Connection to the World The as a Model of Transport and an International City

Barrett Stephen Lane CRP 3810 Professor Jeremy Foster Fall 2009

Table of Contents

Introduction 3

The Docklands: An Overview and History 4

Transportation and Infrastructure 6

Imaging and Branding 12

Conclusion 19

Appendix 22

Bibliography 27

2 Introduction

The London Docklands remains as one of the most ambitious urban regeneration projects of the last half-century. The area of once known for cargo ships and manufacturing is now one of the world’s premier nexuses of finance and global trade.

It is a dizzying complex of glass-and-steel skyscrapers, upscale condominiums, world- class hotels and shops, and gourmet restaurants. Its physical layout is radically different than the rest of London; in contrast to the dense network of streets that define the urban fabric of Central London and Westminster, the Docklands uses an intricate network of canals, wharves, and docks that create large expanses and open spaces between the towering commercial edifices. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Docklands is its modernity. Almost everything within Docklands proper, notably and similar business districts, was built within the last 30 years, almost entirely from scratch.

Overall, it is more reminiscent of major financial cities such as New York, Chicago, or

Toronto than of London itself.

But the success of the Docklands, and what has enabled it to transform into the epitome of today’s fast-paced, business-oriented, globalized city, relies on its infrastructural networks along with its visioning and branding as a locus of global trade.

Improvements in local transportation networks, which include linking the Docklands to the City and points north and east, have made the area easier to reach, encouraging commercial, and later, residential settlement. Furthermore, the Docklands modern approach to planning, through deregulation, business development zones, and innovative design and architecture, allowed the new community to thrive as the new standard for international business districts; models soon followed by cities like Shanghai (Pudong)

3 and Mexico City (Santa Fe). The combination of a reliable transit infrastructure with a business-oriented approach to planning has created a second life for the Docklands; breathing new life into the once derelict docks through reprogramming its use and moving forward in response to modern business and trade.

The Docklands: An Overview and History

Lying just east of the central city, the London Docklands stretches roughly 13 kilometers along the River Thames from to the Thames Flood Barrier, just east of (Bentley, 1997, p. 15). It consists of five major dock areas, going from west to east along the Thames: The Surrey Docks in Rotherhithe, the Docks and

West India Docks on the , the East India Docks near present-day Canning

Town, and the Royal Victoria, Albert, and King George Docks near Beckton (known collectively as the Royal Docks) (see figure 1). Historically, its purpose was to serve as the port of London. In the late 18th and early 19th century, Parliament succeeded in passing several acts allowing for the construction of canals and docks to be built in and around the Isle of Dogs, alleviating commercial ship traffic that congested the River

Thames in Central London (Edwards, 1992). The relocation of the shipyards and related industries to the Docklands area proved to be a big success for Greater London. Major shipping companies such as the West India Company and East India Company built and excavated large wet and dry docks in the area, attracting business from all over the world, and laying the foundation for a 150 year period of prosperity in the region (Bentley,

1997). Central London and the Docklands became interdependent in the 19th century, with the Docklands serving as the commercial and trade workhorse to sustain Central

4 London residents and their local economies (Edwards, 1992). By 1939, ship traffic in the

Docklands was at an all time high: not only were there 60 million tons of cargo that passed in and out of the docks, but the Port of London Authority (PLA) had even gone so far to dredge the River Thames to allow large, modern ocean liners to pass into the

Docklands (Bentley, 1997).

By World War II, the Docklands began to show signs of decline. Initially, however, the Docklands was a boon to the Allies, helping them defeat the Germans in the

European Theater. With its many shipping docks and capacity to launch and hold many vessels, the Docklands was vital in the launch, storage, and maintenance of many Allied warships, as well as storing and shipping off munitions and supplies (Bentley, 1997).

However, the bombing of London in 1940 wiped out a third of the warehouses and half of the storage units in the Docklands, forcing the PLA to rebuild lost facilities, which needed to meet the increase in shipping demand (Bentley, 1997, p. 46). While the

Docklands eventually recouped its losses and reached all-time high levels of trade in the mid 1960s (a 50% increase in traffic compared to 1939), the failure to concurrently modernize the docks themselves to handle the newer, larger incoming ships meant that shippers began seeking other ports in the area to unload their goods (Bentley, 1997, p. 46).

