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'Introspectionism' and the Mythical Origins of Scientific Psychology
Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 634–654 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog ‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology Alan Costall Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO1 2DY, UK Received 1 May 2006 Abstract According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of ‘‘behaviour,’’ that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird. Ó 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Introspection; Introspectionism; Behaviourism; Dualism; Watson; Wundt 1. Introduction Probably the most immediate result of the acceptance of the behaviorist’s view will be the elimination of self-observation and of the introspective reports resulting from such a method. (Watson, 1913b, p. 428). The problem of consciousness occupies an analogous position for cognitive psychology as the prob- lem of language behavior does for behaviorism, namely, an unsolved anomaly within the domain of an approach. -
Dehaene Et Al (2008)
Log or Linear? Distinct Intuitions of the Number Scale in Western and Amazonian Indigene Cultures Stanislas Dehaene, et al. Science 320, 1217 (2008); DOI: 10.1126/science.1156540 The following resources related to this article are available online at www.sciencemag.org (this information is current as of June 6, 2008 ): Updated information and services, including high-resolution figures, can be found in the online version of this article at: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/320/5880/1217 Supporting Online Material can be found at: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/320/5880/1217/DC1 This article cites 24 articles, 4 of which can be accessed for free: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/320/5880/1217#otherarticles Information about obtaining reprints of this article or about obtaining permission to reproduce this article in whole or in part can be found at: on June 6, 2008 http://www.sciencemag.org/about/permissions.dtl www.sciencemag.org Downloaded from Science (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published weekly, except the last week in December, by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. Copyright 2008 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science; all rights reserved. The title Science is a registered trademark of AAAS. REPORTS Before formal schooling, Western children may Log or Linear? Distinct Intuitions of the acquire the number-line concept from Arabic nu- merals seen on elevators, rulers, books, etc. Thus, Number Scale in Western and existing studies do not reveal which aspects of the number-space mapping constitute a basic in- tuition that would continue to exist in the absence Amazonian Indigene Cultures of a structured mathematical language and educa- 1,2,3,4 1,2,4,5 5 6 tion. -
In Defense of Massive Modularity
3 In Defense of Massive Modularity Dan Sperber In October 1990, a psychologist, Susan Gelman, and three anthropolo- gists whose interest in cognition had been guided and encouraged by Jacques Mehler, Scott Atran, Larry Hirschfeld, and myself, organized a conference on “Cultural Knowledge and Domain Specificity” (see Hirsch- feld and Gelman, 1994). Jacques advised us in the preparation of the conference, and while we failed to convince him to write a paper, he did play a major role in the discussions. A main issue at stake was the degree to which cognitive development, everyday cognition, and cultural knowledge are based on dedicated do- main-specific mechanisms, as opposed to a domain-general intelligence and learning capacity. Thanks in particular to the work of developmental psychologists such as Susan Carey, Rochel Gelman, Susan Gelman, Frank Keil, Alan Leslie, Jacques Mehler, Elizabeth Spelke (who were all there), the issue of domain-specificity—which, of course, Noam Chomsky had been the first to raise—was becoming a central one in cognitive psychol- ogy. Evolutionary psychology, represented at the conference by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, was putting forward new arguments for seeing human cognition as involving mostly domain- or task-specific evolved adaptations. We were a few anthropologists, far from the main- stream of our discipline, who also saw domain-specific cognitive pro- cesses as both constraining and contributing to cultural development. Taking for granted that domain-specific dispositions are an important feature of human cognition, three questions arise: 1. To what extent are these domain-specific dispositions based on truly autonomous mental mechanisms or “modules,” as opposed to being 48 D. -
Overruling the Food and Drug Administration
