Ideas & Issues (Maneuver Warfare) Simple Orders in Complex Warfare Use of simple priorities by Capts Alexander Irion & Robert Callison

uring an October 2019 Lec- ture Series entitled Devel- oping Leaders for Maneuver Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to Warfare at Marine do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity. DUniversity, former Secretary of De- fense, James N. Mattis, was asked what —GEN George S. Patton he thought was the biggest threat to the preservation of democracy in the United States.1 His response included To emphasize the importance of simple a thoughtful analysis of likely threats >The authors are both students at the commander’s intent supporting future to democracy at home and abroad and Expeditionary Warfare School. U.S. naval operations, this article ex- how they would be mitigated in a fu- amines ADM Lord Viscount Horatio ture contested environment—through Nelson’s use of commander’s intent at vicious harmony enabled by the human The Battle of Trafalgar and Field Mar- interface at all levels of command.2 shal William Slim’s use of simple orders He described the human interface as to unify the British 14th Army during a system of feedback loops informed World War II. by intent and capable of learning and adapting.3 Echoing pages of MCDP 1, Commander’s Intent and the Human Warfighting, Secretary Mattis’ senti- Interface ments demonstrate how, through the Emphasizing the role of individual integration of commander’s intent and behavior within the naval Services the human interface, leaders can build through organizing principles like trust, open lines of communication commander’s intent can foster a cul- within their organization, and promote ture of intelligent initiative. Studies of concepts of maneuver warfare—like multi-domain battles throughout his- mission command. tory highlight the importance of incor- Threats to the United States’ com- porating simple commander’s intent in mand and control architecture reinforce future concepts of operations.8 The tac- an important principle regarding the tical art of ADM Nelson sheds light on effective application of commander’s the effectiveness of simple commander’s intent: the greater the probability of intent when combating a numerically conducting operations in distributed superior naval force. or communications-degraded environ- On 21 October 1805, ADM Nel- ments, the greater the responsibility of ADM Horatio Nelson. (Portrait by Lemual Francis son defeated the combined fleets of our Nation’s commanders to skillfully Abbott (1760-1802).) the French and Spanish navies during issue clear and concise intent.4 The abil- the Battle of Trafalgar off the coast of ity of our naval forces to persistently op- dinate execution of operations in an Spain.9 The victory concluded with all erate in contested, anti-access environ- anticipated communications-degraded British vessels intact, 22 ships from the ments will require simple commander’s environment.6 combined French and Spanish fleets intent to promote intelligent initiative.5 As LtGen Steven Boutelle points out destroyed, and French ADM Pierre- Simplicity in orders and intent will clar- in The Art of Command, “The effective- Charles Villeneuve taken prisoner ify end states, increase speed in decision ness of today’s armed forces leadership aboard his flagship. It was described making, and generate trust in subor- will define the future of the nation.”7 as, “The most decisive naval battle of the

Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE1 Ideas & Issues (Maneuver Warfare)

[Napoleonic Wars], conclusively ending the morning of battle, ADM Nelson value ADM Nelson placed on intent French plans to invade England.”10 The signaled to his captains: “Engage the by allowing decentralized operations victory was achieved through ADM enemy more closely.”20 The control of to thrive in distributed and communi- Nelson’s belief in the value of com- the battle was effectively handed off to cations-degraded environments. mander’s intent and his deviation from his captains, bringing unmatched speed formal ship-of-the-line warfare typical to 18th century fighting sail tactics.11 At the time, the British practice was ADM Nelson’s use of commander’s intent built trust for commanders to centralize control of the fleet under a single commander and unleashed intelligent initiative by emphasizing using line-ahead battle formations.12 Conventional line-ahead battle forma- short and concise guidance. tions organized fleets in parallel lines that were good for communication but limited their dispersion.13 At the Battle and decisiveness to the fight. ADM Nel- Defeating the Undefeated of Trafalgar, ADM Nelson arranged son’s use of commander’s intent built Enhancing the lethality of the U.S. his ships in columns, directing, “The trust and unleashed intelligent initia- naval Services through proposed com- Order of Sailing is to be the Order of tive by emphasizing short and concise plex force packages will require organiz- Battle.”14 His unconventional use of guidance. ing principles to endow a shared sense of column formations facilitated speed Modern applications of command- responsibility across a large number of and independent maneuver of British er’s intent—shaped by LtGen John A. distributed military platforms.22 Har- ships—and allowed his fleet to approach Lejeune’s 1920 philosophy of the re- monizing the actions of a large number ADM Villeneuve’s linear formation per- lationship between officers and men, of distributed military platforms can be pendicularly. Shaping actions afforded Gen Alfred M. Gray’s 1989 model of accomplished through simple unified by his maneuvers created additional teacher-student relationships, and Gen intent, as demonstrated by historical fields of fire for his broadside-mounted David H. Berger’s 2019 emphasis on examples such as then-LTG Slim in his 24-pounder long guns, which supported measuring the effectiveness of plan- defeat of the Japanese 15th Army during feints and ultimately broke ADM Vil- ning processes by the quality of their World War II.23 leneuve’s lines.15 intent—continue to demonstrate the In his memoir, Defeat into Victory, ADM Nelson unified the actions importance of enabling vicious harmony Slim highlighted the ef- of his captains through commander’s by promoting subordinate initiative.21 fectiveness of commander’s intent in intent, effectively overcoming antici- Through simple guidance based on a leading the British 14th Army to victory pated degradations in communications common understanding of objectives over formidable Japanese forces during through his use of a column formation.16 and decentralized decision making, our World War II.24 From 1942 to 1943, In his personal journal, ADM Nelson naval forces will continue to confirm the LTG Slim commanded the Burma referred to his unorthodox methods of decentralizing authority as “the Nelson touch,” writing, “I am anxious to join the Fleet, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them the Nelson touch, which we say is warranted never to fail.”17 Prior to the battle, he created a common understanding of his objectives, enabling decisive actions at the captain level. ADM Nelson organized the actions of his subordinates through simple guiding principles like, “No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” He de- centralized authority to open fire down to his fleet’s captains and emphasized the importance of attacking effectively first.18 One recollection said, “If signals could not be seen from the flagship, [captains] had complete autonomy to engage the enemy as they saw fit.”19 On Engage more closely. (Painting by J.M.W. Turner, (1775-1851).)

