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Home , Corruption, Crime in Afghanistan, Rangin Dadfar Spanta

Confronting the Threat of and Organized in : Implications for Future Armed Conflict

BY TIM SULLIVAN AND CARL FORSBERG

s the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved over the last decade, it has become apparent that of the many challenges the country and its international partners face, few are as complex, A pervasive, and threatening as corruption and . Together, corruption and organized crime have undermined efforts to build Afghan institutions, consolidate security gains, achieve political progress, encourage economic growth, and set conditions for enduring stability. These problems, however, are not unique to the war in Afghanistan. Conflicts elsewhere in recent decades have revealed that states engaged in or emerging from insurgencies and civil wars—espe- cially those in which institutions are weak, rule of law is minimal, and substantial international resources have been injected with inadequate oversight—are particularly susceptible to the pro- liferation of corruption and organized crime. The Afghan experience is rich with lessons for the American and foreign policy establishment as it considers the likely nature of future armed conflict. In the years ahead, the U.S. may again be compelled to assist or intervene in weak states experiencing protracted instabil- ity or rebuilding after years of . In such environments—as in Afghanistan— there is a pressing requirement not only for seamless integration of civilian and military efforts to establish security, enable law enforcement organizations, and promote the rule of law, but also for full coordination in the pursuit of and accountability within the critical institutions of

Tim Sullivan is currently a graduate student at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs. He served on ISAF’s counter-corruption task force from January 2011 to June 2012. Carl Forsberg is currently a graduate student in the Department of History at the University of Texas in Austin. He served on ISAF’s counter-corruption task force from January 2011 to June 2012.

PRISM 4, NO. 4 LESSONS LEARNED | 157 SULLIVAN AND FORSBERG the state in, or emerging from, conflict. All of Afghan leaders increasingly acknowledge these efforts, meanwhile, must be grounded in the scale of the problem and the threat it pres- a thorough understanding of that state’s poli- ents. Although President Karzai has often tol- tics, and tailored to generate the necessary will erated corruption as part of a complex political among its key leaders to undertake comple- strategy, he has vocalized growing frustration mentary reforms. with the problem. “The permeation of corrup- This article outlines the nature and origins tion and a culture of impunity have under- of the current problems of corruption and mined the development of institutions in organized crime in Afghanistan, as well as the terms of strength and credibility,” President effect they have had on the mission of the Karzai warned at the December 2011 Bonn International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Conference in .1 Corruption in It then discusses the measures ISAF has taken Afghanistan is not an intrinsic cultural phe- to address these threats. It concludes with a nomenon. It exists today at unprecedented review of the lessons and implications of the levels as a result of the events of the past thirty Afghan counter-corruption experience for years (and particularly the decade of future armed conflict and stability operations. rule), including chronically weak governance and rule of law institutions, social structures The Nature and Extent of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan fractured by sustained conflict, and in more recent years, a fragile war economy sustained The prevailing level of corruption across by international , security assistance, and Afghanistan’s public and private sectors pres- the narcotics trade. “Our biggest weakness,” ents a grave threat to United States interests in President Karzai has explained, “was that the the region and the viability of the Afghan state. administration had almost been shattered dur- Corruption undermines the legitimacy, effec- ing thirty years of war.”2 tiveness, and cohesion of the Afghan govern- The most serious and destabilizing forms ment; it fuels discontent among the popula- of corruption in Afghanistan are carried out tion, generating active and passive support for systematically by criminal networks that oper- the insurgency; and it prevents the growth of a ate with political protection. “In this govern- strong licit economy, thus perpetuating Afghan ment,” explained Afghan National Security dependence on international assistance. Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta in December Corruption and organized crime directly com- 2010, “we have mafia networks.” The networks promise the United States’ fundamental inter- “begin with the financial banking system, with ests in Afghanistan and the surrounding corruption networks, with reconstruction and region. Long-term U.S. objectives—including security firms and also with drugs and the the elimination and prevention of transna- Taliban; they are in Parliament and they are in tional terrorist safe-havens—remain depen- government.”3 These criminal net- dent upon strengthening the Afghan state and works (CPNs) are engaged in the capture and hardening its institutions against the resur- subversion of critical state functions and insti- gence of the Taliban, the onset of further civil tutions. They divert customs revenue at conflict, and the interference of the country’s Afghanistan’s international airports and neighbors. crossing points, steal international security and

