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Merging the Natural with the Artificial: the Nature of A MERGING THE NATURAL WITH THE ARTIFICIAL: THE NATURE OF A MACHINE AND THE COLLAPSE OF CYBERNETICS. ALCIBIADES MALAPI-NELSON A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO APRIL 2015 © ALCIBIADES MALAPI-NELSON 2015 Abstract This thesis is concerned with the rise and fall of cybernetics, understood as an inquiry regarding the nature of a machine. The collapse of this scientific movement, usually explained by external factors such as lack of funding, will be addressed from a philosophical standpoint. Delving deeper into the theoretical core of cybernetics, one could find that the contributions of William Ross Ashby and John von Neumann shed light onto the particular ways in which cybernetics understood the nature and behavior of a machine. Ross Ashby offered an account of the nature of a machine and then extended the scope of “the mechanical”. This extension would encompass areas that will later be shown to be problematic for mechanization, such as learning and adaptation. The way in which a machine-ontology was applied would trigger effects seemingly contrary to cybernetics’ own distinctive features. Von Neumann, on the other hand, tinkered with a mechanical model of the brain, realizing grave limitations that prompted him to look for an alternative for cybernetics to work on. The proposal that came out of this resulted in a serious blow against the theoretical core of cybernetics. Why did cybernetics collapse? The contributions coming from both thinkers, in their own ways, spelled out the main tenets of the cybernetic proposal. But these very contributions led to cybernetics’ own demise. The whole story can be framed under the rubric of a serious inquiry into the metaphysical underpinnings of a machine. The rise and fall of cybernetics could thus help us better understand what a machine is from a philosophical standpoint. Although a historical component is present, my emphasis relies on a philosophical consideration of the cybernetic phenomenon. This metaphysical dissection will attempt to clarify how a machine-based ontology remained at the core of cybernetics. An emerging link will hopefully lead towards establishing a tri-partite correlation between cybernetics’ own evolution, its theoretical core, and its collapse. It will hopefully show how cybernetic inquiries into the nature of a machine might have proved fatal to the very enterprise at large, due to unsolvable theoretical tensions. ii Dedications I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my supervisor, Jagdish Hattiangadi, whose unique wisdom, selfless guidance and sound advice made this work possible. I would also like to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Martha Nelson. Her enduring patience and relentless support always stood as a beacon of hope in the most challenging times. iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to Ian Jarvie, for his illuminating insights and meticulous reading of the draft, to Daniel McArthur, for his very positive support of my work, and to Steve Fuller, for his generous feedback on an earlier version of the draft. I would also like to thank Erica Swanson for proofreading parts of this thesis and Ulyana Savchenko for her support. I will always sincerely appreciate the time and effort they put into reading my work. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Dedications iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v List of Figures vii Introduction 1 I. Cybernetics: The beginnings, the founding articles and the first meetings. 4 1. The problem of anti-aircraft weaponry. 4 2. The AA-Predictor. 9 3. The pre-meetings and founding articles. 25 4. The Macy Conferences. 34 II. Cybernetics: The book, the club and the decline. 48 1. Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics. 48 2. The Ratio Club. 57 3. The decline. 62 4. Traditional explanations for the collapse of cybernetics. 68 III. Pre-cybernetic context: An early 20th century ontological displacement of the machine. 84 1. The “Foundational Crisis of Mathematics” and the response from Formalism. 84 2. A machinal understanding of an algorithm and the material liberation of the machine. 92 3. Alan Turing’s strange reversal regarding the question of Artificial Intelligence. 101 4. Cybernetics as a possible missing link regarding Turing’s change of heart. 110 v IV. Cybernetic tenets: Philosophical considerations. 116 1. Pinning down the core of cybernetics. 116 2. Machines can be teleological. 124 3. Machines can be immaterial. 133 4. Machines are embodied theories. 137 V. Extending the scope of a machine ontology. 143 1. William Ross Ashby’s nature-machine equalization. 143 2. The homeostat: A living machine. 152 3. The Macy presentation: Keeping cybernetics honest. 157 4. The backlash: Unforeseen consequences of a behavior-based ontology. 162 5. Un-cybernetic DAMS: From behavior into structure. 169 VI. Emphasizing the limits of a machine epistemology. 175 1. John von Neumann’s appropriation of McCulloch and Pitts’ networks. 