WE2 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 Corps and the XV Corps, both of which and [explaining] to them how each manding Chindit forces, the Allied faced critical defeats against Japanese man’s contribution [to his priorities] forces disrupted Japanese supply lines, forces during the Burma Campaign.25 played an important part in the overall limited Japanese freedom of maneu- Widely renowned in the Asiatic-Pacific result.”31 He regularly visited the front ver, and stunted Mutaguchi’s ability theater for their training and discipline, lines and delivered intent to his subor- to reinforce the Japanese 15th Army. LTG Ren’ya Mutaguchi’s Japanese 15th dinate commanders in their own lan- Accordingly, “in March 1945, the Brit- Army prioritized speed in tactics to ex- guage, using interpreters when he was ish 14th Army took Mandalay and the ploit gaps in allied defensive positions, unable to do it himself. He decentralized Japanese stronghold of Meiktila.”37 By allowing them to beat back the British control of his distribution network to May 1945, the remaining Japanese 15th forces from Burma into during ground maneuver forces to keep supply Army forces were successfully repelled the Arakan Campaign in 1943.26 lines moving during Japanese attacks.32 from Burma and unable to seize British Following the 1943 Japanese defeat Furthermore, considering the feedback India, allowing Allied forces to establish of the British XV Corps in the Arakan he received regarding the needs of his critical supply lines into China.38 Campaign, LTG Slim was assigned to troops, LTG Slim exploited his robust LTG Slim understood that true lead- command the British 14th Army and logistical network to provide culturally ers do not inspire through writing or dictating their orders, but through lead- ing their people and being with them.39 He built a leadership team where his Following the 1943 Japanese defeat of the British XV army operated more from his com- Corps in the Arakan Campaign, LTG Slim was assigned mander’s intent than written orders, and he developed strong relationships to command the British 14th Army and given orders to that imparted trust in his leaders and prevent Japanese seizure of British India. earned trust in return. In a post-career analysis of his application of orders to his maneuver warfare mindset which contributed to victory in Burma, Field given orders to prevent Japanese sei- appropriate meals to his troops with Marshal Slim notes: 27 33 zure of British India. Upon assuming religious dietary restrictions. I suppose dozens of operation orders command, he identified many struggles Transparency in goals and decen- have gone out in my name, but I never his soldiers would have to overcome— tralization of authority to competent actually wrote one myself. I always had from correcting a notably poor supply subordinates generated quick wins at someone who could do that better than chain to altering his troop’s mindset the small-unit level, allowing the Brit- I could. One part of the order I did, that Mutaguchi’s forces were unable ish 14th Army to overcome the mind- however, draft myself—the intention to be beaten. Most important to LTG set that the Japanese were supermen … it is always the most important.”40 Slim was his need to organize the British and unbeatable. Deliberately limiting LTG Slim’s use of simple priorities 14th Army—which comprised British, the size and scope of his tactical ob- provides a relevant example of how to Gurkha, Burmese, African, American, jectives, he emphasized the conduct of establish command and control systems and Chinese troops—into simple chains small patrols to build confidence in his that are flexible, adaptable, and resil- of command.28 troops’ abilities to move and fight in ient.41 The anticipated speed of a future Soldiers from the British 14th Army the Burmese jungle.34 The success of conflict reinforces the importance of were collectively characterized by a vast the British 14th Army from 1943-1945 decentralizing authority to the low- medley of cultures, languages, and reli- during the Burma Campaign was the est competent authority.42 Emphasiz- gions. LTG Slim unified this disparate result of LTG Slim’s simple orders and ing speed in decision making through force by establishing three transparent organizing principles, ability to trans- simple priorities promotes certainty in priorities for the British 14th Army form the army into a winning team, and uncertain environments and generates which he nested in subordinate priori- unifying principles around a common the bottom-up initiative necessary to ties in every level of his command: build cause.35 Utilizing the momentum of maintain tempo in the absence of di- a cohesive army, prioritize small-unit small-unit victories, LTG Slim adhered rect communications.43 Simple priori- defeats of Japanese forces, and lever- to the leadership advice he received as a ties nested in every level of command age coalition force capabilities.29 LTG young cadet: “Hit the other fellow, as exploit the full potential of the U.S. Slim emphasized the importance of his quick as you can, and as hard as you naval Services’ junior enlisted and of- priorities at the tactical level to support can, where it hurts him the most, when ficers, and will no doubt enable success the achievement of his strategic objec- he ain’t lookin!”36 in a future contested environment. tives in Burma.30 With coalition support from Ameri- To build a cohesive army, he rein- can LTG Joseph Stilwell, USA, com- Unleashing Intelligent Initiative forced the three aforementioned priori- manding Chinese forces and British Maintaining the United States’ ties by “speaking tirelessly to his men American GEN Orde Wingate com- strategic advantage in the emerging

Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE3 Ideas & Issues (Maneuver Warfare)

operational environment will require 3. Ibid. tactical decision makers to intelligently respond to evolving threats impacting 4. James Acton, “Command and Control in the U.S. naval forces’ operational and the Nuclear Posture Review: Right Problem strategic objectives.44 Historical mili- Wrong Solution,” War on the Rocks, (February 2018), available at https://warontherocks.com; tary operations during the Napoleonic and Jeffrey Reilley, “Multidomain Operations: Wars and World War II, modern guid- A Subtle but Significant Transition in Military ance like Gen Berger’s Commandant’s Thought,” Air & Space Power Journal, (Maxwell Planning Guidance, and even industry AFB, AL:Air University Press, 2016). best-practices highlight the effective use of commander’s intent as an asymmetric 5. Gen David H. Berger, Commandant’s Plan- advantage critical to supporting distrib- ning Guidance, (, DC: 2019). uted and complex force packages. FedEx chief executive officer and 6. Anthony Piscitelli, The Marine Corps Way Marine veteran Fred Smith’s simple of War: The Evolution of the U.S. Marine guidance to his employees integrates Corps from Attrition to Maneuver Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, (El Dorado Hills, CA: speed with control for a complex and Savas Beatie, 2017); Liang, Qiao and Wang distributed organization responsible for Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA more than fifteen million shipments per Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999); day: “Get all packages to their destina- and “Multidomain Operations: A Subtle but tion free of damage, in a cost-effective Significant Transition in Military Thought.” manner, and within the shipment peri- od specified by the customer.”45 Smith’s 7. Harry S. Laver, The Art of Command: Mili- use of simple intent promotes intelligent tary Leadership from George Washington to Co- initiative for more than 450,000 FedEx lin Powell, (Lexington, KY: University Press of employees worldwide and harmonizes Kentucky, 2010). subordinate execution of the FedEx mis- 8. James Lacey, “An Historical Look at the Fu- sion in line with his priorities. ture,” (lecture, Quantico, VA, August). The gradual erosion of American Field Marshal The Viscount Slim. (Photo by technological advantages demonstrates Robert Scarth.) (File licensened under the Creative 9. John B. Hattendorf, Trafalgar and Nelson, the need to emphasize commander’s Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 license. (Newport, RI: The Mu- intent at the tactical level, in order to No changes were made to the image.) seum, 2006). increase effectiveness during distributed operations.46 A Design for Maintain- 10. Dan Fogel, “Lord Nelson Can Teach us Lots ing Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, About Strategy,” SP3, (May 2019), available at highlights the importance of decentral- http://www.spthree.com. ized authority as a priority to maintain ... the application of 11. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, strategic advantage within a contested 47 maneuver warfare phi- “Ship-of-the-line Warfare,” Encyclopaedia Bri- maritime domain. Achieving strategic tannica, (August 2010), available at https:// victories in the emerging operational losophy will increase ... www.britannica.com. See also Trafalgar and environment will require execution of Nelson. intelligent tactical initiatives through quality commander’s intent because as the use of succinct, effective, and eas- 12. “Lord Nelson Can Teach Us Lots About Alfred Mahan noted, “[Subordinate] ily-disseminated commander’s intent Strategy.” See also “Ship-of-the-line Warfare.” action by the various great divisions of to promote the same intelligent initia- the fleet [have their] own part contribu- tive demonstrated by ADM Nelson off 13. Staff, “Battle of Trafalgar: Napoleonic tory to the general whole.”48 the coast of Spain and by LTG Slim in Wars,” Learning History, available at https:// As anticipated in Gen Berger’s plan- Burma. www.learning-history.com. ning guidance, the application of ma- 14. Horatio Nelson, Victory, off Cadiz, 9th Oc- neuver warfare philosophy will increase tober 1805, (October1805), available at https:// as we divest of legacy systems that no Notes www.bl.uk. longer support the speed of our opera- 1. Gen James N. Mattis, “Developing Leaders tional requirements.49 Leadership in the for Maneuver Warfare: General Mattis on Lead- 15. Trafalgar and Nelson. high speed and distributed operations ership,” (lecture, Quantico, VA, October 2019). of a future contested environment will 16. “Ship-of-the-line Warfare.” require skillful judgement in the ap- 2. Ibid. plication of maneuver warfare through

