Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy, 1950 – 1966

SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014

NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR

ABSTRACT: This article is about Britain’s long-term plan to decolonize Brunei between 1950 and 1966. The Sultan was concerned of the British plan as it would affect Brunei’s security and survival. This led him to promulgate the 1959 Constitution as he wanted to defend the position of the monarch and the monarchy. Since the Sultan was not attracted in the British plan to associate Brunei with the two Northern Borneo territories, the plan met with failure. Later, there was the Malaysian plan which was announced by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaya, which was aimed at establishing a federation of Malaysia that would consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. The Sultan was careful towards the plan. The Brunei’s People Party, however, was contrary to the plan from its beginning. The Sultan did also not agree the Malaysian plan straightaway. The Sultan abandoned the plan mainly because he wanted to secure the position of the monarch and the monarchy. Nonetheless, after Brunei’s rejection of Malaysia in 1963, Britain was enduring its effort to bring Brunei within the federation of Malaysia at least by 1965. KEY WORD: Britain, Sultan of Brunei, decolonize, Northern Borneo territories, Malaysian plan, and Brunei’s People Party.

IKHTISAR: “Brunei dan Dasar Dekolonisasi British, 1950 – 1966”. Artikel ini adalah mengenai rancangan jangka panjang British untuk melepaskan negeri yang berada dibawah perlindungannya, iaitu Brunei diantara tahun 1950 dan 1966. Sultan Brunei bimbang rancangan Britain ini akan memberi kesan kepada keselamatan dan survival Brunei. Ini membuatkan Sultan Brunei menggubal Perlembagaan Brunei pada tahun 1959, kerana baginda mahu melindungi kedudukan raja dan kesultanan Brunei. Oleh kerana Sultan Brunei tidak berminat dengan rancangan British, rancangan itu telah mengalami kegagalan. Kemudian disusuli pula dengan Rancangan Malaysia yang telah diumumkan oleh Tunku Abdul Rahman, Perdana Menteri Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, yang bertujuan untuk menubuhkan Persekutuan Malaysia yang terdiri daripada Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, Singapura, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. Sultan Brunei mengambil langkah berhati-hati terhadap rancangan ini. Akan tetapi Parti Rakyat Brunei tidak bersetuju dengan rancangan itu daripada mula lagi. Sultan Brunei pun tidak bersetuju menerima Rancangan Malaysia sertamerta. Sultan Brunei menolak Rancangan Malaysia kerana ia mahu menjaga kedudukan Sultan dan juga kesultanan Brunei. Namun, selepas penolakan Brunei terhadap Malaysia pada tahun 1963, British tetap berusaha untuk memasukkan Brunei ke dalam federasi Malaysia, sekurang-kurangnya pada tahun 1965. KATA KUNCI: British, Sultan Brunei, melepaskan negeri di bawah perlindungan, wilayah Utara Borneo, rancangan Malaysia, dan Parti Rakyat Brunei.

INTRODUCTION begin with, this article will brieﬂ y This article will brieﬂ y delineate delineate Britain’s plan to associate Britain’s long-term policy to decolonize Brunei closely with the two Northern Brunei between 1950 and 1966. To Borneo territories and the problems this

About the Author: Dr. Nani Suryani Haji Abu Bakar is a Lecturer at the International and Historical Studies Programme, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences UBD (University of Brunei Darussalam), Jalan Tunku Link, Gadong, Negara Brunei Darussalam. For academic interest, the author can be contacted via e-mail at: [email protected] How to cite this article? Suryani Haji Abu Bakar, Nani. (2014). “Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy, 1950 – 1966” in SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, Vol.2(2), September, pp.123-140. Bandung, Indonesia: Minda Masagi Press and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, ISSN 2302-5808. Available online also at: http://susurgalur-jksps.com/brunei-and-the-british-decolonisation-policy/ Chronicle of the article: Accepted (July 13, 2014); Revised (August 19, 2014); and Published (September 24, 2014).

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 123 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy posed for Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III possible indefi nitely (Saunders, 2002). (Haji Jibah, 1983). This article will argue This article will show that (after Brunei’s that the Sultan was apprehensive of the rejection of Malaysia in 1963), Britain British plan as it would affect Brunei’s was continuing its effort to bring Brunei security and survival. This article will within the federation of Malaysia at least show that one of the reasons why the by 1965. Sultan promulgated the Constitution in 1959 was that he wanted to safeguard BRITISH DECOLONISATION POLICY the position of the monarch and the Britain’s plan to decolonise Brunei monarchy. Since the Sultan was as well as Malaya, Singapore, and their not interested in the British plan to Northern Borneo territories, Sarawak associate Brunei with the two Northern and Sabah, emerged after the end of Borneo territories, the plan met with the Second World War (1939-1945). failure. Although Britain had no intention of The article will also briefl y delineate decolonizing Brunei (its protectorate), the Malaysian plan which was Malaya, Singapore, and the two introduced by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Northern Borneo territories immediately, the Prime Minister of Malaya, and which Britain had a long-term policy towards was aimed at forming a federation of these colonies and protectorate (Pathak, Malaysia that would consist of Malaya, 1988). Britain’s policy was to unite Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei; Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah, before it will discuss the problems this posed they were merged with Malaya and for the Sultan. This article will show then granted independence (Horton, that when the Malayan Prime Minister, 1984:42). The main reason why Britain Tunku Abdul Rahman, announced his planned to unite the three Northern plan to federate Malaya with Brunei, Borneo territories with Malaya was the two Northern Borneo territories and that it wanted to protect them from Singapore, the Sultan was cautious their potentially acquisitive neighbour, towards the plan. In spite of this, he was Indonesia, and to help to level the prepared to study the pros and cons (pro social and economic inequalities in and contrary) of the Malaysian Plan, the three Northern Borneo territories before a decision was fi nally made in (Hussainmiya, 1995:224). July 1963. The PRB (Parti Rakyat Brunei Malcolm MacDonald, who was or Brunei’s People Party), however, was appointed as Commissioner-General against the plan from its inception. for the United Kingdom in Southeast This opposition later culminated in Asia, executed the task to associate the outbreak of the 1962 rebellion in the Northern Borneo territories Brunei. closely before they were merged with Although the 1962 rebellion showed Malaya. In the case of Brunei, Anthony the vulnerability of the Sultanate Abell, the Governor of Sarawak and without British protection, the Sultan High Commissioner for Brunei, was did not accept the Malaysian plan delegated to carry out the plan. In his straightaway. The Sultan recommenced announcement, Anthony Abell wished Brunei’s negotiations with Malaya over to see Brunei develop a closer co- the Malaysian terms, but eventually operation with its neighbours – Sarawak gave up the plan. The Sultan abandoned and North Borneo (Borneo Bulletin, the plan mainly because he wanted to 13/7/1957). secure the position of the monarch and Initially, the co-operation among the the monarchy. The Sultan, however, three Borneo territories took the form was hoping that Britain would continue of governors’ conferences which were its protection over the Sultanate, if held every six months. The aim of the

