January 18, 2011 Wikileaks Cables on Israel's Gaza Onslaught Http

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January 18, 2011 Wikileaks Cables on Israel's Gaza Onslaught Http January 18, 2011 Wikileaks Cables on Israel's Gaza Onslaught http://www.counterpunch.org/wikigazacables.html S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002864 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2018 TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, KWBG, IS SUBJECT: PREPARING FOR AN ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATION IN GAZA Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 1. (S) Summary. Since Hamas announced the end of the "tahdiya" truce agreement December 19, pressure has been building in Israel for the IDF to respond more aggressively to daily barrages of rockets and mortars from Gaza. The Israeli cabinet meeting December 21 was largely devoted to a lively debate about the appropriate military response in Gaza. While Defense Minister Barak, supported by PM Olmert, has so far managed to resist the pressure for an immediate, large-scale operation, the IDF has prepared a range of contingencies, and we assume these options are now under active consideration. The contingencies range from resumption of targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders to a full-scale invasion and reoccupation of Gaza. In the current environment, even such limited operations as air strikes on Hamas or PIJ rocket launching teams could set off such an intensive barrage of rockets that the IDF could be drawn into a ground operation to stop the shelling. Foreign Minister Livni, who is one of the primary advocates of an immediate, large-scale military response to the rocket fire, has instructed the MFA to prepare a diplomatic campaign to explain and justify likely Israeli military action. 2. (S) We recommend that the Department also begin to prepare press guidance, talking points and Security Council reaction in the event that Israel acts in the near future. Our suggestions as to the content appear in para 6 below. We further recommend contingency planning for humanitarian relief that will likely be needed in the aftermath of an Israeli military operation. End Summary. Pressure Building in Israel --------------------------- 3. (C) Pressure inside Israel is building for a much tougher response to rocket and missile attacks from Gaza. While it appears that the GOI has yet to take a specific decision, the Hamas announcement of the end of the "tahdiya" truce and the daily rocket and mortar firing -- over thirty rockets and mortars were fired from Gaza at Israeli communities over the weekend -- is adding to the pressure for an Israeli military response. At the December 21 cabinet session, PM Olmert and Defense Minister Barak had to fend off demands from much of the rest of the government, but especially Foreign Minister Livni, Transportation Minister Mofaz and Deputy PM Ramon, for an immediate, strong military response to the rocket fire. Livni and Ramon have called for overthrowing Hamas rule in Gaza, which would probably entail occupying the entire Strip. Opposition Likud Party leader Bibi Netanyahu visited Sderot yesterday and blasted the government's failure to take stronger military action in response to the shelling. Based on public statements by Barak and IDF Chief of General Staff Ashkenazi, it is clear that Barak and the military want to take action at a time of their choosing and not forewarn Hamas exactly what they have in mind. Nonetheless, the pressure on the GOI to "do something" is growing. Political posturing is part of the mix, as all of the players except Olmert -- who has resigned and will not seek reelection -- are focused on building public support in advance of the 1 February 10 general elections. IDF's Range of Military Options ------------------------------- 4. (S) The IDF has prepared a range of operational plans over the past year. These range from renewed targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders to limited brigade or several brigade-size ground incursions (such as the IDF conducted last March) up to a full scale combined air-land- sea invasion of Gaza. An interim operation often discussed before the tahdiya was signed in June was the IDF's seizure of the southern and northern ends of the Gaza Strip in order to stop the smuggling and make rocket launching more difficult. The precise mix of options is a political decision which the GOI probably has not yet taken and Barak is stressing the importance of limiting public discussion in order to preserve operational surprise. There is also the possibility, much discussed in the media here, that given the build-up in Hamas' rocket stockpiles and the extension of their range, even such limited Israeli military operations as air strikes on rocket squads could lead Hamas and the other organizations to launch massive barrages of rockets, which could in turn force the IDF to go in on the ground to stop it. In this environment, there is no guarantee that what starts out as a limited operation will remain that way. 5. (C) Livni has instructed the MFA's senior staff to prepare