Moreover, the rise of containerization (using high-capacity flat steel containers to store many goods on ships) also spelled disaster for the Docklands. Containerization was both safer and cheaper than traditional methods that had defined the Docklands for over a century and a half; more cargo could be loaded onto ships using less land and workers, with the PLA estimating that “21 container berths could accomplish and process the same amount of cargo as 160 enclosed docks and 300 riverside wharves,” (Bentley, 1997, p.

5 46). With new containerization facilities being built further down the River Thames, closer to the North Sea, the Docklands were becoming increasingly obsolete (Bentley,

1997). By 1980, nearly all of the major docks had shut down.

It was obvious to Greater London and the PLA that the Docklands needed to be reprogrammed in order to avoid becoming a victim of urban decay. Prior efforts in the

1960s and early 1970s to infill unused docks were unsuccessful; scrap merchants and low-grade industrial tenants quickly bought up the land, undermining the goals of revitalizing the former docks and to bring back previous levels of economic wealth and success (Edwards, 1992, p. 7). Seeking a means to attract private investors and their funds, the government set up the London Docklands Development Commission (LDDC) in 1981, the main product of The Local Government, Planning and Land Act of 1980.

The LDDC’s goal was to improve the physical layout, design, and program of the

London Docklands (Edwards, 1992). Their proposed plans were vast, but ultimately relied on creating a reason to return to the once-bustling area. Two key goals needed to be met in order for this to happen: creating a modern, efficient transportation system that would better connect the Docklands with Central London, and marketing the Docklands as an international hub of global business and development.

Transportation and Infrastructure

One of the biggest challenges in redeveloping the London Docklands was bringing in an effective system of modern transportation to region plagued by ineffective transit. Steamboats and paddleboats once served as the primary method of travel, carrying passengers along the River Thames from Greenwich and Woolwich to either

6 Central London or points east (Bentley, 1997, p. 172). By the end of the nineteenth and early 20th century, ship travel declined as rail and road-based transportation networks gained popularity, effectively shutting the steamships out of business (Bentley, 1997, p.

172). Concurrently, a series of tunnels were constructed at different points along the

River Thames to connect communities on either side of the River Thames, along with a series of canals that cut through different segments of the North Bank to make commercial ship travel easier. Not only did this help to alleviate traffic from the growing road network in East London, but it also allowed for the development of important railway connections to and from the docks (Bentley, 1997). However, the success of the railways was short lived: as traffic and commercial activity declined in the docks, so did the railways and similar transport networks, with little incentive invest in new networks or expand existing ones. Therefore, the Docklands was in desperate need of a sustainable method of transportation that didn’t rely on fluctuating economies or industries. The

Docklands needed transportation to attract business, not the other way around (see figure

2) (Bentley, 1997).

When the LDDC formed in the early 1980s, the Docklands transportation network was extremely limited. Railway lines encircled the former commercial zones instead of intersecting them; the closest connections being at and Canning Town, far from the docks. Bus service was almost non-existent: only one bus line (which began in

1980) provided connections between the Docklands and Central London. In terms of the

London Underground, the closest stations were all along Road or to the west in (relatively far from the Isle of Dogs and extremely far from the Royal Docks).

Road connections were no better: there were still no good roads that connected the

7 Docklands to Central London, thanks to the canals and docks that stymied any chance of building good high-capacity road networks. According to historian James Bentley, “the lack of any good road or rail connections reinforced the perception that Docklands was far removed from the heart of the capital. If investors, home buyers, tenants, and employees were to be attracted to the area, it had to be made accessible by road and rail.”(1997, p. 180). As the LDDC put it, the Docklands needed “fast, modern, and direct transport connections” (Edwards, 1992, p. 35). Enter the .

The Docklands Light Railway (DLR) was first conceived by Transport for

London (TFL) in 1982 as the modern, efficient means of transport to serve the future office enclaves that were slated to set up shop in the Docklands (“DLR History Timeline”,

2009). Its design was no doubt modern: the system was to be laid out entirely over- ground using former rail lines and newly-constructed viaducts, a strategy that not only emphasized a new mode of transport for the city, but was infinitely more cost-efficient than constructing a new Underground line (Bentley, 1997) (New Connections, 2001).