158 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 4, NO. 4 CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AFGHANISTAN development assistance disbursed to the mechanisms of many critical Afghan institu- Afghan government, and abuse public and pri- tions are similarly subject to intimidation and vate financial institutions at the expense of coercion. Afghanistan’s economic stability. The networks The scale of corruption in Afghanistan is also profit immensely from facilitating, pro- closely linked to the political settlement that tecting, and participating in the narcotics has occurred in the country as CPNs, which are trade. often regionally and ethnically aligned, pursue CPNs currently operate with impunity— political as well as criminal agendas. The net- consistently avoiding meaningful investiga- works with the greatest degree of influence in tions and prosecution—by exerting influence the Afghan government and its critical institu- within law enforcement, investigative, and tions have their roots in the com- judicial institutions across the Afghan govern- mander’s networks and political parties that ment. “ is constraining [our] ability to emerged in the conflicts of the 1980s and prosecute high-level corruption cases,” noted 1990s—the Soviet-Afghan war, the subsequent Afghan Attorney General Mohammad Ishaq civil war, and the anti-Taliban resistance. With Aloko, whose office is particularly vulnerable the Bonn Agreement in 2001, many of the fig- to political interference and manipulation. The ures in these networks acquired senior posi- internal accountability and oversight tions within Afghanistan’s newly formed national government. These figures, in turn, Todd Huffman

The ‘Go Vote’ posters have a distinct message -- armed guards are prominent on either side and in this case there’s a real one at the base.

PRISM 4, NO. 4 LESSONS LEARNED | 159 SULLIVAN AND FORSBERG distributed power among their allies and affil- example, the connection between the Taliban’s iates, and the purchase of government posts reemergence after 2003 and the abuse of became widespread. With this commoditiza- power by government officials, security forces, tion of political power came the development and their networks of affiliates.4 More recently, within key ministries of cohesive patronage by undermining popular confidence in the networks, elements of which became engaged legitimacy, effectiveness, and long-term dura- in illicit activities. Today, these networks dom- bility of the government, corruption has dis- inate Afghanistan’s political space. They are couraged the population from actively mobi- stakeholders in the state’s weakness, as the lizing against the insurgency, thus lending the continued fragility of Afghanistan’s institu- Taliban passive support. Additionally, the tions provides them freedom of action and short-term maximization-of-gains mentality impunity. among the country’s criminal patronage net- Apart from weakening the country’s criti- works—which is driven both by a lack of faith cal institutions, corruption and organized in Afghanistan’s future and the anticipation, crime have played a role in fomenting instabil- despite reassurances, of an impending, large- ity and insurgent violence. Analysts have con- scale international disengagement from the sistently identified causal links between preda- country—has heightened ethnic and factional tory governance and the expansion of tensions, accelerated the networks’ efforts to insurgency in Afghanistan, noting, for Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford, U.S. Air Force

U.S. Army Capt. Justin Quisenberry, the commander of Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, conducts a joint patrol with Afghan National Security Forces in Andar district, Ghazni province, Afghanistan, on Jan. 7, 2011.

160 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 4, no. 4 CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AFGHANISTAN consolidate power, and set conditions for con- the dysfunction now evident within portions tinued violence. of Afghanistan’s institutions. Criminal patron- age networks (CPN) within the Afghan govern- The Limits of Capacity-Building ment have likewise thwarted many of the Over the last ten years, the U.S., ISAF, and the structural and administrative anti-corruption international community have together pur- reforms that the international community has sued a variety of capacity-building and techni- advocated since the early years of the conflict, cal assistance initiatives in Afghanistan, many including merit-based hiring, pay and grade of which have sought to reduce opportunities reform, and asset declaration policies for for corruption and strengthen Afghan institu- senior government officials. Moreover, CPNs tions against its corrosive effects. These efforts have actively suppressed or sought to co-opt have included training and advisory programs the junior, reform-minded officials who have for Afghanistan’s elite counternarcotics and received training from the U.S. and others in investigative units, along with initiatives to recent years, as well as the experienced – but develop Afghan judicial and rule of law institu- politically vulnerable – technocrats operating tions at the national, provincial, and district within the Afghan government’s bureaucracies. levels. Various international development CJIATF-Shafafiyat: Responding to the agencies have sponsored technical assistance Strategic Threat of Corruption programs in ministries across the government, and considerable resources and attention have In the summer of 2010, ISAF created the been dedicated to the mammoth task of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force– recruiting, training, equipping, and profession- Shafafiyat (“transparency” in Dari and ) alizing the Afghan National Security Forces. in coordination with the international com- While significant progress has been munity, to support the Afghan government, achieved in each of these areas, corruption and foster a common understanding of the corrup- organized crime nevertheless remain common tion problem, plan and implement ISAF anti- within Afghan institutions. A fundamental corruption efforts, and integrate the coalition’s obstacle to the success of capacity-building counter-corruption activities with those of key initiatives has been a frequent failure to interagency and international partners. From acknowledge the inherently political nature of the outset, the task force engaged regularly institutional reform. Portions of Afghan min- with leaders from Afghan civil society and offi- istries function not as professional bureaucra- cials across the Afghan government to frame cies focused on public administration, but as the problem of corruption from the perspec- vertically-integrated patronage networks, ele- tive of those who had experienced it, and to ments of which engage in and facilitate a range develop a shared understanding as a basis for of illicit activities. Technical assistance and joint action and reform. In with capacity-building alone, absent measures to senior Afghan leaders, Shafafiyat (which counter the influence of CPNs within state evolved into the Combined Joint Interagency institutions, can do little to prevent the sys- Task Force –Afghanistan, or CJIATF-A, in late temic diversion of international resources, the 2012) established a variety of structured limited and selective provision of services, and forums in which ISAF, U.S. interagency

