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The Chain of Being : A Hierarchy of Morality Mark J. Brandt and Christine Reyna Perspectives on Psychological Science 2011 6: 428 DOI: 10.1177/1745691611414587

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Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 Perspectives on Psychological Science 6(5) 428­–446 The Chain of Being: A Hierarchy of Morality © The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1745691611414587 http://pps.sagepub.com Mark J. Brandt and Christine Reyna DePaul University, Chicago, IL

Abstract For centuries, philosophers, theologians, and scientists have used the idea of the Great Chain of Being to rank all beings, from demons to animals, humans, and gods, along a vertical dimension of morality. Although the idea of a chain of being has largely fallen out of academic favor, we propose that people still use an embodied vertical moral hierarchy to understand their moral world. This social cognitive chain of being (SCCB) encapsulates a range of research on moral perception including dehumanization (the perception of people as lower on the SCCB), anthropomorphism (the perception of animals as higher and the perceptions of gods as lower on the SCCB), and sanctification (the perception of people as higher on the SCCB). Moral emotions provide affective evidence that guide the perception of social targets as moral (e.g., elevation) or immoral (e.g., disgust). Perceptions of social targets along the SCCB enable people to fulfill group and self-serving, effectance, and existential motivations. The SCCB serves as a unifying theoretical framework that organizes research on moral perception, highlights unique interconnections, and provides a roadmap for future research.

Keywords emotion/affect, social cognition, morality

In 1936, Arthur Lovejoy published his seminal book on the of a perceptual moral hierarchy. Jonathan Haidt and his col- history of the Great Chain of Being, an idea that had its root in leagues (Haidt, 2003a, 2006; Haidt & Algoe, 2004) were the Plato and Aristotle and continued to influence theologians, first to explore these ideas from a social psychological per- philosophers, and natural scientists until its eventual fall from spective. Building on cross-cultural research connecting academic favor during the industrial revolution. The original immorality with “down,” pollution, and animality and con- chain of being, or scala naturae as conceived of by Aristotle, necting morality with “up,” purity, and divinity, Haidt pro- was used to represent all things, whether they were living and posed that people perceive others along a vertical sacred breathing animals, photosynthesizing plants, or lifeless rocks dimension anchored by the animal and the divine.1 The pur- and minerals. Everything had a place on the chain and every pose of this article is to build on the work by Haidt and his link of the chain was occupied. As the idea of the chain of colleagues in order to more fully develop the SCCB as a theo- being progressed, it became less a dimension of existence in retical framework used to organize and elaborate research on general and became a dimension of morality (Russell, 1988). the perception of the morality of social targets. The top of the chain expanded from humans (presumably the The SCCB allows us to capture a diverse range of theory most complex and “perfect” animal) to saints, angels, and and research under the same conceptual umbrella and helps to supernatural deities. Humans were repositioned toward the develop theoretical connections between otherwise indepen- middle of the chain, with animals slightly lower. The bottom dent lines of inquiry. Haidt and his colleagues primarily half of the chain included a hierarchy of increasingly evil focused on the vertical nature of purity/divinity and its asso- demons and ending with Satan himself. The present analysis ciation with the moral emotions (Haidt, 2003a, 2006; Haidt & uses this version of the chain of being to represent a theoretical Algoe, 2004). We include an expanded review of these two framework we call the social cognitive chain of being (SCCB). areas, but also broaden the scope of the SCCB by describing This framework describes the processes and perceptions that perceptions of morality more broadly (not just in the domain help humans organize their moral universe. We argue that the of purity/divinity) and by integrating a wider range of research vertical moral continuum of the chain of being persists in peo- on dehumanization, anthropomorphism, and sanctification ple’s conception and perception of their social world, allowing people to perceive others and themselves along the continuum Corresponding Author: from devilish to divine. Mark J. Brandt, DePaul University, 2219 North Kenmore Avenue, From the basic description of the chain of being as a verti- Chicago, IL 60614, USA cal moral hierarchy it becomes possible to sketch the outlines Email: [email protected]

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 A Hierarchy of Morality 429 that highlights changes in perceived moral standing along the lives (including ourselves) in an effort to understand our socio- SCCB. We propose that morality is the common underlying moral universe and to guide our moral responses to its occu- dimension connecting these diverse domains of research. pants. The metaphor that “up” is associated with the divine and “down” is associated with evil is ancient and has persisted across time and cultures (Haidt, 2003a; Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Predictions of the SCCB Russell, 1988). This metaphor may help map the abstract con- There are three fundamental predictions of the SCCB that per- cept of morality onto the concrete representation of vertical tain to the verticality of moral perceptions, the importance of space (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). As a result, morality location along the chain of being in determining how people can become socially situated and embodied via visual and spa- perceive and treat social targets, and the role of emotions in tial experience. Although other social dimensions (e.g., power signaling one’s position along the chain of being. and authority) can also be associated with verticality (e.g., Schubert, 2005), the SCCB specifically focuses on the vertical nature of morality. Perceptions of morality are on a On the left of Figure 1 is a potential conceptualization of vertical continuum several targets along a vertical continuum ranging from the Akin to the original conceptualization of the chain of being ultimate good down to the ultimate evil. The highest target on (Bynum, 1975; Lovejoy, 1936/1964; Russell, 1988), the SCCB this SCCB is God. Although theoretically any entity that rep- represents a vertical moral continuum that ranges from the resented the ultimate good could occupy the top of the chain of most immoral and evil of social targets to the most virtuous being based upon a person’s own idiosyncratic beliefs, for and good. We predict that this vertical moral hierarchy is used much of the world some sort of moral supernatural deity likely to rank all of the social targets we perceive throughout our occupies this post. For example, recent polls find that 92% of

Ultimate Good Governing Processes Affective Cues

Moral Cues •Awe •Elevation Sanctification • Pride •Self-Satisfaction

Deity Anthropomorphism

Social Cognitive Chain of Being

Animalistic Anthropomorphism

Immoral Cues Dehumanization •Contempt •Disgust •Shame •Guilt

Ultimate Evil

Figure 1. An illustration of the social cognitive chain of being (SCCB) and its associated governing processes and affective cues

