EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN SCORECARD FLASH RELATIONS ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER

Susi Dennison & Dina Pardijs

As the political earthquake caused by the UKIP-orchestrated British leave vote reverberates across the EU, the full force SUMMARY of European anti-establishment parties is hitting home. Sinn Fein has called for a vote on reunifying Ireland and • UKIP’s triumph in securing a majority to leave Northern Ireland, and pressure is mounting from the Scot- the EU in the UK referendum was only the start of tish National Party for a second independence referendum. a broader trend of insurgent parties destabilising The rest of the EU is in no way insulated from the impact the EU. of the Brexit vote. Within hours of the UK’s decision, the news had been welcomed by “insurgent” parties across the • Insurgent parties currently hold 1,329 seats in 25 continent – the Front National in France, the PVV in the EU countries – and are playing a direct role in Netherlands; the AFD in Germany; Lega Nord in Italy; and government in eight member states. FPO in Austria, all calling for the referendum to be emulated in their countries. • Their weapon of choice is undoubtedly the referendum, and insurgent parties across te EU Across Europe, traditional political elites are being chal- are pushing for at least 34 referenda in the coming lenged by newer, smaller, and leaner parties from both left years on various issues such as EU membership, and right. They are winning office – currently holding 1,329 eurozone membership, and refugee relocation seats in 25 countries – and playing a role in government in www.ecfr.eu quotas. eight member states. They are capturing the political agen- da and forcing mainstream parties to adopt their positions. • Some key trends can be identified in their views on Their weapon of choice is undoubtedly the referendum, international affairs: they are sceptical about the used to whip up popular support for their pet issues. EU, resent the United States, and are sympathetic to Russia. Most prefer borders closed, migration Now more than ever, it is important to understand what

June 2016 low, and trade protected. They all want to return these new political forces stand for, and what they really power to the people through direct democracy. think. ECFR has carried out the first comprehensive survey of these outsiders, identifying 45 parties, analysing their • These parties could act as a significant block public statements, and interviewing representatives of 41 of in upcoming EU Council plans for a migration them. We found that, though these “insurgents” come from compact with neighbouring transit countries, across the political spectrum, from hard left to far right,

ECFR/181 and many will oppose the extension of Russia some key trends can be identified in their views on interna- sanctions beyond the summer. tional affairs, which are challenging some of the basic tenets of the European consensus. They are broadly sceptical about 2 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Vladimir Putin’s Russia. They preferbordersclosed,migra- 28 EU member states to draw out the implications for Euro- for implications the out draw to states member EU 28 This flash scorecard draws on our interviews with these par- these with interviews our on draws scorecard flash This game, con- an elite in particularisnolonger Foreign policy The UK’s vote on the EU and the Dutch vote onUkraine Dutch and the EU vote onthe The UK’s Transatlantic Trade and InvestmentPartnership (TTIP) a Transatlantic Trade– climate. political in the shifts by bolstered are outsiders The Italy, theFiveStarMovementwonmayoralelections Insurgent partiesarewinningseatsinlocal, regional, na- Blair on the risks for Britain’s security and the global impact global risks forBritain’s and the Blair onthe security and civilservants. that issues 34 on votes for push to plans have EU the across parties outsider that found ECFR’s research across Europe. a seat at an international table if its consequences at ana- a seatatan international tableifitsconsequences media, popular the using are forces insurgent years. These and diplomats. In the run-up to the UK's referendum on EU referendum UK's the run-up to In the and diplomats. could be just the first in a landslide of popular referendums popular of landslide a in first the just be could on issues that werepreviouslythepreserveofgovernments on issues ducted behind closed doors by small coteries of politicians doors bysmallcoteries behind closed ducted of leaving the EU fell on deaf ears. People care little about care little ears. People on deaf fell EU the of leaving would have direct consequences for theEUin the coming have directconsequences would while, digital developments make it easier for the public to public for the easier it make developments digital while, membership, stirring speeches by David CameronandTony by stirring speeches membership, tional, and European parliaments, andchallengingestab- tional, andEuropean tion low,Aboveall,wanttoreturn they and tradeprotected. to States, andaresympathetic the EU,resentUnited ties and analysis by our network of researchers across the researchers of our network by and analysis ties to managerefugeeflows. tional and local level are not clearly communicated.Mean- tional andlocallevelarenotclearly in Rome. hold politicians to account over high-level deals such asthe deals hold politicianstoaccountoverhigh-level lishment viewsonhowpolicymakingshouldbedone. In referendums national force to office political and pressure, power tothepeoplethroughdirectdemocracy. pean decision-makingoverthe comingyears. deal EU–Turkey or the – agreement trade EU–US planned the EU-Turkey refugee deal? Are youfororagainst AGAINST 78%

22% FOR Who areEurope’snewinsurgentparties? A sense of the need to “re-democratise” policymaking na- policymaking “re-democratise” to need the of A sense Foreign policy Jobbik in Hungary. Some challenge the establishment from Jobbik the establishment in Hungary. Some challenge Europe; the Ukraine crisis and the EU’s relationship with EU’s relationship Ukraine crisisandthe Europe; the This study looks at voices outside the political mainstream the political looksatvoicesoutside This study Through interviews with foreign policy representatives of representatives foreign policy with Through interviews The parties we have included are not exclusively of theright are notexclusively The partieswehaveincluded Russia; EU–US relations, including on Middle East policy East relations, includingonMiddle Russia; EU–US Bloc andSpain’sPodemos,whichadvocateforEUreform. Most of the parties focus primarily on domestic issues, and issues, primarily ondomestic focus parties the of Most and trade;theUKreferendum. all see their role as speaking the truth and challenging the and challenging truth the as speaking their role see all Their in itscurrentstate. EU the about are broadlysceptical are serv- Greeks inGreece, and SyrizatheIndependent only The on aselection. focused parties, we are manysuch capacity. But even newer parties, which have had less time less have had which parties, newer even But capacity. repre- party other and policy, foreign on answers different AfDgave of Germany’s representatives different example, eign policy. They are driven towards thisbytheimpactof eign policy.Theyaredriven towards ered – and analysis of their public pronouncements, we ex- we pronouncements, – andanalysisoftheirpublic ered cov- we 45 the of out 41 – up meet to agreed that party each elites on behalf of the people. The youngest, ALFA, The youngest, was people. of the on behalf elites the selected we today. Foreachmemberstate eign policy of taking the UK out of the EU, through to Portugal’s Left to EU, through the of out UK taking the of Communist PartyinFranceand ranging fromthe or theleft, were founded, are quickly developing their positions on for- their positions are quicklydeveloping founded, were relationship with Turkey; security and terrorist threats to and terroristthreats Turkey; security with relationship member state in which we decided there was norelevant there decided in whichwe member state coun- some for – groups non-mainstream influential most to elaborate policy beyond the core issues on which they on which issues core the beyond policy elaborate to the refugee crisis acrosstheEU,andinterplay between the refugee the oldest, Ireland’s Sinn Féin, was founded in 1905. A full A 1905. in founded was Féin, Sinn Ireland’s oldest, the these all almost common to is EU and acrossthe tionally aim the with founded tional andBritain’s was UKIP, which in Poland, Justice Law and as such some, and sidelines, the tries suchasSlovakia there or theCzechRepublic,where that are influencing and shaping the development of EU for- its foreignanddomesticdimensions. sentatives stated that they could onlyanswerinapersonal that they sentatives stated for – positions policy foreign developed lack fully some immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), while immigrant partyAlternativefürDeutschland parties insurgent governments. The in currentcoalition ing such as Golden Dawn in Greece, Lega NordinItaly, Dawn inGreece, and such asGolden far-right groups to Linke inGermany,through Die socialist plored their positions on the key foreign policy challenges policy foreign key their positionsonthe plored list of the parties and their stance on various issues can be list ofthepartiesandtheirstanceonvarious issues up asan example. They parties, withSwitzerlandoftenheld positions rangevastlywithinthis,fromFrance’sFrontNa- party wasLuxembourg. facing the EU. These include the refugee crisis and the EU’s crisis andthe refugee the include EU. These the facing found intheannextothispaper. anti- from breakaway a as 2015 July in Germany in formed There was a surprising amount of consensus on the existen- In terms of policy towards Europe’s neighbourhood, there tial threats facing the EU. For 34 out of the 45 parties cov- is a general consensus among the insurgent parties that ered, the refugee crisis or the threat of terrorism and radical more enlargement would be a bad thing – that the EU is Islamism (these issues were inextricably linked in the re- big enough and, if anything, should be gradually dissolved. sponses of most) were among the top two threats facing the However, there is slightly more openness to the inclusion EU. This response was not the preserve of the right wing: it of countries to the east (notably Ukraine) than to the south was shared by Germany’s Die Linke, the French Communist (notably Turkey, with major fears expressed about the pos- Party, Spain’s Podemos, and the Lithuanian Labour Party. sibility of Turkish accession). Still, only 10 parties respond- ed unequivocally that they supported Ukraine’s path to EU On the refugee crisis, Angela Merkel’s “refugees welcome” accession and, of these, two wouldn’t support NATO acces- policy does not appear to attract the criticism that might sion for Ukraine (UKIP’s position was the reverse, support- have been expected: only seven parties put it among their ing Ukraine joining NATO but not the EU). two most important explanations for the refugee crisis. US strategy in the Middle East was the most popular answer, Conversely, there is strong suspicion of cooperation with with the violence sponsored by President Bashar al-Assad’s Turkey on the refugee crisis. Twenty-seven parties opposed regime in Syria in second place. this, and many more voiced concern that it paved the way for closer EU–Turkey cooperation. Though far-right par- There is widespread scepticism around European or US ties, such as France’s Front National or the Czech Repub- interventionism generally, particularly in the Middle East. lic’s Dawn, led those expressing concerns about increased This sentiment was expressed by parties ranging from Ire- immigration flows from Turkey, other parties had a more land’s Sinn Féin, Britain’s UKIP, France’s Front National nuanced view. The Sweden Democrats argued that the and Communist Party, Germany’s AfD and Die Linke, Hun- agreement would be ineffective at stopping migration flows gary’s Jobbik, and Italy’s Five Star Movement. On the pros- and would simply push traffic to other routes; whereas left- pect of collective European intervention in Syria, 32 parties ist parties, for example France’s Communist Party, Cyprus’s responded that this should not even be on the table. AKEL, and Italy’s Five Star Movement, opposed the deal on the grounds that Turkey was not a safe country for refugees This position is linked to a general anti-Americanism and a and that as a result the deal violated international law. distaste for the EU toeing the US line, particularly on Middle East policy. As the Front National told our researcher: “The Twenty-two parties opposed cooperation with Turkey on roots of all the main conflicts in Europe and its neighbour- the Syrian conflict, and the same number opposed counter- hoods can be tracked back to the actions of Washington as a terrorism cooperation with Turkey. On other issues, such as hegemonic power.” For many insurgent parties, this spurn- the Ukraine crisis and the eurozone crisis, very few could ing of transatlanticism is also linked to strong suspicions see a case for talking to Turkey at all. about the impact of TTIP, with 27 of the parties interviewed answering that the EU should not make this deal with the When questioned on Europe’s engagement with powers fur- US. But there were some notable exceptions among the par- ther afield, particularly China, few parties had a developed ties that we interviewed – including the Sweden Democrats, view, and fewer still on questions such as whether China the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, the Estonian should be granted market economy status under World Party of People’s Unity, Germany’s ALFA, Syriza, and the Trade Organization rules. There is no real evidence that posi- Independent Greeks – who thought the deal could have a tions on China varied between right and left: 15 parties simply positive impact under the right conditions. had no official position. The European communist parties of- ten confessed to having little understanding of today’s China

Do you support Ukraine’s path Do you support the renewal to EU accession? NO OPINION of sanctions against Russia? 2% MAYBE 4% NO OPINION 11% MAYBE 23% YES YES 33% 31%