WE4 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 17. Oliver Warner, Nelson’s Last Diary and the er’s Role in Planning and Executing a Successful 40. Ibid. Prayer before Trafalgar, (London, UK: Seeley, Campaign, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Service & Co., 1971). Advanced Military Studies, 1992). 41. James N. Mattis and Bing West. Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, (, NY: Ran- 18. Wayne P. Hughes and Robert Girrier. Fleet 28. Owen Connelly, On War and Leadership: dom House, 2019); See also Commandant’s Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition. The Words of Combat Commanders from Fred- Planning Guidance. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018). erick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf, (Princ- eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 42. “Developing Leaders for Maneuver Warfare: 19. Christopher Gabel, Christopher Willbanks, General Mattis on Leadership.” and James Willbanks, Great Commanders, (Fort 29. “Field Marshal William Slim.” Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 43. MCDP 1, Warfighting. Press, 2014) 30. Ibid. 44. Rob Wittman, “Backing the Corps: En- 20. Ibid. 31. Thomas Jordan, The Operational Command- suring the Future of the Amphibious Force,” er’s Role in Planning and Executing a Successful War on the Rocks, (October 2018), available at 21. John A. Lejeune, Relations between Officers Campaign, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of https://warontherocks.com. and Men. Marine Corps Order No. 29. 1920; Advanced Military Studies, 1992). See also Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 45. Chad Storlie, “Manage Uncertainty with 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997); and 32. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma Commander’s Intent,” Harvard Business Review, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and India, 1943-1945. (November 2010), available at https://hbr.org. See also FedEx Corporation, “Corporate Fact 22. John Paschkewitz, “Mosaic Warfare,” (lec- 33. Ibid. Sheet,” FedEx, available at https://about.van. ture, Quantico, VA:, August 2019); DARPA, fedex.com. “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic 34. Andrew Knighton, “Bill Slim and WWII’s Warfare,” available at https://www.darpa.mil; Forgotten Army—One of The Most Successful 46. John Kroger, “Charting the Future of Edu- and Benjamin Jensen, “Innovation: Myths Commanders of the War,” War History Online, cation for the Navy-Marine Corps Team,” War and Meaning,” (lecture, Quantico, VA: Au- (December 2017), available at https://www. on the Rocks, (November 2019), available at gust 2019). warhistoryonline.com. https://warontherocks.com.

23. “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic 35. Aivars Purins, “Uncle Bill of the Forgotten 47. , A Design for Maintaining Warfare.” Army or the Leadership of Field-Marshal Lord Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, (Washington, Slim.” Baltic Security & Defence Review, (Tartu, DC: 2018); see also United States Navy, Navy 24. William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling EE: Baltic Defence College, 2008). Leader Development Framework, Version 3.0, Japan in Burma and India, 1943-1945, (New (Washington, DC: 2019). York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 2000). 36. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1943-1945. 48. Alfred T. Mahan, Types of Naval Officers 25. David Cotter, “Field Marshal William Slim,” Drawn from the History of the British Navy, (Lon- (lecture, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2019. 37. “Bill Slim and WWII’s Forgotten Army— don, UK: S. Low, 1902). See also Williamson One of The Most Successful Commanders of Murray, “MCDP 7,” Marine Corps Gazette, 26. Maj N. R. M. Borton, British Army, “The the War.” (Quantico, VA: November 2019). 14th Army in Burma: A Case Study in Deliver- ing Fighting Power,” Defence Studies, (Milton 38. “Field Marshal William Slim.” 49. Adam Elkus, “Man, the Machine, and War.” Park, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2002). War on the Rocks, (November 2015), available 39. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma at https://warontherocks.com. See also Com- 27. “Field Marshal William Slim.” See also and India, 1943-1945. mandant’s Planning Guidance. Thomas M. Jordan, The Operational Command-

Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE5