Online Appendix Political Booms, Financial Crises
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ONLINE APPENDIX POLITICAL BOOMS, FINANCIAL CRISES HELIOS HERRERA, GUILLERMO ORDOÑEZ AND CHRISTOPH TREBESCH ABSTRACT. In this Online Appendix we (A) Describe in detail the sample and the variables used in the main text. (B) Show robustness to using different samples, to explaining sudden stops and to including several additional economic, financial and political controls. (C) Show out-of-sample forecasting results. (D) Describe the new dataset on government approval based on polling results. (E) Show that the dynamics of the ICRG stability index captures well the dynamics of pop- ularity by comparing it with the new dataset on government approval. We present more detailed evidence of the evolution of popularity and government changes around specific events of financial crises. (F) Present the proofs of Propositions. (G) Provide further empirical support for the reputation mechanism we propose in the manu- script, in particular through the regulatory behavior of policymakers. (H) Provide a numerical simulation of the reputational mechanism dynamics. 1 APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF SAMPLE AND VARIABLES Sample of Countries Sample of Advanced Economies (22): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Sample of Emerging Economies (40): Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colom- bia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Hong Kong, Hun- gary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 2 Table A.1: Sample of Crises Banking CrisesMajor Crises Sudden Stops (Laeven and Valencia) (Laeven and Valencia, (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía) Reinhart and Rogoff) Emerging Economies Emerging Economies Emerging Economies Costa Rica 1987 Hong Kong 1997 Argentina 1995 Argentina 1989 Indonesia 1997 Argentina 1999 Jordan 1989 Malaysia 1997 Brazil 1995 Algeria 1990 Philippines 1997 Brazil 1998 Brazil 1990 South Korea 1997 Bulgaria 1995 Romania 1990 Thailand 1997 Chile 1995 Hungary 1991 Russia 1998 Colombia 1997 Nigeria 1991 Argentina 2000 Costa Rica 1998 Estonia 1992 Turkey 2000 Ecuador 1995 Poland 1992 Ecuador 1999 Slovenia 1992 Advanced Economies Estonia 1998 India 1993 Norway 1987 Hong Kong 1998 Costa Rica 1994 Finland 1991 Indonesia 1997 Mexico 1994 Sweden 1991 Jordan 1994 Venezuela 1994 Japan 1992 Jordan 1998 Argentina 1995 Iceland 2007 Latvia 1999 Latvia 1995 Ireland 2007 Lithuania 1999 Lithuania 1995 United Kingdom 2007 Malaysia 1994 Bulgaria 1996 United States 2007 Mexico 1994 Czech Rep. 1996 Greece 2008 Pakistan 1995 Indonesia 1997 Portugal 2008 Peru 1997 Malaysia 1997 Spain 2008 Philippines 1995 Philippines 1997 Poland 1999 South Korea 1997 Slovak Rep. 1997 Thailand 1997 Slovenia 1998 China 1998 South Korea 1997 Colombia 1998 Thailand 1996 Ecuador 1998 Turkey 1994 Russia 1998 Turkey 1998 Slovak Rep. 1998 Uruguay 1999 Turkey 2000 Argentina 2001 Advanced Economies Uruguay 2002 Austria 1992 Hungary 2008 France 1992 Latvia 2008 Greece 1992 Russia 2008 Portugal 1992 Slovenia 2008 Spain 1992 Sweden 1992 Advanced Economies United States 1988 Finland 1991 Norway 1991 Sweden 1991 Japan 1997 United Kingdom 2007 United States 2007 Austria 2008 Belgium 2008 Denmark 2008 France 2008 Germany 2008 3 Greece 2008 Iceland 2008 Ireland 2008 Netherlands 2008 Portugal 2008 Spain 2008 Sweden 2008 Switzerland 2008 Table A.2: List of Variables and Data Sources Variable Definition Source Economic and Financial Variables Banking crises Crisis onset year (dummy) Leaven and Valencia (2010, 2012) Sudden stops Crisis onset year (dummy) Calvo et al. (2008) Credit growth Change in domestic credit to private sector (yoy, as % of GDP) World Bank WDI dataset Growth rate Change in real GDP (yoy) World Bank WDI dataset Stock market prices Change in main stock market index (yoy, inflation adjusted) Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), updated dataset House price changes Change in real house prices (yoy, inflation adjusted) Cesa-Bianchi (2013), complemented with data by Mack and Martínez-García (2011) Expenditures/GDP Change in general government total expenditure (yoy, as % of GDP) IMF WEO dataset Current account/GDP Change in the current account balance (yoy, as % of GDP) World Bank WDI dataset Consumption/GDP Change in household consumption expenditure (yoy, as % of GDP) World Bank WDI dataset Reserves Change in total reserves (yoy, in months of imports) World Bank WDI dataset Inflation Inflation rate (yoy, in logs) World Bank WDI dataset Terms of Trade Change in terms of trade (yoy, constant local