NO NO 42% 53%

3 4 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER AfD believe that the sanctions on Russia should be lifted, sanctions onRussiashould that the AfD believe These views on Russia policy do notfallnaturallyalongthe on Russia policy views These The parties were divided over security questions too, with questions over security divided were parties The Russia, anddamagingtoEUeconomies. Russia, oranyotheractorsoutsideEurope. – theBalticstates,Finland, more acutely Russia wasfelt from threat the where in countries parties However, some Dawn and other Czech parties, and Syriza and the Indepen parties, andSyrizathe Czech Dawn andother ehp te ot infcn ise ht iie thechal- divides that issue significant most the Perhaps as diverse as the FrenchCommunistParty, as diversethe Cyprus’s AKEL, specific to comes it when However, Russia. of that against and another seven arguing for their countries to withdraw to countries arguing fortheir and anotherseven arguing thatNATO against theRussian should threat; eight dent Greeks viewing them as an obstacle to dialogue with dialogue to as anobstacle Greeks viewingthem dent contacts withtheChineseCommunistParty. cooperate with Russia on current EU crises (refugee crisis, with RussiaoncurrentEUcrises(refugee cooperate or how to work with it, although some maintained historical or howtoworkwithit, althoughsomemaintainedhistorical right split is evident, with parties on the left generally more generally left on the isevident,withparties right split on this.On agree Dawn Syriza andGolden in Greece, while was a general view that there was no need to engage with to engage was ageneralviewthattherenoneed much more mixed. Twenty-four parties argued that the that argued parties more mixed.Twenty-four much the EU’s policy on its neighbourhood should not be pitted not be should neighbourhood on its policy EU’s the that sense a and conflict), the on position decisive a taking the questionofUkraine’s accession, however,moreofaleft– take in more members from the Europeanneighbourhood; take in more membersfromthe terrorism, crisis, there Ukraine, eurozone and Syria). On the to over whether a fairly evensplit There was dialogue. tinue support for at least some recent Russian positions,particu- for atleastsomerecent support expressed parties (30 policy foreign Russian for sympathy in favour of keeping the sanctions, while also trying to con- trying to also sanctions, while the keeping in favourof sanctions should not stay in place beyond July, with parties July, with beyond in place stay not should sanctions seven responding that NATO should build up militarily up build NATO should that responding seven supportive ofUkraine’spathtoEUmembership. Linke and Die in Germany,both – forexample, spectives policies such as EU sanctions against Russia, views were Russia, views against sanctions as EU such policies of otheractors larly itsinterventioninSyria,absence in the Russia. Thereisgeneral with engage to is how parties lenger lines of left and right, but tend more towards national per- more towards tend and right,but left of lines Sweden, Poland’s LawandJustice,Hungary’s Sweden, Fidesz –were What are yourmainviewsonfuture engagementwithNATO? 5 8 2 10 2 3 6 7 - The foreignpolicyimplications Following the Dutch referendum in May, it will be more be inMay,itwill referendum Dutch the Following an Parliament. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Tayyip Recep President Turkish Parliament. an One of the issues where there is most consensus between consensus most is there where issues the of One viewed sceptically by a number of key member state govern- state member key a numberof by sceptically viewed complex to coordinate a European policy towards Russia towards policy a European to coordinate complex find could Council European the successful, is policy crisis growing proposal fromItaly.Ifthe migration pact the der move to want they if home at parties insurgent of concerns po - serious to exert able status. Theymaybe refugee granted others werereasonablycomfortablewiththestatusquo. while views, their reflected options the of none that felt or with other neighbouring transit countries such as Libya un- as such transit countries neighbouring other with nent in particular is likely to face opposition in the Europe in the to faceopposition nent inparticularislikely refugees and migrants arriving in Europe,andthenumbers refugees ments, including France, and the visa liberalisation compo- visa liberalisation France, andthe ments, including thin. Governments across the EU will have toanswerthe will EU thin. Governmentsacrossthe the insurgent parties is their desire to reduce the number of the reduce to desire their is parties insurgent the itself evenmorehamstrunginactingonthisdossier. quid proquodeals to applies same it forward–andthe pressure for referendums and more consultation on refugee consultation and more for referendums pressure is wearing with theslowpaceofimplementation patience litical pressure on this issue. The EU–Turkey deal is already is deal EU–Turkey The issue. on this pressure litical from the alliance altogether. Many parties were undecided were Many parties alliance altogether. from the Which crisesrepresent thebiggestthreat totheEU? 1ST CHOICE REFUGEE 26 CRISIS NATO shouldbuild-upmilitarilyagainstRussia’s threat NATO shouldbuildupmilitarilyagainstotherthreats their security/toreinforceitsEuropeanpillar. NATO shouldacceptnewmembersfromourneighbourhoodtoguarantee Funding forNATO needstoincrease shouldkeepthestatusquowithNATOOur country shouldrethinkengagementwithNATOMy country alliance shouldwithdrawfromthemilitary Our country shouldhavenothingtodowithNATOOur country 13 TERROR &RADICAL 9 ISLAM 2ND CHOICE 10 EUROZONE 6 CRISIS 10 UKRAINE CRISIS 1 2 0 BREXIT 4 - beyond the upcoming Council decision on whether to ex- a post-UK referendum EU that is likely to face increasing tend EU sanctions, and the question of a Deep and Com- pressure for reform, simplification, and making decisions at prehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine, and its the national level as much as possible, these results indicate eventual accession. The Dutch population rejected the As- that there may be less pressure for reform on foreign and se- sociation Agreement with Ukraine (an outcome for which curity policy, and that even the insurgent parties are willing the PVV campaigned fiercely). The spectrum of views from to see this remain largely at EU level. the insurgent parties on these issues in some ways mirrors the wide range of views across member states. However, in How are the insurgent parties influencing some countries, such as Germany, Lithuania, and Poland foreign policy? (where the Law and Justice party is in government), there are insurgent parties for and against the use of sanctions on With the exception of Malta’s Imperium Europa, all 45 par- Russia, further complicating any deal. ties that we surveyed hold at least one seat in their national parliaments or the European Parliament. However, for Many of the challenger parties want to place clear limits on many of these groups, their most effective levers of influ- support for Ukraine. The accession conversation is over as ence are their ability to drive debate in the media and chal- far as the majority of these parties are concerned: their vi- lenge the establishment rather than working within it. sion is of guaranteeing EU security through hard power, not through supporting neighbours to become more similar to For example, although Britain’s UKIP has been successful the EU, and eventually join the club. in European Parliament elections – it is the largest UK par- ty, with 22 MEPs – and at local level, with 488 councillors, The insurgent parties’ vision of a Europe that operates it holds only one seat in the UK House of Commons. Its through stick rather than carrot could help the goal of devel- major success has been outside its elected role, stirring the oping European defence capacity in order to make it a more debate on UK membership of the EU to a degree that re- independent security actor. Many of the parties are pushing opened rifts in the ruling Conservative Party, so that Prime for greater investment on this front. Many of the parties, in- Minister David Cameron felt it necessary to put the matter cluding the French Front National and Belgian Vlaams Be- to a national vote. lang, as well as parties from newer member states that are geographically closer to Russia, such as the Estonian Con- The referendum is a tool that appeals strongly to challenger servative People’s Party, have a vision of a militarily strong parties, resonating with their wish to “re-democratise” de- Europe that invests more in its own security – largely at na- cision-making. The 2016 Dutch referendum on the Ukraine tional level – and consequently in independence from the Association Agreement had strong backing from the PVV, US. It is likely that these parties will voice strong opinions and the UK Brexit vote is undeniably a success story for and exert pressure on their national governments regarding UKIP. Many of the parties we interviewed saw the building how they engage with the new US administration. Republi- momentum of referendums in 2016 as an opportunity. can candidate Donald Trump’s arguments that Europeans and others need to pay their way within the NATO alliance However, insurgent parties are also working within govern- in exchange for a security guarantee are resonating strongly ment: in Bulgaria, the Patriotic Front supports the govern- with some of the insurgent parties. ing coalition; in Finland, the Finns Party is participating in the ruling coalition and its leader, Timo Soini, is serving as However, for the insurgent parties, investment in security Foreign Minister; in Greece, Syriza and the Independent and defence should not necessarily be read as groundwork Greeks are currently in government; in Hungary, Fidesz is for increased interventionism. As set out above, many of the the leading party in the governing coalition. In Latvia, the parties are extremely wary about engagement in the Middle National Alliance holds a number of high offices including East and elsewhere, and are critical of previous interven- the Ministry of Justice; in Lithuania both the Order and tions. As a growing force, these parties are likely to bolster Justice Party and the Labour Party are in government; Law the sense of intervention fatigue in EU foreign policy over and Justice are in power in Poland; and SMER-SD and the the coming years, making it even more difficult for national Slovak National Party are two of the four-party governing governments to sell future military deployments to their coalition in Slovakia. Polls ahead of the 26 June national populations: insurgent parties largely view increasing mili- elections in Spain are putting the Podemos-led coalition in tary capacity as important to make the threat of European a strong position. The odds are strong that the Front Na- retaliation or intervention real, but are sceptical of argu- tional’s Marine Le Pen will make it into the second round of ments for using it in most circumstances. the French presidential elections in 2017.

Surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the parties see As this study shows, these parties are not all of one mind European solutions as more appropriate than national so- on key foreign policy challenges, from the war in Syria, to lutions in dealing with the crises currently facing the EU. the US relationship and the Ukraine crisis. However, on This was most pronounced on terrorism, where 34 opted some broader points it would be possible for coalitions of for European-level solutions, compared to 29 on the Syr- “insurgent governments” to operate within the Foreign Af- ian conflict, 28 on Ukraine, and 24 on the refugee crisis. In fairs Council. For example, all insurgent parties currently 5 6 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Finally, it is clear that in addition to developments in the Finally, itisclearthatinadditiontodevelopments However, our research also shows that challenger parties However, ourresearchalsoshowsthatchallenger are stronger at this level than nationally.Wheretheirviews are strongeratthislevel assertive Parliament’s increasingly European Council, the as FranceandSpain. re- of EU for aprocess also formanimportantdrivingforce gained popularityafterbackingthecoalitiongovernment. go against establishment EUthinking, go againstestablishment the consultationrole could grouping this referendum UK the crisis. Following gee do not just change the system – the system can also change – thesystem do notjustchangethesystem such parties, from insurgent pressure political intense der or “maybe” when asked whether they wanted to return to to wanted they whether asked when or “maybe” of the parliament on international agreements provides a of theparliamentoninternationalagreements role in foreign policy – as seen most recently in itsvocalop- most recently policy –asseen role inforeign tion. This isalsotrueforBulgaria’s Patriotic Front, which since joiningitscoali- EU government lineonthe the toed them. For example, Syriza’s experience in governmenthas Syriza’s experience them. Forexample, are un- that governments with larger states included these them tousethistoolmoreoften. grow parties insurgent As the policy. shape to for them tool set to continue. The great majority of the challenger parties challenger the majority of great to continue.The set rap- of promises pre-government its tempered significantly n ofdne n ifune cos h E, wecanexpect EU, the across influence and confidence in refu- of the causes of the same analyses the shared roughly has tempered its nationalisticrhetoricandhasactually has tempered have representationintheparliament,andmanyofthem position to elements of the EU–Turkey deal on refugees – is on refugees EU–Turkey deal ofthe position toelements Finns Partyhasbroadly Russia, andthe with prochement playing arolein “yes” their national government answered form. The potential for foreign policy coalitions is greater if is greater coalitions policy forforeign potential form. The business as usualinrelationswithRussia. Similarly, business they Shield PartyandMOST Romania’s DemocraticNationalistParty;Croatia’s Human repercussions for elected officials: Spain’s Podemos; National issues,suchasindependenceofregions, TTIP: Slovenia’s UnitedLeftandSlovenianPeople’s Party Democrats; EstonianPartyofPeople’s Unity;Austria’s FPÖ sovereign powers:Portugal’s LeftBloc;Sweden Future changesinEUtreaties/Further transferof Enlargement issues:Germany’s AfD;Austria’s FPÖ Unity; Portugual’s LeftBloc with StabilityandGrowth Pact: EstonianPartyofPeople’s Eurozone responsibility towards Greece/Compliance Italy’s FiveStarMovement Their country’s eurozone membership:Germany’s AfD; Unity; Hungary’s Fidesz;andJobbik;Poland’s Kukiz’15 Refugee relocation quotas:Estonia’s PartyofPeople’s “Abuse offree movement”:SwedenDemocrats Vlaams Belang People’s PartyofEstonia;Germany’s AFD;Belgium’s Legitimacy andcontentofrefugee policy:Conservative NATO membership: Bulgaria’s Ataka Front Turkey’s EU membership: agreements: Belgium’s VlaamsBelang;Germany’s AfD Ukraine AssociationAgreement/ People’s PartyofEstonia;theNetherlands’PVV AfD; Hungary’s Jobbik;Italy’s LegaNord;Conservative Belgium’s VlaamsBelang;Bulgaria’s Ataka;Germany’s Coalition; Sweden Democrats; Danish People’s Party; KSCM, PartyofFreeCitizens,andDawn–National Front National and Communist Party; Czech Republic’s Their country’s EU membership following: they would liketosee popular referendums on are the likely consequenceofthevote.Theissuesthattheysaid parties cited this as the most likely or second-most it wouldtriggergradualdisintegrationoftheEU.Twelve the impactofUKvoteonEUmembershipwasthat The mostcommonpositionoftheinsurgentpartieson Referendum watch Bulgaria’s AtakaandPatriotic : Austria'sFPÖ,France’s other association AUSTRIA FPÖ

Number of seats in National Parliament 38/183 in National Council; 13/61 in Federal Council Number of seats in European Parliament 4/18 (Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom) Current performance in polls/recent elections FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer won 49.7% of the second-round vote in the 2016 presidential elections Participation in government? Yes – short stints in the 1980s and 1990s Current leader Heinz-Christian Strache

Meet the insurgents1 that another positive outcome of Brexit could be that there is a step back from supra-nationalism and a step towards The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei more intergovernmental policies. In the opinion of the FPÖ, Österreichs, FPÖ) was founded in 1956 by Anton Rein- there should be a two-tier euro currency – a strong northern thaller, who had served in the national socialist government euro and a weaker southern euro, with the possibility to de- that was formed in collaboration with Adolf Hitler after preciate the currency if necessary. the Anschluss in 1938. The FPÖ was the party for those un- co mfortable with the domination of Austrian politics by the Views on foreign policy socialist-clerical coalition governments. The party had lib- eral and nationalist wings, which frequently disagreed over The FPÖ considers Russia to be the most important part- strategy. The FPÖ had governing stints in various coalitions ner for Europe and Austria, especially on energy and in the in the 1980s and 1990s. After a split in the party in 2005, agricultural sector. Even as sanctions were being imple- it attracted an increase in popular support, leading to very mented, the FPÖ began meeting Russian leaders to build good results in the latest elections under the leadership of up an alliance against the “American and NATO-infl uenced” Heinz-Christian Strache. EU policy. The party sees American interventionism in the Middle East as extremely problematic, and thinks the EU Views on Europe should not cooperate with the US on a solution for the Syria war, preferring cooperation with Russia. The FPÖ opposes The FPÖ sees a lack of solidarity and unity between EU any alignment of Austria with NATO, and accepts a Russian member states as the main cause of the refugee crisis and sphere of infl uence in the east. the eurozone crisis, which in turn are considered to be the biggest problems facing Europe. It terms the EU–Turkey deal a disaster, because it is against any alignment of the EU with Turkey. It considers the big diff erence in the stan- dard of living between Europe and the rest of the world as a key cause of both the refugee crisis and radical Islam, believing that young people become radicalised when their vision of a better lifestyle is not achieved. The FPÖ feels that living standards for citizens of Austria should be pro- tected, and that immigrants who are unwilling to integrate in Austria under the present conditions should be forced to leave the country.

