The Grand Game: Articles Mainly on Issues Affecting the Horn of Africa Region
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Volume III Issue II March-April 2020 Bulletin The HORN Bulletin is a bi- monthly publication by the HORN Institute. It contains thematic The Grand Game: articles mainly on issues affecting the Horn of Africa region. Gulf Interests in the Horn INSIDE of Africa By Tamara Naidoo The Grand Game: Gulf Interests 1 in the Horn of Africa Comprehensive Border Security 10 Critical to Stability in the Horn of Abstract Africa The article offers an account of the significant and diverse investments Reintegration of Terrorist 19 Returnees: How Communities made by Gulf states in the Horn of Africa and the grand games playing out Should Respond within both regions, affecting regional conflict management. The Horn of Challenges to Democratization of 28 Africa urgently need to control this surge of investment, while protecting the New Sudan their sovereignty and pushing back on the influence of political agendas of the Gulf. Currently, Gulf states are largely seen to be inexperienced About the HORN Institute in African political dynamics. These resulting short-term interests have already proven disadvantageous to Gulf interests in some respects and The HORN International Institute yet interestingly, cases are available that point to the adaptations and for Strategic Studies is a non- concessions made by Gulf states to be viewed as more acceptable external profit, applied research, and partners to African states. The traditional objectives of the great powers policy think-do tank based of the West to ensure democratization and peaceful political transition in Nairobi, Kenya. Its mission in the Horn of Africa should remain relevant if regional progress is to be is to contribute to informed, seen. Ultimately though, foreign policy experts must embrace a multipolar objective, definitive research and worldview, leaving behind departmental divisions separating Africa from analytical inquiry that positively the Middle East. After all, resolving the peace and security challenges in informs policies of governments, one of the two regions, the Gulf or Horn, is bound to have implications for intergovernmental and non- the other region as well. governmental organizations and spaces. Its vision is a progressive Horn of Africa served by Introduction informed, evidence-based and problem-solving policy research he Horn of Africa countries especially Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and and analysis. Eritrea have had ties with Gulf countries for centuries, shipping goods Tsuch as camels and frankincense over the Red Sea, sharing religious traits 2 The HORN Bulletin • Volume III • Issue II • March - April 2020 Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani inspects a guard of honor upon arriving at the Bole International Airport during his official visit to Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa on April 10, 2017. (Photo Credit: Reuters/Tiksa Negeria) in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia which are predominantly relations. During 1970s, when Gulf countries were Muslim nations whereas Ethiopia and Eritrea have large particularly wealthy, they sided with the United States, Muslim populations as well (Wilson & England, 2019). The as opposed to the Soviet Union-supported African Gulf region is described as a complex arena of differing governments. uncertainty and risks (Cordesman, 2016). It consists of Iran, Today, the Gulf countries account for low to medium Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, governance and economic risk. All of the Gulf countries Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. continue to improve their domestic forces and their Since the 1950’s, the region’s lucrative petroleum resources internal security, the UAE and Saudi Arabia holding most have enabled rapid urbanization and led to well-educated significant capacity in this regard. There are a number of citizenry. There are also significantly greater formal threats to the stability in the Gulf region, depending on sector employment opportunities. Despite this progress, a country’s stance on Islamic radicals or positioning on the Gulf’s youth bulge has been a debilitating point as the conflict in Yemen. Another debilitating force among youth struggle to find career placements in economies Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait is the conflictual focused on oil. Therefore, on one hand, Arab economies, stance between the Sunni and Shi’ite populations. Still, propped up by petroleum, have created sufficient cash the relative political stability among Gulf countries over flow to pursue foreign policy ambitions abroad, while on the past decade has seen a number of economic projects the other hand, petroleum export revenues have created established in Africa. Economic diplomacy with Africa is