Moreover, the entire system would also be driverless, controlled entirely by computers; a first for London and the UK (Bentley, 1997, p. 183). In its initial configuration, the DLR provided the much-needed connections to link the new business development district in the Isle of Dogs to both businesses Central London and international rail connections in

Stratford. Construction began in 1984. Three years later, the system opened to the public.

The initial response was less than what the LDDC and TFL had hoped for. Riders were immediately taken aback by the DLR’s shortcomings. The computer system, which controlled the driverless trains, was completely inadequate, unable to keep up with the high demand of passengers. As a result, the DLR had to temporarily shut down so that its

8 electronics could be reconfigured (Bentley, 1997, p. 183). Still, the system’s relatively small layout proved to be its biggest hindrance. Despite technological improvements and extending the system directly to the City, connecting with the Bank and Monument

Underground interchange in 1991, the DLR was simply too small to handle current and projected passenger traffic. According to author Brian Edwards, three years after the

DLR opened, roughly 40% of the 40,000 Docklands employees would arrive via the DLR

(1992, p. 34). Moreover, with the projected employee population and transit ridership numbers to only increase, the LDDC and TFL realized that a serious overhaul and upgrade of the Docklands transit infrastructure was needed.

The overhaul of the transit infrastructure was a two-part process: upgrading the current DLR network and extending the into the Docklands proper to ease traffic and congestion along the highly-popular light railway. In 1992, the DLR was wholly transferred from TFL to the LDDC. Over the next two years, the DLR was expanded eastward to Beckton, providing a much needed rail connection to the business districts in the Royal Docks (Bentley, 1997, p. 183). Moreover, transit stations along the

DLR were upgraded to handle the increase in traffic: platforms were extended to accommodate more train cars; architects were called in to redesign important, high-traffic stations on the system, and all stations and trains were retrofitted to accommodate they physically disabled (Bentley, 1997). By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the DLR was running with the speed and efficiency its creators had originally envisioned, carrying over

70,000 passengers per day from Central, East, and South London into the Docklands with

98% reliability (Bentley, 1997).

9 In terms of bringing in the London Underground, loose plans to extend the system into Greenwich and the Docklands had existed since the 1960s, but with the DLR already at full capacity less than a year after its debut and the working population of Canary

Wharf projected to increase exponentially over the next decade, both political officials and developers realized that another rapid transit line was vital (Bentley, 1997) (New

Connections, 2001). Starting in 1988, planners began to carve a route for the new line, an extension of the existing , that would cross the River Thames four times and connect Westminster with London Bridge, Canada Water, Canary Wharf, the new

Millennium Dome, Canning Town, and Stratford, among others (see figure 3)(Bentley,

1997). Moreover, project developers tapped some of the world’s foremost architects and firms, like Norman Foster and Ian Ritchie, to design each of the new stations (New Connections, 2001). In this sense, the new transit line and its stations wouldn’t become simply another piecemeal element of the Docklands’ urban design scheme, but would ultimately become a string of landmarks and nodes connecting the most important areas of both old and new London, and addressing the uniqueness of each neighborhood the stations served. Not to mention, the new system would be at the same standard of service as the existing London Underground, greatly reducing the possibility of technological faults and poor reliability.

In this case, the modernity of the Jubilee Line wouldn’t be built for the sake of progress (one of the DLR’s major faults and setbacks), but as a direct response to neighborhood conditions and with more planning knowledge and forethought taken into consideration. Its design scheme would be consistent with the regional architecture, commuting patterns, and moving about through different environments. As Jeremy

10 Melvin puts it, “the subterranean realm is a place of fantasy and imagination…the stations themselves become the places where different issues and ideas coalesce momentarily before unwinding in the public spaces outside, or sliding through the tunnel to the next viewpoint, just as the people do,” (New Connections, 2001, p. 13). Whereas the DLR was a failed experiment in technological innovation that ultimately succeeded after much retooling and improvement, the Jubilee Line would be successful from the get-go, using local cues to create a sustainable, appropriate method of inter-city transit

(see figure 4). Construction began on the Jubilee Line extension in 1993 and six years later, the system opened to the public, just in time for the new millennium.

