be made on the multi-causal nature of peasant movements. Other less tangible factors have played an equal, if not more important role in the development of the Samin movement, and the nature of status differentiation in Javanese society has a direct bearing on the following analysis. One of the most important distinctions in the Javanese village is that between the 'nuclear landowning villagers' and the 'newcomer families'.43 The 'nuclear villagers' were the fully-qualified members of the village community, being descended from the mythical founders of the village. They were entitled to a share in the irrigated farmland, and village leaders were drawn from this core of wealthier, higher status peasant farmers. The 'newcomer families' could only possess dry land and usually worked as share-croppers on die 'nuclear villager' land. In addition, landownership was the most important factor underlying status divisions in village society. As Jay says of the Javanese village, 'Land is the form of wealth that carries the greatest value as a mark of personal rank... Ownership of farmland is identified with success at farming, the most valued occupation and the one most closely identified with being a villager'.44 In addition, families in Jay's village tried at all costs to avoid entering sharecropping relationships with landowners, or working for a wage, since income from ownership of land and income from the selling of

41 Cohn, N., The Pursuit of the Millennium. Reuolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (Paladin, 1970; first published by Secker and Warburg, 1957). 42 Ibid., pp. 14-15 and 285-6. 43 Wertheim, W. F., 'From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java', Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1969), p. 1. 44 Jay, R. R., Javanese Villagers. Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto. (Cam- bridge, Massachusetts, 1969), p. 262.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 467 one's labour-power produced a basic status-division among villagers, expressed in practice by relationships of patronage and dependency.45 Therefore, the landowning villagers in particular, valued land just as much for its status value as for its material value, although both aspects are obviously closely interrelated. The concept of status deprivation has clearly been neglected in analyses of the Samin movement, and it may prove a useful tooi in the study of other movements in Indonesia and elsewhere. D. F. Aberle attempted to fit wider aspects than the purely economie within a comprehensive conceptual framework which he termed 'relative deprivation theory'.4e This is a useful starting point for the analysis of the dynamics of rural unrest. He states that au important cause of unrest is '... a discrepancy between an anticipated state of af f airs, and a less agreeable actuality'.47 This discrepancy may involve various types of deprivation, including deprivation of status, worth, and behaviour, as well as of possessions. As The Siauw Giap has pointed out the Village Community Regu- lation of 1906 increased the status and decision-making powers of the village headmen, '... making them responsible for the satisfactory conduct of local af fairs'. 48 Traditionally the headman was regarded as a primus inter pares, consulting gogol in the execution of village policy. In contrast, af ter 1906, gogol who did not become headmen experienced a relative decline in status and influence, being subject to the communal pressures of the 'ethical policy' and the apparent inhibiting of more individualistic forms of land tenure. It seems likely that the Samin movement was in the first instance a withdrawal from village society by the more status-conscious villagers in an attempt to re-establish their status position vis-a-vis the village, its headman and the colonial authorities.49 Increased economie burdens also played a part in the growth of unrest, although it is probable that economie hardships had greater motivational force for poorer elements in the rural population.

45 Ibid., pp. 262-7. 46 Aberle, D. F., 'A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory. As Applied to Millenarian and Other Cult Movements', in Thrupp, S. L., op. cit., pp. 209-14. 47 Ibid., p. 209. 48 The Siauw Giap, op. cit. (1969), p. 70. 49 Interestingly this phenomenon of protest by withdrawal from communal authórity is also shown in the mejapi movement of the Bare'e Toradja of the Celebes, described by van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 115-16. The mejapi movement (p. 82) also illustrates the existence of strong egocentric tendencies and the frequency of individual dissociation from village authórity.

