DOCSLIB.ORG

Science Perspectives on Psychological

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Science Perspectives on Psychological Perspectives on Psychological Science http://pps.sagepub.com/ The Chain of Being : A Hierarchy of Morality Mark J. Brandt and Christine Reyna Perspectives on Psychological Science 2011 6: 428 DOI: 10.1177/1745691611414587 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pps.sagepub.com/content/6/5/428 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Association For Psychological Science Additional services and information for Perspectives on Psychological Science can be found at: Email Alerts: http://pps.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://pps.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 Perspectives on Psychological Science 6(5) 428 –446 The Chain of Being: A Hierarchy of Morality © The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1745691611414587 http://pps.sagepub.com Mark J. Brandt and Christine Reyna DePaul University, Chicago, IL Abstract For centuries, philosophers, theologians, and scientists have used the idea of the Great Chain of Being to rank all beings, from demons to animals, humans, and gods, along a vertical dimension of morality. Although the idea of a chain of being has largely fallen out of academic favor, we propose that people still use an embodied vertical moral hierarchy to understand their moral world. This social cognitive chain of being (SCCB) encapsulates a range of research on moral perception including dehumanization (the perception of people as lower on the SCCB), anthropomorphism (the perception of animals as higher and the perceptions of gods as lower on the SCCB), and sanctification (the perception of people as higher on the SCCB). Moral emotions provide affective evidence that guide the perception of social targets as moral (e.g., elevation) or immoral (e.g., disgust). Perceptions of social targets along the SCCB enable people to fulfill group and self-serving, effectance, and existential motivations. The SCCB serves as a unifying theoretical framework that organizes research on moral perception, highlights unique interconnections, and provides a roadmap for future research. Keywords emotion/affect, social cognition, morality In 1936, Arthur Lovejoy published his seminal book on the of a perceptual moral hierarchy. Jonathan Haidt and his col- history of the Great Chain of Being, an idea that had its root in leagues (Haidt, 2003a, 2006; Haidt & Algoe, 2004) were the Plato and Aristotle and continued to influence theologians, first to explore these ideas from a social psychological per- philosophers, and natural scientists until its eventual fall from spective. Building on cross-cultural research connecting academic favor during the industrial revolution. The original immorality with “down,” pollution, and animality and con- chain of being, or scala naturae as conceived of by Aristotle, necting morality with “up,” purity, and divinity, Haidt pro- was used to represent all things, whether they were living and posed that people perceive others along a vertical sacred breathing animals, photosynthesizing plants, or lifeless rocks dimension anchored by the animal and the divine.1 The pur- and minerals. Everything had a place on the chain and every pose of this article is to build on the work by Haidt and his link of the chain was occupied. As the idea of the chain of colleagues in order to more fully develop the SCCB as a theo- being progressed, it became less a dimension of existence in retical framework used to organize and elaborate research on general and became a dimension of morality (Russell, 1988). the perception of the morality of social targets. The top of the chain expanded from humans (presumably the The SCCB allows us to capture a diverse range of theory most complex and “perfect” animal) to saints, angels, and and research under the same conceptual umbrella and helps to supernatural deities. Humans were repositioned toward the develop theoretical connections between otherwise indepen- middle of the chain, with animals slightly lower. The bottom dent lines of inquiry. Haidt and his colleagues primarily half of the chain included a hierarchy of increasingly evil focused on the vertical nature of purity/divinity and its asso- demons and ending with Satan himself. The present analysis ciation with the moral emotions (Haidt, 2003a, 2006; Haidt & uses this version of the chain of being to represent a theoretical Algoe, 2004). We include an expanded review of these two framework we call the social cognitive chain of being (SCCB). areas, but also broaden the scope of the SCCB by describing This framework describes the processes and perceptions that perceptions of morality more broadly (not just in the domain help humans organize their moral universe. We argue that the of purity/divinity) and by integrating a wider range of research vertical moral continuum of the chain of being persists in peo- on dehumanization, anthropomorphism, and sanctification ple’s conception and perception of their social world, allowing people to perceive others and themselves along the continuum Corresponding Author: from devilish to divine. Mark J. Brandt, DePaul University, 2219 North Kenmore Avenue, From the basic description of the chain of being as a verti- Chicago, IL 