The FPÖ is worried about Brexit because it might lead to a disintegration of the EU, but thinks the debate might have a positive eff ect if direct democracy is used as a tool for EU in- tegration. Issues like enlargement, treaty changes, and new treaties should be voted on in EU member states. It argues

1 For all parties in this publication the number of European Parliament seats held by the party is expressed as a total of that country's total allocation of seats, rather than of the total number of seats in the European Parliament. 7 8 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER hopes thatitwillleadtothedisintegrationofEU. and needs, EU the revolution” “Copernican the as endum Brexit refer- the is afailure.Thepartysees currency euro common and thatthe are notdemocratic that itsinstitutions EU: of the weaknesses it revealstwo since sis asabigissue, cri- eurozone the EU. Italsosees of the body the weakening to adisease it has compared which to multiculturalism, lems prob- links these party The facing Europe. threats biggest crisis, terrorism, refugee and Islamasthe the The VB sees Views onEurope Alliantie, whichiscurrentlyinthefederalmajority. Nieuw-Vlaamse of thedramaticrisemoremoderate inflconsiderable lost has because VB uence the decade, last the country. However, during in the parties other by stalled a of because infl limited Its was uence racism. of convicted being after 2004 in Belang Vlaams to name its change to had It mid-2000s. the until rise steady a enjoyed and 1977, in created was (VB) Blok Vlaams The small right-wingpartiestogether. myriad bring the to a charismatic leader lack of ties, andthe socialist par- of theFrench-speaking of theomnipotence partofthecountry,partlybecause in theFrench-speaking was not replicated country. Thisphenomenon north ofthe the in largely based minority Dutch-speaking a – Flemish with advancing the causeof are traditionallyassociated Flemish far-right parties started to develop in the 1950s, and Meet theinsurgents Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats BELGIUM Tom Van Grieken No 12% inApril2016poll 0/17 11/240 cordon sanitaire in- cordon cause tosmallandmedium-sizedenterprises. could it damage possible environmental standards,andthe of sanitaryand chance ofalowering ity ofnegotiations,the opac- to TTIP of the Russia. because The partyisopposed with cooperation for renewed way the open to sanctions end values, andwantsto European It thinksPutinsharestrue fi Islam. radical and multiculturalism, terrorism, against ght in a Russia with Belgium ally for NATO,and nancial support fiup build to wants also - VB The ISIS. against intervention a European support to few the of one is party lution. The so- as partofthe seen Vladimir Putin’s Russiaistherefore and Bashar al-Assad’sregime with world.Siding over the governments all contributing totheriseoffundamentalist for EU by supportinganti-Assadforces,andalsoblamesthe The VB blames EU countries for escalating the Syria confl ict Views onforeignpolicy Belang Vlaams BULGARIA ATAKA Patriotic Front

Number of seats in National Parliament 11/240 18/240 Number of seats in European Parliament 0/17 1/17 (European Conservatives and Reformists) Current performance 2.2% in February 2016 polls (parliamentary in polls/recent elections threshold is 4%) 4.4% in February 2016 polls Participation in government? No, but supported government 2013/14 Part of the current governing coalition Current leader Volen Siderov Krasimir Karakachanov and Valeri Simeonov

Meet the insurgents Views on Europe

There are two parties in the Patriotic Front – the VMRO Both parties are Eurosceptic, but Ataka is more openly anti- and the NFSB. The VMRO (also VMRO–BND, in English: EU. The party is strongly against the EU’s immigration pol- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Bulgar- icy, as it sees a direct correlation between the number of in- ian National Movement) was established in 1989, claiming coming migrants and terrorist attacks in Europe, and wants to be the successor to the historic VMRO, which fought for to remove all “illegal migrants” hailing from North Africa the liberation of Bulgarian lands from the Ottoman Empire. and the Middle East. Ataka is hoping for Brexit because it The National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) was might speed up the dissolution of the EU, and is pursuing a established in 2011, after its founder Valeri Simeonov broke Bulgarian exit from the EU. with the Ataka party. The Patriotic Front has similar views on immigration, but Ataka quickly became an important, although relatively is slightly more moderate. The party sees Brexit as a bigger small, player in politics after its establishment in 2005 by threat to the EU than the eurozone crisis or the Ukraine cri- a former pro-democracy, pro-reformist politician, Volen sis, and thinks it might trigger the disintegration of the EU. Siderov. The party combined nationalism and populism as it started to speak about corruption, poverty, income, and Views on foreign policy pensions. It also gradually became overtly pro-Russian and leader Siderov clearly backs all Russian-led investment proj- Both parties have strong anti-Turkey positions and are ects. The party had a key role in supporting the government against plans for Turkish membership of the EU. They are of 2013–2014, but was less successful in the next elections. also strongly anti-Muslim and anti-refugee parties. They are anti-Western and especially anti-American, too. Ataka has Both parties identify as nationalist organisations and have a the strongest views on the US, which it accuses of having strong focus on ethnic and religious minorities in the coun- caused the refugee crisis by funding and training groups such try – Turks, Muslims, and Roma. They both have their own as ISIS, with the aim of destroying its competitor – Europe. TV channels and are infl uential in shaping the debate, but The party wants to leave NATO and cooperate with Russia haven’t held high positions in the executive. on energy connections and military-political protection. It believes the confl ict in Ukraine was also instigated by the US, and sees Russia as protection against Islamist invaders.

The Patriotic Front also criticises US and EU policy in the Middle East as one of the reasons for the rise of radical Islam, and it is against attempts to bring down the Syrian government. However, it is less supportive of Russia; it ad- vocates neutrality regarding the Ukraine crisis and is open to EU and NATO accession for Ukraine. 9 10 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Views onEurope ii zid)partysur- (Živi Human Shield At thesametime, Meet theinsurgents

EU andpro-Russian.trendscontinue,itis If thepopularity Turkey refugee deal, and is hopeful for the future of Europe. for thefuture deal, andishopeful Turkey refugee The largest traditional parties in Croatia were formed after formed Croatia were in parties traditional largest The The MOST party (the Bridge of Independent Lists) was of Independent Bridge The MOSTparty(the assuming power, the party toned down its demands, and demands, its down toned party the power, assuming biggest the with coalition a formed party time. The the at have quicklyrisentopower that parties anti-establishment MOST sees the refugee crisis aslinkedtoterrorismand refugee the MOST sees ernment spending and public debt, reforming the public debt, reformingthe andpublic ernment spending established itself as the third-most infl uential political force name. This group mostly fi ghts foreclosures by occupying fi foreclosures mostly ghts group This name. same the of group anti-eviction an by 2014 in formed was intra-coalition dis- of because crises with is riddled which maker” inthenextparliamentaryelections. the last (November 2015) parliamentary elections, the party thinks that stronger common European responses should responses common European thinks thatstronger threat toEurope.It considers ittobethebiggest therefore the end of the socialist regime, partly by groups that were re- were that regime, partlybygroups socialist end ofthe the in recentyears. sector, and reducing administrative unitsinCroatia. After sector, andreducing by They arenowchallenged for itsindependence. sponsible has suff eredanastonishingdecreaseinpopularity. likely that Human Shield will assume MOST’s roleof“king- assume will Human Shield that likely anti- is party The and forming“humanshields”. property MOST partyintermsofvotersupport.The the passed gov- reducing with is concerned The MOSTplatform putes. – Union party Croatian Democratic in Croatia–the party founded in 2012 as a regionalist political platform. During platform. political regionalist a as 2012 in founded be developed. The party is cautiously supportive of the EU– of the supportive The partyiscautiously be developed. Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats CROATIA Ivan ViliborSincic No 7.3% votersupportinMay2016 0/11 1/151 Views onforeignpolicy As a relatively new party, MOST does not yet have veryde- not yet party, MOSTdoes new As arelatively It believes the Brexit debate will help EU countries to con- to countries EU help will debate Brexit the It believes Ukraine, as well as continuing the build-up of NATO and Ukraine, ascontinuingthebuild-up as well Human Shield has quite the opposite view, and sees the EU the sees view, and opposite the quite has Human Shield Human Shield is Russia-oriented in itsforeignpolicy,and is Russia-oriented Human Shield f i nancing jihadist groups, and sees China as a bettereco- asa China sees and groups, fi jihadist nancing as a totalitarian entity and the biggest threat to its member its to threat biggest the and entity a totalitarian as all bigforeignpolicyissues. put for corporations to a tool as views TTIP, it which against NATO asaninstrumentfor and interventionism,sees for imperialism US the attacking when as acounterweight veloped views on foreign policy, and mostly sides with its views onforeignpolicy,andmostlysides veloped cause the disintegration of the EU, and advocates Croatia’s EU, andadvocates the of disintegration the cause coalition partner. As such, it is supportive of acontinua- coalition partner.Assuch,itissupportive cates national solutions rather than European solutions for solutions rather thanEuropean national solutions cates advo- it unsurprisingly, Perhaps a disadvantage. at citizens oppression that Croatia should withdraw from. The party withdraw Croatia should that oppression withdrawal aswell. nomic partner with a better human rights record. nomic partner It isalso with abetter ratifying TTIP. tion of sanctions against Russia and more cooperation with tion ofsanctionsagainstRussiaandmorecooperation states, as it limits their sovereignty. It hopes that Brexit will that sovereignty. Ithopes their limits it as states, solidate andrediscovertheirfaithintheEU. sees the US as directly responsible for creating,arming, responsible and as directly US the sees blames the EU for the Ukraine crisis. It often uses Russia uses Ukraine crisis.Itoften for the EU the blames MOST Shield Human Božo Petrov 2016; BožoPetrov isvice-primeminister. Yes, sinceJanuary inacoalitiongovernment 5.7% votersupportinMay2016 0/1 15/151 AKEL (Progressive Party of Working CYPRUS People)

Number of seats in National Parliament 16/56 Number of seats in European Parliament 2/6 (European United Left/Nordic Green Left) Current performance in polls/recent elections 25.7% in May 2016 elections Participation in government? On and off, in the opposition since 2013 Current leader Andros Kyprianou

Meet the insurgents Views on foreign policy

Since the division of Cyprus in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus Regarding foreign policy, Cyprus’s relationship with Russia has been governed solely by the representatives of the Greek is important. Cyprus is favoured by Russian oligarchs Cypriot community. None of the Greek Cypriot parties has because of its low taxes, and is considered to be a popular managed to elect a president by itself or win a majority in destination for Russian capital with a large Russian the 56-seat House of Representatives and form a single- community. AKEL was a close supporter of Soviet Russia’s party government. There are two main political parties in policies, and opposes the very existence of NATO. The party Cyprus — the socialist Progressive Party of Working People also feels that Russia played a positive role on the Cyprus (AKEL) and the right-leaning Democratic Rally (DISY), the problem as a member of the UN Security Council. AKEL has latter of which is more popular. opposed the sanctions launched against Russia by the EU and considered the removal of Ukrainian President Viktor AKEL supports an independent, demilitarised, and non- Yanukovych during the Maidan uprising as a coup d’etat. aligned Cyprus, and a federal solution to the Cyprus prob- lem. It places particular emphasis on rapprochement with The party’s view is that US strategy in the Middle East, in the Turkish Cypriots. It supported Cyprus’s EU accession, conjunction with the EU’s “European Security Strategy”, albeit with some reservations, and is still regarded as a mar- has provoked the violent redrawing of borders in that region ginally eurosceptic party. AKEL is a strong supporter of wel- and the overthrow of “non-cooperative” governments. The fare benefi ts and the nationalisation of industry and services. bloody civil war raging in Syria and the millions of Syrians However, it is often accused of mismanaging the country’s becoming refugees is the result of US–NATO–EU–Turkey– economy during the 2012–13 Cypriot fi nancial crisis. Gulf monarchy policies to overthrow the Assad government.

Views on Europe The party is against TTIP, which it sees as the formation of an “economic NATO”, developed in secrecy, with the goal to AKEL was originally against Cyprus joining the EU. It counter the rise of the BRICS nations and give multination- does not share the view of many that the EU is crumbling, al monopolies the chance to operate unchecked in a single and does not see the refugee crisis, terrorism, Brexit, the Euro-Atlantic market. Ukraine crisis, or the eurozone crisis as threats. The party feels strongly that the EU should be guided in its actions by adherence to international law, and it is very much against the EU–Turkey deal and the other actions of the EU regard- ing the refugee crisis on account of them being in contra- vention of it. According to AKEL, the crisis has worsened dramatically as a result of the repressive and inhumane immigration policy implemented by the EU, the logic of military and police repression of the refugee fl ows by Fron- tex, NATO, and EUNAVFOR Med, the Dublin II Regulation which imprisons refugees in specifi c countries, the closing of the so-called Balkan corridor, and the refusal of EU mem- ber states to participate in refugee hosting plans. 11 12 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Views onEurope All three parties think Brexit might cause the disintegration the think Brexitmightcause parties All three Meet theinsurgents The Velvet Revolution in 1989 enabled the development of development the enabled 1989 in Revolution Velvet The Republic. ThePartyofFreeCitizensisasmaller,right-wing, part ofthecoalitiongovern- However, ithasneverbecome Dawn – National Coalition is a populist, anti-immigration, is apopulist, Dawn –NationalCoalition Dawn, the Brexit debate has been triggered by the centrali- by the triggered has been Brexit debate Dawn, the NATO, andarelargelyanti-EU. anti-Islam, and Eurosceptic party. It succeeded in the 2013 the in succeeded It party. Eurosceptic and anti-Islam, Theydemandwithdrawalfrom and youngeropportunists. i (SM a iet ucso o te omns Party). Communist the of successor direct a – (KSČM via drawal fromtheEU. main point Democracy, andthe as Dawn–Direct elections member- KSČM’s level. governmental a on it with cooperate chamber is the Communist PartyofBohemiaandMora- chamber isthe of referenda as a regular decision-making tool in the Czech as a regulardecision-makingtoolinthe of referenda introduction for the to call programme was of theirelection other party that has always been present in the dominant in the present been party thathasalways other of the EU, and have initiated or supported proposals for a proposals or supported of theEU,andhaveinitiated referendum on CzechmembershipoftheEU.According to referendum ment as the two other dominant parties refuse to directly refuse other dominantparties two ment asthe ments: the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) on the right and right on the Party (ODS) Civic Democratic ments: the democracy. SincethedivisionofCzechoslova- multi-party the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) on the left. The left. the on (ČSSD) Party Democratic Social Czech the issues concerning bananas and coff ee machines instead of coff instead and machines bananas ee concerning issues ship base combines mostly old Communist Partymembers old mostly combines base ship sis happen because they were focused on banalregulatory focused were they because happen sis sation oftheEU. The EUinstitutions lettheeurozonecri- kia, parties have beenabletoleadgovern- only twopolitical libertarian, and anti-EUpartythatdemandsCzechwith- in NationalParliament Number ofseats in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in polls/recentelections Current performance Participation ingovernment? Current leader REPUBLIC CZECH 33/200 3/21 (PartyoftheEuropean Left) 14% inJune2016poll sible coalitionpartners No, consistentlyblockedbypos- Vojtech Filip 0/200 racy inEurope) 1/21 (AllianceforDirect Democ- 2014 3.5 %inmunicipalelections No Petr Mach Views onforeignpolicy Free Citizens thinks the deal will simply not workandisle- simply will deal Citizens thinksthe Free The parties are all opposed to TTIP forvaryingreasons,in- to opposed are all parties The The partiesagreethatthemaincauseofrefugeecrisis KSČM wants the Czech Republic to withdraw from NATO from withdraw to Republic Czech the wants KSČM Russia, and want to normalise relations with Russia in thein Russia with relations normalise to want and Russia, Party of Free Citizens would like to strengthen NATO, but like tostrengthen would Citizens Party ofFree NATO will ensure its security, but it does not wantthe coun- NATO will ensureitssecurity,butitdoes and advocates a more neutral position for the country. The for the position a moreneutral and advocates action againstISIS, areagainstsupportingUkraine gally questionable. KSČM sees Turkey as a dictatorship that grate inEurope,whereasDawnseesthenatureofIslamic cluding the much-reviled arbitration clause, fear about the about fear arbitration clause, much-reviled the cluding causes. Allthreepartieshave beenimpressedwithRussian doctrine itselfandsupportfromtheWestasmain cal IslamhasgrownbecauseMuslimshavefailedtointe- real problems. All three parties oppose the deal with Tur- deal the oppose parties real problems.Allthree not necessarily in juxtaposition to Russia. Dawn would also would Russia. Dawn to in juxtaposition necessarily not risks that come with the harmonisation of standards, and harmonisation of the with come risks that the means to destroy the EU singlehandedly. The Party of The singlehandedly. EU the destroy to means the to the future of Europe and its culture, tradition,andvalues. and its Europe of future the to a threat Islam as on migration,seeing outspoken most the the secrecyof negotiations. try to be drawn into confl icts that are not directly relevant to the PartyofFreeCitizensalsoagreethatthreatradi- should not be allowed to have avisa-freeregime.Dawnis not beallowed should its securityinterests. and KSČM East. Middle the in policy interventionist US is key. Dawn believes TurkeyisblackmailingtheEUandhas key. Dawnbelieves like the Czech Republic to stay in NATO because it feels that it feels in NATObecause to stay Republic Czech like the long term. Coalition Dawn -National Free Citizens Party of KSCM 7/200 0/21 4.5% inMarch 2016poll No Miroslav Lidinský Danish DENMARK People’s Party