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Interestingly, another recent study of unrest has stressed the importance of status deprivation. Cochrane in his study of Melanesian cargo cults writes, 'The movements were spontaneous reactions against status deprivation. They were attempts to force Europeans... to recognise indigenous concepts of status'.50 Following Aberle's relative deprivation framework one must also consider the rather difficult concept of worth deprivation. Aberle regards this as something of a residual category, referring to '... a person's experience of other's estimation of him on grounds over and above his alterable characteristics — of possessions, status and behaviour'.51 His discussion of this concept is at best vague. The concept 'worth' is best used in a summary sense to include such factors as wealth, status, ethica! values, knowledge etc, in fact all factors which serve to define relative positions between individuals and groups. Yet in a consideration of 'relative worth' some factors are obviously more significant than others, depending on the particular peasant movement under investigation. Some writers have referred to the disruption of integral elements of the culture or the cultural focus of a society as the cause of social unrest.52 This argument again fits into the 'relative deprivation' framework. In the case of the Samin, landownership, success in farming and its associated status are the central elements in deciding an individual's worth. The Dutch by inhibiting agricultural development and by failing to provide a framework for more successful cultivation in the Samin area abused principles dear to a number of individuals in the Samin area. Similarly in Cochrane's study of Melanesian cargo cults, the institution of 'Big Men', which embodied indigenous concepts of status, also provided a central cultural referent. Leaders or 'Big Men' in Mela- nesian society represented all that was powerful, moral and superior in contrast to the inferior 'Rubbish Men'.53 It is natural that the Melanesians, when confronted with the material sophistication of Western society, should assign to Westerners the status of 'Big Men' and assume the more lowly status themselves. Their attempts to re- establish their status position led to widespread unrest.

50 Cochrane, D. G., Big Men and Cargo Cults, (Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 163. For an argument along somewhat similar lines see Sartono Karto- dirdjo, op. cit., p. 21. 51 Aberle, op. cit., p. 211. 52 Inglis, J., 'Cargo Cults: The Problem of Explanation', Oceania, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1957), pp. 249-63, and 'Interpretation of Cargo Cults - Comments', Oceania, Vol. 30 (1959), pp. 155-8. 53 Cochrane, op. cit., pp. 159-70.

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In f act 'relative worth' is almost synonymous with 'self respect'. Firth, for example, in his analysis of cult action says, 'It is part of an affirmation of native claims, native community solidarity, native values, in the face of what is conceived to be an impassive, unsympathetic and hostile outside world'.64 Worsley in a simüar vein states, 'Cults... express social and moral solidarity in a highly charged emotional situation resulting from the overthrow or questioning of ancient ethical values'. He continues, 'Those things which formerly brought a man high social status... are now the objects of attack . . . The most sacred beliefs and rites are dubbed pagan superstition. Young men defy their fathers ...' 5o 'Relative worth' obviously involves a conflict between indigenous and Western concepts, particularly acute if certain integral elements of the indigenous culture and social structure are undermined. This has led some writers to adopt a rather confusing analytical notion, that is, the conflict between the 'Little Tradition' and the 'Great Tradition'.56 Sturtevant who rejects 'simplistic p>olitical and economie causes' sees the basic cause of rural unrest in what he terms 'cultural alienation', which he defines as '... profound conflicts between deep-seated peasant values and modern urban attitudes ...: the struggle in other words between the Little and Great Tradition'.57 This conflict is central to an investigation of causes of unrest, but it is of little analytical value to adopt such vague and loaded terms as 'cultural alienation' and 'Great and Little Tradition'.58 Even the concept of 'relative worth' embodies certain elements which are more significant than others. In this present analysis of the Samin movement I have

54 Firth, R., Elements of Social Organization (London, 1951), p. 113. 55 Worsley, op. cit., p. 256. 56 For the theoretical formulation of these two concepts see Redfield, R. Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago, 1956). The 'Little Tradition' refers to the cultural system of the rural population, the 'Great Tradition' to that of the urbanised intellectuals, priests and aristocracy. 57 Sturtevant, op. cit. (1969), pp. 29-30. 58 Benda has also stressed the conflict between the intellectuals of the Western- ised 'Great Tradition' and the peasantry of the rural 'Little Tradition'. See his article 'Peasant Movements in Colonial Southeast Asia', Asian Studies, Vol. 3 (1965), p. 424. For a general consideration of the 'Westernisation' process in Indonesian society see Wertheim, W. F., Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague, Bandung, 1959). In addition, Tambiah, S. J. provides a useful comment on Redfield's conceptual framework and a valid criticism of what he terms the 'global concept', in his book Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-5 and 367-77.

