Barriers to Entry For
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Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?1 Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg March 10, 2011 Abstract “Fortified boundaries” are asymmetrical, physical barriers for the purposes of border control. These boundaries are more formidable in structure than conventional boundary lines but less robust than militarized boundaries. Their goal is not to eliminate the cross- border movement of clandestine transnational actors but to impose costs on would-be infiltrators and in so doing deter or impede infiltration. This paper introduces a novel dataset encompassing all pairs of contiguous states worldwide. Of these 635 dyads, 45 are separated by fortified boundaries. We find that states are building fortified boundaries at an accelerating rate. Barriers tend to be built by one authoritarian country against another. Over half of the barrier builders and over three quarters of their targets are Muslim-majority states or groups. We find no support for the thesis that fortified boundaries are routinely constructed as an attempted land grab but we also find no evidence that states who build barriers have experienced a disproportionate number of terror attacks. Instead, the data show that differences in state wealth and migration rates are the best predictors of barrier construction. We conclude with hypotheses about the effectiveness of fortified boundaries. Throughout, our argument is illustrated with detailed case studies, ranging from the Moroccan Berm to the Israeli West-Bank barrier. 1 A previous version of the paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Toronto, September 3-9. 2009; at the conference on “Fences and Walls in International Relations,” University of Quebec at Montreal, October 26-29, 2009; at the annual meeting of the Association for Israel Studies in Toronto, May 10-12, 2010l and at Ben Gurion University, Tel Aviv University, the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliyya, Israel, Bar Ilan University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Haifa University. We thank Nina Kelsey, Jay Purcell, and Ben Oppenheim for excellent research assistance. We thank Ian Lustick, George Gavrilis, Kelly Greenhill, and Peter Andreas for their comments on previous drafts of this paper. Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why? In October 2006, President George W. Bush signed a bill authorizing the construction of a 700-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico border. The barrier, consisting of reinforced fencing, cameras, lighting and sensors, was designed to stem the flow of illegal immigrants and smugglers into the United States.2 Critics were quick to attack the feasibility of the project on three primary grounds: expenditure, complexity and effectiveness.3 Several barrier opponents argued that the costs of constructing the fence, at an estimated $1-2 million dollars per mile, would be prohibitive.4 Others doubted the feasibility of the project given the challenges posed by border length and terrain.5 The most vocal group of opponents expressed skepticism over the effectiveness of a fence, 2 Michael A. Fletcher and Jonathan Weisman, “Bush Signs Bill Authorizing 700-Mile Fence Border,” Washington Post, October 27, 2006; Rachel L. Swarns, “House Votes for 698 Miles of Fences on Mexico Border,” New York Times, December 16, 2005. 3 Additional criticism of the U.S.-Mexico border fence included the claim that it would increase fatalities among immigrants forced to seek more dangerous routes into the U.S.; that it would harm the environment by disrupting the ecosystem along the border and by causing floods and erosion; that it would insult Mexico and weaken U.S.-Mexico ties; and that it would be aesthetically displeasing. See John King, “Border Fence is a Dividing Line in Immigration Debate, CNN International, on-line at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/13/king.sou.border/index.html; Ralph Blumenthal, “Some Texans Fear Border Fence Will Sever Routine of Daily Life,” New York Times, June 20, 2007, p.17; Sylvia Moreno, “On the Rio Grande, Anger Swells Over Plans for Fence: Residents, Ecologists United in Opposition,” Washington Post, June 22, 2007, A12; Associated Press, “Critics of Fence Point to Flood at Border Sites,” New York Times, August 26, 2008; Manuel Roig-Franzia and Sylvia Moreno, “More Than A Line In the Desert; Flow of People and Trade Conquers 2,000-Mile Border Between U.S. and Mexico,” Washington Post, May 21, 2006, A01; Charles Bowde, “U.S.-Mexico Border,” National Geographic, May 2007. 4 Spence S. Hus, “Delay Seen for Fence At U.S.