Number of seats in National Parliament 37/179 Number of seats in European Parliament 4/13 (Movement of a Europe of Liberties and Democracy) Current performance in polls/recent elections 19.2% in January 2016 poll Number of seats Participation in government? Lent support to liberal-conservative government from 2001-2011; declined position in coalition in 2015 in National Parliament 33/200 0/200 7/200 Current leader Kristian Thulesen Dahl Number of seats 1/21 (Alliance for Direct Democ- in European Parliament 3/21 (Party of the European Left) racy in Europe) 0/21 Current performance 3.5 % in municipal elections in in polls/recent elections 14% in June 2016 poll 2014 4.5% in March 2016 poll Participation in government? No, consistently blocked by pos- Meet the insurgents to negotiate a new kind of partnership with the EU. In the sible coalition partners No No event of Brexit, it expects Britain to negotiate a new kind of hybrid partnership with the EU, somewhere between full Current leader Vojtech Filip Petr Mach Miroslav Lidinský The Danish People’s Party (DPP) party was founded in 1995 membership and the European Economic Area – a model by Pia Kjærsgaard, a former carer for the elderly. With her that might also be suitable for Denmark. The party is willing non-academic background and level-headed rhetoric, she to call for a referendum on this matter. instantly wooed certain segments of Danish workers, espe- cially in provincial areas. The DPP grew out of the Progress Views on foreign policy Party, which towed a staunchly anti-immigrant line focusing mainly on non-Western immigrants and zero-taxes rhetoric. The DPP also sees the EU’s foreign policy through the prism of the Islamic threat facing Europe, and is irritated by the The party’s policy is aimed at safeguarding Danish (and fact that political discussions centre on the perceived need sometimes Western) cultural heritage and unity. The core- to fi nd a counter-balance to Russia. Instead, it sees the family unit is often pictured in their election campaign need for “Western civilisation” as a whole to be protected, materials. The party’s rhetoric and symbols include the through cooperation with both NATO and Russia, and par- Danish monarchy, the Lutheran Protestant Church, anti- ticipation in a US-led coalition against ISIS. It does not sup- immigration, animal welfare, and a strong welfare system. port the sanctions against Russia and is worried about their In 2015, the DPP became the second-largest party in Den- eff ect on businesses in Denmark. mark, and the largest party on the right wing. The DPP entered into negotiations with the liberal party in regards The party is against giving market economy status to China to forming a government. In the end, the party decided to because of the risks it poses to the Danish market, but also remain in opposition where it thought it could be more in- cites concerns about the human rights situation in China. fl uential, not least because it disagreed heavily with the lib- Support from Danish politicians for the Tibetan cause has eral party over critical issues such as redistribution policy met with resistance from China, and the DPP is unhappy and immigration policy. that China, as a trading partner, is pressuring Denmark Views on Europe with political demands. The DPP is generally open to TTIP but has concerns about the regulatory council, workforce protection for Danish citizens, animal welfare, and environ- According to the DPP, radical Islam is the main threat to mental protection laws. Denmark and Europe. The Ukraine crisis and the eurozone crisis are not seen as existential threats but problems that can be solved with diplomacy. The party is very much op- posed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal, and is worried that the EU will allow an Islamic state into the Union. The DPP also blames the German “refugees welcome” policy for the current refugee crisis in Europe, and is critical of Greece’s handling of the situation at the borders, as well as the lack of support from Brussels.

The DPP sees the in/out referendum in the UK as an “hour of destiny” for the EU, and wants to use the opportunity 13 14 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER ship inthemediarelatedtothatmatter. refugees ormigrants, andseekstouncover suspectedcensor- collecting informationrelatedtopossiblecrimescarriedoutby ise theteachingofKoran. Thepartyhasalsobeenactivein criminal- to proposal a made PPU the 2016, April In coverage. vote, butnonethelesshadanimpactduetowidespreadmedia the of percent 1 than less received PPU the elections, 2014 the ty’s goalhasbeentomeetthedemandsof“simplevoter”.In ber oftheEuropeanParliament. Sinceitsearliestdays, thepar- AffForeign Mem- of and Minister airs former a Ojuland, tiina The Party of People’s Unity (PPU) was created in 2014 by Kris- political partyinthecountry,witharound8,000members. supported third most growing, anditisnowthe has been CPP for the The support for Greece. and support EU in the fias solidarity well nancial as rights, gay to opposed also is into thelabourmarket. nality anddonotintegrateTheparty immigration, claiming thatmigrantsareasourceofcrimi- to opposition its clear about future. Thepartyhasbeen the to theEUin strument formakingrelated political decisions tralisation. bythepartyasapositivein- Referenda areseen and cen- federalisation EU country, andstopping the facing crisis demographic the of theEstonianeconomy,stopping development the on focused is CPP The 2012. in founded (CPP) was Estonia of Party Conservative People’s The tionalist, andleft-radicalpro-Russianparties. among rural, right-radical na- appear to began arguments fi anti-EU the rst that 2000 in only was it However, 1991. in starts in Estonia radical parties populist of The history Meet theinsurgents Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats ESTONIA Mart Helme No 19% popularsupportinApril2016 0/6 7/101 become aEuropeanproblem. has East Middle that instabilityinthe fact for the Greece crisis, both partiesblameGermanyand On therefugee number ofitemsintheEuropeandecision-makingprocess. on a referenda current coalition.Theydosupport under the an Estonianexit EU, butdon’t foresee of the membership on Estonia’s to survive.is needed Bothpartiesthink a debate wants it if intergovernmentalism towards and moveinstead to addressthistrend taken. needs The PPUthinksEurope are under- radical reforms unless inevitable is disintegration CPP grow, andforthe will membership rationality ofEU the over in Estonia solidarity. Debates European forced of stead in- and interests wards thinking in termsofnationalneeds to- in Europe tendency a growing is CPP thinksthere The Views onEurope it willhaveonEstonia. impact wants moreinformation onthe but trade agreement, the against The PPUisnotnecessarily kinds oftreaties. on these process decision-making European the with agree not to TTIP it isdoes On trade, the CPPisopposed because hand, thinksitisvitaltostepupagainstRussia. but notin clear oppositiontoRussia. The CPP, on the other to strengthen it wants PPU’s approach toNATO, which the reflis This nation. conservative and strong a having in ected of idea the eurozone, and the of criticism lam andrefugees, approachtoradicalIs- decisive own,suchasthe their with overlap they where for Russianpositions sympathy some than theCPP, is abitmoreoptimisticandhasdeveloped and NATO.ThePPU EU to the for Ukraine’s accession paths DCFTA withUkraine, ongoing sanctions,theand support towards Russia, PPUarebothcautiousand The CPPandthe Views onforeignpolicy Unity Party ofPeople’s of Estonia People’s Party Conservative Kristiina Ojuland No 13 %inApril2016poll 0/6 0/101 The Finns FINLAND Party

Number of seats in National Parliament 38/200 Number of seats in European Parliament 2/13 (European Conservatives and Reformists) Current performance in polls/recent elections 9% in June 2016 poll Participation in government? Yes, in a coalition since 2015 Current leader Timo Soini, also foreign minister and deputy prime minister

Meet the insurgents Views on foreign policy

The Finns Party (FPP) was established in the 1990s out of The FPP thinks it is important to maintain good relations the ashes of the Finnish Rural Party – an agrarian, anti- with Moscow regardless of what happens between the EU establishment, and anti-communist party that was active and Russia, since it will remain an important trading part- from 1959. The FPP blends centrist, or left-leaning, socio- ner for Finland. Sanctions are seen as a necessary evil. economic views and conservative values, and pitches the There is some disagreement on NATO, as some party mem- preferences of the “people” against those of the ruling bers would like to see Finland join NATO and others favour elites. Euroscepticism has become more and more impor- military and political non-alliance. The party doesn’t see a tant for the party’s identity and platform over the years. At military solution to the war in Syria, but accepts the actions the same time, the party has also adopted more sceptical taken by the various actors against ISIS. views on immigration and multiculturalism. After having long been a rather marginal party, the FPP started to grow On trade, the party is relatively liberal. It is generally positive in the latter half of the 2000s. Following the 2015 parlia- towards TTIP, but identifi es potential worries about the pro- mentary election, in which it won the second-biggest num- tection of foreign investment, labour norms, and food safety. ber of seats in the Finnish parliament, the FPP joined the government, where it now sits in coalition with two centre- right parties. FPP offi cials hold both the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry.

Views on Europe

As a governing party, the FPP has had to compromise on its views about EU cooperation, for example by subscribing to strengthening the EU’s Common Security and Defence Pol- icy and defi ning the EU as a “political choice that connects Finland to the Western community of values” – something they had been in opposition to. The party previously sup- ported the idea of organising a referendum on Finnish EU membership, but most party members have now tabled this idea since a clear majority of Finns are not interested. Part of the party has constantly highlighted the possible negative consequences of immigration and multiculturalism, and the refugee crisis is seen as a threat to the viability of the Nor- dic welfare model. The party sees the ever-deepening, all- encompassing integration process of the EU as a threat to its unity, as member states are looking for alternatives.

15 16 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER “a security emergency” for Europe,arguingthatit threatens emergency” “a security Views onEurope Meet theinsurgents France shortly after the Second World War, but its inflits but u- War, World Second the after shortly France France hashadtwodistincttypesofanti-establishment East, as well as Germany’s “refugees welcome” policy, for welcome” as Germany’s “refugees East, aswell The FN views the refugee crisis (to which it closely links the it closely which crisis (to refugee the The FNviews The second political family unites around far-rightpopulist unites family political The second f i rst electoral successes in the 1980s, and got to the second the to got and fi 1980s, the in successes electoral rst one as considered today and 1972 in created (FN), National fi rstgroup,unitedaroundfar-leftrevolutionaryideologies, and reactionary ideologies. The leadingpartyistheFront and reactionaryideologies. as itisconcerned. Communist Partywasthelargestpartyofoppositionin globalisation andcapitalism, andhasapositiveview ofim- ence has slowly decreased since the 1980s. It is critical of critical is It 1980s. the since decreased slowly has ence complete reconstruction of the European project and are- project European the of reconstruction complete of the FN, and quickly engaged in a process of “normalising” of in aprocess FN, andquicklyengaged the of of the three main parties in Frenchpolitics:anoveltythe main parties three of the round of the presidential elections in 2002, a feat it could re- now hasasecondaryroleinFrenchpolitics. TheFrench radical partiessincetheendofSecondWorldWar. The migration, whicharebothreasonstocriticisetheEUasfar the party and dampening the stigma historically attached to attached historically stigma the and dampening party the traditional bipartisan landscape. The FN experienced its experienced FN The landscape. bipartisan traditional turn to total national sovereignty. It hopes Brexit will trigger will Brexit Ithopes national sovereignty. total turn to situation. TheFNcontinues topromotethe the present civilisation has European on which values fundamental the as infl Islam) growing of the uence and terrorism of threat it. Its inability to forge political alliances has prevented it has prevented alliances political forge to inability it. Its produce in 2017. In 2011, Marine Le Pen became president became Pen Le Marine 2011, In 2017. in produce from majorelectoralvictoriessofar. been built. The FN blames US and EU strategy in the Middle in the strategy US andEU built. TheFNblames been Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats FRANCE Marine LePen No vote inboththefi rst andsecondround) December 2015regional elections(27%ofthe 6.8 millionvotesinthesecondround of 21/74 (Europe ofNationsandFreedom) 2/577 Views onforeignpolicy French interests. Itwantstobeableactindependently h Fec Cmuit at are ta te infl the uence that agrees Party Communist French The and recentUSthe aggressivepolicyofNATO sees The FN The FrenchCommunistPartycriticisessocio-economicpol- Russia thatexcludestheUS. ThepartyalsosupportsRus- and theeventual dissolutionofNATO, claimingittobean contain Russia. outdated organisation. of externalpowersintheMiddleEastistoblamefor result ofanaggressiveattemptfromtheEUandUSto regarding theDCFTAandEUNATOaccession. Atthe rial regimesintheregion. ItislesspositivetowardsRussia refugee crisis, butalsopointstotheroleofviolentdictato- referendum ontakingFranceoutoftheeurozone. many, but not the European project itself. It is opposed to many, but nottheEuropeanprojectitself.Itisopposed than theFN,supportingwillofUkrainianpeople the use of more referenda Europe-wide, and wants to have a to and wants Europe-wide, more referenda of use the towards moreambitioussocialrightsforallEUcountries. work to inrenegotiations is interested of Brexit, but idea the interventions asthebiggestthreattoEuropeanpeaceand icies decided at the European level and prompted by Ger- level andprompted European at the icies decided sia regardingUkraine, andseestheUkrainecrisisas same time,itadvocatesFrance’swithdrawalfromNATO, from NATOandwantsapan-Europeanpartnershipwith Front National Party French Communist Pierre Laurent No regional elections 1.55 %offi rst-round votesinDecember2015 2/74 (European UnitedLeft/Nordic Green Left) 7/577 GERMANY Die Linke ALFA