a sense of economic insecurity into these Gulf states viewed to provide Gulf countries with expanded work (Cordesman, 2016). Some of the Gulf State’s foreign policy opportunities and diversifying Gulf markets, in addition objectives in the Horn of Africa have most thoroughly to situating surplus profits in development projects that been recorded since the 1950’s. Arab rivalry has, in fact, also stimulate Gulf influence in Africa (Al-Faisal, 2019). In spilled over into the Horn in repeated intervals over the this article, I will seek to unpack the grand game of Gulf decades (Khan, 2018). This occurs, for instance, in the interests in the Horn of Africa and its impact on regional form of the Arab-Israeli rivalry, the competition between conflict management. I first provide an overview of shared conservative and radical states, and even between economic interests between the most prominent states Baathist states. The dimensions of Arab rivalries were in the Gulf and Horn of Africa. Secondly, I will outline in fact also present during the longstanding Sudanese the influence and impact of peace and security issues conflict, Ethiopia’s civil war and the Ethiopia-Somalia surrounding the relations between African and Arab The Grand Game: Gulf Interests in the Horn of Africa 3 states in the region. Lastly, I will provide recommendations states for at least four reasons (Khan, 2018). Firstly, the to enhance diplomatic relations between the two regions. Horn of Africa in particular is a geostrategic location. Secondly, access to African agricultural produce improves The Meeting Point: African and Arab Arab food security. Thirdly, the role of Gulf states in Economic Diplomacy Africa strengthens their reputation as global players and friendly Muslim nations. Lastly, economic influence The Red Sea is a prominent shipping route and meeting in Africa unlocks financial means to ensure security and point for Africans and those on the Arabian Peninsula. diplomatic goals in the Gulf itself. The three axes of Gulf Despite its potential to boost economic relations between investments are represented by the Arab axis (led by the regions, economic activity is marred in this stretch of Saudi Arabia and UAE, but including Egypt and Bahrain); water by several issues including the war in Yemen, and the Iran axis; and the Qatar-Turkey axis (Mishra, 2019). Ethiopia’s pot-stirring attempts to gain access to the waters (Oneko, 2018). Nevertheless, a turning point in the Eritrea on the Red Sea coast has long been an ideal Horn of Africa’s relations was noted in 2018 when the UN partner for the UAE and Saudi Arabia but its weak Secretary-General Antonio Guterres referred to a “wind economy and military strengths meant that, a more of hope blowing in the Horn of Africa.” His statement prosperous relationship would need Ethiopia’s buy-in followed as Ethiopia, an evolving regional hegemon, as well. This is because Ethiopia, as a growing regional brokered a peace deal with long-time rival Eritrea to hegemon, would provide greater opportunity for access the Red Sea waters, with the assistance of both economic relationships with its heightened security the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The move not capabilities and burgeoning economy. In the past 20 only brought together the Arab and Horn of Africa but years, the enduring conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea also proved opportune to address other tensions as well. thwarted any ideas of a mutually beneficial relationship where Ethiopia could access the Red Sea. At first not The Prominence of Saudi Arabia and the overly concerned by these tensions in the Horn, Saudi UAE Arabia had already constructed pipelines and oil refineries around the Red Sea’s coast in addition to creating a Red The foreign policy trend of Gulf states has usually Sea fleet in case the Iranians attempted to block Saudi oil been cautious around engagements with Africa due to exports via the Strait of Hormuz (Oneko, 2018). The UAE, instability within many African states. Still, the prospect in turn, offered large investments in logistics, ports, and of attaining geopolitical influence through the Red Sea trade development to establish its foothold in the Horn and its location in the Horn of Africa has prompted more of Africa. The political spat between Ethiopia and Eritrea considerate foreign policy making, somewhat akin to a however, stunted the prospect of greater economic gains grand political game (Vertin, Haecker, & Musila, 2019). for Gulf states. Ethiopia’s bad blood with Eritrea was As Al-Faisal (2019) notes, the Horn of Africa came to instilled in its foreign policy objectives to isolate Eritrea’s be viewed by Gulf foreign policy actors ‘as a chance to President Isaias Afwerki from the African Union and other control emerging markets and enter into new economic regional bodies. The change in Ethiopian leadership agreements