Overruling the Food and Drug Administration: An Analysis of the 2011 Denial of Over-the-Counter Status for Plan B Placed within the Historical Context of Executive Influence on FDA Action The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Alisha Crovetto, Overruling the Food and Drug Administration: An Analysis of the 2011 Denial of Over-the-Counter Status for Plan B Placed within the Historical Context of Executive Influence on FDA Action (May 2012). Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10985168 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Overruling the Food and Drug Administration: An Analysis of the 2011 Denial of Over-the-Counter Status for Plan B Placed within the Historical Context of Executive Influence on FDA Action Alisha Crovetto Harvard Law School J.D. Candidate, 2013 May 2012 Food & Drug Law Course Paper Abstract On December 7, 2011, newspaper headlines from coast to coast announced that Plan B One-Step, a form of emergency contraception, would not be made available to females under seventeen without a prescription. The denial of over-the-counter (“OTC”) status, though newsworthy itself, drew particular attention because of the unusual nature of the decision. As the New York Times announced, “[f]or the first time ever, the Health and Human Services secretary publicly overruled the Food and Drug Administration . -
ICS18 - Study Questions
ICS18 - study questions January 23, 2019 1. What is the broad and what is the narrow notion of cognition? 2. What is representation? Enumenrate examples of representations considerd within different disciplines (cog. psy- chology, neuroscience, AI) and show that they fulfill the definitional requirements 3. Enumerate and characterize briefly key cognitive disciplines 4. Key theses and principles of associationism 5. How to explain a mind: pure vs mixed associationism 6. A mind according to behaviorists 7. Why is behaviorism considered “the scientific psychology”? 8. Why behaviorism (as a theory of mind) was rejected? 9. Find the elements of behaviorism within contemporary cognitive theory of mind (either symbolic or connectionist) 10. Describe Turing Machine as a computational device 11. What is computation? (remember the roll of toilet paper...) 12. The idea of a mind as a “logic machine” (McCulloch, Pitts) 13. What features does a McCulloch-Pitts neuron have? 14. What is the main difference between a McC-P neuron and a perceptron? 15. What is a model? (cf. Kenneth Craik&Minsky) 16. What are the assumptions of phrenology? 17. Localizationist view on a brain (Gall, Spurzheim) 18. Holistic approaches to human brain 19. What does it mean that some part of our body has a “topographic representation” in the brain? 20. The consequences of Broca’s and Wernicke’s discoveries for a cognitive view on a brain 21. What is Brodmann famous for? 22. What did Golgi invent? What consequences had his discovery? 23. Describe Cajal’s discoveries and their influence on neuroscience 24. The key aassumptions of the “neuron doctrine” (Cajal) 25. -
Masakazu Konishi
Masakazu Konishi BORN: Kyoto, Japan February 17, 1933 EDUCATION: Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, B.S. (1956) Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, M.S. (1958) University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D. (1963) APPOINTMENTS: Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Tübingen, Germany (1963–1964) Postdoctoral Fellow, Division of Experimental Neurophysiology, Max-Planck Institut, Munich, Germany (1964–1965) Assistant Professor of Biology, University of Wisconsin, Madison (1965–1966) Assistant Professor of Biology, Princeton University (1966–1970) Associate Professor of Biology, Princeton University (1970–1975) Professor of Biology, California Institute of Technology (1975– 1980) Bing Professor of Behavioral Biology, California Institute of Technology (1980– ) HONORS AND AWARDS (SELECTED): Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1979) Member, National Academy of Sciences (1985) President, International Society for Neuroethology (1986—1989) F. O. Schmitt Prize (1987) International Prize for Biology (1990) The Lewis S. Rosenstiel Award, Brandeis University (2004) Edward M. Scolnick Prize in Neuroscience, MIT (2004) Gerard Prize, the Society for Neuroscience (2004) Karl Spencer Lashley Award, The American Philosophical Society (2004) The Peter and Patricia Gruber Prize in Neuroscience, The Society for Neuroscience (2005) Masakazu (Mark) Konishi has been one of the leaders in avian neuroethology since the early 1960’s. He is known for his idea that young birds initially remember a tutor song and use the memory as a template to guide the development of their own song. He was the fi rst to show that estrogen prevents programmed cell death in female zebra fi nches. He also pioneered work on the brain mechanisms of sound localization by barn owls. He has trained many students and postdoctoral fellows who became leading neuroethologists. -
