Money and Power in the Roman Republic

Home , 201 BC, 205 BC, 70s BC, Claudia Moatti, Elio Lo Cascio, Favonius (horse)

COLLECTION LATOMUS Fondée par M. Renard en 1939 Continuée par J. Dumortier-Bibauw et C. Deroux (directeur honoraire) Dirigée par D. Engels VOLUME 355

Hans Beck, Martin JeHne, and John Serrati (eds.) Money and Power in the Roman Republic

Éditions latomus bruxelles 2016

98368_CollectionLATOMUS_Beck_Vwk.indd 3 29/03/16 09:48 ISBN 978-90-429-3302-6 D/2016/0602/XX

Droits de traduction, de reproduction et d’adaptation réservés pour tous pays. Toute reproduction d’un extrait quelconque, par quelque procédé que ce soit et notamment par photocopie ou microfilm, de même que la diffusion sur Internet ou tout autre réseau semblable sont strictement interdites.

98368_CollectionLATOMUS_Beck_Vwk.indd 4 29/03/16 09:48 COLLECTION LATOMUS VOL. 355

money and power in the roman republic

98368_CollectionLATOMUS_Beck_Vwk.indd 1 29/03/16 09:48 LATOMUS COLLECTION LATOMUS www.latomus.be Fondée par M. Renard en 1939 Continuée par J. Dumortier-Bibauw La Revue Latomus, fondée en 1937 par M.-A. Kugener, L. Herrmann et M. Renard, ainsi que la eroux « Collection Latomus », fondée en 1939 par M. Renard, sont publiées par la « Société d’études latines et C. D (directeur honoraire) de Bruxelles - Latomus », A.S.B.L. La revue paraît quatre fois par an. Elle forme annuellement un tome Dirigée par D. Engels de 500 à 1.200 pages. Chaque article est signé et l’auteur en est seul responsable. Tout ouvrage inté- ressant les études latines adressé à la revue fera l’objet d’un compte rendu dans la mesure du possible, VOLUME 355 mais aucune réplique ne pourra être insérée.

Président honoraire de la Société : Carl Deroux.

Conseil d’Administration de la Société : Marie-Astrid Buelens (secrétaire), Pol Defosse (secrétaire adjoint), David Engels (président), Caroline Levi (trésorière). Hans Beck, Martin JeHne, and John Serrati (eds.) Membres de la Société : 1) Membres effectifs : Loïc Borgies, Alexandre Buchet, Marie-Astrid Buelens, Arlette Bunnens-Roobaert, Altay Coșkun, Pol Defosse, Carl Deroux (directeur général honoraire), Marc Dominicy, Emmanuel Dupraz, David Engels (directeur général, rédacteur en chef de la Revue et directeur de la Collection), Money and Power Taffy Koegmans, Caroline Levi, Jacques Marneffe, Alain Martin, Marcel Meulder, Dennis Pausch, Hervé Savon, Paul Simelon, Ghislaine Viré, Didier Viviers. 2) Membres adhérents : in the Roman Republic a) membres correspondants : Allemagne et Autriche : Maria H. Dettenhofer, Abt. Alte Geschichte, Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 München. — Canada: C. J. Simpson, Archaeology and Classical Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5. — Espagne : J.-M. Blázquez, Instituto de Arqueología, Duque de Medinaceli 4, E-28014 Madrid. — États- Unis : James C. Anderson, jr., University of Georgia, Franklin College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Classics, 221 Park Hall, Athens, Georgia 30602 (USA). — France : H. Savon, 52, rue Leibniz, F-75018 Paris. — Italie : C. Pellegrino, Dipartimento di Lingue e Letterature Antiche Moderne e Comparate, Piazza Morlacchi 11, I-06123 Perugia. — Mexique : R. Duarte Castillo, Hidalgo, 35, 58760 Purépero, Mich. México. — Royaume-Uni : F. Cairns, P.O.Box 296, Cambridge CB4 3GE (U.K.). — Suisse: Ph. Mudry, Montolivet 28, CH-1006 Lausanne.

b) autres membres adhérents (belges et étrangers) : N. Adkin (North Carolina at Chapel Hill), L. Bonfante (New York), J.-P. Brachet (Paris IV), R. Brulet (Louvain-la-Neuve), J.-L. Charlet (Aix-en-Provence), J.-M. Croisille (Clermont-Ferrand), Fr. Decreus (Gent), R. Delmaire (Lille III), J. Drinkwater (Nottingham), R. Duncan-Jones (Cambridge, U.K.), G. Freyburger (Strasbourg), G. Galimberti Biffino (Milano, Sacro Cuore), J. Gran Aymerich (Paris, CNRS), Th. Haye (Göttingen), Y. Le Bohec (Paris IV), B. Liou-Gille (Paris IV), Ed. Lipiński (Leuven), J. Loicq (Liège), G. Mader (Pretoria), J.-Cl. Margolin (Tours), J. Meyers (Montpellier III), J. Moorhead (Brisbane), P. Murgatroyd (Hamilton), Fr. Paschoud (Genève), J. Thomas (Perpignan), R. Turcan (Paris IV et Institut de France), Chr. Walde (Mainz), C. Wolff (Avignon), Ét. Wolff (Paris X), F. Wulff Alonso (Malaga). Comité international scientifique et de lecture : il comprend notamment l’ensemble des membres, effectifs et adhérents, de la Société. Présentation des manuscrits : voir le site électronique .

Contact : Prof. David Engels, directeur général de Latomus, Boîte Postale 54, B-1170 Bruxelles (Belgique), [email protected]. Abonnements et commandes : Éditions Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven, Belgique. ; site internet : . Pour l’achat des tomes I à XXI: Schmidt Periodicals GmbH, Dettendorf, D-83075 Bad Feilnbach ; site internet :

Droits de reproduction, de traduction et d’adaptation réservés pour tous pays.

98368_CollectionLATOMUS_Beck_Vwk.indd 2 29/03/16 09:48 Table of Contents

Preface...... 7

Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, John Serrati Introduction...... 9

1. currencies of Power

David B. Hollander (Iowa State) Lawyers, Gangs and Money: Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic..... 18

Cristina Rosillo-Lopez (Sevilla) Cash Is King: the Monetization of Roman Politics...... 26

Jonathan Edmondson (York) Investing in Death: Gladiators as Investment and Currency in the Later Roman Republic...... 37

Brahm Kleinman (Princeton) Rhetoric and Money: The lex Aurelia iudiciaria...... 53

Wolfgang Blösel (Duisburg-Essen) Provincial Commands and Money in the Last Decades of the Roman Republic...... 68

2. money and State Action

Bruno Bleckmann (Düsseldorf) Roman War Finances in the Age of the Punic Wars...... 82

John Serrati (McGill/Ottawa) The Financing of Conquest: Roman Interaction with Hellenistic Tax Laws. 97

Nathan Rosenstein (Ohio State) Bellum se ipsum alet? Financing Republican Imperialism...... 114

98368_CollecLatomus_Beck_00_Contents.indd 5 29/03/16 09:51 6 table of contents

3. wealth and Status

Hans Beck (McGill) Money, Power and Class Coherence: the ambitus Laws of the 180s B.C. 131

Elio Lo Cascio (Sapienza) Property Classes, Elite Wealth and Income Distribution in the Late Republic 153

Francisco Pina Polo (Zaragoza) Cupiditas pecuniae: Wealth and Power in Cicero...... 165

Elizabeth Deniaux (Paris) The Public Generosity of Aediles and Electoral Success for Praetors and Consuls...... 178

Martin Jehne (Dresden) The Economics of Status in the Late Republic...... 188

Bibliography...... 208 Indices ...... 232

98368_CollecLatomus_Beck_00_Contents.indd 6 29/03/16 09:51 Preface

This volume originates from a workshop that was hosted by the editors at McGill University in May 2011. Selected from the overall pool of papers presented at the symposium, many of the subsequent articles were revised for publication, some of them substantially, as a result of the scholarly conversation in Montreal and beyond. The present volume thus comprises the research findings of individual authors as presented in their respective contributions. At the same time the collection speaks to the team effort and lively exchange among an international community of scholars.

The initiative for ‘Money and Power’ came from two separate yet not unrelated observations. Roman republican scholarship has gained much in recent years from the study of high-powered forms of capital (Pierre Bourdieu). The symbolic capital of elite families in particular has been singled out by several scholars in their attempt to disclose the power relations between the senatorial elite and the common people. It has been noted by many that office holding and aristocratic status at Rome were not inheritable as such. Yet the social credit that was generated from a family’s symbolic capital – loosely defined as the sum of all achievements accumulated by all family members in the past – almost guaranteed its political success over generations. Such a reading of Roman politics has become extremely influential. The fascination with one form of capital, however, has led to a noticeable neglect of other registers in Bourdieu’s canon. After many years of vibrant research on social and symbolic capital, the editors felt that the time was ripe to return to ‘real’ capital and explore the intersection between economy and political culture. This desire was fueled by contemporary experience with the financial sector and its capacity to ignite and accelerate social crises. From the experience with the financial crash of 2008 to the smold- ering United States insolvency crisis to the eminent bankruptcy of Greece, it does not require a Marxist reading of politics and society to acknowledge that financial capital is not only a necessary engine of societal development but also a potential challenge, if not threat, to societal coherence, in particular in moments of crisis.

‘Money and Power’ was co-sponsored, in equal part, by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Germany. The Thyssen Stiftung also funded the publication of this volume through a separate grant program. Other funding partners of the workshop

98368_CollecLatomus_Beck_00_Contents.indd 7 29/03/16 09:51 8 PREFACE

included The Dean of Arts at McGill University, the Department of History and Classical Studies, and the John MacNaughton Chair of Classics. The Editor-in- Chief of the Collection Latomus, David Engels, provided valuable editorial assistance as the project moved from manuscript to book volume. Along the way, the two peer reviewers offered insightful advice. François Gauthier helped with editing and indexing. To all of these we extend our heartfelt thanks.

Montreal and Dresden, March 2015 Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John Serrati

98368_CollecLatomus_Beck_00_Contents.indd 8 29/03/16 09:51 Introduction

Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John Serrati

1. Preliminary Considerations

After being out of vogue for a significant period, the political culture of the Roman Republic returned in a meaningful way to the scholarly discourse hori- zon three decades ago. This renaissance was initiated when Fergus Millar put forth a provocative hypothesis which conceived of the Roman Republic as a democracy in its own right. 1 This triggered an explosion of studies attempting to support, refute, or modify his conjecture. 2 The resulting debate introduced various profound questions, leading to nothing short of a quantum leap in the study of the political culture of Rome. At the same time, research has grown in purely quantitative terms. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, for example, has offered a seminal survey which not only engages with a variety of branches of current research in the field, but itself sketches out the divergent concepts and perspectives for future scholarship, all supplemented by a bibliography of no less than thirty-nine pages. 3 The study of political culture has sparked many ideas that might be sub- sumed under the general rubric of political communication and civic rituals. 4 The various people’s assemblies in Rome have particularly attracted much attention; this focussed not only on the comitia centuriata – wherein laws were made and magistrates were elected 5 – but also on the contiones, the gatherings in which speakers from the aristocracy addressed the common people and attempted to win them over to their cause. 6 Further studies have re-examined and reconceptualised the framework of leading aristocrats. 7

1 Millar 1984: 1-19. His relevant publications on this subject are now collected in id. 2002 vol. 1; see also id. 1998. 2 For a brief summary of the debate, cf. Jehne 2006: 14-23. 3 Hölkeskamp 2010. 4 For example, cf. Jehne 2003: 279-97; Bell 2004; Sumi 2005. 5 Cf. Yakobson 1992: 32-52; id. 1999; Sandberg 2001; Jehne 2010: 495-513; id. 2013a: 129-52; id. 2013b: 103-44. 6 Cf. Pina Polo 1989; id. 1996; Mouritsen 2001; Morstein-Marx 2004; Tan 2008: 163-201; Tiersch 2009: 40-68; Hiebel 2009; Yakobson 2010: 282-302; Steel / Blom 2013. 7 Linke / Stemmler 2000; Braun / Haltenhoff / Mutschler 2000; Walter 2004.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 9 18/04/16 14:37 10 h. beck, m. jehne, and j. serrati

Others still have renerved discussions about processions and pompa in regards to their symbolic force, the visual messages sent out by the procession, and the cityscape of Rome which provided the urban stage. 8 Related studies explore the symbolic dimension of the political practice at Rome in general. 9 Another vein of scholarship has highlighted the composition of the ruling elite, especially in the early and middle Republic, as well as the aristocracy’s mechanisms of perpetuation and social distinction. 10 This has led to a greater understanding of the role of friendship and patronage relations. 11 The rise, expansion, and control of the empire and subsequent effect on patterns of behaviour amongst Roman politicians has formed the basis of a number of important studies, and these then return to the question of the impact of a rising and dynamically expanding dominion on the political elite in the city of Rome. 12 Demographic analyses have been methodologically advanced so that there now is a plethora of new and developing approaches to social and regional mobility (the long- term debate over population figures and associated social structures in Italy, of course, remains very much alive). In particular, these shed new light on the impact of the power negotiations between Rome and the other inhabitants of Italy and how this relates to the Gracchi and their reforms in this arena. 13 Finally, there are innumerable studies that attempt to decipher the processes, backgrounds, and ramifications of religious practices and belief systems in Rome and Italy. 14 The aforementioned is only a small cross-section of the broader spectrum of research as well as the many vectors and trajectories which have informed scholarship within the past two decades. Despite the tremendous proliferation and diversification of Republican themes in this scholarly kaleidoscope, that economic developments played only a minor role in the overall understanding of politics is itself highly noteworthy. 15 The transformation of Rome from a local player in Latium to a world power was accompanied by a dramatically accelerated development of economic realities which cannot have been isolated from the realm of politics. The persistent influx of money and goods from the

8 Flaig 1995: 115-48; Flower 1996; Itgenshorst 2005; Beck 2005b: 73-104; Hölkeskamp 2008: 79-126. 9 For example, cf. Flaig 2003. 10 Beck 2005a; id. 2008: 101-23; Farney 2007; Fernoux / Stein 2007. 11 Wallace-Hadrill 1989a; Deniaux 1994; Eilers 2002; Rollinger 2014; Ganter 2015; Pina Polo / Jehne 2015. 12 Cf. Edmondson 1993: 156-92; Kallet-Marx 1995; Schulz 1997; Baltrusch 2002: 245-62; Crawford 2008: 631-43; Wendt 2008. 13 Scheidel 2001; Lo Cascio 2005: 197-232; id. 2003; Rosenstein 2004; de Ligt / Northwood 2008; de Ligt 2012. 14 For a summary of the voluminous previous scholarship, cf. Scheid 2001; Rüpke 2006. Cf. also Jehne / Linke / Rüpke 2013. 15 Nevertheless, from the 1970s onwards a number of excellent works that have laid important foundations; cf. especially Schneider 1974; Shatzman 1975.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 10 18/04/16 14:37 introduction 11

Empire altered the basis of the Roman military as well as the lifestyles of mass and elite alike. And whereas the income of the res publica grew by colossal amounts, the exercise of political influence at Rome was almost self-evidently intertwined with the question of personal wealth and access to resources. Although the archaic ideal of plain lifestyles and frugal expenditures never lost its allure, senatorial families were increasingly steered towards, and dependent on, their success in the accumulation of wealth. In the first century, access to money and economic resources impacted the political competition amongst these families, and everyone involved felt unavoidable effects. Thus the crum- bling of the Republic was accompanied and accelerated by a financial crisis that touched every stakeholder and every stratum within Roman society.

2. Money as Power

The present volume, which emerges from a symposium held at McGill Univer- sity in Montreal, 16 aims to explore the economic side of power relations and the financial aspects related to the exercise of political power at Rome. This approach has long been neglected and has yet to integrate the numerous aforementioned advances in Roman Republican scholarship. After many attempts to grasp the symbolic capital of political power, the time has come to look at the actual capital, in its most rigid sense, behind these struggles. In a fashion, the asking of monetary and financial questions beyond the realm of purely economic history is already an ongoing trend. 17 Consequantly this has led to at least as many questions as answers, and thus the subject merits the further consideration provided within this volume. One of the few uncontested aspects of Roman history is that the financial costs for political careers skyrocketed in the second and first centuries. How the necessary funds for such a career were acquired, however, remains altogether unclear. The traditional view that senatorial families gained their income primarily through agricultural production from their large estates has been profoundly challenged by Nathan Rosenstein. He has convincingly argued that problems relating to the transport, delivery, and retail put a low ceiling on the revenue potential of agricultural production, and therefore exceeding this ceiling and drawing further revenues from the agrarian sector became quite difficult if not impossible. 18 That senators nevertheless continued to engage and invest actively in agricultural production is explained by Rosenstein through the motivations of status and the enhancement of familial

16 The conference was made possible by generous funding from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, for which the editors wish to express their gratitude. 17 In addition to the works mentioned in subsequent notes, cf. Aubert 1994; Schäfer 1998; Verboven 2002; Hollander 2007; Rosillo-López 2010a. 18 Rosenstein 2008: 1-26. For the influence of social and political status on economic agency cf. Verboven 2002; also Wiedemann 2003: 12-27.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 11 18/04/16 14:37 12 h. beck, m. jehne, and j. serrati

prestige, rather than simple economic gain. Moreover, scholarly orthodoxy has promulgated the notion that Roman generals were in charge of the distribution of plunder and that they undertook conquests for material gain, so much so that a successful campaign would significantly increase their private income. But this consensus has also been critiqued and challenged by Bradford Churchill, who demonstrates that the spoils of war belonged to the res publica as a whole. 19 If the victorious general was not able to divert such funds from successful campaigning into his private coffers, then this has immense consequences for the conventional understanding of how political careers were actually financed. This view is complemented by Wolfgang Blösel, who observes that the number of praetors and consuls who refrained from provincial magistracies in the year following their regular imperium was significantly higher than would be expected. The implication is that they deliberately shunned such opportunities to supplement their income – legally or illegally – by remaining in Rome. 20 Therefore, as can be seen from the above survey, the crucial question as to where and by what means the political actors in Rome amassed their economic assets remains entirely open. The work comprises a broad selection of contributions which seek to unravel the intersection between political and economic culture. Questions of purely monetary or economic history are of only corollary interest; rather, the relation between wealth and power is targeted. In this method, the present avenue of inquiry suffices to operate with a rather pragmatic definition of money. Simply put, money is a vehicle that enables economic transactions, while wealth is a significant accumulation thereof. Power, following Max Weber, is the chance to see one’s attitudes, views, or beliefs manifest themselves within society. 21

3. Structure of the Volume

The goal of the volume is to frame the topic of money and power in the Roman Republic within a broader discussion by moving away from the binary of elites versus non-elites, and the purely symbolic capital of socio-political power and status possessed by the former over the latter. Instead, the work centres on monetary and non-monetary assets with the goal of examining how economic power and ‘real’ capital influenced and augmented the nature of aristocratic power at Rome and the driving forces behind the Republic’s foreign expansion. The research is divided into three sections. The first cluster of articles, ‘Currencies of Power’, sets the tone for much of the volume and opens with examinations of how currency, especially in the form of ‘real’ monetary assets,

19 Churchill 1999: 85-116. 20 Blösel 2009; cf. also id. 2011: 55-80. 21 On the economic history of the ancient world, cf. the anthologies of Scheidel / Morris / Saller 2007; Scheidel 2012.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 12 18/04/16 14:37 introduction 13

came to play a dominant role in the accumulation and projection of power at Rome. These themes form the core of the paper by Hollander, ‘Lawyers, Gangs and Money: Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic’. This begins by discussing the gradual monetisation of Roman politics, examining the changing and increasingly unstable nature of political power in the Republic during the first century, and how those best able to recognise and exploit these changes came to dominate politics at Rome. Afterwards, however, the piece transitions to a more specific case study, analysing the ill-fated career of Gaius Verres as an example of the failure of ‘traditional’ forms of power – political position, familial connections, high-powered friends – to protect a politician who had seriously disrupted the economy of a profitable Roman province and threatened non-elite interests. The themes explored by Hollander are subsequently expanded upon by Rosillo-Lopez in ‘The Monetization of Roman Politics’. This paper adopts a broad approach to Rome, examining how the progressive introduction of money in Roman politics during the second and first centuries radically changed the way both political power and political careers were understood. As increasing numbers used money as a means of achieving political success, the consequences were felt by elites and non-elites alike. For the former, this significantly increased the amount of real capital necessary to secure office, driving nobles to establish intricate financial relationships which often involved corruption. Concerning the latter, the greater amounts of money exchanged during elections led to more currency in circulation; this, however, also very likely caused prices to rise, leading to a decrease in the living standards for the Roman poor, which in turn contributed greatly to the social unrest of the times. As also examined later by Deniaux, these citizens were compensated by grain distributions, which themselves not only became a tool of the elite, but also heavily taxed public finances. The idea of a dichotomy between forms of money and power at Rome is furthermore the basis of Edmondson’s discussion on gladiators as new forms of non-traditional assets. ‘Investing in Death: Gladiators as Investment and Currency in the Later Roman Republic’ examines how certain assets on occasion served as very useful stores of wealth, even if this was not their primary function. In this regard, slaves in particular had considerable advantages over coins, bullion, or grain since they could serve as an investment and generate wealth through their labour. Moreover, their value could be enhanced through training, which enabled them to provide more skilful, and hence more lucrative, services. In this realm, gladiators came to play a particularly important role, especially from the 60s onwards, in the investment strategies of the Roman elite. By this date, Roman aristocrats had started to amass troupes of gladiators as part of their own capital resources. Not only were they useful as bodyguards in the violent politics of the period, but they also served as public displays of wealth, enhancing the symbolic capital of Roman aristocrats. Moreover,

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 13 18/04/16 14:37 14 h. beck, m. jehne, and j. serrati

gladiators could be leased, sold, or gifted to fellow aristocrats who were anxious to stage a memorable gladiatorial show in the hypercompetitive politics of the period. As outlined in the first three papers, the late Republic saw a significant upturn in the use of divergent types of wealth to enhance one’s status in the political culture of the time. In keeping with this theme, Kleinman’s contribution, ‘Rhetoric and Money: The Lex Aurelia Iudiciaria’, presents the lex Aurelia of 70 as a case study to explore the impact of financial interests and the rhetoric of corruption on senatorial politics in the late Republic. The work considers the symbiotic role of wealth as well as public speech, and illustrates how senators could exploit accusations of financial corruption against opponents, no matter how exaggerated, in order to gain support for their own legislation. The paper further explores how one’s very presence on the political scene in Rome provided immense amounts of symbolic capital and greatly aided the furthering of one’s ambitions. This aspect is central to Blösel’s chapter, ‘Provincial Com- mands and Money in the Last Decades of the Roman Republic’, as he illustrates how physical presence in the turbulent arena of late Republican politics often proved far more beneficial, and perhaps even more lucrative, than provincial command. Therefore, contrary to the standard scholarly narrative, Roman nobiles of the late Republic were not at all eager to acquire the governorship of a province after their term as consul or praetor. Around the Mediterranean, the financial dealings of publicani and local elites had drastically reduced the amount of profit that could be had from participation in provincial government; new sources of wealth could be found only in recently conquered territories like Cilicia, Syria, and Gaul, though these provinces were often monopolised by military strongmen such as Pompey and Caesar. Thus many senators preferred a legateship under these men to a command in their own province. A majority, however, preferred to remain in Rome, as they not only considered their presence in the city to be vital towards the maintenance of their positions, but their absence for a prolonged period might seriously dent their ability to manage the real and symbolic resources that allowed for the projections of their power. Overall, the papers that form the first section demonstrate how the patterns of money-making amongst the Roman nobility dramatically shifted during the last decades of the Republic. Moving away from Rome, the second section, ‘Money and State Action’, focusses on external Roman projections of money and power, looking specifically at imperialism, army financing, and provincial organisation. Chapters within this section address the various ways by which the Roman state financed the wars it waged. Also discussed are the nature of the Roman expansion and the financial advantages this offered to different groups in society. Bleckmann’s ‘Roman War Finances in the Age of the Punic Wars’ considers how Roman armies in the third century faced increasingly demanding logistical challenges, and how these could not have been met – particularly during the Second Punic

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 14 18/04/16 14:37 introduction 15

War – without the existence of significant entrepreneurship. Both Bleckmann and Serrati, in his contribution ‘The Financing of Conquest: Roman Interaction with Hellenistic Tax Laws’, argue that it was precisely the decentralised, private, and ad hoc organisation of wartime finances which allowed the Romans to withstand the diverse and unexpected developments of this period, and which ultimately explain the success of Rome on the battlefield. Serrati’s piece examines the changes to Roman logistics that were both caused and affected by the conquest of Sicily, and how the provincial grain tithe on the island, the so-called lex Hieronica – which itself demanded the creation of Roman administration in Sicily in order to facilitate collection – was crucial to the development of military supply throughout the empire. Like Bleckmann, Serrati contends that Roman supply methods came of age during the latter half of the third century, and Sicilian grain, combined with the experiences of long distance supply developed on the First Punic War, were major factors in both the defeat of Hannibal, and the subsequent conquests of the eastern and western Mediterranean. Wartime entrepreneurialism and Sicilian grain thus allowed Roman forces to remain in the field for months or even years on end as armies and their movements were no longer tied to the agricultural calendar. How this process affected strategy as well as military financing then forms the core of Rosen- stein’s ‘Bellum se ipsum alet? Financing Republican Imperialism’. This puts forth the argument that although a few rich conquests during the early second century yielded enough spoils to offset the expenditures involved, most of the Republic’s wars in this period operated at a loss, and overall Rome’s acquisition of an empire in these years cost more than it brought in, at least in the short- term. The deficit is even more evident for conquests prior to the Hannibalic War, when funding for military endeavours depended principally on the tribu tum. At this time, regular payment of the tributum in turn depended on a robust class of assidui, the moderately prosperous citizens who shouldered most of the burden of financing the Republic’s wars. Because this class, as a body of taxpayers, was an absolute necessity for war financing, the Roman leadership took pains to foster and sustain them. The Republic’s dependence on the tributum during the third century and beforehand therefore gave the assidui substantial power within the Roman state. The tributum as a war tax was no longer considered necessary after the conquest of Macedonia in 168. This was caused by a sharp increase in state revenues from the conquest of parts of the eastern Mediterranean in the second and third quarters of the second century. Following this change in military financing, the power of the assidui waned and presaged the shift in the relationship between ruling elites and the people of Rome. This, along with the monetisation of Roman politics as discussed the volume’s first section, set the stage for the changing nature of money and power on the Roman political scene leading up to the late Republic. The resulting consequences altered political climate form the basis of the last section, ‘Wealth and Status’, which examines

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 15 18/04/16 14:37 16 h. beck, m. jehne, and j. serrati

the dependency of power and status on actual financial means. Chapters in this section focus on how and by what means money was used to enhance social status and prestige, and how its use was regulated by the elite. Beck’s chapter, ‘Money, Power, and Class Coherence: The Ambitus Laws of the 180s BC’, opens the section by analysing how the composition of the Roman aristocracy changed in the final years of the Hannibalic War and then, almost drastically so, in the post-war years. The outlined shift towards families of the ‘wider aristocracy’ set the stage for the discourse of the day. Overall, the symbolic capital of the old gentes was an immense asset in the competition for office. Yet, from the many laws that governed this competition and from the changing nature of the Roman economy in the early second century, there can be no question that money equally became a driving factor; it too came to work in favour of the old nobility. Cato the Elder is often viewed as being at the forefront of a battle over what constituted true Romanitas during this period; however, upon closer examination, he emerges not as a defender of true Roman culture, but as a major player in a complex negotiation of the aristocracy’s ethos as a ruling elite. Combining Rosenstein’s discussion of the diminishing role of the assidui and Beck’s contentions about the shifting nature of ruling elites at Rome, Lo Cascio focusses on the extent to which the gap between wealthy and poor citizens increased over time in his piece ‘Property Classes, Elite Wealth and Income Dis- tribution in the Late Republic’, concluding that the census rating of the first class, eight or nine times that of the fifth class in the final decades of the third century, was twenty-five times greater by the second half of the second century. Lo Cascio further contends that, as opposed to the standard narrative which tends to place this process later, these changes were accompanied by an enrichment of the rural elite through their agricultural estates, which in the late Republic became market oriented, responding to a substantial demand for wine and oil. Thus both Beck and Lo Cascio chart the accumulation of large fortunes by the ruling elite. The theme is further explored by Pina Polo, who uses Cicero himself to illustrate this process in his chapter ‘Cupiditas Pecuniae: Wealth and Power in Cicero’. Indeed, the orator’s assets probably increased by tenfold in period following his consulship of 63. This is in marked contrast to Cicero the philosopher, whose writings expressed distain for money. Nevertheless, he was more than anything else a man of his time, and as many of the papers in this volume illustrate, gathering riches in the late Republic was ultimately linked with the holding of magistracies and membership of the senate. In many ways, the final two papers bring the volume full circle. Deniaux’s contribution, ‘The Public Generosity of Aediles and Electoral Success for Prae- tors and Consuls’, looks back to ‘Currencies of Power’ and Rosillo-Lopez’s paper as it similarly explores how grain distributions as well as public spectacles were used by elites in order to garner political support from the masses. In this sense, the paper also builds on Beck’s analysis of how assets were used in

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 16 18/04/16 14:37 introduction 17

the charged political milieu of the second and first century Republic. In general, Deniaux charts how the aedileship, which was not compulsory on the cursus honorum throughout much of the period and was often eschewed by nobiles of the upper stratum, might act as a tool of social mobility for non-established elites. To be a successful aedile, one was expected to ensure a supply of public grain and to organise lavish ludi, but this made the office a particularly expensive one to hold. As previously discussed by Edmondson, aediles were usually forced not only to use their own assets for the purpose, but additionally to borrow from friends as well as creditors. Nevertheless, in lieu of a military record, the memory of a successful aedileship could be used – like Edmondson’s gladiators – as symbolic capital, and became particularly useful if the individual sought an upper-level magistracy. Many of the forms of elite wealth discussed thus far – the lavish games, the ownership of gladiators, networks of friends, or the enlargement of estates – were not true assets in the modern sense of the term, but should be viewed, according to Jehne, as ‘instruments’ to be used towards the fulfilment of one’s own political ambitions. His capstone chapter, ‘The Economics of Status in the Late Republic’, outlines the relationship between one’s worth and one’s goals. Since the conservation or enhancement of power was clearly the dominant personal aim behind public life, economic possessions served as a means to an end. Much of the third and early second centuries was spent in the organisation of financial hierarchies, what might be termed as ‘economic management’. Elites organised their relationship with the assidui in order to launch military endeavours, while conquered overseas territories saw the development of administrative structures as well as entrepreneurialism in order to ensure supply during these wars. The breakdown of this connection between the elite and the assidui was caused by a sharp increase in the wealth coming into Rome from the early second century onwards, and despite some early efforts at control by the likes of Cato, this resulted in the monetisation of Roman politics. The latter process in turn meant senators had to manage scarce resources in order to obtain optimal results with a view to their ambitions. In the end, however, few were successful in achieving any sort of balance between their ambitions and the assets required to fulfil them. Once the wealth of organised provinces was put at the disposal of men like Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar, the bar was forever set too high for the rest. Altogether, senators in the late Republic depended too much on chance, but by the first century there were too many aspects of public life that they could not influence by reasonable management of resources. In short, these men did not react well to unpredictability, and so fared even worse than normal as times became increasingly chaotic. This inability to react to unforeseeable events, in essence, the inability to counterbalance money and power, is an integral and understudied factor in the eventual breakdown of the entire Republic.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 17 18/04/16 14:37 Lawyers, Friends, and Money: Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic

David B. Hollander

That a young Octavian could prevail over several more experienced and prominent men in the struggles of the late 40s and 30s is a testament to the forbidding complexity of late Republican power dynamics. 1 Traditional forms of power – nobility, wealth, and high office – might suddenly become positive liabilities in the last century of the Republic. The proscriptions make this abundantly clear: wealth, according to our sources, sealed the fate of many innocent men while their very dignitas hampered the ability of some former magistrates to flee unno- ticed by bounty hunters (App., B.C. 4.29-30, 40, 48). In contrast, other changes happened so gradually that apparently few noticed them until literally slapped in the face. Lucius Veratius, observing that the fine for assault, established in the Twelve Tables, still remained in force, went around slapping men, accompanied by a slave who immediately gave his victims the requisite 25 asses, now rather meager compensation (Gell. 20.1.12-3). While the power of a slap had presumably changed little in four centuries, the value of the Roman as had diminished substantially. In response, the Romans quickly developed a new means of assessing damages. It is the relationship between money and power in the late Republic that will be explored in this essay. Money demand theory, I will suggest, provides a useful lens for understanding Roman power because power, like money, can take many forms and the ‘exchange rates’ are rarely fixed. While Roman historians have identified many varieties of power (political, social, legal, gender, economic), they rarely bother to define ‘power.’ Michael Mann’s definition, that ‘power is the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s environment’, 2 is a good starting point though it implies that only individual actors with specific goals exert power. Even though the focus here is on the power of individuals, it is undoubtedly the case that objects, institutions, and ideas also have power. 3 Working from Mann’s definition, it is easy to generate a lengthy list of powers: official and legal forms such as impe rium, tribunicia potestas, and patria potestas, social forms such as the ability

1 All dates BC unless otherwise indicated. 2 Mann 1986: 6. 3 Harris 2010: 564-78.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 18 18/04/16 14:37 lawyers, friends, and money 19

to call upon the assistance of friends, patrons, and clients, and economic forms such as the possession of coins, land, slaves, or credit. Noble ancestry, dignitas, glory, rhetorical skill, and even pearls were forms of power. 4 Valerius Maximus gives some indication of the power of lies with the story of Sentius Saturninus Vetulo’s escape from the triumvirs’ proscription (Val. Max. 7.3.9). In contrast to other fugitives who hid in sewers, wells or even dung heaps to escape detection (App., B.C. 4.13, 22), Saturninus disguised himself as a praetor. Accompanied by fake lictors, apparitores, and public slaves, he brazenly made his way to Puetoli and then on to safety in Sicily by seizing carriages, ships, and lodgings along the way. 5 The task of cataloguing all the forms of Roman power is theoretically endless and almost certainly thankless, but the most important forms may be grouped into a few big and partially overlapping categories: state-sanctioned power (the authority of magistrates in the courts, assemblies, and with armies; but also knowledge of the law and the ability to navigate legal and political institutions more generally), social power (influence wielded through patronage, friendship, family, and reputation), and economic power (the ability to bribe, corrupt, or create bonds of dependency and gratitude through gifts or loans). Put simply, if imprecisely, power was lawyers, friends, and money. While the categories are fairly straightforward, the relationships between them became destabilized in the late Republic. Some tools increased in importance while others declined. One of the most interesting changes in the balance of power was the vastly increased value of rhetorical ability beginning in the second century. The earliest indication of this phenomenon is in 161 when the senate told the praetor Marcus Pomponius not to admit rhetoricians and philosophers to Rome (Suet., Rhet. 1; cf. also Gell. 15.11.1). A few years later came Carneades’ famous embassy during which the philosopher’s rhetorical ability so disturbed Cato the Elder that he sought to have the visiting Athenian removed from the city as quickly as possible. As Plutarch describes it (Cat. Ma. 22), Cato ‘hated the fervor for oratory flowing into the city, fearing lest the young men… prize the glory of speaking rather than that deriving from deeds and military service.’ Rhetoric was a threat to more traditional sources of political power. By the first century, the change was irreversible. Despite a ban on Latin rhetoricians issued by the censors of 92 (Suet., Rhet. 1), rhetoric became a regular part of an upper class Roman education. Even leaders now mostly associated with military power, such as Caesar and Antony, spent time as young men studying in the east under Greek rhetoricians (Suet., Iul. 4; Plu., Ant. 2). Cicero, obviously, is the clearest example of the powerful potential of rhetorical ability in the late Republic.