Alternative für Deutschland

Number of seats 64/630 0/630 0/630 in National Parliament State Parliaments: 155/1857 3/1857 State parliaments: 102/1857 Number of seats 7/96 (European United 5/96 (European Conservatives 2/96 (Europe of Nations in European Parliament Left/Nordic Green Left) and Reformists) and Freedom) Current performance 16% of the vote in March 2016 24% of the vote in March 2016 in polls/recent elections Saxony-Anhalt elections; March 2016: less than 1% Saxony-Anhalt elections; 2.9% in Baden-Württemberg; in federal state elections 15% in Baden-Württemberg; 2.8% in Rheinland-Pfalz in the three states it ranin 12.6% in Rheinland-Pfalz Participation in government? No No No Current leader Katja Kipping and Bernd Riexinger Bernd Lucke Frauke Petry

Meet the insurgents Views on Europe

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), founded in 2013, The AfD sees the refugee crisis and related integration is a relatively new right-wing populist and Eurosceptic problems as the biggest threat facing Europe, but thinks party. The AfD was founded as a single-issue party that the eurozone crisis could easily top the list again, as the campaigned against the euro currency and the bailouts re- EU’s solutions are not sustainable. The party sees Brexit as sulting from the European debt crisis. In 2015, after a split, a big threat for Europe, but hopes it can have some posi- the party’s new leader transformed the party into an anti- tive eff ects in terms of European reforms and a more wide- immigration and anti-Islam platform. There is still an open spread use of referenda in Europe. dispute within the party and its MEPs on how far it should shift to the right. Apart from its economic and fi nancial policies described above, ALFA’s general view on the EU is that it should no The party that split off from the AfD in 2015 became the longer be an organisation based on supranational decision- Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA). It is a Euros- making and instead be a loose federation of states. ceptic, liberal-conservative political party. The party is concerned with economic and fi nancial policies, calling for Die Linke sees the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis as the a Greek exit from the eurozone or Germany’s withdrawal biggest threats to the EU, and blames a lack of solidarity be- from the euro and a return to national currencies. tween member states for the current crisis. The party thinks referenda should be used for decision making in the EU more Die Linke is a democratic-socialist political party founded often, and some members feel that Brexit might make the de- in 2007 out of a fusion of several left-wing parties. The par- velopment of a stronger European core more likely. ty calls for a statutory minimum wage, for an annulment of some social-welfare reforms, and for an increase in inheri- Views on foreign policy tance tax and the top rate of tax, as well as international disarmament. The AfD has strong sympathies with Vladimir Putin’s views and policies – it is pro-law and order, anti-multicultural- ism, pro-individualist-pluralist in society, pro-national sovereignty, and pro-emancipation from the US and Brus- sels. It opposes continuing EU sanctions against Russia, and calls for the replacement of NATO by a security order that integrates Russia. The party is building close ties with Russia, which might be underlined soon by the partnership of the AfD’s youth wing with the youth wing of Putin’s par- ty, United Russia. It is critical of US actions in the Middle 17 18 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER country, andisaimedatdisarmamentonbothsides. Russia as amember that includes system security collective a with replaced be for NATOto party calls Germany. The the of military engagement of form any Die Linke callsforinternationaldisarmament, and rulesout in favourofTTIP. lantic securityanddefencestructure.Inaddition, ALFA is ners) andthecommitmenttoNATOaspartoftransat- Westbindung (securitycooperationwithWesternpart- As opposedtotheAfD, ALFA isinfavourofGermany’s and theriseofradicalIslam. East, partlyblaminginterventionismfortherefugeecrisis outside Bundeswehr GREECE SYRIZA Independent Greeks

Golden Dawn

Number of seats in National Parliament 144/300 9/300 18/300 Number of seats in European Parliament 4/21, GUE/NGL 0/21 3/21 (N/A) Current performance 2% in a recent poll (the threshold in polls/recent elections 15.5% in a recent poll to enter the parliament is 3%) 7.5% in a recent poll Participation in government? Yes, since 2015 Yes, since 2015 Current leader Alexis Tsipras Panos Kammenos Nikolaos Michaloliakos

Meet the insurgents provide poor Greeks with food and attempt to replace the po- lice by off ering protection against potential criminals. After the establishment of democracy in Greece in 1974, a two-party system dominated the political landscape for de- Views on Europe cades, but popular responses to the economic crisis facing the country have caused a shift in Greek politics. Syriza and the Independent Greeks see the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis as the biggest threats to the EU. The par- Syriza was founded in 2004 as an alliance of small left-wing ties believe that the current policy of austerity is not appropri- parties. In January 2015, the party won the national elections ate for steering the EU out of the crisis. They also consider and formed a government in cooperation with the Indepen- the stance of some EU countries on the refugee crisis (such dent Greeks party. Syriza suff ered a serious internal crisis in as Austria and Hungary) as counter-productive and express the summer of 2015 when the decision of Prime Minister Alexis their concern that the future of Europe might be jeopardised Tsipras to make a U-turn from its pre-election anti-austerity should principles of humanity and free movement of persons platform led party members to jump ship. The party is now not be respected. The right-wing Independent Greeks would pro-EU and committed to applying the agreed bailout terms. in theory be negatively predisposed vis-à-vis migrants and refugees in Greece, but in practice they cooperate with Syriza The Independent Greeks party was founded in February to ensure governmental unity. Regarding Brexit, the two gov- 2012, championing the idea of Greece gaining “indepen- erning parties hope that the Brexit debate will give them some dence” from its international creditors and protecting its na- more fl exibility with their creditors, since the EU would not tional sovereignty. The Independent Greeks party is a highly be prepared for a new Greek crisis during a period of concern personifi ed political vehicle for its leader Panos Kammenos, about Britain’s position in the EU. However, they are also who has a remarkable fl exibility in adopting himself to po- concerned that if Brexit does happen, Grexit could follow, es- litical conditions. The Independent Greeks party is currently pecially if the country does not meet its fi scal targets. in a governing coalition with Syriza. From the perspective of Golden Dawn, the eurozone cri- Golden Dawn is a neo-Nazi party, established in 1980 by its sis, the refugee crisis, and radical Islam and terrorism are current leader Nicolaos Michaloliakos, an admirer of Adolf the top threats. The party advocates for Greece to stop Hitler and the Nazi era. Until 2012, the party had enjoyed paying its creditors, and condemns “illegal immigrants” only marginal support, but by investing in populism during that come to the country. the economic crisis it managed to be elected in 2012. The party preserved a core base of supporters despite the ongoing trial against it after the killing of the pop artist Pavlos Fyssas by a Golden Dawn member in September 2013. Golden Dawn employs a political communication strategy against establish- ment political parties, refugees, and the creditors of Greece which still fi nds resonance in Greek society. Its members also 19 20 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Moscow and increase the possibility of large-scale war. Moscow andincreasethepossibilityoflarge-scalewar. such adevelopmentwillharmrelationsbetweenBrusselsand build upmilitarilyagainstRussiabecausetheybelievethat the alliance. However,bothpartiesdonotwanttoseeNATO matter ofprincipleandwouldagreewiththeenlargement dent Greeksarepositivelypredisposedvis-à-visNATOasa ments ofGreeceasamemberthealliance. TheIndepen- ter ofprinciple.While governing, itrespectsthecommit- While inopposition, SyrizahadbeenagainstNATOasamat- will notopposeanagreement. and in Greece debt-restructuring USforpotential the need originally verycriticalofTTIP, cooperation. Theywere but on Greek-Russianeconomic count they July, because yond of sanctionsagainstRussiabe- not infavourofanextension are They concerns. financial their to back come views policy governing parties,manyoftheirforeign two As forthe sues. position but lack positions on many specific foreign policy is- pro-Russia in astrong Dawn invests whole, Golden On the Views onforeignpolicy HUNGARY Fidesz Jobbik

Number of seats in National Parliament 114/199 24/199 Number of seats in European Parliament 11/21 (European People’s Party) 3/21 (N/A) Current performance in polls/recent elections Up to 33% in April 2016 20.22% of the vote in 2014 Participation in government? Yes, since 2010 No Current leader Viktor Orbán Gábor Vona

Meet the insurgents Jobbik used to be strongly against Hungary’s EU member- ship, but it has toned down this rhetoric and no longer calls Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) was founded under the directly for a Hungarian exit from the EU. However, it would name of Alliance of Young Democrats in 1988 as a youth like the opportunity to renegotiate membership and hold a movement in opposition to the ruling Communist Party. referendum on the subject. The party supports cooperation The party has had representation in parliament since the with Turkey on the refugee crisis but sees the Turkey deal as fi rst free elections, although it has undergone several waves a complete failure. of ideological change in the course of the past three decades, from liberalism and libertarianism via conservatism to na- Views on foreign policy tionalism. Since 2010, the party has developed a strong na- tionalist line, with frequent references to the importance of Fidesz started out on a strong anti-Soviet, anti-Russian plat- the sovereignty of the nation in opposition to “Brussels’ rule” form, but has changed its views in recent years. The party’s and a turn towards traditional values. Because of the strong leader, current Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, representation of Fidesz politicians in relevant institutions, shows a certain degree of admiration towards Putin’s gov- the governmental foreign policy line can be considered as ernance style, and high-level visits between the two leaders that of Fidesz. take place regularly. Nevertheless, the party would support a renewal of sanctions if a majority of countries voted for Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) was founded in this, and it supports Ukraine on the DCFTA, NATO acces- 2003, but failed to gain parliamentary representation until sion, and EU accession. The party offi cially supports TTIP 2010. Jobbik is a nationalist Christian party claiming to de- but is worried about GMOs, the investor-state dispute set- fend Hungarian values and interests. tlement clause, and the secrecy of the negotiations. Jobbik opposes TTIP with the same concerns as Fidesz. Views on Europe Jobbik has also become increasingly supportive of Russia, Fidesz sees the refugee crisis as the biggest threat to Europe, and has opposed the sanctions and EU support for Ukraine. as it has shown that the EU is not capable of protecting itself. The party is critical of NATO as a geopolitical tool used by The governing party generally sees the incoming people as the US to weaken Russia. The party also blames the US and (economic) migrants who could undermine the European its main allies for the crisis in Syria, and is against a Euro- way of life, rather than as refugees. The threat of Brexit wor- pean military intervention in the country. Fidesz would be ries the government because of the impact it would have on open to such an intervention through a Europe-wide initia- the EU as a whole, and also because it raises questions about tive or a coalition of the willing. Both Jobbik and Fidesz MPs what would happen to the more than 56,000 Hungarians have argued that one of the most important reasons for the living and working in the UK. The crisis of the eurozone en- growth of radical Islam is the inevitable failure of Western forces the generally negative opinion the government holds European societies to integrate Muslim communities. about the capacity of the EU to recover from the economic crisis. Fidesz is supportive of the refugee deal with Turkey.

21 22 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Views onEurope 1997 opened the door for SF to take its seat at the table fortable the at seat its take to SF for door the opened 1997 gov- national and local in participate to begun had 1980s Meet theinsurgents

EU duetothepotentialeconomic, political, andsocialim- Though SF continued to be seen as apartywithmanylegacy Though SFcontinuedtobeseen gains in the wake of the economic crisis. In 2011, it capital- it 2011, In crisis. economic the of wake the in gains ernment on both sides of the border. The PIRA ceasefi re in campaigned againstBrexit. ItopposedBritainleavingthe class base.SFisnowthethird-largestpartyincountry. working- traditionally among its credibility its damaged efi ted from the electoral collapse of the Labour Party, whose come the fourth-largest party in the country. In 2016, it ben- campaign ofviolenceinNorthernIrelandandtheUK of thePIRA. role in the previous pro-austerity coalition government had government coalition pro-austerity previous in the role rope”. SFhasbeencriticaloftheIrishandEuropeancom- ment of April 1998 and ultimately in the decommissioning multiparty peacetalks,resultingintheGoodFridayAgree- military wing, theProvisionalIRA(PIRA). Themodern man rightsrecord. mitments intherefugeecrisis, arguingthatresettlementof must bechangedandreformed,inparticularwithrespect the 1960s led to the birth of the modern Sinn Féin and its and Féin Sinn modern the of birth the to led 1960s the the EU–Turkey refugee deal because of Turkey’s poor hu- poor Turkey’s of because deal refugee EU–Turkey the to whatitconsidersthe“declining importanceofsocialEu- fihas party the time, same the Europe how about ideas rm ised on anti-governmentandanti-Troika to be- ised sentiment party inNorthernIre- second-largest it isnowthe issues, has split multiple times, and thebeginningofIRA’shas splitmultipletimes, land, and in the Republic of Irelandithasmadeenormous land, and intheRepublic undemocratic becauseoftheBritishelectoralsystem. At pact itwouldhaveonIreland, andseesthereferendumas SF isinaninterestingposition–itanti-EUpartythat mid- the by but 1974 until UK the in banned was Féin Sinn Sinn Féin(SF)’spost-warhistoryiscomplicated. Theparty Syrian refugeesneedstobesped up. Itisalsoopposedto Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats IRELAND Gerry Adams No 15 %inJuly2016 3/11 (European UnitedLeft/Nordic Green Left) 23/157 Views onforeignpolicy Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and insuffiand Libya, and Syria, Iraq, It region. the for aid cient NATO expansion, and opposes the sanctionsagainstRus- NATO expansion, and opposes and theredoesnotappeartobeanycollaborationwith Many oftheseviewsoverlap withRussia’s, butSFoppos- and Ukraine crisisonEU the of blame the of much puts also vulnerable to radicalisation. SF blames the refugee crisis refugee the blames SF radicalisation. to vulnerable diffa has party the Islamic history, of SF’s view Given erent es Russia’s useofmilitaryforcetoachieve itsobjectives, be might minorities that or isolated disenfranchised ering ency ofthenegotiations. dispute settlementmechanism, andthelackoftranspar- on a combination of Western interference in Afghanistan, Western interference on acombinationof mainly becauseofconcernsovermismatchedregulatory the country. involve empow- have to inevitably would solution the that fiproblem the said and politics, of failure a foremost and rst called representative One parties. other terrorism thanmost terity sentiments. ThepartyisstronglyopposedtoTTIP, including thePartnershipforPeace. Ireland andNATO, to anycooperationbetween is opposed sia. The party considers NATO to be a “Cold War relic” and War relic” a “Cold NATO to be considers sia. Theparty standards, environmentalstandards, theinvestor-state SF’s foreign policy approach is characterised by anti-glo- by characterised is approach policy foreign SF’s balisation, anti-interventionism, anti-war,andanti-aus- balisation, Féin Sinn Lega ITALY Nord Five Star Movement

Number of seats in National Parliament 18/630 91/630 Number of seats in European Parliament 5/73 (Europe of Nations and Freedom) 17/73 (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy) Current performance in polls/recent elections 4.2% of the overall vote in 2013 elections 25.7% of the overall vote in 2013 elections Participation in government? Three times in various coalitions from 1994 No Current leader Matteo Salvini Beppe Grillo

Meet the insurgents to deal with it on EU-related policies and obligations. It sees the “refugees welcome” policy as a threat to Europe because Lega Nord is a regionalist political party that was founded of the risk of terrorism that they believe it poses. Both par- in northern Italy in 1991. Its original aim was the transfor- ties are also strongly against the EU–Turkey refugee deal. mation of Italy into a federal entity. Gradually, the focus of the party shifted to a more moderate position advocating a Views on foreign policy decentralisation of power and stronger autonomy for the regions. The party started to grow as it exploited the wide- In international politics, Lega Nord is pro-American and spread disillusionment generated by corruption scandals. It pro-Israeli, but it is still critical of US actions in the Mid- played a major part in pushing the government to take dras- dle East. Salvini has made no mystery of his personal ad- tic measures to tackle illegal immigration, and has become miration for Vladimir Putin, and the party wants sanctions increasingly Eurosceptic since the election of Matteo Salvini against Russia to be removed as soon as possible. as secretary general. As a non-violent movement, the Five Star Movement has of- The Five Star Movement was founded in 2009 by the Italian ten criticised any Italian military intervention in the MENA comedian Beppe Grillo and internet entrepreneur Gianro- region (both in Syria and Libya), and it also voiced concerns berto Casaleggio. In its early days the party was an envi- about Italy’s sale of arms to Middle Eastern countries. The ronmental and pacifi st organisation, which also advocated movement argues that Italy has been directly damaged by diff erent means of direct participation via the internet and the sanctions on Russia since Moscow has shifted its geo- anti-system and anti-political narratives. As the Five Star strategic interests away from Italy. It wants to stop sanc- Movement grew, it started developing foreign policy strate- tions and return to “business as usual” as soon as possible. gies, based around its pacifi sm and Euroscepticism. Views on Europe

Both parties share the opinion that the “EU super-state” and the Italian government, seen as excessively accommodating to- wards the EU, are equally to blame for Italy’s existing political and economic diffi culties. They both aim to take Italy out of the eurozone, although this issue has fallen down the agenda since a referendum on the matter was rejected by the senate.