Other elements of the transportation infrastructure were also improved in the years following initial opening of the DLR. In the same year that the DLR debuted, the

LDDC opened , built and designed almost exclusively for business travelers working in the Docklands and the City. It not only provides short-haul flights to major European cities, but helps to alleviate some of the air traffic at London’s larger airports (Bentley, 1997, p.186). Between 1989 and 1993, the LDDC constructed the

Limehouse Link, a high-capacity carriageway tunnel connecting Canary Wharf with

Wapping, part of the £250 million road improvement scheme and ultimately creating a more direct road connection with the City (Bentley, 1997, p. 192). Furthermore, the

LDDC also invested in new footbridges, pedestrian pathways, and water-based services to better circulate workers and residents, as well as emphasize the many water-based landscaping features in the area (see figure 5). Overall, improving transportation in the

Docklands, particularly in fixed transit networks, was imperative to the area’s success in terms of re-growth, economic importance, and relationships with neighboring areas of

11 London. It laid the necessary infrastructure for the Docklands to ultimately become an important player in the role of global trade and international finance.

Imaging and Branding

In addition to bringing in a fixed, reliable, and high-capacity transit system, the

LDDC also needed to completely overhaul the physical image of the Docklands.

Although the Docklands once represented the pinnacle of maritime trading, shipbuilding, and manufacturing, by the late 1960s and 1970s, it was the epitome of urban blight and decay. If the LDDC was going to attract foreign investors, revitalize the Docklands, create new housing, and most importantly, turn a run-down port into a world-class financial hub reminiscent of La Defense or Wall Street, it needed to focus on creating an environment that would not only attract international business interests, but do so in a strikingly modern urban setting, uniquely distinct from the rest of London.

In the early 1980s, the LDDC, with the backing of England’s Secretary of State and led by Peter Turlik, issued a four point plan outlining why the Docklands was destined to become Britain’s (and arguably the world’s) next greatest financial center.

Citing the Dockland’s vast amounts of open space (“capable of redressing many of the employment and economic deficiencies, of not only the Docklands itself, but also its surrounding areas,”[Bentley, 1997, p. 52]), its proximity to the City and Central London, its potential to become a major business redevelopment zone (with its proximity to the

River Thames and surrounding docks), and a “waterscape environment offering scope for leisure activities” that was incomparable to any existing section of London, Turlik was able to convince the government to allow the LDDC to take free reign in leading the

12 redevelopment efforts in East London (Bentley, 1997). With the later help of Reg Ward, the LDDC boldly stepped into action, quickly setting up a publicity campaign that would blend the Docklands’ “maritime heritage” with a “state of the art financial and commercial center” that would “[lead] Britain into the twenty-first century,”(Eade, 1997, p. 131). By the mid 1980s, billboards and ads touting the Docklands promise were omnipresent all over East London, many succinctly stating the LDDC’s vision with slogans like “It will feel like Venice and work like New York,” bringing about visions of a high-powered financial hub set in a network of canals (Bentley, 1997).

The first step in this process was retooling the planning language and practices that had long dominated the Docklands. Prior to the LDDC, local planning was extremely bureaucratic. Even though boroughs in and around the Docklands, such as

Southwark, Tower Hamlets, and Newham, had presented earlier plans that proposed regeneration and urban renewal, their failure to attract private investors or gain approval from higher authorities prevented the plans from ever being fully realized (Edwards,

1992). The LDDC, however, did not have to deal with the restrictions and red-tape that dogged prior efforts. Instead of being restrained by orthodox practices, bureaucratic procedures, and local agencies and control, the LDDC was granted the opportunity to sell off “disused docks and redundant land” to any investors interested in redeveloping the lots (Edwards, 1992) (Brownhill, 1990, p. 3) (Bentley, 1997, p. 38). It was a trend that was becoming common among many urban development corporations (UDCs) in Britain at the time. By diminishing the role of the public authorities and giving private investors and market forces a greater role in the direction and implementation of plans, results

13 would not only be more expedient, but would be custom-tailored to the needs of future stakeholders (Brownhill, 1990, pp. 30-31).