60614, USA cal moral hierarchy it becomes possible to sketch the outlines Email: [email protected] Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 A Hierarchy of Morality 429 that highlights changes in perceived moral standing along the lives (including ourselves) in an effort to understand our socio- SCCB. We propose that morality is the common underlying moral universe and to guide our moral responses to its occu- dimension connecting these diverse domains of research. pants. The metaphor that “up” is associated with the divine and “down” is associated with evil is ancient and has persisted across time and cultures (Haidt, 2003a; Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Predictions of the SCCB Russell, 1988). This metaphor may help map the abstract con- There are three fundamental predictions of the SCCB that per- cept of morality onto the concrete representation of vertical tain to the verticality of moral perceptions, the importance of space (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). As a result, morality location along the chain of being in determining how people can become socially situated and embodied via visual and spa- perceive and treat social targets, and the role of emotions in tial experience. Although other social dimensions (e.g., power signaling one’s position along the chain of being. and authority) can also be associated with verticality (e.g., Schubert, 2005), the SCCB specifically focuses on the vertical nature of morality. Perceptions of morality are on a On the left of Figure 1 is a potential conceptualization of vertical continuum several targets along a vertical continuum ranging from the Akin to the original conceptualization of the chain of being ultimate good down to the ultimate evil. The highest target on (Bynum, 1975; Lovejoy, 1936/1964; Russell, 1988), the SCCB this SCCB is God. Although theoretically any entity that rep- represents a vertical moral continuum that ranges from the resented the ultimate good could occupy the top of the chain of most immoral and evil of social targets to the most virtuous being based upon a person’s own idiosyncratic beliefs, for and good. We predict that this vertical moral hierarchy is used much of the world some sort of moral supernatural deity likely to rank all of the social targets we perceive throughout our occupies this post. For example, recent polls find that 92% of Ultimate Good Governing Processes Affective Cues Moral Cues •Awe •Elevation Sanctification • Pride •Self-Satisfaction Deity Anthropomorphism Social Cognitive Chain of Being Animalistic Anthropomorphism Immoral Cues Dehumanization •Contempt •Disgust •Shame •Guilt Ultimate Evil Figure 1. An illustration of the social cognitive chain of being (SCCB) and its associated governing processes and affective cues Downloaded from pps.sagepub.com by Mark Brandt on September 11, 2011 430 Brandt and Reyna Americans believe in God or another type of “universal spirit” social targets up or down the SCCB. As illustrated with the and 75% believe in angels (Gallup, 2011; see also Sedikides, four arrows, several mostly independent literatures have 2010). Similarly, at the bottom of the chain of being is a repre- developed in social psychology that describe the processes of sentation of the Devil—a supernatural agent that 70% of perceiving a social target as it falls down the chain of being Americans believe in (Gallup, 2011)—however, once again (deity anthropomorphism and dehumanization; e.g., Haslam, whoever or whatever represents the ultimate evil will vary 2006; Morewedge & Clear, 2008) and as it rises up the chain across people and cultures. Between humans and the ultimate of being (animalistic anthropomorphism and sanctification; good likely resides humans that people perceive to be particu- e.g., Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Pargament & Mahoney, larly virtuous (e.g., saints) and perhaps angels or other moral 2005). Past work has outlined how dehumanization and ani- supernatural agents (e.g., lesser Gods that are perceived to malistic anthropomorphism represent corresponding inverse have some imperfections). Between humans and the ultimate processes governing the perception of humans as animal-like evil likely reside humans that people perceive to be immoral and the perception of animals as humanlike (Waytz, Epley, & (e.g., terrorists, Nazis), as well as animals. We do not take a Cacioppo, 2010); however, our SCCB theoretical framework position on the objective morality of any particular attitude, lets us postulate that deity anthropomorphism and human (or behavior, or social agent. Instead, we assume that people are animal) sanctification are also corresponding inverse pro- relatively idiosyncratic in their perceptions of virtue and vice cesses that track the perception of the divine as more human (cf. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), though there may be and humans as more divine.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Roles of Moral Emotions and Gender