a diplomatic strategy to explain a large-scale Israeli military operation in Gaza. While international criticism of Israeli action is predictable, we anticipate that the tenor of the Arab and international response will be TEL AVIV 00002864 002 OF 002 determined by a number of unknown factors, including the scale and duration of the operation and the extent of the damage to the civilian populations on both sides. There is also the question of an Israeli exit strategy: if the GOI decides to reoccupy large parts of Gaza, as soon as the smoke clears the Israelis probably will be looking for a third party to whom they can transfer responsibility. Action Recommendation: Consider U.S. Response Now --------------------------------------------- ----- 6. (C) We strongly recommend that the Department consider now the U.S. response to the above-mentioned range of Israeli military operations, including press guidance, talking points and even Security Council action, bearing in mind that we are likely to have little to no advance warning and that even a relatively restrained operation could rapidly grow into something much bigger. Our recommendation is that the USG start with putting the blame on Hamas for the illegitimacy of its rule in Gaza, its policy of firing or allowing other factions to fire rockets and mortars at Israeli civilian targets, and its decision to end the "tahdiya" calming period; and support for Israel's right to defend itself, while also emphasizing our concern for the welfare of innocent Palestinian civilians and U.S. readiness to provide emergency humanitarian relief. On this last point, USAID points out that large-scale U.S. and international humanitarian assistance will be urgently needed in Gaza if the IDF ends up carrying out a broad-scale military operation. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM 23.12 from Jerusalem Al Quds quotes a recent World Bank report that concludes trade in the West Bank cannot improve under the current Israeli restrictions and checkpoint regime. The report focused on the Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan where Palestinian exports must pass through several Israeli obstacles. It demands the lifting of existing Israeli limitations on the travel of Palestinian citizens and goods. The report also considers Gaza to be on the verge of economic collapse due to the Israeli siege. 2 29/12/08 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002906 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2018 TAGS: KWBG, MOPS, PREL, PTER, PINR, EAID, EFIN, IS SUBJECT: GAZA SITUATION REPORT, DECEMBER 29, 18:00 REF: JERUSALEM 2295 Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (B/D). 1. (C) Summary: The IDF continued its deployment of ground forces around the Gaza periphery on December 29, with elements of at least three armored and two infantry brigades taking up positions opposite Gaza City and Beit Hanoun. Air strikes against strategic and tactical targets continued throughout the day, as did rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip. One Israeli civilian was killed when a rocket landed in Ashkelon on the morning of December 29. According to IDF contacts, 63 truckloads of humanitarian supplies entered Gaza via Kerem Shalom during the day on December 29, with further deliveries scheduled for December 30. Israeli political leaders, including FM Livni and MoD Barak, caution that military operations could continue for weeks, and that the goal is to change the strategic environment and destroy Hamas' offensive rocket capabilities. Separately, Bank Hapoalim and Bank Discount announced that they will cease providing correspondent banking services to Gaza at midnight on December 31. End summary. Military Operations ------------------- 2. (SBU) The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is continuing its strategic campaign against Hamas leadership, personnel and infrastructure throughout Gaza. In addition to targets associated with the manufacture, storage and deployment of Kassam rockets, the IAF has also attacked the Hamas Interior Ministry, Islamic University (which contains labs that the GOI says are active in weapons and explosives research for Hamas), and a Hamas guest house used for official visitors. The IDF Spokesperson announced that the office of Hamas PM Ismail Haniyeh was attacked overnight (note: speaking on Israeli radio December 29, Deputy Defense Minister Vilnai denied that Haniyeh was personally targeted in the airstrike), as were "dozens of other Hamas-related targets." Israeli Naval forces also attacked Hamas vessels and coastal structures overnight, according to the Spokesperson,s office. In his radio interview, Deputy Defense Minister Vilnai also said the IDF has high morale, and in contrast to the Second Lebanon War, all levels of the military know their task and what is expected of them. Vilnai said the operations will last a long time, "perhaps much longer than people expect." Asked to comment on a possible ground campaign, he declined to answer, saying he did not intend to broadcast to Hamas Israel's military intentions.
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