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Ukraine's Internally Displaced Persons Hold a Key to Peace

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Atlantic Council DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER ISSUE BRIEF Ukraine’s Internally Displaced Persons Hold a Key to Peace LAUREN VAN METRE, STEVEN E. STEINER, OCTOBER 2017 AND MELINDA HARING s Ukraine nears the end of the fourth year of conflict, the national government, local governments, and international community must begin to take Ukraine’s large internally displaced persons (IDP) population more seriously. Ukraine’s Aalmost 1.7 million displaced persons can be a powerful constituency for peace. They are contributing to local economies, advocating for each other, and supporting local reconciliation efforts; many are building bridges between east and west; and some are advancing the peace process through their activism. One-third of the IDPs plan to integrate into local communities rather than return.1 As a result, Ukraine has developed a unique model of local support and integration in the midst of conflict.2 This paper examines Ukraine’s IDP policies in the context of the larger crisis between Moscow and Kyiv, and is based in part on extensive field work with displaced persons who have settled in Kyiv and Vinnytsia. We argue that Ukraine’s displaced persons can and should play a role in a sustained peace process, and many are already building bridges and fostering local reconciliation. Their successful integration into local communities, while still preserving their right to return, strengthens the legitimacy of local governance, creates respect for national government, reduces socially and economically dependent populations, and creates constituencies for peace and democracy. Empowering Ukraine’s displaced persons also contributes to the country’s democratic development, social cohesion, and reconciliation, thereby undermining Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy for regional destabilization. In the initial phase of the conflict, the government passed several legislative acts to both provide targeted assistance for six months to internally displaced persons and enable IDPs to register to receive social and administrative services in their place of resettlement. The Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and 1 World Bank, “Ukraine: Survey of the Socio-Economic Impact of the Movement of prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Citizens and the Return of ATO Participants,” March 2017, https://www.ostro.info/ Europe and Turkey in the West to news/1970/, found that 34 percent of Ukraine’s 1.7 million IDPs do not plan to return. the Caucasus, Russia, and Central 2 Elizabeth Ferris, Suleiman Mamutov, Kateryna Moroz, and Olena Vynogradova, “Off Asia in the East. to a Shaky Start: Ukrainian Government Responses to Internally Displaced Persons,” Brookings Institution and HIAS, May 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/Ukrainian-Govt-Responses-to-Internal-Displacement-May-2015.pdf. ISSUE BRIEF Ukraine’s Internally Displaced Persons Hold a Key to Peace Figure 1. Share of internally displaced people out of IDPs in Ukraine (statistics from April 2016) population 52% in unoccupied parts of Syria Donetsk and Luhansk regions South Sudan Colombia 1,586,724 registered IDPs Iraq Sudan 239,737 children (15%) Yemen 808,153 pensioners (51%) Afghanistan Ukraine 58,468 disabled (3.6%) Democratic Republic of Congo Source: Ministry of Social Policy Turkey 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% Source: Spiegel. However, IDPs have not generally been educated on Overview their access to government support, and there is little Ukraine has the world’s ninth largest population of transparency and great inequality in the distribution of displaced persons, after Colombia, Syria, Democratic benefits. The government has not addressed critical Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, issues for IDPs, such as their rights to vote and to Sudan, and Yemen.4 Despite the enormity of the 3 compensation. With no infrastructure or process in displacement in Ukraine, the crisis has drawn little place to facilitate IDP resettlement, a new breed of international attention and humanitarian support. In civil society organization has stepped in to provide 2017, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of IDPs assistance upon arrival and information on their Humanitarian Affairs has received only 11.5 percent, or new communities, and to advocate for local funding $24.6 million, of the $214.1 million it needs to run its and support. Kyiv should be recognized for not forcing operation in Ukraine. Even worse, donor support has policies and funding that pressure IDPs to return and significantly flagged since the conflict began.5 not resettle, as other countries have done. However, its current minimalist approach of letting local Ukraine has nearly 1.6 million officially registered governments and