Ethnolinguistic Federalism and Interborder Conflict in Ethiopia
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ISSN: 2036-5438 Ethnolinguistic federalism and interborder conflict in Ethiopia by Yonattan Araya Zemaryam Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 12, issue 3, 2020 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E - 99 Abstract This study examines the interplay between federalism and interborder conflict between the Tigrai and Amhara regions of Ethiopia. To this effect, secondary data, both qualitative and quantitative, were collected from the National Census Report, YouTube and official government letters. The qualitative data were analysed through thematic analysis, while the quantitative data were expressed in terms of percentages. Results indicate that ethnolinguistic federalism was not implemented based on concrete parameters, but mainly on language that the government used as a tool for interborder demarcation and historical ownership of territories that can serve as a sound parameter. This practice has led to interborder conflict, which has both historical and linguistic bases, between the Tigrai and Amhara regions. Thus, it is concluded that ethnolinguistic federalism could not be a panacea for ethnic conflict in Ethiopia, especially in the north. Both regions are working to expand their territories beyond their current statuses, and thus laying claims for pieces of lands from each other. Key-words Ethiopia; Ethnolinguistic federalism; interborder conflict; Raya; Wolkait Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -100 1. Introduction Following the collapse of the military regime in 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced ethnolinguistic federalism. It divided the country’s political map predominantly along ethnolinguistic lines to establish regional autonomy and decentralise government power. Hence, politically, Ethiopia is a federal state, comprising nine administrative regions, namely Tigrai, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR), as well as two chartered cities, namely Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Each of the first four regional states is dominated by one linguistic group, and thus they are somehow homogenous, while the SNNPR is the most heterogeneous region consisting of 56 different linguistic groups. Gambela and Harari are also heterogeneous regions where more than two numerically competing linguistic groups dwell. Unlike the other regions, Benishangul-Gumuz, as the name denotes, is a home for two linguistic groups, namely Benishangul and Gumuz. The current administrative structure – federalism – is a new phenomenon for Ethiopia but not for other federalist countries. The idea of federalism dates back to the ancient Greek civilisation where the legal relationships between the leagues and the city-states were attempted to be elucidated; nonetheless, the modern concept of federalism was brought in by the American Constitution of 1787 (Graves 1964). The very discourse of federalism deals with devolution of state power among the central and regional governments. It is ‘a system of government in which central and regional authorities are linked in a mutually interdependent political relationship’ (Ville 1961:196). Nonetheless, the practices of federalism differ owing to the linguistic, ethnic and economic contexts of a given country that formulates and implements it. For instance, Ethiopia’s federalism is implemented mainly on an ethnolinguistic basis. The legal foundation for the federal model is clearly stated in the preamble of the 1995 federal Constitution of Ethiopia; ‘We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia: Strongly committed, in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political community founded on the rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing our economic and social development’. To put the federal model into practice, as stated in the Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -101 Constitution (Article 47(1)), nine regional states were established. The boundaries of the regions were demarcated predominantly based on language and ethnicity in order to protect the unity of the country, promote peace and ensure the rights of nations and nationalities. The Constitution (Article 46) indicates that ‘States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the peoples concerned’. The use of language and ethnicity in the establishment of the regions was meant to pacify national and border conflicts. Meles Zenawi, the architect of the federal arrangement, who served as the head of the federal government since its inception until 2012, said: From a purely legal point of view, what we were trying to do was to stop the war and start the process of peaceful competition. … The key cause of the war all over the country was the issue of nationalities. Any solution that did not address them did not address the issue of peace and war. … People were fighting for the right to use their language, to use their culture, to administer themselves. So, without guaranteeing these rights it was not possible to stop the war or prevent another one. (Quoted in Vaughan 2006:33-37) This implies that ethnolinguistic federalism was introduced to exterminate conflicts between ethnic groups and promote peaceful competition. This model has been in practice for the last three decades and has protected the country from disintegration. Ethnolinguistic federalism has preserved the unity of Ethiopia, while providing full recognition to the principle of linguistic, cultural and ethnic equality as well as political, cultural and linguistic autonomy at regional level (Alem 2003). It has helped to minimise internal conflicts in the last three decades. Since most violent conflicts of a country are fought between different groups within the country, the potential of ethnic federalism to maintain political stability, prevent territorial disintegration and facilitate the accommodation of differences has rendered it one of the international society’s preferred conflict resolution strategies (Monteux 2006). However, ethnolinguistic federalism is not without problems. The major argument against ethnic federalism is that it “will only lead to further ethnic fragmentation, tensions and conflicts and will thus ultimately result in the demise of the state” (Beken 2009:1). This view appears to be true when we see it in terms of interborder conflicts in Ethiopia that have taken place following the focus only on language and ethnicity to establish the regional states and mark out their borders. Therefore, it is argued that though language and Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -102 ethnicity appears to be unavoidable in the establishment of regional states, they are not the only parameters, and thus there is a need for consideration of other factors such as historical ownership of territories. To deal with ethnicised conflict and to reduce ‘ethnic clashes’ in Ethiopia, there probably has to be some constitutional revision and a reordering of the current regional state boundaries in the country to produce workable, balanced units where territory … and regional identity are the building blocks, and not [only] ethnicity or language. … The issue of land and access to land is currently playing a major role in this Ethiopian conflict dynamic. Land is the most important resource, and historically it had major existential and identity aspects for people. (Abbink 2006:392) In a nutshell, it appears that the introduction of ethnolinguistic federalism could not yield the intended result because ethnic conflicts, such as interborder conflict, is still a main state-building challenge in Ethiopia, probability because of the avoidance of other factors, especially historical land ownership that has become a challenge of effective implementation of the federal model. Therefore, this study aims to examine the interplay between federalism and interborder conflict in Ethiopia by taking the border issue of Tigrai and Amhara regions as a case in point. To this end, a qualitative research approach was effectuated for this study. Qualitative data were drawn purposefully from official government letters about the Raya territory and were written a few years after the territory was taken away from the Tigrai province because analysing historical documents is crucial to justify the claims made over the Raya and Wolkait-Tsegede territories. Moreover, it is important to analyse the views of the Tigrai and Amhara elites who lay claims over the territories and thereby triangulate their views with the historical evidences. Hence, qualitative data were collected from YouTube videos of interviews that journalists conducted in 2018 and 2019, with politicians and other professionals who have deep knowledge about the Raya and Wolkait-Tsegede territories. The two years are selected purposefully because the debates on the Tigrai-Amhara interregional borders of the Raya and Wolkait-Tsegede territories have become hot after friction among the coalition forces of EPRDF started in 2018. In addition, quantitative data were drawn from the 1994 National Census of Ethiopia. The YouTube qualitative data were transcribed verbatim and translated from Tigrinya and Amharic into English. Also,