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attempted to clarify what I consider to be the focal elements in this conflict of values. The importance of status associated with landownership and the important position of the peasant farmer in Javanese villagé society are key factors in the growth of the Samin movement. These key factors are themselves reflected in, and reinforced by the Samin belief system, the Agama Adam. I suggest, in agreement with de Waal Malefijt, that Aberle's scheme '... gives important insights into the nature of deprivations which are conducive to the birth of religious cults'.58 Yet obviously 'relative deprivation theory' does not provide explanations for the nature of the belief systems of peasant movements. In addition, it does not provide the only range of causes in an analysis of rural unrest. Other factors are also present, operating in different ways and to different degrees in time and space. There are other factors which dovetail into this analysis of the Samin movement. Benda and Castles state that, '. .. there was no doubt that the Saminists had strong religious convictions, and many of their actions were inexplicable in terms of simple economie advantage'.80 The movement certainly drew on a store of religious beliefs already present in Javanese belief systems. However, Benda and Castles see the 'Religion of Adam' as something unique in the Javanese experience. They state that it was in fact, 'sui generis'."1 Certainly, unlike the usual syncretic forms of religions in Java, Samin religion had little place for alien belief systems. Yet the above authors overstate their case for a unique Samin tradition. Samin religion should be seen within the context of Javanese folk-beliefs, een tred around agricultural activity.62 Indeed, Samin emphasis on fertility, sexual imagery and the magical power inherent in sex is reminiscent of traditional Javanese agricultural fertility cults.03 Like other peasant cults in other parts of the world these Javanese cults held the belief in a conjugal union between Heaven and Earth.

58 De Waal Malefijt, A., Religion and Culture. An Introduction to the Anthro- pology of Religion (New York, 1968), p. 342. 60 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 224. ai Ibid., p. 231. 02 Ideas and beliefs expounded by leaders of peasant movements must have relevance for their audience. Therefore, leaders must base their teachings on certain acceptable and comprehensible traditional beliefs. See for example, Mair, L. P., 'Independent Religious Movements in Three Continents', Com- parative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1959), p. 124. 63 Onghokham suggests that Saminism is a relic of an agricultural fertility cult. See his Saminisme: Tindjauan sosial ekonomi dan kebudajaan pada gerakan tani dari awal abad ke-XX (Djakarta, 1964), p. 54.

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From this unión comes all living things.84 These beliefs also emphasise the important position of the peasant farmer who participates in the 'marriage' by tilling the soil. The Samin also regarded marriage ties as sacrosanct. The reason for this becomes clear when it is realised that in the context of fertility cult beliefs the union between Heaven and Earth on the macrocosmic level is a symbolic expression of, and in harmony with the union between husband and wife on the microcosmic level.00 The Samin belief that 'God is within me' also reinforces the importance of the individual peasant, who is responsible for his own salvation and is independent of any official religious hierarchy mediating between God and man. As Benda and Castles point out this inner searching is reminiscent of Javanese mystical beliefs, exemplified by the teachings of the sixteenth century mystic, Kiai Ageng Pengging.68 I suggest that the above belief system, rather than having causal significance serves to emphasise the status and worth of the Javanese peasant farmer. As successful cultivators the Samin adopted and elaborated traditional Javanese beliefs as a buttress against all alien authority and status hierarchies. In addition, religious beliefs can have motivational force in rural unrest, particularly if the society in question has a world view which embraces belief in the possibility of a messiah or a millennium. This is J. M. van der Kroef's thesis in his explanation of Javanese messianic movements.07 He states that the 'peculiar Javanese world view' is an important causal factor in peasant uprisings. According to him the tendency to put one's faith in a messiah, who prophesies the coming of a peaceful and happy era, apparently sterns from the Javanese concept of an unchanging and balanced world and cosmic order.68 The world of man and the world of the supernatural are both intimately interrelated and influence one another. The individual must continually