4 Cic., Brut. 7 likens oratio to arma. According to Pliny the Elder (Nat. 9.114), people called a pearl ‘a woman’s lictor in public.’ 5 Appian tells a similar story of Pomponius (B.C. 4.45) and also mentions two men who disguised themselves as centurions in order to escape (B.C. 4.46).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 19 18/04/16 14:37 20 david b. hollander

While his military career was unspectacular, 6 he won friends, clients, students, and high office by virtue of his speaking ability. It is not, of course, that rhetoric had been unimportant prior to the late Republic – Cato the Elder himself owed some of his success to his speaking ability 7 – but its potential had vastly increased. This development stems in part from the establishment of quaes tiones perpetuae (permanent criminal courts) in 149 and their expansion by Sulla in 81 (Cic., Brut. 106). The new courts provided an important venue for speakers who were not yet magistrates to display their abilities in public. 8 Cicero began his career in 76 before just such a court speaking in defense of Sextus Roscius (Cic., S. Rosc. 1). Another important shift in the balance of power, roughly contemporary with the rise of rhetoric, was the growing importance of the plebeian tribunes in Roman politics. The Gracchi provide the most notable example of this; their reform efforts, made possible by the tribunes’ legislative powers, are too well- known to require any elaboration here. Occasionally forgotten, however, is the fact that the trend started earlier. Tribunes jailed the consuls of 151, L. Licinius Lucullus and A. Postumius Albinus, for their harsh behavior in levying troops for a war in Spain (Liv., Per. 48). C. Curiatius did the same thing to the consuls of 138 (Liv., Per. 55; Cic., Leg. 3.20). Even the violent deaths of the Gracchi brothers did not deter later tribunes from wielding the full power of the tribunate. These tribunes include L. Appuleius Saturninus (103 and 100), C. Servilius Glaucia (101), M. Livius Drusus (91), and P. Sulpicius Rufus (88) – all of whom died violently. Sulla severely weakened the authority of the tribunes, however, after the office’s restoration during the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70, tribunes continued to play a large and highly disruptive role in Republican politics down to the civil wars of the 40s. Publius Clodius is the most famous example from the later period. Of course, the laws passed by these and other tribunes further disrupted other aspects of the balance of power by redistributing land, changing the composition of juries, and so forth. Closely connected with the new prominence of tribunes in Republican politics was the increased willingness of politicians to resort to violence to achieve their aims. Here too there are many well-known examples. In addition to the murdered tribunes, there are the Sullan and Triumviral proscriptions, and, by the 60s, the frequent use of gangs – partially composed of gladiators – to gain political advantage or simply provide protection. 9 Lintott helpfully catalogues almost four dozen incidents of violence, nearly all from the last century of the

6 Beard 2009: 197 may be right to accuse critics of never treating Cicero’s military career seriously but his accomplishments are hardly impressive in comparison to many of his peers. 7 Plu., Cat. Ma. 1.3; cf. Deniaux 2006: 408. 8 David 2006: 427. 9 Ville 1981: 291-3.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 20 18/04/16 14:37 lawyers, friends, and money 21

Republic. 10 Though he acknowledges that ‘Roman tradition tolerated and even encouraged violence in political and private disputes’ 11 and that the Romans ‘considered it an essential constituent of libertas that a man should be allowed to use force in his personal interest to secure what he believed to be his due’, 12 Lintott nevertheless sees a ‘surge of violence in the late Republic’ which the state was unable to effectively counter. 13 Even the Roman patron-client system seems to have lost some of its force in the late Republic, although here the evidence is less clear-cut. In 139 the Lex Gabinia established the secret ballot for elections and three subsequent laws extended it to trials and legislation by 107 B.C. 14 As Cicero (Leg. 3.33-5) makes clear, the Roman nobility regarded these laws as depriving them of their influence over the people, in other words preventing them from ensuring that their clients supported them politically. 15 As tribune of the plebs, a young Gaius Marius also passed a law designed to limit upper-class influence during the voting process and did so in part by threatening to imprison a consul (Plu., Mar. 4). However, Erich Gruen has cast strong doubt upon whether these measures actually changed anything. He points out that ‘[w]ritten ballots gave the electorate a sense of libertas, but the choices available to them were generally men of the same established families who had run the state for many generations.’ 16 Peter O’Neill makes a similar point in a discussion of informal popular gatherings (circuli) at Rome, observing that the Roman elite were able ‘to maintain an ideology that stressed the theoretical power of the populus Romanus while allowing the people only a restricted role in constitutional politics.’ 17 Another incident from early in the career of Gaius Marius suggests a different sort of challenge to the established patron-client relationship. At a trial, Gaius Herennius sought to avoid testifying against Marius, appealing to the law against the practice of patrons testifying against clients. Marius responded by denying that he was still a client of Herennius since he had been elected to office. Plutarch claims (Mar. 5), however, that Marius was wrong and that only curule offices dissolved prior bonds of patronage. Marius’ subsequent relationship with Q. Caecilius Metellus as well as Sulla’s later conflict with Marius suggest at the very least that patronage relationships were no match for political ambition. There is plenty of evidence indicating that patron-client relationships

10 Lintott 1968: Appendix A. 11 Id. 4. 12 Id. 204. 13 Id. 4. 14 The three subsequent laws were the lex Cassia of 137 (for the extortion court), lex Papiria of 131 (for legislation), and lex Coelia of 107 (for treason cases). 15 Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 70; Deniaux 2006: 413. 16 Gruen 1991: 261. For further discussion of this issue cf. Yakobson 1995: 426-42. 17 O’Neill 2003: 163.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 21 18/04/16 14:37 22 david b. hollander

remained very important in the late Republic 18 but, as Wallace-Hadrill suggests, a number of factors, most notably ‘the massive advance of bribery… struck at the heart of the traditional patronage system.’ 19 Bribery brings us finally to the subject of money. There was a dramatic increase in the importance of money in Roman politics and society in the late Republic. An array of evidence attests to this development but efforts to combat luxury and corruption are representative of the broader trend. Starting in the early second century, there seems to be a growing concern with conspicuous consumption, particularly at banquets. In 182, two years after Cato the Elder’s censorship, there appeared the first in a series of sumptuary laws: the lex Orchia which limited the number of guests at banquets. 20 The lex Fannia of 161 limited what could be spent on a banquet and banned certain foods. 21 The lex Didia of 143 applied the rules of the lex Fannia to Italy as a whole and punished guests as well as hosts for excesses (Macr., Sat. 3.17.6). Sumptuous banquets were a way to forge political alliances and put the guests in one’s debt. The lex Antia of 71 illustrates this function since the law banned magistrates from attending banquets (Gell. 2.24.13; Macr., Sat. 3.17.13). As Emanuela Zanda puts it, ‘Sumptuary laws are the weapons of self-defense used by the Roman ruling class to protect the base of its own power.’ 22 Related to these sumptuary laws were the anti-corruption measures which began in 181 with the lex Cornelia Baebia de ambitu (Liv. 40.19) and continued down to the end of the Republic. 23 Indirectly, through banquets, or directly, through various forms of bribery, ambitious Romans were using money to increase their social and political clout. It is not that money had been considered an unimportant form of power prior to the second century but that the immense wealth amassed by the Romans in the late Republic changed the scale on which it operated. Given the shifting balance of powers, 24 it is hardly surprising that some Romans badly miscalculated in trying to protect their interests. Gaius Verres’ encounter with Cicero provides one illustration of this sort of miscalculation. When Cicero prosecuted him for extortion in 70, Verres was a successful

18 pompey, for example, raised an army from his clients in the 80s (Plu., Pomp. 6; App., B.C. 1.80). Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus drew on his coloni to man ships in 49 (Caes., Civ. 1.34). 19 Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 71. 20 Macr., Sat. 3.17.2. I follow Zanda 2011: 51, regarding the laws passed during the Second Punic War as ‘wartime measures’ rather than ‘sumptuary laws in a strict sense.’ 21 Gell. 2.24.1; Plin., Nat. 10.71.1; Macr., Sat. 3.17. 22 Zanda 2011: 70. Censors also occasionally targeted the same kinds of excess. 23 Later ambitus (bribery) laws include the lex Cornelia Fuluia (159 B.C.), lex Cor nelia (81), lex Aurelia (70), lex Calpurnia (67), lex Tullia (63), lex Licinia de sodaliciis (55), and lex Pompeia (52). Cf. Lintott 1990: 1-16; Rosillo-López 2010: 70-4. 24 Many other examples could be added to the changes discussed here, such as the effect of the changing composition of the Roman electorate in the period after the Social War.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 22 18/04/16 14:37 lawyers, friends, and money 23

veteran of nearly fifteen years of Roman power struggles. Despite initially siding with the Marians in the civil war of the 80s, he had gone over to Sulla and apparently thrived under the new regime, gaining a praetorship in 74 and serving as governor of Sicily for three years. 25 According to Cicero (Verr. 1.40), Verres frequently declared to many listeners in Sicily that he sought money not just for himself but had the revenue of his tenure divided into three portions: one year’s worth, if he was fortunate, for himself; another year’s for his patron and defenders; and a third portion, the largest, for his judges. This pecunia, in addition to a powerful friend (hominem potentem) would, Verres believed, protect him. Furthermore, Verres had attempted to manipulate the legal system so that he could stand trial under the most favorable circumstances possible. 26 In other words, Verres’ hope lay in lawyers, friends, and money. But there was one more dimension to Verres’ defense: statues. He had forced the Sicilians to set up many honorific statues; ‘his statues are everywhere’, Cicero says (Verr. 2.2.154). Verres knew that these statues would cast doubt on any accusations that he had extorted money from the Sicilians (Cic., Verr. 2.2.168). Why would they honor him if he had mistreated them? 27 However, in this instance, all these forms of power were no match for Cicero’s rhetoric. 28 Verres fled during the trial, living out the rest of his life in exile in Massalia. 29 Cicero himself would experience many defeats in the last decades of the Republic, but few are as revealing with respect to power dynamics as his encoun- ters with Sextus Cloelius, a somewhat obscure figure, often described (if mentioned at all) as the leader of Publius Clodius’ gang. 30 In this capacity, Cloelius was responsible for a considerable amount of violence but that is where the resemblance to the stereotypical modern gang leader ends. He was also a scriba, an official scribe (Asc., Mil. 33.6); he wrote laws passed by Clodius (Cic., Dom. 83); briefly administered Rome’s grain supply (Cic., Dom. 25); and once caught and returned to Rome a fugitive Armenian prince (Asc., Mil. 47.12-26). Cloelius was neither a senator nor an equestrian yet he wielded considerable power. 31 And he wielded it without (apparently) great wealth. This clearly frustrated Cicero, our main source for Cloelius’ activities. He expresses his frustration in a

25 Covino 2012: 6968. 26 This involved delaying the trial and finding a more sympathetic prosecutor. Cf. e.g., Plu., Cic. 7; Cic., Caec. 29; id. Verr. 1.31. 27 Cf. Tanner 2000: 32-3, 48. 28 plutarch, it is true, claims Cicero won by not speaking (Cic. 7), but this remark simply refers to the fact that Cicero, using a procedural ploy, opted against beginning his prosecution with a long speech. 29 According to Pliny the Elder (Nat. 34.6), Antony had Verres killed in the proscriptions of 43 in order to acquire his Corinthian bronze. 30 On the ‘rediscovery’ of Sex. Cloelius cf. Shackleton-Bailey 1960: 41-2; id. 1981: 383. For doubts, cf. Flambard 1978: 235-45. 31 Damon 1992: 227-50, discusses Cloelius’ status and collects all the references to him. On the ordo scribarum, cf. Purcell 1983: 125-73.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 23 18/04/16 14:37 24 david b. hollander

speech in defense of Caelius, delivered in 56. According to Cicero, Cloelius had burnt down a temple, set fire to the census and other public documents, destroyed Cicero’s own house, set fire to his brother’s house, and tried to get a gang of slaves to burn down the entire city. But Cloelius was acquitted! Cicero (Cael. 78) cannot understand how this is possible or at least thinks it completely unfair that Cloelius wields such power despite being, as he puts it, ‘without money, without credit, without hope, without home and without resources’ (sine re, sine fide, sine spe, sine sede, sine fortunis). It is tempting to dismiss Cloelius as merely an agent of Clodius and no doubt that relationship was of great importance, but Cloelius continued to wield power after Clodius’ death. In 52 B.C., following Clodius’ murder on the Appian Way, Cloelius, at the head of an angry crowd, took Clodius’ body and cremated it in the Senate house, burning down the building in the process along with a nearby basilica (Cic., Mil. 33; Asc., Mil. 33.5-9). This, finally, gets Cloelius convicted and exiled (Asc., Mil. 55-6). But he returned to annoy Cicero once more in the 40s, recalled thanks to Marc Antony. We last hear of him in October of 44; Cicero thinks that he is up to something, but is not sure (Att. 15.13.3). Though much remains uncertain about Cloelius, his successes indicate that someone could wield great power without great wealth. It is likely that this was due in part to his connection with Rome’s collegia whose political activity had led to a crackdown in 64. 32 On 1 January 58, Cloelius presided over the ludi Compitalicii, a job previously held by magistri collegiorum. 33 Clodius restored the collegia shortly thereafter. The careers of Verres and Cloelius show that, while money certainly was an expected form of power, it was not an essential one. Cicero is able to overcome Verres’ money, but is surprised that Cloelius manages to protect himself without great wealth. In Cicero’s discussion of these men, he imagines them wielding portfolios of power, composed of a range of assets (money, patrons, fides, etc.). Verres has lawyers, friends, money, and statues while Cloelius should have money, a house, and credit. Cicero seems to conceptualize power in much the same way that economists think about the demand for money. Demand theory conceives of money as simply one form of wealth an individual might choose from a portfolio of assets; in response to actual needs as well as potential risks and rewards (called transactions, precautionary, and speculative motives), an individual adjusts his or her holdings, converting – with attendant transaction costs – assets into one another in order to achieve financial goals. 34

32 Asc., Pis. 7.9-11. Despite Cicero’s claim (Pis. 9) that the members of these professional associations were the city’s dregs and slaves, the collegiati, while not wealthy, must have been quite well off compared to the urban poor. 33 Cic., Pis. 8; Asc., Pis. 7.16-21. Clodius’ law revoking the ban on (some) collegia had not yet been passed and it is not clear what, if anything, Cloelius was a magister of at this point. For discussion of Cloelius’ status, cf. Damon 1992: 232 n. 16. For the collegia ban, cf. Salerno 1984: 615-31. 34 Serletis 2001: 79. Cf. also Hollander 2008: 122-5.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 24 18/04/16 14:37 lawyers, friends, and money 25

Verres, one might say, trades some of the actual power of his governorship for ‘precautionary’ forms of power: money to bribe judges and statues to intimidate would-be prosecutors. No one better illustrates the advantages of widely diversified holdings of power than Julius Caesar. During Sulla’s proscriptions he remained safe by using money to bribe the bounty hunters while friends secured a pardon. 35 Caesar’s rhetorical ability also served him well early on, whether it was in court prosecuting – unsuccessfully but nevertheless impressively – Dolabella in 77, or on the rostra eulogizing Julia and Cornelia in 67. 36 Even statues may have played an important role: Plutarch (Caes. 5.2, 6.1-2) reports that Caesar, as a quaestor and aedile, used εἰκόνες of Gaius Marius to garner popular support. But it is the role of money most of all in his ‘portfolio’ that shows how inno- vative Caesar was in amassing power. Caesar borrowed heavily in the early stages of his career and spent the money on gladiators, banquets, and other spectacles, tools of power and the means of acquiring more. Of the young, heavily indebted Caesar, Plutarch comments (Caes. 5.8-9) that ‘with his lavish expenditures, he appeared to be exchanging a lot of money for an ephemeral and trifling glory, but was really buying the greatest things for a small price.’ In other words, Caesar speculated in power, using credit to buy the esteem and gratitude of the people, things offering a long-term ‘growth potential’ in power. If economics offers a helpful lens with which to observe Roman power dynamics, it is also salutary for economic historians to take account of money’s important role in the realm of power. The demand for coins and other forms of money was based not only upon the ability it gave one to purchase goods and services, but also on the security it could provide. In the modern western world of substantial police forces, clearly defined rights and state-subsidized assistance such as public defenders, it is easy to overlook the vulnerability of the average Roman to violence. When we speculate about Roman demand for coinage, we need to consider the demand for security. The disruption of traditional forms of power in the late Republic undoubtedly promoted monetization. Money may have failed Gaius Verres but it served many other Romans quite well and was unlikely to let you down as spectacularly as Caesar’s reliance on the power of gratitude ultimately did him. Judging from the sheer number of anecdotes preserved, proscription tales were quite popular under the Empire, a kind of ‘zombie apocalypse’ genre for the Roman reading public. What does one do when one’s wife, slaves, friends, and acquaintances suddenly become potential murderers and informers? Many Romans must have observed the utility of portable, impersonal cash under those circumstances.

35 Suet., Iul.1.2; Plu., Caes. 1.6-7, gives a slightly different version of events. 36 Suetonius (Iul. 55) says that after the Dolabella prosecution, Caesar was considered one of the best advocates. Cf. also Plu., Caes. 4.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 25 18/04/16 14:37 Cash Is King: the Monetization of Politics in the Late Republic

Cristina Rosillo-López 1

Attempting to explain some puzzling aspects of the Roman society to his Greek readers, Plutarch devoted one of his Roman Questions to elections: “Why was it the custom for those canvassing for office to do so in the toga without the tunic, as Cato has recorded?” His first suggestion was the following answer: “Was it in order that they might not carry money in the folds of their tunic and give bribes?” 2 Plutarch was describing not only a Roman practice, but also one that had occurred in the Greek states: the use of money in politics. The following study analyses its introduction into Roman politics and its economic and social implications for both the elite and the plebs. Was the process of monetization of politics beneficial or prejudicial to the Roman elite and the plebs? This study does not take a negative view of the use of money in politics: that is something that ought rather to be left to moralists. There is never such a thing as a virtuous past, and corruption was a fact of life in the Late Roman Republic. This analysis does not deal with the use of bribes in politics, or their actual impact on the results of elections. 3 The following pages centre exclusively on the evolution and consequences of the introduction of money into politics. Of course, the Roman administration also became dependent on cash, especially for policies such as the distribution of grain or land reform.

1. The Process of the Monetization of Politics

The appearance of coinage in Rome can be dated from the 4th century B.C. In this sense, Rome was not in the avant-garde of Italy, since the Greek colonies of the South had already been using coins since the 6th century B.C. 4 The pub-

1 This research has been financed by the projects ‘Las clientelas provinciales en el Occidente del Imperio romano’, (HAR2010-16449), through the Ministerio de Educa ción y Ciencia and “Opinión pública y comunicación política en la República Romana (siglos II-I a de C.)” (HAR2013-43496-P) through the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Spain, 2 Plu., Q.R. 49. 3 On the impact of bribes in elections in Rome see Lintott 1990; Jehne 1995. 4 Howgego 1995:7, 10.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 26 18/04/16 14:37 cash is king 27

lic needs of the state have been proposed as the main reason for the development of coinage, since it was necessary to find an easy way to pay for official expenditure. Other scholars have suggested that coinage was a symbol of civic pride and also a necessity for commercial exchange. 5 Nevertheless, monetization did not necessarily imply the use of coinage. Objects with a quantifiable and negotiable value could be used, such as bullion, cattle, or land. 6 For a time, even coins were treated as bullion, as simply a medium of exchange. 7 In fact, the Roman State minted large quantities of money in the 3rd century B.C., when the society was not monetized at all; this would support the theory that the development of coinage was a consequence of the necessities of the state. 8 The appearance of coinage, however, did not ensure monetization. The development of monetary institutions and a central authority to enforce laws to control weight, measures, and regulations were indispensable in enabling the evolution of coinage. 9 In Rome, a mint was established near the temple of Juno Moneta in the third century B.C. 10 The stimuli for monetization in Rome, especially after the Second Punic War, consisted of three factors: first of all, army pay, since soldiers became used to coins and veterans continued this habit back home or in the territories allotted to them; secondly, the growth of villas, which pushed for cash-crop productions with commercial purposes, claiming monetary rents; thirdly, an increase in financial activity. 11 During the second century B.C., Roman economy became monetized: between 140 and 100 B.C., minted coinage increased by 500%. 12 If monetization of the state was voluntary and directed from the top, monetization of politics was not; it was left in the hands of those who used money as a medium. However, monetization was not a straightforward evolution, since pre-monetary uses in politics were attested: distributions of grain or wine had been used as a medium of exchange since the second century B.C., before coinage entered politics. 13 Money was introduced into politics in two main ways: as a distribution by the state, and as bribes and extortion, related to corruption. The precondition, of course, was the necessary development of monetization at all levels of society. When money became a medium of exchange for everyday transactions, even

5 Martin 1996: 258-261; cf. a bibliographical essay on the origins of coinage in Von Reden 2002: 141-174, esp. 152-157. 6 Von Reden 1992: 160. 7 Von Reden 2010: 24-25. 8 Von Reden 2010: 51. 9 Von Reden 2010: 18-19. 10 Cf. LTUR S.v. Iuno Moneta, Aedes. Cf. Mattingly 1982: 9-46; Woytek 2012. 11 Hollander 2005: 229-240; Andreau 1999b; Von Reden 2010: 52-55. 12 Crawford 1974 698ff; Hopkins 1980: 109-111; Howgego 1992: 13; Nicolet 1994: 632. 13 Rosillo-López 2010a: 38-48.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 27 18/04/16 14:37 28 cristina rosillo-lópez

among the lower levels of society, it could be used in politics. Elections were becoming more competitive every year and votes were becoming ever more coveted. 14 Thus, senators had to woo a greater number of citizens, including those of lower status. As Martin Jehne points out in this volume, status has to be proved over and over again, and elections were key moments in this process. Those who lacked the economic resources for status-enhancing expenditure stood no serious chance of political success. The progressive monetization of Roman politics in relation to corruption is made visible through the laws that were intended to control it. Provincial extortion came first: in 171 B.C., several Roman magistrates were accused by an embassy of Hispanic communities of having accepted money, probably in local coins. 15 The accusation of the extortion of provincials was partly named as pecu nia capta, as mentioned in the lex Acilia repetundarum of 122 B.C.: “Everything taken by force, captured, gathered, got or embezzled”. 16 Roman politics became monetized later, by the end of the second century B.C. The scandal that erupted in 142 B.C. marks the starting point for the distribution of money in trials. Praetor L. Hostilius Tubulus “accepted money openly” 17; and his name became a synonym for corruption for centuries. 18 Appian named the juries of the courts of 122 B.C. dedôrodokêkotes, those who accepted bribes. 19 Finally came electoral corruption. During the elections to the consulship of 115 B.C., the loser, P. Rutilius Rufus, was accused by the winner, M. Aemilius Scaurus, of ambitus or electoral corruption. During the process, Rutilius’ accounts books were produced in order for certain abbreviations in them to be discussed, especially that of A.F.P.R. According to the accuser, it stood for Actum Fide P. Rutili, referring to money or debts used during the elections. 20 Even if Scaurus’ interpretation was faulty, by this period it was plausible to a judge in court that someone had distributed money during canvassing or on the day of the election. Money was also attested in the habitual workings of the administration. Roman public contracts were among the most lucrative businesses, which were awarded by the state to the highest bidder. 21 Valerius Flaccus was accused of having charged fifty talents for approving a tax farming contract. 22 Thus, at least by the decades of the 120s to the 110s Roman politics were definitely monetized. Money in politics had risen to compete with social

14 Lintott 1990: 1-16; Yakobson 1999; Rosillo-López 2010a: 49-86. 15 Liv. 43.2ff; Cf. Rosillo-López 2010a: 102-103; 117-118. 16 Lex Acilia repetundarum, edition Crawford, Roman Statutes (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1996), l. 3: ablatum captum coactum conciliatum aversum siet. 17 Cic., Fin. 2.54: pecunias cepit aperte. 18 Gell., Hist. 2.7.20 ; cf. Rosillo-López 2010a: 164-165. 19 App., B.C. 1.22. 20 Cic., Or. 2.280. 21 Cf. Rosillo-López, 2003: 57-94. 22 Cic., Flacc. 90-93.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 28 18/04/16 14:37 cash is king 29

connections. Seneca summarized Cicero’s letters by stating that they discussed how people canvassed for the consulship in the last years of the Republic. There were two methods: influence (that of Caesar or Pompey); or the candidate’s own money (arca). 23 The monetization of politics also entered into language. In a satire, Varro stated that elections had really become a market. 24 Cicero also used this simile in his Philippics to denigrate Mark Antony’s politics: thus, he declared that totius rei publicae nundinae. 25 The jurist Ulpian used nundinae (in the sense of “commercial transaction”) to speak about bribery. 26 This simile was on its way to becoming a topos. Money supply was a prerequisite for effective monetization. Hopkins proposed a money stock for the Republic between 1,600-2000 million sesterces. 27 Verboven has suggested a higher figure, of 4,000-6,000 million sesterces. 28 Hopkins estimated a rise in the money supply from 157 to 50 B.C., but with stable prices. Thus, either the velocity of money decreased or production increased. 29 He argued that the velocity diminished because, among other reasons, the state had large reserves in the Treasury, and so did private individuals and bankers. 30 Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that, in the case of individuals, these reserves were not always easily converted into money. The treasure chest of wealthy Romans was not only composed of coins, but also of loans and properties. In the turbulent moments of the summer of 44 B.C., Cicero saw his mobility restrained because of a lack of cash at home. 31 In general, cash flow problems were recurrent in antiquity, due to fluctuation in the coin supply. 32 The Roman government had an active monetary policy to achieve a sufficient money supply. 33 Money supply in Rome had been scarce in the 60s, but had recovered slightly by the 50s. 34 Ready money was not always available for the elite, since it was usually invested in business activities, loans, land, or buildings, which could be difficult to turn into cash at short notice. Hoarding rarely occurred. In order to obtain cash, the Roman political elite preferred to tap into informal lines of credit, linked to the duties of amicitia, which offered

23 Sen., Ep. 118.2. 24 Varr., Sat. Men. Sexagessis 492. 25 Cic., Phil. 5.4.11.. 26 Ulp., dig. 12.2.3.2; cf. de Ligt 1993: 53, n. 70. 27 Hopkins 2002. Cf. For methodological questions and a thorough review on the issue of quantification, cf. de Callataÿ 2011: 7-29. 28 Check explanations for the figure in Verboven 2009: 99, n. 30; Verboven 2003: 49-68. More estimations in Verboven 1997: 44-47; 65-67. 29 Hopkins 1980. 30 Hopkins 1980: 109-110. 31 Cic., Att. 15.15.4. 32 Von Reden 2010: 26. 33 Lo Cascio 1981: 76-86, pace Crawford 1970: 40-46. 34 Verboven 1997: 50-51.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 29 18/04/16 14:37 30 cristina rosillo-lópez

better financial conditions. 35 When this resource failed, they resorted to professional financiers. 36 The need for cash was so vital that in one case, so as to prevent corruption, elections were called so quickly that candidates did not have time to gather the means. 37 Thus, monetization of politics played an important role, first of all in financial life. Senators and candidates required cash, since they needed to finance their way into and throughout politics. Although it was mainly cash that was used in politics, non-monetary means were still employed, creating new necessities that had to be fulfilled by the economy, such as greater supplies of food and wine for banquets or beasts for the games. Any well-connected senator would try to press his networks to get most of these requirements in kind for free. Food could also be obtained from the elite’s real estates in Italy. Thus, Caelius asked Cicero repeatedly for wild animals from Cilicia, a request with which the latter did not comply. 38 Those animals had to be shipped and kept until they could be shown in the arena, so business developed around this enterprise. This was well established up to a point that, at an unknown moment, the Roman state decreed that quaestors were exempt from paying portorium duties for the beasts for their games. 39 Never- theless, not all senators and candidates enjoyed such networks, so probably had to resort to the market. Varro complained about the increase in the price of food and the sheer quantities of it being sold, especially for banquets. 40

2. The Monetization of Political Relationships

The monetization of elite relationships was usually restricted to the exchange of non-coined forms of money, preferably loans at low interest rates, or payment of debts. 41 Crassus developed a complex network based on the money he had lent to other politicians, who would rise to his rescue when he needed their support, such as when he was accused of being part of the Catilinarian conspiracy. 42 He also paid the debts of others. Caesar later emulated these methods. 43 When Caelius was loaded with debts, Caesar offered to lend him money, at low interest rates and with more favourable conditions, and extended the same to

35 Cf. Verboven 2002. 36 Cf. Andreau 1978: 47-62; Andreau 1999b: 2-28. 37 Cic., Planc. 49. 38 Cic., Fam. 2.11.2; 8.2.2; 8.4.5. It was an obligation between friends, cf. Sen., Ben. 1.12.3. 39 Symm., Ep. 5.62. 40 Varr., R. 3.2.16. Not only the amount of banquets increased, but also the quantities offered at them: Varr., R. 3.2.15; 3.5.8; 3.6.6; Plin., Nat. 9.171. 41 Cic., Off. 2.55. 42 Sall., Cat. 48.5. 43 Cf. e.g. Dio 40.63.4.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 30 18/04/16 14:37 cash is king 31

other senators in similar situation. 44 L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50) received financial help from Caesar, who gave him 1500 talents; despite having been his enemy, Paullus refrained from attacking him further. 45 These loans often became gifts, since payment in cash was not always expected or preferred. It has been argued that the direct offer of money within the elite, without it being coated in layers of amicitia, was still frowned upon during the Late Republic. 46 After the civil war, Caesar used magistracies as a way to recom- pense those who had supported him during the conflict, but also those whom he had forgiven and who needed to be drawn closer to him. 47 Nevertheless, it was impossible for him to reward all his allies and new supporters with such coveted prizes. 48 Thus, facing the impossibility of compensating Minucius Basilus with the government of a province, he sent him a sack of money. 49 Governors usually enriched themselves in provinces, so Caesar was sending him part of the proceeds that he would have gained, without the corresponding honour. This insult could explain the presence of Basilus among the conspirators. 50 However, this view should be revised. Most dealings with money in politics among the elite were linked to friendship ties, so it was necessary to find ways of dealing with money that did not involve coinage. This could not only be due to a resistance to the monetization of politics. Although various laws forbade giving cash or rewards in kind to voters under certain circumstances, there were no similar rules about payments between members of the elite. Rewards in kind avoided the exchange of cumbersome money. An exchange of debts, their payment by a third person (perhaps directly, or through a debt transfer), or help in finding money (as Crassus may have offered during the trial against Clodius for the Bona Dea affair), were easier ways to deal with the issue. It was not a question of not leaving traces that could be identified in case of a trial. On the contrary, loans and debt transfers were usually carefully entered into account books; any mention within their pages could be taken as proof in court. For instance, during the trial, Cicero had at his disposal the account books of both Verres and his father. 51 The reticence to exchange money was not, therefore, not linked to any particular social attitude or sense of propriety. It was a matter of expediency. As Von Reden has pointed out, these cashless operations increased money supply

44 Dio 40.63.4. 45 Cic., Fam. 8.10.3; App., B.C. 2.26 ; Plu., Caes. 29.3; Pomp. 58.1; Suet., Iul. 29.1; Dio 40.63.2. 46 Cf. Rosillo-López 2010a: 20-21. 47 Cic., Off. 2.55. 48 Storch 1995: 45-52 has proposed that the deprivation of magistracies was one of the motives behind the tyrannicides. 49 Dio 43.47.5. 50 App., B.C. 2. 113; Oros. 6.18.7. 51 Cic., Verr. 1.60.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 31 18/04/16 14:37 32 cristina rosillo-lópez

and the use of money. 52 Furthermore, wealth in Rome was usually described in terms of land and loans, rather than cash. Senators were commonly involved in moneylending, but debts also extended to modest people. 53 In fact, debts were also noted in the census as part of a citizen’s wealth. 54 It seems that cash was not the only preferred medium of exchange of the elite. 55 There was a thriving market for debts in Rome, in which payments were carried out through debts and loans. 56 Harris has even suggested that the decrease of silver coinage in the 70s B.C. due to a reduction in minting was probably related to the fact that a large number of transactions were carried out by means of documents. 57 Why, then, was Basilus angered? Depending on how much he could have squeezed provincials, he would have gained more money in a province than by taking the amount offered by Caesar. Even without resorting to violence to receive payments, the profits in the provinces were exponentially enormous, with the near certainty that, in the case of a breach of the lex Iulia de repetundis, Caesar would not push for the prosecution of a trusted ally. Furthermore, a provincial government would have allowed him to develop a set of networks in Rome and within the province, and connections with prospective clientela. Finally, a magistracy was a coveted honour in the Roman Republic, and would increase his status and that of his family. These opportunities could not be bought with money.

3. The Consequences of Monetization for the Citizens of Rome

What were the consequences of the monetization of politics for the plebs? In fact, corruption was partly beneficial for them, since they took a share in the profits of provincial corruption or obtained part of the wealth of the elite, both distributed during elections to win their votes. Nevertheless, the negative consequences of this process of monetization should not be overlooked. The monetization of politics, rather than the use of gifts in kind, put pressure on the money supply. One of the possible limitations of the demand for coinage, the creation of more sophisticated financial practices, 58 did not apply to money in politics, in which from the last quarter of the second century B.C. onwards and more progressively, cash was king. The new financial instruments, such as

52 Von Reden 2010: 94-95, 98 (on the description of land and debts). Harris has revised this statement since, in his opinion, loans from people of modest mean were very difficult and costly to recover, and thus, they were not used to make payments; cf. Harris 2008: 191; more on this debate in Lo Cascio 2011. 53 Cf. Harris 2008:190-191. 54 Rosillo-López 2007: 161-175. 55 Cf. Harris 2006: 1-24; Harris 2008: 184ff. 56 Cf. Cic., Att. 12.31.2; Harris 2008: 193. 57 Harris 2008: 197-199. 58 Hollander 2008: 132-134.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 32 18/04/16 14:37 cash is king 33

the permutatio, could not be used in politics. Bribes were most likely petty sums, which could be distributed with ease. It is also understandable that the voters preferred their cash in hand. Furthermore, the credit systems of the elite and plebs were parallel, and did not interact with one other. That meant that there was rarely any possibility, for instance, of cancelling the debts of the voters one wanted to bribe, or of making them a loan. Credits, loans, and debts could not be used to bribe poorer citizens, so cash had to be employed. 59 This process put pressure on the supply of money needed in a healthy economy. Suddenly, millions of denarii were changing hands, either physically or in loans, increasing the regular velocity of circulation. 60 Monetization of politics, and especially electoral corruption, fluctuated over the years. Sources attest to an increase in the first century B.C., boosted by competition, greater access to wealth in foreign lands (especially in the form of provincial corruption), and probably a wider demand for money as a tool for electoral corruption. 61 All these variables meant that corruption in a particular year could be exceptional, but more conventional at other times. The election for the consulship of 59 B.C., for instance, was fiercely competitive, with Caesar and Bibulus, supported by the optimates, canvassing for the post. 62 But it was another year, 54 B.C., which recorded extraordinary competition between not two, but four very generous candidates. Furthermore, the unusual situation prompted Cicero to comment extensively on the elections, providing us with the tools necessary for analysing them. The four candidates of 54 B.C. were engaged in furious competition. Accord- ing to Cicero, their chances were particularly well balanced: “I have never seen candidates so evenly matched”. 63 Faced with this situation, the contenders resorted to gifts of money: “none of them stands out: money levels all their ranks”. 64 Hearsay suggested that ten million sesterces had been offered to the centuria praerogatiua, which voted first and whose vote was always taken heavily into account. 65 These movements of money were not restricted to the consular elections: at the request of the candidates for the tribunate of the plebs, Cato the Younger set himself up as an arbiter of the fairness of the elections and requested half a million sesterces from every candidate, to be deposited with him as a guarantee of their fair and law-abiding behaviour. The candidates com- plied. 66

59 On debt and credit as a way of creating relationships, cf. Graeber 2011. 60 Cf. Verboven 1997: 42, who has pointed out that velocity of circulation should not be assumed to be constant. 61 Rosillo-López 2010a: 81-85. 62 Suet., Iul. 19.2. 63 Cic., Att. 4.16.6: numquam ego uidi tam paris candidatos. 64 Cic., Att. 4.15.7: pecuniam omnium dignitatem exaquat. 65 Cic., Q. Fr. 2.15.4. 66 Cic., Q. Fr. 2.15; Att. 4.15.7.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 33 18/04/16 14:37 34 cristina rosillo-lópez

The velocity of the circulation of money increased, especially since the candidates needed cash to bribe at least non-elite citizens. Liquidity was necessary during the elections since, unlike judicial corruption, electoral corruption depended upon bribing a large number of people with small amounts of money. 67 Thus, the monthly interest rate doubled in a short time, passing from 4 to 8% in just twelve days. 68 The Romans were aware of the mechanisms that made interest rates go up when there was a short supply of credit and a high demand for it. 69 On the first of October, Cicero told Atticus that these negotia, movements of money, would not last much longer. 70 He was wrong. This state of affairs continued, as Cicero mentioned gifts of money to the people and even offers to the consuls from July until the end of November (or beginning of December) 54, when the elections were finally held. The comitia were delayed many times, which furthered competition and the delivery of more money. Even on the day of the voting, money was distributed openly. 71 Thus, the increase in the velocity of circulation was based on three aspects: 1) the bribes distributed; 2) the loans contracted by the candidates; 3) the expenditure carried out with the money that was distributed. As Nicolet’s seminal article pointed out, the Romans had an understanding of the implications of the law of Bodin, which established a direct relationship between the mass of money and the price level. 72 The modern Fisher identity has focused on the velocity of circulation of the money (V) and its relationship with money supply (M), on one side, and prices (P) and transactions (T) on the other. Thus, the equation MV=PT helps in understanding that a change in the money supply entails a change in prices. The concept of velocity of circulation, and its link to the economic situation, has been hotly debated. 73 Mayhew, for instance, has proposed that a high velocity of circulation may be more closely related to economic problems than to a healthy state of the economy. 74 In fact, scarce money is related to an increase in the velocity of circulation, at least up

67 For the relationship between corruption and liquid assets, cf. Rosillo-López 2010a: 207-216. 68 Cic., Att. 4.15.7; Q. Fr. 2.15.4. 69 Howgego 1995. 70 Cic., Att. 4.17.4. 71 Cic., Att. 4.19.1. 72 Nicolet 1971: 1203-1227, esp. 1255; cf. Hollander 2008:117-122. 73 The suitability of applying this identity to preindustrial times has lately been put into question by, among others, Mayhew 1995: 238-257 and Hollander 2008, who both prefer the Cambridge school approach. The latter, considering that Fisher was too focused on a flow approach (the money in circulation), preferred to analyze account stocks (money holdings at a given moment in time). Thus, k was exchanged over V, k meaning demand for money to hold which is, in fact, the opposite of V. For the sake of the argument of this paper, Fisher identity has been chosen as a method for determining velocity of circulation. 74 Mayhew 1995: 239.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 34 18/04/16 14:37 cash is king 35

to the point at which the state had to intervene to alleviate the scarcity, as is likely to have happened in 54 B.C. When money is plentiful, the velocity of circulation tends to reduce. 75 Taking into account the Fisher identity, this increased velocity of circulation, related to electoral corruption, caused a rise in prices. The supply of the city of Rome was limited, and thus the sellers could impose the price of the resources. Food was until recent times the main object of consumption for non-elite citizens. Therefore, increased bribery led to a deterioration in the living standards of the plebs, especially of those with lower incomes. 76 Their real wages, conceived as the relationship between prices and income, fell. The difficulty in assessing the situation quantitatively for the late Republic is obvious. Scheidel, for instance, has formed a model based on Egyptian papyri, which offer a series of consumption baskets (food, clothing, shelter and fuel), based on Robert Allen’s work, for parts of the second and third centuries CE. 77 However, no such detailed series are available for the Late Republic. During the Late Republic, food supply and food crisis were recurrent problems. 78 In cases of scarcity, riots were usually attested, as in 75 B.C., when two consuls had to find shelter in a house to flee the angry mobs. 79 Speculation on the price of grain was common: in 67 B.C., pirates disrupted the grain supply to Rome. Pompey’s appointment to eliminate them caused a sudden plummeting of the high price of grain, due to his reputation as a general. 80 Despite the absence of quantitative qualifications for the 50s, the existence of social unrest related to high prices of food is attested. In 57, Pompey received a cura annonae command for five years following episodes of scarcity. The highest point was reached in September 57, when crowds besieged senators on the Palatine. By April 56, there was little grain in the market. 81 Furthermore, a flood in 54 ruined a large amount of cereals, causing Pompey to seek alternative supplies. 82 Nevertheless, the impact of scarcity on a market with rising prices, related to the continuing distribution of bribes since at least July, could have been disastrous. Pompey’s swift action may have been related to the increasing discontent of the Roman plebs. Monetization of politics, especially in regard to corruption, did have an impact on the standard of living of the Roman plebs. They received money,