    International Journal of Communication 14(2020), 4890–4912 1932–8036/20200005 An Examination of Information Behaviors Surrounding Controversial Sociopolitical Issues: Roles of Moral Emotions and Gender CHENG HONG California State University, Sacramento, USA WEITING TAO University of Miami, USA WAN-HSIU SUNNY TSAI University of Miami, USA BO RA YOOK Fairfield University, USA Given the emotion-laden nature and moral considerations of controversial sociopolitical issues, this study examines two key antecedents of publics’ information behaviors about controversial sociopolitical issues. We focus on the underresearched emotional dimension by investigating the effects of moral emotions induced by such issues as well as a key demographic factor, gender, on publics’ information behaviors toward such issues. Results of this study highlight the significant influence of moral emotions and expand theoretical understanding of public advocacy on highly divisive issues. Keyword: moral emotions, controversial sociopolitical issues, gender, information behaviors In today’s volatile political climate, controversial sociopolitical issues such as abortion, immigration, and LGBTQ rights have generated heated public debates and shaped public opinion. When exposed to these issues, people of different stances and levels of issue involvement tend to take, select, and give issue-related information differently (Kim & Grunig, 2011; Ni & Kim, 2009). Drawing insights from the situational theory of problem solving (STOPS; Kim & Grunig, 2011), literature on information avoidance (Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010), and theories of moral emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), this study focuses on three key information behaviors—information seeking, avoidance, and forwarding—as the determinants of citizens’ engagement in civic and political conversation. This study focuses on these three behaviors for two important reasons.
    [Show full text]
  • Guilt, Shame, and Grief: an Empirical Study of Perinatal Bereavement
    Guilt, Shame, and Grief: An Empirical Study of Perinatal Bereavement by Peter Barr 'Death in the sickroom', Edvard Munch 1893 A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Centre for Behavioural Sciences Faculty of Medicine University of Sydney November, 2003 Preface All of the work described in this thesis was carried out personally by the author under the auspices of the Centre for Behavioural Sciences, Department of Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Sydney. None of the work has been submitted previously for the purpose of obtaining any other degree. Peter Barr OAM, MB BS, FRACP ii The investigator cannot truthfully maintain his relationship with reality—a relationship without which all his work becomes a well-regulated game—if he does not again and again, whenever it is necessary, gaze beyond the limits into a sphere which is not his sphere of work, yet which he must contemplate with all his power of research in order to do justice to his own task. Buber, M. (1957). Guilt and guilt feelings. Psychiatry, 20, p. 114. iii Acknowledgements I am thankful to the Department of Obstetrics and Department of Neonatology of the following hospitals for giving me permission to approach parents bereaved by stillbirth or neonatal death: Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Royal Hospital for Women, Royal North Shore Hospital and Westmead Hospital. I am most grateful to Associate Professor Susan Hayes and Dr Douglas Farnill for their insightful supervision and unstinting encouragement and support. Dr Andrew Martin and Dr Julie Pallant gave me sensible statistical advice.
    [Show full text]
  • Moral Emotions As Determinants of Third-Party Punishment: Anger, Guilt, and the Functions of Altruistic Sanctions
    Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 7, December 2009, pp. 543–553 Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt, and the functions of altruistic sanctions Rob M. A. Nelissen∗ and Marcel Zeelenberg Tilburg University, the Netherlands Abstract Third-party punishment has recently received attention as an explanation for human altruism. Feelings of anger in response to norm violations are assumed to motivate third-party sanctions, yet there is only sparse and indirect support for this idea. We investigated the impact of both anger and guilt feelings on third-party sanctions. In two studies both emotions were independently manipulated. Results show that anger and guilt independently constitute sufficient but not necessary causes of punishment. Low levels of punishment are observed only when neither emotion is elicited. We discuss the implications of these findings for the functions of altruistic sanctions. Keywords: third-party punishment, social norms, emotions, decision-making. 1 Introduction own (Haidt, 2003). We experience feelings like empathy, anger, and guilt if we consider how others have been hurt, People often defend the interests of others. They stand wronged, or harmed (e.g., Batson, 2006; Haidt, 2003). up for their friends if someone speaks ill about them in The view that moral emotions also have functional behav- their absence. They do not tolerate a colleague being bul- ioral consequences is reflected in evolutionary hypothe- lied at work. They boycott consumer products that are sis about their adaptive value (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, produced using child labor. Some even come to the aid 1990; Trivers, 1971). of a stranger who is being physically harassed, in spite Especially Robert Frank’s (2004) notion of emotions of obvious personal danger.