The LDDC’s success in attracting investors came largely through the creation and implementation of enterprise zones (EZs). Initially located in the central area of the

Docklands, near the West and East India Docks, EZs were specific zones that encouraged development as opposed to preserving existing structures (see figure 6)(Brownhill, 1990, p. 3)(Edwards, 1992, p. 23). Investment incentives such as development land tax exemptions, less building regulation control, 100% capital allowances against tax, and the lack of permission needed from local planning boards made the EZs extremely attractive for potential stakeholders and new businesses (Brownhill, 1990, p. 32). The LDDC further attracted investors by marketing the area’s many historic buildings outside of the

EZs as candidates for both preservation and regeneration. For example, existing landmarks such as All Saints church were refurbished and restored with grants from the

LDDC while old warehouses that lined the docks near Tower Bridge were redeveloped into condominiums and shops (Edwards, 1992, p. 11, 13). Finally, nearby infrastructure and services acted as pull factors for finance-oriented businesses. Proximity to the City via the DLR, the London City Airport, and the new ExCel exhibition hall at Custom

House made the area all the more suitable for large multi-national banks and investment firms.

As a result, construction boomed, and the skyline and physical shape of the

Docklands changed dramatically, adding thousands of square feet of commercial space and residences in the forms of new office buildings, retail centers, and housing. By the mid 1990s, the Docklands had a thriving workforce and steady population base. More

14 than 72,000 employees, working in fields such as finance, journalism, and technology, were working in Docklands offices, while over 80,000 residents were now calling the

Docklands their home (Bentley, 1997, pp. 57-58).

Contemporary architecture and urban design also played a key role in the redevelopment and branding of the Docklands as an international district and distinctly

“reborn” section of London. As new construction went up, so did the desire to bring in aesthetic design and flair into the new plans (Edwards, 1992, p. 23). As a UDC, the

LDDC’s team of architects, planners, and landscape architects was supplemented by consultants who were renowned in their field (Edwards, 1992, p. 20). It would be imperative, then, for these professionals to use this opportunity to showcase some of their most ambitious and modern work, especially considering the fact that they would be given what is essentially a clean slate to work from (Williams, 1990). As a result,

Docklands architecture is distinctly “modern” in comparison to the rest of London, with plate-glass facades (like the towers of ) and intriguing exteriors (such as the Cascades residential complex) commonplace among the buildings (see figure 7)

(Edwards, 1992, pp. 78-79). Moreover, the lack of restrictive planning codes or ordinances gave architects the ultimate freedom in designing structures, focusing more on individual building design than on contextual cohesiveness in most cases. While this was true in a lot Docklands developments and neighborhoods, it was not so in Canary Wharf.

Arguably the emblem of Docklands regeneration and the crown jewel of the

LDDC’s plans to redevelop the Isle of Dogs, Canary Wharf is a 12 million square foot office and retail complex situated near the West India Dock, and developed by Olympia and York between the late 1980s to mid 1990s (Edwards, 1992, p. 67). Planned out by

15 Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill and containing designs from major architects such as I.M.

Pei and Cesar Pelli, the complex is specifically designed to appeal to international corporations, emphasizing big business (with its over 240 meter skyscrapers that dwarf the surrounding neighborhoods) and commerce as its primary programs (Williams, 1990, p. 116). It’s centerpiece, an 800 foot skyscraper designed by Pelli (One ), dominated the London skyline in the early 1990s, and in years since its construction has been flanked by additional skyscrapers so as not to completely overpower the surrounding landscape (see figure 8)(Edwards, 1992, p. 72)(, plc,

2008). It’s an anomaly compared to the rest of the LDDC-planned areas within the

Docklands for the fact that it is highly masterplanned, taking cues from European town planning rhetoric and American-influenced architecture to create a highly unified, modern, commercial superblock centrally located within the Docklands (Edwards, 1992).