75 Mayhew 1995: 239-240. 76 On Roman standards of living. Cf. Yavetz 1958: 500-517. 77 Scheidel 2014. 78 Cf. Garnsey 1988: 198-217; Virlouvet 1985: 15, 40. 79 Sall., Hist. 2.45; Garnsey, 1988: 200. 80 Cic., Imp. Cn. Pomp. 44. 81 Garnsey 1988: 201; Cf. Courrier 2014: 796-797 with full bibliographical details. 82 Dio 39.63.3. The chronology of the flood is not well attested; Pompey had left the city and came back for the trial of Gabinius de repetundis, whose diuinatio was hold 12 October 54. The trial might have continued into early 53 B.C.; Alexander 1990: 148, identified Cassius Dio’s allusion to this trial.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 35 18/04/16 14:37 36 cristina rosillo-lópez

sharing the benefits of the distribution of wealth, particularly from provincial plunder. Elio Lo Cascio’s chapter in this volume shows that Italians benefited from the Empire. This was not the case for the inhabitants of Rome. Due to an augmentation in the money supply and an increase in the velocity of circulation, both related to corruption, prices rose, and as a result non-elite real wages, purchasing power, and standards of living decayed. The elite, aware of the importance of avoiding conflict, compensated for this through distributions of grain or the establishment of a fixed price for that foodstuff. Thus the money spent by the candidates had to be compensated via state expenditure in order to avoid social conflict. The private interests of the elite had an important impact upon state finances. Furthermore, the apparently beneficial impact of corruption on the people, with injections of money and distributions, had a negative side. Thus, the monetization of politics seems not to have been wholly beneficial for the elite and the plebs, or even for the Roman state itself. In conclusion, Roman politics became fully monetized during the second century B.C., following the monetization of the economy and of daily life. This process changed radically the level of access to political power and the way in which was understood. It redistributed wealth in an asymmetric way through distributions, causing positive but also negative consequences for plebeians. Monetization of politics was left in the hands of those who used money as a means for political success. It was introduced through state distribution, bribes, and extortion, related to corruption. The laws that attempted to control the use of money in politics show that from the end of the second century BC, money became either an ally or a competitor to social connections in the pursuit of political power. This monetization of politics required a healthy supply of money, which became one of the objectives of the Roman government. In this process, the relationship between money and politics was different in each of the major strata of society: the Roman elite, when seeking the support of their peers, preferred to use debt transfers or payment of debts, not due to a reluctance to use money, but as a matter of expediency. Nevertheless, when dealing with non-elite citizens, the majority of the voters, cash was king. Finally, the plebs were affected by this change. They benefited from the distributions of money, taking their share of the profits of provincial corruption. However, they also suffered negative consequences. The increasing amounts of money exchanged during elections raised the velocity of circulation incremen- tally, and, very likely, entailed a rise in prices. This implied a deterioration in the living standards of the Roman plebs, which could lead to social unrest. The latter were compensated by the elite through grain distributions, thus plac- ing a heavy burden on Roman public finances. In a way, state resources were mobilized to pay for the negative economic impact of elite interest in securing magistracies and honours.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 36 18/04/16 14:37 Investing in Death: Gladiators as Investment and Currency in the Late Republic 1

Jonathan Edmondson

In a series of recent studies William V. Harris has argued vigorously against the prevailing consensus that ‘all Roman money consisted of coins’. 2 In so doing, he has shown how credit and lending operations formed a key part of economic transactions in the late Republic and early Principate. In particular, ‘credit- money’, he has argued, ‘enabled the Romans to extend their money supply far beyond the limits of their monetized metal.’ 3 Harris’ student, David B. Hollander, whose 2002 Columbia dissertation, Money in the Late Roman Republic, was published in a substantially revised form as a monograph in 2007, has explored in greater depth the manner in which and the extent to which the Romans used uncoined gold and silver bullion and other financial instruments, such as ‘near money’ – syngraphae (written cheques/bonds), partes (shares), and nomina (literally ‘names’, which by metonymy was used to denote lists of names of debtors) – and monetary processes (permutationes), to play key monetary roles in late-Republican economic life. 4 Hollander has also demonstrated how certain assets beyond coinage and bullion functioned as money, thus reducing the demand for coinage in economic transactions. Grain, wine and olive oil, livestock, land, slaves and labour, for instance, were sometimes used as ‘means of payment’, as when Roman soldiers serving in North Africa during the Jugur thine War paid for wine and other goods with the slaves and cattle they had plundered from local farmsteads (Sall., Jug. 44). 5 On occasion such assets were used to pay off debts, as in a telling passage from Cicero’s pro Flacco (48–50)

1 All dates are BC unless otherwise indicated. I am very grateful to those at the McGill conference, at lectures at the University of Southern California and the Univer- sity of Windsor, and at a ColPAH work-in-progress seminar in Toronto for their comments on this paper. I am particularly grateful to David Hollander, Thomas Habinek, Claudia Moatti, Eric Gunderson, Richard Aronson, and David Wigg-Wolf for their remarks. 2 Harris 2006; id. 2007, esp. 521-3; id. 2008: 174-207. 3 Harris 2006: 24; cf. id. 2008: 207, with the discussion by Lo Cascio 2011. Cf. also Verboven 2009: 91-124 and the various studies in Lo Cascio 2003. 4 Hollander 2007: esp. 31-57 (ch. 3). For a succinct account, cf. von Reden 2010: 111-3. 5 Hollander 2007: 59-75.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 37 18/04/16 14:37 38 jonathan edmondson

in which we learn that a certain Heraclides handed over some slaves to his creditor Hermippus to discharge himself of a debt. Hollander goes on to argue that these assets sometimes served as very useful ‘stores of wealth’, even if this was not their primary function. 6 Slaves in particular had considerable advantages over coins, bullion, or grain in this capacity, he points out, since ‘their labor produced value and ideally profit for their owners’. 7 Hence they could serve as an investment and generate wealth by their labour. Moreover, their value could be enhanced through training, which enabled them to provide more skilful, and hence more lucrative, services. In short, they had the potential to be a very profitable investment. It is the aim of this paper to argue that during the late Republic one particular group of slaves, gladiators – an overwhelmingly servile group, even if it occasionally included freeborn Romans (auctorati) who had sworn an oath of loyalty (auctoramentum) to a gladiatorial trainer (lanista) – came to play an important role, especially from the 60s onwards, in the investment strategies of the Roman elite. 8 By this date, Roman aristocrats had started to amass troupes of gladiators as part of their own capital resources. Not only were they useful as bodyguards in the violent politics of the period, but they also served as public displays of wealth. Gladiators could be leased out or sold but also presented as gifts to fellow aristocrats anxious to stage a memorable gladiatorial show in the spoilingly competitive politics of the period. They functioned as economic and social capital both within an increasingly monetised economy and also within a more traditional system of gift-exchange.

1. Acquiring Gladiators in the Republican Period

During the Roman Republic gladiatorial presentations (munera) were the preserve of the Roman senatorial aristocracy, who sponsored such spectacles in Rome at the funerals of distinguished family members. 9 The term used to describe them, munera, is a telling one; they were seen as gifts that one’s status obliged one to provide for the rest of society. 10 Such spectacles started small: just three pairs of gladiators at the first munus in 264, staged in the Forum Boarium in the very centre of Rome at the funeral of D. Iunius Brutus ‘Scaeva’,

6 Hollander 2007: 75-86. 7 Hollander 2007: 78-9 (quotation: 79). 8 On gladiators, the fullest treatment remains that of Ville 1981. On auctorati, cf. Diliberto 1981; Sanfilippo 1982; Guarino 1983. 9 In general, cf. Ville 1981: 57-88. 10 Cf. Festus (Paul. ex Fest. p. 140 M): munus significant officium, cum dicitur quis munere fungi. item donum quod officii causa datur. (‘Munus means a duty, when it is used for performing a munus; at the same time it means a gift that is given for duty’s sake.’)

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 38 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 39

consul in 292, by his sons, Decimus and Marcus. 11 From the series of brief reports in Livy’s history, the next one hundred years, it would appear, saw a fairly steady increase in their scale (cf. Table 1).

Table 1. Some important munera gladiatoria staged at Rome, 264–160

Date Honorand Highest office Sponsor(s) Number of Reference(s) held gladiators 264 D. Iunius D.f. cos. 292 M. and D. Iunius 3 pairs Val. Max. Brutus Scaeva D.f. Brutus, sons 2.4.7; of the honorand Liv. Epit. 16 216 M. Aemilius cos. 232; cos. L., M., and 21 pairs Liv. 23.30.15 M.f. Lepidus suff. between Q. Aemilius M.f. over 3 days 222 and 219; Lepidus, sons of augur the honorand 200 M. Valerius ? cos. 220; P. and M. Vale- 25 pairs Liv. 31.50.4 P.f. Laevinus cos. 210 rius P.f. Laevinus, over 4 days sons 183 P. Licinius P.f. cos. 205; Unspecified 60 pairs Liv. 39.46.2–3 Crassus Dives pontifex over 3 days maximus 174 T. Quinctius cos. 198 T. Quinctius T.f. 37 pairs Liv. 41.28.11 T.f. Flamininus Flamininus, son over 3 days of the honorand 160 L. Aemilius cos. 182 and P. Cornelius P.f. ?? (cost Polyb. L.f. Paullus 168 Scipio Africanus 30 talents = 31.28.5–6 Aemilianus and 180,000 Q. Fabius Q.f. denarii) Maximus Aemi- lianus, sons of the honorand

However, in describing the munus at the funeral of T. Quinctius Flamininus in 174, Livy comments that ‘some gladiatorial munera were given in that year; many of them were small, but one was outstanding’ (41.28.11). 12 So from this remark it is clear that Livy only reported the most striking celebrations; most munera of this period, we must assume, were rather smaller than those that he mentions.

11 Ville 1981: 9, 42, n. 100. For D. Iunius Brutus Scaeva’s consulship, cf. MRR I: 181–2; RE 10.1 (1917), 1026, no. 59 (Münzer). 12 Liv. 41.28.11: munera gladiatorum eo anno aliquot, parua alia data; unum ante cetera insigne fuit, T. Flaminini. On this munus, cf. Ville 1981: 43.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 39 18/04/16 14:37 40 jonathan edmondson

How these senatorial families acquired their gladiators in this early period is not entirely clear. For the very first gladiatorial munus in honour of D. Iunius Brutus Scaeva, Servius in his comments on a passage of Vergil’s Aeneid (3.67) claimed that prisoners-of-war (captiui) were used. 13 Although one might question how well informed Servius, writing in the late fourth century AD, could have been about an event so remote in the past, he may well have used Livy’s account, now lost to us. D. Iunius Brutus Pera, the elder of Scaeva’s two sons who sponsored this munus (pace Servius, not his grandson), had celebrated two triumphs as consul in 266 for his victories in Umbria and then Calabria. 14 So it is certainly possible that in 264 he still had some prisoners-of-war in captivity to be used at the munus he arranged for his father’s funeral alongside those captiui sent by ‘many peoples’ (multae gentes), if we can trust Servius’ account. For later periods there is clear evidence for prisoners-of-war being held in reserve for the arena: so, for instance, in 100 M.’ Aquillius sent captives from his military operations quelling the Second Sicilian Slave Revolt to Rome to fight in the arena, though in the end they served as helpless victims for lions at a uenatio rather than as gladiators proper (Diod. Sic. 36.10.2); or again in AD 70, after his victories in Judaea, Titus had large numbers of the Jewish rebel prisoners thrown to the wild- beasts or compelled them to fight in mass-combats during the spectacles he staged at Caesarea Philippi (Joseph., B.J. 7.23–24, 37–38) and at Berytus (B.J. 7.39–40) on his leisurely progress back to Rome. According to Josephus, the most hand- some, the physically most impressive specimens, were saved for his triumph in Rome (B.J. 6.417), but we are not told precisely how they met their deaths. 15 So while some Roman aristocrats could have access to prisoners-of-war – either through their own military activities or through those of their kinsmen and friends – before long specialized trainers (lanistae) and training-schools (ludi) made their entrance into the gladiatorial world. 16 The earliest surviving attestation of lanistae in our sources refers to the 170s, when King Antiochus IV of Syria was seeking gladiators for the spectacles he was to put on in Antioch

13 Serv., Aen. 3.67: institutum est, ut apud sepulcra et uictimae caedantur. apud ueteres etiam homines interficiebantur, sed mortuo Iunio Bruto cum multae gentes ad eius funus captiuos misissent, nepos illius eos qui missi erant inter se conposuit, et sic pugnauerunt: et quod muneri missi erant, inde munus appellatum. (‘It was the custom that victims would also be slaughtered at the sides of graves. In early times men even would be killed, but after the death of Iunius Brutus, when many peoples had sent captives to his funeral, his grandson arranged for those who had been sent to be divided into pairs, and they fought in this way. Furthermore, because they had been sent as a gift, it was henceforth called a munus.’) 14 Liv., Epit. 15; Fasti Triumphales (Inscr. It. XIII.1, sub anno), with MRR I: 201. For Scaeva’s sons, cf. RE 10.1 (1917), 1076, nos. 124–5 (Münzer). 15 Joseph., B.J. 6.417: τῶν δὲ νέων τοὺς ὑψηλοτάτους καὶ καλοὺς ἐπιλέξας ἐτήρει τῷ θριάμβῳ. 16 On lanistae and gladiatorial training in general, cf. Ville 1981: 272-6; Mosci Sassi 1992: 124-8.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 40 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 41

and at the sanctuary of Apollo at neighbouring Daphne. 17 ‘At first’, Livy reports (41.20.13), ‘he had been accustomed to purchase trained gladiators at great prices from Rome’ before turning to local volunteers for his spectacles. 18 Georges Ville, in his classic study La gladiature dans l’Occident romain (published posthumously in 1981, but largely complete before his tragically early death at the age of 38 in 1967), argues that professionalism had already begun by 206, on the basis of Livy’s report that when P. Scipio (the later Africanus) in that year held a munus to honour his deceased father and uncle at New Carthage in south-eastern Spain, the gladiators who fought at it were not, ‘of the usual sort provided by lanistae: slaves bought on the trading-block (catasta) or free men willing to offer their blood for sale’, but rather Iberians who agreed to fight ‘voluntarily and without payment’. 19 This, however, does not necessarily mean that Scipio had the choice in 206 to go to formal lanistae, as Ville assumed. Livy is only providing for his readers a sense of the unusual nature of these Iberian gladiators on this particular occasion; they were not the kind that his contemporaries in the Augustan age would have immediately called to mind: that is, those acquired from a gladiatorial training-school (ludus) run by a lanista. The passage cannot, therefore, be pressed to prove that such ludi were up-and-running by the end of the third century. Nevertheless, it is clear that by the early second century at the latest, lanistae had come to be the key supply mechanism for those wishing to sponsor gladiatorial munera. Rather than go to the trouble of acquiring potential gladiators directly on the slave-market and training them up for their munera, Roman aristocrats came to prefer to negotiate a contract with a lanista to provide the necessary number of performers, all trained up and properly nourished in time for the munus. As Gaius (Inst. 3.146) was later at pains to explain in his discussion of obligations arising from contracts (obligationes quae ex contractu nascuntur), a special form of legal contract was developed for the gladiatorial arena: item si gladiatores ea lege tibi tradiderim, ut in singulos, qui integri exierint, pro sudore denarii XX mihi darentur, in eos uero singulos, qui occisi aut debilitati fuerint, denarii mille, quaeritur utrum emptio et uenditio an locatio et conductio contrahatur. et magis placuit eorum, qui integri exierint, locationem et conduc

17 For these spectacles, cf. Edmondson 1999; Carter 2001; Mann 2011: 47-9. 18 Liv. 41.20.13: qui primo ab Roma magnis pretiis paratos gladiatores accersere solitus erat, iam suo… Livy’s text breaks off at this point, but the strong contrast between primo and iam seems to demand that Livy went on to say that Antiochus eventually came to use gladiators trained in Syria itself. 19 Liv. 28.21: Scipio Carthaginem ad uota soluenda dis munusque gladiatorium, quod mortis causa patris patruique parauerat, edendum rediit. gladiatorum spectacu lum fuit non ex eo genere hominum ex quo lanistis comparare mos est, seruorum de catasta ac liberorum qui uenalem sanguinem habent: uoluntaria omnis et gratuita opera pugnantium fuit. For discussion, cf. Ville 1981: 47.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 41 18/04/16 14:37 42 jonathan edmondson

tionem contractam uideri, at eorum, qui occisi aut debilitati sunt, emptionem et uenditionem esse; idque ex accidentibus apparet, tamquam sub condicione facta cuiusque uenditione aut locatione. iam enim non dubitatur quin sub condicione res uenire aut locari possint.

Again suppose I deliver gladiators to you on the express terms that I will get 20 denarii for the efforts of each one who comes off unharmed but 1,000 denarii for each one killed or maimed. Is this sale (emptio et uenditio) or hire (locatio et conductio)? The received opinion is that there is hire of the ones who come off unharmed but sale of those killed or maimed, and events determine the classification, as if there were a conditional sale or hire of each one. For there is no longer any doubt that things can be sold and hired subject to conditions. (trans. W. M. Gordon and O. F. Robinson) Sponsors would thus negotiate a differential fee for each gladiator: one price based on a lease agreement (conductio–locatio), the other an outright purchase (uenditio–emptio). What transpired in the arena determined the final fee that the sponsor owed the lanista. Precisely when this special form of contract came into existence at Rome is unclear, but an early date is probable given the special nature of the commodity involved. 20 What is not in doubt is that by the mid-second century the most distinguished families were willing to outlay considerable sums to ensure a memorable spectacle. Polybius mentions in passing (31.28.6) that in 160 the total expenses of a munificent gladiatorial munus could amount to ‘not less than thirty talents’, when he discusses the munus that Scipio Aemilianus and his brother Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus put on at the funeral of their distinguished father, L. Aemilius Paullus. At sixty drachmae/denarii to the talent, the sum of thirty talents amounts to 180,000 denarii. 21 To put this figure into some sort of perspective, Polybius reveals in the same passage (31.28.3) the size of the estate that Aemilius Paullus handed down to his two surviving sons. Polybius’ text has been interpreted by Shatzman and Walbank to suggest that his total estate was worth sixty talents, or 360,000 denarii, a moderate fortune, but not among the richest in that period according to Shatzman. 22 If so, the cost of the munus honouring Aemilius Paullus in 160 amounted to at least half the total estate of a leading Roman. However, Polybius’ text can be read to suggest that each son was left sixty talents and Scipio Aemilianus generously handed

20 For further discussion cf. Guarino 1985; more briefly, Zimmermann: 1996: 236. 21 Cf. the comments of Walbank 1957-79: 3.510 ad loc.; cf. 506, discussing Plb. 31.27.2. 22 For discussion cf. Shatzman 1975: esp. 243 (though he converts the sum to 370,000 denarii); Walbank 1957-79: 3.509-10, ad loc., pointing out that it is not clear whether this sum was calculated before or after the repayment of his widow’s dowry of 150,000 denarii.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 42 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 43

over his half-share to his brother, meaning that the total inheritance was 120 talents or 720,000 denarii. If so, Polybius’ figure of thirty talents for a decent munus would amount to one-quarter of Aemilius Paullus’ estate – still a substantial sum. The establishments that such lanistae ran varied from small and sometimes itinerant operations to more fixed and permanent enterprises. 23 A very jaun- diced and hostile image of lanistae persisted in Roman thought, equating them with pimps, prostitutes, auctioneers, actors, and, of course, gladiators. 24 One reason for this was that many lanistae were indeed former gladiators, who had won their freedom and used their accumulated prize-money to establish gladiatorial ludi. But it might also suggest that initially at least the scale of most of their operations was generally quite small. For Roman moral discourse always despised the small-scale. As Cicero famously remarked in the De Officiis (1.151), trading (mercatura), if ‘small-scale’ (tenuis), was ‘sordid’ (sordida), but if it were more ambitious in scope, involving, for instance, overseas shipping, ‘it seems that it can with full justification be praised’ (uidetur iure optimo posse laudari). In time, some lanistae were able to establish quite sizeable training-schools, once it became clear that munera were becoming more lavish, and hence more profitable for lanistae, as political competition escalated at Rome during the later second century. An example is the ludus run by C. Aurelius Scaurus, who in 105 was willing to hire out his gladiatorial trainers (doctores) to the consul P. Rutilius Rufus to instruct Roman legionaries under his command on how to fight more effectively. 25 By the early first century the Campanian town of Capua had established its reputation as the major centre in Italy for training gladiators. 26 As is well known, this was where Cn. Lentulus Battiatus had his ludus, which in 73 housed, if we can put any faith in Plutarch’s figure (Crass. 8.2), at least 200 gladiators, including one Thracian slave called Spartacus, who famously managed to escape with 77 other fellow-gladiators according to Plutarch, or 70 if we prefer Appian’s account (B.C. 1.116). 27

23 For itinerant lanistae circumforani, cf. Suet., Vit. 12.2, with Mosci Sassi 1922: 127-8; Chamberland 2007, esp. 139-40. Ville 1981: 273, n. 99 interprets Juv. 6.82-3 as attesting another lanista circumforanus. 24 For a convenient list of four professions (histrio, gladiator, lanista, and leno) that brought infamia, cf. the SC from Larinum of AD 19: Aé 1978, 145 = EAOR III, no. 2, lines 15–16, with the discussion of Levick 1983: 108–10; cf. the late-Republican law preserved on the Tabula Heracleensis: CIL I2 593 = ILS 6085 = Roman Statutes 24, lines 122–4, excluding male prostitutes, lanistae, actors, and pimps from serving on the coun- cils of local municipia. For auctioneers, cf. Juv. 3.158. 25 Val. Max. 2.3.2; Ennod., Pan. Theod. p. 284 Hartel; cf. further Ville 1960, esp. 305-7; Ville 1981: 46; cf. Baltrusch 1988. 26 On the importance of Capua as a gladiatorial centre, cf. briefly Ville 1981: 296; Welch 2007: 91, although there is no clear evidence, to my knowledge, pace Welch, that C. Aurelius Scaurus’ ludus was at Capua. 27 On Spartacus’ uprising, cf. Bradley 1989: 83-101; Shaw 2001.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 43 18/04/16 14:37 44 jonathan edmondson

2. Gladiators as Investment During the First Century

As the first century progressed, leasing or purchasing gladiators from a lanista was not the only available source of supply for such combatants; for some members of the Roman elite came to own gladiatorial troupes (familiae gladiatoriae) of their own. During his curule aedileship in 65, Julius Caesar purchased no fewer than 320 pairs of gladiators for the munus he was planning for the funeral of his father, who had died 20 years earlier. 28 This extraordinarily high number disconcerted his political rivals (inimici) to such a degree that they immediately rushed through a bill limiting the number of gladiators that any individual could maintain in the city of Rome. As a result, Caesar was forced to stage a much smaller munus than the one he had originally planned (Suet., Iul. 10.2). 29 It is clear that Caesar was not the only Roman aristocrat buying up gladiators in this period. 30 On the Ides of March 44, the consul designate (and conspirator) D. Iunius Brutus stationed a troupe of his own personal gladiators in the Thea- tre of Pompey on the pretext that he was planning to stage a munus there. 31 Most importantly, elite Romans were coming to see gladiators as a financial investment. As so often, an exception proves the rule. In a letter written to his friend Atticus in the summer of 56, Cicero waxed lyrical about the quality of the gladiators Atticus had recently purchased (Cic., Att. 4.4a = SB 78): me dius fidius, ne tu emisti λόχον praeclarum! gladiatores audio pugnare magnifice, si locare uoluisses, duobus his muneribus liberasses (‘Well, upon my word you have bought a fine troupe! I hear the gladiators are fighting magnificently! If you had cared to hire them out, you would have cleared your outlay in these last two shows!’). The clear implication of Cicero’s words is that Atticus had purchased a troupe of gladiators, but on these two occasions he had decided not to hire them out to make money; he had simply loaned them to a couple of friends

28 Plu., Caes. 5.9; Suet., Iul. 10.2; cf. Plin., Nat. 33.16.53; Dio 37.8. Cf. further Ville 1981: 60, no. 8. This gladiatorial munus needs to be distinguished from the elaborate ludi that Caesar sponsored the same year with his aedilician colleague M. Bibulus, on which cf. Bernstein 1998: 300-1, 327-8. 29 It is difficult to reconcile this notice of Suetonius with Plutarch’s account (Caes. 5.9), which states that 320 pairs of gladiators were staged. But the restriction mentioned by Suetonius jibes well with the successive attempts made during the 60s to restrict ambitious politicians from staging gladiatorial munera to win popular support: for example, the SC of 63 interpreting the lex Calpurnia de ambitu of 67 that sought to prevent candidates from arranging places for fellow members of the same voting tribe at gladiatorial combats (Cic., Mur. 67) or Cicero’s own lex Tullia de ambitu of 63 prohibiting candidates for election from sponsoring munera within a two-year period leading up to their candidacy: Cic., Sest. 134; Vat. 37. Cf. Ville 1981: 82-3. 30 For discussion of gladiators bought up to serve as gangs in the political violence of the period, cf. Lintott 1968: 83-5. 31 Dio 44.16.2; cf. Nic. Dam., Aug. 81, 92, 94, 98-99; Vell. 2.58.1–2; Plu., Brut. 12.5; App., B.C. 2.17.118.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 44 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 45

as a gift, so that they could use them in two recent munera in the city of Rome. The verb Cicero employs here, locare, is precisely the same one used by Gaius in his discussion of the distinction between emptio–uenditio and locatio–con ductio in contracts involving gladiators (Gaius, Inst. 3.146; supra: p. 41-42). Ville misinterprets this passage when he claims that Atticus was content to provide gladiators by leasing them out or by sale. 32 Cicero’s words imply that he expected Atticus to derive profit from leasing or selling them to fellow aristocrats; on this specific occasion, however, he preferred to solidify a social bond with an unnamed friend by providing him with gladiators as a gift. In this regard, Atticus’ actions fit within a more traditional gift-exchange economy. They would qualify as one of those occasions that Cicero defined in the De Officiis (2.55) as an act of largesse undertaken as a token of generosity between friends, a largitio liberalis. Friends were expected to provide beneficia by exchanging gifts as one of the obligations of amicitia. 33 On other occasions, Atticus treated his gladiators as a capital venture. Cicero’s remark that just two performances in the arena were usually sufficient to repay the initial cost of the gladiators is significant here; it implies that a gladiator-owner such as Atticus would expect to reap a profit from his gladiators from their third performance onwards. As we have seen in the case of the munus put on at Aemilius Paullus’ funeral in 160, gladiatorial shows did not come cheap (supra: p. 42). Owners of gladiators had at their disposal a very valuable resource, for which they could demand a high price. Ville took another remark of Cicero in a letter to Atticus (Att. 13.37.4 = SB 346), dating to 21 August 45, as a further reference to Atticus’ use of gladiators as a financial speculation. Here Cicero expresses the hope that Atticus will provide him with daily reports ‘on the gladiators and the other “trifles light as air” you write about’ (de gladiatoribus, de ceteris quae scribis ἀνεμοφόρητα). Ville interprets this passage as follows: ‘on supposera qu’Atti- cus avait continué ses fructueuses spéculations; et la curiosité de Cicéron, qui veut être tenu au courant “quotidiennement”, révèle que lui-même avait toujours des intérêts dans ces opérations.’ 34 While Cicero’s wording here could be interpreted to refer to Atticus’ profitable investments in gladiators, his phra- seology is distinctly allusive and could equally well mean a number of other things. The phrase de gladiatoribus might refer to Atticus’ gladiators, but it could just as easily mean ‘gladiatorial shows’, as Shackleton Bailey prefers in his translation of the passage. 35 So, in sum, the text is too ambiguous to be

32 Ville 1981 : 271: ‘il [sc. Atticus] se contenta de fournir les gladiateurs – par loca tion ou vente.’ 33 For further discussion, cf. Verboven 2002: 35-48, 63-7. 34 Ville 1981: 271. 35 For gladiatores meaning ‘gladiatorial shows’, cf. Ter., Hec. Prol. 39–40: rumor uenit / datum iri gladiatores; cf. Cic., Sest. 133: qui legem meam contemnat, quae dilucide uetat gladiatores biennio quo quis petierit aut petiturus sit, dare.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 45 18/04/16 14:37 46 jonathan edmondson

pressed as unequivocal further support for the argument that Atticus engaged in speculative investment in gladiators. However, we do hear elsewhere of Atticus’ gladiators and their potential as a financial asset. In another letter of late March 56, Cicero comments to his brother Quintus (Q. fr. 2.5.3 = SB 9) about the way in which gladiators and beast-fighters (bestiarii) were rapidly changing hands among the Roman elite. The tribune C. Porcius Cato, he reports, had recently bought a troupe from Atticus and from C. Cosconius, plebeian aedile in 57, to use as an armed escort. 36 When Cato was struggling to find the resources necessary to feed, house, and train them, T. Annius Milo bought the troupe via a third party, perhaps at a knock-down price, since Cato clearly needed to offload his expensive investment. 37 Owning gladiators was becoming fashionable, and the market for them had a good turnover. They were often a useful source of economic gain, an asset that had clear monetary value. In this period gladiators were needed not just for public spectacles at the funerals of the elite; brawny gladiators were increasingly demonstrating their value as bodyguards or ‘enforcers’ to pressure or rough up political opponents, or one’s opponents’ supporters, in the mean and violent streets of the city of Rome. 38 We have already noted how in March 44, D. Iunius Brutus had a troupe of his own gladiators at the ready in the Theatre of Pompey on the day the conspirators planned to assassinate Julius Caesar, presumably to help out if their plans went awry (supra: p. 44). Nine years earlier in 53 T. Annius Milo had used his own gladiators (perhaps those purchased in 56 from the tribune C. Porcius Cato) to deadly effect when he and his entourage happened to encounter his arch-rival P. Clodius travelling down the Appian Way with his own escort of thirty armed slaves (Asc., Mil. 31-32; cf. Cic., Vat. 140). However, in a world in which many members of the Roman elite were linked to one another through ties of kinship, inter-marriage, or formal amicitia, other possibilities beyond outright purchase existed for acquiring gladiators needed to stage a munus or provide a bodyguard. A friend or relative could loan or even gift a group of gladiators. Atticus, as we have seen, did just that in 56 for two successive munera (supra: p. 44-5). Cassius Dio alludes to another case the previous year when P. Clodius allegedly ‘borrowed’ a troupe of gladiators that his brother had bought to put on a munus in honour of their father; Clodius wanted to use them to disrupt the vote on whether to recall Cicero from exile (Dio 39.7.2). In 56 Clodius was, according to Cicero, using novice gladiators

36 Cic., Q. fr. 2.5.3 = SB 9: nam ille (scil. C. Cato) uindex gladiatorum et bestiario rum emerat de Cosconio et Pomponio bestiarios, nec sine iis armatis umquam in publico fuerat. For a brief discussion, cf. Lintott 1968: 84. 37 Cic., Q. fr. 2.5.3 = SB 9: hos alere non poterat, itaque uix tenebat; sensit Milo: dedit cuidam non familiari negotium, qui sine suspicione emeret eam familiam a Catone. 38 Supra: n. 30.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 46 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 47

(gladiatores …nouicios) that he himself had acquired in anticipation of his aedileship that year, to bring physical pressure once more to bear on the political process (Cic., Sest. 78; cf. Dom. 6, 48). When it came to acquiring wild-beasts for performances in the circus at ludi – in this period uenationes were not yet associated with gladiators; that was an early imperial development 39 – social ties and connections were even more important. According to Plutarch (Sull. 5), the later dictator Sulla failed to gain election as praetor for 95 because the Roman plebs desperately wanted him to hold the curule aedileship; for as aedile, they hoped, he would be in a position to stage at the ludi for which he was, as aedile, responsible a brilliant uenatio of ‘Libyan wild beasts’ thanks to his friendship with King Bocchus of Maure- tania. Indeed when Sulla was eventually elected praetor for 93, unusually for a praetor he put on a uenatio at which 100 male lions appeared for the first time in Rome (Plin., Nat. 8.20.53). The younger Seneca simply assumed they had been provided by his friend Bocchus (Breu. Vit. 13.6). Similarly it is possible that Julius Caesar sent his son-in-law Pompey the Gallic animals that the latter included in the uenatio staged to mark the opening of his new theatre with its annexed temple of Venus Victrix in 55. 40 Four years later both the curule aediles elect, M. Octavius and M. Caelius Rufus, sent repeated requests to Cicero, then proconsul in Cilicia, to arrange for the locals to hunt down panthers and send them back to Rome for their aedilician games. Caelius was particularly insistent, beginning his long string of requests in June 51 (Fam. 8.2.2) even before he had secured his election as aedile. 41 Ville argued that the tone of Cicero’s responses suggests that such requests were normal and his refusal to consent to them unusual. 42 This is certainly a point made by Caelius in one of his letters to Cicero, dated to 2 September 51, when he mentions how C. Scribonius Curio, quaestor in 54 or 53, elected pontifex in 52, had previously acquired ten panthers from one Patiscus, and that he had donated these ten, plus another ten African panthers, to Caelius (Fam. 8.9.3 = SB 82). As Verboven has commented, such donations should be interpreted as ‘status- enhancing gifts’, gifts that helped politicians sustain the high costs of an active

39 For uenationes during the Republic, cf. Ville 1981: 88–99 (‘la venatio à Rome jusqu’à la mort de César: un appendice des ludi’); Coleman 1996. 40 Plin., Nat. 8.28.70: Pompei Magni primum ludi ostenderunt chama, quem Galli rufium uocabant, effigie lupi, pardorum maculis. On these uenationes, cf. Cic., Fam. 7.1.3 = SB 24; Plin., Nat. 8.7.20–21, 24.64; Plu., Pomp. 52.4; Dio 39.38.2. 41 For Caelius’ requests, note Cic., Fam. 8.2.2 (June 51); 8.4.5 (1 July 51); 8.9.3 (2 September 51); 8.8.10 (October 51); 8.6.5 (February 50) = SB 78, 81, 82, 84, 88; for Cicero’s responses: Att. 6.1.21 (February 50) = SB 115; Fam. 2.11.2 (April 50) = SB 90. For M. Octavius’ requests, note Cic., Fam. 8.9.3 (2 September 51) = SB 82; Att. 5.21.5 (13 February 50); 6.1.21 (February 50) = SB 114, 115. Cf. briefly Jennison 1937: 137-40; for a more detailed treatment cf. MacKinnon 2006; for the importance of patron-client relations in supplying wild-beasts, cf. Deniaux 2000. 42 Ville 1981: 349.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 47 18/04/16 14:37 48 jonathan edmondson

political career at Rome. 43 Social connections and gift-exchange, therefore, played a significant part in mustering gladiators and occasionally wild-beasts. The financing and supplying of arena performers (both human and animal) was underpinned by a mixture of traditional forms of aristocratic gift-gifting and much more monetized forms of exchange, whereby those who sponsored spectacles had to enter into a monetized contract either with a lanista or with a member of the Roman aristocracy who had acquired a gladiatorial troupe as a form of investment.

3. Julius Caesar’s Investment in Gladiators

The final section of this paper will return to the subject of Julius Caesar’s gladiators, since, as in so many other matters, he marked a clear watershed in developments – not just in the sheer number of gladiators he came to own, but also in the organization he put in place to keep them housed, fed, and trained and in his use of gladiators as an investment strategy. In short, he laid the foundations for the gladiatorial infrastructure that developed in the early Principate, wherely the emperor controlled the largest supplies of gladiators, which he then used for the elaborate shows that he himself sponsored in Rome, but which he could also lease or sell to local elites who sponsored gladiatorials displays in other parts of the Roman Empire. 44 We have already seen how in 65 Julius Caesar had acquired no fewer than 640 gladiators for the munus he was planning to hold in honour of his deceased father, although in the end he was prevented from presenting so many thanks to the intervention of his political rivals (supra: p. 44). In 52 he announced that he would sponsor another munus, this time to honour the memory of his daughter Julia, who had died in childbirth in 54. Even though busy campaigning in Gaul, he took a personal interest in making sure that preparations went smoothly. In the end this munus was not staged until 46, when it was combined with the celebrations and spectacles marking his quadruple triumph. 45 Suetonius inserts a couple of curious details about how he built up his gladiatorial troupe for this particular munus (Iul. 26.3): gladiatores notos, sicubi infestis spectatoribus dimicarent, ui rapiendos reseruan dosque mandabat. Tirones neque in ludo neque per lanistas, sed in domibus per equites Romanos atque etiam per senatores armorum peritos erudiebat, precibus enitens, quod epistulis eius ostenditur, ut disciplinam singulorum susciperent ipsique dictata exercentibus darent. In this passage, Suetonius first reports that Caesar would leave instructions (mandabat) that whenever famous gladiators (gladiatores noti) fought without winning the acclaim of the crowd, they should be forcibly removed [scil.

43 Verboven 2002: 90. 44 For gladiators owned by Roman emperors, cf. Ville 1981: 277-90. 45 Suet., Iul. 26; for the date of the eventual celebration, cf. Plu., Caes. 55.4; Dio 43.22.3, 23.3. For discussion, cf. Ville 1981: 68-71, no. 23. For Julia’s death in childbirth, cf. Plu., Caes. 23.5-7.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 48 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 49

from the arena] and kept back for him or saved from death. Ville suggested that this means that Caesar rounded up star performers and forced them into his gladiatorial troupe, to the great annoyance of the ordinary people. 46 This strains Suetonius’ Latin, especially given the position of the clause infestis spectatoribus within the sentence, and so should be rejected. Catharine Edwards, in her Oxford World Classics translation of Suetonius, translates the passage as follows: ‘He gave orders that, whenever famous gladiators fought and were unpopular with the people, they should be forcibly removed and kept for him’. 47 She argues that this means that Caesar was able to rescue star gladiators from the arena after they had suffered a defeat and when the crowd was not supporting their reprieve; in this way he built up a supply of famous names in his familia gladiatoria. 48 But how did he actually carry this out? Does it mean that he used force to strong-arm defeated gladiators into his own familia gladiatoria? It is difficult to envisage how even Caesar could have achieved this, unless he employed armed men to force their way into the arena and remove these star gladiators to the safety of his own gladiatorial training-school. But would this be possible, even in the violent times of the 50s? After all, each of these star gladiators still belonged to an owner, whether a lanista or the sponsor of the particular spectacle in question. Would these owners have stood idly by while losing a valuable economic resource to the financial advantage of Caesar? A more probable scenario suggests itself. If Caesar or, more likely, Caesar’s agents (institores) had to negotiate with the owners of these gladiators, it is easy to see that he might have been able to acquire these star gladiators for a lower price, especially if his agents used force (uis) or the threat of force to complete the transaction. 49 Their defeat in the arena would have considerably reduced their value. With rest, recuperation, and further training, Caesar might hope that they would recover their prowess and return to further victories in the arena, thereby raising their value substantially and allowing Caesar to reap a considerable financial reward, if and when he decided to sell them to a new owner later in their careers. This notion of enhancing the value of an investment comes out more clearly in Suetonius’ second comment about Caesar’s preparations for the munus com- memorating Julia, when he reports that Caesar had the novice gladiators (tirones) he had acquired trained not in a regular ludus or by normal lanistae, but in private homes by Roman knights and senators ‘skilled in arms’ (per equites Romanos atque etiam per senatores armorum peritos). (In this passage, Sueto- nius’ rhetoric draws a strong contrast between the ‘star’ gladiators (gladiatores

46 Ville 1981: 277, n. 112, rejecting the Budé translation of Ailloud: ‘partout où des gladiateurs fameux combattaient devant un public hostile.’ 47 Edwards, 2000: 13. 48 Ibid. 300. 49 On business managers, cf. Aubert 1994.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 49 18/04/16 14:37 50 jonathan edmondson

notos) and the ‘novices’ (tirones).) Suetonius felt a special need to underline the authenticity of this detail by stating that he had seen some of the letters that Caesar had sent urging these elite Romans to take their responsibilities seriously (quod epistulis eius ostenditur). 50 The purpose of this unparalleled training regime was, I would suggest, to give Caesar’s gladiatorial troupe a special cachet value. His tirones were to be seen as exceptional, trained by high-status Romans rather by low-ranked lanistae, distinctive from regular gladiators. It would have considerably enhanced their prestige and their monetary value. In the end, political events intervened and this munus was not staged until 46, as we have seen (supra: p. 48). But when it did occur, all the sources suggest that it was a spectacle of unprecedented scale and variety, for which, we must presume, Caesar employed his own gladiators. For by this date he had built up a very sizeable troupe. By the start of the year 49, if not earlier, they were installed in a ludus at Capua. 51 As we have seen (supra: p. 43), Capua was already entrenched as a major gladiatorial centre, and Caesar’s decision to house them there attests not just to the quality of Capuan lanistae, but also to the political difficulties of keeping such a large group in the city of Rome. 52 Not surprisingly, Caesar’s gladiators became a particularly sensitive political issue as soon as he crossed the Rubicon on 10-11 January 49, the event that triggered the start of civil war. Just two weeks later on 25 January, Cicero wrote to Atticus informing him that Pompey had ‘very sensibly’ (sane commode) distributed Caesar’s gladiators two per household, on the grounds that as a single group they constituted too great a security risk. 53 The fact that Pompey on this occasion found no fewer than 1,000 shields in this Capuan ludus helps to give some hint of the size of Caesar’s familia gladiatoria. Caesar himself was a master of political spin, and he rehearses a somewhat different version of the same incident in Book I of the Civil Wars. He claims there that the consul L. Cornelius P.f. Lentulus had promised them their freedom and ordered them to follow him, but ‘since his action had met with such universal disapproval’, he later reversed his decision and dispersed them for safe-keeping among the slave-gangs (familiares conuentus) of

50 For the preservation of Caesar’s letters, cf. Suet., Iul. 56.6. 51 Suet., Iul. 31.1 mentions Caesar’s intention to build a gladiatorial ludus also at Ravenna, a city that became important as a gladiatorial training centre by the early imperial period: cf. Strab. 5.1.7 (C 213). For discussion of gladiators in Gallia Cisal- pina, cf. Gregori 1994, reprinted in Gregori 2011: 97-109, esp. 101. 52 For Capua in this period, note Cicero’s claim (Sest. 4.9) that P. Sestius as military tribune in 63 had had C. Marcellus expelled from Capua, where he had thrust himself into a gladiatorial ludus under the pretext of studying armed combat; cf. Sall., Cat. 30. 53 Cic., Att. 7.14.2 = SB 138: gladiatores Caesaris qui Capuae sunt, de quibus ante ad te falsum ex Torquati litteris scripseram, sane commode Pompeius distribuit binos singulis patribus familiarum. scutorum in ludo CIƆ fuerunt; eruptionem facturi fuisse dicebantur. sane multum in eo rei publicae prouisum est.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 50 18/04/16 14:37 investing in death 51

Campania. 54 No matter which version one prefers, what is clear is that by early in 49, Caesar had built up quite a large and formidable group of gladiators. These gladiators became known as the ‘Iuliani’, a prestige title that marked them out as distinct from other gladiators. 55 Their successors formed the nucleus of the emperor’s gladiatorial establishment and fought in gladiatorial spectacles not just in Rome, but elsewhere in Italy and the western provinces: to date, they are attested epigraphically at Rome, Pompeii, and in the Baetican communities of Corduba and Gades, but they doubtless performed in other important Roman cities too. 56 In the Principate the emperor came to own a vast gladiatorial establishment. He had imperial freedmen and later equestrian procurators engaged in all aspects of the recruitment and training of gladiators and the production of ever more lavish gladiatorial spectacles. 57 Following the precedent of Roman aristocrats who owned gladiators in the late Republic, the Roman emperor used these gladiators in the shows that he himself sponsored, but he also sold or rented them to sponsors of shows in municipal communities around the Empire. On certain occasions, he could also send out his gladiators as gifts to local munerarii to publicise his munificence and generosity across the wider empire, but these imperial developments are the topic for another paper.

4. Conclusion

The roots of the Roman emperor’s gladiatorial establishment can be traced to the late Republic, when Roman aristocrats acquired ownership of increasingly large familiae gladiatoriae during the first century. Initially this served to ensure that they would have adequate supplies of well-trained performers for the spectacles that their status required them to put on, but before long enterprising Romans such as T. Pomponius Atticus or C. Iulius Caesar come to realize just what a valuable economic resource gladiators could be. The demand for them grew as gladiatorial spectacles mushroomed in number and grew larger and more complex in scale, and as gladiators became an increasingly valuable source of mus- cle and protection in the violent ambience of late Republican politics. In such

54 Caes., Civ. 1.14.2: gladiatoresque quos ibi [sc. Capuae] Caesar in ludo habebat ad forum productos Lentulus libertatis confirmat atque his equos attribuit et se sequi iussit; quos postea, monitus ab suis, quod ea res omnium iudicio reprehendebatur, circum familias conuentus Campaniae custodiae causa distribuit. 55 Cf. Asconius’ description of Milo’s personal entourage, which included gladiators, as ‘Miloniani’ (Asc. p. 32, Clark). 56 Rome: EAOR I, nos. 68, 78, 101. Pompeii: CIL IV 1182, 2508 = Sabbatini Tumolesi 1980: nos. 29, 32. Corduba: CIL II2/7, 365 = EAOR VII, no. 21. Gades: Aé 1962, 58 = EAOR VII, no. 29. For ‘Neroniani’, cf. CIL VI 10172-3; AE 1988, 27 = EAOR, I, nos. 33-4, 87 (Rome); CIL IV 1190, 2508, 10236–8 = Sabbatini Tumolesi 1980: nos. 22, 32, 71; cf. CIL IV 1421–2, 1474, 1513, 2387, 2508 (all Pompeii); CIL IX 466 = EAOR III, no. 68 (Venusia); CIL II2/7, 355, 359, 361 = EAOR VII, nos. 31, 23, 24 (Corduba). 57 Cf. PFLAUM 1950: 51, 73, 76-7, 268; id. 1960: 2.737-8.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 51 18/04/16 14:37 52 jonathan edmondson

circumstances, their viability as financial assets – as a form of non-coined money – became ever more apparent to the Roman elite. They could be bought, trained up, rented out, and then sold on at a higher price, especially if victories in the arena boosted their fame, increased their fan-base, and enhanced their intrinsic value. Constant training gave gladiators ever greater skills, which in turn made them a more valuable asset, increasing their rental or purchase price. Julius Cae- sar appears to have recognized their full potential as a form of investment and set in place the foundations of the organizational regime that later Caesars adopted and developed still further. At the same time, gladiators could also be presented to close-kin or friends as outright gifts or, perhaps more frequently, on an on-loan basis, helping in the process to cement the social bonds between the partners in this process of exchange. In this manner they clearly played a role in more traditional forms of elite gift-exchange, which coexisted alongside more monetized types of transactions. Thus, in microcosm, the various modes of acquiring gladiators illustrate the highly variegated nature of exchange systems in the late Republic. The wide variation in the abilities, experience, and ‘star-quality’ of individual gladiators must have made it difficult to assign them a fixed monetary value. Their value must have been based on a careful evaluation of their skills, career- record to date, and future potential, as negotiated between buyer and seller. As a result, gladiators cannot have functioned as ‘general-purpose money’, which in Karl Polanyi’s formulation has to serve a range of different functions in any given society: not just as a means of exchange, but also as a method of payment, a standard of value, a store of wealth, and a unit of account. Rather one might argue that gladiators functioned as a form of ‘special-purpose money’, serving as a restricted means of exchange, a method of payment, and, perhaps most of all, as a store of wealth. 58 There were higher risks, of course, in investing in this type of asset than in ordinary slaves: injuries in training or in the arena and, most of all, death in the heat of the combat could reduce or eliminate their value at a stroke. The steep differential in Roman contract law between the purchase price and the rental fee for gladiators, which stood in a ratio of 50 to 1 (20 denarii for rental vs. 1,000 denarii for purchase), if we can trust Gaius’ figure (Inst. 3.146), vividly reflects the investment risk for owners. It is, of course, impossible to even begin to try to quantify the degree to which gladiators served as a medium of exchange, but in the light of arguments developed in this paper it now seems clear that they need to be taken more fully into account as part of the broad variety of assets that Roman aristocrats in the later Republic built up to use as forms of monetary exchange and as a facet of more traditional practices of gift-exchange that continued to exist even in the face of the growth of an increasingly complex monetized economy.

58 Cf. further Polanyi 1957: 264-6; id. 1977: ch. 9; Maurer 2006: esp. 20-2. Also useful is Bloch and Parry 1989: esp. ch. 1 (Introduction).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 52 18/04/16 14:37 Rhetoric and Money: The Lex Aurelia Iudicaria of 70 B.C.

Brahm Kleinman

During the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70, the praetor Lucius Aurelius Cotta proposed the lex Aurelia Iudiciaria, a law that eliminated the senatorial monopoly on jury positions at criminal trials. 1 During his dictatorship in the late 80s, Sulla had transferred the permanent courts, the quaestiones, from the equestrian order to the senatorial order so as to give more power to the senate (Cic., Verr. 1.37; Vell. 2.32). Instead, when passed, the lex Aurelia granted juror rights to senators, equites and the tribuni aerarii equally. The enactment of this law has been cited by historians such as Hill and more recently by Flower as part of a process by which the so-called Sullan constitution was slowly overthrown during the decade after his death. According to these scholars, this process culminated in 70 with both the lex Aurelia and the overturning of Sulla’s law that had deprived the tribunate of the plebs of its traditional powers, though scholars disagree on whether these laws represent a return to pre-Sullan forms of Republican government. 2 This analysis presents the lex Aurelia as an example of class conflict between the declining senatorial order and the increasingly successful equestrian order, and also emphasises that excessive corruption in the senatorial courts led to the passing of the law. Others, including Erich Gruen, have rejected these explanations, arguing instead that any discussion of class conflict between the equestrian and senatorial orders in this period is anachronistic; the law did not threaten senatorial interests or the Sullan constitution, and it was not proposed in order to eliminate judicial corruption, but for administrative reasons. 3 After a brief discussion of the law’s contents, I will examine the causes of the proposal and adoption of the lex Aurelia and will argue for three principal causes. First, I will argue that although the extent of corruption in the courts in the 70s has been overstated by our sources, rhetoric against senatorial corruption gave the law popularity and momentum. This rhetoric, in conjunction with an aristocratic feud between the Cottae and Lucullus as well as pressure from the publicani due to Lucullus’

1 All dates are B.C. unless otherwise noted. 2 Hill 1952: 152-6; Flower 2010a: 141-2; id. 2010b: 83-4. 3 Gruen 1974: 28-35.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 53 18/04/16 14:37 54 brahm kleinman

taxation reforms, led to the adoption of the law. Therefore, the Lex Aurelia provides an example of how the combination of aristocratic competition, the rhetoric of monetary corruption and financial interests could influence the proposal and adoption of legislation. Our sources for the law are limited and contradictory, though a scholarly consensus has emerged on its contents. The summary of book 97 of Livy states that ‘at the hands of the praetor Marcus Aurelius Cotta the courts were transferred to the equites by the Roman people.’ 4 Plutarch’s description is similar (Pomp. 22), though he notes that the law was passed with the approval of the consul Pompey. Yet Asconius writes (Pis. 17C; also Schol. Bobb. 94 St.) that Lucius Aurelius Cotta proposed the law by which the courts were divided between the senate, Roman knights, and tribuni aerarii, a group that is not mentioned in either Plutarch or Livy. Asconius’ definition of the law is supported by the description of several trials in the letters of Cicero, such as the trial of Sextus Cloelius in March of 56, in which he notes that the jury was divided into three groups which voted separately: the senators, the equites and the tribuni aerarii. 5 The contemporary evidence of Cicero suggests that both Livy and Plutarch are incorrect: the lex Aurelia did not transfer the courts to the equestrians, but divided them into three decuries. The identity of the tribuni aerarii has been contested, though it may be inferred. An eques can be loosely defined as a man who surpassed the highest census requirement (likely of 400,000 HS) set by Gaius Gracchus when he first enrolled non-senators in the quaestiones. 6 They were also enrolled in the 18 equestrian centuries, but were not members of the senate. I accept Claude Nicolet’s argument that the tribuni aerarii were those who met, or nearly met, this census requirement but were considered to be of lower class than the equites or who did not belong to the 18 centuries, though it has also been suggested that they were members of the centuriate assembly’s first class, who were considered of higher social status. 7 However, the latter suggestion is unlikely. As Ramsey has recently shown, it was only Marc Antony’s judiciary

4 Liv., Per. 97: Iudicia quoque per M. Aurelium Cottam praetorem ad equites Romanis translata sunt (‘the courts were also transferred to the equestrians through Marcus Aurelius Cotta the praetor’). This statement is most notably flawed in its attribution of the law to Marcus Aurelius Cotta instead of Lucius. For similar descriptions of the ‘laws’ contents, cf. Tac., Ann. 11.22.10; Vell. 2.32.3. 5 Cic., Q. Fr. 2.5; similarly, note Cic., Q. Fr. 2.16; Asc., Pis. 28C, in which he states that in the trial of Aemilius Scaurus in 54 ‘votes were cast by twenty two senators, 23 knights [and] 25 tribuni aerarii.’ 6 App., B.C. 1.22; Plin., Nat. 33.34; Hill 1952: 111; Badian 1972: 83-4. 7 Nicolet 1966-74: 1.608-10; Wiseman 1971: 68-9; 1988: 210-1; Williamson 2005: 305. Cassius Dio (43.25.1-2) states that before Caesar amended the laws concerning the jurorship during his dictatorship, πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμίλου τινὲς συνδιεγίγνωσκον αὐτοῖς (‘previously some of the common people had also made judgements with them [the equestrians and senators]’).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 54 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 55

law of 44 that extended the jurorship to members of the first class. 8 Cicero’s grouping of the tribuni aerarii with the equites and senators and not with the plebs in the Pro Plancio (21) further suggests they were of a higher census class. The lex Aurelia, then, split jury service between three separate classes, suggesting that the law was a compromise; no class was to monopolize the courts, as was the case before. With the contents of the law in mind, I will now turn to the reasons for the law’s proposal and adoption. In the introduction to his first speech against Verres in the summer of 70, Cicero claims that ‘a belief has by this time established itself… that these courts, constituted as they now are, will never convict any man, however guilty, if only he has money.’ 9 The trial of Verres for provincial extortion took place as a law on court reform was being formulated, and it appears that the lex Aure- lia had already been proposed by 20 September, when the second phase of the trial was to begin. 10 In the context of this imminent court reform, Cicero argues that Verres’ guilt was so incontrovertible that by acquitting him, the senatorial jurors would display their own corruption to such a degree that popular furor would cause the lex Aurelia to be passed. On the other hand, by convicting Verres the senators could demonstrate their honesty and therefore maintain their jury privileges (Cic., Verr. 2.3.223). Cicero’s undelivered speeches against Verres also provide insight into Cotta’s possible rhetoric. Cicero states (Verr. 2.3.224) that Cotta had delivered speeches in contiones claiming that the corruption of the senatorial extortion courts had diminished Rome’s reputation to such an extent that political stability was threatened unless the courts were given to the equestrians, who had never committed such offences. It seems that Cicero and Cotta himself argued that one of the most important causes for the proposal and adoption of the lex Aurelia was the corruption of the senatorial courts due to bribery of the jurors. Erich Gruen contests the notion that the senatorial courts were as corrupt as Cicero claims and denies that a problem of widespread judicial bribery caused the lex Aurelia to be proposed and then passed, and his argument has some merit. 11 It was in Cicero’s interest to stress the corruption of the courts and

8 Ramsey 2005: 24-32. 9 Cic., Verr. 1.1; for a short summary concerning the argumentation of the Verrine orations, cf. Frazel 2009: 18. 10 Ferrary 1975: 333-4. Only Cicero’s first speech against Verres was actually delivered, however, since Verres fled afterwards, the others, which Cicero intended to deliver, were published. It is likely that Cicero made changes to the text after the adoption of the lex Aurelia to emphasize, perhaps incorrectly, his role in the passing of the law. 11 Gruen 1974: 30-1; Berry (2003: 225, 229) frames such rhetoric as evidence for Cicero’s attachment to the equestrian order. Some scholars have accepted the Ciceronian narrative, e.g. Badian 1972: 96; Hoy: 1952: 12-20. For a short discussion of the lex in the context of judicial secret ballot laws and for the interesting observation concerning how we have no evidence that equestrian jurors were ever prosecuted for judicial corruption, cf. Rosillo-López 2010a: 160, 176.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 55 18/04/16 14:37 56 brahm kleinman

therefore the importance of Verres’ trial in assuring or preventing the adoption of Cotta’s law in order to goad the jurors into voting for conviction. 12 Cicero himself admits in the Brutus that rhetoricians are allowed to distort history to make a point. 13 And the fact that Cicero, in effect, won the trial when Verres was forced to flee, and that the law was still passed, contradicts Cicero’s claim that the law would only be passed if Verres won the case. Therefore, we should view Cicero’s rhetoric in this trial with some scepticism. Indeed, Cicero likely exaggerates the corruption of the senatorial courts. Gruen, noting that most of our knowledge of judicial corruption in the 70s comes from Cicero’s speeches against Verres and in the Pro Cluentio, argues that there are only three certain examples of judicial bribery in the 70s: the trials of Q. Calidius in 77, of Terentius Varro in 74, and of Oppianicus in the same year. 14 He claims that the rest of the examples Cicero gives are ‘a mass of Ciceronian hyperbole.’ He further notes approximately twenty cases in the 70s for which there is no implication of bribery, though the silence of our evidence is not decisive. Given this lack of evidence, and noting that Cicero has to be read with scepticism, it seems impossible to determine the extent of corruption in the senatorial criminal courts. However, it is reasonable to assume that bribery was not a problem unique to the senatorial courts. Jurors continued to be bribed in the mixed courts immediately after the adoption of the lex Aurelia. 15 It is similarly unlikely that no equestrians had received bribes before Sulla’s reforms, despite Cicero’s claims to the contrary (Font. 32.46). Yet it is important to note the effectiveness of the rhetoric of corruption in the late Republic and how this rhetoric could lead to the adoption of laws. 16 In this respect, it is not relevant whether judicial corruption was common or whether the equestrian courts had been corrupt or not. A praetor like Cotta, using the rhetoric of financial corruption that Cicero describes, could argue from a few notorious examples that the senatorial jurors were corrupt and that the courts of the equites had been free from bribery, whether true or not, and

12 Gruen 1974: 35. 13 Cic., Brut. 42; Lintott 2008: 33. 14 Gruen 1974: 34-5; for Calidius, cf. Cic., Verr. 1.38; for Varro’s case, in which the voting ballots were marked by the defense lawyer Hortensius so he could see whether the people that were bribed had voted for his client’s acquittal, cf. Cic., Verr. 1.40; Clu. 130; for a narrative of the trial of Oppianicus, cf. Cic., Clu. 62-116. 15 Cf. Dio. 36.38 for an example of judicial bribery as early as 68, and more famously, Cic., Att. 1.16, in which he condemns bribery at the Clodius trial of 61. Rosillo-López (2010a: 155-78) provides a summary of evidence for judicial bribery in the Roman Republic. 16 Morstein-Marx 2004: 282. Contra Williamson 2005: 78, 9495, 260, who argues that for political leaders proposing legislation, ‘successful leadership rested on their ability to effectively recognize and facilitate the needs and wishes of the people expressed in Rome.’ This conclusion at the very least over-simplifies the complexity of the inter action between speakers and audiences at legislative contiones (infra: n. 19).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 56 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 57

thus ensure that his law was passed. 17 This is further supported by the rhetoric used by others who criticized the senatorial monopoly of the courts. For example, the tribune L. Quinctius attacked senatorial judicial corruption after the Oppianicus trial, and Cicero notes (Clu. 77, 130) the outrage against the courts after the trial of Terentius Varro in 74/73, in which Hortensius had the voting tablets marked so that he could see whether the jurors he had bribed had fulfilled their end of the bargain. Cicero also notes the universal approval Pompey attained at a contio in 71 when he spoke out against the corruption of the courts (Verr. 1.45). Moreover, as Morstein-Marx and others have noted, expressions of popular opinion at contiones were often staged by those who called them, meaning that the alleged popularity of this sort of rhetoric against judicial bribery was at least partially manufactured. 18 Yet Morstein-Marx has further shown how elites could claim that contional responses represented the ‘will of the Roman people’ and use this artificial consensus to create a bandwagon effect and enough momentum for legislation to be passed. 19 This explains why Cotta was holding contiones every day; he needed to ensure that his rhetoric against monetary corruption continued to succeed in drawing enough public attention and in maintaining the appearance of widespread support for his law so that its adoption would eventually become inevitable (Cic., Verr. 2.3.223-4). The lex Calpurnia de ambitu of 67 provides a similar example of this process, though the context for its adoption is difficult to reconstruct. 20 According to Dio, the tribune Cornelius initially proposed a law with severe penalties on those guilty of ambitus (loosely translated here as ‘electoral bribery’), which the concilium plebis adopted. 21 The senate, however, feared that a strict law with such excessive punishments would discourage accusations and condemnations;

17 For Cicero’s paraphrase of Cotta’s rhetoric, cf. Verr. 2.3.223-4. For similar rhetoric, cf. Cic., Verr. 1.38, in which he states that not a single equestrian juror had ever been suspected of accepting bribes: cum equester ordo iudicaret, annos prope quinquaginta continuos in nullo iudices equite Romano iudicante ne tenuissima quidem suspicio acceptae pecuniae ob rem iudicandam constituta sit. 18 Morstein-Marx 2004: 158-9; Pina Polo 1996: 134-40; Mouritsen 2001: 46-52; cf. Hölkeskamp 2004: 234-42. 19 Morstein-Marx 2004: 124-8, drawing on Laser 1997: 68-9, 138-42, who argues that this process explains why legislation seems to have been so rarely defeated in actual votes. Note that I do not make any claims about the class identities of the voters on legislation and on whether late Republican politics were democratic or not, questions which are irrelevant for the purpose of my argument. 20 On the lex Calpurnia, the tribunate of Cornelius, and the events of 67, cf. McDonald 1929; Broughton, MRR II: 144; Griffin 1973; Gruen 1974: 213-5; Hayne 1974: 280-2; Morstein-Marx 2004: 215, 275; Williamson 2005: 373-6; Rosillo-López 2010a: 66-7. 21 Dio 36.38.1-36.40.3. The complexities of the definition of ambitus are far beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be noted that ‘bribery’ has too many modern, pejora- tive connotations to accurately express the concept.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 57 18/04/16 14:37 58 brahm kleinman

prominent aristocrats were also hostile to Cornelius and may have wanted to block his legislation to limit the political success of his tribunate. 22 However, it seems to have been recognized that the adoption of a law against ambitus was now inevitable and desirable. Dio (36.38.4, 39.3) and Asconius (Corn. 74C-75C) both reference the support Cornelius had gathered for his law, and Dio mentions that the tribune led a crowd to attack the consuls, likely at a contio. Critically, Dio claims that the consul Calpurnius Piso did not propose his own version of the law, which was eventually adopted, because he wanted to restrict ambitus; he proposed the lex Calpurnia because he was forced to by ‘the senate’, reacting to the popularity of Cornelius’ initiative. 23 Although this case is not identical by any means to the lex Aurelia, I believe it shows how rhetoric against a monetary practice styled as corruption could lead to enough popular support for a law that its adoption became assured, even when the magistrate proposing the law was opposed to its measures. Gruen’s argument against there being an abnormal amount of judicial corruption in the 70s therefore may be correct. Still it is likely that Cotta and his allies effectively used rhetoric concerning judicial bribery to gain support for his law, and that the lex Aurelia was passed to eliminate judicial corruption, even if that is not the most important reason for which it was proposed. Granting the importance of this rhetoric of judicial corruption in securing the adoption of Cotta’s law, the law has also been understood as a product both of popular and tribunician discontent with the rule of Sulla’s aristocracy and of class conflict between the equestrians and senators. The criminal courts, after all, had belonged to the equites before the dictatorship of Sulla, and were polit- icized to such a degree that jurors could convict political enemies and acquit allies and friends, though convictions, admittedly, were rare. Famously, equestrian jurors had convicted the innocent senator Rutilius Rufus of provincial extortion in 92 after he had reformed eastern provincial administration to diminish the

22 It is impossible to determine what these excessive punishments might have been. Perhaps, as the lex Tullia of 63 later imposed, the tribune Cornelius’ plebiscite stipulated the harsher penalty of ten years’ exile for those convicted of ambitus (Cic., Mur. 47; Dio 37.25.3). On hostility to Cornelius and on inimicitia as a factor in Republican politics, cf. Asc., Corn. 57C-58C; Epstein 1987: 65-9. 23 Dio 36.38.3: ἔπραξαν δὲ τοῦθ᾽ οἱ ὕπατοι οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἤχθοντο τῷ πράγματι… ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἠναγκάσθησαν ὑπὸ τῆς γερουσίας (‘the consuls did not do this because they objected to the practice… but because they were forced to by the senate’). Of course, once Piso was set on this course it became necessary for him to ensure that the law was adopted to increase his own aristocratic prestige at the expense of Cornelius. This competition over who could take credit for the law also explains why Cornelius protested Piso’s lex. He argued that that the senate had infringed on the rights of the people by allowing Piso to present his bill to the people, even though elections had already been called, thereby disregarding the plebiscite adopted by the concilium plebis: Dio 36.39.2. Cf. Schol. Bob.148 (Stangl) on the leges Aelia et Fufia prohibiting legislation after the announcement of elections.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 58 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 59

corrupt practices of the publicani. 24 Cicero also claims that in cases of extortion, senatorial jurors were predisposed to acquit fellow senators. For example, when Gaius Julius Caesar prosecuted Cornelius Dolabella for extortion in 77 with the support of many Greek cites, Dolabella was acquitted and Caesar was forced to leave Rome due to the resulting hostility. 25 Jurors therefore possessed some political power and Sulla’s transfer of the courts away from the equites was clearly meant to extend senatorial influence. 26 The question remains as to whether the lex Aurelia was a popular proposal meant to destroy one of the few remaining arrangements of the Sullan constitution and to attack the Sullan aristocracy, and as to whether the law was the result of an inter-class struggle between equites and senators. Some scholars have rejected these explanations and argued that the law was proposed for administrative reasons, such as to ease the burden on the small number of senators who were forced to judge all trials in the quaestiones. According to this interpretation, there was no pressure for judicial reform outside of the senate and the law was not consciously meant to attack Sulla’s constitution. I disagree with this administrative argument and will conclude instead that certain equites, and most notably the publicani, pressured Cotta to propose the law and that Cotta also hoped to use the law to gain prestige and weaken his rivals. Tribunes of the plebs do seem to have contested the Sullan judicial arrangement, at least during the later years of the 70s. Admittedly, there is no evidence to suggest that popular agitation for court reform was ever an important issue in the platform of many popular reformers in the 70s. 27 The first recorded attempt to reform the courts seems to have been in 74-73, when, the tribune of the plebs Lucius Quinctius criticized the senatorial courts as well as the lack of traditional tribunician power in the aftermath of the Oppianicus trial (Cic., Clu. 77, 110, 136). Quinctius was likely more concerned with advancing his career than with the destruction of the Sullan constitution. Still, it is interesting that he was able to gain temporary popularity and to stir up the populace to violence with this rhetoric, if Cicero can be believed. 28 Therefore, promoting anti-Sullan court arrangements could help an aristocrat promote his career. In 71, then, as noted before, Pompey similarly promised to restore tribunician powers and to reform the courts if he became consul, and this was met with popular approval at his contio; he kept both promises during his and Crassus’ consulship, as demonstrated by Plutarch’s attestation of his support for Cotta’s law. 29 Clearly

24 Vell. 2.13; Gruen 1968: 204-5. 25 Cic., Verr. 1.41; Suet., Iul. 4; Plu., Caes. 4. 26 Vell. 2.32; Hill 1952: 148. 27 Gruen 1974: 33. 28 Cic., Clu. 136. Gruen (1974: 33-4) accepts this. 29 Cic., Verr. 1.45; Plu., Pomp. 22. Cicero’s claim that Pompey’s promise of court reform was more popular than his promise of tribunician reform is undoubtedly exaggerated.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 59 18/04/16 14:37 60 brahm kleinman

there was debate and agitation concerning court reform towards the end of the 70s, and aristocrats could use the issue to gain prestige and support. It is, however, mistaken to conclude, based on the limited evidence we have, that political reformers opposed to the Sullan constitution had been attempting to reform the courts throughout the entire decade or, to the same degree, that they attempted to restore tribunician powers. Some have questioned whether Lucius Cotta’s law was meant to weaken Sulla’s constitution, since, to quote Gruen, Cotta was ‘a member of the ruling class, not an eques or a demagogue.’ 30 Yet in the context of aristocratic competition, there is nothing inconsistent about Cotta’s status. I would argue that Cotta used the lex Aurelia both to attain prestige and to weaken the position of his competitors, who continued to support Sulla’s constitutional reforms. Cotta was undoubtedly part of the post-Sullan core aristocracy. As Cicero says (Verr. 2.2.174), Cotta was neither a new man in the senate nor ‘a man of equestrian antecedents… but a man of most ancient nobility.’ And Cotta’s family was quite successful after Sulla’s dictatorship. His brothers Gaius and Marcus held the consulship in 75 and 74 respectively, and Lucius himself would become consul in 65. Yet any reform in this period would necessarily have been initiated by a distinguished member of the senate. Few new men ever reached the highest magistracies, and the tribunes of the plebs now lacked legislative powers. 31 Any reform must have been proposed by an eminent member of the senate of at least praetorian rank. I also disagree with the assumption that any distinguished senator who proposed reforms must have done so in the interests of the Sullan system. 32 As we have seen, in order to gain prestige and attack rivals, reformers in the 70s attempted to weaken Sulla’s laws and thus criticized the so-called Sullan constitution. 33 So, it is noteworthy that Lucius Cotta’s brother Gaius proposed a law when he was consul in 75 that, when adopted, eliminated one of Sulla’s most important reforms, in this case by allowing men to hold offices after the tribunate. 34 Furthermore, Asconius, quoting Cicero’s fragmented speech Pro

30 Gruen 1974: 29. Similarly, cf. Badian 1958: 280-1; Marshall 1975: 142-3. 31 Wiseman 1971: 6-8; on the tribunate, cf. App., B.C. 1.100; Plu., Pomp. 22. 32 Gruen 1974: 29, 42. 33 Ferrary 1975: 322-3, 327-8. 34 Sall., Hist. 3.48.8; Asc., Corn. 67C, 78C. Gruen (1974: 26-7) has taken a remark from the speech of Licinius Macer in Sall., Hist. 3.48.8 that Gaius Cotta was ex factione media consul (‘a consul from the heart of the oligarchy’ his trans.) to show that Cotta was ‘a central figure in the Sullan establishment’ who ‘knew full well that an enhancement of the tribunician office opened no major breach in the Sullan constitution.’ For a similar interpretation, cf. Syme 1964: 200. Gruen’s translation is undoubtedly correct, yet we should be careful in using this speech as evidence for the motives of political actors in the 70s, even if it does provide a useful and brief history of tribunician action during that period. The rhetoric of the speech is constructed around Macer’s assertion that he is fighting alone against the power of the nobility (Sall., Hist. 3.48.3:

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 60 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 61

Cornelio (Asc., Corn. 78C), writes that there were senators after Sulla’s death who ‘believed that they should cling to [Sulla’s policies] at any cost… [and] were the deadly enemies of C. Cotta.’ This does not mean that all those who wanted to maintain Sulla’s laws were necessarily Cotta’s enemies. If Cicero is to be believed, Quintus Lutatius Catulus, who had supported Sulla and who continued to prominently support his policies in the 70s, was friends with Cotta in 77. 35 There were no strict party lines in the senate in the 70s, dividing senators between factions of optimates and populares. Still, reformers like Cotta could clearly present a threat to the Sullan constitution despite their political status. Instead, I argue that Lucius Cotta’s proposal of the law can be explained in the context of his family’s rivalry with Lucius Lucullus, a rivalry his brother Gaius Cotta had developed when they both were sent to fight Mithridates of Pontus; Lucullus, significantly, had been one of the most notable supporters of Sulla and had remained powerful in the post-Sullan senate. 36 In this context of aristocratic rivalry, it is also interesting to note that Pompey was an opponent of Lucullus’. It is possible that Lucius Cotta and Pompey allied themselves in 70 and sought to reform the courts in opposition to Lucullus and his allies, who had already attempted to maintain Sulla’s laws, as is shown by Sallust’s note that Lucullus had opposed Quintius in 74 when he agitated for court and tribunician reform. 37 Although there is more to be said about this possible alliance with respect to the proposal of the lex Aurelia, nonetheless it is clear that divisions within the senate in the 70s caused agitation for court reform. Senators like the Cotta brothers and Quintius were disposed to attack the laws Sulla had introduced and did so to weaken powerful pro-Sullan rivals, while forming alliances with other reformers such as Pompey. 38 The argument does not hold that Lucius Cotta’s law automatically implied no fissure in the Sullan constitution

Neque me praeterit, quantas opes nobilitatis solus, impotens inani specie magistratus pellere dominatione incipiam). It is in the interests of Sallust’s Licinius Macer to emphasize Cotta’s status as an oligarch to stress that he only passed his law out of fear of the plebs. On the difficulties of using this speech to reconstruct political ideologies, particularly due to the lack of context for the speeches in Sallust’s fragmentary Histories, see Blänsdorf, 1978: 54-6; Latta 1999. For the tendency of Sallustian speeches in general to subvert the historical characterization of the individual speakers and those they are discussing in favour of stylistic and thematic unity, cf. Sklenář 1998: 205-6. 35 Cic., N.D. 1.79; on Catulus, cf. Sall., Hist. 3.48.10. I once again note the complexity of this speech and the difficulties in using it as evidence. Still, its annalistic narrative of specific tribunes attempting to restore the power of their office, as well as the consuls who opposed them seems quite credible, especially since it contradicts Macer’s own rhetoric that he is the only tribune to have opposed the nobilitas (Sall., Hist. 3.48.3-5). 36 Plu., Luc. 2-5, 8. Plutarch writes that Sulla was affectionate of Lucullus and appointed him guardian of his sons. Lucullus became consul in 75. 37 Plu., Luc. 4-5; Pomp. 22 ; Sall., Hist. 3.48.11. 38 Ferrary 1975: 326-8.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 61 18/04/16 14:37 62 brahm kleinman

because he belonged to a distinguished senatorial family. Even those who were deeply engrained in the Roman aristocracy could benefit politically by disman- tling Sulla’s less favoured laws and allying themselves with reformers. The lex Aurelia was therefore likely proposed by Cotta in the context of aristocratic competition and passed, at least in part, to eliminate judicial corruption. Yet the most pressure for the proposal of the law likely came from equites who wanted to protect and extend their interests. Financial interests and the rhetoric of corruption could intersect with aristocratic competition. This conclusion does not imply that there was a struggle between all elements of the equestrian and senatorial orders. As we have already seen, there were divisions within the senate on this issue, and there is no evidence to suggest that the equestrian order as a whole campaigned for court reform. 39 But it does not follow, as some have argued, that because Sulla had included many former equestrians in the senate when he enlarged the number of senators from 300 to 600, that the equites did not agitate for court reform, or that the lex Aurelia was mainly proposed for administrative reasons without opposition from any senators (App., B. C. 1.100; Liv., Per. 89.4). Sulla’s enlargement of the senate to include many equestrians did not likely reconcile those equites who were not promoted and at the same time remained deprived of the right to be jurors. Sulla’s proscriptions, after all, were responsible for the deaths of many equestrians (2,000), and the size of the class had increased as Italian elites were slowly enfranchised after the Social War. 40 Santangelo has also recently cast doubt on Appian’s figure, arguing that there is no evidence to corroborate Sulla’s enlargement of the senate to 600 members. 41 Even if we grant that Appian is accurate (B. C. 1.100), it is still unlikely that Sulla’s senate even remained the same size. Appian notes that in the late 50s, only 392 senators voted on a proposal. Though some senators were simply absent from the meeting or in the provinces, we still know from Cicero and Cassius Dio that in the year 70 the censors ejected approximately sixty four senators from the senate, though it is impossible to determine whether these ejections occurred before or after the proposal of the lex Aurelia. 42 If after these expulsions there still remained approximately 200-250 former equestrians in the senate, it does not follow that allowing these men to be jurors would have

39 Gruen 1974 : 29-30; Nicolet 1966-74 : 625-30. 40 App., B. C. 1.103; no doubt Appian exaggerates the number. Concerning the integration of Italian elites after the Social War, see Lovano 2002: 61-3, who argues that the censorship of 86 under the Cinnae dominatio enrolled at least a limited number of new citizens, particularly those who were loyal to the Cinnan regime. However, he admits it is impossible to determine what this census accomplished. It was only in the year 70 that a full census was conducted to place all new Italian citizens into their proper classes. Cf. Wiseman 1969: 59-75; Bispham 2007: 189-99, 204. 41 Santangelo 2006: 8-15. 42 Cic., Clu. 127; Dio 36.38; Hawthorn 1962: 53, 57.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 62 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 63

satisfied the many other equites who belonged to the 18 equestrian centuries but were not members of the senate. Indeed, Appian notes (B. C. 1.35) that the equestrians disliked Livius Drusus’ proposal in 91 to transfer the courts to the senate while allowing some equestrians to become senators for this very reason. Similarly, this arrangement would not have satisfied other men who did not belong to those centuries but possessed considerable wealth, such as the tribuni aerarii, though they had not been jurors before. And since Cicero notes (Cic., Verr. 2.2.174, 5.177; cf. Vell. 2.32) that the equites wanted jury rights, and since they were granted that right and began to seek other rights soon after, including reserved seats in theatres as per the law of Roscius in 67, there is no reason to think that Sulla’s enlargement of the senate stopped some equites from coming into conflict with senators over the courts. We know of one example of conflict between equites and senators that directly contributed to tensions surrounding the proposal of the lex Aurelia. I have already mentioned that when Rutilius Rufus attempted to regulate equestrian publicani in the 90s, the equestrian jurors responded by unjustly convicting him of provincial extortion. Similarly, Plutarch writes (Luc. 7) that when Lucullus was fighting Mithridates in the late 70s, he found that the eastern Roman empire was impoverished due to the greed of these equestrian money lenders and tax collectors. Lucullus therefore first tried to admonish the publi cani, and according to Plutarch (Luc. 20), when this failed, he drove them off. In late 71 and early 70, he ordered further debt relief for the eastern provinces and enacted laws to regulate interest rates and lending practices which were favourable to the provincial inhabitants but not to the publicani. As a result, equites began to attack Lucullus at Rome by bribing and forcing indebted senators to oppose his military command in the east. 43 The pressure against Lucullus culminated in Pompey’s replacement of him in 66, despite the number of senators still supporting his command (Plu., Luc. 36). Jean-Louis Ferrary has suggested that the tensions created by this conflict caused equites to also apply more pressure for court reform to their allies, and in particular to Cotta and Pompey. 44 This is plausible, particularly since our sources note that Pompey supported the lex Aurelia and was an enemy of Lucullus. 45 It is also known that Pompey was later supported by the publicani and attempted to pass legislation in their interests. 46

43 Plu., Luc. 20. Keaveney (1992: 153) also suggests that the publicani initiated a propaganda campaign against Lucullus’ handling of the war through letters to Rome, for which he cites Cicero’s reference to such a letter campaign in the year 66 (Cic., Leg. Man. 4). This suggestion is probable, though admittedly conjectural. 44 Ferrary 1975: 338-41. 45 Pompey’s support of the law: Cic., Verr. 1.45; Plu., Pomp. 22. Pompey’s rivalry with Lucullus: Plu., Luc. 5. 46 App., B. C. 2.13; Stockton 1973: 218. Pompey, after all, did not become a member of the senate until his consulship.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 63 18/04/16 14:37 64 brahm kleinman

There has been some debate, however, on the identity of the publicani. Should we be comfortable automatically equating them with the equites? In other words, would the publicani have been pressing for equestrian judicial rights? The old fashioned view, promoted by Hill, is that the publicani were a central component to a rigidly defined equestrian middle class. 47 More recent scholarship has rightly revised this, noting that those whom the census strictly defined as belonging to the 18 equestrian centuries often derived their wealth from landowning. 48 Yet despite this caveat, there still seems to be consensus that the publicani were able to exert significant influence in the decuries of the equites before Sulla’s reforms and in those of the equestrians and tribuni aerarii after the adoption of the lex Aurelia. 49 Pliny the Elder suggests this when he con- flates the equites during the time of the Gracchi to an order of jurors (iudici), and then claims that the publicani became the most powerful component of the order. 50 Andeau corroborates this view by detailing the economic ties that existed between Italian landowning elites, including senators, and publicani. 51 Many who had invested in tax collecting companies might have supported pub licani interests. It is commonly accepted, then, that those responsible for the tax collecting companies were among the economic elite. The publicani were a mix of equestrians and other wealthy elites, including those who would belong to the decuria of the tribunii aerarii after 70. And for those equites who were not tax collectors but who had business interests in the provinces, it is not hard to believe that they would have supported being included as jurors in the Roman courts once the publicani and Cotta began pushing for the lex Aurelia. The non-senatorial wealthy elite could thus gain from the specific agitation of the publicani for court reform due to the policies of Lucullus in the East. It therefore is likely that some equites were agitating for court reform. This agitation likely intensified due to Lucullus’ eastern reforms, and the monetary interests of the publicani thus coincided with the goals of Pompey and Cotta.