civil society organizations handle IDPs out of a population of forty-three million.6 To the crisis is a serious concern in light of the protracted understand the enormity of that figure, one should conflict. Kyiv could be model for an enlightened policy remember that Germany, whose population is double on resettlement by engaging local governments on that of Ukraine, accepted one million refugees in 2015. funding and programming for IDPs, starting a national Fifteen percent of IDPs are children, 63 percent are discourse on stereotyping and IDPs, and beginning to women, and 51 percent are pensioners.7 catalogue IDPs’ loss of property and assets to facilitate their potential return and seek war reparations from Russia. In doing so, Kyiv would be recognized for 4 “Database,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/. assisting IDP resettlement, while preserving the right 5 “Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan 2017,” Financial Tracking to return. This approach would strengthen social Service, https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/531/summary. cohesion and Ukraine’s democratic development, while 6 Since 2014, Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy has registered undermining Putin’s influence in the Donbas. nearly 1.6 million IDPs. This number includes people who are not permanently displaced by the conflict to the government-con- trolled areas, but forced to register as IDPs since the law links pensions to IDP status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that the real figure of those who are permanently displaced is around 0.8-1 million higher. 3 Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Overview on State Assistance for IDPs,” 7 Data from the Ministry of Social Policy, April 2016, and UNHCR, January 2016, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ “Ukraine,” Fact Sheet, October 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/en- protection_cluster_overview_on_state_assistanceeng.pdf. us/news/updates/2015/10/5614d38e3/ukraine-fact-sheet.html; “Housing Land and Property Rights of Displaced and Conflict-Af- 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL ISSUE BRIEF Ukraine’s Internally Displaced Persons Hold a Key to Peace IDP in front of her destroyed house in Eastern Ukraine, March 2015. Photo credit: UNHCR/Y. Gusyev. Current State of Play: Government and In April 2016, the government set up a ministry Societal Responses dedicated to IDPs, but it has a weak mandate and lacks Facing these shortages in international support for the necessary enforcement mechanisms. It is understaffed country’s large IDP population, the government has and frequently bypassed by other line ministries, struggled to mount a coordinated response. Much of notably the Ministry of Social Policy. the burden has fallen to local communities and civil The government’s response to the crisis has been society organizations. “largely inadequate,” according to Aleksandr Galkin, The Ukrainian government has passed a number of director of the Ukrainian nongovernmental organization 9 laws and the Cabinet of Ministers has issued several (NGO) Right to Protection. The government does not resolutions that apply to Ukraine’s displaced persons, but have sufficient resources or the political will. the approach has been piecemeal. There is little appetite “There is no national strategy in Ukraine as far as IDPs to do anything more, a sentiment that former Prime are concerned,” said Dr. Hryhoriy Nemyria, a member Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk captured well when he said in of parliament and chair of Ukraine’s parliamentary 2016, “The situation is more or less under control.”8 Human Rights Committee. “Yes, there are policies . but they look like improvisations.”10 fected Communities in Eastern Ukraine,” Norwegian Refugee Council, January 2016, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/ en/operations/ukraine/document/housing-land-and-property- rights-displaced-and-conflict-affected. 9 Melinda Haring, “Europe’s Short Memory and Ukraine’s Long Crisis,” 8 Melinda Haring, “Worried about Brexit? No, Scared, Says Atlantic Council, June 22, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ Ukraine’s Former Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk,” component/content/article?id=30971:europe-s-forgotten-crisis. UkraineAlert, June 30, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 10 The overview section has been taken and updated from Haring, blogs/ukrainealert/worried-about-brexit-no-scared-says-ukraine- “Europe’s Short Memory and Ukraine’s Long Crisis.” s-former-prime-minister-arseniy-yatsenyuk. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 ISSUE BRIEF Ukraine’s Internally Displaced Persons Hold a Key to Peace The Ukrainian government had provided social Calling it “the most outstanding issue,” Nemyria noted assistance and pensions to some IDPs, but those that a lack
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