The London School of Economics and Political Science
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The London School of Economics and Political Science Making It Work: The Development and Evolution of Transnational Labour Regulation Natalie Beinisch A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2017 Page 1 of 193 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 59 778 words. Page 2 of 193 Abstract Who has the capacity to regulate production in transnational supply chains and whose interests does this serve? This focus of this thesis is on transnational regulation, specifically the identification of the actors who participate in setting and implementing regulatory agendas, their interests, capacity and interactions between them. Transnational regulation is the regulation of activities which take place across national jurisdictions. State and non-state actors are direct participants in transnational regulatory regimes and non-state actors may play leading roles in their development and implementation. While work has been done which examines the roles that non-state actors play in transnational regulatory processes, there has been limited investigation into the relationships between state and non-state actors on transnational standard setting and implementation. The Governance Triangle, developed by Abbott and Snidal (2009) is a framework that positions the relationships between states, businesses and NGOs as central to transnational regulation. They argue that cooperation is necessary between these groups for there to be sufficient capacity to regulate a transnational problem. However, due to the divergent interests of these actors and the distribution of bargaining powers between them, they posit transnational regulatory standards are likely to be dominated by business interests and will be sub-optimal. This thesis explores the question of whether transnational regulatory programmes dominated by business organizations are necessarily lacking regulatory capacity and whether they remain that way over time by studying the emergence and evolution of two cases of industry self- regulation designed to improve labour standards in the production of toys and chocolate. Building upon the Governance Triangle, this thesis makes three key findings: 1) Bargaining in transnational regulation is not always distributional and that it is possible for actors to cooperate to identify and develop frameworks for transnational regulatory problems. 2) Interactions within one actor type and interactions involving all three actor groups can shape power dynamics in the bargaining process and 3) Regulation that is dominated by business actors does begin as sub-optimal. However, over time new bargaining processes can be initiated which lead to incremental developments in the capacity of a system to regulate. This thesis also contributes to the literature on non-state actors in regulation by identifying the actors which participate in transnational regulatory processes and their motivation and capacity to do so. It identifies two new sources of regulatory capacity: individual policy entrepreneurs and the media. Page 3 of 193 Contents Chapter One: Context Setting ................................................................................................................. 8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 8 Transnational Self- Regulation and the Emergence of Non -State Actors ............................................ 10 Transnational Industry Self-Regulation: Defining the Actors ............................................................... 17 Business Actors ................................................................................................................................. 17 Multinational Corporations .............................................................................................................. 17 Suppliers ........................................................................................................................................ 19 Industry Associations .................................................................................................................... 20 NGOs ................................................................................................................................................. 22 State Actors in Transnational Regulation ......................................................................................... 24 Multilateral Organizations ................................................................................................................ 24 Missing Actors ................................................................................................................................... 25 Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 28 Data ....................................................................................................................................................... 34 Chapter Two: Emergence of the ICTI CARE Process ............................................................................. 38 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 38 Organization of the Toy Industry .......................................................................................................... 38 Issue Emergence ................................................................................................................................... 40 Nature of the Regulatory Problem.................................................................................................... 40 Toycott Campaign ............................................................................................................................. 41 Toy Coalition ..................................................................................................................................... 45 Intervening Period ................................................................................................................................ 48 Mattel and Hasbro Implement Codes of Conduct ........................................................................ 49 Working with the International Toy Council to promote and industry standard ......................... 50 Limited Adoption of the ICTI CARE Process .................................................................................. 53 Industry Self-Regulation ........................................................................................................................ 54 Alan Hassenfeld and the ICTI CARE Process .................................................................................. 54 Appealing to National Toy Associations and Retailers .................................................................. 56 Conclusion: Actors and their Interactions on the Governance Triangle ............................................... 57 Chapter Three: Emergence of the Harkin Engel Protocol ..................................................................... 63 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 63 Organization of the Chocolate Industry ................................................................................................ 63 Issue Emergence ................................................................................................................................... 65 Political Instability in Côte d’Ivoire ............................................................................................... 65 Witch’s Broom............................................................................................................................... 67 Page 4 of 193 Industry and State Coordination ................................................................................................... 68 Intervening Period ................................................................................................................................ 71 Trafficking and Child Slavery in West Africa: Linked to chocolate manufacturing by the media . 71 Etireno Incident and the Anti-slavery taskforce ........................................................................... 74 Industry Self-Regulation ........................................................................................................................ 77 News reports about child slavery in the United States stimulates regulatory action .................. 77 Tom Harkin offers alternative to statutory regulation ................................................................