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan 124 ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014 conferences was to “plan for greater co- (The Sarawak Gazette, 1/6/1948). ordination in policy and administration Furthermore, the Sultan and the of matters of common interest” (Straits aristocrats were apprehensive that if Times, 23/4/1953). At the conference Brunei were closely associated with on 23 April 1953, an announcement was Sarawak and North Borneo, the Chinese made that a decision had been taken to in Sarawak and North Borneo would form a standing conference of the heads dominate the Malays in Brunei (Hadi of government of the three Northern Abdullah, 2002:143). In addition, they Borneo territories with the aim to were concerned that there would be “maintain the closest possible harmony an infl ux of immigrants from Sarawak of policy among them” (Straits Times, and North Borneo to the Sultanate. 23/4/1953). Moreover, they were sceptical that the Following the conference, the Straits Muslims in Brunei and the Islamic Times newspaper reported that the religion would be adversely affected if meeting was held as a step towards the Brunei were to be closely associated formation of the federation of the three with Sarawak and North Borneo, Northern Borneo territories (Straits who were mostly non-Muslims (Hadi Times, 23/4/1953). In its editorial of Abdullah, 2002:21). 24 April 1953, the same newspaper Besides, the Sultan and the commented that the conference was the aristocrats were alarmed that Brunei’s seed of the federation (Straits Times, wealth would be used by the central 24/4/1953); but the Sultan promptly administration to subsidize the denied that it was a step towards development of Sarawak and North the establishment of the federation Borneo (Ranjit Singh, 1984:140). This (Simandjuntak, 1969:122). According was despite the Governor of North to the Brunei government’s report, the Borneo’s assurance to the Sultan that Sultan had “never thought about the Brunei’s wealth would not be shared unifi cation nor did they wish to unite with Sarawak and North Borneo (Ranjit or federate Brunei with other states” Singh, 1984:127). The Sultan and the (Berita Brunei, 16/3/1956). aristocrats were also concerned that the Indeed from the outset, Sultan Bruneians would be administratively Omar Ali Saifuddien was apprehensive dominated by the people of Sarawak, of Britain’s plan to associate Brunei as Brunei had insuffi cient skilled closely with Sarawak and North Borneo, powers to run the administration because he realised that it could of the country (Hadi Abdullah, affect the security and the survival of 2002:18). Therefore, it is obvious that the Sultanate. In this regard, he was the Sultan and the aristocrats were concerned that the plan would reduce apprehensive of the British plan as they his status from that of an absolute believed that it would affect Brunei’s monarch to a constitutional monarch protectorate status, the status of the (Haji Ahmad, 1989:60). Besides, the monarch, Brunei’s economic wealth, its Sultan and the aristocrats were worried administration, the Malay race, and the that if Brunei were closely associated Islamic religion. with Sarawak and North Borneo, Although the Sultan and the Brunei’s status would be reduced aristocrats doubted Britain’s plan from a protectorate to a colony (Ranjit to associate their country closely Singh, 1984:143-144). This was despite with Sarawak and North Borneo, Anthony Abell’s assurance to the Malcolm MacDonald and Anthony Bruneians that the arrangement would Abell continued to pursue the not affect Brunei’s status as a protected plan. In 1954, Malcolm MacDonald state with a British High Commissioner suggested that all British territories in

Southeast Asia should be formed into and a number of other Malay offi cials. a federation (Ranjit Singh, 1984:127). The British Resident would become At this time, not only the Bruneians the British Advisor, who was to offer doubted the British plan to unite “nasihat” (good advice) to the Sultan and the Borneo territories; the people of his administration, and his appointment Sarawak and North Borneo were also was to be approved by the Sultan-in- having reservations about such a plan Council. (Simandjuntak, 1969:120). In order to The powers of the High Commissioner put a stop to Britain’s plan to associate would also be transferred to the Sultan- Brunei with the two Northern Borneo in-Council, where he would retain the territories, the Sultan ignored the right to advise the Sultan-in-Council Colonial Offi ce’s proposal and made his (Hussainmiya, 1995:146-148). Anthony own way to promulgate the Constitution Abell, however, was not satisfi ed with which was aimed at safeguarding the the Sultan’s arrangement regarding the positions of the monarch, the monarchy, issues of the Resident and the reserve the Malay race, and the Islamic religion powers of the High Commissioner. which the Sultan and the Bruneians Consequently, these issues became an were concerned would be affected if obstacle between the Sultan and the Brunei were to be closely associated High Commissioner which subsequently with Sarawak and North Borneo (Hadi delayed the promulgation of the Abdullah, 2002:17). Constitution. When Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien Anthony Abell’s dissatisfaction over announced his desire to grant Brunei its the Sultan’s arrangement was also fi rst written Constitution, Anthony Abell shared by the PRB (Parti Rakyat Brunei welcomed the Sultan’s decision, because or Brunei’s People Party). The PRB led he was hoping that he would be able to by Azahari sought national leadership to infl uence the Sultan to limit the power pass through the rapid democratization of the monarch. He was also hoping to of governmental institutions. The retain the power of the Resident and PRB, formed in 1956, wanted the to increase the authority of the High implementation of a democratic system Commissioner by establishing reserve of government in Brunei with the Sultan powers built into the Constitution as a constitutional monarchy. In its (Hussainmiya, 1995:148). Furthermore, memorandum to the British government he thought it was time that Brunei in 1957, the PRB requested the British re-assessed the functions of the State to hold free and democratic elections in Council and possibly substituted it with Brunei. It wanted at least 75 per cent of new institutions. This was because to the members of the proposed legislature him, the present State Council had to be elected by adult suffrage and the become anachronistic and obsolete party, which commanded the majority (Hussainmiya, 2000:14). in the house, to form the government The Sultan, however, did not want to (Haji Ahmad, 1987; and Jamil al-Sufri, give any real power to the Resident or 1992). It also sought to form a “Union the High Commissioner, but wanted all or Federation” of the three territories administrative powers presently vested of Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah, with in the Resident to be transferred to a the Sultan of Brunei – Sultan Omar Mentri Besar or Chief Minister, who Ali Saifuddien III – becoming the would be a Brunei Malay and who would constitutional head of the state (Haji hold offi ce at the Sultan’s pleasure. Jibah, 1983; and Menon, 1988). He would also appoint a Brunei Malay Although the PRB shared the same State Secretary, who would act as plan as Britain to form the federation the government’s offi cial spokesman, of Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo,

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan 126 ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014 the High Commissioner did not support their demand (Frey, Pruessen & Yong, the PRB. This was because the ultimate 2003:118) to grant Malaya independence decision to form the federation should in 1957. come from the Sultan, not the PRB. Sir Robert Scott (1955-1960), who It was, therefore, the duty of Anthony replaced Malcolm MacDonald as the Abell to persuade the Sultan to unite Commissioner-General, however, had a Brunei with Sarawak and North Borneo; new plan for the Borneo territories. He he was, however, unable to do so as he proposed to unite the Borneo territories could not convince the Sultan that his urgently and to speed up the political country’s wealth would not be used to progress among the territories should develop Sarawak and North Borneo, and independent Malaya adopt the plan to that his country’s status would not be absorb the Borneo territories into its fold altered from a protectorate to a colony. (Hussainmiya, 1995:231). The Sultan In 1957, in his bid to prevail upon was, however, persistent in rejecting the Sultan to accept the proposal for any proposal which aimed to unite a closer association, Anthony Abell Brunei with the two Northern Borneo proposed that the Colonial Offi ce return territories. When the Secretary of State the island of Labuan and Limbang proposed immediate talks with Sarawak to Brunei (Hussainmiya, 1995:229). and North Borneo, the Sultan rejected Anthony Abell also proposed that the proposal (Hussainmiya, 1995:231). the Colonial Offi ce cease Brunei’s The Sultan’s continuous rejection administrative link with Sarawak which of Britain’s plan to associate Brunei had been in operation since 1948 closely with the two Northern Borneo and make the Sultan the head of the territories led Anthony Abell and Sir Islamic faith in the three territories Roland Turnbull, the Governors of North (Hussainmiya, 1995:227). In addition, Borneo, to instigate a plan to establish a he suggested the establishment of the loose federation, where the three states offi ce of Governor-General who would would continue their existence, retaining represent the British government autonomy over their own revenue and in North Borneo and Sarawak, and expenditure (Ranjit Singh, 1984:139). act as High Commissioner in Brunei The Central government would control (Hussainmiya, 1995:228). The Colonial their defence, external relations, Offi ce, however, rejected these proposals communications, and internal security, aimed at winning over the Sultan just but the Sultan persistently rejected for the sake of getting his agreement to the proposal. According to the Borneo the closer association (Hussainmiya, Bulletin’s report on 15 February 1958, 1995:229). members of Brunei’s State Council With the independence of Malaya in opposed Brunei’s federation with other 1957, however, Britain’s plan to merge territories (Borneo Bulletin, 15/2/1958). the Borneo territories with Malaya and In 1958, when the Commissioner- Singapore into a unit before it was General for Southeast Asia was quoted granted independence was shattered. as saying (at the ninth Inter-Territorial When the Alliance of the UMNO (United Conference held in Brunei) that the Malays National Organization) and the conference pointed the way to a closer MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) political association (Borneo Bulletin, and later the MIC (Malayan Indian 5/4/1958), the Sultan unremittingly Congres) emerged victorious in 1955 announced that the Conference did not Malayan elections, they demanded the mean that the three territories would acceleration of Malaya’s independence become a federation (Borneo Bulletin, from the British government. 26/4/1958). He also announced Consequently, the British had to fulfi l that Brunei was not a colony and

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 127 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy that it was important to preserve the BRUNEI AND THE MALAYSIAN PLAN country’s position with patience and In 1958, Tunku Abdul Rahman, determination (Ranjit Singh, 1984:140). the Prime Minister of Malaya, voiced With the promulgation of Brunei’s his plan to unite Malaya with the Constitution in September 1959, the three Northern Borneo territories Sultan was in a much more secure to the Colonial Offi ce. The idea of position as the latter successfully the unifi cation of Malaya and the strengthened, enhanced, and Northern Borneo territories had been safeguarded the power of the monarch under discussion since 1956 (Andaya and the monarchy. Although initially & Andaya, 2001:283). It became Anthony Abell did not welcome the signifi cant to the Malayan leaders when Sultan’s constitutional proposal, they realized that it was necessary to he eventually accepted it almost unite Malaya with Singapore. In fact, the unchanged. This was mainly because idea emerged after several discussions of the Sultan’s intransigence to give in with Singapore’s leaders, including Lee to Britain’s wishes (Hussainmiya, 1995: Kuan Yew. The latter and his party, the 207). People’s Action Party (PAP), became the With the promulgation of the main promoter of the merger with the Constitution, the 1905/1906 Agreement federation (Frey, Pruessen & Yong eds., was revoked and replaced by the 1959 2003:148). Agreement, the post of the Resident was In the early 1950s, the Malayan abolished and the High Commissioner leaders refused to federate with took the place of the Resident. The Singapore as they were apprehensive administrations of Brunei and Sarawak that Singapore’s predominantly were divorced and Brunei achieved Chinese population would overwhelm internal self-government. The British, the predominantly Malay population however, retained complete control over of Malaya. In this case, the Chinese Brunei’s external affairs and defence, would be the largest single community, and this was stated in the Article 3 of comprising 43 per cent of the total the 1959 Agreement. population compared with 41 per cent Following the promulgation of Malays (Turnbull, 1989:272). Moreover, Brunei’s Constitution, the British began the Malayan leaders were anxious that to toy with the idea of merging Sarawak Singapore’s economic interests would and North Borneo without Brunei. Lord confl ict with those of Malaya and that Selkirk announced that he favoured the Malayan politics would be radicalized federation of the two territories as a step through contact with Singapore’s towards their self-government (Borneo left-wing parties (Andaya & Andaya, Bulletin, 24/9/1960). However, the plan 2001:203). was not pursued as the two territories However, since the development were not economically able to stand on of Communist activities in Singapore their own without Brunei (Ranjit Singh, alarmed the Malayan leaders, they 1984:155). Moreover, the association began to reconsider merging Singapore of North Borneo and Sarawak would be with Malaya. This was because they considered as unworkable to the British were concerned that an independent if Brunei were not part of the association Singapore would come under the (Frey, Pruessen & Yong, 2003:148). control of the Communists, which As a result, Britain began to look to would affect the position of Malaya. independent Malaya in order to solve The Malayan leaders, therefore, wanted its problems over its Northern Borneo to assist the non-Communist leader, territories, including Brunei. Lee Kuan Yew of PAP (People’s Action Party), in order to achieve independence