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Americans believe in God or another type of “universal spirit” social targets up or down the SCCB. As illustrated with the and 75% believe in angels (Gallup, 2011; see also Sedikides, four arrows, several mostly independent literatures have 2010). Similarly, at the bottom of the chain of being is a repre- developed in social psychology that describe the processes of sentation of the Devil—a supernatural agent that 70% of perceiving a social target as it falls down the chain of being Americans believe in (Gallup, 2011)—however, once again (deity anthropomorphism and dehumanization; e.g., Haslam, whoever or whatever represents the ultimate evil will vary 2006; Morewedge & Clear, 2008) and as it rises up the chain across people and cultures. Between humans and the ultimate of being (animalistic anthropomorphism and sanctification; good likely resides humans that people perceive to be particu- e.g., Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Pargament & Mahoney, larly virtuous (e.g., saints) and perhaps angels or other moral 2005). Past work has outlined how dehumanization and ani- supernatural agents (e.g., lesser Gods that are perceived to malistic anthropomorphism represent corresponding inverse have some imperfections). Between humans and the ultimate processes governing the perception of humans as animal-like evil likely reside humans that people perceive to be immoral and the perception of animals as humanlike (Waytz, Epley, & (e.g., terrorists, Nazis), as well as animals. We do not take a Cacioppo, 2010); however, our SCCB theoretical framework position on the objective morality of any particular attitude, lets us postulate that deity anthropomorphism and human (or behavior, or social agent. Instead, we assume that people are animal) sanctification are also corresponding inverse pro- relatively idiosyncratic in their perceptions of virtue and vice cesses that track the perception of the divine as more human (cf. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), though there may be and humans as more divine. some things that most people in a given culture find to be moral (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Nonetheless, it is this perception of morality that Emotions cue locations on the SCCB and is important to our work here. coordinate social action Our third prediction, consistent with Haidt’s conceptualization of the chain of being, is that the emotions associated with Location on the SCCB is consequential moral judgments can serve as affective cues to the location of and dynamic social targets along the chain of being (Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Our second prediction is that the positioning of a social target Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1983). on the SCCB has profound consequences for both the per- For example, a target that elicits disgust or contempt by violat- ceiver and the social target. To the extent that the SCCB repre- ing moral values will be perceived as less than human (e.g., sents a moral hierarchy, one would expect that social targets Rozin et al., 2008) and thus lower down the moral hierarchy, that are considered less moral (on the bottom half of the whereas a target that upholds sacred values elicits awe and SCCB) would be perceived as more animal-like and, in elevation and will be perceived as more saint-like (e.g., Haidt, extreme cases, even akin to demons and devils. Conversely, 2003a) and thus higher on the hierarchy (see right column of social targets that are considered especially moral (on the top Figure 1). Moreover, because emotions can provide strong half of the SCCB) would be perceived as more saintlike and, affective evidence for the morality of a particular social target, in some extreme cases, even akin to God. Similarly, if people priming a moral emotion prior to the evaluation of a target are portrayed as animal-like, they will be perceived as less should also influence moral judgments of the target. These moral and lower on the chain of being, whereas if people are moral emotions provide people with information about the portrayed as more godlike, they will be perceived as more appropriate response to the social target (e.g., avoid or reject moral and higher on the chain of being. Thus, we are propos- vs. approach or accept). ing that the perception of humanity, animality, and divinity have a bidirectional and mutually reinforcing relationship with the moral hierarchy of the SCCB. The perception of social tar- The goal of the SCCB gets as more or less human will have implications for the treat- The goal of this article, and the conceptualization of the SCCB, ment of those targets, such that those lower on the chain will is to provide a broad, inclusive framework for thinking and be excluded and punished for their moral violations and those theorizing about morality. We examine the three predictions of higher on the chain will be promoted for their moral virtues the SCCB and reconceptualize various literatures and research and protected from the undesirable influences and effects of traditions that can be understood in new ways through their the more secular world. shared connections with the SCCB. It is important to note that the perceived location of a social target along the chain of being is not necessarily fixed—it can be changed depending on a perceiver’s current motivational The SCCB as a Vertical Moral Hierarchy state or a person’s perception of the morality of a target’s Throughout history, the chain of being was thought to be a behaviors across time. Thus, entities can acquire or fall from vertical continuum—an idea that was captured not only in how grace depending on the morality of their actions. The middle people spoke about the chain (e.g., humans are above animals, portion of Figure 1 represents the potential movements of Gods in heavens on high) but also in artistic representations of

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 A Hierarchy of Morality 431 the chain. Following this historical precedent, the SCCB also positioning the head and eye gaze downward (e.g., Keltner, proposes that perceptions of morality fall along a vertical con- 1995; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Conversely, emotions that tinuum in which the moral, the righteous, and the divine are are indicative of virtue and success, such as pride, are charac- perceived as “up” and the immoral, the evil, and the animals terized by a more open and upward posture (e.g., Tracy & are perceived as “down” (Haidt, 2003a; Haidt & Algoe, 2004). Matsumoto, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2007). The early experi- Indeed, cross-culturally moral thinking is often associated ence with moral good coming from above and the upward and with vertical metaphors. For example, a moral member of downward bodily orientations of some of the moral emotions society is “an upstanding citizen” who is “on the up and up,” may provide common physical experiences necessary to “scaf- whereas an immoral person is “down and dirty.” God is said to fold” the more complex, higher mental processes of the per- reside “up in the heavens,” whereas Satan was sent “down to ception of morality (see Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). In hell.” Animals are often thought to be beneath humans. addition, art often represents ideas akin to the chain of being, This view proposes that the vertical metaphors we use to depicting morality up high and evil down low, which poten- describe the relationship between gods, humans, animals, and tially allows moral cognition to build on this cultural represen- the Devil, as well as people who are more or less moral, are tation (cf. Garcia-Marques & Ferreira, 2009). The verticality not coincidental, but instead reflect the influence of visual and of morality may continue to persist because it provides a meta- spatial bodily experiences in situating the abstract concept of phor with which to concretely think about morality based on morality. Our position is consistent with theory and research in people’s cross-culturally shared experiences across the life cognition, and social cognition in particular, that suggests span and social contexts. mental processes are situated and embodied in our physical experiences (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Empirical evidence for the association and Ric, 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004; M. Wilson, 2002). That is, embodiment of verticality and morality the body, its sensory-motor systems, and its physical and per- The proposition that there exists a perceived vertical moral ceptual experiences are implicated in both online cognition hierarchy that is situated in visual space via metaphors is sup- and the reliving of an event, providing concrete feelings that ported by several recent studies that are part of a larger trend enhance cognition. to incorporate metaphor into models of social cognition (see The metaphor of the moral and sacred as “up” and the Landau et al., 2010). This research has found, in general, that immoral and evil as “down” provides a mediating link between concepts associated with morality and righteousness are asso- the abstract concept of morality and its association with visual ciated with higher visual space, and concepts associated with space (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; see also Gibbs & immorality and evil are associated with lower visual space, Matlock, 2008; Johnson, 2007; Landau, Meier, & Keefer, providing a match between the concepts, the metaphors, and 2010). This link allows people to think about the abstract con- spatial cognition. For example, studies using the Implicit cept of morality and divinity with the help of physical experi- Association Test have found that the concepts of moral and ences and reference points, thereby enabling one to enrich and immoral and God and Satan are more quickly associated with more fully understand the abstract concept. Metaphors may be concepts of up and down, respectively (Meier, Hauser, et al., particularly apt at explaining and structuring abstract thought 2007; Meier, Sellbom, & Wygant, 2007). Others have demon- with physical experiences because they are ubiquitous (Gibbs, strated that priming the concept of up increases prosocial 1994), easy to comprehended (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990), behavior more than does priming the concept down (Sanna, readily represented in physical experiences (Gibbs & Matlock, Chang, Miceli, & Lundberg, 2011). 2008; N. Wilson & Gibbs, 2007), and by definition are con- Beyond these conceptual associations, research has demon- nected with abstract ideas. strated that perceptions of morality are situated within our There are developmental, socio-emotional, and cultural experience of visual space. Positive words (e.g., gracious, reasons for the association between verticality and morality. heaven) are evaluated more quickly when the word appears Our experiences as infants may be an early contributor to higher, and negative words (e.g., devil, nasty) are evaluated the development of a vertical hierarchy of morality (Meier, more quickly when they appear lower (Meier & Robinson, Sellbom, & Wygant, 2007). As infants, rewards in the form of 2004). Moreover, the mere act of evaluating a word as positive food, and moral behavior in the form of love and helping, or negative is enough to activate upward-directed or downward- often literally come “from above” (i.e., from adults; Tolaas, directed spatial attention, respectively. Additional studies have 1991), providing an initial link between higher vertical loca- found that positivity biases spatial memory upward, and nega- tions and morality. Perhaps more concretely, people respond to tivity biases spatial memory downward (Crawford, Margolies, moral emotions by directing their gaze and posture either Drake, & Murphy, 2006). Neurologically, the classification of upward or downward, depending on whether the emotion sig- words as positive or negative uses the same neural networks nals a violation or virtue. Shame and embarrassment, emo- used to categorize the vertical location of geometric shapes on tions that indicate a person (often the self) has violated a a computer screen (Quadflieg et al., 2011). Meier, Sellbom, & personal or social norm, are cross-culturally characterized by Wygant (2007) found that “moral” words (e.g., caring, charity,