    [Show full text]
  • University of Groningen the Bereavement Guilt Scale Li
    University of Groningen The Bereavement Guilt Scale Li, Jie; Stroebe, Margaret; Chan, Cecilia L.W.; Chow, Amy Y.M. Published in: Omega : journal of death and dying DOI: 10.1177/0030222815612309 IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2017 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Li, J., Stroebe, M., Chan, C. L. W., & Chow, A. Y. M. (2017). The Bereavement Guilt Scale: Development and preliminary validation. Omega : journal of death and dying, 75(2), 166-183. https://doi.org/10.1177/0030222815612309 Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne- amendment. Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal.
    [Show full text]
  • What Disgust Does and Does Not Do for Moral Cognition Jared Piazzaa
    What Disgust Does and Does Not Do for Moral Cognition Jared Piazzaa, Justin F. Landyb, Alek Chakroffc Liane Youngd, Emily Wassermand a Lancaster University, Department of Psychology b University of Chicago Booth School of Business cCharlie Finance Co., San Francisco, CA dBoston College, Psychology Department 2 1. Introduction Disgust is typically characterized as a negative emotion associated with the rejection of distasteful or contaminating objects (Rozin and Fallon 1987). The physiological aspects of disgust involve nausea and loss of appetite, and the bodily expression of disgust includes behaviors (e.g., gagging, vomiting) designed to orally block or expel noxious substances (Ekman and Friesen 1971; Royzman, Leeman and Sabini 2008; Rozin, Haidt and McCauley 2008; Yoder, Widen and Russell 2016). The canonical elicitors of disgust are well documented: many people report feeling nauseous or sick at the sight or smell of oral contaminants (e.g., rotten food, bodily waste) and/or disease vectors (e.g., blood, skin maladies, sexual fluids, certain animals; Curtis, Aunger and Rabie, 2004; Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 1994; Olatunji et al. 2007). It is uncontroversial that disgust can also be evoked in the context of a moral offense. What remains controversial is disgust’s role or relevance within a moral context. When Armin Meiwes, the Rotenburg Cannibal, was discovered to have eaten the severed penis of his voluntary victim, before killing him and consuming his flesh over the next ten months, the story of this crime undoubtedly aroused disgust (and horror) in many of us. The relevant question is not whether we felt disgust about this crime—for most of us, human penis is not on the menu, and the thought of Meiwes’ preferred cuisine is deeply distasteful.
    [Show full text]
  • Compassion and Sympathy As Moral Motivation Moral Philosophy Has Long Taken an Interest in the Emotions
    Compassion and Sympathy as Moral Motivation Moral philosophy has long taken an interest in the emotions. Ever since Plato’s defense of the primacy of reason as a source of motiva- tion, moral philosophers have debated the proper role of emotion in the character of a good person and in the choice of individual actions. There are striking contrasts that can be drawn among the main tradi- tions in moral philosophy as to the role they assign to the emotions, and to the particular emotions that they evaluate positively and nega- tively. Here are some examples. Utilitarianism is often presented as a the- ory which simply articulates an ideal of sympathy, where the morally right action is the one that would be favored by someone who is equally sympathetic to the pleasure and pains of all sentient beings. And, on another level, utilitarianism tends to evaluate highly actions motivated by sympathy and compassion, and to evaluate negatively actions motivated by malice and spite. Kantianism (or deontology, as it is often called) has a completely different structure and, conse- quently, a different attitude towards the emotions. It conceives of morality as the self-imposed laws of rational agents, and no emotion is thought to be involved in the generation of these laws. It is true that Kant himself does find a special role for the emotion—if that is the right word—of respect for rational agents and for the laws they impose on themselves. But Kant seems to regard respect as a sort of effect within us of our own inscrutable moral freedom, and not as the source of moral legislation.