PRISM 4, NO. 4 LESSONS LEARNED | 161 SULLIVAN AND FORSBERG partners, and international organizations coordination with its Afghan and international could exchange information, gain insights, and partners, Shafafiyat therefore sought consis- work cooperatively with Afghan officials to tently to illustrate the comparative long-term develop and implement concrete anti-corrup- risks of inaction, so as to persuade senior lead- tion plans and measure progress. ers that it is in their ultimate interests—and Since the task force initiated its work, the interest of the Afghan state and its peo- Afghan officials have increasingly recognized ple—to address the problem with a degree of and acknowledged that the scale of corruption urgency. within their country’s critical institutions is In partnership with organizations across compromising the security, stability, economic ISAF, the U.S. interagency, the Afghan govern- health, and cohesion of the state. Afghan lead- ment, and the international community, ers also express concerns about their country’s Shafafiyat prioritized efforts in areas in which international reputation and standing, corruption and organized crime present the acknowledging that corruption, organized greatest threat to the coalition’s mission and crime, and the narcotics trade jeopardize the the viability of the Afghan state. credibility of Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Many Security Ministries and the ANSF leaders remain deterred, however, by what they perceive as the near-term political risks of act- The problem of corruption is particularly dan- ing against powerful criminal networks. In its gerous within the security ministries and the PFC Sha’Quille Stokes

The first sergeant of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 1st Special Operations Kandak examines illegal drugs found during the search of a compound Nov. 11, 2013, in Achin district, Nangarhar province Afghanistan.

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Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), as it allowed to operate free from , intimida- threatens the combat effectiveness and cohe- tion, and political interference. ISAF officials sion of the army and police. ISAF, through the have also worked directly with senior, efforts of the NATO Training Mission- national-level Afghan leaders in an effort to lift Afghanistan (NTM-A), supported the develop- protection from criminals, encourage prosecu- ment of professional Afghan security forces, tions, and prevent the reinstatement elsewhere managed by transparent and accountable secu- in the government of officials removed for cor- rity ministries. Shafafiyat and NTM-A worked ruption. closely with senior officials from the Ministry and Airports of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) in a sustained manner through several The criminal capture of state functions at joint, Afghan-led, working groups and com- Afghanistan’s border crossing points, interna- missions to develop detailed anti-corruption tional airports, and inland customs depots recommendations and implementation plans, robs the state of revenue, inhibits economic including the creation of insulated investiga- growth, impedes capacity-development efforts, tive, oversight, and adjudicative bodies within and leaves the country vulnerable to transna- the security ministries so as to ensure that the tional threats. The ranks ANSF can enforce internal accountability while Afghanistan’s borders as the fourth hardest in avoiding political interference and intimida- the world to cross for the purposes of trade, tion. ISAF also worked to identify areas in creating a significant obstacle to the country’s which security assistance is being diverted regional economic integration.6 Corruption within the ANSF for criminal ends, such that and organized crime at Afghanistan’s critical it is a net dis-benefit to the coalition’s mission. ports of entry also directly undermine the state’s security and sovereignty by enabling the Rule of Law and the Judicial Sector trafficking of narcotics, precursor chemicals, Across Afghanistan’s provinces, the erosion of and weapons, while facilitating insurgent free- the rule of law has not only empowered ele- dom of movement. The civil-military team in ments of the insurgency—which have capital- and senior Afghan officials have com- ized on the population’s demand for swift and mitted to work together to expose and act impartial dispute resolution—but has allowed against the criminal networks operating at power to remain in the hands of local and these borders, airports, and customs depots, so regional powerbrokers, who are involved in a as to enable the Afghan state to maintain cred- range of predatory, extractive, and illicit activi- ible sovereignty and achieve enduring security, ties.5 ISAF and its partners in the U.S. mission while collecting revenue sufficient to expand in Kabul have supported the development of its licit economy and reduce its dependence on Afghan law enforcement and judicial institu- international assistance. tions that are responsive to the needs of the Counternarcotics and Transnational population and reliably enforce the rule of Crime law. This effort requires sustained engagement within the Afghan judicial sector, to ensure As the mutually-reinforcing relationship that investigators, prosecutors, and judges are between the Afghan narcotics trade,