04 See Wilken, G. A., Verspreide Geschriften, Vol. III (Semarang, 1912), pp. 182-3. 65 For a discussion of the relations between the macro- and micro-cosmic see Heine-Geldern, R., Conceptions of State and Kingship in South-East Asia (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, No. 18, Ithaca, New York, 1956). 08 For a discussion of Javanese mysticism see Geertz, C, op. cit., espec. Chapter 20. 6T Van der Kroef, J. M., 'Javanese Messianic Expectations. Their Origin and Cultural Context', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. I (1959), pp. 299-323. Thrupp also states that the existence of a tradition of millennial thought may encourage subsequent social unrest and uprisings, op, cit., p. 26. 68 Of course this is not an uniquely Javanese belief.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access 472 VICTOR T. KING seek to maintain the 'status quo' and a condition of well-being (slamet) both within himself and in his relationships with others.69 If this equilibrium is upset and misfortune results, then order must be restored. However, van der Kroefs analysis is somewhat misleading. He sees Samatism and Saminism as expressions of this all-important Javanese messianic tradition. Yet according to Benda and Castles' information the Samin movement at least, was not messianic.70 The mass messianic movement of the Sarekat Islam, active at the same time as the Samin movement, had little appeal for the Samin.71 Javanese messianic uprisings were also usually violent, subject to suppression by the authorities, and were often short-lived once their messiahs were removed, or when the millennium failed to materialise. In the Samin case, Surontiko Samin believed in a simple life on this earth, not in a vague future paradise on earth. The movement was essentially passive and rational, usually being prepared to accomodate itself to the wishes of the Dutch. Even with the removal of its main leaders, the movement continued to survive. The confusion of van der Kroefs analysis is increased by his lumping Saminism together with Samatism. The Samat of Pati's teachings could be classed as messianic. He prophesied the coming of twin rulers (Ratu Adil) who would return the land to the Javanese and establish a kingdom based on equality (sama rasa, sama rata) ,72 But van der Kroefs assertion of messianic influence in the formation of the Samin movement is plainly wrong, even Üiough some of the later fringe elements may have interpreted Surontiko Samin's teachings in messianic terms, or regarded Samin himself as a messiah. In his study of messianic movements in Sumatra, Borneo and the Celebes, van der Kroef again stresses the metaphysical equilibrium factor, as a common element in traditional Indonesian culture.73 He

68 This theme is exemplified in the Javanese shadow-play {wajang) described very well by Mungkunagoro VIII, of Surakarta in his Paper entitled On the Wajang Kulit (Purwa) and its Symbolic and Mystical Elements (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, No. 20, Ithaca, New York, 1957). 70 Benda and Castles, op. cit., pp. 229-30. 71 At the grassroots level the Sarekat Islam was an abangan movement. It too was a reaction against the pressures of taxation and the 'ethical policy". For information on Islamic-inspired messianic movements see Benda, H. J., 'Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundation of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia', Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXX (1958), pp. 338-47, and also Sartono Kartodirdjo, loc. cit. 72 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 215. 73 Van der Kroef, op. cit. (1962), pp. 120-1.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 473 maintains that belief in the fusion of 'oppositions' in a higher cosmic unity tends to produce a psychological climate conducive to messianic fervour.74 According to him this 'stasis-seeking' is something typically Indonesian. I suggest that any small-scale or peasant society involved in agricultural activity is usually concerned with the need for harmony between man, nature and the cosmos. In conditions of incisive culture change there is an obvious desire to re-establish order. It is therefore not particularly illuminating to attribute the cause of Indonesian unrest to a 'peculiar world view', and one needs to be wary about placing too much emphasis on the motivational force of Javanese religious beliefs in the development of the Samin movement. In general, there is a complex interaction between religion and other features of the social structure, and religious beliefs must be taken into account in any analysis of the causes of unrest.75 Nevertheless, it is true that the Samin movement owed much to traditional Javanese beliefs. lts unique feature is the degree to which it espoused Javanese folk culture, but these beliefs, rather than being a causal factor in the Samin area, served to promote solidarity and to enable the Samin to with- stand the pressures of external authority. Samin leaders struck responsive chords among the Blora and Rembang peasantry by drawing on some of the elements of Javanese beliefs. The espousal of traditional folk culture led to a rejection of both the Islamic and Hindu-Indian systems and to the desire for '... a pure Java, unsullied by all foreign authority- laden intrusions'.70 This rejection of all alien authority is consistent with the belief in their own high status as Javanese peasant farmers. They therefore dissociated themselves from all Javanese communities who had embraced any foreign beliefs. Many writers have noted Samin emphasis on certain ethical qualities such as honesty, patience, industry and equality.77 These moral precepts also serve as a mechanism in group solidarity. They serve to convince group members of the rightness of their movement vis-a-vis oppressive, alien authority. Egalitarianism in particular, is more easily practised and

74 See van der Kroef, J. M., Indonesia in the Modern World, Vol. I (Bandung, 1954) and his article 'Dualism and Symbolic Antithesis in Indonesian Society", American Anthropologist, Vol. 56 (1954), pp. 847-62. 75 Probably one of the most well-known examples of the analysis of religious causality is Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 8th. edition (London, 1967). 76 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 234. 77 The stress on ethical qualities in social movements is also mentioned by Ward, B. E., in her study of Ashanti witch-finding cults, 'Some Observations on Religious Cults in Ashanti', Africa, Vol. 26 (1956), pp. 47-60.