47 Hill 1952: 45-86. 48 Nicolet 1966-74: 317-42; Brunt 1969: 88-91; Andeau 1999 : 271-4. 49 Brunt 1965: 90. 50 Plin., Nat. 33.34: Indicum autem appellatione separare eum ordinem primi omnium instituere Gracchi discordi popularitate in contumeliam senatus, mox debellata auctoritas nominis uario seditionum euentu circa publicanos substitit et aliquamdiu tertiae sortis uiri publicani fuere. 51 Andeau 1999: 278-80. The most famous example of senatorial involvement in the tax collecting businesses is Marcus Junius Brutus (Cic., Att. 6.1.5-6); Lucius Egnatius Rufus, who had business (negotia) in the provinces of Cilicia, Bithynia, and Asia, provides an example of an equestrian who did not himself collect tax but depended on the work of those who did (Cic., Fam. 13.43-5, 47, 74). For a more general analysis of the funding of tax companies, cf. Badian 1972: 67-81; Malmendier 2002: 65-221.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 64 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 65

I disagree with the notion that the principal reason for the proposal of the law was senatorial dissatisfaction with excessive jury service, and that there was no pressure from the equites for court reform. 52 According to this interpretation the law was a simple administrative reform that received no opposition and posed no threat to Sulla’s constitution. Cicero does suggest (Verr. 2.1.22) that some senators might have regarded their judicial duties ‘as a heavy and irksome burden,’ and it must have been difficult for the same 500 to 600 jurors to preside over all of Sulla’s permanent courts. And the lex Aurelia was above all a political compromise. No single class was to have control of the courts, though an argument could be made that the interests of the tribuni aerarii and equites coincided such that they held more power in the courts than the senators. 53 But it does not follow in the context of all the evidence we have that administrative problems were the chief reason for the law’s proposal, nor that the law did not threaten the Sullan constitution and was not opposed by senators who wanted to maintain Sulla’s laws. A key piece of evidence used to support this argument is Cicero’s description of the pro-Sullan senator Quintus Catulus in In Verrem 1.44, who allegedly ‘conceded that there was no point in unnecessarily rousing public antipathy,’ attesting to the lack of political struggle over the law. 54 This interpretation of the passage seems misguided. Rather, according to Cicero, Catulus responded to Pompey’s measure to restore the powers of the tribunate by stating: patres conscriptos iudicia male et flagitiose tueri: quodsi in rebus iudicandis populi Romani existimationi satis facere uoluissent, non tanto opera homines fuisse tribuniciam potestatem desideraturos. 55 This statement, then, has nothing to do with the lex Aurelia, as Catulus conceded nothing other than that the courts were corrupt in the context of tribunician

52 Gruen 1974: 30; similarly, Southern 2002: 55; Badian 1972: 96: ‘A law of 70 (passed by the praetor Lucius Aurelius Cotta) had already shared the juries between Senate and equites – not, as far as we can see (and we have plenty of evidence), owing to any demands by the equites, who, throughout the events leading up to the year 70 and the liquidation of the spirit of the Sullan constitution, are, as one might say, remarkably quiet.’ 53 Hill 1952: 155-6; Brunt 1988: 210-1; Berry 2003: 223. Some, including Ferrary (1975: 334-5, 338-9) and Berry (2003: 225), note that it is possible Cotta originally intended for the courts to be entirely transferred to the equites, based on Cicero’s wording at Verr. 2.2.174, 3.223, 5.177, which would suggest the equites and Cotta compromised in the face of strong senatorial opposition. As Ferrary himself admits, however, Cicero’s rhetoric here is weak evidence. 54 Gruen 1974: 34-5, his translation; for a similar interpretation, cf. Marshall 1975: 141. 55 Cic., Verr. 1.44: ‘The members of [the senate] were guarding the courts badly and sinfully; if in acting as judges they had wished to act well enough in the judgment of the Roman people, men would not have sought the restoration of tribunician power with such effort.’

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 65 18/04/16 14:37 66 brahm kleinman

reform. It does not suggest that he or other senators did not oppose court reform. Cicero’s rhetoric during the trial of Verres suggests the opposite. Granted, Cicero exaggerates when he claims that the passing of the lex Aurelia or a similar law depended on the verdict of the Verres trial, but the types of arguments he uses still suggest that the senators wanted to retain their court monopoly. Cicero’s argument hinges on being able to goad the senatorial jurors into convicting Verres so as to keep the courts in their possession; this then would suggest that Cicero, at least, thought that most senators would want to continue to monopolize the courts (Verr. 1.1-3; 2.3.223-4). A final piece of evidence that has been used to confirm a lack of opposition to the lex Aurelia is found in a letter of Cicero’s to his brother Quintus, written in 58, in which he cautions him concerning Hortensius. Cicero writes: illud caueto (et eo puto per Pomponium fouendum tibi esse ipsum Hortensium) ne ille uersus, qui in te erat collatus cum aedilitatem petebas, de lege Aurelia, falso testimonio confirmetur. 56 Cicero refers to Quintus’ campaign for the aedileship in 66, making it likely that the law referred to is the lex Aurelia of 70 (cf. Att. 1.4.1). Although, as McDer- mott has indicated, we should be careful in interpreting this passage due to the difficulty of determining its context, he and other scholars have settled on the following interpretation. 57 Bruce Marshall in particular has argued that Cicero here alluded to an epigram of unknown authorship which criticized the lex Aurelia, thus presumably offending Hortensius, who would then seem to have supported the law. 58 Since Marshall assumes that Hortensius belonged to a faction that was supportive of Sulla’s laws and opposed to Pompey, he concludes, similarly to Gruen, that there was little senatorial opposition to the law, at least in its final form. 59 There are several problems with this argument. The only direct piece of evidence for Hortensius’ opposition to Pompey is from Asconius (Mil. 49; Corn. 62 (Stangl)), who notes that Hortensius gave testimony against Gaius Cornelius, a tribune of the plebs allied with Pompey, in 67. Marshall’s conclusions in this respect rely on tying Hortensius to a faction opposed to Pompey and all his allies that may have never existed. 60 More importantly, I am not convinced by

56 Cic., Q. Fr. 1.3.9: ‘Beware this one thing (and I think that for this you should try to gain the favour of Hortensius himself through Pomponius), that the verse about the Aurelian law which was attributed to you when you were campaigning for the aedileship is not confirmed as yours by false evidence.’ 57 McDermott 1971: 708, n. 26. 58 Marshall 1975: 136-7. Similarly, cf. McDermott 1971: 708, n.26; Tyrell and Purser 1904: 1.377. 59 Marshall 1975: 140-1, 149-50. 60 Marshall’s argument (1975: 140, 152) in particular depends on showing that Horten sius had married into an anti-Pompeian alliance.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 66 18/04/16 14:37 rhetoric and money 67

this interpretation of Cicero’s letter. Cicero does not write that Quintus should attain Hortensius’ favour so that, if the epigram on the Aurelian law was attributed to him, Hortensius would not be offended against him. The sentence is constructed as a fear clause. Quintus should beware (caueto) and for this reason (et eo) seek the favour of Hortensius, lest the rumour that he wrote the epigram be confirmed. The implication seems to be that Hortensius would confirm that the epigram belonged to Quintus if he did not seek Hortensius’ favour, not that Hortensius would take offense at Quintus for having authored the epigram. This interpretation is also more likely in light of Cicero’s description of Hortensius earlier in the letter, which emphasizes his treachery and faithlessness. 61 A comment on Hortensius’ willingness to fabricate Quintus’ authorship of the epigram fits Cicero’s theme more than the concern that Hortensius would be genuinely offended. It is therefore impossible to use this letter for evidence of Hortensius’ and the senate’s attitudes toward the law. The adoption of the lex Aurelia Iudiciaria was therefore not the result of class warfare between the equestrians (aided by populares) and the senatorial order. But it was also not a simple administrative reform that posed no threat to the Sullan constitution or many of the senatorial supporters of his laws. The law instead provides an example of how the business interests of the publicani and rhetoric against corruption and bribery could affect senatorial politics. With the support of prominent aristocrats like Pompey and Lucius Aurelius Cotta, the publicani and other wealthy elites who were engaged in tax collecting and money lending in the east could respond to Lucullus’ financial reforms by forcing the senate to compromise and grant them some degree of political power through the courts. At the same time, Cotta and Pompey used the lex Aurelia to oppose their political enemies, gain personal prestige, and reward their allies. Finally, Cotta effectively used the rhetoric of judicial corruption to emphasize the need for judicial reform and gain support and momentum for his law. It is true that some senators likely supported the law for administrative reasons. Still, it is significant that financial interests and the rhetoric of monetary corruption were among the chief reasons that one of Sulla’s most important laws was abolished, and that, as a result, the powerful supporters of Sulla’s reforms were unable to effectively oppose the legislation of 70. Money and the rhetoric of corruption were powerful tools to ensure the adoption of legislation, and would remain so during the last 20 years of the Roman Republic.

61 Cic., Q. Fr. 1.3.8: quantum Hortensio credendum sit nescio, me summa simula tione amoris summaque adsiduitate cottidiana sceleratissime insidiosissimeque tractauit (‘I do not know how much Hortensius should be trusted, since he treated me wickedly and treacherously while pretending the greatest levels of affection, and constantly attending to me every day’).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 67 18/04/16 14:37 Provincial Commands and Money in the Late Roman Republic

Wolfgang Blösel

For decades it has been held as an undisputed axiom that the highest Roman magistrates, the consuls and praetors, had nothing else to do after their term of office but to take over one of the several provinces and to get rich by plundering the provincials. 1 Verres in Sicily, Caesar in Spain and thereafter in Gaul or Gabinius in Syria seem to be only the inglorious tip of the iceberg whereas Cicero’s reluctance to go to Cilicia seems to be the rare exception. Therefore, Ernst Badian branded the Roman nobiles as by far the greatest exploiters of the provinces and claimed that they were even more unscrupulous than the publicani. 2

Nevertheless, this allegedly general desire for a provincial governorship conflicts with a striking phenomenon during the last three decades of the Republic: a considerable number of consuls for the years 80 to 53 B.C. declined governorship of a province after their consulship. 3 If we take into consideration only the fourteen who are explicitly attested as declining such a position, the number represents a good quarter of all consuls. 4 If we add the twelve consuls for whom any hint of a governorship after their term of office is lacking, 5 it amounts

1 Cf. e.g. Jolliffe 1919; Brennan 2000: 402 and Rosillo López 2010b: 981-999, esp. 990. The case of M. Aemilius Scaurus, praetor of 56 (Asconius p. 19 Clark), might have corroborated this interpretation. 2 Badian 1968: 91. 3 Brennan 2000: 400-402; 589 has indeed detected this conspicuous phenomenon, but fails to give an explanation. I have of course left out those consuls whom disease or death prevented from taking up a governorship; cf. the short list with Brennan 2000: 589 with 892 n. 86. 4 These were: L. Cornelius Sulla (cos. II 80), D. Iunius Brutus (77), L. Gellius Publi cola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (coss. 72), P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura (71), Pompey and M. Licinius Crassus (coss. 70), Q. Hortensius Hortalus (69), L. Aurelius Cotta (65), L. Iulius Caesar (64), C. Marcius Figulus (64), Cicero (63), M. Calpurnius Bibulus (59), and L. Marcius Philippus (56). 5 These were: Cn. Octavius (cos. 76), Cn. Aufidius Orestes (71), L. Volcacius Tullus and M’. Aemilius Lepidus (coss. 66), L. Licinius Murena (62), M. Valerius Messalla Niger and M. Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus (coss. 61), Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (60),

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 68 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 69

to not quite half of the total fifty-five consuls who held office during this period. One might suggest that the consuls might not have been eager for a province because they had already reached the highest rung of the career ladder. Further- more, since the end of the Social War, military glory, to say nothing of a triumph, was not a requirement for holding the censorship. 6 All the same, we should not rate the attractiveness of a provincial governorship for the higher ranking senators based solely on the behaviour of the consuls; rather we should look at the middle stage of the cursus honorum as well. For it was the praetors who, after spending their term of office in the city of Rome, for the first time got the opportunity to control a whole province and to wage larger military actions with an independent imperium. After Sulla’s increase of the annual number of praetors from six to eight, ambitious men had to be keen in order to stand out amongst their competitors. In contrast to the consular Fasti, large gaps exist in the Fasti of the praetors, even after Sulla’s time. Nevertheless, for the years 80 to 50 we have data for 137 of the total 248 praetors, including their area of responsibility in the city and, for some, even listing a territorial province afterwards. These data have been collected by T. Corey Brennan in his monumental opus The Praetorship in the Roman Republic (2000).

Table 1:

Period Praetors who Praetors for Praetors for whom Total number governed a pro- whom only the the rejection of a of praetors vince after their urban task is province is attested urban office attested or probable 80–71 B.C. 23 15 1 39 70–61 B.C. 26 16 8 50 60–50 B.C. 23 14 11 48 Sum 72 45 20 137 Proportion 52 % 33 % 15 % 100 %

Table 1, which is based on his work, shows in the first column that, of the 137 praetors known by name, just over half, i.e. 52%, took over a territorial province after their year in office. In the second column we can see that, for another third, only urban tasks are attested whereas any hint of a prorogated imperium

Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus (56), L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (54), and Cn. Domi- tius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53). 6 As the lists of J. Suolahti 1963: 569; 732-743 show, most censors up to the Social War had celebrated a triumph before their censorship. But after 88 B.C. only M. Licinius Crassus (cens. 65) and P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cens. 55) had earned an ouatio and a triumph respectively.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 69 18/04/16 14:37 70 wolfgang blösel

for a governorship is lacking. Finally a bare sixth, i.e. 15%, of all praetors explicitly rejected a province after their urban office.

Before I discuss this latter group and its motives, it is necessary to present an overview of the possible total number of magistrates who refused to take on a province. The number of praetors for whom we do not have any evidence of a governorship after their term in office amount to a total of 156 of the 248 praetors for the years 80 to 50. 7 How many of these 156 praetors should we estimate did in fact accept a province? In order to get at least an idea we must establish the needs of governors. Using Brennan’s meticulous Fasti of governors, 8 I have listed in Table 2 the number of years between 80 and 50 B.C. for which no governor is attested in a province.

Table 2:

Province Number of years Average duration of Number of missing without an attested a governorship in governors governor years Sicilia 12 1,6 7,8 Sardinia et Corsica 26 1 (?) 26 (?) Hispania citerior 7 2 3,5 Hispania ulterior 7 1,9 3,7 Macedonia 3 1,7 1,8 Africa 17 1,7 10 Asia 3 1,3 2,3 Cilicia 3 2,2 1,4 Gallia Transalpina 2 2,3 0,9 Gallia Cisalpina 7 1,7 3,7 Bithynia et Pontus 4 1,6 2,5 Creta 16 2,5 (?) 6,4 (?) Cyrene 19 1,5 (?) 12,6 (?) Syria 0 1,8 0 Sum 126 82,6

7 In the 31 years from 80 to 50 B.C. with eight praetors per year there were 248 praetors. From these 248 we have to subtract those 72 who are proven to have taken over a province after their praetorship as well as those 20 who are proven to have declined a province. 8 Brennan 2000: 708-722.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 70 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 71

For the sake of simplicity I take it for granted that, for the years without attested governors, praetors were exclusively employed, rather than one of the twelve consuls for whom no governorship after the consulate is attested. Even if we assume the extremely unrealistic case that the Senate sent a praetor for each of these 126 years without governors, then of the 156 praetors no fewer than 30 are left over without a province. Taken together with the twenty praetors whose rejection is attested or quite probable the total number rises to 50, i.e. 20% of the 248 praetors in all. The proportion of 20%, however, is only a minimum, for if we take into consideration the average length of stay of governors in a particular province during the years 80 to 50 and add this to our calculations in table 2, then approximately 83 praetors are required to fill all positions. 9 To get this result of 83 praetors, the number of years without governors for every province (in the first column) is to be divided by the average length of stay of the known governors (in the second column). Then, the results of all provinces (in the third column) are summed. Nevertheless, governors’ average length of stay is, for most provinces, difficult to calculate, especially since in Sardinia et Corsica, Creta and Cyrene fewer than five governors are known for this period. 10 With 83 praetors needed for the provinces there remains, of 156 praetors, another 73 without a governorship. These, combined with the twenty known to have rejected a governorship, amount to 93 praetors without a province, i.e. 38 % of the total of 248. However, I suppose that far fewer than the 83 praetors calculated above would have been necessary for filling the missing governorships. For, in Sar- dinia et Corsica and Creta, besides legates and quaestores, only two officials pro quaestore and one consul respectively are attested as governors and for Cyrene not even a praetor is attested. 11 For this reason legates and quaestores pro praetore were probably sent into these three provinces. This is quite essential for our calculation as the 61 years without a governor in Sardinia et Corsica, Creta and Cyrene represent nearly half of the total 126 years.

9 The decimal places in this table should not at all suggest an accuracy which is impossible during such speculations, but should only help to avoid mistakes caused by rounding. 10 This difficulty is stressed in the table by the use of question marks. 11 For Sardinia cf. Brennan 2000: 494-498. For the legates and quaestores pro prae tore as governors of the two provinces Creta and Cyrene, which were not united until the time of Augustus, cf. Balsdon 1962: 134-141, esp. 135, and extensively Harrison 1985: 363-371, esp. 368, and Laronde 1988: 1006-1064, esp. 1013, contra Perl 1970: 319-354, who sees both provinces as constantly governed by praetors since their institu- tion in 75 and 67 respectively.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 71 18/04/16 14:37 72 wolfgang blösel

I summarise my calculations so far in Table 3:

Praetors for whom information on taking on a province 156 156 156 after their praetorship is missing Hypothetical estimate for the number of praetors who – 130 – 83 – 52 were needed for filling the missing governorships Praetors who remained without a province according 26 73 104 to this estimate Praetors whose rejection of a province is attested or + 20 + 20 + 20 probable Total sum of praetors who might have rejected taking 46 93 124 on a province Proportion of these praetors from all 248 praetors 19 % 38 % 50 %

We can assume that at least nearly a fifth of all praetors during the years 80 to 50 B.C. declined to take on a province after their praetorship. However, 38% is a more probable estimate and 50% does not seem so impossible. The same proportion of magistrates likely to have rejected a province has already been established for the consuls, precisely from a quarter up to a half. This is quite amazing for the highest officials of the Roman state who, by virtue of their imperium militiae, were authorized to govern a province. This result demonstrates beyond any doubt the non-existence of a Sullan lex Cornelia de prouinciis which – at least in the opinion of most German-speaking scholars since Mommsen – compelled the consuls and praetors after 80 B.C. to take on a province after their term of office. 12

This tremendous degree of refusal has far-reaching consequences for our picture of the Roman provinces’ distribution among the nobiles in the late Republic. Since Montesquieu’s Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence from 1734 13, it has been a truism, at least with German

12 Giovannini 1983: 97-101 has convincingly demonstrated how the fiction of a lex Cornelia permeates modern discussion. This lex is deemed a fiction by Pelham 1888: 27-52, esp. 32-3; Valgiglio 1956: 132-140; Evola Marino 1974: 115-123; Keaveney 1983: 185-208, esp. 199-200; Girardet 1987: 291-329, esp. 292-3; J.D. Cloud 1988: 69-72; Crawford 1990: 91-121, esp. 111 n. 83; Nicolet 1992: 163-166, esp. 163-4; Seager 1994: 165-207, esp. 201-2; Brennan 2000: 396 (although he retains an institu- tionalization of promagistracy by Sulla); Hurlet 2010: 45-75, esp. 49; most recently Pina Polo 2011: 225-248. 13 The incompetence of city–states to rule an empire has been already stressed by Tac., Ann. 1.1-3; Hist. 2.38.1; Flor. 3.12.6; Dio 44.2.4; 47.39.4-5; 52.15.4-6; 56.39.5

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 72 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 73

ancient historians, that the large-scale expansion of Roman power in the second and first centuries B.C. overburdened the constitution of the Roman city-state. 14 The number of annual holders of an imperium, allegedly, was no longer sufficient for governing the conquered territories. For this reason the Senate is said to have repeatedly prolonged the imperia of governors, often several times in succession, and additionally to have had to entrust extraordinary commands to people without office, especially since Sulla had, once again supposedly, tightened the legal restrictions for military activities of ‘normal’ provincial governors through his lex Cornelia de maiestate. 15 This explanation, however, is called into question by the proportion of magistrates who declined governorship of a province. For even in the fifties of the first century the, by now fourteen, provinces could have been administered by the ten annual holders of an imperium by prorogating four of them once – but only under the condition that these holders were ready to take on this task without, or nearly without, exception. Therefore, we need not look for structural defects in the Roman constitution in order to explain the multi-year extraordinary commands of Lucullus, Pompey, and Caesar. One cause for these extended commands, amongst others, was that Sulla and the Senate had omitted vigorously to oppose the nobiles’ growing lack of interest in provincial administration. Consequently, they would have had to make governing a province obligatory for all consuls and praetors after holding an urban office and to install high hurdles for its rejection. 16 There existed an urgent need for a lex de prouinciis ordinandis, the introduction of which has admittedly been ascribed to Sulla, the complete lack of which is all the more strikingly demonstrated by the historical practice afterwards. In fact, the rejection of a province required only the swearing of an oath. Velleius Paterculus reports that Pompey as consul of 70 did so and – what was especially laudable – Pompey kept his oath. 17 The last remark shows that in

(for Rome) and Thuc. 3.37.1; Strab. 6.4.2 (288C) as well. Cf. Sion-Jenkis 2000: 117- 121; 126. 14 Heuss 1956: 1-28, esp. 23; Molthagen 1974: 34-53; emphatically Bleicken 1998: 683-704, esp. 684: “Über die Ursachen des Verfalls der Republik herrscht unter allen (!) Gelehrten Einigkeit: Die Republik zerbrach an dem Mißverhältnis von Stadtstaat und Weltherrschaft”; Christ 1982: 134-167, esp. 141-144; von Ungern-Sternberg 1982: 254-271, esp. 254; 269f.; Deininger 1996: 81-94; Sion-Jenkis 2000: 11; emphatically Baltrusch 2002: 245-253. 15 Hantos 1988: 156-159; Brennan 2000: 399-400. However, as Bauman 1967: 68–87 has shown, the lex Cornelia de maiestate was for the most part only tralatician and its effects were few. Similarly Giovannini 1983: 94-5 and Zack 2001: 132-3 and 143-4. 16 Cf. Seager 1994: 202: “such a system could work only if every magistrate were compelled by law to take a province at the end of his year of office, but in fact there was no compulsion, nor even indeed any pressure.” 17 Vell. 2.31.2: Qui cum consul perquam laudabiliter iurasset se in nullam prouinciam ex eo magistratu iturum idque seruasset, … Cf. Brennan 2000: 400-402, postulating even a separate sort of oration for declining a promagisterial province.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 73 18/04/16 14:37 74 wolfgang blösel

spite of the oath, praetors would often revoke their decision to decline governorship of a province. Additionally, governorship of a province may all too often have been the last refuge from judicial prosecution. The loop-holes that allowed for nobiles’ to reject the command of a province were finally eliminated by the lex Pompeia de prouinciis in the year 52. The law prescribed an interval of at least five years between the consulate and the praetorship on the one hand and the governorship of a province on the other. So the Senate was no longer restricted to the ten annual holders of an imperium for recruiting governors. Subsequently, the senate could exert much greater pressure on those who had rejected command of a province to accept a position as demonstrated by the case of Cicero in 51 for the province of Cilicia. 18 The vast majority of Rome’s defeats in wars from 100 to 43 B.C. were not caused by provincials, but rather by Romans like Sertorius or the Italians in the Social War. Nor did these defeats take place in the Roman provinces proper, but far beyond their limits as in the case of Lucullus’ legates against Mithridates near Zela or of Crassus against the Parthians at Carrhae. 19 Therefore, Roman setbacks should not be attributed to structural defects in Roman provincial administration or to the legal restrictions imposed upon the governors.

III

Having demonstrated that there existed an aversion to governing provinces for a considerable minority of the post-Sullan high-ranking magistrates we cannot help but inquire about the possible reasons for this aversion. Ernst Badian, explains this behaviour, the alleged idleness and irresponsibility, as the addiction to metropolitan luxury and the egoism of the post-Sullan nobiles, and dismissed them as “proved cowards and open self-seekers”. 20 But can we be content with this exclusively moralistic condemnation of their alleged depravity? Were the magistrates who declined provincial commands in fact totally unmilitary characters who were merely conscious of their own shortcomings as generals? The relatively rich sources for the Ciceronian age allow us to carry out a cross-check by cataloguing the high-ranking magistrates who rejected the governorship of a province after their praetorship or consulate or are at least very likely to have done so, but later took over a military command as a legate under the command of another general. This striking behaviour is detectable for A. Gabinius, M. Petreius, C. Antonius Hybrida, Q. Fufius Calenus, P. Vatinius, and Ser. Sulpicius Galba, who served under either Pompey or Caesar. Being a legate of a famous general seems to have been politically and economically

18 Cic., Fam. 3.2.1; 15.1.4; cf. Badian 1970: 31 n. 83 and Brennan 2000: 402. 19 problems in the structure of provincial administration could be detected only on the northern frontier of Macedonia. 20 Badian 1970: 30-32, quotation 32.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 74 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 75

much more lucrative than taking on a provincial governorship. 21 These cases encourage us to suppose rational and purposeful motives for them. Since their pattern of behaviour so drastically ran counter to the previous ideals of the nobles, we may presume that this was the result of changes within the socio- political situation of the nobility. Such a pattern is discernible in the careers of the twenty praetors whom we know rejected a governorship. Table 4 shows their subsequent political careers:

Praetor Year of Year of Unsuccessful candidature praetorship consulship for the consulship of the year C. Calpurnius Piso 71 ? 67 L. Lucceius 67 59 C. Antonius 66 63 M. Tullius Cicero 66 63 C. Aquilius Gallus 66 (famous jurist) L. Cassius Longinus 66 (Catiliarian, died in 63) C. Orchivius 66 Ser. Sulpicius Rufus 65 51 (!) 62 Q. Gallius 65 Q. Voconius Naso Before 59 Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (?) 60 57 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus 58 54 Cn. Domitius Calvinus 56 53 P. Vatinius 55 47 T. Annius Milo 55 52 M. Porcius Cato (Uticensis) 54 51 L. Aemilius Paullus 53 50 Q. Minucius Thermus Before 51 M. Nonius (Sufenas?) Before 51 Cn. Tremellius Scrofa Before 51 P. Silius Before 51

Only a minority of these men left the race for the highest offices and were content with praetorian rank. On the contrary, twelve of the twenty magistrates who rejected command of a province stood for the consulate for the most part immediately after the obligatory biennium, and no fewer than seven won it at the first attempt. The nine eventual consuls out of these twenty praetors, in fact, as a group had a much higher success rate (45 %) than average praetors (25 %). 22

21 Most striking is the case of C. Antonius Hybrida, who immediately after his praetor ship in 66 became a legate of Pompey in the Mithridatic War (cf. Brennan 2000: 450 with 822 n. 80). For the growing loyalty of the legates to their patrons cf. Spielvogel 2002: 97-112. 22 This contra Brennan 2000: 793 n. 96: “for an ex-praetor to refuse a prouincia imparted no compelling advantage when running for the consulship.”

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 75 18/04/16 14:37 76 wolfgang blösel

However, this result, based on only twenty cases, may simply be an accident of transmission. A comparison with larger groups, however, confirms the trend. Only seventeen consuls of the years 80 to 53 governed a province after their praetorship, but the instances of rejections of provincial commands is attested or highly probable for twice as many (i.e. 35). 23 Why was staying home so important even for consulars? Can we help deducing from these results that the praetors, when they remained in Rome, had better chances at being elected consul? Or the other way round: Why was the governorship so unattractive? In the following sections I shall attempt to arrive at some answers. First, we need to estimate how much profit provincial governors were able to make during the late Republic. Fortunately, Raimund Schulz has recently done this work for us in a thorough review of the material. 24 Schulz has shown several ways in which the provincial governors were able to earn money: first, by investing the large sums disbursed by the Roman treasury for paying the soldiers with the publicans at good interest rates; second, by demanding excessive deliveries of grain from the provincial towns; and, third, by levying troops or ships from the provincials or by threatening to quarter soldiers in their homes. Understandably, the provincials tried to avoid all of this by paying large sums to the governor. For this reason the cities of Cyprus paid 200 talents to every new governor, that sum being sufficient for maintaining one legion for a year. Finally some governors, especially Cicero’s enemy Piso, claimed the aurum coronarium in the amount of a hundred talents even without having achieved military success in their province. 25 However, these possibilities for self-enrichment were not always present in every Roman province. Schulz rightly stresses that, contrary to the opinion of William Harris, 26 the provinces which provided opportunity for large-scale

23 These were: Ap. Claudius Pulcher (pr. 88, cos. 79), Q. Lutatius Catulus (pr. before 80, cos. 78), Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus (pr. before 79, cos. 77), D. Iunius Brutus (pr. around 80, cos. 77), C. Scribonius Curio (pr. before 80, cos. 76), Cn. Octavius (pr. before 78, cos. 76), L. Octavius (pr. before 77, cos. 75), C. Aurelius Cotta (pr. before 77, cos. 75), M. Aurelius Cotta (pr. before 76, cos. 74), M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (pr. 76, cos. 73), C. Cassius Longinus (pr. before 75, cos. 73), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (pr. around 76, cos. 72), P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura (pr. 74, II 63, cos. 71), Cn. Aufidius Orestes (pr. 77, cos. 71), Q. Hortensius Hortalus (pr. 72, cos. 69), Q. Caecilius Metellus (pr. 71, cos. 68), Q. Marcius Rex (pr. before 70, cos. 68), C. Calpurnius Piso (pr. 71?; cos. 67), M’. Acilius Glabrio (pr. 70, cos. 68), L. Volcacius Tullus (pr. before 68, cos. 66), M’. Aemilius Lepidus (pr. before 68, cos. 66), L. Manlius Torquatus (pr. before 67, cos. 65), C. Marcius Figulus (pr. before 66, cos. 64), M. Tullius Cicero (pr. 66, cos. 63), C. Antonius (pr. 66, cos. 63), D. Iunius Silanus (pr. 67, cos. 62), M. Valerius Messalla Niger (pr. 64?, cos. 61), Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (pr. 63, cos. 60), M. Calpurnius Bibulus (pr. 62, cos. 59), A. Gabinius (pr. 61, cos. 58), L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (pr. 61, cos. 58), Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (pr. 60, cos. 57), L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (pr. 58, cos. 54), Cn. Domitius Calvinus (pr. 56, cos. 53), and M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (pr. 62?, cos. 53). 24 Schulz 2011: 93-111. 25 Cf. Schulz 2011: 99-103 with detailed source references. 26 Harris 1979: 74-79.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 76 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 77

military actions were much more profitable than those at peace which required only civilian administration. Significantly, the greatest profits are reported from Spain, Transalpine Gaul, Macedonia, Cilicia, and Syria where Roman commanders could wage many wars even during the Late Republic. Presuma- bly, the booty and the profit realised from selling prisoners of war as slaves, even after small campaigns, vastly exceeded the profit from collecting grain from the provincials. Additionally, the governor could expect many more “presents” from neighbouring client kings if he were militarily active. 27 In peaceful provinces, on the other hand, the publicans and the local elites had divided the profit margins in minute detail during the, usually long, period of Roman rule. Consequently, the governors seem to have been in competition with the publicans especially in the richest provinces of Sicily, Asia, and Bithy- nia et Pontus. 28 A governor was likely to make enemies of the publicans if, despite his understandable ignorance of the local peculiarities, he tried to make a large profit from the province during the one year, or at most two years, period of his governorship. Furthermore, since many senators siphoned off the profits from the provinces as silent partners in the publicans’ societies or/and as sole creditors of large loans to the provincial cities, as shall be demonstrated below, the chances for governors to get rich were limited. Of course, ruthless governors dared to ignore these limits by imposing heavy additional taxes on the provincials, by using their own personnel to collect them and by prohibiting the publicans from collecting revenue. These strategies were adopted by M. Fonteius in Transalpine Gaul, C. Verres in Sicily, L. Valerius Flaccus in Asia and A. Gabinius in Syria. However, it is not at all a coincidence that we find these former governors shortly thereafter on trial for exploiting the provincials. Ernst Badian viewed these governors as extreme cases, but their rapacity itself as perfectly representative for the nobility as a whole. 29 I am not at all convinced that this is correct, for it is not typical for the mass of provincial governors, but rather specifically characteristic for the four mentioned above. These men were also notorious for extorting large sums for military ends; for campaigns against allegedly rebellious tribes or for warships against supposedly threatening pirates. This combination of claiming special excise taxes as well as military contributions is also reported for L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus in Mac- edonia and Ap. Claudius Pulcher in Cilicia. 30 But both avoided a charge of repe tundae, presumably by exploiting their excellent connections within the nobility.

