Simple Orders in Complex Warfare Use of Simple Priorities by Capts Alexander Irion & Robert Callison
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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE) Simple Orders in Complex Warfare Use of simple priorities by Capts Alexander Irion & Robert Callison uring an October 2019 Lec- ture Series entitled Devel- oping Leaders for Maneuver Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to Warfare at Marine Corps do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity. DUniversity, former Secretary of De- fense, James N. Mattis, was asked what —GEN George S. Patton he thought was the biggest threat to the preservation of democracy in the United States.1 His response included To emphasize the importance of simple a thoughtful analysis of likely threats >The authors are both students at the commander’s intent supporting future to democracy at home and abroad and Expeditionary Warfare School. U.S. naval operations, this article ex- how they would be mitigated in a fu- amines ADM Lord Viscount Horatio ture contested environment—through Nelson’s use of commander’s intent at vicious harmony enabled by the human The Battle of Trafalgar and Field Mar- interface at all levels of command.2 shal William Slim’s use of simple orders He described the human interface as to unify the British 14th Army during a system of feedback loops informed World War II. by intent and capable of learning and adapting.3 Echoing pages of MCDP 1, Commander’s Intent and the Human Warfighting, Secretary Mattis’ senti- Interface ments demonstrate how, through the Emphasizing the role of individual integration of commander’s intent and behavior within the naval Services the human interface, leaders can build through organizing principles like trust, open lines of communication commander’s intent can foster a cul- within their organization, and promote ture of intelligent initiative. Studies of concepts of maneuver warfare—like multi-domain battles throughout his- mission command. tory highlight the importance of incor- Threats to the United States’ com- porating simple commander’s intent in mand and control architecture reinforce future concepts of operations.8 The tac- an important principle regarding the tical art of ADM Nelson sheds light on effective application of commander’s the effectiveness of simple commander’s intent: the greater the probability of intent when combating a numerically conducting operations in distributed superior naval force. or communications-degraded environ- On 21 October 1805, ADM Nel- ments, the greater the responsibility of ADM Horatio Nelson. (Portrait by Lemual Francis son defeated the combined fleets of our Nation’s commanders to skillfully Abbott (1760-1802).) the French and Spanish navies during issue clear and concise intent.4 The abil- the Battle of Trafalgar off the coast of ity of our naval forces to persistently op- dinate execution of operations in an Spain.9 The victory concluded with all erate in contested, anti-access environ- anticipated communications-degraded British vessels intact, 22 ships from the ments will require simple commander’s environment.6 combined French and Spanish fleets intent to promote intelligent initiative.5 As LtGen Steven Boutelle points out destroyed, and French ADM Pierre- Simplicity in orders and intent will clar- in The Art of Command, “The effective- Charles Villeneuve taken prisoner ify end states, increase speed in decision ness of today’s armed forces leadership aboard his flagship. It was described making, and generate trust in subor- will define the future of the nation.”7 as, “The most decisive naval battle of the Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE1 IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE) [Napoleonic Wars], conclusively ending the morning of battle, ADM Nelson value ADM Nelson placed on intent French plans to invade England.”10 The signaled to his captains: “Engage the by allowing decentralized operations victory was achieved through ADM enemy more closely.”20 The control of to thrive in distributed and communi- Nelson’s belief in the value of com- the battle was effectively handed off to cations-degraded environments. mander’s intent and his deviation from his captains, bringing unmatched speed formal ship-of-the-line warfare typical to 18th century fighting sail tactics.11 At the time, the British practice was ADM Nelson’s use of commander’s intent built trust for commanders to centralize control of the fleet under a single commander and unleashed intelligent initiative by emphasizing using line-ahead battle formations.12 Conventional line-ahead battle forma- short and concise guidance. tions organized fleets in parallel lines that were good for communication but limited their dispersion.13 At the Battle and decisiveness to the fight. ADM Nel- Defeating the Undefeated of Trafalgar, ADM Nelson arranged son’s use of commander’s intent built Enhancing the lethality of the U.S. his ships in columns, directing, “The trust and unleashed intelligent initia- naval Services through proposed com- Order of Sailing is to be the Order of tive by emphasizing short and concise plex force packages will require organiz- Battle.”14 His unconventional use of guidance. ing principles to endow a shared sense of column formations facilitated speed Modern applications of command- responsibility across a large number of and independent maneuver of British er’s intent—shaped by LtGen John A. distributed military platforms.22 Har- ships—and allowed his fleet to approach Lejeune’s 1920 philosophy of the re- monizing the actions of a large number ADM Villeneuve’s linear formation per- lationship between officers and men, of distributed military platforms can be pendicularly. Shaping actions afforded Gen Alfred M. Gray’s 1989 model of accomplished through simple unified by his maneuvers created additional teacher-student relationships, and Gen intent, as demonstrated by historical fields of fire for his broadside-mounted David H. Berger’s 2019 emphasis on examples such as then-LTG Slim in his 24-pounder long guns, which supported measuring the effectiveness of plan- defeat of the Japanese 15th Army during feints and ultimately broke ADM Vil- ning processes by the quality of their World War II.23 leneuve’s lines.15 intent—continue to demonstrate the In his memoir, Defeat into Victory, ADM Nelson unified the actions importance of enabling vicious harmony Field Marshal Slim highlighted the ef- of his captains through commander’s by promoting subordinate initiative.21 fectiveness of commander’s intent in intent, effectively overcoming antici- Through simple guidance based on a leading the British 14th Army to victory pated degradations in communications common understanding of objectives over formidable Japanese forces during through his use of a column formation.16 and decentralized decision making, our World War II.24 From 1942 to 1943, In his personal journal, ADM Nelson naval forces will continue to confirm the LTG Slim commanded the Burma referred to his unorthodox methods of decentralizing authority as “the Nelson touch,” writing, “I am anxious to join the Fleet, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them the Nelson touch, which we say is warranted never to fail.”17 Prior to the battle, he created a common understanding of his objectives, enabling decisive actions at the captain level. ADM Nelson organized the actions of his subordinates through simple guiding principles like, “No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” He de- centralized authority to open fire down to his fleet’s captains and emphasized the importance of attacking effectively first.18 One recollection said, “If signals could not be seen from the flagship, [captains] had complete autonomy to engage the enemy as they saw fit.”19 On Engage more closely. (Painting by J.M.W. Turner, (1775-1851).) WE2 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • April 2020 Corps and the XV Corps, both of which and [explaining] to them how each manding Chindit forces, the Allied faced critical defeats against Japanese man’s contribution [to his priorities] forces disrupted Japanese supply lines, forces during the Burma Campaign.25 played an important part in the overall limited Japanese freedom of maneu- Widely renowned in the Asiatic-Pacific result.”31 He regularly visited the front ver, and stunted Mutaguchi’s ability theater for their training and discipline, lines and delivered intent to his subor- to reinforce the Japanese 15th Army. LTG Ren’ya Mutaguchi’s Japanese 15th dinate commanders in their own lan- Accordingly, “in March 1945, the Brit- Army prioritized speed in tactics to ex- guage, using interpreters when he was ish 14th Army took Mandalay and the ploit gaps in allied defensive positions, unable to do it himself. He decentralized Japanese stronghold of Meiktila.”37 By allowing them to beat back the British control of his distribution network to May 1945, the remaining Japanese 15th forces from Burma into India during ground maneuver forces to keep supply Army forces were successfully repelled the Arakan Campaign in 1943.26 lines moving during Japanese attacks.32 from Burma and unable to seize British Following the 1943 Japanese defeat Furthermore, considering the feedback India, allowing Allied forces to establish of the British XV Corps in the Arakan he received regarding the needs of his critical supply lines into China.38 Campaign, LTG Slim was assigned to troops, LTG Slim exploited his robust LTG Slim understood that true lead- command the British 14th Army and logistical network to provide culturally ers do not inspire through writing or dictating their orders, but through lead- ing their people and being with them.39 He built a leadership team where his Following the 1943 Japanese defeat of the British XV army operated more from his com- Corps in the Arakan Campaign, LTG Slim was assigned mander’s intent than written orders, and he developed strong relationships to command the British 14th Army and given orders to that imparted trust in his leaders and prevent Japanese seizure of British India.