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is more obviously necessary in a small community. The egalitarian nature of the Samin movement also appears to have been an intra- and not an intercommunity ethic. Samin adherence to an individualistic folk culture led them to stress the nuclear family as the only important social unit and to withdraw from labour exchange and other common bonds with non-Samin villagers.78 The Siauw Giap remarks that the '... (Samin) had strong feelings of superiority to other classes of society... (and) a marked sense of self-esteem, even to the point of self-complacency' ,79 To argue that a people as a whole feels superior to outsiders is in no way to deny the possibility that they may be strongly egalitarian towards each other. Obviously equality within their community served to unify them and enable them effectively to defy all authority. An example of Samin superior attitudes and their belief in the primacy of peasant values is seen in their orientation to urban society. The Samin rejected urban values, since the country folk (wong desa) and particularly the Samin themselves, were the upholders of true Javanese culture. On the other hand non-Samin villagers tended to accord respect to townspeople {wong kuta), particularly the aristocratie prijaji, who to them represented the source of all that is superior and refined in Javanese society. One final consideration is the causal importance of political motivation in rural unrest. It is clear that some uprisings of ten involve active struggles for greater. political participation and independence. However, as Benda and Castles point out, it is doubtful whether the Samin movement represented an incipient or embryonic form of nationalism80 or that it was 'fraught with political implications' as Lanternari suggests.81 Ever since Indonesian independence the Samin have continued to resist government authority.82 They have never iden-

78 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 235. 78 The Siauw Giap, op. cit. (1969), p. 73. 80 Benda and Castles, op. cit., pp. 207-9. In connection with the Samin movement and nationalism see Kahin, G. McT., Revolution and Nationalism in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York), pp. 43-4, and Mintz, J. S., 'Marxism in Indo- nesia', in Trager, F. N. (ed), Marxism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, 2nd. ed., 1965), p. 175. Also see Mintz, J. S., Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen (Praegar, U.S.A., 1965), p. 19, on the 'natural communism' of the Indonesian people. Samin rejection of certain village obligations and their individualism tend to cast doubt on Mintz's remarks. 81 Lanternari, V., The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults (London, 1965), p. 267. 82 The two reports by the Indonesian Ministry of Information, loc. cit., tend to understate this resistance. However, other studies of social unrest have given much attention, perhaps too much attention, to the causal importance of

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 475 tified with nationalist movements, they have never had a recognisable political manifesto, nor have they wished to replace the existing power structure. They simply denied the legitimacy of all authority, alien and indigenous. The movement was political in the sense that it was concerned with relations of power and authority. Yet its political motivation was entirely negative. This means that the Samin only desired the right of self- determination within their own organisational framework, and the recognition of their own particular value system. They showed very little interest in the realities of political power vis-a-vis other groups. They have always been essentially peaceful and willing to reach a modus vivendi with other interest groups. Douglas in her book 'Natural Symbols', discusses 'revivalist movements among the poor and oppressed' in which trance situations are common, and comes to the conclusion that, 'Compensation theory too glibly explains by reference to physical suffering and deprivation of civil and economie rights'. She continues: 'My explanation is tidier... In all cases, it is the lack of strong social articulation.. the slackening of group and grid which leads people to seek, in the slackening of bodily control, appropriate forms of expression'.88 While I agree in part with her conclusions, there are two criticisms. Firstly, she is rather unfair to 'relative deprivation theory' and takes insufficient account of the explanatory value of Aberle's model. It is dangerous to impute a particular type of religious behaviour to a particular social structural feature. The lack of strong social articulation is often only one of a number of factors in the outbreak of 'effervescent religious movements', and there is constant interaction between the religious and the social. Secondly, the role of these movements as an integratory mechanism, arising from a lack of social integration has already been written about by others, particularly Worsley.84 He suggests that in societies which lack overall unity and other forms of organisation, religious movements are an expression of this lack of unity, and in turn, a means to unify.85 reactions against imperialism. See for example Lanternari, op. cit., and Jacoby, E., Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia (New York, 1949). Criticism of this approach has come from such people as Sturtevant, loc. cit., and Cochrane, loc. cit. 83 Douglas, M., Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology (London, 1970), pp. 82-3. 84 Worsley, op. cit., pp. 235-51; this is a chapter entitled 'The Integratory Role of the Cults'. 85 Ibid., p. 236.