PRISM 4, NO. 4 LESSONS LEARNED | 163 SULLIVAN AND FORSBERG corruption, and the insurgency became sanctions is therefore a critical means of increasingly apparent, ISAF and its partners in degrading Afghanistan’s criminal networks, the international law enforcement community while creating a deterrent effect currently not began targeting the intersection of these con- achieved by the Afghan judicial system. vergent threats. Likewise, as ISAF and its inter- Contracting and Procurement agency and international partners in Kabul have expanded their visibility on the flows of Task Force 2010, a component of U.S. Forces- , narcotics, precursor chemicals, weap- Afghanistan (USFOR-A) was formed simulta- ons, and other resources across Afghanistan’s neously with CJIATF-Shafafiyat in the summer criminal networks, it became clear that there is of 2010 to coordinate, expand, and apply a significant transnational dimension to cor- greater oversight and management of U.S. con- ruption and organized crime in Afghanistan. tracting, acquisition, and procurement pro- As the U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational cesses, so as to deny criminal patronage net- Organized Crime explains, “nowhere is the works and insurgents access to U.S. funds and convergence of transnational threats more materiel. Having acknowledged that interna- apparent than in Afghanistan and Southwest tional spending has the potential to directly Asia.”7 The application of international law impact campaign objectives, U.S. forces are enforcement actions and targeted financial increasingly integrating procurement and Gunnery Sgt. Bryce Piper Sgt. Bryce Gunnery

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Anthony Duncan picks a poppy flower while returning from a security patrol through a poppy field in Helmand province’s Green Zone. Elements of 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to Afghanistan to provide regional security in Helmand province in support of the International Security Assistance Force.

164 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 4, NO. 4 CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AFGHANISTAN contracting considerations into planning and well as impediments to sustainable security, operations at all levels. Task Force 2010 and host nation security force development, polit- others have recognized that high-value con- ical progress, and economic growth. These les- struction contracts in insecure areas are the sons are likewise presented with the under- most difficult to oversee and administer, and standing that the U.S. and the international the task force has prioritized its efforts accord- community have at times inadvertently con- ingly. Additional contracting reforms have tributed to and compounded the problems included the disaggregation of large contracts faced today in Afghanistan with respect to cor- to encourage more bidders and to deter the ruption and organized crime—missteps the emergence of ; the wider advertis- U.S. and its allies cannot afford to make in ing of contracts so as to improve Afghan ven- future conflicts. dors’ awareness of and access to the bidding Lesson 1: Anticipate and Respond Swiftly to process; and identification of intended sub- Corruption and Organized Crime contractors in the course of bidding. U.S. forces’ contracting reform efforts have been In insecure states with underdeveloped institu- coordinated with the Afghan government, as tions and weak rule of law, a massive infusion well as with civilian agencies operating in of international resources disbursed with lim- Afghanistan like USAID, which has published ited oversight is likely to be accompanied by a its own COIN contracting guidance, similar to surge in corruption and organized crime.8 that issued by ISAF. International forces and their interagency counterparts prosecuting counterinsurgency or Looking Ahead: Implications of the Afghan Counter-Corruption Experience stability operations must anticipate this devel- for Future Conflict opment and be prepared to put in place, in the earliest stages of their mission, mechanisms by In anticipation of future missions of similar which to mitigate and monitor the problem complexity, it will be essential to ensure that (by tracking illicit financial flows, for example, the lessons emerging from the counter-corrup- and implementing vendor-vetting measures), tion experience in Afghanistan are integrated while at the same time articulating expecta- into U.S. forces’ training, doctrine, and leader- tions for transparency and accountability ship development. Although future efforts will among officials in the supported government. demand close civil-military coordination and Timing, in all these efforts, is critical. It is vital unity of effort, U.S. and allied forces must be to launch counter-corruption initiatives before prepared to anticipate and exercise initiative in criminal networks and patterns of corruption addressing the problems of corruption and become entrenched, before the population has organized crime in counterinsurgency and sta- become disillusioned with its government and bilization environments. The lessons and international forces, and before the perception insights outlined below reflect the expectation has arisen within the host government that that U.S. and allied forces and their inter- impunity for politically-connected criminals agency partners will, in the years ahead, engage will be tolerated. The international community in operations in which corruption and orga- will also maximize its influence if it acts before nized crime will serve as drivers of conflict, as its will to impose costs for