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 432 Brandt and Reyna nurture) were evaluated more quickly when they were pre- Summary sented in a higher position but that “immoral” words (e.g., cor- rupt, dishonest, evil) were evaluated more quickly when they Morality appears to be widely represented as a vertical hierar- were lower. Two other sets of studies revealed that concepts chy, perhaps as a result of early life experiences that link posi- related specifically to God and to the Devil were associated tive and moral outcomes to experiences associated with higher with vertical locations, consistent with the SCCB (Chasteen, visual space and the immoral or repugnant with things often Burdzy, & Pratt, 2010; Meier, Hauser, et al., 2007). It is impor- found in lower visual space. As a result, the SCCB is situated tant to note that Meier and colleagues (Meier, Hauser, et al., in visual and physical space as a vertical experience that can 2007) expanded the study beyond the use of words and con- facilitate metaphorically consistent cognition and behavior, cepts. Images representing God and the Devil were remem- indicating that the SCCB is an integral part of human’s social bered more accurately when they appeared in metaphorically cognition that is deeply intertwined with our experiences. consistent vertical locations, and these effects could not be explained by differences in power. The association of morality with vertical space does not Movement Up and Down the just remain cognitive, but is affected by the body’s position in Chain of Being: Dehumanization, vertical space and manifested in moral or immoral behaviors. Anthropomorphism, and Sanctification In a recent set of studies, Sanna and colleagues (2011) found that people were more charitable after riding up an escalator The next step in outlining the SCCB is to describe the than after riding down an escalator. Moreover, people were processes and consequences of perceiving social agents— more helpful and less aggressive if they walked up onto a whether humans, supernatural agents (both evil and divine), stage to complete a study rather than if they walked down into or animals—along this moral hierarchy. The framework of an orchestra pit. Thus, the movement and positioning of the the SCCB, as we have conceived it, predicts that as the per- body up or down leads people to act in more moral or immoral ception of social targets moves down the chain of being from ways. divine to devilish, the social target will be perceived as more Taken together, these results provide evidence that moral immoral and deserving of blame, exclusion, and discrimina- concepts (including positive and negative evaluations and rep- tion, thus indicating that the perceiver no longer believes the resentations of God and Satan) and behaviors are intimately target is worthy of care and concern. Conversely, as the per- tied to vertical spatial cognition and movement, facilitating ception of social targets moves up the chain of being, from metaphor-consistent processing and behavior. The SCCB devilish to divine, the social target will be perceived as more takes the consistent research mapping vertical metaphors to moral, deserving of support, protection from secular encroach- morality and the empirical results connecting morality with ments, and worthy of care and concern. Therefore, where an vertical space as evidence that the SCCB is grounded in our entity is perceived along this chain will have profound conse- bodily experiences associated with verticality. quences for how it is treated by those making the moral judgment. Dehumanization (e.g., Haslam, 2006), anthropomorphism Alternative metaphors for morality (e.g., Epley et al., 2007), and sanctification (Pargament & There are other possible metaphors of morality that situate and Mahoney, 2005) represent powerful examples of this subjective embody moral cognition in physical experiences. For exam- placement of entities along the chain of being and provide a ple, the metaphors of morality and immorality as clean bulk of the evidence in support of these predictions (see also and dirty (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010; Zhong & Figure 1). Dehumanization represents the perception of humans Liljenquist, 2006) or light and dark (Meier, Robinson, & as less than human (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000) and con- Clore, 2004) situate moral cognition in experiences with stitutes a move downward on the chain of being.2 The anthropo- cleanliness and colors. These multiple metaphors associated morphism of gods (i.e., deity anthropomorphism), represents with morality are an example of metaphorical pluralism the perception of moral supernatural agents as closer to humans (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) that serves to enrich, rather than (Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009; detract from, our conceptual understanding of morality. Morewedge & Clear, 2008) and also constitutes movement Although these metaphors may represent completely indepen- down the chain of being. Sanctification, the attribution of divine dent conceptualizations of morality, it may also be the case and sacred characteristics to a social target (Pargament & that these other metaphors are associated with the vertical Mahoney, 2005), and the anthropomorphism of animals and metaphors already discussed. For example, Haidt (2003a) objects, the attribution of human traits to nonhuman animals pointed out that purity and pollution are also related to a meta- (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), represent movement up the phoric vertical continuum, which indicates that vertical and chain of being. cleanliness metaphors may be related. Similarly, to the extent The specific location of a given entity along the SCCB can light colors serve as a proxy for cleanliness and dark colors are vary across individuals. For example, people whose moral a proxy for dirtiness, this metaphor too may be associated with identity is important to the self are more likely to treat all verticality. people as a part of their moral community, showing more