Canary Wharf is also highly organized in terms of its programming: it relegates retail and public services to the lower stories of buildings with corporate offices designated to the upper floors, looking over the activity below. Furthermore, the buildings are designed using similar building materials (such as limestone, glass, and steel) to create a cohesive feeling within the complex, and the major structures all face large public plazas that are lined up in a single axis (Edwards 1992). This modern, glass and steel architectural scheme is also carried over to the infrastructural elements that serve Canary Wharf. The

Canary Wharf DLR station is visually enthralling, with its soaring glass arches reminiscent of old-style train stations (see figure 9) (Bentley, 1997, p. 184). Moreover,

Norman Foster’s design for the Canary Wharf Underground station on the Jubilee Line

16 has won numerous awards for its glass canopies and architectural innovation (New

Connections, 2001, p. 40).

Yet, achieving this new vision would not be possible without criticism and controversy. Part of creating this new image of corporate wealth and international trade meant doing so at the expense of the existing populations, workforce, and local history.

Many of the new jobs created in the Docklands catered to a new wave of “immigrants”, white middle-class settlers, that would in theory inhabit the new residences and condominiums being built alongside the office complexes and towers (Eade, 1997, p.

130). The native white and Bangladeshi working-class population, which had settled comfortably in the surrounding neighborhoods next to the Docklands, was completely ignored in the LDDC’s new Docklands vision, creating a socio-economic polarization that made the working-class seem unwelcome in the new developments (Eade, 1997, pp.

130-131). In addition, when the LDDC presented the neighborhood and its context to potential stakeholders, they continually glossed over the existence of the underclass in the vicinity, both historical and present, in fear that by doing so, they would lose investors and new business opportunities (Eade, 1997, p. 133). Critics argue then, that by catering only to the “global elite”, the new plans for the Docklands will disintegrate nearby communities, push the working-class farther out from Central London, and portray poorer residents in an increasingly negative context.

Similarly, the trend of removing public checks and balances and giving most of the planning power to private investors has fueled many arguments against the LDDCs redevelopment plans and visioning of the Docklands as a global city. Author Sue

Brownhill, an outspoken critic of the London Docklands redevelopment plan, cites that

17 even though overall figures of unemployment have decreased in Greater London during the first ten years of the LDDC, many of the new jobs created in the Docklands have not been going to local residents, instead being awarded to outsiders or foreigners (1990, p.98). Furthermore, she contends that EZs destroyed local democracy, allowing for rampant over-development and “commercial citadels” that segment, rather than unify the

Docklands (Brownhill, 1990, p. 32) (Edwards, 1992).

Finally, from a design perspective, the LDDC’s proposition of the international city and giving free reign to the private sector sacrificed the opportunity to create a cohesive, well planned design scheme for the entirety of the docklands, and not just for one EZ or neighborhood. By relying on “trend planning” (letting private developers and stakeholders take control of plans while the urban planner merely allocates tax dollars to let the developer get their way [Edwards, 1992, p.26]), the Docklands redeveloped in a piecemeal fashion, creating uncomfortable situations such as having residences would be pushed up against high-rise commercial towers or entire neighborhoods that had completely different street layouts and patterns (see figure 10) (Edwards, 1992). Efforts to unify the region with a set masterplan have been rejected by the LDDC, citing that such measures work against its ideology of not having restrictive measures for development (Edwards, 1992, p. 44). In the early 1990s, a compromise was struck between the LDDC and local planning boards with implementing flexible urban design frameworks based upon the policy of “parcelization”, which advocated developing parcels of land within the Docklands individually but also with a loose set of guidelines that would steer the overall neighborhood towards a more cohesive design scheme

(Edwards, 1992, pp. 44-45). Since then, later construction within the Docklands,

18 particularly in additions to Canary Wharf, has been more considerate with regards to urban design and neighborhood cohesiveness. Although the economic incentives of the

EZs have been discontinued since the early 1990s, the vision and spirit of the Docklands as a powerful international node is still very well and alive.