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Even in the case of the Samin movement, which was by no means an 'effervescent' movement, this function was present, but its unity was not expressed in the existence of close physical ties of co-operation. The Samin, although regarded as an entity by themselves and others, were essentially individualists, preferring to cultivate their own fields without help. It is probably more correct to see the Samin as a collectivity of individuals bound together by a common belief system and way of life. The Agama Adam served to define the Samin as a distinct entity. This feature of religious movements is again recognised by Worsley in his discussion of the role of the leader of the movement. He says, 'By this projection on to the supernatural plane he (the leader) avoids sectional discord. This is always backed up by specific injunctions to love one another, by calls to forget the narrow loyalties of the past, to abandon those things that divide them and to practise a new moral code of brotherly love'.88 This ties in well with my earlier discussion of the role of religious and ethical beliefs in the development of the Samin movement.

Theoretical Considerations In the above analysis the main conceptual framework is concemed with the causal importance of deprivation in its widest possible sense. Other factors which have contributed to the growth and character of the Samin movement have also been discussed. It is not suggested that die above theoretical framework of deprivation enables us to predict die outbreak of rural unrest. A multiplicity of factors have to be taken into account in each individual case, presenting a complex picture of cause and effect. In addition, perhaps because of a variation in the cultural context in which the causal factors operate, the same factors operative in one situation may not, and often do not produce the same result in anodier cultural situation. Nevertheless, comparative generalisations can be made on a causal level. We should be aware of simplistic explanations in terms of economie and political factors. We should take into account considerations of status and relative worth, and attempt to examine the cultural and social context in which these movements have arisen. In addition, the concepts of 'status deprivation' and 'worth deprivation'

86 Ibid., p. 245. For a discussion of the vocational role of the leader in social movements see Emmet, D., 'Prophets and their Societies', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 86 (1956), pp. 13-23.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 477 may be more useful and meaningful in analyses of rural unrest than has hitherto been realised. A Comment on Clifford Geertz Benda and Castles' article discusses the Samin in terms of Geertz's categories of abangan, santri and prijaji. It is appropriate here to offer a few cominents on Geertz's Religion of Java in relation to the above analysis of the Samin community. In an earlier article Benda sees the Samin movement as 'a peculiar variant of the abangan tradition of rural Java'.87 Recently he rejected this contention in favour of a unique Samin tradition.88 Certainly the Samin exhibit an extreme adherence to peasant values and a consequent repudiation of all alien authority and values, in contrast to traditional Javanese syncretism. Yet their espousal of peasant values must set them in the mainstream of Javanese peasant society. In addition, on the basis of information available from investigations in the 1950's Benda and Castles state that at that time it seemed that the Samin were '... in the process of being absorbed into the mainstream of abangan Javanese culture'.89 This statement seems to be an oversimplified generalisation and a too uncritical use of Geertz's categories.80 Benda and Castles sometimes tend to regard the abangan category as a homogeneous tradition. Geertz's categories of 'Javanese religion' are presumably ideal-type constructs, based not only on em- pirical observation but also on theoretical abstraction.91 It is unlikely that peasant society in ordinary sawah areas would exhibit so entirely homogeneous a culture as to be completely lacking in diversification: nor, as we have already seen, did the Samin follow a completely homogeneous and unique tradition. It is better to regard the Samin as a peasant sub-culture among odier sub-cultures, all based, to different degrees, on traditional Javanese folk culture. There appear to be differences between social organisation in