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 A Hierarchy of Morality 433 compassion and less aggression toward innocent members of 2000, 2001)—can result in greater discrimination (Pereira, threatening outgroups (e.g., children from Afghanistan shortly Vala, & Leyens, 2009), as evidenced by less group-based guilt after the attacks on the World Trade Center; Reed & Aquino, for past atrocities (Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2003). Others may not value humanity (i.e., have low 2008), less intergroup forgiveness (Tam et al., 2007, 2008), “humanity-esteem”) and may not consider human beings any and fewer helping behaviors (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; more moral than dogs or cats, leading them to denigrate other Zebel et al., 2008) toward the infra-humanized group. People people and groups (Luke & Maio, 2009). Regardless of indi- and groups who are perceived to violate values are denied vidual and group variations, we expect that when an agent is assistance and resources (e.g., Henry & Reyna, 2007; Henry, perceived higher or lower on the SCCB, the agent will be met Reyna, & Weiner, 2004; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, with either moral praise or condemnation and will be deemed 2006; Sears & Henry, 2005; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993), face worthy of protection or punishment, respectively. greater punishment following negative outcomes (e.g., Reyna, Brandt, & Viki, 2009), and are more likely to be kept at a greater physical and psychological distance (Skitka et al., Moving down the chain of being: 2005). Even infants as young as 6 months old preferred a pup- from divine to devilish pet who demonstrated moral behavior (by helping another Our theoretical framework of the SCCB predicts that the lower puppet climb a hill) rather than a puppet that violated moral a social target is perceived on the chain of being, the worse standards (by pushing another puppet down a hill; Hamlin, treatment they will receive. These perceptions increase the like- Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and 3-year-olds use similar kinds of lihood that the social targets would face derision, exclusion, and information to determine whether they should provide help to discrimination, culminating in hate crimes, torture, and even a person who violated moral norms (Vaish, Carpenter, & genocide (Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990, 2001; for a review see Tomasello, 2010). Similar consequences emerge following Haslam, 2006). We propose then that perception of social tar- deity anthropomorphism. God, typically perceived as a moral gets as less moral will be associated with perceptions of that supernatural agent, is attributed more blame when perceived target as lower on the chain of being (e.g., as less than human) as sharing characteristics with humans (e.g., communication, and greater instances of discrimination and exclusion. thought, self-control) and thus has the potential to fall lower In support of our first proposition, the processes and conse- on the chain of being (H. M. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). In quences of dehumanization appear to be rooted in moral judg- sum, social targets lower on the chain of being are not per- ments and the protection of values. As Struch and Schwartz ceived as deserving the same moral consideration as those (1989, p. 366) asserted, “The greater the perceived dissimilar- who are higher up. ity between in-group and out-group in their hierarchies of basic values . . . the more inhuman the outgroup is perceived to be.” Preliminary evidence (Reyna, Brandt, Viki, Hughes, & Moving up the chain of being: Benson, 2010) demonstrates that the violation of cultural and from devilish to divine moral values can lead to dehumanization, even the dehuman- According to the SCCB theoretical framework, when social ization of value-violating ingroup members—a group whose targets are perceived as higher up the chain of being, they will humanity is typically protected (cf. Leyens et al., 2001). More- be treated more positively, receiving protection and beneficial over, when people and groups are perceived as less than human treatment. Unfortunately, psychology—especially social psy- they are often excluded from one’s moral universe (Opotow, chology—has focused less on the perception of social targets 2001) and receive less compassion and empathy (Bandura, as morally worthy, perhaps because the negative social conse- 2002). Some researchers have even found that the perception quences of dehumanization, negative evaluations, and value of a group as violating important values is related to the per- violations demands more immediate attention (e.g., Cuddy ception of that group as demonic (Pargament, Trevino, et al., 2007; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Opotow, 1990, 2001). Mahoney, & Silberman, 2007; Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney, & Nonetheless, there is some evidence for our predictions. Trevino, 2008). Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the Anthropomorphizing nonhumans. The research that does exist connection between immorality and dehumanization, how- shows that people who chronically anthropomorphize nonhu- ever, is the extreme dehumanization of the Devil (Demoulin, mans are more likely to think it is morally wrong to destroy a Saroglou, & Van Pachterbeke, 2008). Overall, this research super-computer, a bed of flowers, and a motorcycle (Waytz, supports the idea that an entity’s perceived position along the Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), granting these inanimate objects a SCCB is rooted in moral judgments. sense of moral concern when they were infused with human The perception of a person or group as lower on the chain qualities. When people were primed with the idea that humans of being also has punitive consequences, such that dehuman- and animals are similar, they were more likely to humanize ized groups face greater blame and punishment following immigrants—a group that is typically dehumanized (Hodson & undesirable outcomes (Bandura, 1999; Goff, Eberhardt, Costello, 2007)—and have more empathy for immigrant Williams, & Jackson, 2008). Even more subtle forms of dehu- groups than were people primed with the idea that humans and manization—often called infra-humanization (Leyens et al., animals are not at all similar (Costello & Hodson, 2010).

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Similarly, as others have argued (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, Furthermore, people attempt to protect sacred values from 2010), perceiving animals as more human and higher on the secular encroachments (e.g., monetizing values; Tetlock, Kris- chain of being is a key component in the debate over whether tel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) and use sacred values to or not animals can be treated as property or can be killed for determine perceptions of justice (Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Mul- food (e.g., Morton, Burghardt, & Smith, 1990). Presumably, if len, 2002). In general, the sanctification of values, goals, and animals have minds similar to humans, then they are worthy of behaviors promotes them and keeps them separate from the moral care, empathic concern, and mercy from extreme servi- contamination of secular, “earthly” concerns. Similarly, it tude or the butcher’s block. Where animals fall on this vertical would be expected that people who uphold a perceiver’s val- continuum would likely vary across culture, individuals, and ues and morals would be sanctified; thus, the sanctified person types of animals depending on how moral the animals are per- or group would be more likely to receive support for these ceived to be. For example, house pets (who may be seen as values and relationships. loyal) may be placed higher than vermin and perhaps some morally questionable humans. Sanctification. Other research has examined sanctification, Theoretical inversions or the infusion of social targets with sacred characteristics The perceptions of social targets as being up or down the (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005)—a movement up the chain of chain of being are considered inverse processes in the frame- being. The idea that people can become saints, popular in the work of the SCCB, such that both processes share inverse Roman Catholic Church, may be a concrete manifestation of underlying components. Research on both dehumanization this process. Saints are typically human beings who are seen as and the anthropomorphism of animals supports this conceptu- morally righteous and are thereby granted some divine status. alization (Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). For example, One recent study (Brandt & Reyna, 2010a) found that saints studies examining anthropomorphism and dehumanization are perceived as more sacred than the self and human groups, often borrow each other’s measures of humanity (cf. Leyens but as less sacred than God—an idea that is consistent with the et al., 2001; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), interpreting the chain of being. As particularly moral targets, those who are attribution of human traits to animals as anthropomorphism or sanctified (and the values they embody) will likely be pro- the denial of human traits to humans as dehumanization. moted, protected, and treated with more care and concern. Beyond methodological interpretations, this inverse relation- Other programs of research provide indirect support for our ship between anthropomorphism and dehumanization exists at hypothesis. For example, social identity theory is predicated a neural level. Anthropomorphism activates the medial pre- on the notion that people will perceive even the most minimal frontal cortex (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010)—the same ingroup as favorable (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This identi- brain area implicated in social cognition more generally fication with a group leads to actions and behaviors that sup- (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Inversely, the medial prefrontal cor- port the values and interests of the groups, including collective tex is activated less for dehumanized targets than it is for other action for low-status groups (e.g., Derks, van Laar, & human targets (Harris & Fiske, 2006), suggesting that dehu- Ellemers, 2009) or support for the current status-hierarchy for manization and anthropomorphism may manifest as inverse high-status groups (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), suggesting neurological processes. at the very least that people favor members of their groups and According to the SCCB, the sanctification of humans and attempt to protect and promote those groups. Other research the anthropomorphism of moral supernatural agents may be finds that people have more positive attitudes towards groups inverse processes of one another, a possibility that heretofore who uphold their moral values (Graham et al., 2011). has not been considered. As researchers continue to study the Other research on sanctification that has not examined the attribution of human and sacred traits to social targets, tests of perception of social targets is also largely supportive of our this hypothesis may be especially fruitful in understanding the predictions. For example, people who sanctify their marriages commonalities in how we perceive and attribute morality. are more likely to have stable marriages (Mahoney, Parga- ment, Murray-Swank, & Murray-Swank, 2003), people who sanctify the environment are more likely to make donations to Summary environmental causes (Tarakeshwar, Swank, Pargament, & The idea of the chain of being as a moral hierarchy provides Mahoney, 2001), parents who sanctify parenting are more a unique way to understand the processes and consequences committed to parenting values that they deem to be important of organizing our worlds along this moral hierarchy, whereby (A. Murray-Swank, Mahoney, & Pargament, 2006), college the placement of entities up and down this chain results in students who sanctify sex are more likely to have sex and feel distinct and often profound consequences for both the target more satisfied with sex (N. A. Murray-Swank, Pargament, & and the perceiver. The SCCB also allows us to conceptualize Mahoney, 2005), college students who sanctify their body are and integrate sanctification with the heretofore distinct more likely to take care of their body (Mahoney, Carels, et al., anthropomorphism and dehumanization literatures and pro- 2005), and people who sanctify their goals are more likely to poses that all of these processes share common underlying spend time on those goals (Mahoney, Pargament, et al., 2005). features.