currency units) World Bank WDI dataset Contagion Share of countries entering a banking crisis Leaven and Valencia (2012), own calculation Country credit ratings Change in credit rating score of the Institutional Investor magazine, Institutional Investor which ranges from 0 (highest risk) to 100 (lowest risk). Political and Institutional Variables Government stability Indicator capturing the government's ability to stay in office and carry ICRG dataset out its policy program(s) Popularity Government approval rates (in %) based on political polls. See Appendix Own data collection (Appendix D) D for details Democracy Polity2 index ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy) Polity IV project database Executive constraints Based on "XCONST" variable in Polity IV project Polity IV project database Presidential system Based on "SYSTEM" variable (presidential systems) Database of Politcal Institutions (DPI) Rule of law Law and order indicator, capturing strength and impartiality of the legal ICRG dataset system and the popular observance of the law Bureaucratic quality Indicator capturing the institutional strength and quality of the ICRG dataset bureaucracy Quality of Government Sum of institutional indicators on ”corruption”, ”rule of law” and ICRG dataset ”bureaucracy quality” Central bank independence Central bank autonomy index, capturing both economic and political Arnone et al. (2006) New executive (gov. change) Federal election (presidential or parliamentarian) in the last two years DPI (Beck et al. 2001) Political fractionalization Based on "GOVFRAC" variable (probability that two deputies picked at DPI (Beck et al. 2001) random from among the government parties will be of different parties) Years in office Based on "YRSOFFC" in the DPI (How many years has the chief DPI (Beck et al. 2001) executive been in office?) Years to next election Based on "YRCURNT" in the DPI (years left in current term) DPI (Beck et al. 2001) Left government Based on "EXECRLC" on the DPI (party orientation "Left") DPI (Beck et al. 2001) External conflicts Scope of external conflicts, building on the subcomponents "War", ICRG dataset "Cross-Border Conflict" and "Foreign Pressures" Internal conflicts Scope of internal conflicts, building on the subcomponents "Civil War", ICRG dataset "Terrorism/Political Violence" and "Civil Disorder" Violent riots Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving Banks and Wilson (2013) the use of physical force. General strikes Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves Banks and Wilson (2013) more than one employer and is aimed at national government policies or Anti-government demonstrations Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the purpose of voicing opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. Major government crises Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of Banks and Wilson (2013) the present regime, excl. situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow. 4 APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS FIGURE B.1. Stability index surrounding banking crises: full sample Emerging Economies Advanced Economies 9 9 8,5 8,5 8 8 7,5 7,5 7 7 6,5 6,5 6 6 Avg pre-crisis Avg. pre-crisis change: -4.7 % 5,5 change: + 12.3% 5,5 N=52 N=19 5 5 -3 -2 -1 0 1 -3 -2 -1 0 1 FIGURE B.2. Stability index surrounding sudden stops: full sample Emerging Economies Advanced Economies 10 10 9,5 Avg pre-crisis 9,5 Avg pre-crisis change: -9.8% 9 change: +27.1% 9 8,5 8,5 N=6 8 8 7,5 7,5 7 7 6,5 6,5 6 6 5,5 5,5 N=28 5 5 -3 -2 -1 0 1 -3 -2 -1 0 1 5 Table B.1: Predicting Banking Crises - Additional Economic and Financial Controls . (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Without House Stock Household Terms of Random Time Asian Growth Current Prices Prices Consumpti Inflation Trade Effects Fixed Crisis and Rate Account (change, (change, on/GDP (log) (change, Panel Effects Fin. Cris. (real) to GDP real) real) (change) real) of 2008 Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ΔGovernment Stability -0.007 -0.014 -0.017** -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 -0.009 (yoy change, lag 1) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) ΔGovernment Stability -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.000 (yoy change, lag 2) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) ΔGovernment Stability -0.009* -0.005 -0.007 -0.009* -0.009 -0.010* -0.008 -0.009* -0.010 -0.008 (yoy change, lag 3) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) Interaction ΔGovStab & 0.026** 0.029** 0.031*** 0.026** 0.028** 0.035** 0.027** 0.028** 0.032** 0.023*