27 Cf. especially Schulz 2011: 107-109. 28 Schulz 1997: 214-270 has extensively demonstrated the limits for making money for the governors of Sicily. Nevertheless, the publicans in Pontus, Cilicia and Syria had only managed to make pactiones with the individual towns which resulted in a noticeable smaller profit; cf. Sherwin-White 1984: 232-3. 29 Badian 1968: 76-91. 30 Cf. Schulz 2011: 99-100 with references, who, like Badian, assumes claiming special excise taxes as the normal practice of the governors.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 77 18/04/16 14:37 78 wolfgang blösel

In general, the propraetors were the group of governors most frequently charged with repetundae, as the list of the four governors mentioned above illustrates. More than half of all accused governors were propraetors, for whom a conviction was especially probable. 31 The publicans seem to have been able to produce enough pressure to punish uncooperative governors at this level. The lex Pompeia de prouinciis of the year 52 B.C. may be of relevance here. The law prescribed an interval of at least five years between a praetorship or a consulate on the one hand and a provincial governorship on the other. 32 If we follow the recent and convincing interpretation of Catherine Steel 33 it was the primary goal of this law to compel in particular the praetors, to decide whether or not to apply for the consulate after the necessary biennium, and consequently to reject a governorship, or to take on a province and to postpone their candidature for at least seven years. I am certain that if this law had been valid for much longer than the three years until 49 B.C., we would see a further tremendous increase in the number of praetors who declined command of a province. Since this law was presumably not designed to produce consuls older than 48 years, it must have been possible, at least around the time of its passage, to stand for the consulship without the profits earned in a provincial governorship. Yet in the fifties the necessary expenditure of a campaign for the consulship had not fallen, but risen, as the case of the consuls of 53 demonstrates. Obviously, there were chances to get a lot of money without having to leave the capital as a provincial governor. During the fifties, at the latest, shares in the publicans’ societies were traded, and from Cicero’s frank mention of shares held by senators we can conclude that even they were at least tacitly allowed to possess these shares. 34 Ernst Badian presumed on good grounds that the integration of hundreds of equites into the senate by Sulla had made this possible. 35 For many of the former equites had previously been active as publicans and even afterwards were dependent on that sort of income in order to meet the costs of being a senator. The continued business of these new members may have reduced older established senators’ scruples against enjoying the enormous profit rates from investment in such societies.

31 Lintott 1981: 162-212, esp. 207-212 with the list of officials accused de repetun dis. The consular Gabinius was in so far exceptional as he had overplayed his hand by vainly trusting in Pompey’s influence. 32 For the technical details of the law cf. Marshall 1972: 887-921, and Ferrary 2001: 101-154, esp. 105-7. 33 Steel 2012: 83-93. 34 Cic., Vat. 29; Val. Max. 6.9.7. Badian 1972: 102-106, and Schulz 2011: 108 think that the sleeping partnership in tax-collectors’ societies was widespread under the senators while Shatzman 1975: 103 A. 21 and Schneider 2011: 113-135, esp. 131, contest this. 35 Badian 1972: 99; 104; 110.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 78 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 79

There was yet another way of getting money from the provinces while staying at Rome: by granting a loan to provincial cities which were heavily in debt. A law of A. Gabinius had indeed expressly forbidden such loans to provincial cities however the senate could give permission by way of an exception. 36 Primarily, senators are likely to have obtained such an exemption and so the interest rates rose tremendously. Consequently, a senator might earn 48 % per annum from such loans, while at Rome one could get only four percent. The best example is the future assassin of Julius Caesar, M. Iunius Brutus, who tried to collect this enormous interest from the Salaminians on Cyprus through an agent who was to use brute force. 37 Therefore, the senators were privileged in their possibilities of exploiting the provinces from Rome. Besides the material profit from a provincial governorship, there might also be an immaterial gain: the attainment of military glory. However, the Late Republic provided extremely poor conditions for earning glory as truly profitable wars could be waged in very few provinces. Furthermore, the voters, the plebs urbana, could not be impressed by military skill unless it were converted into endless carts overflowing with booty in the triumphal processions or large territorial conquests, because the plebs urbana had not been conscripted for service since the second century. 38 In general, the Romans in the capital, as well as in Italy, were not interested in what was going on in the provinces. 39 Cicero learned this the hard way when he returned to Italy from his quaestorship in Sicily. When he realized that the Romans had deaf ears, but sharp eyes, he decided to spend his life in the Forum Romanum. 40 Real military glory had become the monopoly of a handful of outstanding generals. This is demonstrated by the small number of five triumphs in the 60s and 50s. With the exception of one triumph of Pompey’s, the claimants of a triumph had to wait outside the pomerium for several years. The supporters of Pompey and Caesar prevented the senate from allowing triumphs in order to guarantee the unchallenged excellence of their patrons. 41 Even more revealing are the coins, statues and dedications of booty. Since the end of the second century, it was exclusively the military victories of Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Lucullus and Caesar that were depicted and perpetuated in these ways. 42

36 Badian 1968: 82-84; Andreau 1987: 658-666. 37 Cf. Badian 1968: 73; 84-87; Rauh 1989: 3-30, esp. 3-5. 38 Brunt 1971: 95; 386. 39 Cf. Richardson 1994: 564-598, esp. 593. 40 Cic., Planc. 65-6. 41 This is most conspicuous with the triumph of C. Pomptinus (Schol. Bob. Cic., Vat. 30, p. 149-150 Stangl); cf. Brennan 2000: 534-5 with further references. 42 Zehnacker 1973: 536-540, 544-549, stresses this for the coins. For the statues and dedications of booty cf. Hölscher 1980: 351-371.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 79 18/04/16 14:37 80 wolfgang blösel

While estimating the attraction of a provincial governorship in the Late Repub- lic, we can conclude that only very few provinces like Gaul, Syria, Cilicia and the eastern parts of Asia minor offered chances for waging war and thus for enrichment and military glory. However, these territories had become the domain of Pompey and Caesar and their respective followers. On the other hand, in the peaceful provinces, with their mainly civilian administration, it was imperative for the average praetorian or consular governor to exercise great self-control with the Roman publicans and negotiatores in order to avoid a charge of repetundae. The small margin of profit to be expected were not worth the often several years far away from Rome and her comforts. An even more serious loss was caused by the interruption or at least relaxation of political and economic connections within the Roman aristocracy, especially if one’s partners in Rome considered one’s province to be not particularly lucrative. However, apart from the disadvantages of holding the average governorship, remaining in Rome after a praetorship provided many more opportunities to further one’s political career. For the former praetors could appear at the Forum Romanum in court as lawyers and character witnesses, give their opinion in the people’s assembly and intensify their contacts with powerful peers whose help they would need for furthering a future candidacy for the consulship. As Martin Jehne has recently shown, 43 during the second century, the political relevance of the consulars in the senatorial deliberations as well as in the decision making of the assemblies grew tremendously. Therefore, staying in Rome after a consulship was not at all less attractive than obtaining a military command in a province. In general, during the second century B.C. the interests of ambitious young nobles shifted dramatically from service in the Roman army, which had formerly been the only field in which to obtain excellence, to rhetorical and judicial activities. This can be explained by the stream of Italian aristocrats into Rome and, consequently, the increased competition for the highest magistracies. At this time, an apprenticeship with famous orators and teachers of rhetoric was more important than military training in camp. We find a trustworthy witness to this change in Polybius who contrasts, for the mid second century, the 18-year-old Scipio Aemilianus, who spent his time hunting, with his aristocratic contemporaries who spent the whole day in the Forum shaking hands and participating in lawsuits. Furthermore, according to Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus after having returned in the year 135 from the Numan- tian disaster was outshone by Postumius Albinus’ influence as lawyer and orator in the Forum Romanum. 44 There are further hints of a demilitarisation of the

43 Jehne 2011: 211-231. 44 Pol. 31.29,8-12 and Plu., T.G. 8.8.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 80 18/04/16 14:37 provincial commands and money in the late roman republic 81

Roman nobility. 45 First, around 130 B.C. the Roman cavalry ceased to be recruited from the aristocrats. 46 Second, the custom whereby candidates showed their scars from war injuries to potential voters fell into abeyance. 47 Finally, the requirement of ten military campaigns for admission to the cursus honorum seems to have fallen into disuse by the end of second century. 48 Therefore, Marius’ complaints about incompetent generals from the Roman nobility are likely to be much more than mere Sallustian polemic (Iug. 85). 49 The same is true for Cicero’s frequent lament about the penuria imperatorum, the lack of generals. 50 It is only within the context of this tremendous decline in military competence within the Roman aristocracy that we are able to understand the rise of Marius, Pompey, and Caesar. In the last three decades of the Republic two outstanding generals, Pompey and Caesar, controlled all provincial commands with the prospect of a large- scale war. The other provinces, being at peace, were unattractive to the average noble as they had no riches which had not yet been distributed amongst the Roman publicans, traders and local elites. However, in my opinion, the negative financial aspect was not decisive for the high percentage of a third up to half of all praetors and consuls respectively who declined governorship of a province. The most important cause for this striking fixation on the capital was positive: Rome was genuinely attractive because being in the city was necessary for political advancement. The demilitarisation of the Roman nobility – clear in the shift of its interests from military to rhetorical and judicial abilities – goes hand in hand with this fact. 51 Cornell has convincingly connected this process of demilitarisation, which had begun presumably in the first half of the second century B.C., with a large-scale development towards a civilian Roman society up to the High Empire. 52

45 For more detailed argumentation cf. Blösel 2011: 55-80, and in my not yet published “Habilitationsschrift” Imperia extraordinaria liberae rei publicae – Studien zur Demilitarisierung der römischen Nobilität (2009). 46 The loss of the equus publicus as a result of the plebiscitum equorum redden dorum (Cic., Rep. 4.2) had made service in the Roman civic cavalry for the senators and young nobiles quite unattractive. Cf. McDonnell 2006: 253-6. Although McCall 2002 has pointed to many factors responsible for the demilitarisation of the Roman nobility already during the second century, his thesis that the Roman civic cavalry was not abolished until the Social War (pp. 100-113), is not convincing. 47 Plu., Mor. 276c-d; Sall., Jug. 85.29-30. Cf. Flaig 2003: 123-136. 48 Pol. 6.19.5; Plu., C.G. 2.9; cf. Kunkel 1995: 60-64. 49 Sall., Jug. 85. 50 Cic., Verr. 2.5.2; 2.5.25; Font. 42-3; de Orat. 3.136; Man. 27; furthermore Cassius Dio (36.32.2-3; 25.3; 26.4; 27.4-5) has the optimate Catulus lament the dramatic lack of competent army commanders before Pompey got his command against the pirates in 67. 51 Cf. e.g. recently Brizzi 2010: 85-103, esp. 102: “il progressivo distacco della nobilitas dalla pratica delle armi era invece un fatto ormai evidente a tutti.” 52 Cornell 1993: 139-170, esp. 164-8.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 81 18/04/16 14:37 Roman War Finances in the Age of the Punic Wars 1

Bruno Bleckmann

War need not always be the father of all things. In Roman history, however, the connection between public organization and the demands of warfare on other areas is evident. It is thanks to the Punic Wars that the Roman Republic created a silver currency, established overseas provinces, built a fleet, established maritime interests, and acquired the ability to supply and feed large armies for long periods and on several fronts – an ability that explains the creation of the Roman Empire independently of advances in tactics and weaponry. The importance of money and power is omnipresent in the period of history in which the Roman republic founded an empire that surpassed all other ancient powers in complexity and size. During this phase of rapid expansion of Roman power, the investment of resources and money again and again brought profits that far exceeded the original capital. Despite periods of great loss during the First Punic War from 218-216, this recipe for success functioned fairly consistently over the longue durée. It explains not only Rome’s imperial success, but also the (quite fragile) solidarity of the nobility, which was less the product of a common ethos than of participation in the permanent expansion of military power and economic resources. The finances of the rival hegemonic power, Carthage, relied on the same mechanism of wartime profit but gradually diverged from this policy due to the need for greater liquidity to pay mercenaries. 2 The mechanism of wartime profit in Carthage, however, would falter in the event of military defeat. This is illustrated especially by the mercenary rebellion after the First Punic War, when the Carthaginian government paid the price of funding war by speculating on booty that it ultimately failed to materialize. Beyond such extremely generic comments, Roman income and expenditure in the age of the Punic Wars can only be sketched in outline, neglecting numerous

1 Translated by J. Dillon. 2 Cf. Pol. 6.52.5 and Diod. 29.6. This difference explains why the Carthaginians minted considerably more money than the Romans during the first two wars. The Romans also, however, certainly paid mercenaries, such as Celtic or Celtiberian auxiliary troops (Zon. 8.16.8 und Pol. 2.7.10; Plu., Cat. Mai. 10.2). The difference between Rome and Carthage thus grew only gradually. Liv. 24.49.8 seems to represent the hiring of mercenaries in 213 as an unusual novelty.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 82 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 83

unspecified qualifications and unanswered questions, some of which will be addressed in this brief overview. 3 Despite calculations such as those made by T. Frank or P. Marchetti, which explain Roman war finances in the form of a precise budget with income and expenses, there are considerable grounds for caution that must be acknowledged. 4 Such a historical model, first of all, requires that one optimistically accept the numbers given in the ancient historio graphical sources, above all Livy, as a genuine record of balances and war expenses. The history of war finances in such studies is thus always connected to questions of source criticism however the problems are virtually insurmount- able. Primarily, the question as to the reliability of the statements concerning the number of legions raised must be addressed. For instance, whether it was an army of eight legions or only an augmented four-legion army that fought at the Battle of Cannae affects the total volume of finances that can be estimated for the war. For the critical year 215, Livy, who relies on the largely invented military narratives of the late annalists, 5 relates a fictitious battle (the Battle of Grumentum), at which Ti. Sempronius Longus, consul of 218, is given command over equally fictitious troops. 6 A large portion of the legions raised in 214 owe their existence to a mechanical doubling in Livy’s source. 7 The falsifications of the annalists prevent us from determining anything certain about the number of legions that were or were not retained in service during winter in wartime, and this is of no small consequence for war expenses. 8 Skepticism of a simple model of income and expenditure is appropriate not only with respect to the extant numbers. The formulation of “income” and

3 See the current synthesis by Ñaco del Hoyo 2011. The excellent synthesis in Cadiou 2008 handles an abundance of the problems related to financing the Second Punic War in Spain. 4 Frank 1933: 61-68 on the First Punic War and the table on p. 95 on the Second Punic War; Marchetti 1978a. Frank’s collection of materials, however, remains of lasting value. 5 Examples would include the victories at Ilutergeia and Intibili (Liv. 23.49.9-11 and 13), the non-existent battle at Capua (Liv. 25.4.12), a fictitious victory of Claudius Nero at Grumentum (Liv. 27.41.1-42.13) and more of the same. 6 Cf. Liv. 22.37.10-11 with Seibert 1993: 236, n. 61. The fundamental skepticism of the number of legions in Livy, articulated by Gelzer 1964, is in my opinion justified. Contra Marchetti 1978a: 8 and 141, n. 7. 7 Seibert 1993: 254, n. 5 with bibliography. 8 Rosenstein 2004: 36f. considers the measures of 215, when some of the legions at Nola were sent home, to have been a necessary exception and believes that legions normally wintered where they were deployed; cf. also Seibert 1993: 238. One can agree with Rosenstein 2004: 43, that the need to work the fields at home should not have been a reason to dismiss the soldiers. On the other hand, simply the exigencies of provisioning the army could explain why it was difficult to keep the legions in the field over the long term. For the First Punic War, it is surely correct to assume that the legions were deployed only for a short campaign, a few weeks during the summer, which goes toward explaining part of the rushed strategy of the period.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 83 18/04/16 14:37 84 bruno bleckmann

“expenditure” supposes that perhaps not all income flowed directly into the aerarium, the central treasury, but that some kind of central oversight or administration existed. The fact that the Senate had actually achieved such power of control by the late second century 9 does not necessarily mean we may assume something similar for the age of the Punic Wars. Not only the annalistic sources used by Livy, but even Polybius sketches a picture of the Punic Wars generations after the events; he presumes mechanisms of control that were created, in part, after the Second Punic War as well as a highly developed set of regulations, and the means to enforcing them, such as can be observed in other areas under the jurisdiction of the nobility during the same period. 10 However, even during the second century, the Senate’s control over war finances was far from absolute. The fact that it was impossible to distinguish between private and public spheres of war finance is exemplified by the case of war booty, which, during the age of the Punic Wars, constituted a considerable portion of Rome’s income. 11 There was no strict division between the private booty of the general and the public booty of state, regardless of how praeda and manubiae exactly differ. 12 The distribution of booty was left primarily to the general’s discretion and perhaps also – as in the case of the booty Manlius Vulso seized from the Galatians – the outcome of later political and legal wrangling. If a general made war booty available to the state, the funds were not necessarily deposited into the central treasury. 13 Booty could also be distributed directly among the people, as was done by Duilius. 14 Money could also be distributed to soldiers on site or kept and spent to finance one’s own campaign, which is what occurred with the 600 talents that Scipio found in Carthago Nova and transferred to his quaestor. 15 Exceptionally, under Fabius Cunctator,

9 Pol. 6.13. 10 Centralized finances were also a way of keeping increasingly autonomous military commanders under control; see Cadiou 2008: 511. 11 booty constituted a very significant part of income at the time of the Punic Wars. In the (problematic) summary of Frank 1933: 95, it amounted to 65 million denarii, equal to the 65 million collected in tributum or approximately one fifth of the total income of the Roman state in the period from 218 to 201. 12 Cf. the opposed positions of Shatzman 1972b and Churchill 1999. Even if manu biae were supposed to belong to the public, not private, sphere, Churchill’s analysis also clearly shows that the general ultimately could dispose of manubiae at his own discretion when he considered it useful. 13 Contra Cadiou 2008, Zon. 9.3 does not provide evidence that the Scipios sent booty back to Rome. The exact opposite is the case. In contrast to the other participants in the war, the Scipios sent only worthless pieces of booty, namely children’s dice, back to Rome. The rest was dispersed immediately on site. 14 Beck 2005: 221. Booty was distributed to individual soldiers at the triumph of Cn. Manlius Vulso (Liv. 39.7.2), at which each soldier received 42 denarii; see also Liv. 40.16.9. For the third century, see e.g. Eutr. 3.16.1. 15 Pol. 10,19,1. According to Appian (Hisp. 4.23), gold, silver, and ivory were duly sent to Rome.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 84 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 85

the proceeds from the sale of captives were deposited in the public treasury, but this detail was probably introduced by the annalists to exalt Fabius as the supposedly ideal general. 16 Scipio gave the captives from Carthago Nova to his tribunes to distribute to the soldiers, apparently for private resale. 17 Moreover, the sources tend to describe booty only as the result of significant undertakings by the army, so that only exceptionally do we glimpse at the numerous raids made by marauding soldiers on their own initiative, who neither surrendered their plunder to the aerarium nor made it available for the provisioning of the troops. 18 Further haziness looms: remarkably, the exact amount of the stipendium that a Roman soldier received during the Punic Wars, despite its crucial importance, is not attested in the sources. Instead, we must content ourselves with Polybius’ statement, relevant to c. 150 B.C., that soldiers received two (Attic) obols per day, the interpretation of which has been extensively discussed. 19 Payment was probably also irregular, and, during the First and Second Punic Wars, may often have been left unpaid, not only in crisis periods such as around 215, for which Livy (24.18) reports the soldiers patriotically did without pay. The timing of the mutiny at Sucro 20 – the year 206, when after the expulsion of the Carthaginians no serious military engagements were expected in Spain – may suggest that the demand for previously unpaid wages might have occurred, above all, when other lucrative sources of income such as booty or donatiua dried up. 21 It is also unclear how the cost of provisions was calculated against the legionary stipendium. Under the Empire, part of the pay of a professional soldier was deducted for provisions guaranteed by the state, especially grain. 22 Polybius’s account clearly suggests that this was essentially also

16 Eutr. 3.16.1: uiginti quinque milia hominum captiuorum uendidit, praedam mili tibus dispertiuit, pecuniam hominum uenditorum ad fiscum rettulit. Cf. Oros. 4.18.5. It is probably historically correct that part of the booty was brought to the aerarium, though not in the way described by the Livian tradition; cf. Plu., Fab. 22. 17 See Welwei 2000: 110f. on Pol. 10.17.6-14 and 19.8 (cf. Liv. 26.47.1-3). 18 Liv. 26.6.3 on the plundering of Bruttium by Roman soldiers, who are represented as following the bad example of others: postremo Romani quoque milites iam contagione quadam rapto gaudentes, quantum per duces licebat, excursiones in hostium agros facere. Frank 1933: 81 gives only a global estimate of 10,000,000 drachms for booty from small locales that would have been deposited in the central treasury. The enormous booty that Laelius, for example, seized during his raids in Africa (Liv. 29.4.6) is omitted from Frank’s survey. 19 On the interpretation of Pol. 6.39.12 see Boren 1983: 437-442. On the question whether Polybius presumes Attic drachms, see Pedroni 2001 against the view of Lo Cascio 1982. On the amount of the stipendium in the third century, see Boren 1983: 455-458. 20 Pol. 11.28.3-6; Livy 28.5.6. 21 Thus Cadiou 2008: 496. In general on compensation for the lack of booty with payment of the stipendium, see Boren 1983: 432f. 22 Boren 1983: 435; Herz 2007.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 85 18/04/16 14:37 86 bruno bleckmann

true for the armies of the Republic. 23 Payments of cash would have made little sense when soldiers were serving in areas where it could not be used. 24 More- over, part of their pay could have been met from income obtained on site and not sent by the central administration. 25 The dispatch of large amounts of cash from Rome is less plausible than the assumption that payment was kept on the books as a soldier’s basic need, and that this basic need was satisfied at the discretion of the general as the financial situation permitted. 26 The mutiny at Sucro could be explained by the fact that Scipio had accommodated the soldiers’ demands for payment only for his own campaigns, while the total from the preceding years was left unpaid. 27 Even if the Roman state usually provided grain directly, this does not mean that all the costs of war were met in cash; on the contrary, allies or communities in the war zone, for example, could be commanded to supply grain. In individual cases, but presumably seldom during the Punic Wars, allies were even paid

23 Pol. 6.39.15. 24 Napoleon’s Grande Armée encountered similar supply problems in the sparsely urbanized regions of White Russia. 25 Cf. e.g. Liv. 28.25.9 , 28.34.11, and 29.3.5, where money for the soldiers’ pay is extracted from Spanish communities. Cadiou 2008: 499 attempts to qualify the first passage with reference to Pol. 11.25 and argues that only the amount of the outstanding stipendium payments, which normally were paid directly by Rome, was collected in Spain. One of Cadiou’s central theses is that the stipendium was always, and on principle, paid from Rome out of the aerarium, and that money was transported from Rome to the armies in order to accomplish this. There were more ideological than material reasons for this, namely so one could impress upon the soldiers that they were Roman citizens; the stipendium that was paid by the central administration from the tributum or, after 168, from other income of the Roman people, will have demonstrated “[la] persistance d’une certaine conception de l’armée civique.” Cadiou 2008: 509 supports this central thesis with reference to Cic., Prov. 28. Yet the special situation faced by Caesar, who could have arranged for the payment of soldiers’ wages without relying on the aerarium, should, in my opinion, be interpreted differently. It was only because Caesar’s legions had been raised illegally that he required that their citizen status be legitimated ex post facto by the payment of their wages from the aerarium. For citizen armies of the Second Punic War, though, these problems of legitimation were irrelevant; there was no need to confirm one’s citizen status by payments from the aerarium. The decentralized and far more practical way of paying the stipendium with resources found on site raised no special questions. 26 In contrast to Cadiou 2008: 495, who holds that it was impossible to calculate the stipendium and booty together: “Il est donc raisonnable de penser que les différents postes de la fiscalité militaire étaient plus étanches qu’on ne l’a dit. Le général ne pou- vait pas interchanger à sa guise les fonds précisément calcululé et fournis en vue du stipendium avec le produit du butin.” The passages discussed are from Sallust and Cicero thus different rules would have applied during the time of the Punic Wars. 27 Cf. Pol. 11.28 (speech of Scipio): “It is clear to me that you are frustrated because I haven’t paid you your wages, but that was not my fault. During my time in office, you always received your wages in full. But if you are still owed by Rome, because what has long been owed you has not yet been made good...”

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 86 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 87

for supplying grain, so even further costs might be incurred. 28 It is, at any rate, clear that the uncertainties of supplying grain would have made attempts to keep balances pointless, even if accurate figures were available. The fluctuating needs of providing the army with grain also leave it an open question how much revenue the aerarium had to generate at the beginning of a campaign. If tributum really was the payment of one-tenth of one percent of one’s property value, total revenue would have been unpredictable and varied. 29 It is possible and even probable that the total amount needed to finance a campaign was determined by the consuls in advance and then distributed to individual units, not according to the number of taxpayers, but according to larger units, i.e. tribes and centuries; the tribuni aerarii were responsible for collecting the amount and liable for the sum. 30 In these cases, naturally, it remains unknown whether the tribuni aerarii were held to their pledges and had to make good on deficits by surrendering their property. In some cases, the tributum, which was by no means collected every year, had the character of a more or less voluntary loan rather than a tax. Repayment from war booty may have been frequent. 31 Depending on whether the expenses from direct taxes were compensated by the generous distribution of booty or not, the total budget of the Roman state might be completely different. In terms of income, one also must reckon with potentially profitable currency manipulation, which often occurred in pre-modern states as a kind of hidden tax and is attested explicitly by Pliny for both the First and Second Punic Wars, although the details are problematic. 32 It is likewise unknown to what extent the central administration in Rome calculated the revenue from the provinces under its control in addition to the income from citizens. The provincials in Spain were systematically taxed during the later second century at the earliest, 33 but one may assume that provincials

28 On the practice of having Roman officials and soldiers purchase grain, e.g. in Thes- saly and Apulia during the second century, see Erdkamp 1998: 105 and 112. On payment for grain, Liv. 36.2.12. 29 See Nicolet 1976a: 213-215. In greater detail on the general problem, Nicolet 1976b. Contra e.g. Ñaco del Hoyo 2005: 381-383. In favor of Nicolet’s thesis is the fact that the eisphora in Athens, which became a regular tax only in 347, functioned in precisely this way, as for example the first eisphora of the Peloponnesian War, where the Athenians set a sum of 200 talents (Thuc. 3.19.1). 30 Nicolet 1976a: 214-216 with reference to the implications of D. H. 4.19.1-4. On the proeisphora system, cf. Nicolet 219, who thus also intelligibly explains the role of the tribuni aerarii. 31 Attested for Manlius Vulso: Liv. 39.7.4-5. See Buraselis 1996: 165f.; Ñaco del Hoyo 2005: 374. The repayment of tributum by Papirius Cursor is presumably fictitious; cf. Liv. 10.46.5. 32 Plin., Nat. 35, 45. Cf. Nicolet 1963. Frank 1933: 81f. also considers the manipulation of the currency a form of special income. 33 On the date when regular taxation was introduced in Spain, see Ñaco del Hoyo 2005: 379; connected with Tiberius Gracchus by Richardson 1976.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 87 18/04/16 14:37 88 bruno bleckmann

were irregularly taxed at least in an improvised fashion to support the Roman army even earlier. One must also distinguish such payments from occasions which Roman generals financed and supplied the army with raids and plundering, usually against enemies but also sometimes against neutral parties. The campaign of L. Veturius and Q. Caecilius in 206 was limited to just such a plundering raid, 34 whereas that of Laelius in Africa was meant to prepare the ground and find the finances for the “proper” invasion which was to be conducted by Scipio. The question as to what extent the armies in Spain were supplied by pillaging the countryside has been the object of scholarly controversy. Some scholars interpret the saying of Cato, Bellum se ipse alet, as a break from previous practice and infer that the Spanish armies previously had drawn their grain supply from Italy. 35 However, Cato may only intend a contrast with his immediate predecessors in office after 197 B.C. In general, with respect to the provision of grain, one will have had to consider numerous variables. Grain from Rome was necessary especially at the beginning of a campaign. In the interest of their own success, the commanders setting out from Rome would ensure that all possible resources at home were tapped to outfit their campaigns, but part of the necessary provisions, such as fodder for horses and firewood, could only be obtained at their destination; the theater of war itself. Such advance provisioning and financing were not always possible. After Cannae, the propraetors T. Otacilius and Cornelius Mamula in Sicily and Sardinia waited in vain for pay and supplies from the central administration in Rome; instead they received the instructions to provide for the fleets and armies themselves. 36 Since there was no hostile territory in these provinces that could be plundered, the problem was solved by a (hardly) voluntary gift from Hiero and by the allegedly well-meaning contributions of Sardinian cities. 37 Once legions were in the field, on the other hand, they could dispense with grain and money from Italy. The fact that only in 215 the Scipio brothers requested that the state provide for the army 38 may illustrate that a year earlier, in 216, it had been possible to support the army on the land, while at least part of the troops in Spain in 217 were still supplied from Italy. 39 Sometimes ship- ments and payments from Italy were supplemented by provisions and money collected in the theater of war itself. This was true, for example, of Scipio’s

34 Liv. 28.11.12-15. 35 For this interpretation of Liv. 34.1.12, see e.g. Erdkamp 1995: 170; Erdkamp 1998: 95. See also Cadiou, 2008: 579-583, who emphasizes Cato’s tactical motives for his campaign, which were to deprive the enemy of local resources. 36 Liv. 23.21.1-5. 37 Cf. Liv. 23.21. 38 Liv. 23.48.4-5. 39 This is true anyway of the force with P. Scipio that reached Spain in 217 (cf. Liv. 22.22.1-2). The report about the extraordinary success of the Scipios in 216 (Liv. 23.26- 29) warrants considerable skepticism; cf. Seibert 1993: 220-223.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 88 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 89

army in Sicily. Scipio had supplied his army grain from Sicily, but prepared for the offensive in Africa with grain from Italy. 40 The broad claim that “most often grain was sent from Rome” 41 in provinces like Spain may thus need qualification. During phases of war when the armies maintained themselves by contributions, quartering, and plundering in the field, “income” was generated, but it certainly was not registered centrally. Frank estimates gross income under the rubric “loans, contributions, supertaxes etc.,” which include income generated by plundering raids, at 117 million denarii, but he arrives at this figure only because he needs to balance his table of total income and expenditure; he thus requires this boldly estimated sum on the income side. In reality, most individual entries cannot be determined. The extent of grain provisioning and cash payments that the Romans required, for example, from Sicilian cities to conduct the land war on Sicily during the First Punic War is completely unknown. 42 The age of the Punic Wars witnessed the development of a monetized economy and the introduction of precious metal coinage. The numismatic evidence alone, however, does not give an all-around satisfactory explanation of how war finances and the new coinage were connected, even if the now securely dated introduction of the denarius provides us with one sure piece of information. Thus it remains unclear how local issues in Spain were related to the presence of Roman armies on campaign. 43 Silver didrachms from Emporion make up the majority of the hoard finds, 44 while denarius payments for the Spanish troops are scarcely attested for the period of the Second Punic War, and this situation remained essentially the same until the war against Sertorius. 45 Since a donative

40 Liv. 29.1.14. 41 Boren 1983: 458, who refers to Liv. 34.9.12f. and Liv. 40.35.4 with respect to Spain. Cadiou argues similarly. Even if one correctly assumes, with Cadiou, that the conquered part of Spain was taxed from the beginning of the Roman presence, it is still most probable that this tax was exacted in the form of grain deliveries. Livy’s evidence, in my opinion, pertains only to the contrast with the situation in the most recent years before. 42 For the analogy to the campaign of Manlius Vulso in Galatia, about whom Livy and Polybius provide some detailed information, see. Erdkamp 1998: 14. On the haziness surrounding this kind of war financing, cf. Erdkamp 1998: 15: “The distinction between plunder, confiscation, requisition and purchase is therefore not very clear.” Cities were commanded sometimes to provide cash and supplies at the same time, as in the case of Abdera (Liv. 43.4.9) during the Third Macedonian War (100,000 denarii and 50,000 modii of grain), which will hardly have been an isolated case; cf. Erdkamp 1998: 98. The claim by Frank 1933: 64 concerning the supply of the Roman army in Sicily, “There was not much foraging in Sicily; Rome either bought grain in Sicily or sent it from Rome,” is problematic; the passages from Polybius that he cites (1.18.11; 1.52.5 and 8) do not really support this conclusion. See contra Roth 1999: 295f., and Bleckmann 2002: 60f. with further literature. 43 E.g. drachms from Emporion. 44 Crawford 1985: 87. 45 Crawford 1985: 91.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 89 18/04/16 14:37 90 bruno bleckmann

was paid to Spanish troops in bronze still in 179 BC, Cadiou has conjectured that wages were paid in bronze during the Second Punic War. 46 The communis opinio, however, infers from the issue of denarii that soldiers were provided with silver money as remuneration for campaigns. 47 It is possible that the first denarius issues served above all to facilitate the division of booty. The assumption that the first denarii were minted immediately after the capture of Capua, where an extraordinarily rich sum of precious metals was procured, might support this claim. 48 The finances of the period of the First and Second Punic Wars constituted a bundle of improvised measures and a complex system that nonetheless functioned well enough, on the presumption of continual success, so that the out fitting and provisioning of the armies were normally guaranteed. Only in exceptional cases do we hear of emergencies related to the pay and supplies of the army. The sources, moreover, let us glimpse at only a fraction of the persons involved in the complex process of financing war. Usually only the generals are known, while nothing is said about other individuals. We can only speculate that wars were undertakings supported by private investment, from the consul or from clients of Roman or Italic origin, and bound up in personal assets. The use of one’s private property in the service of imperial ventures was a tradition of ancient polis culture. 49 Even in Athens, which possessed very sophisticated central treasuries, the real costs of war far exceeded the numbers listed in the official budget. In Rome, a successful campaign might also give a member of the nobility and his adherents long-term influence in Roman politics; one might need to guarantee such success by offering one’s own person or property within a network of friendships. The irregular appointment of young Scipio Africanus to the Spanish command, with which he had to save the influence of his house after severe defeats, must have depended on the massive support of clients and friends, who must have provided at least part of the supplies that he brought to Spain. 50

46 Cadiou 2008: 518f. on Liv. 40.59.2. 47 Cf. Boren 1983: 455 with reference to Plin., Nat. 33.45. 48 Szaivert 2008: 165-170. Kondratieff 2004 assumes that precious metals were minted for the purpose of distributing booty already by Duilius. 49 Cf. Thuc. 6.32.5 on private investment in the Sicilian Expedition (trans. M. Ham- mond): “Anyone computing the combined public and private expenditure on this expedition would have found that in total a vast sum of money was leaving the city. Public costs were not only the expense already committed but also the funds sent with the generals. Private money had been spent by individuals on their own equipment and by the trierarchs on their ships, with more costs to come: add to that the pocket money for a long campaign which everyone would have taken over and above their state pay, and all that servicemen or merchants had with them on board for trading purposes.” 50 On Scipio’s decision (which the late annalists make virtually impossible to reconstruct) to remain legally priuatus (Dio fr. 47.40), see Beck 2005: 338-340; Blösel 2008. Scipio brought 400 talents, the provenance of which is indeterminate; cf. Pol. 10.18;

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 90 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 91

The fixation of the historiographical tradition on the collective history of Rome leaves few traces of how private players bore the financial burdens of the state at their own risk. An episode from the year 217 – the refusal of the senate to pay ransom money promised by Fabius Maximus – perhaps shows that the Senate controlled finance in many areas, just as Polybius (6.13) claims. 51 The fact that Fabius nonetheless paid the ransom from his own property illustrates, however, the peculiar fusion of public and private finances that make calculating a total balance of war expenditure impossible. 52 That the property of private individuals could meet the needs of an entire army on a narrowly circumscribed field for at least one campaign is illustrated by the unusual and chance account of Busa, a female member of the Italic elite, among whom numerous families rose to join the nobility in the third century. 53 While these two cases show how private property might be sacrificed in emergencies, private property was also used to make a profit. This encompasses the various shades of war entrepreneurialism, which was of greater importance in the wars waged by ancient city states than is generally assumed. Scattered cases of war entrepreneurs are identifiable in Carthage, for example, where one Hannibal “the Rhodian” is found acting as the captain of a ship at his own expense and peril. 54 The Athenian trierarchies of the fourth century were by no means always only the losing proposition of patriotic citizens obligated to perform the liturgy; on the contrary, they could be so profitable that they were sold at auction. The profit derived primarily from the opportunity to undertake plundering raids (sylan). A war entrepreneur like Timotheos utilized capital in a complex system of loans of all kinds and plundering campaigns. 55 Naval warfare under the Roman Republic must have generated analogous cases, as may be inferred from some late notices. Already at the beginning of the First Punic War, private interest in plunder was decisive, dictating the resolution of the rich majority of the comitia centuriata to declare war on

App., Hisp. 4.18. Livy relates that Scipio received the command because no one else was prepared to take it over (Liv. 26.18.4-11; App., Hisp. 4.18), but one may conjecture that Scipio received the command because he was prepared to make significant material investments in the campaign. Whether the army of volunteers he brought with him to Spain came from his own clients is unknown; see, however, Pol. 35.4 on the younger Scipio. 51 Ñaco del Hoyo 2005: 376 on Liv. 22.23.7-8. 52 The details of the transaction seem of dubious authenticity. Fabius would have sold an estate and from the proceeds paid the ransom money for the remaining Romans. According to this report, Fabius would have had to pay 2.5 Roman pounds of silver for each of the 247 remaining Romans. 53 Liv. 22.52.7, 22.54.4-5. Although with great difficulty, Busa ultimately provides for 10,000 men. Erdkamp 1998: 164, n. 22 is highly skeptical of Busa’s historicity, but see Fronda 2010: 65 on Busa and Canusium. 54 Pol. 1.46.4-47.10. Cf. Ameling 1993: 134-137. 55 On which cf. Dem. 51.13; Ps.-Dem. 24; Ps.-D. 48 and Eich 2006: 439-444.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 91 18/04/16 14:37 92 bruno bleckmann

Carthage. 56 The importance of war entrepreneurialism becomes clear especially in the last years of the war – only if, however, one corrects Polybius’ account with the alternative tradition that is available. Polybius gives the impression that Roman resources were utterly exhausted at the end of the war; recourse to the private wealth of prominent, patriotic citizens who provided ships for the fleet of Lutatius Catulus was only an emergency solution. 57 This characterization is probably inaccurate as after the defeat at Drepana, Rome had abandoned the costly naval war, an action which the tribunes of the plebs had criticizes for its riskiness. The commanders of the land army meanwhile, without any restrictions, fell back on the rich resources of Sicily, which had been available to them since the 40s almost in their entirety. The expenses necessary to finance the legions and man the cities were balanced by gifts from Hiero and by the contributions of numerous Sicilian cities paid in kind. War fatigue and exhaustion, in contrast to the dramatic, psychologizing picture painted by Polybius, 58 were thus probably kept in check on the Roman side. Lutatius Catulus had to rely on private citizens for his campaign probably not because the treasury was completely empty and no public resources were available, but rather because the outfitting of a fleet had been prohibited by law after the catastrophic loss of several fleets. 59 Military operations at sea in this period, the 40s of the 3rd century, despite the prohibition on naval warfare, did not come completely to a halt. Raids by privateers proved far more successful and incidentally maintained Roman maritime expertise. 60 This somewhat plausible scenario wins a certain credibility over the alternative tradition (especially in Cassius Dio/Zonaras). The business negotiations to outfit ships on the eve of the Battle of the Aegates Islands, as well as the advancement of supplies to the army and the credit business, are developments of war entrepreneurism observable already in the Greek world. One difference from the Greek world could be the fact that the hierarchical structure of Roman society tied war entrepreneurs to the clientelae of the great nobiles. That explains, for example, why the interests of negotiatores and ship owners influenced Roman policy so decisively in the third century. 61