87 Benda, H. J., op. cit. (1965), p. 428. 88 Benda and Castles, op. cit., p. 235. Bijleveld, J. in an article entitled 'De Samin Beweging', Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Vol. XIX (1923), p. 11, also refers to the unique quality of the Samin movement. 89 Ibid., p. 240. 90 Benda and Castles themselves note that '... the Samins were still capable of more opposition to the government than was being admitted . . .', and that '... there was still sufficient evidence of their previous distinctiveness.. .', op. cit., pp. 218 and 240. 91 Geertz's data were also obtained from a fairly limited area in east-central Java. Therefore some of his generalisations must be regarded with caution.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access 478 VICTOR T. KING sawah and non-saivah areas. In addition, peasants in contact with the Samin might exhibit differences from peasants in other areas, since the Samin must have influenced their neighbours. Finally, peasant social and cultural structures affected by the Dutch Culluurstelsel in the productive sawah areas, such as in the 'special area' (daerah istimewa) of Jogjakarta might exhibit differences from those in sawah areas unaffected by Dutch export agriculture.92 Considerations of this kind make it necessary to reconsider Geertz's apparent assertion that Javanese peasants in general can be classified in a single abangan category. However, in the long term it seems likely that the sub-cultures will develop other similarities. I stressed the importance of status considerations in the Samin movement, associated with landownership and success in farming, and supported by a belief system which emphasises the vital position of the peasant farmer and his individual search for salvation. The Soehernowo report notes that the Samin are still industrious farmers, but that values are changing. Education is now a vital factor in status considerations in village society everywhere in Java, but until recently the Samin rejected secular education. Unless the Samin change their views on this point, their claim to higher status may be undermined, but if, as seems likely, they do change it, then the long term results of education may well include a greater degree of Samin assimilation in succeeding generations. Furthermore, it does indeed seem likely that as Javanese society in general becomes more 'Westernised', and economie factors become more important, there may develop divisions along class lines, cross-cutting the sub-cultural divisions.83 In- addition, parallels can be drawn between the Samin movement and two movements of a non-peasant origin in Java. Geertz's prijaji category also has its internal variations. The Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa movements were comprised mainly of members of the aristocracy, who uniike many Javanese aristocrats, adhered to the primacy of Hindu- Javanese culture. They rejected much of Western culture, and they, like the Samin, had no wish to replace the Dutch. They only desired

92 For studies from other areas in Java see references in Jaspan, M. A., Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Indonesia (Djakarta, 2nd. revised and expanded ed., 1961), also Koentjaraningrat (ed), Villages in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York, 1966), and van der Kroef, J. M., 'Land Tenure and Social Structure on Rural Java', Rural Sociology, Vol. 25 (1960), pp. 414-30. A more recent comment on the inadequacy of Geertz's categories has been made by Wertheim, loc. cit. 93 Weitheim, op. cit. (1969), pp. 13-16.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 479 equality with them.94 However, even Budi Utomo was not homogeneous. In its early stages there was conflict between the elder, more conservative members who really wanted a mutually protective and socially elite organisation for the upper strata of Javanese society, and the younger more progressive intellectuals. The most extreme representatives of this younger group were Dr. Tjipto and Soewardi Soerianingrat. Soewardi wanted to imitate Western society and culture, and by this means to destroy the power of the Dutch. Despite these variations, in general there was a central guiding prin- ciple in Budi Utomo. As van Niel points out '... the organisation sought to draw strength from the Javanese culture and cosmos in synthesis with the West'.95 Later Soewardi (Ki Hadjar Dewantoro) became dis- illusioned with the political bickerings within Budi Utomo and with the possibility of destroying the Dutch by political action. He concluded that the best approach was through Javanese culture. Taman Siswa ('Garden of Learning') schools were established to educate Javanese youth along national lines and préparé the way for autonomy and self-expression. Music, dance and character formation were important elements in its educational programme and as van Niel writes ' {Taman Siswa) ... can.. . be in a certain sense regarded as one facet of the aims of the Budi Utomo'.98 There is an obvious parallel here between the reaction of the Samin and the young prijaji intellectuals to Dutch colonial authority. Both represent an espousal of non-Western cultural values —• the Samin adhered to the 'pure' Javanese folk culture, and the Budi Utomo/Taman Siswa to the Hindu-Indian tradition. However, this harking back to traditional cultural values does not necessarily imply a negative, passive reaction to outside interference. The Samin could have been agents in economie development had the Dutch pursued more rational and flexible agricultural policies; the Taman Siswa schools followed an educational curriculum based upon a realistic synthesis of Indonesian and Western culture. Both movements were essentially non-political, but they served as alternatives to Dutch society and culture and more than that they represented ideological rallying points for the Javanese.97

94 Kahin, op. cit., pp. 64-5. 85 Van Niel, R., The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague, Bandung, 2nd. ed., 1970), p. 69. 98 Ibid., p. 222. 97 Budi Utomo was involved in political activity but not Taman Siswa, Kahin, op. cit., pp. 66 and 73.