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan 128 ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014 within a federation (Hadi Abdullah, (Frey, Pruessen & Yong eds., 2003:148). 2002:32). Nevertheless, the Malayan The Commonwealth Offi ce was leaders judged that if Singapore was particularly worried over the Communist to be brought into the federation, they threat in the Borneo territories. The also needed to bring the Northern Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) in Borneo territories within Malaya to Sarawak had been heavily infi ltrated by balance Singapore’s predominantly Communist elements and furthermore Chinese population with the Malays of it had connections with the PRB, Parti Malaya and the three Northern Borneo Rakyat Brunei or Brunei People Party territories. (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:36). In Brunei’s case, apart from its Moreover, the Colonial Offi ce was crucial function of balancing the Malay worried that Brunei would be a target population with the Chinese population for Indonesian conspiracy and internal in Singapore, Brunei’s merger with sedition. In Britain’s view, Brunei would Malaya, Singapore, and the two not be able to defend itself against Borneo territories could also enhance any internal and external threats, the security of the region against any but if Brunei joined the federation, Communist activities. Tunku Abdul Brunei would benefi t from the central Rahman was also interested in bringing government’s forces as well as British Brunei within the federation of Malaysia forces. If the Federation of Malaysia was as it could provide bigger markets formed, the existing defence agreement and create more job opportunities for that Malaya had with Britain (the the people of Brunei (Hadi Abdullah, Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement 2002:39). [AMDA] of 1957) would be extended to Furthermore, Tunku Abdul Rahman the Northern Borneo territories (Hadi was confi dent that if Brunei joined the Abdullah, 2002:35). federation, the latter could safeguard the Therefore, from Britain’s perspective, survival of the Sultanate. In this case, the best solution for Brunei’s future Brunei’s dynasty would be protected security was to join the Federation within the Federal Constitution which of Malaysia. The Colonial Offi ce “would contain effective safeguards consequently supported the idea and for the position of the Ruler” (Hadi even pressed the Sultan to join Malaysia Abdullah, 2002:39). Nevertheless, the as it would be dangerous for Brunei to Sultan would only be a constitutional stay alone (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:129- monarch. Moreover, if Brunei joined the 130). Moreover, the decolonization of Federation, Brunei could economically Brunei became an even more pressing assist the development of Sarawak and matter for the Colonial Offi ce as in North Borneo (Abu Bakar, 1981:122) December 1960, the United Nations and Malaysia as a whole (Frey, Pruessen General Assembly had passed a & Yong eds., 2003:158). resolution – the Declaration on the The Malayan plan to federate Malaya Granting of Independence to Colonial with Singapore and the three Northern Countries and Peoples – where the Borneo territories was accepted in colonial powers were urged to take principle by Britain, as the plan immediate measures to transfer all would help to solve Britain’s problems powers to the peoples of their colonies.1 with decolonizing the three Northern The Colonial Offi ce nevertheless Borneo territories (Frey, Pruessen & warned Tunku Abdul Rahman against Yong eds., 2003:144). To the Colonial any premature announcement of the Offi ce, individual independence for these territories was not viable as these 1See, for example, fi le on “UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] Resolution, No.1514, XV, 14 countries would be exposed to danger December 1960”.

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 129 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy federation as it would cause political internal self-government in 1959, the chaos in the Northern Borneo territories. rapport between Brunei and Malaya Lord Selkirk warned the Federal became formidable as Brunei sought Government of Malaya’s Prime Minister Malayan offi cials to fi ll the important not to rush the scheme too quickly, as posts in the administration of the state, unrest could occur throughout Northern which had previously been held by Borneo (Mackie, 1974:63; and Matthew, the British (Hussainmiya, 1995:239). 2002:67). In early 1960, however, Tunku In 1958, the Brunei State Council Abdul Rahman took the initiative by approved a $100 million loan to Malaya visiting Sarawak and North Borneo; and following a personal approach by on 27 May 1961, he eventually made Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Sultan his idea for the Federation of Malaysia (Hussainmiya, 1995:234). An exchange public, when he made an address to the of visits between the leaders of the two Foreign Correspondents Association of countries also took place. As a result South-East Asia in Singapore.2 of Brunei’s close relationship with The Tunku Abdul Rahman’s speech Malaya, the British plan to unite Brunei had immediate and widespread with Sarawak and North Borneo was consequences in Sarawak and North undermined. Borneo. Although it was widely As mentioned before, when Tunku welcomed in Sarawak, the latter Abdul Rahman announced the plan suggested that it should be united for the formation of Malaysia in May fi rst with North Borneo. However, the 1961, the Sultan was cautious. When Sarawak and North Borneo territories’ the Eighth Regional Conference of feelings toward the federation hardened the Commonwealth Parliamentary as they were not in favour of a proposal Association (CPA) was held in Singapore for the absorption of Sarawak and North in July 1961, Brunei did not send any Borneo with the same status as the observers (Hussainmiya, 1995:254). At existing States (ibidem with footnote this conference, the principle of merger 2). In Brunei, the Sultan received was approved and a formal agreement the Tunku Abdul Rahman’s speech in principle was announced (Turnbull, with caution. Although Sultan Omar 1989:272). Ali Saifuddien had had a favourable Although the Sultan’s attitude attitude towards Malaya prior to Tunku towards Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Abdul Rahman’s announcement of announcement was guarded, he was the plan, the Sultan was nevertheless aware of Brunei’s weaknesses if Britain cautious over the Tunku’s proposal. were to end its military protection In the 1950s, the Sultan showed a over Brunei. Since 1906, Brunei had favourable attitude towards Malaya depended on British military protection as he wanted to avoid the issue of the for its security and survival. The 1906 Northern Borneo federation. When Agreement that Brunei had with Britain Malaya became independent in 1957, brought Brunei under full British Brunei’s relation with Malaya improved protection. Even though Sultan Omar as the Sultan wanted to demonstrate Ali Saifuddien III was cautious towards to Britain that he preferred Brunei to the plan, he was prepared to examine be associated with independent state the pros and cons (pro and contrary) of than with the British colonies: Sarawak joining Malaysia. In addition, the Sultan and North Borneo (Hussainmiya, planned to seek favourable terms from 1995:233). After Brunei achieved Malaya that would bring advantages and benefi ts to the people of Brunei 2File on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce], and the country. If the terms were not 51/154, Origins and Formation of Malaysia, 10 July 1970”. favourable to Brunei, it would not enter

Malaysia (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:53). PKI supported Azahari not because it Nevertheless, the PRB (Parti Rakyat wanted to see the creation of the NKKU, Brunei or Brunei’s People Party) opposed but to destroy the Malaysian Federation the Malaysian Plan from its inception, and set up its own power base in the since it would jeopardise its aim to form Borneo territories. Sukarno, who wanted the NKKU (Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan the PKI’s continuous support, backed Utara or Unitary State of the North the PKI’s policy by supporting Azahari Kalimantan) under the “Sri Mahkota (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:204). Negara” as the Sultan of Brunei would Within Brunei and the adjacent areas be called. According to Haji Zaini Haji (such as Limbang and Lawas), the PRB Ahmad, the party’s organizer, it was the had won a large number of followers aim of the PRB to restore the sovereignty who had become increasingly anti- of the Sultan of Brunei over his former Malaysia. Even before the Malaysian dominions Sarawak and Sabah (Haji Plan was proposed, there were already Ahmad, 1987:17). Thus, any move to widespread anti-Malayan feelings unite the Northern Borneo territories among the people of Brunei. They with another country would fail in its resented the presence in Brunei of the attempt to integrate the three territories Malayans, who were enlisted by the and to restore Brunei’s sovereignty Brunei government to fi ll several key over Sarawak and Sabah (Haji Ahmad, positions that had previously been held 1987:22). by British offi cers, following Brunei’s In order to upstage the Malaysian achievement of internal self-government Plan, the PRB mobilised support from in 1959 (Hussainmiya, 1995:255-258). the political leaders of Sarawak and These ill feelings towards the Malayans Sabah, where it successfully gained deteriorated after Tunku Abdul cooperation from the Sarawak United Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaya, People’s Party (SUPP) and the United announced the Malaysian Plan in May Kadazan Organisation of North Borneo, 1961. which were also anti-Malaysia. On 9 The Sultan was well aware that the July 1962, the PRB, SUPP, and the people of Brunei were anti-Malayan United Kadazan Organisation of North and that they supported the PRB Borneo formally established the United because of its vociferous opposition Borneo Front (Haji Ahmad, 1987:22). to the Malaysian Plan. Consequently, In addition, the PRB gained support the Sultan was under pressure. from the Indonesian leaders, who gave According to B.A. Hussainmiya, “the moral backing to the PRB. Aside from Sultan faced the toughest decision of moral support, members of TNI (Tentera his career” (Hussainmiya, 1995:276). Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian On one side, there were the British, National Army) were also known to who urged him to join Malaysia; and have trained TNKU (Tentera Nasional on the other side, there was the PRB, Kalimantan Utara or North Kalimantan which had successfully mobilised National Army) members secretly mass opinion against the Malaysian as early as July 1962 (Haji Ahmad, Plan (Hussainmiya, 1995:276), and 1987:47). The reason for Sukarno’s wanted Brunei to form a federation with espousal of the PRB’s struggle was the Sarawak and Sabah, which the Sultan powerful infl uence of the PKI (Partai was totally against. Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian On this issue, the Sultan had to play Communist Party), within Sukarno’s for time to enable him to consider the cabinet. The PKI shored up Azahari’s advantages and disadvantages of joining anti-Malaysia cause, which led to the Malaysia. According to Muhammad 1962 rebellion (Poulgrain, 1998). The Hadi Abdullah, the Malaysian proposal

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 131 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy presented an option to the Sultan to verbally attacked the Brunei delegation balance pressure posed by the people for signing the documents, saying that and the British; by manipulating the joining Malaysia was contrary to the issue, the Sultan could tackle and then wishes of the people (Borneo Bulletin, crush the PRB (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:25- 24/2/1962). 26). Indeed, during the hearing of the The Malaysian plan was, however, Brunei–Malaysia Commission of not a straightforward issue, since it had January 1962, the majority of the coincided with Brunei’s fi rst district people in Brunei opposed Malaysia council elections. According to the 1959 and supported the formation of the Constitution, elections to the district NKKU (Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan councils were to be held two years after Utara or Unitary State of the North its commencement. In September 1960, Kalimantan). The Brunei government, the Brunei government announced that however, did not publish the report on these elections would be held in August the Brunei–Malaysia Commission, and 1961 the following year. However, only gave the impression that the people when the time of the elections was of Brunei had accepted Malaysia in approaching, the Sultan postponed principle (Haji Ahmad, 1989:25). During them indefi nitely (Hussainmiya, a session of the Brunei Legislative 1995:261). During this time, the Council held on 18 July 1962, the Sultan encouraged the formation of Sultan announced that the people political parties in an attempt to erode had accepted the Malaysian concept the political strength of the PRB (Hadi “in principle” (Brackman, 1966:139). Abdullah, 2002:65); and as a result of This was followed by a move made by this, two political parties emerged – the the Acting Chief Minister, Dato Marsal Brunei National Organisation (BNO) and Maun, to support the royal speech, the Brunei United Party (BUP). Both the and the motion was adopted, which BNO and BUP were pro-Malaysian Plan. clarifi ed the pro-Malaysian position of Nonetheless, neither of these parties the Brunei government (Borneo Bulletin, was able to attract large numbers of 21/7/1962). The Sultan obtained a people to challenge the PRB, which had mandate from the Legislative Council to attracted the majority of the people of negotiate with the British and Malaysian Brunei (Hussainmiya, 1995:265). governments on the terms of Brunei’s Although the Sultan was losing the entry into Malaysia. support of his people, he did not give This development disappointed the in to the PRB’s wishes, as the motives PRB. Nevertheless, the PRB pinned of the PRB were contradictory to his its hope on the coming of the District stance. Moreover, he still wanted to Council election to be held in August explore the benefi ts of Brunei joining 1962. To the PRB, the election was Malaysia. On 5 December 1961, signifi cant in order to achieve its aim the Sultan issued a statement that of preventing Brunei from entering the idea of the Malaysian plan was Malaysia. If they won the election, “attractive”, because of the social and the district councillors elected to the cultural affi rmatives between the two Legislative Council could present a countries (Haji Ahmad, 1989:22). In motion to block Brunei’s entry into February 1962, Brunei delegates joined Malaysia. When the District Council Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo election was held on 30 and 31 August in the signing of the “Memorandum on 1962, the PRB adopted manifestos Malaysia”, which unanimously approved which among other issues included the Malaysian plan (Hussainmiya, independence for Brunei by 1963; the 1995:265). Consequently, the PRB rejection of Malaysia and the formation

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan 132 ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014 of a Federation of North Borneo; and recognition for the government of the internal economic, administrative, NKKU), announced that the Sultan and educational reform (Haji Ahmad, had declared the independence within 1987:25). the Commonwealth of a state that The election resulted in a landslide comprised the three Northern Borneo victory for the PRB, which won fi fty-four territories; the Sultan denied this out of a possible fi fty-fi ve seats, with the promptly in a broadcast (Hadi Abdullah, remaining seat going to an independent 2002:186). Azahari and Zaini’s mission that later joined the PRB. The PRB to the UN, however, failed to materialise victory proved the undisputed popularity as their visa applications were rejected of the party and also the endorsement of by the American Embassy in Manila the people’s opposition to the Malaysian (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:220-221). plan. In September 1962, when the During the rebellion, the Sultan new Legislative Council was formed, could not handle the situation effi ciently the party sought to table a motion and effectively. The TNKU, the militant “blocking” the formation of Malaysia. As wing of the PRB, was everywhere. The the Council feared suffering defeats in oilfi elds at Seria, much of Brunei Town the debates, it postponed the Legislative and the rest of the state and parts of the Council meeting to 5 December 1962 Fourth and Fifth Divisions of Sarawak, (Simadjuntak, 1969:151). including Limbang, were overrun by the Before the Legislative Council meeting rebels. The country’s police force could was held, the PRB submitted a motion not quell such a large-scale rebellion. to the Brunei government to be tabled Moreover, Brunei’s army had just been at the forthcoming meeting. The motion created and was undergoing training demanded that the British government in Malaya, and the British forces were return Sarawak and North Borneo to not present in Brunei at that time. the sovereignty of the Brunei Sultan; Under the 1959 Agreement, although that the British government federate the the internal security and defence of the three Borneo territories; that Brunei be state were under British responsibility, kept out of Malaysia and that Brunei be the Sultan did not allow any British granted independence by 1963 (Borneo security exercises on Brunei’s soil Bulletin, 8/12/1962). (Borneo Bulletin, 1/8/1962). Despite The Sultan, who was against the PRB this, when the rebellion broke out, motion, rejected the motion to be tabled Britain immediately despatched its army at the forthcoming meeting by giving to Brunei to crush the rebellion. the excuse that the motion involved the Although the 1962 rebellion, and the British government and had nothing to indirect involvement of Indonesia in do with the government of Brunei (Ranjit the rebellion, showed the vulnerability Singh, 1984:172). This disappointed of the Sultanate, this did not persuade Azahari who commented, “when we the Sultan to accept the Malaysian received that, I knew we could not stop Plan straight away. Similarly, although Malaysia by constitutional means, the people of Brunei were against the we had no alternative, we decided to Malaysian Plan, this did not make the strike” (Straits Times, 19/1/1963). On 8 Sultan directly abandon the plan. The December 1962, the rebellion broke out. 1962 rebellion did not stop the Sultan The 1962 rebellion was a major further considering the pros and cons challenge to the Sultan as the rebels (pro and contrary) of joining Malaysia, openly threatened his position and and soon after the end of the 1962 the country’s security. When Azahari, rebellion, in January 1963, two Brunei who was in Manila (on his way to offi cials were despatched to Kuala New York to seek the United Nations’ Lumpur to hold preliminary talks with

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 133 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy the Malayan government. to reach any consensus became one In the meetings, which were held of the main reasons why the Sultan between 5 February and 3 March 1963, refused to join Malaysia in 1963. issues such as Brunei’s fi nances, the Indeed, the Sultan had already stated Sultan’s position in the council of in his correspondence to Tunku rulers, the special rights and privileges Abdul Rahman between July 1961 of the people of Brunei, and the and October 1963 that Brunei should representation of Brunei in the federal only join the federation if the Malayan government were discussed thoroughly government could accept all Brunei’s by both governments. However, none terms (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:137). of the issues discussed in the meetings However, there was also a suggestion satisfi ed the Sultan. that Brunei refused to join Malaysia as During the discussions, the Malayan the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company side insisted that the control of Brunei’s infl uenced the Sultan not to join the oil revenues should be passed to the federation. During the Sultan’s meeting federal government ten years after with the Malayan government in Kuala Brunei’s entry into Malaysia, whereas Lumpur, the Brunei Shell Petroleum the Sultan wanted to retain Brunei’s Company sent a telegram indicating control over any revenue and income a large commercial discovery of oil at relating to oil in perpetuity. The Southwest Ampa Field. The Company Malayan government also wanted the warned the Sultan that if Brunei joined right to tax immediately any new oil Malaysia, the control and management and mineral fi nds discovered after the of Brunei’s oil resources would be Sultanate joined Malaysia, whereas the merged with the federation. According Sultan maintained that Brunei should to B.A. Hamzah, the telegram was sent retain such revenue. The Malayan purposely to the Sultan in order to government additionally wanted the infl uence him to stay out of Malaysia Sultan’s contributions of $40 million (Hamzah, 1991:225-226). annually to the federal government to be Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was compulsory, while the Sultan wanted it disappointed with Brunei’s decision to be voluntary. not to enter Malaysia, claimed that There was also the issue of discussions broke down after agreement precedence. According to the Malayan had been reached on all matters only government, the Sultan’s ranking among when the Sultan raised the question the rulers would be the lowest, based of his precedence (as it was too late upon the date of joining the council for Tunku Abdul Rahman to consult of rulers and not from the time he the council of rulers). In March 1963, ascended the throne. Previously, during the Conference of Rulers had already the preliminary meeting between Brunei decided that the precedence and the and the Malayan governments (in July position of the Sultan of Brunei should 1962), the Malayan government had relate to the date of Brunei’s accession assured the Sultan that precedence was to Malaysia, so his name would be the in accordance with the date of accession last on the election list to be appointed to the throne and not dependent upon as a Yang Dipertuan Agong of the new the date of joining the council of rulers. Federation of Malaysia. Although the terms were further Tunku Abdul Rahman’s allegation, discussed in June 1963, these issues however, was strongly denied by the remained unsolved, as Tunku Abdul Sultan, who stated that the main reason Rahman refused to give in to Brunei’s for Brunei not joining Malaysia was that terms and the Sultan refused to Malaya had failed to accept “Brunei accept the Malayan terms. The failure terms” (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:129). In

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan 134 ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014 this regard, the Sultan probably thought According to Muhammad Hadi that his status as a ruler of a self- Abdullah, the Sultan was never governing state was better than as a interested in joining Malaysia. He member of Malaysia’s government with suggested that “the idea of accepting, fewer responsibilities (Hussainmiya, in principle, was simply a political 1995:321). Moreover, the Sultan would maneuver and diplomatic approach on not want to exchange his absolute power the part of the Sultan to ensure for the for that of a constitutional monarch. survival of the Brunei Sultanate in its This, however, was not mentioned then form as a Malay Islamic Monarchy during the meeting between the two under the British protection” (cited in governments. According to Tan Sri Hadi Abdullah, 2002:140). He further Ghazali Shafi e, the Malaysian Minister added that the differences over the of Foreign Affairs, the Sultan might issues of revenue, fi nance, taxes, and possibly have thought he could keep his precedence were simply explanations for power as an absolute monarch if Brunei the Sultan to reject the idea of joining joined the Federation (cited in Hadi Malaysia (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:141). Abdullah, 2002:161). According to a British report, the In addition, Brunei’s wealth had Sultan showed no regret at all for not always been a sensitive issue for the entering Malaysia since he had the Sultanate. The fear that it would support of his people, who were mainly have to be shared among the other anti-Malaysia.3 The Sultan insisted two British Borneo territories was that the question of Brunei’s entry into one of the reasons why the Sultan Malaysia was closed and that there was not interested in the British plan would be no point in any subsequent to associate Brunei with Sarawak meeting between himself and Tunku and Sabah in the 1950s. When the Abdul Rahman or representatives of the Malayan government insisted that it two governments (ibidem with footnote would control Brunei’s oil revenue after 3). He further stated that should there ten years and would tax any new oil be any question of re-opening the issue discovered after Brunei joined Malaysia, of Brunei’s entry into Malaysia in the it looked as if the federal government of future, negotiations would have to begin Malaysia wanted to control Brunei’s oil from scratch, that is, without regard wealth. Brunei would not surrender its to any previous negotiations on the oil wealth to the federal government of subject, adding that, “no one could tell Malaysia, because that would leave it what the position would be in a decade’s with nothing, since Brunei’s economy time” (ibidem with footnote 3). From depended on its oil revenues. this, it was clear that the Sultan’s mind Finally, the Sultan would not want to was more than ever unreceptive to the give away Brunei’s identity as a separate idea of entering Malaysia. kingdom, which the previous Sultans The Sultan was actually satisfi ed had striven to retain since 1800, by with the present arrangement with becoming part of Malaysia. As D.S. the British government and wanted to Ranjit Singh notes: maintain British protection if possible indefi nitely. While the fi nal meetings Bearing in mind the proud historic on Malaysia were taking place in heritage of having preserved the identity of London in July 1963, the Sultan had their kingdom for centuries, the Bruneian authorities did not feel inclined to reduce already indicated that he wished to the status of their country to a mere discuss the future relationship of his state in the Federation of Malaysia […]. state with Britain and had referred All Brunei would be a loser by joining the Federation of Malaysia (Ranjit Singh, 3See, for example, fi le on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 1984:197). 229/8, Outlook for Brunei, 24 October 1963”.

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 135 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy to the possibility of “strengthening part of Malaysia, Brunei would not be Brunei’s defence treaty with the United a target of Indonesia. In addition, the Kingdom”.4 He also hoped that the wealth of Brunei could be used for the British government would “continue defence and development of Sabah and to honour the existing agreement for Sarawak and the rest of the Federation.6 the defence of Brunei” (cited in Borneo As Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of Bulletin, 23/6/1963). However, the State for Commonwealth Relations, said British government could not keep on that the Malaysians would in certain protecting Brunei, because its partial circumstances like to have Brunei in independence would be increasingly Malaysia, or at least in much closer diffi cult to defend by the UK (United association than at present. They could Kingdom) representatives at the UN certainly fi nd a good use for Brunei’s (United Nations). oil revenues.7 Also, if Brunei chose to In 1962, the UN General Assembly become independent outside of the established the Special Committee on federation, the Malaysian government Decolonization (the Special Committee was concerned that Sabah and Sarawak of 24 on Decolonization) to monitor would probably decide to separate from the implementation of the Declaration Malaysia and become independent.8 (the Declaration on the Granting of In both cases, they could destroy the Independence to Colonial Countries and stability of the federation as a whole; if Peoples of 1960). The establishment Sabah and Sarawak opted to become of the Special Committee of Twenty- independent that would be the end of Four on Decolonization put pressure the federation. on Britain to relinquish its remaining Thus, in order to ensure the security responsibilities towards Brunei (Haji of the Federation, Brunei should be Ismail, 1991). brought into Malaysia. The British, who Furthermore, both the British and did not intend to force the Sultan to the Malaysian governments did not accept the Malaysian proposal, adopted want to see Brunei left to stand on its a new policy whereby Britain would try own, as that would pose political and to infl uence the Sultan to join Malaysia military problems for the British and at least by 1965. The adoption of the Malaysian interests over the security of policy also aimed to avoid any allegation the new federation. Both governments that Britain was trying to maintain a were apprehensive that an independent re-colonisation policy in Brunei (Hadi Brunei without British protection Abdullah, 2002:137). would be a security risk to Sabah and Initially, the British government Sarawak, and the Federation of Malaysia hoped to see continuous co-operation as a whole (Bartlett, 1972 and 1978). from Malaysia in seconding Brunei For example, if an uprising recurred its offi cers in various fi elds of in Brunei, it would probably spread to administration even after Brunei’s Sabah and Sarawak; if that happened, rejection of Malaysia in 1963. By giving Malaysia would almost certainly have to Brunei this type of co-operation, the deal with this matter on its own. British government hoped that Brunei Moreover, the British government was would become closer to and eventually concerned that Brunei might become the target of Indonesian deception and Policy towards Brunei, 8 November 1967”. internal insurrection;5 whereas if it were 6File on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 39/89, Talks with the Sultan of Brunei, November 1969 – Brief No.9”. 4File on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce], 7See fi le on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 169/547, A. 371/169703, 11 July 1963, Telegram from Mackintosh Bottomley to A.H. Reed, 8 July 1966”. to Secretary of State, 18 July 1963”. 8File on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce], 5See fi le on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth 15/288, Britain’s Medium- and Long-Term Policy Offi ce], 15/288, Britain’s Medium- and Long-Term towards Brunei, 8 November 1967”.

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan 136 ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com SUSURGALUR: Jurnal Kajian Sejarah & Pendidikan Sejarah, 2(2) September 2014 enter Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman, to 1966. The British plan to associate however, demanded that the Brunei Brunei closely with their Northern government return the Malaysian Borneo territories, namely Sarawak offi cers to Malaysia, as he wished to and North Borneo, was a challenge to teach Brunei a lesson for not joining the Sultanate as it could lead Brunei’s the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 status to be reduced from a protectorate (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:249-250). Tunku to a colony, and the Sultan’s status Abdul Rahman hoped that by recalling to be decreased from an absolute the offi cers, their positions would be monarch to a constitutional monarch. substituted by British expatriates. When Moreover, the Sultanate’s burgeoning this happened, he expected that it would oil would probably have to be shared stimulate the people of Brunei to rise with Sarawak and North Borneo. This against the British in Brunei, push the article has also shown that one of the British to grant Brunei independence, reasons why the Sultan promulgated and drive the Bruneians to seek the Constitution was to safeguard and membership of Malaysia.9 strengthen the power of the monarch Tunku Abdul Rahman’s action in and the monarchy, as well as the recalling Malaysia’s seconded offi cers Bruneian Malays and the Islamic from Brunei did indeed impel the Sultan religion. to obtain British assistance in providing Since the Sultan was not interested Brunei with technical and professional to closely associate Brunei with the two services. However, still seeking close co- Northern Borneo territories, Britain’s operation between Malaysia and Brunei, plan to see the formation of the the British government encouraged the federation of the three Northern Borneo Sultan to employ offi cers from Malaysia territories collapsed. Britain’s hoped, (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:259). Although however, that independent Malaya the Sultan claimed that he would would solve the British problem over review the position of the Malaysian its Northern Borneo territories. Britain offi cers already in Brunei and intended did not want to grant these territories to retain those who were suffi ciently individual independence as they were experienced, he still chose to recruit underdeveloped and prone to internal offi cers from Britain rather than from and external threats. When the Malayan Malaysia (Hadi Abdullah, 2002:257). Prime Minister proposed the formation Moreover, the Tunku Abdul Rahman’s of the Federation of Malaysia consisting motive backfi red. Although more British of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North offi cers were needed to replace the Borneo, and Brunei, Britain supported Malaysian offi cers, the people of Brunei the proposal as this would assist it in had actually become more anti-Malaysia decolonizing its three Northern Borneo than anti-British (Hadi Abdullah, territories. 2002:251). Britain’s efforts to bring The Sultan, although showing a Brunei within Malaysia by 1965 were, favourable attitude towards Malaya, therefore, unsuccessful. was cautious toward such a plan. He was initially prepared to study the pros CONCLUSION and cons (pro and contrary) of Brunei From this article, it has been shown joining Malaysia, before a decision that the challenges and problems faced was made in July 1963. However, the by the Sultanate (with regard to its PRB (Parti Rakyat Brunei or Brunei’s security and survival) had existed prior People Party) vigorously opposed the plan from the start and its opposition 9See fi le on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 169/547, A. subsequently led to the outbreak of the Bottomley to A.H. Reed, 25 October 1966”. 1962 rebellion. The rebellion, viewed by