    [Show full text]
  • Developmental Perspective 1 RUNNING HEAD: DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE on MORAL EMOTIONS a Developmental Perspective on Moral Emoti
    Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch Year: 2015 A developmental perspective on moral emotions Malti, T ; Dys, Sebastian P Abstract: This article outlines a developmental approach to the study of moral emotions. Specifically, we describe our developmental model on moral emotions, one in which emotions and cognitions about moral- ity get increasingly integrated and coordinated with development, while acknowledging inter-individual variation in developmental trajectories across the lifespan. We begin with a conceptual clarification of the concept of moral emotions. After a brief review of our own developmental approach to the study of moral emotions, we provide a selective summary of the developmental literature on negatively and positively valenced moral emotions, and describe a recent line of developmental research on the anticipation of neg- atively and positively valenced moral emotions in multifaceted contexts of social exclusion and inclusion. Next, we describe what it means to take a developmental perspective on moral emotions. Finally, we provide some preliminary conclusions and recommendations for future work to the developmental study of moral emotions. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9224-5 Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-87084 Journal Article Accepted Version Originally published at: Malti, T; Dys, Sebastian P (2015). A developmental perspective on moral emotions. Topoi: An Interna- tional Review of Philosophy, 34(2):453-459. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9224-5 Developmental Perspective 1 RUNNING HEAD: DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL EMOTIONS A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions Tina Malti and Sebastian P.
    [Show full text]
  • What Makes an Emotion Moral?
    What Makes an Emotion Moral? by Mara L. Bollard A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) in the University of Michigan 2018 Doctoral Committee: Professor Daniel Jacobson, Chair Professor Sarah Buss Professor Peter A. Railton Associate Professor Chandra Sripada Mara L. Bollard [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2416-948X © Mara L. Bollard 2018 Acknowledgements I could not have completed this dissertation without the support of many people, and I regret that I cannot properly express my gratitude to everyone who helped shape this project, and my time in graduate school, in these few short pages. First of all, tremendous thanks are due to my committee members: Daniel Jacobson, Sarah Buss, Peter Railton, and Chandra Sripada, all of whom played no small role in my decision to come to Michigan in the first place, and have continued to intellectually enthrall, challenge, and encourage me ever since. I am especially grateful to my advisor, Dan Jacobson, whose guidance, humor, and unflagging support got me, and this project, across the finish line. Special thanks, too, to Chandra Sripada, who has been a cheerful and constant advocate of my work, my teaching, and the Mind and Moral Psychology Working Group. The research and writing of this dissertation was supported by a Mellon Recruitment Award, a Rackham One-Term Dissertation Fellowship, a Sweetland Dissertation Writing Institute Fellowship, and numerous Rackham Conference Travel Grants. I am grateful for incisive and helpful feedback on these chapters from members of the University of Michigan Mind and Moral Psychology Working Group, the University of Michigan Graduate Student Working Group, the 2016 University of Michigan Candidacy Seminar, and the 2017 Sweetland Dissertation Writing Institute.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Moral Emotions in Predicting Support for Political Actions in Post-War Iraq
    Political Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007 The Role of Moral Emotions in Predicting Support for Political Actions in Post-War Iraq Sabrina J. Pagano University of California, Los Angeles Yuen J. Huo University of California, Los Angeles A web-based study of 393 undergraduates at a public university in the United States was conducted to examine the relationship between moral emotions (i.e., emotions that motivate prosocial tendencies) and support for political actions to assist Iraqi citizens after the Second Gulf War (2003–2004). Previous work on emotions and prosocial tendencies has focused on empathy. In the context of post-war Iraq, we found that while empathy predicted support for a number of different political actions that have the potential to advance the welfare of the Iraqi people (humanitarian action in particular), guilt over the U.S. invasion was an important predictor of support for reparative actions (i.e., restoring damage created by the U.S. military), and moral outrage toward Saddam Hussein and his regime was the best predictor of support for political actions to prevent future harm to the Iraqi people and to punish the perpetrators. Our findings demonstrate the utility of an emotion-specific framework for understanding why and what type of political actions individuals will support. And in contrast to the traditional view that emotions are an impediment to rationality, our findings suggest that they can serve as a potentially powerful vehicle for motivating political engagement among the citizenry. KEY WORDS: moral emotions, political attitudes, Iraq, justice, war “On life’s vast ocean diversely we sail, Reason the card, but Passion the gale.” Pope, Moral Essays, Western political philosophy and the social sciences in general are heavily influenced by the rational choice view of human behavior.