PRISM 4, NO. 4 LESSONS LEARNED | 165 SULLIVAN AND FORSBERG corruption—whether through conditionality financial positions prior to international of aid or international law enforcement forces’ ultimate departure—rather than a actions—has been called into question. shared commitment to satisfy mutual goals. It is clear, therefore, that counter-corruption Lesson 2: Acknowledge the Centrality of Politics efforts stand to have the greatest effect when implemented in support of a carefully coordi- International forces and their civilian partners nated political strategy on the part of interna- must ground all of their efforts in a thorough tional forces and their civilian counterparts, understanding of the history and politics of designed to marshal military, diplomatic, and the state in which they are engaged. War— economic tools and resources in pursuit of a whether in the form of a counterinsurgency thorough and clearly articulated set of political campaign or post-conflict stability opera- objectives. tions—is a fundamentally political endeavor. Lesson 3: Guard Against the Criminal Corruption in post-conflict states, likewise, is Capture of Institutions within the fundamentally a political problem, closely Supported Government linked to the balances of power among national elites. As a 2010 UNDP study noted, Attention to the politics of the supported gov- “effectively responding to corruption can be ernment and early implementation of joint difficult because it nearly always requires tak- anti-corruption measures are particularly criti- ing political, economic, and social power away cal for preventing the emergence of what has from those who benefit from the status quo.”9 been called the “political-criminal nexus”—a With this in mind, international forces must mutually beneficial relationship of protection understand the key leaders with whom they and profit between corrupt government offi- engage and partner in the context of their cials and criminal networks.10 If left unchecked, political, social, and cultural networks. The this dynamic has the potential to lead to the intelligence community has an important role criminal capture of critical state functions, to play in this regard, although additional whereby the supported government’s institu- training for analysts may be required to ensure tions become directed toward serving the inter- a proper focus not only on the composition of ests of a narrow political elite and their crimi- political networks, but on the historic affilia- nal associates, rather than advancing and tions, dynamic relationships, and balances of protecting broad national interests. In post- power within them—as well as an understand- conflict states whose governments are the ing of their respective roles in the context of a recipients of large sums of international assis- broader national political settlement. It is also tance, there is an enormous incentive for crim- important to be aware that host-nation offi- inal networks to infiltrate and co-opt fragile cials’ interests might not always align fully institutions newly flush with resources. The with those of international forces. Host-nation Afghan experience has demonstrated that political actors may in some cases be moti- international technical assistance and profes- vated by narrow agendas driven by their his- sionalization training are necessary, but not toric, ethnic, and factional affiliations—as well sufficient, for girding institutions against crim- as a desire to maximize their political and inal infiltration and subversion. Rather than

166 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 4, NO. 4 CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AFGHANISTAN focusing narrowly on capacity-building, those while dramatically disempowering others, thus providing international assistance must generating unintended political, social, and become attuned to patterns of criminal activity security consequences. Development, procure- and work with key leaders in the supported ment, and acquisition initiatives thus, as government to develop coherent, broadly COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance sug- acceptable strategies to disrupt criminal net- gests, represent operational concerns that must works and sever the relationships between be integrated and aligned with a comprehen- political patrons and their criminal clients. sive national or coalition political strategy. It will be imperative in future conflicts to imple- Lesson 4: Understand the Impact of International Spending ment measures to ensure rigorous vendor-vet- ting and sustained post-award oversight for The infusion of substantial international large logistics and development contracts— resources—whether in the form of develop- and to pursue full integration across the civil- ment assistance or contracts—without suffi- ian and military agencies involved, so as to cient oversight into a contested or post-conflict achieve a “common contracting operating pic- state with an underdeveloped economy has the ture.” In Afghanistan, it has further been potential to significantly empower some actors observed that failure to adequately judge local

Soldiers of 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, intercept illegal timber as it is smuggled through the Narang Valley in Afghanistan’s Konar province.