© 2014 by Minda Masagi Press Bandung and UBD Bandar Seri Begawan ISSN 2302-5808 and website: www.susurgalur-jksps.com 137 NANI SURYANI HAJI ABU BAKAR, Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy the Sultan as a threat to the security Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay of the monarch and the monarchy, was Archipelago. New York: F.A. Praeger. File on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 229/8, Outlook for successfully crushed by Britain which Brunei, 24 October 1963”. was responsible for Brunei’s internal File on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 169/547, A. security. Although the rebellion showed Bottomley to A.H. Reed, 8 July 1966”. the weakness of the Sultanate without File on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 169/547, A. British protection, the Sultan did not Bottomley to A.H. Reed, 25 October 1966”. File on “DO [Dominion Offi ce], 39/89, Talks with accept the Malaysian Plan straight the Sultan of Brunei, November 1969 – Brief away. In this regard, the Sultan still No.9”. wanted to discuss details of the terms File on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce], with Malayan leaders. 371/169703, 11 July 1963, Telegram from Mackintosh to Secretary of State, 18 July The Sultan, however, eventually 1963”. gave up the Malaysian Plan as he did File on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce], not want Brunei to lose its sovereignty 15/288, Britain’s Medium- and Long-Term to Malaysia. The Sultan was, however, Policy towards Brunei, 8 November 1967”. File on “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce], hoping that Britain would continue 51/154, Origins and Formation of Malaysia, its protection over Brunei if possible 10 July 1970”. indefi nitely. This article has shown that File on “UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] after Brunei’s rejection of Malaysia, the Resolution, No.1514, XV, on 14 December 1960”. British government continued its efforts Frey, Marc, Ronald Pruessen & Tan Tai to bring Brunei within Malaysia at least Yong [eds]. (2003). The Transformation of by 1965. Britain’s efforts were, however, Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on unsuccessful as the Sultan refused to Decolonization. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. employ Malaysian offi cers, whom the Hadi Abdullah, Muhammad. (2002). “Brunei’s Political Development and the Formation of British suggested and hoped would Malaysia, 1961–1967”. Unpublished Ph.D. bring Brunei closer to Malaysia and Thesis. Hull: University of Hull, OD39/89. eventually persuade Brunei to join the Haji Ahmad, Haji Zaini. (1987). Partai Rakyat latter. Brunei, the People’s Party of Brunei: Selected Documents/Dokumen Terpilih. Kuala Lumpur: 2R Publication. Haji Ahmad, Haji Zaini. (1989). Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme di Brunei, 1939-1962. Kuala Bibliography Lumpur: 2R Publication. Haji Ismail, Eusoff Agaki. (1991). “Brunei Abu Bakar, Mohamad. (1981). “Politik Brunei Darussalam: Its Re-Emergence as a Sovereign Menjelang Penubohan Malaysia” in Malaysia and Independent Malay-Muslim Sultanate dari Segi Sejarah. (1959-1983)”. Unpublished M.A. Thesis. Hull: Andaya, B.W. & L.Y. Andaya. (2001). A History of University of Hull. Malaysia. Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2nd edition. Haji Jibah, Matassim bin. (1983). “Political Bartlett, C.J. (1972). The Long Retreat: A Short Development in Brunei with Reference to History of British Defence Policy, 1947 – 1970. the Reign of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III London and New York: Macmillan, St. Martin’s (1950-1967)”. Unpublished M.A. Thesis. Hull: Press. University of Hull. Bartlett, C.J. (1978). A History of Post War Hamzah, B.A. (1991). The Oil Sultanate: Political Britain, 1945-1974. London: Longman. History of Oil in Brunei Darussalam. Kuala Berita Brunei [newspaper], 16 March 1956. Lumpur: Mawaddah Enterprise. Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 13 July 1957. Horton, A.V.M. (1984). The British Residency Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 15 February 1958. in Brunei, 1906 – 1959. Hull: University of Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 5 April 1958. Hull, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 26 April 1958. Occassional Paper No.6. Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 24 September 1960. Hussainmiya, B.A. (1995). Sultan Omar Ali Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 24 February 1962. Saifuddin III and Britain: The Making of Brunei Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 21 July 1962. Darussalam. Kuala Lumpur: Open University Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 1 August 1962. Press. Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 8 December 1962. Hussainmiya, B.A. (2000). The Brunei Borneo Bulletin [newspaper], 23 June 1963. Constitution of 1959: An Inside Story. Bandar Brackman, A.C. (1966). Southeast Asia’s Second Seri Begawan: Brunei Press Sendirian Berhad.

Jamil al-Sufri, Mohd [Pehin Dato Haji]. (1992). Poulgrain, Greg. (1998). The Genesis of Liku-liku Perjuangan Pencapaian Kemerdekaan Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, Negara Brunei Darussalam. Bandar Seri 1945 – 1965. Bathurst, N.S.W: Crawford Begawan: Pusat Sejarah Brunei. House, Foreword by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Mackie, J.A.C. (1974). Konfrontasi: The Indonesia- Ranjit Singh, D.S. (1984). Brunei, 1839-1983: Malaysia Dispute, 1963 – 1966. Kuala The Problems of Political Survival. Singapore: Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press. Matthew, Jones. (2002). Conﬂ ict and Saunders, G.E. (2002). A History of Brunei. Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961 – 1965: London: Routledge Curzon, 2nd edition. Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and the Simadjuntak, B. (1969). Malayan Federalism, Creation of Malaysia. New York: Cambridge 1945 – 1963. London: Oxford University Press. University Press. Straits Times [newspaper], 23 April 1953. Menon, Unnikrishnan K. (1988). “Negara Straits Times [newspaper], 19 January 1963. Brunei Darussalam from Protectorate to The Sarawak Gazette [newspaper], 1 June 1948. Statehood: The Ceaseless Quest for Security”. Turnbull, C.M. (1989). A History of Singapore, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Victoria: University 1819 – 1988. Singapore: Oxford University of Wellington. Press, 2nd edition. Pathak, Archana. (1988). “British Foreign Policy towards Malaysia, 1957 – 1967”. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Hull: University of Hull.

Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III of Brunei Darussalam (Source: www.google.com, 31/8/2014)

The Sultan was apprehensive of the British plan as it would affect Brunei’s security and survival. One of the reasons why the Sultan promulgated the Constitution in 1959 was that he wanted to safeguard the position of the monarch and the monarchy. Since the Sultan was not interested in the British plan to associate Brunei with the two Northern Borneo territories, Sabah and Sarawak, the plan met with failure.