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The Moral Emotions as Markers of Morality often associated with perceptions of immorality and dehuman- Along the Chain of Being That Guide Social ization or sacredness and the divine, respectively, indicating Judgments and Decision Making that these diverse research areas are intimately connected. Disgust. Disgust serves a variety of functions and is elicited Emotional reactions to social targets shape our perceptions of by many kinds of stimuli. For example, the initial function of the location of social targets on the chain of being, such that disgust was likely to motivate people to avoid disease-causing positive moral emotions indicate that the social target is more agents and materials, such as rotten food, sick people, and human or closer to the divine and negative moral emotions body products (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Rozin et al., indicate that the social target is less human and closer to ani- 2008; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). Co-opted mals (or worse; Haidt, 2003a; Rozin et al., 2008). Past work from its original function, disgust also helps regulate sexual has argued that emotion and intuition play an important role in behavior, discouraging people from engaging in sexual acts judgments of morality (Damasio, 2003, 1994/2005; Haidt, with certain people (e.g., close relatives) who would be less 2001) by allowing us to make quick intuitive judgments about likely to produce genetically healthy offspring (Tybur et al., the morality of an attitude or behavior (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; 2009). Disgust can promote and perpetuate moral standards Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009). and norms by discouraging moral transgressions (Jones & Research across several fields using diverse methods has Fitness, 2008; Rozin et al., 2008; Tybur et al., 2009) in terms found that moral judgments are tightly bound to emotional of both violations of divinity and purity (Horberg, Oveis, reactions (e.g., see Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, Damasio, 1999; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 1999) and justice and fairness (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mullen Anderson, 2009; Danovitch & Bloom, 2009; Moretti & & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011).3 di Pellegrino, 2010).5 Finally, feelings of disgust help us The SCCB borrows from work on the social functions of avoid that which reminds us of our animal nature, including emotions (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Schwartz & Clore, 2007; particular behaviors (e.g., some sex acts) or groups of people Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) to propose that these (Goldenberg et al., 2001; Rozin et al., 2008). gut level emotional reactions serve as information regarding a According to the SCCB, disgust, as an emotion that signals target’s location along the chain of being (Haidt, 2003a; Haidt & moral violations or animalistic behavior, is elicited when a Algoe, 2004; cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The emotions people person or other entity is perceived as lower on the chain of experience in relation to social targets (e.g., disgust) provide being (e.g., is dehumanized) or otherwise engages in a behav- affective cues to the moral standing of those targets along the ior that lowers their position along the chain via his or her chain of being (e.g., immoral). These emotions provide quick violation of moral values (e.g., Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & information about the perceived morality of a target so that a Mihic, 2008). People often feel disgust when confronted with person can make appropriate decisions and take appropriate a violation of a moral virtue (Chapman et al., 2009; Horberg action regarding the target (e.g., avoid or reject). These emo- et al., 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Rozin et al., 1999). For tional reactions can be self- or other-referential, which is impor- example, when people are given unfair offers in the Ultimatum tant to note because it makes clear the SCCB can be applied to Game, their disgust facial motor action program is activated, both the perception of others as well as the self. and they are more likely to report greater disgust (Chapman A variety of emotions could potentially serve as affective et al., 2009). Moreover, dehumanized social targets activate cues to one’s position along the SCCB, though it is likely that areas of the brain consistent with feelings of disgust, providing these emotions are consistent with past lists of moral emotions some evidence that it can serve as an affective cue felt in reac- (Haidt, 2003b; see also Figure 1). These include negative emo- tion to perceptions of people being lower than other humans tions directed toward others like anger, contempt, and disgust; on the SCCB (Harris & Fiske, 2006; see also Sherman & negative emotions directed toward the self like shame and Haidt, 2011). guilt; positive emotions directed toward others like awe and A corollary of the SCCB’s perspective on disgust is that elevation; and positive emotions directed toward the self like activating disgust will make moral judgments harsher because pride and self-satisfaction.4 Although the specific eliciting the activated disgust indicates to the person that the target conditions of the various moral emotions may differ, we argue should be perceived as lower on the SCCB. Several studies that they all serve the similar purpose of cueing people to the have attempted to either prime or induce disgust. Wheatley location of social targets along the SCCB. In the following and Haidt (2005) hypnotized people to associate an innocuous section, we highlight research on several of the moral emo- word (e.g., “often”) with disgust. When the participants subse- tions that can serve as affective markers on the chain of being: quently read paragraphs about moral violations, paragraphs disgust, elevation, guilt, and shame. containing the hypnotized word were perceived as more mor- ally wrong than paragraphs that did not contain the hypnotized word. Similar results were found when disgust was manipu- Disgust and elevation lated using a bitter tasting liquid (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, Disgust and elevation have been previously connected to the 2011). Activated disgust also increases perceptions of unfair- chain of being (Haidt & Algoe, 2004). These emotions are ness and the rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game