56 Pol. 1.11.2 (with misunderstandings concerning the majority in the comitia centu riata). 57 Pol. 1.59.6. 58 Pol. 1.58.7-9. 59 For the details of the ban on naval warfare, see Bleckmann 2002: 177-185; on the outfitting of Lutatius Catulus’ fleet, see Bleckmann 2002: 205-214. 60 Known from Zon. 8.16.3 and 8. On a Roman pirate ship active in the eastern Mediterranean in the 40s, cf. Plu., Arat. 12.5. 61 Pol. 1.83.7-8 (500 merchants who traveled from Italy to Carthage); (the murder of negotiatores by Teuta). Only very few ship owners will have personally traveled overseas; cf. Cic., Verr. 2.5.154 (P. Granius as ship owner from Puteoli). In certain cases, ownership of the ship was shared; cf. Plu., Cat. Mai. 21.5-6 on this system of risk minimization, and in general d’Arms 1981: 33-44.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 92 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 93

For the Second Punic War, Livy in particular provides information about the behind the scenes financial and organizational efforts of war entrepreneurs. The tendency of the annalists toward realistic invention, projecting later conditions anachronistically onto earlier times, makes it difficult to evaluate Livy’s detailed depiction of financial operations during the Second Punic War. His account, however, clearly suggests that the importance of private financiers fluctuated dramatically. As the conflict over Saguntum escalated, business ambitions were placed in privateering and profit from supplying provisions overseas. Such voyages must have been anticipated for the military operations against the Carthaginian possessions in Spain and in Africa itself, in other words, the commands entrusted to the consuls of 218. These campaigns were planned as large naval operations. In addition to the consular armies, Sempronius Longus was provided a fleet of 160 ships; Cornelius Scipio, a fleet of 60 ships. 62 The same parties who had risen to prominence at the end of the First Punic War may have made sufficient investments to accompany these armadas or to undertake privateer raids in their wake. Such a background could most convincingly account for the lex Claudia de naue senatorum, passed in 218. This law addressed precisely the question of private investments in privateer and transport ships. 63 It is clear that senators were eager to participate in such ventures, but the (perhaps only slight) majority in the popular assembly apparently found this combination of political decision- making and private interest inappropriate. 64 These hopes evaporated after the great defeats at the battle against Hannibal. The precarious financial situation after the Battle of Cannae described by Livy is corroborated by the reduction of the silver content of contemporary coin issues. 65 Compulsory measures were introduced to finance the armies, yet private capital continued to play a part. In the Spanish theater of war, the army allegedly was supplied with grain and clothing by nineteen patriotic persons, who stipulated two conditions: that they be exempt from military service and that the state covers risk of loss, to the enemy or in the event of storms. 66 E. Badian argues that a system of public contracts was established already by the time of the Second Punic War, whereby the state paid large sums of money to companies of military contractors for the provisioning of the army. Badian conjectures that the isolated cases mentioned by Livy are only the tip of

62 Liv. 21.17.5 and 8. Private investors may also have participated in Laelius’ piratical operatinos (Liv. 29.1.14, 29.3.6-5.1). For general plundering by fleets during the Second Punic War, see Liv. 29.26.1. 63 Elster 2003: 187-190 (No. 57). 64 Liv. 21.63.4 reinterprets the moral by assuming that material gain was altogether unbecoming a senator. See contra, the passages collected by d’Arms 1981: 20 (Plu., Cat. Mai. 21.8; Pol. 6.56.1-3 etc.). 65 Zon. 8.26 with Nicolet 1963: 417ff. 66 Liv. 23.49.1-4.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 93 18/04/16 14:37 94 bruno bleckmann

the iceberg, since the majority of contracts would have fallen within the norms of the public contracting system and received no further notice. 67 Later scholarship, however, has rejected the theory that the army was supplied by private contractors as an anachronism that projects the conditions of the Late Republic and even the Early Modern period onto the age of the Punic Wars. 68 The provision of grain and clothing in advance of payment by private citizens demon- strably falls outside the normal structures in place to supply the Roman army. The extensive grain deliveries that helped prepare Scipio’s invasion of Africa, 69 for example, were imposed on dependent allies. Also, in other attested cases, the supply of grain and provisions for the army during the Middle Republic was undertaken directly by the commanders. 70 This does not mean that Livy’s reports all derive ultimately from annalistic inventions. On the contrary, every means of supplying the army with grain was an option. Within a wide range of possibilities, grain could have been provided by a private company as an emergency measure. Such an action would attest to the importance of war entrepreneurs when a crisis demanded an improvised response. Such businessmen are more easily identifiable in the famous episode concerning Marcus Postumius of Pyrgi, 71 which is often erroneously connected with the patriotic army suppliers of 215. 72 M. Postumius and T. Pomponius Veientanus allegedly committed fraud by deliberately sinking defective ships loaded with defective cargo and then charging the public treasury for grossly exaggerated losses. The incident resulted in a trial against M. Postumius. Some details of this story, especially the introduction of an established class of publi cani, are definitely anachronistic; others are simply absurd. The value of the cargo, in particular, could have been checked before the ships set sail. It is also doubtful whether the fraudulent machinations of a ship owner would have won extensive public support, as Livy alleges. The fate of T. Pomponius, on the other hand, is interesting: a year before the trial against Postumius, he was captured by the Carthaginians while raiding the territory of the Lucanians. 73

67 Badian 1972. 68 Erdkamp 1995: 168f. argues against the supposition that “large scale contractors” were systematically involved in the provision of grain. He rightly observes (p.170) that the provisioning of the army is not one of the tasks of the societates in Polybius’ account (6.17). See also Erdkamp 1998: 114. 69 Liv. 29.36.3. 70 Cf. Boren 1983: 458f.; Erdkamp 1995 and Erdkamp 1998: especially 105-112 on the responsibility of legates and other officers for the purchase of grain. 71 Liv. 25.3, 8-5,1. 72 E.g. Nicolet 1974: 991 and 996; Erdkamp 1995: 169; Erdkamp 1998: 114 (M. Postumius is “one of these publicani”). Badian 1997: 240 (German edition of Badian 1972 with an appendix) notes the same misunderstanding in his own work. 73 Liv. 25.3.9: T. Pomponium Veientanum, quem populantem temere agros in Lucanis ductu Hannonis priore anno ceperant Carthaginienses. The position of a praefectus socium (25.1.3) who acts on his own initiative is presumably fictitious. Nicolet 1974 :

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 94 18/04/16 14:37 roman war finances in the age of the punic wars 95

This is clear evidence that the financiers of the Second Punic War had maintained their ties to piratical war entrepreneurs. Ship owners were indispensible in wartime for transport 74 and, occasionally, for the provisions themselves, but such initiatives were not without their conflicts – which may provide the background for the episode related by Livy. This was particularly true when public compensation for private service had to be negotiated. In an economy in which transactions in precious metal money had reached only a primitive level, it must have been extremely difficult to strike a balance. The introduction of the denarius after a phase of extreme scarcity of precious metal shows that the capture of Capua, Syracuse, and Tarentum vastly improved the liquidity of the Roman state. War loans became good business for entrepreneurs. Livy attempts to give the reader the impression that these loans were acts of great patriotism; his account, however, makes it clear enough that the lenders counted on turning a serious profit. 75 In the ten years since the compulsory fiscal measures imposed on the citizens in 210, Rome’s economic situation had changed completely. Nicolet explains this transformation as a process whereby a tax system that relies heavily on the elite (typical for antiquity) transforms into a kind of business relationship that permits a tiny group of privileged persons to undertake lucrative, speculative enterprises. 76 However, if one takes Livy’s passages on the period after 218 into consideration it is clear that this group of privileged persons had existed from the start but had previously remained in the background during dangerous times for opportunistic reasons. War entrepreneurs and speculators, whose business had become very sophisticated during the period since the First Punic War, were prepared to make advances to the state only on exorbitant terms, so that the state was forced to collect money from citizens by means of compulsory fiscal measures. Only when the prospect of profit improved at the end of the Second Punic War were investments forthcoming. Groups of investors even appear to have helped steer the course of events. Buraselis has argued very plausibly that investors’ concerns about the repayment of public loans decisively influenced the controversial decision to renew military operations in the Second Macedonian War. 77 However, the financial

991, who considers Pomponius Veientanus and Postumius equestrian publicani, remarks, “Il est intéressant de voir en sa personne la rencontre d’une vocation militaire et d’une activité financière.” Livy 29.1.16 gives further notice of private acts of violence in the war zone: Graeci res a quibusdam Italici generis eadem ui, qua per bellum ceperant, retinentibus concessas sib ab senatu repetebant. 74 Erdkamp 1998: 59 assumes that the Roman state itself possessed a “fleet of cargo vessels,” but this seems impossible to verify. 75 Nicolet 1976a: 224ff. 76 Nicolet 1976a: 227f. 77 Buraselis 1996.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 95 18/04/16 14:37 96 bruno bleckmann

interests of war entrepreneurs seem to have influenced political decisions already at the end of the First Punic War. When Lutatius Catulus attempted to have his treaty with Carthage ratified in Rome, he was opposed not only by noble rivals who wanted a successful command of their own, but potentially also by the first census class, who were disappointed by the profit from the battle of the Aegates Islands and hoped to acquire more booty in Africa. 78 The revision of the terms of the treaty, which raised the war indemnity, better protected the interests of this class of investors and facilitated the profitable return on the contributions to the fleet that Lutatius Catulus had promised them. 79 In conclusion, one may say the following about the finances of the First and Second Punic Wars. It is virtually impossible to describe Roman war finances at the time of the Punic Wars according to a model of income and expenditure. Rome possessed, at best, only an incipient central oversight or control of finance. The payment of soldiers’ wages from the aerarium and centrally collected tributum constituted only a fraction of the real costs of war. Roman finance flowed primarily through many smaller, decentralized circulation systems. The Romans continually improvised and reacted sometimes more, sometimes less effectively to local conditions. Furthermore, the greatest burden was borne by allies and dependent provincials at and around the theater of war. Private capital, however, played a prominent part. The Roman war machine could not have functioned without the complementary and even crucial support of private capital in outfitting fleets, provisioning the army, and in advancing cash and war loans. Private entrepreneurs took on a variety of roles, appearing as pirates and ship owners in the First and at the beginning of the Second Punic War, and as lenders in the final years of the Second, when new, lucrative business opportunities opened up with the introduction of Rome’s own precious metal currency. It is fair to conjecture that their opinion carried some weight in the political decisions of the third century.

78 Zon. 8.17.5-6. 79 Pol. 1.63.2-3.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 96 18/04/16 14:37 The Financing of Conquest: Roman Interaction with Hellenistic Tax Laws

John Serrati

The foremost purpose of the Roman conquest of Sicily and the installation of a bureaucracy to run the island in the third century was for security; Sicily represented a bridge between Africa and Italy, and its control was vital for both Carthage and Rome. Therefore, based on the fact that Sicily was a recently conquered land, and that the island was meant to serve as a major source of grain for the Romans, it is unlikely that there would have been no Roman supervision at anytime after the conquest of much of the island in 241. In the context of Sicily, security and grain supply were interrelated; the primary purpose of the latter was to feed the Roman garrisons on the island, and, in the second century, to feed Roman armies overseas. Roman governmental structure appeared on Sicily not as a result, but as a by-product of this process. It cannot be overstated that Sicily was the very first extra-Italian possession, and in 241 the senate had no model upon which to base any kind of lasting settlement. Administration and taxation of conquered lands in the third century were therefore not imposed via the government in Rome, but rather continued and modi- fied native traditions, practices, and laws already in place. Accordingly, many institutions that modern scholars associate with provincial governments – tithes, tributes, large bureaucracies, and such – evolved out of a series of ad hoc measures designed to meet immediate needs. 1 In the majority of years, most if not all of the Sicilian tithe went to the Roman army. While it remains true that the army has been significantly under- estimated as a consumer, it should be noted that the number of legions in service dropped sharply after the defeat of Hannibal in 201, and remained at ten

1 Brennan 2000: 1.89-97, 144-53; Prag 2007; id. 2013a; id. 2013b; Serrati 2000; Zambon 2008: 246-63. The Roman hegemony in general lacked any sort of provincial structure well into the second century. For this process in Spain cf. Richardson 1976: 147-51; id. 1986: passim, esp. 1-10, 57-8, 75-94, 109-23; id. 1994: 580-9, 593-8; López Castro 2013. Macedonia and the East: Eckstein 2008: 342-81; id. 2013; Kellet-Marx 1996: passim, esp. 11-123, 126-38, 148-52. Illyria: Dzino 2010: 44-74. Transalpine Gaul: Ebel 1976: 64-95. In general cf. Lintott 1993: 72-6; Gargola 2010; Meyer- Zwiffelhoffer 2009: 11-24, 69-79. I am grateful to my colleagues in the audience at the conference for helpful suggestions. All dates BC unless otherwise stated.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 97 18/04/16 14:37 98 john serrati

or less for most of the 190s. 2 Although it is true that most of the produce of the lex Hieronica did go to the military, the small size of the Roman army in the early second century, coupled with the large import of grain from Sicily to the city of Rome in 202 (Liv. 30.38.5), the island’s substantial gift to the capital in 196 (Liv. 33.42.8), and the price gouging over grain in 189 (Liv. 38.35.5), leads to the conclusion that imported grain was required on a much more significant scale in the capital, and therefore it remains a strong possibility that some of the produce of the lex Hieronica did in fact reach Rome (cf. Garnsey 1994). Nev- ertheless, Sicily and the lex Hieronica were crucial in the development of Roman military logistics throughout the empire. The methods by which supplies were transported to military theatres came of age during the latter half of the third century, and Sicilian grain, combined with the experiences of long distance supply developed during the First Punic War, were major factors in both the defeat of Hannibal, and the subsequent conquests of the eastern and western Mediterranean.

1. Roman Provincial Administration on Sicily and the Imposition of the Lex Hieronica

The early Roman military and administrative structures on Sicily are obscure, and while we have no direct evidence that there was any official Roman presence at all before 227, the fact that the island was so close to Carthage and still harboured a sizable Punic population in the west makes it unlikely that the senate did not take at least some measures to safeguard the place. It would consequently appear likely that the island was home to a garrison that could protect Sicily from Punic attacks, discourage subversive activities among the Punic population, and maintain general order necessary for the collection of taxes and the facilitation of trade. The first evidence of a Roman garrison comes from the year 225. 3 Yet there was little reason to install troops at this date, and so it is likely that they were put in place at some earlier juncture, with the end of the first war with Carthage in 241 being the most obvious time. The presence of troops would demand the presence of an imperium-holding magistrate to command them in the years before an extra praetor was elected to take charge of Sicily in 227. 4 The Romans likely did not conquer Sicily with the specific long-term intentions of making a profit from a grain tithe. Upon occupying the island, however, they would have found that such a tithe already existed in the old Punic west,

2 Brunt 1971: 424. For the army as a consumer cf. Erdkamp 1998: 11-8; id. 2007: 103-4; Middleton 1983: 75-83; Roth 1999: 158-65, 224-30. 3 Pol. 2.24.13; cf. Baronowski 1993; Prag 2007; Serrati 2000. 4 Installation of a praetor in 227: Liv., Per. 20; Sol. 5.1; cf. Brennan 2000: 1.87-95; Broughton MRR 1.229.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 98 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 99

and also that their ally King Hieron II of Syracuse (265-215) was making a substantial yield with such a scheme in the east. It therefore would appear likely that the Romans adopted their grain tithe from the older taxation systems that existed on Sicily in the years before 241. This premise is furthered by the strong possibility that the Romans appear to have sent a quaestor to Sicily in 241. As the primary role of this magistrate was in the realm of finance and supply, this meshes well with the idea that the Romans adopted existing tithes on the island at the conclusion of the First Punic War. Sources attest that in the later Republic there was indeed a quaestor in Lilybaion (Asc., Div. 2; Cic., Planc. 65, Verr. 2.2.22), and this office was most likely in place prior to 227. A quaestor was best suited for this assignment since not only did he have the financial powers necessary to run the territory, but could also on occasion command a fleet. 5 It has also been convincingly argued that Rome actually increased the number of quaestorships to accommodate Sicily and later Sardinia after the First Punic War (Harris 1976: 104). Although this line of argument places their creation in 227, accompanying the new praetor, it would make more sense if a quaestor was sent to the prouincia from 241 onwards, since any grain tithe could not be operated without at least some supervision. Nevertheless, the dispatching of an annually elected praetor in 227 signalled a major change in the Roman stance towards Sicily; never controlling a territory outside Italy before, the Romans were largely unsure about what should be done with Sicily, and their governing of the place previously had been of an ad hoc nature. The implementation of the regular praetor meant that the senate had decided to permanently occupy the island. Furthermore, as the western Mediterranean was at peace in this period, and the island was relatively secure with a garrison, the only possible benefit that the Romans could incur from a new, more permanent, system of administration on Sicily, was the expansion of and extended control over the existing grain tithe. Roman practice throughout the Republic involved the adoption and adaptation of structures and laws that had existed within a territory prior to its conquest. Only when such things did not exist, as with the foundation of Narbo and the creation Gallia Transalpina (later Narbonensis) as a province in 118 for example, was any sort of specifically Roman infrastructure created. Generally, the Roman administration within a conquered territory found it easiest simply to graft itself on to a governmental framework already in place, and then to alter this as necessary to suit both Roman and local needs. The Roman grain tithe in

5 Pol. 1.52.7. Recently, a number of warship rams have been discovered in under- water excavations off Sicily’s western coast; these are almost certainly from the Battle of the Aegates Islands in 242. That several of rams are inscribed with the names of quaestors has reignited the debate on the existence of the quaestores classici. For the rams, cf. Tusa / Royal 2012; for the original debate cf. Pareti 1953: 185; Thiel 1954: 33 n. 90; contra Harris 1976: 102.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 99 18/04/16 14:37 100 john serrati

Sicily, the so-called lex Hieronica, almost certainly developed in this type of fashion. Originally a series of rules and regulations for the collection of agricultural tithes by Hieron, it was adopted by the Romans on Sicily at some point between 241-210. The lex Hieronica, perhaps best translated of ‘method’ rather than ‘law’ of Hieron, then undoubtedly evolved into the more standardised system of grain collection that was in place during Cicero’s time, when he described the Sicilian grain tithe in detail within the Verrines. The existence of certain Hellenistic laws clearly illustrate how Roman provincial administrations adopted and adapted existing governmental structures. The Taormina Financial Documents attest the extent to which the evolution of the economic systems within the ancient city of Tauromenion on Sicily evolved under Roman rule. These inscriptions remain highly enigmatic in that at least some of them have been moved over time, and the context in which they were found has never been fully clear. Moreover, they have been rarely been available for public viewing, have been published sporadically between 1890-1988, and have never been subject to modern scholarly examination. 6 The majority of the inscriptions appear to date from the mid-first century; however, some may go back to the mid-second century or even earlier. Thus, despite the questions surrounding them, the documents nevertheless do illustrate how the financial institutions of Tauromenion evolved under the Romans. The bulk of the texts deal with the markets of the city; they outline monthly sales of grain, stone, wood, cattle, and honey, as well as income derived from citizen liturgies, public, and sacred lands. Also listed are the three financial magistrates who exercised duties in these areas. Hieromnamones (ἱερομναμονές: ‘those in charge of sacred things’) were officials associated with religious revenues and very likely temple maintenance, while tamiai (ταμίαι: ‘distributors’) served as the city’s treasurers and paymasters. The most important magistrates, however, appear to have been the sitophylakes (σιτόφυλακες: ‘grain inspectors’), who had charge of the collection, sale, and distribution of public grain. As such they were also responsible for public granaries, and perhaps most significantly, they set the annual grain prices. It is in the functions of the sitophylakes that we can most clearly connect the Taormina Financial Documents to agricultural taxes and trade within the Roman province of Sicily. Firstly, the sitophylakes would appear to be the local name for the magistratus Siculus mentioned frequently in the Ver rines in relation to the lex Hieronica and the collection of grain. 7 And what is

6 For their publication, cf. IG 14.421-30; Syll.³ 954; SGDI 5220-8; SEG 4.48-58 (cf. also 33.755, 38.973-5); Arangio-Ruiz / Olivieri 1925: 4-13; IGLPalermo 115; Man- ganaro 1964; id. 1988. For discussions of the inscriptions cf. Antonetti 1985; Del Monaco 2003; Manganaro 1963; id. 1964; id. 1988; Sartori 1954; Sherk 1990: 253; id. 1993: 271; Willers 1905. 7 Cic., Verr. 2.3.34, 116, 120, 181 (and perhaps also at 2.5.27); the magistratus Siculus mentioned at 2.4.146 is undoubted an official with a purely political function. Cf. Prichard 1970: 360-2.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 100 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 101

more, the inscriptions themselves, at least in part, may very well be the records of a city’s agricultural produce that Cicero says (Verr. 2.3.120) had to be archived on an annual basis. Conquered in 265 by Hieron II just prior to his victory the Longanos River over the Mamertines (Diod. 22.13.2), Tauromenion was a major port within the Syracusan kingdom, and remained under its control after the First Punic War (Diod. 23.4; cf. Karlsson 1993: 41-4). It therefore would have been subject to the king’s agricultural tithe. The older financial inscriptions may very well reflect the tithe as it existed under Hieron. However, when Hieron’s grandson Hieronymos switched sides and joined the Carthaginians in 214 during the Han- nibalic War, Tauromenion remained loyal to Rome. The city’s defection to Rome was of great strategic importance and would have been a blow to the enemy supply network, reducing the number of places by which grain could be shipped to the Punic forces operating in the east of Sicily. It would also have been used as a supply base for the Roman army that besieged Syracuse from 213-211 as the place was closer to the action than Messana. For its loyalty to Rome, Tauromenion became a ciuitas foederata in 213, and was from this point onwards no longer subject to an agricultural tithe. Nevertheless, the terms of the alliance did contain a clause that forced the Tauromenians to sell grain to the Romans on demand, and for this reason alone, the scrupulous annual recording of all matters relating to the agricultural yield would have been of utmost importance. 8 What makes the Taormina Financial Documents truly significant for our purposes, however, is that they illustrate the evolving nature of Roman administration on Sicily, and strongly hint at increasing Roman control over Tauro menion’s grain trade. Specifically, while most of the inscriptions utilise typical Sicilian Greek numbers and currency units, most prominently the litra (λίτρα), the last two change to a system that seems to be based on Roman accounting. Specifically, the coin denominations used, the heminomon (ἡμίνομον) and the tetralitron (τετράλιτρον), appear to be equated with the Roman quinarius and the as respectively. 9 More obvious Roman influence comes in the method of dating; the majority of the documents employ a local variant of a typical Doric calendar, but with the last of them this changes to the Republican (pre-Julian) method of dating, written in Latin script (cf. Rüpke 1995: 133-8). Additionally, the magistrates listed for most years have Sicilian Greek titles, specifically the aforementioned hieromnamones, tamiai, and sitophylakes, but these as well are eventually Romanised, with later inscriptions speaking of duoandres (δύο ἄνδρες), a very clear Hellenisation of the Roman duouiri. One of the documents

8 Alliance with Rome: App., Sic. 5; Liv. 25.40.4; exemption from lex Hieronica: Cic., Verr. 2.3.13, 91-93; treaty with grain clause: Cic., Verr. 2.5.56. There is no evidence for any changes to the treaty between the Second Punic War and Cicero’s time. 9 Manganaro 1964: 53-64; id. 1988: 187; cf. also Carroccio 2004.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 101 18/04/16 14:37 102 john serrati

also contains consular fasti from the years 39-36 and 31-30. How and why these fasti come to be preserved within a set of financial inscriptions remains unknown, however, they do speak to the increasing influence that the Roman administration had on the agricultural economy of Tauromenion and of Sicily in general. The changes over time in the accounting, the currencies, the calendar, and the titles of magistrates all make plain how the Romans, although making no significant changes to the basic agricultural structures of this Hel- lenistic city, nonetheless Romanised them over time as the provincial administration on Sicily gradually exerted its influence over local policy as necessity demanded. A similar process can be seen on a Greek legal inscription from the eastern Mediterranean. The Customs Law of Asia, commonly known as the Monumen tum Ephesenum, outlines the portorium, or customs dues, from Ephesos in the Roman province of Asia. Along with the lex Hieronica and the financial documents of Tauromenion, the inscription that outlines the portorium on the Monu mentum Ephesenum is another transparent example of the Romans taking over an existing Hellenistic tax structure and altering it to suit their own purposes. 10 The inscription dates from AD 62 but nevertheless the text makes it clear that the law itself is much older than the actual inscription. In all likelihood, the portorium, or really the telos as it is called in the Greek text, goes back at least to the reign of Attalos III (138-133), and perhaps even earlier. 11 The text refers to an ‘Attalos’ directly (ll. 67-9), and there is no indication that this is necessarily Attalos III, as the laws governing taxes at Ephesos could very well have been laid out by Attalos II (160-138), whose elder brother Eumenes II had secured the city for the Attalids at the Peace of Apamea in 188 (Pol. 21.45.10). Moreover, early parts of the inscription refer to Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Galatia as though they were foreign places (l. 7-8); although these may origi- nate from a time before the Romans expanded beyond the province of Asia, they may predate the Roman presence in Asia Minor and could equally be remnants of the original Attalid law. 12 Either way, it would appear that upon the creation of Asia as a province in 129, the Romans adopted the existing Attalid customs structure. They appear to have left this largely intact, but did

10 SEG 39.1180 (cf. also 46.1456, 49.1469, 50.1159, 51.1574, 52.1130, 54.1181). The standard version of the text and translation is now Cottier et al. (eds.) 2008. This work has also superceded all previous secondary bibliography. Nevertheless, several pieces remain vital: Dreher 1997: 79-96; Eck 1990: 139-45; Engelmann / Knibbe 1989: 1-195; Heil 1991: 9-18; McGing 1995: 283-8; Merola 1996; Nicolet 1990: 675-98; id. 1991: 465-80; id. 1993: 929-59. In relation to this paper, within Cottier et al. (eds.) 2008, cf. esp. the chapters by Corbier; Mitchell; Rowe. 11 Cf. Mitchell 2008: 186, 199-200; Rowe 2008: 237-9; contra McGing 1995: 283-7, who argues that the law goes back to Nikomedes IV of Bithynia, and only came to be used by the Romans when Nikomedes bequeathed his kingdom to them in 75. 12 Dreher 1996: 115-6; Mitchell 2008: 167, 169-78; Nicolet 1993: 948-50.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 102 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 103

make a few immediate changes. A total of twelve further changes were made between 75 BC-AD 62. 13 Most of these were minor, involving exemptions from tax for goods being transported on behalf of the Roman people, the army, the praetor, or exported from local ager publicus. Other changes also take into account shifts in the political geography of the area over almost two centuries (eg as opposed to the aforementioned ll. 7-8, l. 94 strongly implies the existence of other Roman provinces in Asia Minor). Nevertheless we are left with a fine example of a Hellenistic tax system. But more importantly for our purposes is the fact that the Romans did make changes. They added to the law on average of about once every fourteen years, and this should serve as an example of just how much a native statute could have been altered by the Romans over time. The Asian portorium and the lex Hieronica are linked in that both are Hel- lenistic taxation schemes taken over by the Romans. Additionally, parts of the portorium (ll. 72-4) deal with taxes paid not in coin but in agricultural produce, as was normal for the lex Hieronica (though in Sicily, farmers did have the option of substituting cash in lieu of grain, cf. Cic., Verr. 2.3.191-2). A more striking resemblance comes in how they were both reformed in 75 by the consuls Lucius Octavius and Gaius Aurelius Cotta. In Asia, the pair reorganised the parts of the agricultural tithes that related to the publicani who collected them, and they created new provisions governing imports and exports. 14 In Sicily they transferred to Rome the auction on all crops save grain. Although Cicero (Verr. 2.3.18) says the senate authorised this, that he names the two consuls involved would strongly suggest that they themselves were behind the measure. The simultaneous reform of these two tax structures are doubtlessly related, and should be viewed as an attempt by the Romans to update older Hellenistic tax laws, recognising and regulating the role of the publicani within the provincial tax structure. These changes were arguably overdue, as the publicani had been operating largely unregulated for many decades. This had disastrous consequences in 88, when many Italians in Asia were massacred during what is traditionally seen as the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War. However, as Mithridates offered specific rewards to all those who killed their Roman creditors, this episode should be viewed as a rebellion by provincials against unregulated Roman taxation policies. 15 As for Sicily, Cicero (Verr. 2.3.12-3, 15) states that when the Romans conquered the island, they made no changes to any existing legal structures. This may be true in the initial sense. At the conclusion of the First Punic War in 241,

13 Specifically in in 75, 72, 70, 17, 12, 7, 2, AD 5, 8 or 12, 19, 37, and 62. 14 Lines 72-5; cf. Cottier et al. (eds.) 2008: 127-33; Rowe 2008: 237-9. 15 App., Mith. 22; Memn., FGrH 434 F 1.22.9; the infamous event is mentioned in numerous other sources. For Roman taxation in Asia before the massacre of 88, cf. esp. Diod. 34.25.1, 37.5; also Cic., Planc. 33, Q. Fr. 1.1.33; Liv., Per. 70; Badian 1972: 60-4, 87-90; de Ligt 2004a; Kellet-Marx 1996: 153-8; Magie 1950: 1.166-76; Ñaco del Hoyo et al. 2009: 38-40.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 103 18/04/16 14:37 104 john serrati

the Romans had no existing administrative systems with which to govern conquered territories outside Italy; as a result, they tended to leave existing arrangements in place. But over time there can be little doubt that the lex Hieronica, as parallelled by the financial inscriptions of Tauromenion and portorium of Asia, would have indeed been changed, with provisoes added to govern things like Roman garrisons, the praetor and his staff, and changes in a city’s legal status. Unfortunately, before we reach the Verrines it is impossible to discern any of these alterations. Therefore, it should be stated outright that what is presented here is the lex Hieronica as it appeared in the first century. Evidence from beforehand certainly does exist, but is nevertheless negligible in comparison with Cicero, who must often be relied upon as the only available source. 16 The standard view concerning the implementation of a tax or tithe on crops in Sicily is that it was instituted across the entire island by Valerius Laevinus in 210. 17 At this point in the Hannibalic war, the Republic was in significant financial distress; extraordinary taxes had to be levied, and Rome was desperate for grain to feed both its population and its massive army. We are aware that the war in Italy was strongly affecting grain production in some areas. Laevi- nus, the proconsul of Sicily in 210, gave great encouragement to the Sicilians, many of whom had been driven from their land by the war, to restart their farms so that their grain could come to the aid of the Romans in Italy. 18 The scholars who date the imposition of the lex Hieronica to 210 propose that the fall of Syracuse brought Rome into contact with the tithe scheme of Hieron, and that the Romans then decided to implement his rules all over the island. Evidence may point in another direction. First, Appian (Sic. 2.2) claims that, at the end of the first conflict with Carthage in 241, those Sicilians under Roman authority were charged an agricultural tithe. Although the passage also says that a praetor was installed in this year, a statement we know to be false, as other sources clearly state that a praetor was not present until 227, this does not mean Appian should be dis- counted entirely. 19 Some form of war tithe may have already been in place as early as 250; in that year Polybios (1.40.1) says that the Romans left the proconsul Metellus at Panormos in order to protect the grain of their allies (τῶν συμμάχων) as it was brought into the city after being harvested. Presumably here he means Rome’s Sicilian allies during the First Punic War, and although this may not have been a regular tithe, it is still evident that the Romans were cooperating in the exaction of grain from their newly conquered Sicilian subjects.

16 For the most succinct and scholarly piece on the weaknesses of the Verrines as a historical source, cf. Ferrary 2007: 284. 17 Edwell 2011: 330; Hallward 1930: 114; Lintott 1993: 30; Prag 2007: 77; Puglisi 2009: 67-8; Rickman 1980a: 37. 18 Liv. 26.40.15-6; cf. Cornell 1996; Ñaco del Hoyo 2011: 379-91. 19 Creation of Sicilian praetorship: Liv., Per. 20; Sol. 5.1; cf. Broughton, MRR, 1.229.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 104 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 105

As the Romans operated in the area of Panormos for thirteen years before the war ended, there remains the possibility that this did become regularised, or it may have been a direct continuation of the Punic tithe that existed in the area prior to the Roman conquest of 254. 20 Livy (23.48.7) states that, prior to the Hannibalic War, the Sicilians had paid taxes to Rome in kind. Such types of taxation would become the norm in provinces by the second century as the Romans tended to extract revenue from conquered areas in the means by which the people could most easily pay. While Italy – which, although its people still paid tax, was of course not a regularly constituted province – paid in men, other places paid in kind. Put simply, even in places that possessed coin-based economies, the Romans accepted, and perhaps even preferred, taxes that were paid by the most readily available means (Duncan-Jones 1990: 198; Hollander 2007: 195). For Sicily, this was most certainly grain, and thus, following the pattern that the Romans would later establish around the Mediterranean, it becomes both logical and unsurprising for an agricultural tithe to have been in place on Sicily long before the Second Punic War. More evidence in this regard comes from the status which certain cities acquired vis-a-vis Rome at various points before 210. As previously discussed, upon becoming a ciuitas foederata in 213, Tauromen- ion was declared free and immune from paying an agricultural tithe. Segesta was another of Sicilian cities declared to be free and immune from taxes. Around the conclusion of the First Punic War, the Segestans began to mint coins which depicted Aeneas and Anchises in order to further its claim of kinship with Rome. 21 As Cicero (Verr. 2.4.72) says that they were treated specially because of this, we can conclude that their privileged position goes back to 241 or shortly thereafter. Therefore, a tax had to have been in place in at least some parts of Sicily between the wars, since it would have been superfluous to declare these cities to be free from a financial levy which did not exist. We know that for centuries the Carthaginians had been charging their subjects in Sicily an agricultural tithe. 22 Agricultural tithes were a very common source of revenue from the ancient world, and many such tithe systems continued to be profitable well into medieval times. 23 Certainly, when the Romans conquered the western half of the island they would have left the Punic tithe in place. At the end of the First Punic War, Polybios (1.58.9) relates how Rome was exhausted, both physically and financially; if the state could have recouped part of its losses by means of an existing agricultural tithe, then it seems likely that the Romans would have done so. We return to the aforementioned statement of Cicero (Verr. 2.3.12-3, 15) that when the Romans conquered Sicily,

20 Capture of Panormos: Diod. 23.18.3-4; Pol. 1.38.8-10; Zonar. 8.14. On the punic tithe, cf. n. 22 (infra). 21 Gardner, BMC Greek (Sicily): 137; Hill 1903: 213; Puglisi 2009: 154. 22 Diod. 13.59.3, 114.1, 14.65.2; cf. Clemente 1988: 106-7; Serrati 2000: 124-5. 23 On the return of medieval tithes cf. Duby 1968: 213, 252; id. 1974: 223.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 105 18/04/16 14:37 106 john serrati

they made no changes to the existing local structures. While this is certainly an oversimplification, it does indicate that taxes were probably not changed, since if the Romans had removed any financial burdens from the Sicilians, Cicero would likely have made use of such an act as an example of Roman magnanimity (Badian 1972: 28; Scramuzza 1959: 231). What can be said with confidence is that at some point the Romans adopted a system of taxation that had been in place in the domain of Hieron, and they proceeded to spread its use to the whole of Sicily. This system was effective and it suited their purposes. We cannot say when Hieron’s tithe structure was either adopted by the Romans, or applied to the whole of the island, but we can suggest that the system of Hieron as used by the Romans, the lex Hieronica, as with the Customs Law of Asia, almost certainly utilised many features of the Greek or Punic systems it replaced.

2. Sicily and the Roman Grain Supply

Sicily is intrinsically linked not only to Roman monetary history, but as well to the development of Roman military logistics. During the initial conflict with Carthage the Romans were, for the first time, forced to deal with a problem which challenges armies even to this day: maintaining troops in the field over a lengthy period of time and far away from their place of origin. Previously, the legions had operated only within the Italian peninsula, and remained annual musters of the citizen body that would disband at the end of every campaign season. Therefore supply was usually not a problem, as they often operated close to Rome or could easily carry with them the necessary provisions. But with the opening of the war for Sicily in 264, this became a different matter. The first aspect of the Roman military to be affected was its annual rotation, and this is evident in the very first year of the war; when Claudius Caudex departed Sicily at the end of the campaign season in 264, he left a garrison behind to protect Messana, and thus for the first time in recorded history, Roman legionaries did not return home with their commander at the end of a campaign to be discharged, but stayed in the field throughout the winter. In 259- 258 Aquillius Florus campaigned in Sicily throughout the winter, and then had his consular imperium from the previous year prorogued in March. Then in 258-257 Atilius Caiatinus did the same and also had his imperium renewed, while Caecilius Metellus was made proconsul in 250 with the object of protecting the army’s grain supply. The same year saw an outbreak of disease in the Roman camp in front of Lilybaion, and thus one consul and his army were recalled to reduce the danger, while the other army was maintained in Sicily throughout the winter. 24 As the fighting with Carthage was constant and the

24 Winter of 264-263: Zonar. 8.9. Florus: Zonar. 8.11. Caiatinus: Pol. 1.25.6. Metellus: Pol. 1.40.1; cf. Walbank 1957-79: 1.101-2. Winter of 250-249: Zonar.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 106 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 107

distance from many parts of Italy was great, Roman armies henceforth had to be maintained in the field throughout the year. Sending an entirely new army into the field every spring was simply no longer militarily expedient. Moreover, the First Punic War as a conflict of attrition and lengthy sieges also contributed to the length of time troops remained in the field. Such a process can be seen in the Peloponnesian War (431-404), which was of similar length and also involved numerous sieges and difficulties with supply, necessitating the maintenance of troops in the field over winters for the first time. Thus a pattern can be divined between long wars, military logistics, and the gradual professionali- sation of armies. And growing professionalism is exactly what is seen with the Romans in the mid-third century, as from this point onwards, legions remained in the field indefinitely, and were only topped up by annual reinforcements to replace the casualties as well as those who rotated back to Italy. 25 Maintaining troops in the field all year round also meant that they had to be quartered and supplied throughout the winter, and then supplied again for the new campaign season. By use of waterborne transport and supply depots, the experience in the First Punic War helped the Romans to develop the logistical system that became one of the hallmarks of their army from the third century onwards. At around the same time, the army was also being monetised via the stipendium. 26 It would seem, therefore, that there is a link between these two processes. We know from Cicero’s famous quotation – ‘What do you think to have been destroyed more often in recent years, the cities of your enemies by the arms of your soldiers or the cities of your friends by winter quarters?’ (Man. 38.15) – that armies were usually billeted upon cities during the winter months. Additionally, the much older Sicilian Greek cities upon whom the Romans were quartered were themselves fully monetised by the mid-third century. Hence it would be logical to conclude a link between the monetisation of the Roman army in the mid-200s and the first use of urban, winter quarters for the legions. Simply put, the billeting of soldiers in cities not only gave them avenues for spending their stipendia, but in many cases, these fully monetised urban areas would have necessitated them doing so as coinage would have been the foremost medium of exchange. The process whereby the Roman army became monetised by the stipendium and the genesis of winter quarters should therefore not simply be seen as chronologically coincidental, but as two parts of the very same process.

