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Country Reports on Terrorism 2014

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Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 June 2015 ________________________________ United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism Released June 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. 1 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2014 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment Chapter 2. Country Reports Africa Overview Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership The Partnership for East African Regional Counterterrorism Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Chad Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Somalia South Africa Tanzania Uganda East Asia and Pacific Overview China (Hong Kong and Macau) Indonesia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Europe Overview Albania Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 Bulgaria Cyprus Denmark France Georgia Germany Greece Ireland Italy Kosovo Macedonia The Netherlands Norway Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Turkey United Kingdom Middle East and North Africa Overview Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and Jerusalem Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen South and Central Asia Overview Afghanistan Bangladesh India Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan 3 Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Western Hemisphere Overview Argentina Brazil Canada Colombia Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Venezuela Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Cuba Iran Sudan Syria Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) Terrorist Safe Havens Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front Multilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism; International Conventions and Protocols Long-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens -Countering Violent Extremism -Capacity Building -Regional Strategic Initiative Support for Pakistan Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia Broadcasting Board of Governors Initiatives: Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) Ansar al-Dine (AAD) Ansar al-Islam (AAI) Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) Army of Islam (AOI) Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) 4 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Boko Haram (BH) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) Hamas Haqqani Network (HQN) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) Hizballah Indian Mujahedeen (IM) Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Lashkar e-Tayyiba Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) National Liberation Army (ELN) Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Revolutionary Struggle (RS) Al-Shabaab (AS) Shining Path (SL) Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms 5 Annexes: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, and Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens Overseas in 2014 6 CHAPTER 1 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT Major trends in global terrorism in 2014 included the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL’s) unprecedented seizure of territory in Iraq and Syria, the continued flow of foreign terrorist fighters worldwide to join ISIL, and the rise of lone offender violent extremists in the West. Despite the fragmentation of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, weak or failed governance continued to provide an enabling environment for the emergence of extremist radicalism and violence, notably in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, and Iraq. Continuing a trend noted in last year’s report, terrorist groups employed more aggressive tactics in their attacks. In ISIL’s case, this included brutal repression of communities under its control and the use of ruthless methods of violence such as beheadings and crucifixions intended to terrify opponents. Boko Haram – operating in the Lake Chad Basin region of northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and southeast Niger – shared with ISIL a penchant for the use of brutal tactics, which included stonings, indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, and kidnapping children for enslavement. ISIL targeted religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis in particular, but also Shia Muslims and Sunni tribesmen who defied its rule. The 2014 calendar year also witnessed a powerful regional and international mobilization to counter ISIL that halted the group’s initial advances in Iraq. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September constituted a significant step forward in international efforts to cooperate in preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from conflict zones. * * * * * The ongoing civil war in Syria was a significant factor in driving worldwide terrorism events in 2014. The rate of foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria – totaling more than 16,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 90 countries as of late December – exceeded the rate of foreign terrorist fighters who traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last 20 years. Many of the foreign terrorist fighters joined ISIL, which, through intimidation and exploitation of political grievances, a weak security environment in Iraq, and the conflict in Syria, secured sufficient support to conduct complex military operations in an effort to seize contiguous territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria for a self-declared Islamic caliphate. ISIL routinely and indiscriminately targeted defenseless civilians, including religious pilgrims, while engaging in violent repression of local inhabitants. ISIL showed a particular capability in the use of media and online products to address a wide spectrum of potential audiences: local Sunni Arab populations, potential recruits, and governments of coalition members and other populations around the world, including English- speaking audiences. ISIL has been adroit at using the most popular social and new media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter) to disseminate its messages broadly, with near- instantaneous reposting and the generation of follow-on links and translations into additional languages following ISIL’s initial publication of online propaganda. Content included brutal images, such as hostage beheadings and boasts of slave markets of Yazidi girls and women. In 2014, ISIL expanded its messaging tactics to include content that purported to show an idealized version of life under its rule and progress in building the institutions of an orderly state. ISIL’s use of social and new media also facilitated its efforts to attract new recruits to the battlefields in 7 Syria and Iraq, as ISIL facilitators answered in real time would-be members’ questions about how to travel to join the group. Individuals drawn to the conflict in Syria and Iraq were diverse in their socioeconomic and geographic backgrounds, highlighting the need for comprehensive counter-messaging and early engagement with a variety of communities to dissuade vulnerable individuals from traveling to join the conflict. In 2014, ISIL began to foster relationships with potential affiliates beyond Iraq and Syria. Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah pledged allegiance to ISIL in October 2014, and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, operating primarily out of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, officially declared allegiance to ISIL in November. Questions remained, however, about the meaning of such affiliates – whether representative of a command relationship, commonality of strategic goals, or merely opportunistic relationships. The prominence of the threat once posed by core al-Qa’ida (AQ) diminished in 2014, largely as a result of continued leadership losses suffered by the AQ core in Pakistan and Afghanistan. AQ leadership also appeared to lose momentum as the self-styled leader of a global movement in the face of ISIL’s rapid expansion and proclamation of a Caliphate. Though AQ central leadership was weakened, the organization continued to serve as a focal point of “inspiration” for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa’ida in the
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