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(Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010). Taking an individual differ- Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982). Feelings of shame go a ence approach, people who were chronically perceptive of dis- step further, such that people see the transgression as having gust were more punitive mock jurors and more likely to view negative implications for the self and, thus, the behavior as (mock) defendants as evil (Jones & Fitness, 2008). In sum, more stable (Niedenthal et al., 1994; Sabini, Garvey, & Hall, disgust can serve as an indicator of a target’s immorality, cuing 2001; Tangney, 1992; Tangney et al., 1996; Tracy & Robins, the observer to perceive the target as lower on the chain of 2006, Weiner, 2006). being. Targets who commit moral violations elicit disgust, and In the context of the SCCB, self-referential moral emotions disgust elicits harsher judgments of moral violators—effects like guilt and shame serve as a cue that one has violated social consistent with the perspective presented here. norms and values in some way and has moved down the chain Elevation. Just as people who trigger disgust are perceived of being. For a person who has committed a moral violation, as immoral and less than human, people who trigger positive the experience of guilt serves as a reminder of the immorality moral emotions, such as elevation, will be perceived as par- of the behavior, perhaps motivating the person to make up for ticularly virtuous and more than human. Elevation is the their misdeed and regain their moral status (Regan, 1971). “emotional response to witnessing acts of virtue or moral People who are unable to regain their moral status may turn to beauty” (Algoe & Haidt, 2009, p. 106; see also Haidt, 2003a). self-punishment (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli, 2011; Nelissen & Although virtuous acts may not be as salient as acts of evil, Zeelenberg, 2009) and exhibit depressive symptoms (Kim, people can often witness virtue in action (e.g., acts of altru- Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011), suggesting they still perceive ism). Rather than being an emotionally neutral experience, themselves as lower in status on the SCCB and in need of witnessing virtue and moral excellence is a positive experi- correcting. ence that may make a person feel more open or warm in his The intrapersonal function of guilt and shame is augmented or her chest (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Vianello, Galliani, & by an interpersonal function that motivates people to make up Haidt, 2010) and release oxytocin (Silvers & Haidt, 2008). for their misdeeds and regain moral status on the SCCB by Witnessing moral virtue, and the associated appraisal of vir- repairing damaged social relationships. In some cases, this tue, can help motivate the person experiencing the emotion could mean that an individual confesses and apologizes for his to engage in prosocial behavior. These effects are largely dis- or her transgression or that he or she will strive to behave more tinct from other positive emotions (e.g., joy, amusement; morally toward the victim in the future (Baumeister, Stillwell, Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010; & Heatherton, 1994; de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, Vianello et al., 2010). 2008; Ketelaar & Tung, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, Elevation, especially, is connected with the perception of a 2007). People also use displays of guilt and shame to demon- target as more than human and closer to the divine (Haidt, strate their knowledge of their moral failing to others around 2003a; Haidt & Algoe, 2004). The primary elicitors of eleva- them. Such displays may help repair an individual’s position tion are the blurring of the “human–god divide” (Haidt & along the SCCB by convincing others that the individual Algoe, 2004, p. 285) and the perception of righteous virtuous knows he or she has violated social mores and will attempt to behaviors—conceptually, the opposite of the elicitors of dis- avoid similar transgressions in the future (e.g., Davis & Gold, gust (Rozin et al., 2008). Elevation is also similar to the per- 2011; Gold & Weiner, 2000). ceptions of sanctification described previously. Just as elevation is a reaction to righteousness, sanctification occurs when people perceive other humans as sacred and closer to the Summary divine and is often measured by the attribution of traits such Emotions and intuitions provide people with compelling evi- as righteous, holy, inspiring, heavenly, and blessed (Mahoney dence of the morality of a behavior and can cue the location of et al., 2003). Feelings of elevation then provide an affective a target as above or below human along the SCCB. More than cue that a virtuous other is indeed closer to the divine and just serving as cues to the location of others along the SCCB, higher up the SCCB. moral emotions—such as guilt—can be used to cue people to their own location along the SCCB and motivate action to repair lowered status on the SCCB. Guilt and shame Guilt and shame are perhaps the traditional moral emotions. These are self-referential emotions that are thought to be Perception Along the Chain of Being is caused by moral violations or the transgression of social Influenced by Self- and Group-Serving, expectations and norms (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Effectance, and Existential Motivations Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). When a person feels guilty, they feel regret or remorse for the specific trans- So far, we have discussed how judgments of morality along a gression and believe their behavior is potentially changeable vertical chain of being can be used to organize our social (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1992; world. Although there is ample evidence that we use moral Tangney et al., 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Weiner, 2006; hierarchies, it is equally important to establish why we are

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 A Hierarchy of Morality 437 motivated to make such judgments and why we might be com- justifying their group’s actions and maintaining their group’s pelled to place certain entities or groups in certain positions perch on the chain of being. This strategy seems to be espe- along this chain. Along with its organizing and simplifying cially prevalent for people who see their ingroup as particu- function, the use of a hierarchical moral framework helps us larly moral and worthy (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & fulfill important motives and goals that not only allow us to Giner-Sorolla, 2010). achieve personal stability and fulfillment, but allow better Protection of the ingroup’s moral standing does not only take coordination and stability within our social groups. Although place in intergroup contexts. Building on the black sheep effect these goals can have many day-to-day manifestations, prior (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994), which asserts that violators of research has established that self- and group-serving, ingroup norms are derogated in an attempt to maintain group effectance, and existential motives likely influence percep- cohesiveness, Reyna and colleagues (Reyna et al., 2010) found tions along the SCCB. that ingroup value violators are dehumanized more than both ingroup and outgroup value upholders as well as outgroup value violators, perhaps in an effort to exclude the source of moral Self and group enhancement threat and preserve the moral standing of the ingroup. Perhaps the most basic motivations associated with the SCCB are those related to the enhancement of the self and one’s group. People across the world like to perceive themselves and Effectance motivations their groups in a positive light, allowing them to feel that they People are motivated to accurately understand their world in are of value and worth (e.g., Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Steele, order to effectively and competently function within it (White, 1988; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). People perceive themselves as 1959). These effectance motivations include the desire for especially virtuous and moral, predicting that they would be control, predictability, and understanding of one’s environ- more likely to act in a more virtuous way than the average ment. In line with recent theorizing (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., person (Balcetis, Dunning, & Miller, 2008; Epley & Dunning, 2010), this broader conceptualization of effectance motivation 2000). Similarly, morality is the characteristic most important serves to unite a variety of motivations often considered sepa- to positive group evaluation (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, rately, including, for example, the need for closure (Kruglan- 2007), and people are prone to view their own groups more ski & Webster, 1996), need for control (Burger & Cooper, positively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), more valuable (Cikara, 1979), intolerance of inconsistency (Feather, 1964), and intol- Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Pratto & Glasford, 2008), erance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962). We propose that and more human (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & effectance motivations also play a role in the perception of Leyens, 2005; Leyens et al., 2000, 2001; Viki et al., 2006) than social targets along the SCCB, because the SCCB helps peo- outgroups. Moreover, people more strongly link outgroups (in ple to organize and understand their moral worlds. comparison with ingroups) with animal images (Boccato, Knowing the moral standing of people, animals, and super- Capozza, Falvo, & Durante, 2008) and more quickly discrimi- natural agents allows a person to interact more effectively with nate between ambiguous ingroup and animal images than these entities and correctly anticipate their future behaviors ambiguous outgroup and animal images (Capozza, Boccato, (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). Andrighetto, & Falvo, 2009). By perceiving one’s self or one’s Although these perceptions are not necessarily accurate, they groups as higher up the SCCB, a person can see himself or are likely accurate enough to provide a useful heuristic in most herself and those they associate with as especially moral—or social interactions. According to this perspective, most people at least not as immoral as others. would utilize the SCCB, as most people would benefit from Other research speaks more directly to the motivational the ability to understand and predict the behaviors of other aspect of perceiving one’s self or group higher up the SCCB. people. Studies that have examined the vertical metaphor People elevate their moral standing after threats to the self associated with the perception of God and Satan have rarely (Jordan & Monin, 2008) and reject others who threaten their found interactions with participants’ self-reported religiosity moral self (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008). If people are (Chasteen et al., 2010; Meier, Hauser, et al., 2007; with the motivated to see their own groups as more human than other exception of Meier, Hauser, et al., 2007, Study 1), suggesting groups, then information that threatens this standing should that even the nonreligious utilize a vertical moral hierarchy to cause people to differentiate their own group from other organize and understand their moral world. groups. This differentiation should serve to bolster their Moreover, this perspective predicts that people who are not group’s standing on the moral hierarchy of the chain of being. motivated to understand morality will not use the SCCB. For example, Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) reminded par- Meier and colleagues (Meier, Sellbom, & Wygant, 2007) ticipants of their groups’ responsibility in past atrocities com- found that people who score high on a scale of psychopathy do mitted against an outgroup (e.g., White Americans’ historical not use a vertical dimension to understand moral and immoral treatment of Native Americans). They found that after remind- concepts. Psychopaths are generally less concerned with ers of their group’s moral lapse, participants were more likely behaving morally (e.g., Hare, 1996), and measures of psy- to dehumanize the outgroup harmed by their ingroup—thereby chopathy are inversely associated with the perception of

