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Media Outlets and the Relation Between Social Media and Far-Right Radicalisation

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Media Outlets and the Relation Between Social Media and Far-Right Radicalisation From Cambridge to Charlottesville: Media outlets and the relation between social media and far-right radicalisation Pasko Kisic Merino Supervisor: Catarina Kinnvall MSc programme: Global Studies Major: Political Science 1 From Cambridge to Charlottesville: Media outlets and the relation between social media and far-right radicalisation Abstract Far-right radicalisation and social media are subjects that are increasingly addressed in a joint fashion. However, a nuanced understanding of the features of this relationship remain elusive due to their novelty, research emphasis in large organisations, and the difficulty to access radical groups and individuals. Online media outlets are one of the few channels through which these features can be addressed, yet their lecture is affected by critical sociopolitical contexts and their own political agendas. Consequently, to understand the debate between far-right radicalisation and social media expansion I, first, examined the way in which online media outlets portray the three key elements of their relationship – social media, the far-right, and the process of radicalisation – and, second, I examined the way in which these portrayals shape the debate itself. By cross-analysing 24 articles from the UK and the US with 19 in-depth analytical questions I established three common “struggles” by which online media shape the debate by portraying the violent relationship between the three core elements: anti- establishment tension; the reshaping of social relations; and control of information. Keywords: far-right, social media, radicalisation, political psychology, communications, United States, United Kingdom, Charlottesville, Donald Trump, Tommy Robinson, Cambridge Analytica. Word count: 21995 2 Acknowledgements I could not have traversed this gruelling experience nor gather the confidence to embark on this journey of knowledge and suffering without the unquenching love and support of my mother Carmen, my father Pasko, my siblings Kate and Ivo, and my niece, Alana. To my mother, especially, I thank your motivational speeches, your late (and early) talks, for reminding me of my position of responsibility in society, and for the continued feeling of belonging somewhere. To my supervisor, Catarina, for the enormous trust deposited in me, your patience, advice, and unwavering support, as well as for challenging me to constantly improve my work and my thinking processes. To Fredric, Thea, and Batsy, for being the closest friends in the worse possible moments and for never letting me feel alone. Fredric, thank you for enormous friendship, motivation, and your terrific support in writing this thesis and challenging me to improve it constantly; Thea for being my dear sister in the farthest land and always taking care of me; and dear Batsy, for being the warmest possible manifestation of peace and tranquillity, and for always being patient with me. To Erla, thank you for your long-standing care, support, exemplary optimism and drive, intellectual challenge, patience, those rain songs, and for being the best partner during these two years of constant struggle. To Martín and Andrés, who always kept me both grounded and hopeful of an inevitable cyborg apocalypse. Your support and friendship truly transcended time and space, and I have not felt a rupture in my links to Peru in great deal thanks to you. Bre bre, urya. To all my (old and new) close friends all around the world: Renzo, Caro, Gonzalo, Nico, Kiari, Mariano, Micaela, Lau, Camila, Alessandra, Pantango, Farid, Mach, Elio, Veri, Eli, Vince, Jules, Gem, Joakim, Panchita, Fanny, Lisa, Filipo, TanTan, Sarp, Ahmad Chan Sugoi, Onurchis, Emi Chibi Chan, Fabiano, Nino, Zeynep, Lana, Sarita, Suzanne, Viktor, Amaranta, and Rahel – thank you all. Also, Teki and Filou – thank you for keeping me sane and alive the last month. You’re both insane and I hate your midnight protests, but I love you deeply. Finally, I would like to thank Black Sabbath, Judas Priest, Iron Maiden, Megadeth and Metallica for keeping me angry enough to power through the exhausting late stages of the writing process. And Steven Wilson for reminding me the pointlessness of that anger (and emotions in general). 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 3 Section 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................... 6 1.1. Research problem and research question (RQ) ................................................... 7 1.2. Background .............................................................................................................. 9 1.3. Thesis plan ............................................................................................................. 12 Section 2. Previous research ................................................................................................. 14 Section 3. Theoretical framework ........................................................................................ 17 3.2. Expansion of the far-right in Europe and the US ................................................... 17 3.2.1. Definitions of the far-right: what does the FR encompass? ............................ 17 3.2.2. Epistemological issues of the study of the far-right.......................................... 20 3.2.3. Discourse and narratives of the far-right .......................................................... 22 3.2.4. Expansion and internationalisation of the far-right ........................................ 25 3.3. Radicalisation ............................................................................................................. 28 3.3.1. First area of debate: The “end-points” – cognitive v. behavioural radicalisation. ................................................................................................................ 28 3.3.2. Second debate: collective v. individual approaches to radicalisation ............. 30 3.4. Social media theory .................................................................................................... 37 3.4.1. Social media as a socialisation and information channel ................................. 38 3.4.2. Early form of online socialisation: fandom ....................................................... 40 3.4.3. Social media and political participation ............................................................ 40 3.4.4. How does social media challenge modern socialisation? ................................. 42 3.5. Theoretical wrap-up .................................................................................................. 44 Section 4: Methodology ........................................................................................................ 45 4.1. Research design .......................................................................................................... 45 4.2. Justification ................................................................................................................. 48 4.3. Operationalisation of research .................................................................................. 49 4.3.1. Sub-research Questions (SRQs) ......................................................................... 49 4.3.2. Operationalisation framework ........................................................................... 50 Section 5: Analysis ................................................................................................................ 53 5.1. SRQ1: How do online media outlets portray the elements of the debate? ....... 55 4 5.1.1. How are social media portrayed? ................................................................ 56 5.1.2. How is the far-right portrayed? ................................................................... 62 5.1.3. How is the process of radicalisation portrayed? ........................................ 67 5.2. SRQ2: How are the elements of the debate shaped by these portrayals? ........ 76 5.2.1. Fight the power: The struggle of the far-right against the liberal establishment ................................................................................................................. 76 5.2.2. The falsity of martyrdom: far-right and the reshaping of social relations 80 5.2.3. Is big brother watching? The attempts and failures to control the far- right online ..................................................................................................................... 84 Section 6: Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 88 References .............................................................................................................................. 93 Appendix 1: Research sample – 24 online articles ........................................................... 103 5 Section 1: Introduction On the 12th of August 2018 a few dozen far-right activists gathered in Washington D.C. in an attempt to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the Charlottesville riots, or what was called the “Unite the Right” rally. Back in 2017, these riots positioned the myriad of US radical far-right movements in the eyes of major media outlets and, consequently, the world. A successful commemoration of this “historical” event was not meant to be, however. News media networks mocked the far-right activists due to their few numbers and limited support (Andone
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