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populations’ development needs or accurately result, security forces can become subject to assess communities’ capacity to absorb inter- factionalism, politicization, and corruption. national aid has generated extreme waste and International forces assigned to develop the created opportunities for , corruption, and supported government’s security sector must patronage, while preventing the emergence of therefore be prepared to apply the same rigor entrepreneurs.11 Models of development, of analysis to understanding the political and focused instead on host nations’ nascent small factional affiliations of key leaders within the enterprises and business sectors, stand to serve host nation’s security forces as those of other as a check against large scale corruption, while national figures, as discussed above. A security setting the conditions for inclusive, responsive force development model focused strictly on governance of a sort that deters systemic abuse capacity-building and professionalization may of power.12 not be sufficient for ensuring a politically neu- tral force or for adequately integrating former combatants into new national security struc- international forces can anticipate having tures. As the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field significant access, agency, and leverage within Manual makes clear, “the acceptance of values, the supported government’s security sector. such as ethnic equality or the rejection of cor- ruption, may be a better measure of training effectiveness in some COIN situations” than Lesson 5: Promote Transparency simple “competence in military tasks.”14 In the and Accountability in Security Force long-term, of course, there is not a dichotomy Development between these objectives, as host-nation secu- With the expectation that future counterinsur- rity forces rife with corruption will suffer sig- gency and stability operations will be coupled nificantly reduced operational effectiveness. with security force development missions, The Afghanistan experience demonstrated the international forces can anticipate having sig- extent to which corruption consistently under- nificant access, agency, and leverage within the mined a unit’s leadership, morale, will to fight, supported government’s security sector. This readiness, and logistical sustainability. To the access presents a critical opportunity to inte- degree that host-nation security forces are seen grate counter-corruption efforts within train- by the population to be professional and ing and professionalization initiatives. The above ethnic, tribal, and political factionalism, development of effective, professional, and they have the potential to lend additional cred- accountable security forces is essential, of ibility to the supported government, serving as course, for the transfer of security responsi- the locus of an emerging sense of national bilities to the host nation – a prerequisite for unity. successful counterinsurgency and stabilization Lesson 6: Integrate Law Enforcement, missions. In many developing countries Military, and Information Operations emerging from conflict, however, control of the security ministries and their forces is much As the war in Afghanistan has made clear, cor- sought after among elites and their networks ruption, organized crime, and insurgency are as the political settlement develops.13 As a interconnected problems that cannot be dealt

168 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 4, NO. 4 CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AFGHANISTAN with in isolation. In states engaged in or as they build alliances with political leaders, emerging from conflict, an effective response financial institutions, law enforcement, foreign to these converging threats requires the inte- intelligence, and security agencies.”16 gration of law enforcement, military, and Transnational criminal organizations, in short, information operations at the tactical, opera- exploit and further destabilize the weak insti- tional, and strategic levels, so as to employ the tutions, internal divisions, and permissive full range of tools available to address these security environments of states engaged in or problems. The integration of these capabilities is also essential for exploiting the likely “crim- criminal networks “threaten stability and inalization” of the insurgency. This dynamic undermine free markets as they build has been seen, to varying degrees, in alliances with political leaders, financial Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—as insur- institutions, law enforcement, foreign gent groups that had engaged in illicit activi- intelligence, and security agencies.” ties initially as a means of financing their operations became increasingly profit-focused, at the expense of their original ideological or emerging from conflict. If the Afghan experi- political aims. International forces and their ence and others are a reliable guide, key figures civilian partners can capitalize on this dynamic within indigenous criminal networks will also not only through information operations— rely upon links to the international financial calling attention to the groups’ venality and system to launder their criminal proceeds and —but by mobilizing and empower- maintain licit business interests abroad. In ing host-nation law enforcement assets these instances, the U.S. and its allies have a through evidence-based operations against range of tools at their disposal to operate insurgents groups’ criminal activities.15 against the transnational dimension of corrup- Because host-nation law enforcement and tion and organized crime, while furthering judicial institutions often become targets for counterinsurgency and stabilization objec- insurgent attacks, as well as for infiltration and tives—by tracking illicit finance, initiating tar- subversion by criminal networks and their geted coercive financial actions, pursuing sanc- affiliates, international forces and their civilian tions designations, and identifying partners must also help insulate and protect opportunities for mutual legal assistance these institutions from intimidation and coer- requests. International forces and their civilian cion. partners would benefit in future conflicts from the creation of a central, unified, interagency Lesson 7: Identify and Operate Against the Transnational Dimensions of the Problem strategic planning body with the capacity to manage and coordinate the application of As President Obama’s Strategy to Combat these tools and capabilities against transna- Transnational Organized Crime makes clear, tional networks. the problem of transnational organized crime Lesson 8: Develop a Counter-Corruption can be particularly acute within weak and Narrative That Resonates With the developing states, where criminal networks Population “threaten stability and undermine free markets