-Mexico Line; Construction Costs, Land Purchasing Cited,” Washington Post, September 11, 2008, p.A02; Mary Vallis, “Congressman Proposes Wall along Border with Mexico: To Block Illegal Immigrants: Idea Compared to Berlin Wall, West Bank Barrier,” National Post (Canada), November 11, 2005, p.A13. 5 Greg Weston, “Great Wall of America? Plan to Separate U.S. from both Canada and Mexico with Big, Honking ‘Electronic Fence’,” Toronto Sun, September 24, 2006, p.C4; N. C. Aizenman, “Border Fence Would Slice Through Private Land; Families on U.S.-Mexico Line Fighting Plan,” Washington Post, February 16, 2008, p.A01. 1 arguing that illegal immigrants would be able to circumvent the barrier with ease by climbing over it, digging under it or cutting through it.6 The passion with which both proponents and opponents of the US-Mexico border wall cling to their views is surprising given how little we actually know about these barriers. In this paper we present a novel database of similar barriers around the world, analyze the conditions under which such barriers are constructed, and hypothesize about their effectiveness. In the first part of this paper, we elaborate the concept of “fortified boundaries,” which are asymmetrical, physical barriers for the purposes of border control. These boundaries are more formidable in structure than conventional boundary lines but less robust than militarized boundaries. Their goal is not to eliminate the cross-border movement of clandestine transnational actors (CTA’s) but to impose costs on would-be infiltrators and in so doing deter or impede infiltration. The states that construct fortified boundaries tend to do so unilaterally. We illustrate these characteristics by describing a paradigmatic case: the fortified boundaries around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. In the second part of this paper, we review the literature pertaining to borders and boundaries, and offer some preliminary speculation on state motives for the construction of fortified boundaries. Our analysis throughout is both state-centric and rationalist: We assume that states are unitary actors that engage in cost-benefit analyses prior to 6 Lawrence Downes, “The Not-So-Great Wall of Mexico,” New York Times, April 20, 2008, p.9; Peter Andreas, “Politics on the Edge: Managing the US-Mexico Border,” Current History (February 2006), pp.64-68. 2 constructing fortified boundaries.7 We illustrate the process of deliberation that leads to barrier construction by means of a second detailed case study that explores the Israel- West Bank barrier. Third, we introduce a novel dataset encompassing all pairs of contiguous states worldwide. Our data include a range of economic and demographic variables for the years 1995 and 2000. To distinguish builders from targets and account for the existence of reciprocal fortified boundaries, we list each dyad twice in out dataset, yielding 635 dyads, of which 45 are separated by fortified boundaries.8 These data illustrate several points. First, states are building fortified boundaries at an accelerating rate. Half of all post-World War II barriers were initiated after 2000. Moreover, several of these barriers cover greater distances, traverse more challenging terrain, and place a far greater burden on the finances of the initiating states than the proposed U.S.-Mexico border fence. Second, we show that while barrier builders tend to be considerably richer than barrier targets, they are not freer or more democratic than target states. Finally, our data reveal that Muslim-majority states are more likely to be the targets of fortified boundary construction than other types of states. The fourth part of this paper present a multivariate analysis of these data. We find no evidence for the thesis that fortified boundaries are routinely constructed as an attempted land grab but we also find no evidence that states who build barriers have experienced a disproportionate number of terror attacks. Instead, the data show that 7 This distinguishes our analysis from studies that emphasize the role of domestic political interests and constraints on border policy. See George Gavrilis, The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 8 We exclude islands that do not share land borders with other countries. 3 differences in state wealth and migration rates are the best predictors of barrier construction. In the fifth part of this paper we consider the difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of fortified boundaries. The paucity of data on the stopping power of barriers, the challenge in posing counterfactuals and the problem of selection bias all encumber the analysis of fortified boundary success. Moreover, even obviously successful barriers can create long-term reputational costs and provide disincentives for compromise, a dilemma illustrated by Moroccan construction