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However, one major difference between the two movements remains. The syncretic nature of the Taman Siswa, drawing inspiration from the Hindu-Indian tradition and attempting a synthesis with Western culture, contrasts with Samin rejection of both these traditions. Reactions of the type mentioned above would seem likely in an area such as Java where people are aware of their long history and cultural greatness, particularly when this culture is threatened by alien cultural influences. Tracing internal differences with Geertz's abangan, and prijaji categories and some of the similarities between these types helps to avoid the danger of seeing them as homogeneous and discrete categories.88 It may also help as a move away from Geertz's conceptual framework and to the formulation of a more satisfactory one." As a final comment on Indonesian movements, attention should be drawn to J. M. van der Kroef s comparative study of a small number of Indonesian messianic movements.100 His analysis sheds very little light on the dynamics of rural unrest. He confines himself to stating certain similarities between movements in the Celebes, Borneo and Sumatra, such as the nature of indigenous leadership, 'personality' characteristics of adherents, the importance of ancestor beliefs and the common element of 'stasis-seeking'. Even then he has difficulty in proving that these common elements hold for each of the movements.101 On the descriptive level, comparative analysis is not particularly meaningful. There is so much variation between movements in different countries and indeed within the same country that the value of com- paring certain elements within movements is dubious. I agree with Jarvie and Cochrane that the cargo cults of Melanesia show a great degree of uniformity in structure and ideology.102 But in the case of Indonesian movements a similar uniformity seems unlikely. Here, the variety of cultures, religious traditions, technological skills and degrees of Western and other cultural influences preclude the formulation of a category or

68 Geertz does discuss overlapping ties between his categories, but to my mind his analysis of these ties is still inadequate. 89 I do not dispute that Geertz's theoretical framework is useful, but it needs elaboration and modification. It leads him to a distortion of the facts and to a too rigid analysis of Javanese cultural and social types. 100 Van der Kroef, loc. cit. 101 Mair, loc. cit. attempts a similar cross-cultural comparison of movements in South Africa, North America and Melanesia with the same attendant difficulties and confusion. 102 Jarvie, loc. cit., and Cochrane, loc. cit.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 04:36:03AM via free access THE SAMIN MOVEMENT OF NORTH-CENTRAL JAVA 481 type of social movement unique to Indonesia as a whole.103 Indeed, Lantemari's attempt to generalise about Indonesian movements is couched in negative terms. His suggestion that they are characterised by an absence of Christian elements is of little analytical or comparative value.104 I would prefer to use comparative material for the light that it can shed on the analysis of a particular movement, and not for the formulation of descriptive continua, typologies or all-embracing definitions.105 Comparative generalisations can be more profitably made on the level of causal analysis, particularly within a 'relative deprivation' framework.

Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University of Huil

103 This refutes van der Kroef's analyses. The Samin response in Java bears more similarity to the Javanese prijaji response in Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa, than to the Muju movement in Dutch New Guinea. See van der Kroef, loc. cit. (1959). Even within Java, the Islamic-influenced Banten movements — short-lived, non-rational and pitched in terms of a Holy War — differ fundamentally from the Samin and prijaji responses. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, op. cit., pp. 325-6. He also casts doubt on the relevance of the traditional Javanese messianic expectation in the Banten uprisings, thereby qualifying van der Kroef's rather broad generalisations. 104 Lanternari, op. cit., pp. 298-300. However, the Batak parhudamdam movement in Sumatra was almost certainly Christian-influenced. los Attempts at definition and the formulation of classificatory systems of social movements usually imply a homogeneity and uniformity which does not exist. For the problems faced in definition see Gochrane, op. cit., pp. 145-58. Also see Linton, R., 'Nativistic Movements', American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. I (1943), pp. 230-40, and for an elaboration of Linton's classification see Smith, M. W., 'Towards a Classification of Guit Movements', Man, Vol. 59 (1959), pp. 8-12. It should be pointed out that most of these classificatory systems such as Smith's are merely descriptive typologies. Definition and classification are an aid to analysis, but in the study of social movements the multiplicity of definitions has resulted in semantic confusion. Movements have been variously termed 'revitalistic', 'cargo cult', 'nativistic', 'reformative', 'vitalistic', 'messianic', 'millenarian', and 'chiliastic'. Classi- ficatory systems, attempting to distinguish different types of movement have resulted in even greater semantic elaboration. Terms such as 'ethico-syncretic', 'sacro-nativistic' and 'political innovative' are also coined. See particularly Clemhout, S., 'Typology of Nativistic Movements', Man, Vol. 64, No. 1 (1964), pp. 14-15 and Voget, F. W., 'Towards a Classification of Cult Movements', Man, Vol. 25 (1959), pp. 26-7. Definitional and semantic quibbling have tended to become an end in itself. It is for this reason that I have attempted to avoid the use of some of the existing confusing terminology. If the historical material is available I advocate the detailed analysis of particular movements, bringing in comparative material to ela- borate and qualify.

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