Conclusion

No longer a developing neighborhood, the London Docklands is very much recognized today as one of the world’s key financial centers, home to such companies as

MetLife, HSBC, and Wells Fargo (Canary Wharf Group, Plc, 2008). Instead of factories and warehouses lining the River Thames and docks, the Docklands now boasts riverfront condominiums, hotels, and convention centers to serve corporate employees and their clients. By the mid-1990s, the LDDC saw many of its goals and visions of a new global city fully realized. In 1998, after releasing its final annual report, it formally dissolved

(LDDC History Pages, 2009). It had not only successfully brought in thousands of new jobs and investment dollars into a once dead region of the city, but created a new international landmark for investors and financiers around the world. To put that into perspective, according to the Office for National Statistics, the five boroughs that comprise the Docklands, Greenwich, , Newham, Southwark, and Tower

Hamlets, house 11% of the total established businesses in Greater London in 2008 and 16% of Greater London’s population in 2001 (http://www. neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk).

Transportation has also improved and grown since the dissolution of the LDDC in

1998. Aside from the completion of the Jubilee Line extension in 1999, TFL made two more extensions on the DLR in the mid 2000s to better serve businesses and residences in

19 the Royal Docks as well as London City Airport. In 2004, the new DLR branch to King

George V by way of the airport opened to the public, and in 2009, the same branch was extended further, crossing the River Thames to the town of Woolwich to connect to

National Rail services at Woolwich Arsenal (, 2009). In 2010, the

DLR will expand again, this time opening a new service branch between Stratford and

Canning Town, using formerly operational London Underground lines that will be upgraded to DLR service (“Stratford International”, 2009). Finally, a proposed regional rail service known as plans to bring regional rail to the Docklands via Canary

Wharf, Custom House, and Woolwich, providing direct connections to points east and west of Greater London. Unlike the DLR and the Jubilee Line, it will directly serve communities that are beyond their reach, but like DLR and Jubilee Line, the service frequency will be roughly the same (akin to Paris’ RER) (http://www.crossrail.co.uk/).

With respect to the image and branding of the Docklands, there has been much improvement since the days of EZs and the dominance of Canary Wharf. The opening of

London City Airport and nearby additional infrastructural services has enticed more businesses to set up shop in the Royal Docks. Skyscrapers continue to go up in Canary

Wharf, adding “skyline competition” and visually balancing out London’s cityscape, a prime concern of Canary Wharf’s critics (Canary Wharf Group, plc 2009)(Edwards,

1992). The completion of the Millennium Dome in North Greenwich in 2000 was met with much fanfare and has since been converted into the O2 Arena, one of London’s premier venues for sports and concerts. Additionally, the region’s widespread notoriety for its economic importance and concentration continues to attract major corporations and companies from around the world that seek a London office.

20 Despite what the critics say about its planning methodology or its ultimate formation, the Docklands is without question one of the most successful urban regeneration case-studies of the late 20th century. By improving the local infrastructure and concentrating development efforts on bringing in high-powered corporate business interests, it successfully turned a neighborhood plagued by urban blight into one of the world’s most important economic nodes and center of global trade. Moreover, by reprogramming the sectors of trade and industry to be more consistent with present trends and more sustainable in terms of future development and business patterns, one can be assured that this current plan and usage of the London Docklands will be viable and successful for generations to come.

21 Appendix

Figure 1: Satellite image of the London Docklands with the five major dock areas highlighted. In its heyday, these docks served as the main port of London, receiving millions of tons of cargo annually. It was also valued for its relative proximity to Central London. As the port declined in the mid 20th century, many of the docks were filled in for low-grade industrial development (Bentley, 1997, pp. 24-25).

Figure 2: Transportation schematic for the London Docklands, 1997. The end result of over a decade of planning and development, the transportation infrastructure of the London Docklands included implementing a light rail system and improving important roadways. Also shown on this map is the proposed route for the Jubilee Line Extension, which would open two years later (Bentley, 1997, pp. 176-177).

22

Figure 3: The Jubilee Line Extension, highlighted on a present-day map of the London Underground. 11 stations connect the City of Westminster and Stratford via the South Bank, Docklands, and Newham. The extension not only makes the Docklands more accessible and quicker to get to from Central London, but provides important connections to local boat services, National Rail, and ground transit to Gatwick Airport. Map courtesy of Transport for London, http://www.tfl.gov.uk/assets/downloads/standard-tube-map.pdf, modified by the Author.