The Five Star Movement has criticised the EU’s austerity policies and its fi nancial rules, and wants the eurozone to be more democratic. It has also denounced what it perceives as a lack of democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions and their intrusion in the political decision-making of EU mem- ber states. Lega Nord blames migration and Italy’s struggle 23 24 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER tion oftheEUand triggerwideruseofreferenda intheEU. a disintegra- cause UK, andthinksitwould migrants inthe Latvian of position the endangers it because Brexit against strongly is Alliance National back. The sent be to refugees for all prefer still would but development, a positive as it deal, seeing EU–Turkey refugee the support party does the government position.However, which isnowalsothe gees, troduction ofmandatoryquotasfortherelocationrefu- the in- threats facingtheEU,andstronglyopposes biggest crisis asoneofthe the refugee The NationalAlliancesees Views onEurope It wasestablishedinitscurrentform2010. ofethnicLatvians. towardstheelectorate that areoriented parties the by suicide as political is perceived it with ment Forming agovern- Russian party”. “ethnic an as label its to at formingcoalitionsdue Latvia. success The partyhaslittle of Russiansin interests the represent aims to that party left Social DemocraticParty“Harmony”isacatch-all,centre- ment, andisusuallyneededtoformagoverningmajority. Parlia- the in force the fourth-largest it is as tion government coali- the included in typically Alliance is National values. The and orientedtowardsmaintainingso-calledtraditionalLatvian ing back to 2010. It is a nationalist party, typically anti-Russian, Latvian nationalists, conservatives,andeconomicliberals, dat- via!” –“ForFatherlandandFreedom/LNNK”) isacoalitionof The NationalAlliance(Fulltitle: NationalAlliance“AllForLat- tional AllianceandtheSocialDemocraticParty“Harmony”. two longest-survivingpoliticalforcesinLatvia aretheNa- ethnic stancesandopennesstotheformationofalliances, the ing partiesformalliancesovertheyears. Duetotheirstrong pre-exist- and various elections, before shortly created often Latvia hasatypicalmulti-partysystemwherenewpartiesare Meet theinsurgents Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats LATVIA Gaidis BerzinšandRaivisDzintars coalitionsince2010 Participated ingovernment 14.3% inMarch 2016poll 1/8 (European ConservativesandReformists) 17/100 outcome ofthereferendum. of the regardless development, on itsfuture questions dress viewing itasan Brexit debate, opportunity fortheEUtoad- of the EUatthemoment. It wassupportive threat facingthe the eurozonecrisisasonlyconsiderable Harmony sees vian economy. wants to know more about the eff ects it will have on the Lat- TTIP, Harmony supports whereas The NationalAlliance does notsupportfurtherintervention. region. It in the analysis onsocialandeconomicprocesses enough doing without intervened who EU, US andthe the of strategy East Middle the US. Harmonyblames the with in cooperation military interventionbytheEU,ifitwere support would party The Europe. to moved crisis the reason the as on refugees Germany’s policy to points crisis, but gee refu- Assad andISISforthe blames The NationalAlliance strengthening ofNATOagainstRussia. sanctions andthe values, andreligion,evenifitsupports traditional gender, towards alism, militarism,andpolicies nation- in relationto than Harmonyis,especially Russia to in manyofitspolicies to becloser Alliance canbeconsidered National Russia. Surprisingly,the with relationship positive a advocates generally fulfi but been lled, have lifted being conditions oftheir until the in place stay sanctions should Russian threat.Harmonyalsothinks the to in response up be built that NATOshould Ukraine. The partyalsobelieves for and NATO membership EU to a route and sanctions ing support- Russia, signifi with side cantly not does Alliance National The stance. policy foreign their of emblematic as seen be can Russia on hold parties diff the The views erent Views onforeignpolicy Party “Harmony” Social Democratic Alliance National Nils Ušakovs No 28.5% inMarch 2016poll crats) 1/8 (Progressive AllianceofSocialistsandDemo- 24/100 Labour LITHUANIA Party Order and Justice Party

Number of seats in National Parliament 29/141 11/141 Number of seats in European Parliament 2/11 (ALDE) 1/11 (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy) Current performance in polls/recent elections 8.2% in May 2016 poll 6.3% in May 2016 poll Participation in government? 2004–2008, in coalition from 2012 No Current leader Valentinas Mazuronis Rolandas Paksas

Meet the insurgents Views on foreign policy

The Labour Party was founded in 2003 as a one-man proj- Both parties take the threat from Russia very seriously and ect by Russian-born businessman and millionaire Viktor believe in further strengthening NATO to combat it. At the Uspaskich. A year later, it became the biggest party in par- same time, they are wary about sanctions against Russia, liament on a platform of anti-corruption and the defence because they fear an economically weakened Russia will of the “common people”. Once in power, it faced scandals have more extremist policies. The Labour Party wants to regarding fraudulent accounting, of which it was found prolong sanctions but simultaneously search for other guilty in 2013. In recent years, the party has tried to regain ways out of the situation, and the Order and Justice Party popularity by using populist rhetoric and appealing to anti- wants to end sanctions as soon as possible. The latter has immigrant sentiments in the country. been haunted by accusations of having pro-Russian ties since onetime leader Rolandas Paksas was removed from The Order and Justice Party was established as a liberal offi ce in 2002 after supposedly providing a Russian citizen democratic party in 2002 and changed its name in 2006. with Lithuanian citizenship and secret information after The party has a clear anti-establishment appeal and explic- receiving campaign support. itly contrasts the self-enriching, oligarchic elite with the or- dinary Lithuanian people. The party’s programme includes The Labour Party is open to TTIP as it supports trade agree- elements of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and moral conser- ments, but it is cautious when it comes to the ability of the vatism, and also promotes a more pragmatic approach to EU to negotiate favourable conditions and protect the mar- Russia than some traditional parties. ket from GMOs and pesticide-grown agricultural products. The Order and Justice Party opposes TTIP for similar rea- Views on Europe sons, and is also opposed to the secrecy of the negotiations.

The Labour Party is sure that Brexit would lead to the dis- integration of the EU. Britain leaving the EU would serve as a bad example to other EU members. The party is also wor- ried about terrorism, the refugee crisis, and the eurozone crisis as threats to the EU. It blames the latter on more re- cent newcomers to the eurozone ignoring its requirements.

The Order and Justice Party also sees only negative consequenc- es following Brexit: disintegration of the EU and a recession for all countries including Britain. The party is strongly opposed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal, and sees Australian-style control of the EU’s outer borders as the only solution to the refugee cri- sis, as well as a stop to the illegal movement of migrants within Europe. It is worth mentioning that only 11 refugees have en- tered Lithuania since the beginning of the refugee crisis. 25 26 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER wants aculturalEU. fiof pillars on itbuilt economy, EU, and current nance the outside theEUwhenitcanmakeitsownlaws. Insteadof betterfare would Britain that notice would countries other EU, becausethe disintegration of the Brexit wouldtrigger rejects theEU–Turkeyrefugeedeal. Thepartythinksthat on theburden-sharingplansforrefugeecrisis, andalso cooperate not do fi that imposing countries to the of on idea nes opposed isstrongly It obligations. fulfi their not l tion thatimposeseconomicthreatsoncountriesdo Imperium EuropaseestheEUasamercantileorganisa- Views onEurope an “Aryanageoflight”. manifestand everything” world the gave that aristocracy Europa, theyseektoavoidthe“extinctionofbiological Novaof banner the under parties likeminded of network er of a fi nancial capitalist elite. By creating a pan-European mixing, integration,the“dogmaofequality”, andthepow- dencies” ofEuropeanhistory, thedemocraticprocess,race of twomillionwhitemen. Theyrejectthe“fratricidalten- “Caucasians” withinasingledomaintoberuledbyanelite immigrant platformcallingfortheunityofallEuropean Imperium Europarunsonanovertlypro-white,anti- improved. have slowly results anditselectoral tary elections, European Parliamen- sels now. on contesting It has focused from Brus- come can only change believes it and Brussels”, in made laws the approve who dilettantes part-time 65 for “local parliamentisaplace tional politics,claimingthatthe tional Parliament.participationin na- The partynowrejects Na- in Malta’s seats any secure to failed has party tion, the far-rightNorman writer. Since itsincep- Lowell, aMaltese leader current by 2000 in founded was Europa Imperium Meet theinsurgents Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats MALTA Norman Lowell Norman No 2.8% ofthevoteinEuropean Parliamentaryelectionsin2014 0/6 0/69 tries should be drawn into wars outside their ownterritories. be drawnintowarsoutside tries should coun- European not believe of NATO, membership asitdoes towards Ukraine. in sanctionsorapolicy It alsoopposes involved get to want not does and Russians,but Europeans “native” kinship of cultural, racial,andtraditional the about on ideas Russia, based with improving dialogue to open inside. Itis of those identity the guarding themtoprotect focus on its borders,andshould with mattersoutside self concern it- should EU not thinkthe does Imperium Europa Views onforeignpolicy Imperium Europa THE PVV NETHERLANDS

Number of seats in National Parliament 12/150 Number of seats in European Parliament 4/26 (Europe of Nations and Freedom) Current performance in polls/recent elections 17.3% in June 2016 Participation in government? No, politically supported a minority government coalition in 2010–2012 Current leader Geert Wilders

Meet the insurgents very outspoken with its negative views on the nature of Is- lam, as well as the failure of integration of Muslim commu- In the post-Second World War era, several small anti-es- nities in EU societies. tablishment, populist, and radical parties have existed in the Netherlands. Since 2006, the Party for Freedom (Par- The PVV had an impact on the EU’s foreign policy recently tij Voor de Vrijheid, PVV), led by Geert Wilders, managed when it campaigned for a “No” vote in the Dutch referen- to signifi cantly infl uence political debates in parliament. dum on the Association Agreement with Ukraine. The party Between 2010 and 2012, the PVV supported the minority has been critical of Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine, government coalition of the right-wing liberal party and the but also blames the EU and its member states for fuelling Christian Democrats. The PVV started primarily as an anti- Russia’s behaviour. To the PVV, it is logical that Vladimir Islam party, but increasingly also became an anti-EU party. Putin decided to act against a threat in its sphere of infl u- ence when the EU off ered an Association Agreement to Views on Europe Ukraine. It presented the “No” vote, which was successful in the referendum, as a vote against the Brussels elite, the The PVV’s agenda is consistently and explicitly anti-euro expansion of Europe, and sending money to a corrupt and and anti-EU. The party supports Brexit and hopes that bankrupt country. Britain leaving the EU will help the Netherlands follow suit, eventually causing the disintegration of the EU. The party Regarding TTIP, the PVV is opposed but primarily because sees terrorism, radical Islam, and the refugee crisis as some it would like the Netherlands to have its own trade deals of the biggest threats for the EU, and thinks they are aggre- with the US after a Dutch exit from the EU. gated by EU policies. It sees the infl ow of refugees as a threat to national identity and the welfare state, thinks Schengen is dead, and wants to reintroduce national borders. After the EU–Turkey refugee deal, Wilders accused Dutch and Ger- man governments of letting the Turkish government decide their policies. The party considers the deal a sell-out and is very negative towards Turkey and its current leadership.