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 438 Brandt and Reyna unscrupulous behaviors (e.g., “selling illegal drugs,” “stealing more likely to act independently and are less likely to rely on from a neighbor,” “a student cheating to get good grades”) as interacting effectively with others (e.g., Galinsky, Magee, immoral or disgusting (Tybur et al., 2009). Thus, psychopaths, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Thus, powerful who are less morally motivated, are less likely to organize individuals should be less likely to consider the humanness of their moral universe along a vertical dimension (or any dimen- other people. For example, people in high-power positions sion at all). were more likely to dehumanize other people than were people The link between the SCCB and motivations for people to in low-power positions (Lammers & Stapel, 2010). These interact effectively with their environment has been more exten- results further suggest that a similar, but inverse, motivation sively studied in the realm of anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, underlies both anthropomorphism and dehumanization (see Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). also Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). Because people are quite familiar with fellow humans, perceiv- ing animals as more humanlike (and thus higher along the SCCB) enhances their predictability. Thus, when people are Existential motivations motivated to make accurate predictions about their environ- The SCCB is also affected by existential motivations—that is, ment, they will be more likely to anthropomorphize animals motivations involving the pursuit of ultimate personal mean- when around animals. For example, people are more likely to ing and purpose in life. By perceiving one’s self or group as attribute human qualities and compare animals directly with higher on the chain of being than other people, groups, or ani- humans when animals behave in unpredictable ways than they mals, a person may be able to view their life as having more are when animals are already behaving predictably (Epley et al., moral meaning and purpose. Terror management theory (TMT; 2007). This effect was exacerbated for participants who more Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991, 2004) most chronically need to control and understand their environment clearly encapsulates this existential motivation. Following the (Burger & Cooper, 1979). In another study, participants asked to writings of Ernest Becker (1973) and other existential philoso- write in anthropomorphic terms about a nonhuman target (e.g., phers, TMT asserts that people, as rather advanced animals, a puppy shown in a video) reported a greater understanding of know they will eventually die. Rather than directly coping the stimulus and expressed a greater ability to predict its future with the anxiety associated with their ultimate demise, people actions than did participants asked to describe the puppy “like a associate with cultural institutions, norms, and beliefs in behaviorist would,” using only the objective behaviors of the an effort to demonstrate to themselves and (presumably) oth- puppy (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). ers that they are worthy members of society who live mean- Deity anthropomorphism may also be due, in part, to an ingful and purposeful lives. The threat of death, for example, effort to satisfy an effectance motivation. Unfortunately, human increases religious beliefs and belief in commonly anthropo- beings often face negative and unpredictable events, such as morphized supernatural agents (e.g., Norenzayan & Hansen, natural disasters or accidents that threaten people’s feelings of 2006; Vail et al., 2010). certainty, control, and predictability. Rather than blaming these One line of research from TMT finds that people can events on chance, randomness, and the general chaos of life, defend against the threat of death by seeing themselves as people turn to commonly humanized supernatural agents distinct from their animal counterparts (Goldenberg, 2005; (K. Gray & Wegner, 2010; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000). Laurin, 2008; Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & Galinsky, 2010). The chain of being, religious texts, and scientific writings all Other research finds that religious beliefs and individual differ- portray humans as somehow special, whether it is because ences in effectance motivation are often correlated, including they are on top of the hierarchy of being, are made in God’s the need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010b; Saroglou, 2002), image, or are more evolved. Despite these beliefs, humans are intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962), and intolerance of actually quite similar to animals, and animals are known to inconsistency (Feather, 1964). This research has not specifically die, making animals an uncomfortable reminder that we too examined the anthropomorphism of divine agents in the face of will one day die. However, if people are able to see humans as threats to effectance motivation. However, to the extent that further from animals on the SCCB, they may be more likely belief in divine agents and anthropomorphism of the same to see existence as more meaningful and enduring. Another divine agents are correlated (cf. Guthrie, 1993; Waytz, Cacioppo, example of this is Goldenberg and colleagues’ (2001) study & Epley, 2010, Study 1), we can suggest, preliminarily, that the showing that reminders of death increase liking of an essay anthropomorphism of the supernatural—perceiving divine describing the dissimilarities of humans and animals. Death supernatural agents as lower on the SCCB—would help to ful- related primes also increased feelings of disgust, especially fill effectance needs. disgust related to animals (e.g., cockroaches) and the body Just as the motivation to understand and interact effectively (an intimate reminder of our similarity to animals). Additional with the environment may lead to humanizing animals, studies have found that people reminded of death and mortal- objects, and gods, the inverse of effectance motivation—a ity often shy away from behaviors that humans share with decrease in the need to interact effectively and an increase in animals (e.g., breastfeeding; Cox, Goldenberg, Arndt, & independence—should predict dehumanization (Waytz, Epley, Pyszczynski, 2007) or inhibit uncivilized behaviors (e.g., pel- & Cacioppo, 2010). People who are in positions of power are vic thrusts; Goldenberg; Heflick, & Cooper, 2008). In sum,

