Greece, China and the 17+1 Initiative SECURITY & FOREIGN POLICY George N. TZOGOPOULOS Research Fellow, ELIAMEP November 2020 Policy Paper #45/2020 ELIAMEP | Policy Paper # 45/2020 Greece, China and the 17+1 Initiative Copyright © 2020 | All Rights Reserved HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP) 49 Vasilissis Sofias Ave., 10676, Athens, Greece Tel.: +30 210 7257 110 | Fax: +30 210 7257 114 | www.eliamep.gr |
[email protected] ELIAMEP offers a forum for debate on international and European issues. Its non-partisan character supports the right to free and well- documented discourse. ELIAMEP publications aim to contribute to scholarly knowledge and to provide policy relevant analyses. As such, they solely represent the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Foundation. George N. TZOGOPOULOS Research Fellow, ELIAMEP Summary • Greece’s membership in the 17+1 Initiative can be seen as a ‘Europeanization’ step in the interests of Athens, Beijing as well as the group’s other participants. China is not seeking to antagonize the EU in CEEC, but rather to complement the EU’s economic activities. • Greece has the potential to function as a bridge between the West and the East and could contribute to a better understanding of China in Europe while also helping China better understand the EU. • In spite of the ongoing Sino-American antagonism in the region, Greece can exercise leadership and seek to facilitate synergies—as outlined in the Prespa Agreement that opened the door for the country to join the China-CEEC cooperation platform. • COSCO’s win-win investment in the Piraeus port has transformed it into a transshipment hub.