Views on foreign policy

The PVV is generally pro-US and critical of Russia in its foreign policy. The party is in favour of a strong NATO, but primarily because it helps to serve Dutch interests. It wants fewer peace operations, and is in favour of removing an arti- cle in the Dutch constitution which determines that the pro- motion of the international rule of law is a task assigned to the Dutch armed forces. It supports Dutch airstrikes against Syria as part of the anti-ISIS coalition. The party has been 27 28 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Views onEurope 1989 political scene started to stabilise around 2005, when 2005, around stabilise to started scene political 1989 Voter turnout in Polish parliamentary elections is typically is parliamentary elections in Polish Voter turnout Meet theinsurgents Kukiz, it is especially popular with younger voters. Because younger with popular Kukiz, itisespecially pop- a as elections 2015 the before established was Kukiz’15 PiS is sceptical about further integration with and of the EU, and ofthe integration with further about PiS issceptical and forge stronger ties between constituents and elected constituents between stronger ties and forge ance of nation states. It is also outspoken in itsnegativeap- ance ofnationstates.Itisalsooutspoken prefer an and wouldEUthatmanifestsasavery loose alli- ernment in modern Polish history, and has launched a deep ernment inmodernPolishhistory,andhaslaunched on all issues. One aim of the party is to implement a fia implement rst- to is party the of aim One issues. all on policies have clear doesn’t character, it heterogeneous its of new and age, retirement a lower spending, welfare more of with theEuropeaninstitutions. reshuffltensions heightened has which state, Polish the of e nationalist right liberal-conservativeCivicPlatformandthe post- parties. The of political membership rather low,asis representatives. rope, partly blaming the former on Germany’s open policy former onGermany’sopen blaming the rope, partly tion policies. The country now has the fithe has now country The policies. tion gov- single-party rst migra- taxes onforeignbanks,asbycriticisingEU as well promises with 2015, October in elections, recent most the won party (PiS). traditionalist LawThe latter andJustice centre- – the vying forpower clear parties two were there tive view on the EU–Turkey refugee deal, accepting it asthe deal, accepting refugee EU–Turkey tive viewonthe posi- party hasarelatively However,the refugees. towards Eu- to threats biggest the Brexit as and crisis refugee the past-the-post voting system to speed up decision-making up speed to voting system past-the-post Paweł musician punk by Led party. anti-establishment ulist lesser oftwoevils. eurozone. Itsees of the proach towardsPolishmembership Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats POLAND Jarosław Kaczynski since 2015 Briefl y in2005,andsingle-partygovernment elections Won 37.5%ofthevoteinNovember2015 17/51 (European ConservativesandReformists) 236/460 Views onforeignpolicy Kukiz’15 sees the United Kingdom as an important partner important an as Kingdom United the sees Kukiz’15 ui’5 lo es usa s tra, n nt ny n the in only not and threat, a as Russia sees also Kukiz’15 PiS fully supports sanctions against Russia and the opportu- sanctions againstRussiaandthe supports PiS fully MENA region. It also believes NATO should build up mili- up build NATO should region. Italsobelieves MENA eastern neighbourhood: some in the party believe Russia believe party in the some neighbourhood: eastern and regula- settlement dispute ervations overinvestor-state up NATOagainstthe building Russia. It alsosupports deter open to TTIP, lack oftransparency open worried aboutthe but result of Angela Merkel’s invitation, and because they seek they Merkel’s invitation,andbecause of Angela result nities for Ukraine to join NATO and possibly the EU, since the for UkrainetojoinNATOandpossibly nities ty understands the rise in migration towards the EU as the EU the rise inmigration towards the ty understands tions policy and support for Ukraine. tions policyandsupport The partyisrelatively sanc- EU the Russian threat, andsupports the against tarily tions onagricultureandenergyintensiveindustries. res- with TTIP but in principle, of Russia. Itsupports threat in the EU, and thinks Brexit could lead to serious questions EU, andthinksBrexitcouldlead in the internet freedom. of GMOs,andlimitationson spread in thenegotiations, and thatthiswillbringstabilitytoEasternEurope it expects social benefisocial signatures collecting currently is It jobs. and ts has secret agents within ISIS and is out to destabilise the destabilise to ISIS andisout within agents has secret for areferendumagainsttheEUrelocationprogramme. being raised about Poland’s membership of the EU. Thepar- of the Poland’s membership raised about being Kukiz’15 Justice Law and Paweł Kukiz No Won 8.8%ofthevoteinNovember2015elections 0/51 37/460 PORTUGAL Left Bloc

Number of seats in National Parliament 19/230 Number of seats in European Parliament 1/21 (European United Left/Nordic Green Left) Current performance in polls/recent elections Won 10% of the overall vote in 2015 elections, putting the party in third place Participation in government? No Current leader Catarina Martins

Meet the insurgents Views on foreign policy

During Salazar’s New State authoritarian regime (1933– In terms of international politics, the Left Bloc is highly 1974), only one party was legal: the National Union (União critical of transatlantic relations and NATO, globalisation, Nacional, UN), later renamed the National Popular Ac- and TTIP, and is mostly committed to reducing unfair trade tion (Acção Nacional Popular, ANP). The UN/ANP was and promoting an increasing convergence between North dissolved in the fi rst weeks of the coup that took place in and South. Not ignoring the violence associated with the April 1974, and a great variety of new parties soon replaced civil war in Syria and the instability created by ISIS, the Left it. Some political parties emerged very quickly because they Bloc is of the opinion that the roots of the refugee problem already existed in an embryonic state. That was the case for can be found in the policy of the West towards the MENA the Socialist and Portuguese Communist parties. By the be- region, especially the interventionist policies of the US and ginning of the early 1990s, only four parties regularly won some European powers. The party argues that sanctions seats in the Parliament, and two were so much stronger than against Russia make sense for now because of its annexa- the others that Portugal seemed to be well on its way to an tion of Ukrainian territory, but that the EU and the US still essentially two-party system. The two major parties – PS have a moral responsibility for the situation because of their (Socialist Party) and PSD (Social Democratic Party) – domi- attempts to strongly infl uence the Ukrainians towards the nated political life. The communists and the centre-right path of the Association Agreement. The Left Bloc does not conservatives were the two other political groups with seats believe that China should be granted market economy sta- in the Parliament. That changed with the creation in 1998 of tus, and does not approve of the country’s lack of respect for the Left Bloc, a new far-left party that is critical of the capi- individual rights. talist model of economic growth and opposes policymaking procedures that restrict popular participation. However, it also defends certain issues, such as new policies for drugs, gender equality, more rights to the LGBT community, and so on. Since its appearance on the Portuguese political scene, the Left Bloc has more or less monopolised the representa- tion of “new” political issues, trying to appeal to young, ur- ban, and more educated voters.

Views on Europe

The Left Bloc has been very critical of the EU, denouncing its neoliberal policies for only promoting inequality and privileges. It views the refugee crisis and the possibility of Brexit as major existential threats to the EU, but sees the EU as being on a path to disintegration regardless. It is very critical of the EU–Turkey refugee deal, viewing it not as a solution to the refugee problem, but instead as a means for Europe to clear its conscience of the problem.

29 30 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Views onEurope Area, and hopes this accession would help the country play a play country the help would accession this hopes Area, and Meet theinsurgents 2016, implicating former prime minister Victor Ponta and Ponta Victor minister prime former implicating 2016, The PND supports Romania’s decisions to take in a set num- Romania’s to takeinaset The PNDsupports decisions The PND is greatly infl uenced by the general trend in Ro- in trend general the infl by greatly uenced is PND The The NationalDemocraticParty(PND)isanationalistpoliti- In of aseriescorruptionscandalsthatshookthe spite oai i 21, fe Dn icnsu a cnitd of convicted was Diaconescu Dan after 2015, in Romania People’s Party –DanDiaconescu(PP-DD). People’s The PP-DDof- f i cially merged with the National Union for the Progress of Progress the for Union fi National the with merged cially al Liberal Party remain the two biggest and most inflmost and biggest two the remain Party Liberal al uential extortion. Thepartyhasmainlyfocusedonnationalissues. populist the from MPs former by 2015 in formed party cal despite thesacrifi cesthecountrymadetojoinEU. the EU.It crisis andstabilise chance toimprovetherefugee mania to adopt and promote anything European. The party European. anything and promote mania toadopt more active part in the refugee crisis. It sometimes feels that feels crisis. Itsometimes refugee more activepartinthe foreign citizensintoRomanian means tointegrate society. It the EU treatsRomania and abordercountry, the as anoutsider to the EU, and supports a European approach to the crisis. approach tothe a European EU, andsupports to the sees the refugee crisis and terrorism as the biggest threats biggest crisisandterrorismasthe refugee the sees strongly supports the accession of Romania to the Schengen the Romania to of accession the supports strongly of the deal aspositive because the EU–Turkeyrefugee sees his Social Democratic Party (PSD), the PSD and the Nation- PSD andthe his SocialDemocraticParty(PSD), the and 2015 throughout politics Romanian of levels highest political partiesinRomania. ber ofmigrants, taking intoaccountnationalcapacities,and Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats ROMANIA Daniel Fenechiu No 0.7% inJune2016elections 0/32 0/412 Views onforeignpolicy The PND believes that Romania’s security interests are interests that Romania’s security The PNDbelieves Transylvania by thepartyasan Motorway wasunderstood US or to TTIP NATO. The PNDislikelytobeopposed be- NATO; the failed and expensive deal between the Romanian the between deal andexpensive failed NATO; the attempt atwinningmembershipofNATO. gression in Ukraine, the PND has become unwilling to sup- to unwilling become PND has in Ukraine,the gression cept new members from the eastern neighbourhood to rein- neighbourhood eastern new membersfromthe cept ac- NATO should NATO’s. It believes with aligned closely cause ofconcernsabouttheRomanianmarket. of the Minsk agreement are fulfiare agreement Minsk the of mili- of supportive is It lled. nia has had to pay an extraordinary high price for joining price an extraordinaryhigh pay to had nia has tary actioninSyriaagainstISIS, in apartnershipwiththe state and US company Bechtel for theconstructionof and UScompanyBechtel state upholding the sanctionsagainstRussiauntilconditions upholding port cooperationwithRussiaonmanyissues,andsupports Since Romania actively positioned itself against Russianag- Since Romania itself actively positioned force its European pillar. However, it also feels that Roma- that feels also pillar. However,it European its force Democratic Party National SLOVAKIA SMER-SD Slovak National Party Freedom and Solidarity

Number of seats in National Parliament 49/150 15/150 21/150 Number of seats 4/13 (Progressive Alliance 1/13 (European Reformists in European Parliament of Socialists and Democrats) 0/13 and Conservatives) Current performance Won 12% of the vote in 2016 in polls/recent elections Won 28% of the vote in 2016 Won 8.6% of the vote in national national elections,, polling national elections elections, polling in fourth place in second place Participation in government? Yes – in coalition after 2006 elections, as a single-party government after 2012 elections, Yes, as part of 2006 and 2016 Formed part of the 2010 and in coalition since 2016 coalitions coalition Current leader Robert Fico Andrej Danko Richard Sulik

Meet the insurgents cerned about EU policies that respond to the refugee crisis, and in particular the relocation scheme, which is viewed as SMER-SD, Slovakia’s largest political party, was created being taken forward “against the will of member states”. They after splitting from the Party of the Democratic Left, the are sceptical about key aspects of the EU–Turkey refugee successor to the Communist Party, in 1999. By 2005, it led deal, including visa liberalisation, terming them blackmail. in Slovakian opinion polls with 30 percent support. In 2006, Freedom and Solidarity agrees that the refugee crisis poses it was suspended from the Party of European Socialists for a threat, but is also strongly concerned about the potential of inciting racial hatred, but was allowed to join again in 2008 Brexit contributing to the disintegration of the EU. after pledging to respect European values. After forming a coalition government in 2006, in 2012 it became the fi rst Views on foreign policy single-party government in Slovakia since 1993. SMER-SD takes a pragmatic approach towards Russia – ar- The Slovak National Party (SNS), a junior party in the guing that it should support Ukraine immediately. The par- current governing coalition, was founded in 1989, and has ty believes strongly in NATO and indeed expansion to new three ideological pillars – Christianity, nationalism, and members in the neighbourhood. There are mixed views on socialism. It has courted controversy for its infl ammatory TTIP in both SMER-SD and SNS, and the government par- rhetoric against Roma and Hungarian people. ties are strongly opposed to intervention in Syria.

Freedom and Solidarity, founded in 2009, is a relatively new Freedom and Solidarity, on the other hand, is supportive anti-corruption liberal opposition party that served as part of the Russian sanctions, but also of negotiating a DCFTA of a coalition government in 2010. It is also Eurosceptic, with Ukraine and the country’s eventual NATO accession. and in favour of reform of EU bureaucracy, but cooperates It believes in EU-level cooperation with all global actors in- within the European Conservatives and Reformists group of cluding Russia, Turkey, and the US on the EU’s current chal- the European Parliament. lenges. It reserves judgment on TTIP, but does not believe that China should have market economy status. Views on Europe

For the government parties (SMER-SD and SNS), the refugee crisis, and what they see as the inextricably linked terrorist threat, supersede all other threats to the EU, although other issues – the eurozone crisis and the Ukraine crisis – also pre- occupy them somewhat. These parties are also deeply con- 31 32 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Views onEurope fe giig t idpnec i 19, lvna started Slovenia 1991, in independence its gaining After Meet theinsurgents 7 and 10 percent. The party has so far had to deal with a high hog te 00, h nme ad tegh f smaller of strength and number the 2000s, the Through Both parties favour EU reform inordertoachievemore Both partiesfavourEU Parliament atthenextelections. as theSlovenian Peasant Union, the party–whichisnow grip onthepowerwas,withshortinterruptionsandsup- extent on the crisis of more traditional/centrist parties. On more traditional/centrist crisis of on the extent entered Parliament. Its support has since oscillated between oscillated has since Parliament. Its support entered a 2004, Until infl life. exert political to on continued uence and during theformerregimeremained present established equal representationin decision making – theZL in particu- of Slovenia, of theCommunistPartystructure. a successor of refugees, they believe the jury is still out, but are sceptical out, but jury isstill the believe they refugees, of ZL), a coalition of social democratic and green parties, was parties, green and democratic social of ZL), coalition a just below the 4 percent parliamentary threshold – recently parliamentary threshold the 4percent just below the traditionally timid foreign policy of Slovenia, is creat- Slovenia, is of policy foreign traditionally timid the of Party) is SLS (SlovenianPeople’s centre-right, the the transitioning to a liberal democracy. The political structures political democracy. The a liberal transitioning to to monetary and economic matters. In the context of the ref- the of context matters. In the and economic monetary to ing wavesnationally. The partyhasachancetogainseatsin the eff ectiveness of the EU–Turkey deal in reducing reducing in ows fl deal EU–Turkey eff the the of ectiveness stable support within the electorate, which depends to some which depends electorate, within the support stable support for havingsupport bornethe bruntofarrivals. Regarding launched theideaof“GreatSlovenia”which,withregardto 2008 in Formed policy. foreign of terms in note particular duea levica, parties begantogrow. The UnitedLeft(Združena by LiberalDemocracy port ofsmallercoalitionparties,held level of heterogeneity, cleavages within its ranks, withinits and un- cleavages of heterogeneity, level ugee crisis, should begivenmore the ZL that Greece ugee believes lar calls forfairer governance oftheEU,particularlyrelated formed to contest the European and national elections, and and nationalelections, European the formed tocontest Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats SLOVENIA Joint leadershipbetweenfounderparties No Won 6%ofthevotein2014nationalelections 0/8 6/90 Views onforeignpolicy For boththeSLS andtheZL, therefugeecrisishasitsroots Ukraine, orUkrainianaccessiontotheEUNATO, but Regarding Ukraine, bothpartiesadvocateabroadlysup- Brexit isparticularlylikelybut,in the eventthatitdoeshap- concerned withthenegativeimpactthatsanctionshaveon ests to work together eff together work to ests that believes party Neither ectively. open. The SLS, on the other hand, thinks it is important toit is thinks hand, other SLS,on the The open. resume fullcooperationwithRussiainthefuture, andis the ZL is broadly in favour of keeping the path to accessionpath to the of keeping favour broadly in is the ZL the intentionofunderminingstabilityinregion”. tion oftheEU,ratherthancreateadominoeff ect. inter- have common-enough sides two the ultimately that in theMiddleEast. TheZL termedit“militaryextortion in theinterventionistpolicyofUS,supportedbyEU, positions ontheEU–Russiasanctions, theDCFTAwith portive rolefromtheEU. Neitherpartyhasfullydeveloped pen, they feel that this could contribute to greater consolida- to greater contribute that thiscould feel pen, they Slovenian businesses. by NATO and political extortion by the US and EU withEU and US the by extortion political NATO and by People’s Party Slovenian Left United Marko Zidanšek No Won 3.98%ofthevotein2014nationalelections 1/8 (European People’s Party) 0/90 SPAIN Podemos