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 A Hierarchy of Morality 439 these studies show that by separating the self from animals, Recent treatments of the psychological processes of dehu- people are better able to cope with the threat of death. manization and anthropomorphism have focused on the attri- In addition to managing the fear of death by humanizing bution of personality traits and emotions that are more or less the self, people can also defend against death by humanizing uniquely associated with humanity (e.g., Haslam, 2006; Ley- important ingroups. Building on research showing that people ens et al., 2001; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; for some identify with ingroups to manage death related thoughts (Cas- exceptions, see, e.g., Boccato et al., 2008; Capozza et al., tano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002), Vaes, Heflick, and 2009; Goff et al., 2008). The SCCB considers these traits and Goldenberg (2010) theorized that people may also view the other uniquely human qualities as proxies for the underlying ingroup as especially human compared with an outgroup when dimension of morality. As people perceive human social tar- mortality concerns are made salient. In three studies across gets as less moral, more animal-like, and thus lower on the two cultures, these researchers found that people attributed chain of being, people will attribute fewer uniquely human more uniquely human traits to their ingroup following mortal- traits and emotions to these targets (e.g., Reyna et al., 2010). If ity salience than did those in a control condition, and they people are portrayed as lacking uniquely human qualities, they found that attributing humanness to an ingroup actively buf- will be perceived as less moral, more animal-like, and lower fers against death-thought accessibility. Finally, although not on the chain of being. Similarly, the attribution of sacred traits measuring dehumanization directly, TMT has demonstrated to social targets influences the perceptions of the target as that violence and extreme derogation toward members of more moral and closer to God, and the perception of moral worldview-violating groups helps people cope with the threat virtue influences the attribution of sacred traits. Thus, we are of death (McGregor et al., 1998; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). asserting that the uniquely human and sacred traits identified Overall, these studies demonstrate that perceiving people who by past researchers (e.g., Haslam, 2006; Mahoney et al., 2003) violate one’s cultural worldview as lower on the SCCB and have a bidirectional, mutually reinforcing relationship with thus unworthy of moral care and concern can provide people the SCCB. Morality, then, is the common dimension connect- with a sense of meaning and purpose that buffers the anxiety ing research on anthropomorphism, animalistic dehumaniza- of eventual death. tion, and sanctification. In the course of this treatment of the chain of being, we built on the important work of others who have started to Summary explore some of these processes (Haidt, 2003a, 2006; Haidt & Motivations to see one’s self and one’s group as moral and Algoe, 2004). For example, others have theorized that anthro- deserving of value; to understand, predict, and control one’s pomorphism and dehumanization may be related (Waytz, environment; and to have a sense of existential meaning all Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010) or that the moral emotions can serve contribute to the perceptions of social targets up and down the to alert us to the morality or immorality of social targets (Haidt chain of being. This review of the motivations that shape per- & Algoe, 2004). We have incorporated these interrelation- ceptions along the SCCB highlight the similarities between ships, but we have also gone beyond them to include addi- the diverse research programs encapsulated by the SCCB and tional processes and literatures such as human sanctification provides evidence that the SCCB can serve as a unifying theo- and the likely embodiment of morality along a vertical retical perspective for these varying domains. continuum. We also described several underlying motivations for when people are more or less likely to alter their perception of a target Concluding Remarks and Future Direction as more than human and closer to the divine or less than human Perceptions of morality and their associated emotions are impli- and more akin to animals or worse. The motivations to view cated in a wide range of psychological and behavioral conse- ourselves and our groups as moral, to understand and predict quences that can be either prosocial, such as charity and our social worlds, and to feel a sense of meaning and purpose altruism, or destructively antisocial, such as torture and geno- situate perceptions along the chain of being such that moral per- cide. The SCCB is a broad framework for understanding the ceptions can be altered depending on a person’s current motiva- diverse range of processes and consequences associated with tional state. The positioning or repositioning up and down the the perception of morality and can include, as targets of judg- chain of being can have consequences for how groups are ment, the full range of entities from animals to people and from treated following the gain or loss of moral standing. Overall, our demons to gods. According to the SCCB, the rich and varied theoretical framework of moral perception is largely consistent body of work on dehumanization, anthropomorphism, sanctifi- with Smith and Semin’s (2004) situated approach to cognition, cation, and moral emotions can be encapsulated under a com- which suggests (among other things) that cognition is embod- mon conceptual umbrella. Moreover, the SCCB predicts that all ied, is used for action, and is situated in interactions between the of these processes are similarly embodied via a vertical meta- agent and the situation. phor that associates the ultimate good, righteousness, and the Despite the vast amount of research on moral perception, sacred as “high” and the ultimate evil and pollution as “low.” the many unique predictions and connections between

Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 440 Brandt and Reyna literatures predicted by the SCCB framework have not all Acknowledgments received empirical attention. For example, research has not examined the proposition that the anthropomorphism of gods We gratefully acknowledge Ralph Erber, the Laboratory of Social and the sanctification of humans are inversely related. Like- Science Research at DePaul University, and the editor and reviewers wise, moral emotions, dehumanization, anthropomorphism, from the journal for their helpful comments on this manuscript. and sanctification should all be associated with vertical embodiment. More direct testing of these predictions is nec- Declaration of Conflicting Interests essary. Although the SCCB focuses on a vertical metaphor of The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect morality that facilitates the situation and embodiment of to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. morality in vertical space, other metaphors have been used to Funding describe morality, including light and dark (Meier et al., 2004), clean and dirty (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), and a The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- moral circle (Singer, 1981). The extent these different meta- ship, and/or publication of this article. phors are interrelated or distinct in their effects on the embodi- ment of morality and moral judgments are important avenues Notes for future research. 1. In addition to a vertical dimension of morality, Haidt and col- Another key concept associated with the SCCB that has not leagues’ model also posited a horizontal dimension of closeness and been fully tested in terms of its situation and embodiment in liking and a second vertical dimension of power and authority that vertical space is the perception of animals. We suspect that will not be discussed here because they are not necessarily perceived animals (in general) are likely to fall below humans in the as moral dimensions. SCCB, given that animals are generally not considered capa- 2. Haslam (2006) distinguishes between two types of dehumaniza- ble of moral reasoning. However, this specific hypothesis has tion. The first is the denial of traits that make humans unique from received scant attention. As an initial piece of evidence, ani- animals. The second is the denial of traits that define human nature. mals and dehumanization are often associated with vertical The denial of uniquely human traits (i.e., animalistic dehumaniza- figures of speech, such as “animals are beneath humans” tion) is associated with morality and most closely maps onto the (Haslam, 2006). This hierarchical placement of humans above conception of the SCCB. Thus, this article focuses on this type of animals is prevalent, even among biologists and other scien- dehumanization. tists (e.g., Mogie, 2007; Nee, 2005). 3. This is not to claim that morality and the experience of emotions In addition, the research presented on dehumanization, and other affective states are the same thing, nor that one is necessary sanctification, and anthropomorphism relied on a variety of for the other. Other psychological and neurological processes influ- measures of humanness and sacredness. In order to more ence moral judgments as well as emotions (see, e.g., Greene, directly compare the effects of the perception of social targets Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer, & up and down the chain of being, researchers should develop a Hauser, 2009; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, measure that can effectively capture the perception of a variety 2005). The important point is that moral decision making appears to of targets along the chain of being. One such possibility is the be guided by emotions to a significant degree. measure of sanctification that consists of the attribution of 4. These latter emotions are not always considered moral emotions sacred-related traits to a particular social target (e.g., Mahoney (for a discussion see Haidt, 2003b). However, to the extent these et al., 2003). From the perspective of the chain of being, we emotions indicate to the individual that they are engaging in virtuous would expect that human groups would be attributed moderate behavior, they can serve a moral function within the framework of levels, moral supernatural agents would be attributed high lev- the SCCB (see Weiner, 2006). els, and immoral agents would be attributed low levels of 5. There is some controversy over whether disgust reactions in sacred traits (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2010a). response to violations of justice and fairness are in fact disgust Across time and culture, people have been motivated to (Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009). The critiques argue that disgust is conceptualize their world in moral terms. The chain of being primarily a reaction to violations of sacredness and purity, whereas provides a moral barometer for evaluating the self and others anger is likely the prototypical emotional response to violations of on this important social dimension, indicating where a par- justice and fairness. Thus, disgust may be serving as a proxy for an ticular person, animal, or supernatural being is positioned emotion such as anger. Even so, this kind of result would still be within their moral universe. These classifications provide consistent with the SCCB, which predicts that a variety of negative guidance for how entities should be perceived and treated, moral emotions, including anger, can cue people to the location of and the resulting emotions and behaviors that help to keep the the social target along the SCCB. Recent research has demonstrated moral order intact. The SCCB serves as a unifying theoretical that tasting a disgusting liquid increases moral condemnation toward framework that organizes research on moral perception, high- violators of both the moral domains of purity (e.g., second cousins lights unique interconnections, and provides a roadmap for engaging in consensual incest) and fairness (e.g., a student stealing future research. library books) (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011), which indicates that

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