The Idea of Universality in Linguistics and Human Rights
The Idea of Universality in Linguistics and Human Rights SPEAKER: Noam Chomsky Institute Professor; Professor of Linguistics SPEAKER: Elizabeth S. Spelke Professor of Psychology Co- Director, Mind, Brain, and Behavior Inter-faculty Initiative, Harvard University. The Idea of SPEAKERS: Universality in Noam Chomsky: Institute Professor; Professor of Linguistics Linguistics and Human Rights Elizabeth S. Spelke: Professor of Psychology Co-Director, Noam Chomsky Mind, Brain, and Behavior Inter-faculty Initiative, Harvard March 15,2005 University. Time 00:57:13 ABOUT THE LECTURE: If humans have a common, in-born capacity for language, and Audio Only: for such complex behaviors as morality, might the faculties be QuickTime – 28MB somehow linked? Noam Chomsky perceives a mere thread of MP3 - 70MB a connection. At breakneck speed, Chomsky leads us through Audio and Video: a history of language theory, concluding with the revolutionary QuickTime - 371MB model he championed: a universal grammar underpinning all WindowsMedia - 313MB languages that corresponds to an innate capacity of the human RealVideo - 101MB brain. While scientists may now have a “clearer grasp of the universals of language,” says Chomsky, notions of universality grow murky as we move “into domains of will, choice and judgment.” Chomsky cites the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as one example of “broad cross-cultural consensus.” But he brandishes examples of how “our moral and intellectual culture….forcefully rejects universal moral judgments” -- such as continued U.S. -
How Babies Think
osq216Gpnk3p.indd 4 3/9/16 5:37 PM RAISE GREAT Thirty years ago most psychologists, KIDS philosophers and psychiatrists thought that babies and young children were ir- rational, egocentric and amoral. They believed children were locked in the con- crete here and now—unable to under- Even the stand cause and effect, imagine the ex - periences of other people, or appreciate youngest the difference between reality and fanta- sy. People still often think of children as children know, defective adults. experience and But in the past three decades scien- tists have discovered that even the young- learn far more est children know more than we would ever have thought possible. Moreover, than scientists studies suggest that children learn about the world in much the same way that sci- Photographs by ever thought entists do—by conducting experiments, Timothy analyzing statistics, and forming intuitive Archibald possible theories of the physical, biological and psychological realms. Since about 2000, researchers have started to understand the underlying computational, evolutionary and neurological mechanisms that under- pin these remarkable early abilities. These revolutionary ndings not only change our ideas about babies, they give us a fresh perspective on human nature itself. PHYSICS FOR BABIES Why were we so wrong about babies for so long? If you look cursorily at children who are four years old and younger (the age range I will discuss in this article), you might indeed conclude that not much is going on. Babies, after all, cannot talk. And even preschoolers are not good at re- porting what they think. Ask your aver- age three-year-old an open-ended ques- tion, and you are likely to get a beautiful but incomprehensible stream-of-con- sciousness monologue. -
Selected Books, Articles, and Monographs for the Guidance Of
Dnet,MFti R F SUMF CG 002 982 ED 023 121 24 By -McGuire, Carson Behavioral Science Memorandum Number10. Texas Univ., Austin. Research andDevelopment Center for TeacherEducation. Spons Agency -Office of Education(DHEW), Washington, D C. Report No -BSR -M -10 Bureau No -BR -5 -0249 Pub Date 66 Contract -OEC -6 -10 -108 Note -36p.; Includes Addenda toBehavioral Science MemorandumNumber 10. EDRS Price MF -$025 HC -$190 Development, *Teacher Education Descriptors -*Annotated Bibliographies,*Child Development, *Human Number 10 was theinitial venture intoannotating Behavioral Science Memorandum of busy instructors selected books, articles,and monographsfor the guidance responsible for teacher education.The responses to theannotated bibliographies Apparently some sortof handbook forlearning throughguided have been positive. teacher discovery is a possible meansof orienting collegeprofessors and students in education to the realizationthat the mafor objective inthe educational encounter is regurgitation" in examinationsbut the not "soaking vp"information for later "selective information as it intellectual capabilities necessaryto relate new acquisition of the annotated entries) develops to theunderlying principles of afield study. (137 (AUTHOR) via_57-0.240 EDUCATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTCENTER TN TEAChTH THE UNIVERSITY OFTEXAS Behavioral ScienceMemorandum No. 10 July, 1966 S.H. 308 Bibliographies other Child and HumanDevelopment and the The two bibliographies in thismemorandum, one on and literature. They point to books on Human Development andEducation, merely sample the well as some tiresomereading. What the journals which provide many ideasand explanations, as be of interest toother persons. writer regards as "tiresome" orirrelevant, of course, may IMPORTANT NOTE without much writtenfeedback. The A number of memoranda and aNewsletter have been issued from our readers. -