Number of seats in National Parliament 71/350 Number of seats in European Parliament 5/54 (European United Left/Nordic Green Left) Current performance in polls/recent elections 21.1% in June 2016 elections (in coalition with the United Left) Participation in government? No Current leader Pablo Iglesias

Meet the insurgents Views on foreign policy

Spain has traditionally combined a pro-European rhetoric Podemos, along with other upcoming parties in Spain, did with a geopolitically minded approach, but this changed in not engage particularly on foreign policy to begin with, and 2015 when traditional politics was shaken up by the rise of therefore failed to challenge a more passive and inward- new parties. Podemos was founded in March 2014 by politi- looking Spanish policy that has dominated in recent years. cal scientist Pablo Iglesias in the aftermath of protests against However, this has changed somewhat because of the ac- inequality and corruption. Podemos is a left-wing party made cumulation of crises. It emphasises national sovereignty up of grassroots coalitions channelling the discontent of “in- and human rights in its approach towards foreign policy, dignados” and a general disaff ection in the public with main- but in relation to Russia and some Latin American coun- stream parties. It is motivated by the European debt crisis, tries, these principles are not necessarily followed through and is seeking to remedy the problems of inequality, unem- on. On Syria, Podemos rejects the international coalition ployment, and economic malaise, as well as a democratic re- against ISIS, and believes that working with Bashar al- generation and even generational cleavage. Podemos seeks to Assad and Russia is part of the solution. It is very critical curtail the eff ects of the Lisbon Treaty and has called for a of the Ukrainian government and its treatment of political renegotiation of austerity measures. It has a focus on citizens’ opposition, and opposes ongoing sanctions against Rus- involvement, transparency, and accountability. Its geograph- sia. The party is also critical of NATO and believes Europe ic priorities on foreign policy, as for most Spanish parties, are needs a new security structure that includes Russia and the EU, Latin America, and the Mediterranean/North Africa. Ukraine. In its recent manifesto it sets out a need to “neu- In Latin America, it has very strong ties with Venezuela, and tralise the destabilising role of NATO in Eastern Europe abstains in the European Parliament on resolutions critical of and freeze the current borders of the alliance”. Economi- the Venezuelan government. cally, it believes in strong trade protection instruments to secure jobs and protect EU social and environmental stan- Views on Europe dards. It is against market economy status for China, and leads the opposition against TTIP in Spain. Podemos sees the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis as the main threats to the EU. It has strongly criticised the inaction of the Spanish government in hosting refugees, and is creat- ing local networks to support the reception of asylum seekers.

It is worried about a loss of sovereignty for member states, especially on fi nancial matters, and shares close ties with Syriza on this issue. It is critical of intra-EU fi nancial sup- port packages with reform strings attached. It is strongly opposed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal because of human rights considerations, to the point where four Podemos law- makers organised a hunger strike. Podemos opposes Brexit, but is also against the EU–UK renegotiation deal and other special arrangements for the UK, fearing that this hampers the construction of a more social Europe. 33 34 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER refugees. They have zero tolerance for irregular migration. refugees. Theyhavezerotoleranceforirregularmigration. favour ofresettlingalimitednumber ofthemostvulnerable flrefugee manage in to are Syria and to ows support increased providing advocate Democrats Sweden The liberalisation. visa fulfi gaining to for supposed l is Turkey that conditions the to eye blind a turn will Commission European the that fears also party The fl elsewhere. refugee ows pushes and members EU solution. In their view, it only increases Turkey’s infl uence over terranean butdonotseetheEU–Turkeyrefugeedealas Medi- the via EU the to crossings sea illegal further prevent to trol oftheirnationalborders.TheSwedenDemocratsarekeen Schengen arrangementthatgrantsmemberstatesgreatercon- They opposeSwedisheuromembership,andtheywantanew such astheeconomy,organisedcrime, andbordercontrol. accession, arguingthatmoreworkneedstobedoneonissues sion, buttheyalsofeelitistoosoontobediscussingUkraine’s They opposefurtherenlargement,inparticularTurkishacces- dum totriggerasimilardebateinSwedenonEUmembership. making withintheUnion. TheyaspiretousingtheUKreferen- sceptical ofwhattheyperceive assupra-nationaldecision- highly are and EU the of critical are Democrats Sweden The Views onEurope since allotherpoliticalpartiesrefusetocooperatewiththem. decades, theyhaveneverservedinacoalitiongovernment, Democrats havebeengrowinginstrengthelectorallyrecent ticulturalism infavourofintegration. AlthoughtheSweden mul- rejects it and immigration, managing and values, family a strongdomesticpolicyfocusonlawandorder,“traditional” has and 1988, in founded was party The position. swing-vote tion partywhichiscurrentlySweden’s thirdlargestandina the SwedenDemocrats, asociallyconservative anti-immigra- Centre PartyandtheChristianDemocrats.Theeighthpartyis centre-right partiesaretheModerateParty,Liberals, the the SwedishSocialDemocraticParty,andGreenParty. The Party, left-of-centre partiesaretheLeftin theParliament. The Sweden hasamulti-partysystemandcurrentlyeightparties Meet theinsurgents Current leader Participation ingovernment? in polls/recentelections Current performance in EuropeanParliament Number ofseats in NationalParliament Number ofseats SWEDEN Jimmie Åkesson No 13% ofthevotein2014nationalelections(third place) 2/20 (Europe ofFreedom andDirect Democracy) 49/349 ket economystatus. a viewonChina’s mar- Democrats donotcurrentlyexpress Sweden The expelled. been have recently Putin’s policies to more sympathetic members party Some and Crimeaceases. of Ukraine met, andRussiandestabilisation tions arefully Minsk condi- the normalisation ofrelations until oppose Russia, and against sanctions EU continuing in favourof are broadly They settlement. dispute investor-state garding reservations re- some – with view TTIP positively ever, they vote onsoon.How- Riksdag will the NATO andthat with has signed thatSweden Host NationSupportAgreement the against is party The level. current Sweden’s beyond go not joiningit, arguing thatcooperationshould crats oppose Demo- Sweden and the NATO of a member not is Sweden Views onforeignpolicy Democrats Sweden UNITED UKIP KINGDOM

Number of seats in National Parliament 1/650 Number of seats in European Parliament 22/73 (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy) Current performance in polls/recent elections 18% on 3 June 2016 Participation in government? No Current leader Nigel Farage

Meet the insurgents Views on foreign policy

Since 1990 there has slowly been a rise in the prominence UKIP is strongly sceptical of Western interventionism, par- of anti-establishment parties. The British National Party ticularly in the Middle East. The actions of the EU and the was the most prominent in the 1990s and the early 2000s, US since 2011 are seen as having exacerbated the confl ict in gaining 6.3 percent in the 2009 European election. How- Syria, in particular through the continued refusal to aban- ever, with the rapid rise of UKIP since 2010, the BNP has don the demand for Assad to step down, and the provision of become a fringe party. UKIP was founded as a single-issue military aid to groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Along- party with the aim of taking the UK out of the EU. However, side Germany’s “refugees welcome” policy and regime and since Nigel Farage took over leadership of UKIP in 2009, rebel violence in Syria, it sees these actions as key contribu- it has achieved signifi cant electoral success, with a slightly tory factors to the EU’s refugee crisis. It is highly critical of broader right-wing populist agenda, and a particular focus the EU–Turkey deal on the basis that it “rewards Turkey for on reducing immigration to the UK. In the 2010 national what it should have been doing anyway”. elections, its share of the vote remained very low, at around 2–3 percent. But, in the 2014 European Parliament elec- UKIP believes in extensive cooperation with Russia on a tions, it secured 27.5 percent of the vote, becoming the larg- range of international issues, from Syria to refugees and ter- est UK party in the European Parliament, with 22 MEPs. It rorism. The party opposes sanctions on Russia, which are struggles to secure seats at Westminster. In the 2015 gener- seen as ineff ective and counterproductive. UKIP sees the al election, UKIP gained a substantial 12.6 percent share of extension of the EU’s infl uence in Eastern Europe as one of the vote, yet secured only a single MP. UKIP also has three the main triggers of Russian intervention in Ukraine, and party members in the House of Lords. would like to see sanctions lifted and co-operation with Rus- sia properly restored. Views on Europe UKIP is opposed to TTIP, and does not believe that China UKIP has achieved its aim of securing a majority vote for a should be given market economy status. British exit from the EU. Throughout the early 2010s, UKIP was able to apply pressure from the right of the political spectrum, infl uencing public debate and pushing the Con- servative Party towards a more open embrace of Euroscepti- cism in an eff ort not to lose votes to UKIP.

Though its focus is on the UK in the EU, it would welcome the dissolution of the EU altogether, and sees the eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis as potential triggers for this, since they expose serious tensions between member states. In particular, UKIP highlights attempts to push through the relocation deal as an example of unacceptable EU interfer- ence which exacerbates inter-state tensions and leads to fur- ther dislike of the EU in many countries. 35 36 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Denmark Annex: Where dopartiesstandonvariousissues? Republic Bulgaria Belgium Country Croatia Finland Estonia Austria Cyprus Czech Vlaams Belang Austria Freedom Partyof The FinnsParty Unity Party ofPeople’s Estonia People’s Partyof Conservative Party Danish People’s Coalition Dawn -National zens Party ofFreeCiti- KSCM AKEL Most Human ShieldParty Patriotic Front Ataka Party Supports Russia sanctions? Supports NATO? Supports limiting immigration? disintegration? Supports EU Supports Russia Supports Supports limiting Supports EU Country Party sanctions? NATO? immigration? disintegration?

Front National

France French Communist Party

Alternative for Germany

Germany Die Linke

ALFA

SYRIZA

Independent Greece Greeks

Golden Dawn

Fidesz

Hungary

Jobbik

Ireland Sinn Fein

Five Star Movement

Italy

Lega Nord

National Alliance

Latvia Social Democratic Party “Harmony” 37 38 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER Kingdom Lithuania Romania Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Sweden Nether- Country Poland United Malta Spain lands Imperium Europa Party Order andJustice Labour Party Party UK Independence Sweden Democrats Podemos Party Slovenian People’s United Left Solidarity Freedom and Party Slovak National SMER ic Party National Democrat- Left Bloc Kukiz’15 Party Law andJustice Party forFreedm Party Supports Russia sanctions? Supports NATO? Supports limiting immigration? disintegration? Supports EU About the authors Acknowledgements

Susi Dennison is co-director of the European Power Pro- Firstly we would like to thank our associate researchers for gramme and senior policy fellow at ECFR. Her recent pub- their hard work, for providing a picture of the political sit- lications at ECFR include “One hundred years of British uation in their country and the role of the insurgent parties solitude: Magical thinking about Brexit and security” co- therein, and in many cases for reaching out to new communi- authored with Mark Leonard and Nick Witney, “Bear any ties as part of this. We would also like to thank Ivan Krastev, burden: How EU governments can manage the refugee cri- Mark Leonard and Vessela Tcherneva for their invaluable sis” coauthored with Josef Janning, the “European Foreign input on the direction of this paper. ECFR’s national offices Policy Scorecard 2016”, “The road back to European Pow- gave us extra guidance on the situation in their countries, er” (both with other ECFR authors) and “Europe’s neigh- with Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, in particular, providing impor- bourhood: crisis as the new normal”, with Nick Witney. tant insights from Paris. Hannah Stone and Gareth Davies managed to unite all of these voices in their editing, and Mar- Dina Pardijs is coordinator of ECFR’s European Power pro- co Ugolini provided clarity in graphics and design. gramme. She is also co-author of “Brits abroad: How Brexit could hurt expats” (2016). She has previously worked at the European External Action Service and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation in the Hague and Brussels.

39 40 ECFR/181 June 2016 www.ecfr.eu THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EUROPE’S INSURGENT PARTIES: PUTIN, MIGRATION AND PEOPLE POWER www.ecfr.eu institutions. or individuals to grants make not does but with otherworks in think partnership tanks and organisations ECFR policy. EU foreign avalues-based for advocate and ideas our publish to us allow donors These entities. corporate and andFoundations other foundations, generous individuals Society Open by the funded charity aregistered is ECFR •  •  •  that defineitsactivities: ECFR hasdevelopedastrategywiththreedistinctiveelements values-based Europeanforeignpolicy. across Europeonthedevelopmentofcoherent,effectiveand objective istoconductresearchandpromoteinformeddebate first pan-Europeanthink-tank.LaunchedinOctober2007,its The ABOUT ECFR and communications. Our officesareplatformsforresearch,debate,advocacy in Berlin,London,Madrid,Paris,Rome,SofiaandWarsaw. ECFR, uniquelyamongEuropeanthink-tanks,hasoffices A physicalpresenceinthemainEUmemberstates. Emma BoninoandMabelvanOranje. within theirowncountries.TheCouncilischairedbyCarlBildt, and feedbackonpolicyideashelpwithECFR’s activities thematic taskforces,membersprovideECFRstaffwithadvice meets onceayearasfullbody. Throughgeographicaland from theEU’s memberstatesandcandidatecountries–which politicians, decisionmakers,thinkersandbusinesspeople distinguished CouncilofovertwohundredMembers– A pan-European Council.ECFRhasbroughttogethera reaches out to strategic media outlets. reaches outtostrategicmediaoutlets. debates, and“friendsofECFR”gatheringsinEUcapitals; publishes policyreports;hostsprivatemeetings,public a pan-Europeanfocus.ECFRproducesoriginalresearch; out innovativeresearchandpolicydevelopmentprojectswith researchers andpractitionersfromalloverEuropetocarry ECFR hasbroughttogetherateamofdistinguished Developing contagiousideasthatgetpeopletalking. European CouncilonForeignRelations(ECFR)isthe

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