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Given the extent to which corruption under- positive social pressure for reform. mines popular confidence in a supported gov- International forces and their civilian counter- ernment’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and sover- parts can create the space for these groups to eignty, international forces and their civilian mobilize unimpeded, in part by remaining partners must find a means of presenting aware that, much like the host-nation’s judicial themselves as an honest broker between the institutions, civil society organizations will population and the state, thereby avoiding per- become targets of intimidation and retribution ceived complicity in the host government’s from criminal networks and their , even as international forces con- patrons. Support for and engagement with a tinue to provide vital assistance to the sup- post-conflict state’s civic and social organiza- ported state’s leaders and institutions. To do tions can directly advance fundamental coun- so, it is essential to consistently transmit a terinsurgency and stability objectives, to the message of enduring international commit- degree that a healthy, vibrant civil society is the ment at the strategic and tactical levels—com- foundation of a stable state whose institutions mitment not only to ending corruption, but to are responsive and whose leaders are account- ensuring durable security and to advancing the able. interests and aspirations of the population. Lesson 10 : Employ Incentives and Without a compelling narrative of commit- Disincentives ment, a series of harmful hedging strategies can develop: criminal networks and their Although it must be carefully and strategically patrons will accelerate and expand their illicit applied, international forces and their civilian activities, driven by a short-term maximiza- partners should be aware of the leverage they tion-of-gains mentality that anticipates the maintain to shape events within a host- eventual departure of international forces and nation’s political space. This leverage is the easy access to international resources that afforded, in large part, by the security assur- accompanies them. ances provided by international forces, as well as by international assistance and spending, Lesson 9: Recognize Civil Society as a Force which in some cases may be the only reliable for Anti-Corruption Advocacy and Reform source of revenue for the government of a As has been observed in Sicily, Colombia, beleaguered post-conflict state. This leverage Georgia, Mexico, and elsewhere, civil society can prove vital when pursuing counter-corrup- groups can play a dramatic role in reversing tion efforts, especially when host-nation offi- the influence of organized criminal networks cials’ appetite for reform is minimal, and lead- and the institutional corruption they encour- ers will thus need to be persuaded and age and enable.17 When properly networked incentivized into action. Incentives can and empowered, social activists, educators, include, for example, the provision of addi- entrepreneurs, elements of the media, religious tional assistance to a given state institution (or leaders, and other moral authorities can military unit), linked to the execution of a together foster a critical mass of societal sup- desired host-nation reform or law enforcement port for upholding the rule of law, while stig- action. Targeted coercive financial sanctions or matizing corruption, and thus generating international law enforcement measures

170 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 4, NO. 4 CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN AFGHANISTAN represent yet another means of leverage that, in Colombia, for example, is designed to train, again, must be applied only after consider- advise, and strengthen Colombia’s special ation of the political context. Finally, although forces in the fight against the narcotics trade, it represents a more indirect form of influence, , and insurgency, while reinforcing the international community can take steps to regional . The work of the integrate the host nation into international MILGROUP has contributed to the reversal of regimes and compacts related to corruption, the narcotics-driven insurgent and paramilitary transparency, and accountability, in an effort violence that had for decades paralyzed to encourage compliance with international Colombia’s politics, corroded its judicial sec- norms and standards that appeals to host- tor, and left its population victimized. Another nation leaders’ concerns about the state’s inter- successful model drawn upon in Afghanistan national reputation, standing, and sovereignty. is Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)–South, located in Key West, Florida, which marshals Conclusion resources, shares intelligence, and coordinates Not only are the problems of corruption, orga- operations across agencies in the fight against nized crime, insurgency, and the narcotics trade in Afghanistan mutually reinforcing and Not only are the problems of corruption, convergent; they are also enduring. Even with organized crime, insurgency, and the concerted coalition and Afghan security and narcotics trade in Afghanistan mutually law enforcement efforts in the next two years, reinforcing and convergent; they are also these problems will remain a threat to enduring. Afghanistan’s stability and economic health long after the international force presence recedes. Likewise, the influence of narcotics regional narcotics-trafficking. With representa- profits in the Afghan political-economy may tives from the U.S. military, nine U.S. civilian grow as ready access to international agencies, and eleven different countries, JIATF– resources—and thus the potential for criminal South has had a dramatic impact in disrupting diversion—diminishes. Any long-term security and interdicting the flow of narcotics through- commitment to Afghanistan, therefore, must out Central/South America and the Caribbean. consider the capabilities and organizational As the U.S. military and national security arrangements necessary to sustain the integra- establishment looks back on the wars of the tion of U.S., Afghan, and international law last decade to cull lessons in preparation for enforcement, counter-corruption, counter- future conflicts, the Afghan anti-corruption narcotics, and counter-terrorism efforts. experience must be an essential area of focus. The approach adopted by ISAF and Few threats have cut as widely across U.S. and CJIATF-Shafafiyat has parallels in a number of international forces’ lines of effort in other successful models, which have integrated Afghanistan as corruption and organized military and law enforcement efforts to stabi- crime. By hollowing-out the critical institu- lize states facing convergent threats of insur- tions the coalition and its partners have strug- gency, organized crime, and government sub- gled to build, undermining the legitimacy of version. The U.S. Military Group (MILGROUP) the government ISAF has sought to support,