    [Show full text]
  • The Hourglass Model Revisited
    Department: Affective Computing and Sentiment Analysis Editor: Erik Cambria, Nanyang Technological University The Hourglass Model Revisited Yosephine Susanto Bee Chin Ng Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University Andrew G. Livingstone Erik Cambria University of Exeter Nanyang Technological University Abstract—Recent developments in the field of AI have fostered multidisciplinary research in various disciplines, including computer science, linguistics, and psychology. Intelligence, in fact, is much more than just IQ: it comprises many other kinds of intelligence, including physical intelligence, cultural intelligence, linguistic intelligence, and emotional intelligence (EQ).Whiletraditionalclassificationtasksand standard phenomena in computer science are easy to define, however, emotions are still a rather mysterious subject of study. That is why so many different emotion classifications have been proposed in theliteratureandthereisstillnocommon agreement on a universal emotion categorization model. In this article, we revisit the Hourglass of Emotions, an emotion categorization model optimized for polarity detection, based on some recent empirical evidence in the context of sentiment analysis. This new model does not claim to offer the ultimate emotion categorization but it proves the most effective for the task of sentiment analysis. & IN 1872, CHARLES Darwin was one of the first always been a big challenge for the research scientists to argue that all humans, and even ani- community.2;3 To date, in fact, there are still mals, show emotions through remarkably simi- active debates on whether some basic emotions, lar behaviors.1 Since then, there has been broad e.g., surprise,4 should be defined as emotions at consensus on how and why emotions have all. In this work, we do not aim to initiate any new evolved in most creatures.
    [Show full text]
  • Consumer Moral Dilemma in the Choice of Animal-Friendly Meat Products
    sustainability Review Consumer Moral Dilemma in the Choice of Animal-Friendly Meat Products Li Lin-Schilstra * and Arnout R. H. Fischer Marketing and Consumer Behaviour Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands; arnout.fi[email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Received: 8 May 2020; Accepted: 11 June 2020; Published: 13 June 2020 Abstract: More and more consumers, at least in Western developed countries, are attentive to the sustainability aspects of their food, one of which concerns animal welfare. The conflict of harming an animal for the joy of eating meat causes a moral dilemma, affecting consumers’ reactions to, and choices of, animal-friendly products. This systematic review identified 86 studies from Scopus and Web of Science. The review outlines: (1) What are the personal antecedents among consumers regarding moral conflicts?; (2) In what situation do moral conflicts occur in consumer food choice?; (3) How do consumers emotionally experience the moral dilemma?; (4) How do consumers resolve moral conflicts over animal products? Researchers have studied personal factors and situational factors that arouse consumers’ moral dilemma and how the dilemma is solved, during which emotions and dissonance come into play. When synthesizing these findings into a comprehensive model, we notice that the current research is lacking on how personal factors change and interact with situations, which limits the understanding of the real-life context of consumers’ moral dilemma as well as their choices of animal-friendly products. More in-depth studies are needed to find situational factors that contribute to this complex psychological process. Keywords: consumer behavior; moral dilemma; meat; animal-friendly products; systematic review 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Animal Morality: What Is the Debate About? Simon Fitzpatrick [email protected]
    Forthcoming in Biology and Philosophy Animal Morality: What is The Debate About? Simon Fitzpatrick [email protected] Abstract Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human species. However, these different positions on animal morality generally appear to be motivated more by different conceptions of how the term “morality” is to be defined than on empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly distinct debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define “morality”, “moral cognition”, and associated notions. Several apparent skirmishes in the literature are thus cases of researchers simply talking past each other. I then focus on what I take to be the core debate over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue that this debate is in fact largely terminological and non-substantive. Finally, I reflect on how this core debate might best be re-framed.
    [Show full text]