175 2. The letter to Wiener: Post hoc, ergo propter hoc? 180 3. The Hixon Symposium: Strengths and weaknesses of the McCulloch & Pitts’ networks. 189 4. The Illinois Lectures and the kinematic model: Cybernetic materialization of a theory. 197 5. The Theory of Automata: From embodiment to abstraction. 203 VII. Cybernetic tensions: Further philosophical considerations. 207 1. Consequences of the irrelevancy of materiality for the nature of a machine. 207 2. Consequences of a machine’s isomorphism with highly complex entities. 215 3. An ontological slippery slope: From complexity to disembodiment. 219 Concluding remarks: The nature of a machine and the collapse of cybernetics. 223 Bibliography. 231 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 147 Figure 2 148 Figure 3 148 Figure 4 154 Figure 5 155 vii Introduction. This thesis is concerned with the rise and fall of cybernetics, understood as an inquiry regarding the nature of a machine. Mechanical devices have certainly been the focus of attention in the past. This thesis is not concerned with those --interesting in their own right, but tangentially related to the notion of a machine. In fact, there seems to be so far no treatise which directly addressed the nature of a machine per se. Cybernetics is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of science, and it is my thesis that it was fundamentally concerned with the notion of a machine. Furthermore, cybernetics might stand as the first time in history where the nature of a machine tout court was taken up to constitute the hinge upon which the whole enterprise revolved. This scientific movement, which has arguably not yet received adequate attention from a philosophical standpoint, will be addressed at fair length and depth, using it as a guiding instance for the questioning of the nature of a machine. Delving deeper into the theoretical core of cybernetics, one could find that the contributions of William Ross Ashby and John von Neumann shed light onto the particular ways in which cybernetics understood the essence of a machine. However, both these contributions have been relatively relegated to a secondary role in historical treatments, leaving their philosophical import somewhat in the dark. Ross Ashby pondered about the useful outcomes of extending the scope of “the mechanical” after offering an account of the nature of a machine. This extension would later encompass realms that will show to be problematic for mechanization, and the way in which a machine-ontology was applied would trigger effects seemingly contrary to cybernetics’ own distinctive features. Von Neumann, on the other hand, 1 tinkered with a mechanical model of the brain, realizing grave limitations that prompted him to look for an alternative for cybernetics to soldier on. The proposal that came out of it might have signified a serious blow against cybernetics’ theoretical core. The contributions coming from both thinkers, in their own ways, spelled out the main tenets of the cybernetic proposal, consistent with their original intentions for further advancing it. But these contributions –likely against the will of the contributors themselves—might have led to cybernetics’ own demise. The whole story can be framed under the rubric of a serious inquiry into the metaphysical underpinnings of a machine. The rise and fall of cybernetics could thus help us better understand what a machine is from a philosophical standpoint. This thesis is made up by two major parts: a historical and a philosophical one. The historical part is itself unfolded in two stages: a) the history of cybernetics proper: its beginnings in the early 1940s, flourishing, and decline a decade later; and b) the pre-history that lead to the cybernetic enterprise. What I tried to do in the latter was addressing the historical and theoretical context that put together the stage for cybernetics to emerge. Indeed a particular development in mathematics during the first half of the 20th century, which ended up in Alan Turing’s contribution to the notion of computation, seems to have triggered a questioning close to the nature of a machine. Accordingly, an exposition of this evolving context will precede the articulation of the cybernetic main theoretical tenets in the following part. Although an updated historical account of cybernetics can be worthy in and of itself, my emphasis relies on a philosophical consideration of the cybernetic phenomenon. This latter account is comprised by four parts: a) an articulation of the metaphysical tenets underlying cybernetics (chapters III and IV); b) the contribution of William Ross Ashby (chapter V); c) the contribution of John von Neumann (chapter VI) and d) a philosophical account on the effect of 2 these contributions (chapter VII). This metaphysical dissection will attempt to clarify how a machine-based ontology lay at the core of the cybernetic edifice. An emerging link will hopefully lead towards establishing a tri-partite correlation between cybernetics’ own evolution, its theoretical core, and its collapse.
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