PRISM 4, NO. 4 LESSONS LEARNED | 171 SULLIVAN AND FORSBERG preventing the mobilization of the population 5 Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, “No Shortcut against the insurgency, and contributing to to Stability: Justice, Politics, and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Chatham House, December 2010. insurgent narratives, corruption has jeopar- 6 The World Bank, Doing Business 2012, dized all that the U.S. and its allies have set out Washington, DC. to achieve in Afghanistan. ISAF’s continually 7 The White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing improving understanding of the problem, Converging Threats to National Security, Washington however, as well as its efforts to engage con- DC, July 2011. structively with Afghan leaders on the issue— 8 See, for example, while at the same time assembling the proper Development Programme, “Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations,” June 2011; tools necessary to address the challenge and Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisne, “A New directly—have together laid the foundation for Approach to Postwar Reconstruction,” Journal of counter-corruption progress in the coming Democracy 20, no. 4, October 2009. 9 years. Much work lies ahead, clearly, and much United Nations Development Programme, “Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery still depends on the will of senior Afghan offi- Situations,” June 2011. cials and political elites to commit definitively 10 Roy Godson, Menace to Society: Political- to reforms that, while daunting in the near- Criminal Collaboration Around the World, National Strategy Information Center, 2003. See also, Mark term, represent the country’s best hope of Shaw, “Drug Trafficking and the Development of achieving the promising and peaceful future Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,” in its people, after decades of conflict, sorely Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, eds., deserve. PRISM Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, UNODC & World Bank, 2006; and Peter Andreas, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1, (Spring 2004). Notes 11 Greg Mills and Ewen McLay, “The Path to Peace in Afghanistan,” Orbis 55, no. 4 (Fall 2011), and the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan,” released June 8, 2011. 1 President , “Statement at the 12 R. Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan, The Bonn Conference,” December 5, 2011. Aid Trap (New York: Columbia University Press, 2 President Kamid Karzai, International 2009); and David Kilcullen, Greg Mills, Jonathan Anti-corruption Day Speech, Kabul, Afghanistan, Oppenheimer, “Quiet Professionals: The Art of December 18, 2010. Post-Conflict Economic Recovery and 3 Matthew Rosenberg, “‘Malign’ Afghans Reconstruction,” RUSI Journal 156, no. 4 (August/ Targeted,” The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2010. September 2011). 4 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and 13 Andrew Rathmell, “Reframing Security Sector Laptop (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Reform for Counterinsurgency – Getting the Politics Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy Right,” in Christian Schnaubelt, ed., Complex and Conflict in Kandahar,” New America Foundation, Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War, November 2010; Tom Coglan, “The Taliban in NATO Defense College Report Forum Paper 14. Helmand: An Oral History,” in Giustozzi, ed, 14 FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia 2006, Department of the Army, section 6-13. University Press, 2009). 15 David Spencer, et al., Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense

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University, Washington DC, June 17, 2011; Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2010; and Phil Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2009. 16 The White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security, Washington DC, July 2011. 17 Leoluca Orlando, Fighting the Mafia and Renewing Sicilian Culture (San Francisco: Encounter, 2001); and Roy Godson, “Fostering a Culture of Lawfulness: Multi-Sector Success in Pereira, 2008- 2010,” National Strategy Information Center, Washington, DC, October 2010.

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