Figure 4: Platform of the Jubilee Line at Canary Wharf Station. Architect Norman Foster draws upon the sleek lines of the Canary Wharf skyline and contemporary feel to create a station that conveys feelings of motion, transience, and interplay of light. Natural light from the street travels down the escalators from the ticketing concourse above. Image courtesy of the author.

23

Figure 5: Pedestrian bridges in Butlers Wharf (left) and Poplar in the Docklands. The LDDC also invested heavily in pedestrian pathways, allowing for better neighborhood circulation. Footbridges like these were constructed for both residents of the Docklands (left) and commuters traveling to their workplaces (Bentley, 1997, pp. 197-198).

Figure 6: Location of Enterprise Zones (EZs) in the London Docklands. EZs were created to encourage quick private development and jumpstart the formation of new business interests. EZ sites were chosen based on centralized location and potential for future success. Canary Wharf, Canning Town, and Heron Quays, all successful business enclaves in the London Docklands today, were among the initial EZs (Brownhill, 1990, p. 2).

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Figure 7: Baltic Quays development at Greenland Dock. Few planning restrictions coupled with vast amounts of developable land allowed for architects to run rampant with futuristic, modern designs for new construction in the Docklands. Some of London’s most dizzying works of modern architecture can be found in and around the Docklands and the EZs (Edwards, 1992, p. 105)

Figure 8: Masterplan of Canary Wharf (left) and view of the Canary Wharf skyline from Greenwich, 1992. Canary Wharf was one of the few EZ developments to have a logical, cohesive master plan, essentially creating a micro-city of finance within the greater Docklands redevelopment area. One of its major initial setbacks was its sole skyscraper, which looks oddly out of place in the London skyline (right). Critics of the Docklands disliked this “skyline domination”, feeling that if one building was going to dominate the cityscape, it should at least be more architecturally engaging than Cesar Pelli’s bland corporate obelisk (Edwards, 1992, p. 69, 73).

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Figure 9: Interior of the Canary Wharf DLR Station, 1997. Elements of the infrastructure were given the same architectural treatment as the main buildings themselves. This light rail station is more reminiscent of a grand European rail terminal than a municipal transit stop. Additional platforms and the ability to receive three trains at once also mark the importance of Canary Wharf on the DLR network (Bentley, 1997, p. 185).

Figure 10: Isle of Dogs, early 1990s. The lack of a consistent overall urban design scheme led to some odd juxtaposition of buildings, like this townhome community situated almost directly underneath an office tower. Because the LDDC favored trend-planning, which allowed for private investors and market-driven forces to direct what kinds of buildings would be built, neighborhood context would often be ignored over land availability, resulting in aesthetically-odd outcomes (Edwards, 1992, p. 43).

26 Bibliography

Bentley, James. (1997). East of the City: The London Docklands Story. London: Pavilion Books Limited.

Brownhill, Sue. (1990). Developing London’s Docklands: Another Great Planning Disaster? London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd.

Canary Wharf Group, plc. (2008). The Estate. Retrieved December 6, 2009, from: http://www.canarywharf.com/mainFrm1.asp?strSelectedArea=Estate

Eade, John. (1997). Reconstructing Places: Changing Images of Locality in Docklands and . In J. Eade (Ed.), Living the Global City: Globalization as a Local Process (pp. 127-145). London: Routledge.

Edwards, Brian. (1992). London Docklands: Urban Design in an Age of Deregulation. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd.

LDDC History Pages. (2009). About LDDC – A Brief Overview. Retrieved December 6, 2009 from: http://www.lddc-history.org.uk/lddcachieve/index.html

New Connections: New Architecture, New Urban Environments and the London Jubilee Line Extension. (2001). London: Royal Academy of Arts.

Transport for London. (2009). DLR History Timeline. Retrieved November 2, 2009 from http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/modesoftransport/dlr/history/2982.aspx

Transport for London. (2009). Docklands Light Railway – Stratford International Extension. Retrieved December 6, 2009 from: http://developments.dlr.co.uk/extensions/stratford/stations.asp

Williams, Stephanie. (1990). Docklands. London: Architecture Design and Technology Press.

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