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Moral Emotions As Determinants of Third-Party Punishment: Anger, Guilt, and the Functions of Altruistic Sanctions

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Moral Emotions As Determinants of Third-Party Punishment: Anger, Guilt, and the Functions of Altruistic Sanctions Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 7, December 2009, pp. 543–553 Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt, and the functions of altruistic sanctions Rob M. A. Nelissen∗ and Marcel Zeelenberg Tilburg University, the Netherlands Abstract Third-party punishment has recently received attention as an explanation for human altruism. Feelings of anger in response to norm violations are assumed to motivate third-party sanctions, yet there is only sparse and indirect support for this idea. We investigated the impact of both anger and guilt feelings on third-party sanctions. In two studies both emotions were independently manipulated. Results show that anger and guilt independently constitute sufficient but not necessary causes of punishment. Low levels of punishment are observed only when neither emotion is elicited. We discuss the implications of these findings for the functions of altruistic sanctions. Keywords: third-party punishment, social norms, emotions, decision-making. 1 Introduction own (Haidt, 2003). We experience feelings like empathy, anger, and guilt if we consider how others have been hurt, People often defend the interests of others. They stand wronged, or harmed (e.g., Batson, 2006; Haidt, 2003). up for their friends if someone speaks ill about them in The view that moral emotions also have functional behav- their absence. They do not tolerate a colleague being bul- ioral consequences is reflected in evolutionary hypothe- lied at work. They boycott consumer products that are sis about their adaptive value (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, produced using child labor. Some even come to the aid 1990; Trivers, 1971). of a stranger who is being physically harassed, in spite Especially Robert Frank’s (2004) notion of emotions of obvious personal danger. In general, people retaliate as “commitment devices” seems relevant to understand against injustice even if they are not directly victimized. how moral emotions promote prosocial behavior, in spite Sanctioning of norm-violations is vital for prosocial be- of the associated costs. Frank argues that moral emotions havior to be sustained (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi, have been evolved as commitment devices that make peo- 1986). However, punishing norm-violations is costly in ple forego their immediate self-interest, committing them terms of time and energy. It may even impose physical to a more rewarding long-term strategy. For instance, an risks. Punishing injustice is therefore considered to be angry individual retaliating a norm-violation may incur a moral act, particularly when it is performed on behalf an immediate cost, but may derive a greater benefit in of others (i.e., in case of third-party sanctions, Fehr & the long run by deterring future exploitation. Similarly, Fishbacher, 2004). This begs the question of what incites Frank also argued that guilt feelings act as a commitment third-party sanctions, as they usually oppose self-interest. device because a guilty person may invest time and en- ergy to make up for something (s)he did to another per- 1.1 Moral emotions and prosocial behavior son, but may eventually benefit thereof by saving a mutu- ally rewarding and beneficial relationship. Precisely this Classic philosophical treatises on “moral sentiments” al- effect was empirically supported (De Hooge, Breugel- ready stressed the functional role of moral emotions as mans, and Zeelenberg, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelis- elicitors of prosocial behavior (e.g., Hume, 1739; Smith, sen, Dijker & de Vries, 2007). Moral emotions, par- 1759). Moral emotions are defined as feelings related ticularly anger, have also been proposed as the proxi- to the interest and welfare of others rather than one’s mal mechanism underlying third-party sanctions (Fehr & ∗We thank Urs Fischbacher for providing us with the instructions Fishbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2002). Nevertheless, for the third-party punishment paradigm, Johan Karremans for useful the proposed role for emotions in third-party punishment comment, and Jon Baron for his contributions. Correspondence can requires further exploration for two main reasons. be addressed to Rob Nelissen, Department of Social Psychology and First of all, anger has not yet been linked empiri- TIBER (Tilburg Institute of Behavioral Economics Research), Tilburg University, PO BOX 90153, 5000-LE Tilburg, the Netherlands, Email: cally to third-party sanctions. The associations may [email protected]. seem straightforward, as numerous studies have related 543 Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 7, December 2009 Effect of moral emotions