Four Perspectives
Educational Psychology important notes Theories about human learning can be grouped into four broad "perspectives". These are Behaviorism - focus on observable behavior Cognitive - learning as purely a mental/ neurological process Humanistic - emotions and affect play a role in learning Social - humans learn best in group activities The development of these theories over many decades is a fascinating story. Some theories developed as a negative reaction to earlier ones. Others built upon foundational theories, looking at specific contexts for learning, or taking them to a more sophisticated level. There is also information here about general theories of learning, memory, and instructional methodology. Read brief descriptions of these four general perspectives here: Learning www.allonlinefree.comTheories: Four Perspectives Within each "perspective" listed below, there may be more than one cluster of theories. Click on the name of the theorist to go to the page with biographical information and a description of the key elements of his/her theory. www.allonlinefree.com Educational Psychology important notes 1. Behaviorist Perspective Classical Conditioning: Stimulus/Response Ivan Pavlov 1849-1936 Classical Conditioning Theory Behaviorism: Stimulus, Response, Reinforcement John B. Watson 1878-1958 Behaviorism Edward L. Thorndike 1874-1949 Connectivism Edwin Guthrie 1886-1959 Contiguity Theory B. F. Skinner 1904-1990 Operant Conditioning William Kaye Estes 1919 - Stimulus Sampling Theory Neo-behaviorism: Stimulus-Response; Intervening Internal -
Evolution and Executive Functions: Why Our Toolboxes Are Empty
Revista Española de Neuropsicología 4, 4:351-377 (2002) Copyright© 2002 de REN ISSN: 1139-9872 Evolution and executive functions: Why our toolboxes are empty Roy Sugarman PhD Royal Adelaide Hospital: Glenside Campus Dept of Psychiatry, Adelaide University Abstract: Despite the recent findings with regard to our origins as human primates, we still struggle to find tools that evaluate executive functioning adequately and reliably. Despite some evidence of ecological validity, our toolboxes remain largely empty. With regard to how we produce common behaviours by using individually distinct, multiple areas of focus, each brain is individual. In a sense, not many complex, human, behaviours follow a normal distribution. This work traces the probable origins of executive functioning in humans in a social context, defining in passing the nature of human self-regulation. A discussion follows which integrates these ideas within a second order, cybernetic neuroepistemology of human thought and emotion, and questions the logical paradox of assuming that isolated cortical areas such as the frontal lobes generate executive functions in a linear progression. A brief exploration follows with regard to the nature of human consciousness, and the difficulties in measuring such a homeostatic mechanism as executive function. Using alcohol related brain changes, and cross-cultural issues as exemplars, an attempt is made to define a neuroepistemology for understanding the dynamic interplay between executive function and consciousness. Key words: Brain´s Evolution, executive functioning. Evolución y funciones ejecutivas: por qué nuestras cajas de herramientas estan vacías Resumen: A pesar de los recientes hallazgos en relación a nuestros orígenes como humanos primates, aún luchamos para encontrar instrumentos que evalúen el funcionamiento ejecutivo adecuadamente y de manera fiable. -
Children's Causal Inferences from Indirect Evidence
Running head: CHILDREN’S CAUSAL INFERENCES Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers David M. Sobel Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Brown University Joshua B. Tenenbaum Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT Alison Gopnik Department of Psychology, University of California at Berkeley Cognitive Science in press. Children’s causal 2 Abstract Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector”, a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4- year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base-rate of certain events occurring. Four- year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference. Children’s causal 3 Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers As adults, we know a remarkable amount about the causal structure of the world.