on third-party punishment 544 feelings of anger — either self-reported or at the phys- dently manipulating the elicitation of anger and guilt. Our iological level — to retaliation of personal ill treat- data revealed that the elicitation of either emotion already ment (e.g., Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & Van resulted in punishment, as did the elicitation of both. Winden, 2007; Bosman & Van Winden, 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Still, third-party sanctions are different, as 2 Experiment 1 perpetrators of norm-violations are punished not for what they did to the punisher, but for what they did to someone We investigated the impact of anger and guilt feelings in else. Recent insights clearly show that anger about per- a third-party punishment paradigm (Fehr & Fischbacher, sonal harm is a distinct emotion from empathic anger at 2004). In this paradigm, participants witness an unfair witnessing injustice or harm to someone else (Batson et distribution of some valuable endowment between two al., 2007). Since both types of anger have different elic- other people. As a form of costly punishment, partici- itors, it remains to be demonstrated whether (empathic) pants then had the opportunity to assign reduction-points anger also instigates third-party punishment. to the allocator, out of their own endowment. Second, moral emotions fall into two large categories To independently manipulate the elicitation of anger (Haidt, 2003). On the one hand, other-focused emotions and guilt, we varied the extent to which the unfair distri- like anger arise in response to perceiving someone else in- bution was made intentionally by the allocator (as a proxy tentionally causing harm to another person. On the other for anger) and the participant’s responsibility for punish- hand, self-focused emotions like guilt feelings arise in re- ing the norm-violation (as a proxy for guilt). Research sponse to or anticipation of oneself being responsible for on ultimatum bargaining (e.g., Blount, 1995) shows that another person’s misfortune. Several studies have shown unfair proposals evoke angry reactions (resulting in in- that feelings of guilt are associated with prosocial behav- creased rejection) only in case the outcome is an inten- ior (e.g., De Hooge et al., 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; tional act by another person, but not when people believe Nelissen et al., 2007). Insofar as third-party punishment that, for instance, a computer has randomly (i.e., unin- is a form of “second-order cooperation” (Fehr & Gächter, tentionally) generated the offer. Similarly, the elicitation 2002; Yamagishi, 1986, 1988), it may be fuelled not only of guilt is related to perceptions of personal responsi- by anger over norm-violations, but also by anticipated bility (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The bystander guilt with respect to not punishing this violation when it effect (Latané & Darley, 1970) shows that the presence would be one’s responsibility to do so. of others diffuses personal responsibility and thereby de- creases the willingness to help a victim. Simply put, this means that, as the number of people that are able to allevi- 1.2 Anger, guilt, and third-party sanctions ate someone’s misfortune increases, each individual feels We thus predict that third-party sanctions could be less guilty for not helping and is therefore less willing to elicited not only by feelings of anger, but also by feelings do so. Bystander effects have also been demonstrated for of guilt. However, even though both emotions may under- norm-enforcing behavior (Chekroun & Brauer, 2002). lie third-party sanctions, their impact may occur through Based on these well-documented effects, we predicted different routes, and their contribution to future group- that third-party punishment would be increased (1) if level cooperation may also be of different nature. We norm-violations were brought about intentionally, and think that angry people punish because they perceive the (2) if participants were solely responsible for norm- unequal distribution to be morally unjust. Anger then in- enforcement. duces retribution “whatever the consequences”. This may also serve to deter future transgressions against all group 2.1 Method members, including the punisher (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). Guilt feelings, we think, are elicited Participants and design. Thirty-eight male and 53 fe- when people perceive themselves in some way respon- male undergraduate students (Mage = 20.84 years) par- sible for meting out punishment. When people antici- ticipated in exchange for course credit. The experimental pate guilt they punish in order to restore a sense of justice design included two between-subject factors: Intention- among group members in general and the victim in partic- ality of norm-violation (intentional vs. unintentional) and ular (e.g., Darley & Pitman, 2003). This ensures that we Responsibility
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