8.15. A Roman army was kept in the field for the winter of 280-279, but this was a punishment the for troops who were defeated by Pyrrhos (Fron., Str. 4.1.24). 25 Krasilnikoff 1996: 11; Rankov 2011: 159-62; Serrati 2000: 126-30; id. 2007: 489; id. 2013: 324-6. For soldiers wintering in the field during the later third century, cf. Rosenstein 2004: 36-47. 26 Cf. in particular, the chapters by Bleckmann and Rosenstein in this volume; also Boren 1983: 232-3; Cadiou 2008: 495-509; Crawford 1985: 21-4, 59-61; Hollander 2007: 92-3; Lo Cascio 1989; Roth 1999: 220.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 107 18/04/16 14:37 108 john serrati

Nonetheless, the Roman government had no mechanisms in place with which it could supply its army, and transporting food on such a massive scale was beyond the capabilities of most ancient governments. That army supply was in private hands can been seen in laws like the Lex Claudia de naue senatorum of 218 (Liv. 21.63.3-6); this statute regulated private investment in transport ships and its passage would not make sense if the Romans possessed any sort of merchant marine or if the legions were supplied only through local requisitions. In fact, there is abundant evidence to show that there were groups of private citizens in Rome and Italy who did have the capacity to undertake long distance and large scale transport and supply; these people would later come to be known as the publicani. Almost exclusively from the equestrian class, they regularly bid for and executed public contracts. They undertook the tasks of supplying both the army and the city of Rome on various occasions, and therefore it would be reasonable to conclude that, in the absence of any other means to supply and transport, the publicani undertook the state contracts for overseas shipping on nearly all occasions. By the late third century, with armies across the Mediterra- nean, the lex Hieronica in full use, and with foreign grain coming into Rome on an unprecedented scale, the publicani would have played the most important role in the logistics of the army and the city of Rome. From port to camp or port to market, it is evident that state grain in mid-Republican Rome remained almost exclusively in independent hands, and it is extremely difficult to see how the state could have projected its power into such far-reaching theatres for sustained periods without the active participation of private citizens in the supply of its military forces. Therefore, it would appear highly probable, if not certain, that the transport of grain to the army and to the city of Rome was in private hands, even as early as the mid-third century. Though evidence points to these people accepting agricultural produce as payment (probably taking a percentage of their own cargoes, cf. Hollander 2007: 59-62, 85-6; Rickman 1980a: 14), there is little doubt that many of them would have been paid in coin, and this process was partly responsible for introduction of currency for lower-level transactions. The private means by which the Romans supplied their legions and their city itself therefore further monetised their entire society in the mid-Republic. 27

27 On the publicani and army supply: SEG 34.558 (on which cf. also 45.614, 47.744; Garnsey / Gallant / Rathbone 1984: 36-9, 42; Garnsey / Rathbone 1985: 20-5); Liv. 23.48.4-49.4, 25.3.8-5.1, 34.9.12, 36.4.5, 43.6.12-3; cf. Badian 1972: 16-8, 28, 45; Brunt 1969: 86; Cadiou 2008: 589-601; Garnsey 1994: 32; Kiser / Kane 2007; Rickman 1980a: 40; contra Erdkamp 1995: 168-91; id. 1998: 58-61, 84-94, 112, 116-21, who argues for the existence of a Roman merchant marine. Frumentatores might be sent to an area to purchase grain in the name of the state, but there is no evidence to show that this was a government post, and it appears that these men were clerks, representing private companies, contracted to purchase, collect, transport, store, and finally distribute grain to the capital or to the military. No evidence exists to show that the state had a system of storing grain over the winter months, yet we do know that private companies

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 108 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 109

What remains to be explored is to which destinations the aforementioned private contractors were transporting Sicilian grain. There is the possibility that the Sicilian produce from both the regular, annual tithes as well as the irregular double-tithes went exclusively to the Roman armies operating in both the eastern and western Mediterranean (Erdkamp 1995: 176-9; id. 1998: 84-94). The irregular levies of grain upon provincials in order to feed a military force was relatively common to most ancient states, and Rome, albeit on a larger scale, was no exception. The legions relied heavily on external supply and this grain had to come from somewhere, but there is little evidence that armies in the field were regularly sent foodstuffs from Rome or even Italy. Few places in the Med- iterranean were as agriculturally fertile as Sicily, where the climate and soil made for significant yields on a regular basis. This in turn produced relatively stable prices – allowing for the requisitioning of extra tithes, for which the Romans paid – when compared to other grain growing areas within the Roman hegemony during the middle Republic (Andreau 2007; Evans 1981: 428-9). Therefore, largely because of the lex Hieronica and the ease of exacting double tithes, in terms of grain Sicily can be viewed as its own market in the modern sense of the term, as the government in Rome did not have to make extraordinary and unexpected requisitions upon the population, and never had to negotiate with individual farmers or local magistrates in order to secure the necessary victuals for its forces operating abroad. The central location of the island would have also served to keep down the costs of shipping. Thus overall, while local requisitions and Italian grain undoubtedly had their places, Sicily was an obvious place for the Romans to obtain the means to feed their legions not simply because of its yield, but because of its organisation, accessibility, location, and stability. 28 Certainly, the grain produce of Sicily, either in the form of the lex Hieronica or specific requisitions, supplied the Roman armies based on the island. The first reference to Sicilian grain supplying an army in the field comes from 204, when provisions were sent to Scipio in Africa (Liv. 29.35.8, 36.1, 30.2.1-3,

owned grain storehouses in both Puteoli and Rome. The state also had no mechanisms by which it could distribute produce, and therefore it is probable that this too remained in private hands (cf. Sen., Brev. Vit. 18. 3; Var. R. 1.69; Hollander 2007: 80-1; Pavis D’Escurac 1976: 22-40; Rickman 1980b: 268-70). On the publicani in general during the mid-Republic: Pol. 6.17.2-3 (on this passage cf. Badian 1972: 45; Cimma 1981: 53-5; Toynbee 1965: 2.343; Walbank 1957-79: 1.692); Badian 1972: passim; Cimma 1981: 99-101; Hill 1952: 88-9; Malmendier 2002: passim; id. 2009: 1084-92; Milazzo 1993: 147-9. 28 Contra Boren 1983: 458; Cadiou 2008: 589-601, who argue that the majority of grain that went to the legions came from Rome. Hollander (2007: 99) points to instances where the Romans relied exclusively on local requisitions, however, these are likely being mentioned in the sources specifically because they were exceptional. More- over, for an army to be reliant exclusively upon local requisitioning, it would have to be campaigning in an area of significant agricultural output. On the overall stability of the lex Hieronica system, cf. Dubouloz 2007; France 2007.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 109 18/04/16 14:37 110 john serrati

3.2). After the defeat of Carthage, this process continued almost immediately, as Livy (32.27.2-3) tells us that in 198, Sicily sent both food and clothing to the Roman army in Macedonia. This would appear to be another special levy, as the statement does not mention either the regular annual Sicilian tithe or one of the second tithes exacted periodically. Of the latter, there is no doubt that they went directly to the army and were indeed imposed solely for this purpose. Livy also confirms that each second tithe, exacted from 191-189 and again in 171, went to feed the Roman armies in the eastern Mediterranean (191: 36.2.12; 190: 37.2.12; 189: 37.50.9; 171: 42.31.8). This leaves little doubt that the majority of Sicilian grain went to the legions operating in the field. The lex Hieronica, in whole or in part, was specifically adopted for the purpose of military logistics, and one of the reasons for Sicily’s conversion into a regularised prouincia under the charge of an imperium-holding magistrate was to take greater control of the grain tithe, thus insuring regular provision for the army. Control over Sicily was not a cause, but an effect of Roman efforts to obtain greater amounts of Sicilian grain for their armies. Yet we have little knowledge about the exact destinations of the regular annual tithes from Sicily, and in certain years part of the tithe may have gone to the city of Rome. In 202, we know that a very large quantity of grain came to the city of Rome from Sicily. While Livy (30.38.5) does not explicitly say this was the produce from the lex Hieronica, he does imply that such a quantity was unexpected. This would point to the conclusion that the grain coming into Ostia or Puteoli was a percentage of the regular Sicilian yield that for this year had been quite large. In Ostia, the office of quaestor aerarii Ostiensis may have been created in the third century specifically to deal with the incoming tithes from Sicily. 29 From 191-189 there is no question that both tithes in their entirety went to the army, but in 171 only the second tithe was sent east. In other years, the destination of the regular Sicilian tithe is unknown. In 189, Livy (38.35.5) implies that there was a shortage within the city of Rome as traders were fined for hoarding grain. This might suggest that the produce of the lex Hieronica was normally shipped to Rome, and having gone without it for three years, by 189 there was a shortage that resulted in hoarding and profiteering (cf. Garnsey 1988: 193; Rickman 1980: 44). Grain was sold at subsidised prices to the people of Rome by the government in 203, 201-200, and 196, while in 191 Sardinian grain was present in the city (all references to Liv.; 203: 30.26.5-6; 201: 31.4.5; 200: 31.49.8-50.1; 196: 33.42.8; 191: 36.2.12). For 196 this was the product of a massive gift of one million modii by the people of Sicily to the city of Rome, but for the other years it is significant that there was indeed grain shipped to the city, and it is not impossible that some of this may have come from the lex Hieronica, due to the

29 Coarelli 1994: 39-40; Garnsey 1988: 194-5; Meiggs 1973: 30; Rickman 1980a: 44. On the quaestor aerarii Ostiensis cf. Bates 1986: 265-9; Chandler 1978; Harris 1976: 98-9.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 110 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 111

productive capacity of Sicily and its proximity to Italy. Furthermore, the years 187 and 182-180 saw disease and famine strike the city, and therefore the tithes from Sicily would have been more vital than ever to the people of Rome (cf. Garnsey 1988: 193). This evidence would seem to imply that, in some years at least, part if not all of the Sicilian tithe went to the city of Rome. All the same, Cicero (Dom. 11) remarks that, in his day, the absence of grain imports into Rome from the provinces could spell disaster for the populace. Following conservative estimates for the population of Rome in the second century, if the city is calculated at one million people, then these would have required approximately sixty million modii. The yields of the lex Hieronica would have been hopelessly inadequate for this level of demand. The Sicilian tithe has been estimated at two million modii, and this may very well be high. 30 Even if all of these numbers are treated generously, it remains true that the lex Hieronica could only feed a very small amount of people, perhaps between five and seven percent, in the city of Rome. However, this in no way leads to the conclusion that the tithe did not make a contribution to the city. Foreign imports of grain would not have been required for all citizens: the aristocracy owned their own lands, and undoubtedly many others were able to get by on purchases from local markets at regular prices. 31 Moreover, grain would have been imported into the capital from multiple regions, most notably Italy. This mirrors ancient farming, which was itself intentionally diverse so as to minimise the impact of a bad harvest involving one crop. And so there can be little doubt that Rome pulled in grain from multiple sources, which themselves would have changed year-to-year depending upon yields and the success or failure of harvests. Therefore, although in the majority of years there is no a priori reason to believe that the majority of the Sicilian grain tithe went anywhere but to the army, and thus is an often overlooked facet of Roman imperialism, Sicilian produce may additionally have acted as a top up to Italian grain and provincial imports. Although the lex Hieronica certainly could not feed all those in Rome requiring cheap grain, it was perhaps substantial enough to have been able to play a strong role in the Roman marketplace (Rickman 1980: 261).

3. Conclusion

The Roman decision to permanently occupy Sicily was taken for two main reasons: security and supply. This paper, as well as highlighting the value of grain as currency in the Roman mid-Republic, has put forth the argument that

30 Erdkamp 2005: 43-4, 216; Evans 1981: 429-30; Scramuzza 1959: 240; White 1963. 31 Brunt 1971: 476-81; Garnsey 1988: 193-95; Hin 2008; id. 2013: 261-98, 342-50; de Ligt 2012: 40-78, 135-92; Lo Cascio 1999; Pinzone 2007: 91-4; Rickman 1991: 111; Rosenstein 2004: 144-8; Scheidel 2008.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 111 18/04/16 14:37 112 john serrati

the main reason for the expansion of the Roman bureaucracy on Sicily was born out of military necessity, as the logistical requirements of the forces operating in other parts of the Mediterranean were growing at an exponential rate. The legions had to be fed, and the main source of supply was most likely Sicily, thus necessitating greater control over the island’s grain tithe. Roman control in conquered territories expanded as necessity required. These necessities were at the outset often military, but over time, as prouinciae ceased to be primarily theatres of combat, Roman rule became more administrative in structure. This involved protecting the province and keeping order, making alliances with local elites, and ensuring that natural resources – which in the western Mediterranean were more often than not the main reason Rome had occupied a territory after conquest – could be continuously exploited. Roman practice involved leaving established legal and economic procedures in place, particularly when these were already significantly evolved. However, accomplishing the aforementioned administrative aims required the expansion of bureaucracy and economic control; such an evolution can be seen in how various Hellenistic structures were gradually altered to suit Roman purposes. The lex Hieronica and the Asian portorium illustrate this process clearly; these are both at their heart Hellenistic taxation schemes, which over time were altered to suit the changing needs of the administration within the province as well as, in the case of the lex Hieronica, the legions overseas. In 264, an army made up of seasonal militia invaded Sicily under the guise of protecting the Mamertines. This army had very little logistical structure and had never left the Italian peninsula. As a consequence, it had never had to worry very much about supply or winter quarters. Upon invading Sicily, however, the Romans soon began to realise that things could not always be as they were on the mainland; their armies could not be rotated as easily on an annual basis. When the war with Carthage became one of protracted sieges, this problem became acute, as now it was necessary to maintain the legions in the field for years at a time. And while this brought with it a new and unexpected problem concerning supply, it also served to monetise the Roman army, as soldiers now had direct avenues in the field – the Hellenic cities upon which they were quartered – to spend their stipendia. Moreover, with the supply of these soldiers in private hands, by the third century we can begin to speak of a class known as the publicani not only on a larger scale, but also as another monetised class within Roman society. By the mid-second century, the Romans controlled a pan-Mediterranean empire, but the senatorial elite still operated as though their state was merely a local hegemon, a mindset leftover from their dealings with the Italians in the third century. This is evident in their ad hoc, at times bumbling dealings with the Greek East from 215-146. The mastery that they possessed over military logistics is one of the reasons that they were able to retain such a mindset; as they did not have to concern themselves too much with transport and supply for

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 112 18/04/16 14:37 the financing of conquest 113

long-distance campaigns, there was no immediate or pressing need to contem- porise their own views about the imperium Romanum, and thus the conceptu- alisation of their own control of the Mediterranean remained routed in third century ideas of local hegemony until the provincial reforms undertaken by Sulla. Thus the immense yields of the lex Hieronica and the easy access that the Roman government had to the grain markets of Sicily actually served to retard the process by which the Mediterranean went from being seen a series of conquered but largely unconnected areas, to one that was eventually viewed as a single Roman polity. The third century was the age in which Roman military logistics was born. The monetisation of so much of Roman society is intrinsically linked to this process. The conquest of the first territory outside of Italy for the Romans had further long-term effects in that they were forced to permanently occupy Sicily from 241 onwards because of the place’s proximity to Carthage and because of their military’s growing need for Sicilian grain. And this in turn precipitated the eventual expansion of Roman provincial bureaucracy. It is significant that Roman administration in Sicily appears to have grown out of Roman military need; the legions required Sicilian grain and therefore the Romans gradually instituted more government to facilitate the harvesting, transportation, and distribution of the yearly agricultural yield to forces operating around the Mediter- ranean. Put more simply, state structure in Sicily, as well as the monetisation of the army and the increased role of the publicani, appeared chiefly as a by-product of Rome’s efforts to acquire the means to make war.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 113 18/04/16 14:37 Bellum se ipsum alet? Financing Mid-Republican Imperialism

Nathan Rosenstein

Money was a mainstay of Republican military power. Because Rome and its allies paid their soldiers and supplied much of their equipment, legionaries and socii could wage a very different and far more effective form of warfare than temporary levies of farmers who campaigned for only a few weeks in the summer. 1 Where, then, did this money come from? Did Roman wars ‘feed themselves’, as Cato the Elder claimed his operations in Spain would do (Bellum se ipsum alet: Liv. 34.9.12)? One might suppose so in view of the enormous wealth displayed in the triumphs celebrated during the first third of the second century. Some scholars have questioned the veracity of the figures Livy and other ancient authors preserve, but needlessly. 2 Most recognize the importance that the Romans, and especially the generals themselves, attached to their spoils. They manifested the magnitude of the victory won and the glory accruing to the commander. There was every reason to record and preserve these figures in the archives and at times even on stone as in the inscription that trumpets C. Duilius’ victories over Carthaginian forces in 260 and the sums he brought back to Rome. 3 Such evidence certainly explains the tendency among some scholars to assume that Rome’s acquisition of an empire in the third and second centuries naturally turned a profit. As one eminent historian puts it, ‘[E]xpansion before the Second Punic War had greatly increased public revenues without a comparable increase in regular liabilities. Once the war was over, the impression must have returned to senatorial minds that in general both war and expansion were profitable to

1 All dates BC unless otherwise indicated. Rosenstein 2004: 63-6, 107. 2 E.g., Beard 2007: 159-73. Her skepticism seems unwarranted in view of the ‘meticulous detail with which warriors kept lists of their achievements in war’: Oakley 1997-2005: 3.596; cf. generally ibid. 3.596-99; Coudry 2009: 52-62. 3 CIL I2, 25 line 17 = ILLRP 319 = Inscr. Ital. 13.3.69. Although Mommsen believed the text an Augustan forgery, Degrassi and others accept it as a genuine artifact of the third century, although recopied imperfectly in connection with a restoration of Duilius’ columna rostrata during the reign of Augustus. Cf. Bleckmann 2002: 116-25; Kondratieff 2004: 10-14, 26-32; Beck 2005a: 220 n. 17; Östenberg 2009: 58. Spoils turned over to the quaestor for recording: Pol. 10.19.1-2; Liv. 26.44.7; for records of items from a triumph deposited in the treasury: Cic., Verr. 2.1.57, cf. Coudry 2009: 29-30.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 114 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 115

the state.’ 4 Other scholars might not go that far but nevertheless suggest that the Republic’s conquests at least broke even. ‘In her dealings with foreign powers,’ one writes, ‘Rome had for some time taken the convenient view that since wars were always the fault of the other party, the other party should re-imburse [sic] Rome for the outlay she had been forced to undertake.’ 5 Scipio Africanus insisted on precisely this point in imposing terms on Antiochus after the latter’s defeat at Magnesia. 6 The spoils displayed in these triumphs and the indemnities sometimes paid by the vanquished make it possible to calculate the value of the riches deposited in the aerarium between 200 and 167. However, we have no way to determine the expenses those victories incurred and thus no ability to decide whether they were won at a profit or a loss. The only scholar to approach the problem systematically, Tenney Frank, concluded that the costs of military pay, food, and transport during the first half of the second century exceeded the income from booty and foreign tribute payments by nearly a million and a half denarii. Unfortunately, he had to admit that his figures were ‘decidedly conjectural at many points’ because there is no way to ascertain the costs of all the equipment and food Roman armies required, or to determine the numbers and pay of the support personnel who accompanied them 7. Further, the expenses that might have been incurred in transporting all this material and the costs of warships and their crews are completely unknown. And although Rome obtained much of the food for its armies and fleets after 241 through taxation in kind from Sicily, Sardinia, and eventually Spain, the amounts were arguably never sufficient to meet all of its military’s needs during the third and second centuries. 8 Preparations in 191 for the war against Antiochus the Great illustrate this last point. The senate requisitioned not only double tithes of wheat from both Sicily and Sardinia but also acquired additional grain from Carthage and Numidia amounting to some 1.3 million modii (about 8,700 metric tons). Sizable contributions also came from several allies in the Greek East – all to feed the two legions and socii – some 26,500 soldiers – that would march east in that year along with upwards of 32,000 sailors and marines serving with the fleet. 9

4 Harris 1979: 68-9. 5 Crawford 1977: 43; cf. Gruen 1984: 292. And note Ñaco del Hoyo 2011: 381: ‘Considered a true compensation for the effort of war, these exactions [i.e. booty and indemnities] were intended in the first place to pay for the very troops involved in the victory…’. 6 Pol. 21.17.4, cf. 21.14.7; Liv. 37.45.14, cf. 35.7-9 even if the sum he demanded vastly exceeded anything the war could have cost Rome. 7 Frank 1933: 1.126-46, esp. the table at 145; for the quotation: loc. cit. 8 Cf. Serrati’s chapter in this volume. 9 Liv. 36.3.1, 4.1-10; Erdkamp 1998: 89-90. On the size of the army: Afzelius 1944: 50, 62, cf. 47; on the size of the fleet: Thiel: 1946: 295; number of rowers and marines per quinquireme: Brunt 1971: 670.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 115 18/04/16 14:37 116 nathan rosenstein

Clearly, since the patres felt that double tithes from Sicily and Sardinia were not going to be enough to support forces of this size, it is difficult to believe that the single tithe normally exacted sufficed to feed the eight or nine legions, some 104,000-117,000 Romans and allies, that the Republic levied on average in the first third of the second century to say nothing of the fleets it occasionally employed. 10 Single tithes are unlikely even to have fed the four legions, perhaps 36,000-45,000 men, typically in the field prior to 218. 11 And although contributions from the Republic’s friends (whether voluntary or coerced), requisitions from states and communities in the war zone, and demands from defeated foes could make up some of the shortfall, the Republic still had to purchase a substantial portion of the wheat that fed its armies. The senate paid for the North African grain in 191 and possibly for the second tithes from Sicily and Sardinia as well. 12 It had earlier purchased grain from Hiero around 225 in preparation for the looming conflict with the Gauls (Diod. 25.14). And in 172 it sent three legati to purchase grain in Apulia and Calabria in anticipation of the coming war against Perseus (Liv. 42.27.8). Even Cato the Elder’s boast that his war would feed itself was made by way of justifying his decision to send away the merchants who were there to purchase grain for his army. The treasury in other words expected to fund Cato’s military operations at least at their outset. Fortuitously Cato was beginning his campaign when the wheat harvest was being threshed, enabling him to capture enough grain to support his army, but this was unusual. No army could live off the land for very long. 13 Once Rome established a permanent military presence in Spain after 194, for the next twenty-five years the senate regularly sent grain to support its forces there. 14 Even with the tithes from Sicily and Sardinia, food costs will have constituted a significant but unquantifiable item in the Republic’s military budget throughout the period. The only expense we can be reasonably sure of is the legionaries’ pay, their stipendium. Polybius reports that in his day an ordinary infantryman earned two obols a day, a centurion double that, and a cavalryman a drachma daily (6.39.12). Conversion of Polybius’ Greek currency into its Roman equivalent yields rates of three, six, and nine asses respectively. 15 These rates probably had

10 Assuming 5,500 Romans and 7,500 socii per legion: Afzelius 1944: 48-79; Brunt 1971: 671-84; average number of legions, op. cit., 423-4. 11 Especially since Rome drew tax revenues only from the western portion of Sicily before the war (cf. Serrati 2000: 122-6). Figures assume the ratio of Romans to allies at this point ranged between 1:1 and 2:3: Brunt 1971: 677-9. 12 Liv. 36.3.1, 4.9; Erdkamp 1998: 94-102, 112-21; cf. Roth 1999: 224-32 for other examples and discussion. 13 Liv. 36.9.12; Erdkamp, 1998: 122-40. 14 Liv. 40.35.4; infra. 15 Most scholars hold that Polybius’ Greek drachma was the equivalent of a Roman denarius, e.g. Crawford 1985: 146-7; a minority would disagree, e.g. Lo Cascio 1989:

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 116 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 117

been in force since the monetary reforms of ca 212/211 that introduced the system of coinage based on the denarius and the bronze sextantial as of two ounces and they remained unchanged until Julius Caesar doubled military pay. 16 Further, the value of the legionaries’ stipendium prior to that date was probably about the same even though they earned fewer asses since these weighed ten ounces rather than two. The total weight of bronze that a legion’s stipendium represented before ca 212/211 would therefore have been more or less equal to its weight after that date. On that basis, the annual cost of a legion’s pay during the third and second centuries can be estimated and so the Republic’s yearly outlay for stipendium in this period. That figure enables comparison between this expense and the income Rome derived from booty and indemnities year by year where these totals are preserved. Even though the result cannot yield the total cost of Roman warfare and so tell us whether or not the Republic was making or losing money, the stipendium undoubtedly represented its principal ongoing expense, probably well over half of the cost in most years. The extent to which income from war exceeded or fell short of it would at least serve as a very rough gauge of the profitability of conquest. Still, one might wonder whether the treasury bore the whole of this outlay every year. Possibly all or part of the stipendium was exacted directly from those Rome conquered rather than always coming from the aerarium. Livy claims for example that in 293 the consul Spurius Carvilius demanded that the defeated Faliscans furnish the year’s pay for his army (10.46.12). Yet even though similar demands for pay, food, and/or clothing from the vanquished appear from time to time in Livy’s first decade, a measure of skepticism seems warranted in these early cases. 17 An episode from 180 however may carry greater weight. At the beginning of that year, envoys from the proconsul in Nearer Spain, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, announced to the senate that it need not send out the usual shipment of food and money to his army in view of his victories in the previous year (Liv. 40.35.4). However the issue here was not really about funding the Spanish legions’ stipendium for the coming year but about laying the groundwork for a request for a triumph. The envoys went on to ask the senate to order a thanksgiving for Flaccus’ successes in Spain and for permission to bring his army home, both important factors in the patres’ deliberations

1 101-20. Although Polybius’ daily rates are commonly converted to 3 ⁄3 asses, etc., e.g. Walbank 1957-89: 1.722; Rathbone 1993: 151-2, argues convincingly that Polybius’ figures yield the rates given here. 16 On the reform and its date: Crawford 1985: 55-6 with further references; Caesar’s increase in military pay: Suet., Iul. 26.3. 17 E.g., 9.43.6, 2.54.1, 8.2.4, 9.36.3; cf. Oakley 1997-2005: 3.539-41 for other instances and sensible cautions about the reliability of these early notices. Coudry 2009: 40-1, believes that this may have been tried in the late fourth and early third centuries as a means of financing the Republic’s wars.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 117 18/04/16 14:37 118 nathan rosenstein

over whether or not to grant a triumph. 18 Flaccus’ army in other words would not need stipendium or grain for the next year, at least in his mind, not because the spoils it had won in the past year would meet those expenses but because it would soon be marching home while money for any new forces the senate might elect to send to Spain would accompany them, as was the senate’s normal practice. 19 However, Polybius reports one instance in which stipendium clearly is said to come directly from a defeated enemy. Probably in 187 during a meeting of the senate, someone asked Scipio Africanus to account for the money Antio- chus the Great had handed over after his defeat at Magnesia ‘for the army’s pay.’ Notoriously, that request led Scipio to tear up the account books demanding to know how anyone could ask him about this money when he was responsible for bringing so much wealth into the treasury and so many lands under Roman sway. 20 This episode formed part of the attack against the Scipios that would ultimately lead to the prosecution of Lucius and to Africanus’ retire- ment from Rome. 21 However, it also served as an important step in a much larger senatorial effort to set limits on generals’ heretofore broad authority to dispose as they saw fit of the vast wealth that their armies were winning in the East. 22 Africanus, or more properly speaking his brother Lucius, the consul in command of the war against Antiochus, had apparently used the money to award double pay to his soldiers after their victory at Magnesia. 23 The fact that Africanus’ questioner could make an issue out of Lucius’ generosity to the troops indicates that it was not only unusual but objectionable. That it could form the substance of Lucius’ subsequent criminal trial demonstrates unequiv- ocally that paying the soldiers out of funds destined for the treasury was anything but standard practice at this date. 24 And this makes sense. It would have been dangerous for Rome to depend on the booty its armies won for something

18 Liv. 40.35.5-14; Pelikan Pittenger 2008: 84-103; Beard 2007: 186-218; Bastien 2007: 287-303. 19 As when the elder Africanus arrived in Spain: Pol. 10.19.2. 20 Pol. 23.14.7-11; cf. Diod. 29.21. The date of this episode is notoriously uncertain: cf. Gruen 1995: 78-80. Other reports of the episode contain no mention of the money being earmarked for army pay: Gell. 4.18.7-12; Val. Max. 3.7.1e. 21 Sources and bibliography in Scullard 1973: 290; Briscoe 2008: 170-1 and op. cit. 170-208 for the most recent discussion of the many problems involved. 22 Gruen 1995: 70-80. On a general’s authority over booty: Churchill 1999: 85-116; Shatzman 1972b: 177-205. 23 Liv. 37.59.6; negotiations after Magnesia: Pol. 21.17.5; Liv. 37.45.14. Livy claims double pay was also awarded after Lucius’ triumph, forgetting apparently that most of his army remained in Asia Minor: 37.50.2-3. 24 Gruen 1995: 75; Briscoe 2008: 394. On the trial of Lucius cf. id. 1981: 173-5. The trial apparently turned on the question of whether the money formed part of the indemnity imposed on Antiochus or was booty, over the use of which generals traditionally had considerable discretion: Scullard 1973: 142-3.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 118 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 119

as vital as money to pay its soldiers. Even though victories were frequent, they were never regular enough to constitute a reliable source of cash. A few exceptions can be found, but these occurred during the Second Punic War when a treasury regularly strapped for cash often forced generals to fend for themselves. 25 Armies ordinarily went to war with a chest full of money provided by the treasury, and the regular dispatch of additional funds from Rome thereafter met their expenses over the longer term. As Polybius notes, ‘The legions require constant supplies, and without the consent of the senate, neither corn, clothing, nor pay can be provided...’ (6.15.4). Moreover, a general had every incentive not to use the spoils from a victory to meet the army’s ordinary expenses: better to reserve them to be paraded during his triumph in order to enhance the luster of the occasion and his own glory. 26 Food is the only other factor that might have affected the Republic’s annual outlay for stipendium, since the cost of their grain rations was deducted from the legionaries’ pay. Yet any savings here was to some extent offset by the practice of providing free grain to the socii, who ordinarily outnumbered the legionaries in this period. 27 And as argued above, tribute grain from Sicily and Sardinia was probably insufficient to meet all of the food needs of Roman armies in the second and, probably, the third centuries. Purchases to make up the shortfall will have further offset whatever the Republic saved by making its legionaries pay for their grain allotments. And while at times defeated enemies were forced to supply food for a Roman army as part of the price of peace, it is difficult to believe that a general will have made his legionaries pay for it when he distributed it to them. 28 They will have considered the grain as part of the spoils from the victory they had won, something they were entitled to rather than a commodity they had to purchase. Therefore, we may with due caution use stipendium as a rough proxy for the cost of Rome’s wars, bearing in mind that some factors may have reduced it, as when defeated enemies were made to pay the troops, or because food costs were met by deducting the price of the legionaries’ rations from their pay, or by

25 This fact accounts for the inclusion of pay for the soldiers in the peace terms imposed on the rebellious Spanish tribes in 205: Liv. 29.3.5; App., Hisp. 38; and in the preliminary peace terms with Carthage following Zama while the treaty was being discussed in Rome: Pol. 15.18.6; Liv. 30.37.5; App., Pun. 54; on the inconsistencies in the latter account, cf. Walbank 1957-89: 2.470. Cf. further on Spain, Richardson 1986: 57, 116. 26 perhaps, too, senators will have wanted a general to award bonuses to his troops in Rome, where peer pressure could limit his winning excessive favor thereby. 27 Pol. 6.39.15; on the ratio of allies to legionaries in the third and second centuries, cf. Brunt 1971: 677-84. The Hannibalic War forms an exception, however. 28 E.g. Liv. 29.3.5; App., Hisp. 38; Pol. 15.18.6; Liv. 30.37.5; App., Pun. 54; Pol. 21.40.8-12; Liv. 37.59.6; 38.13.9-14, 15.11, 37.7-9. 43.4.9. Cf. Oakley 1997-2005: 3.539-41 for earlier examples and cp. Caesar: Suet., Iul. 26.3.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 119 18/04/16 14:37 120 nathan rosenstein

acquiring grain through contributions, requisition, or pillage. 29 However, other expenditures will have increased costs appreciably: equipment, transport, occasional food purchases, and perhaps military slaves, but especially naval operations. 30 Ultimately, total costs are not likely to have fallen much below the stipendium and may often have far exceeded it. 31 In comparing the spoils that triumphs brought into the treasury between 200 and 167 to the army’s stipen dium it is also important to bear in mind that in these years the senate regularly deployed several armies annually, not all of which won victories and produced income for the treasury. Nevertheless, the stipendium for all legions, not simply those that triumphed, needs to be included in any calculation of the annual cost of Roman warfare. By this reckoning, the treasury took in the equivalent of over 267 million denarii in the first third of the second century and paid out in stipendium about 171.5 million, for a profit of about 95.5 million denarii or 56 percent – not bad at all. However, this overall total masks a considerable fluctuation in the relationship between the ongoing annual cost of the legions’ pay and the income from victories as Chart 1 indicates. More importantly, the figures for total income include not only coins and precious metals actually carried in the triumphs but also the multi-year indemnities imposed on some of the Republic’s defeated opponents. The Carthaginians were required to pay 200 talents of silver annually for fifty years following their surrender in 201; Philip V of Macedon had to hand over 500 talents immediately in 196 and pay an additional 500 in annual installments spread over ten years. 32 Similarly, Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, paid

29 Stipendium for one legion: (4,940 legionaries at 3 asses/day = 14,820 asses) + (60 centurions at 6 asses/day = 360 asses) + (300 cavalry at 9 asses/day = 2,700 asses) = 17,880 asses/day × 355 days of a pre-Julian Roman year = 6,347,400 asses / 10 = 634,740 denarii. Use of Rathbone’s figures (supra: n. 15) here minimizes the cost of 1 stipendium; assuming the usual figure of 3 ⁄3 asses/day, etc. increases the costs, as does adopting the minority view that Polybius’ drachma here is worth more than a denarius (supra: n. 15). In either case, the result is that costs for stipendium will be higher than the figures in the text, making it more expensive for Rome to wage war. 30 There is no data to tell us what it cost the Republic to build and fit out a quinquireme or to pay and feed its crew (rowers, officers, and marines) of 400: Brunt 1971: 670. Comparative evidence from Athens indicates that expenses for triremes and their crews of 200 could vary considerably but were always very large: Gabrielsen 1994: 105-69. Marchetti 1978a: 250-3, assumes an implausibly low annual cost per ship during the Second Punic War. 31 Note, too, that for purposes of the analysis that follows, I have assumed that all spoils displayed in a triumph were deposited in the treasury. However, if a portion of the spoils was set aside by the army’s commander for his own purposes, as Churchill 1999: 93-101, argues, then the profits available to off-set the costs of a victory will have been less. 32 Carthage: Pol. 15.18.7; Liv. 30.37.5; Philip: Pol. 18.44.7, although the final four payments were forgiven in 190 out of gratitude for Philip’s assistance in the war against Antiochus: Pol. 21.2.3; App., Syr. 23, etc.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 120 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 121

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 121 18/04/16 14:37 122 nathan rosenstein

100 talents in 195 and another fifty every year for eight years to end his war with Rome (Liv. 34.34.11), while Antiochus of Syria was hit with a whopping 15,000 talent indemnity, 500 following his defeat at Magnesia in 190, another 2,500 when the peace was ratified at Rome, and the remaining 12,000 in a dozen payments of 1,000 talents over as many years (Pol. 21.17.4-5). Finally, the Aetolians following their surrender in 189 faced a demand for 500 talents, 200 at once and 50 annually for six years (Pol. 21.30.1-2). In all, these indemnities amounted to over 140 million denarii, over 50% of Rome’s total profits from its wars between 200 and 167. In other words, the 95.5 million denarii surplus over the cost of stipendium in these years was overwhelmingly the product of annual indemnity payments rather than booty. Without them, Rome’s take from its wars in this era fell short of the cost of stipendium by about 44.5 million denarii. Two points deserve emphasis here. The first is how rarely the Republic imposed these sorts of enormous annual payments upon those it defeated, as opposed to one-time demands for cash. The only certain examples prior to the Carthaginians’ indemnity of 201 are the indemnities Rome forced these same enemies to pay in the wake of the First Punic War and its seizure of Sardinia, and the 100 talents Hiero was forced to pay apparently in installments. 33 More importantly, when the figures for booty are disaggregated from indemnities and compared to stipendium as in Chart 2, it is obvious that only in a minority of years between 200 and 167, 8 out of 33, did the value of the cash and precious metals displayed in triumphs exceed the total cost of pay for all legions. In the first of these cases, in 200, booty exceeded stipendium only because that year saw two generals celebrate triumphs, and even here the overage was not large. Likewise in 196, only the combined spoils from the five triumphs celebrated that year enabled the aerarium to show a surplus. In 194 Cato the Elder’s loot from Spain did not equal the outlay for stipendium; only the addition of Flamin- inus’ tremendous booty from Greece put the treasury in the black as far as army pay was concerned. Indeed, those eastern spoils by themselves exceeded the total cost of that year’s stipendium, and the same was true of the other eastern

33 Carthage: Pol. 1.62.8-63.3, 88.12; Hiero: Pol. 1.16.9, cf. Zonar. 8.16 with Walbank 1957-89: 1.68-69. Teuta, the Illyrian queen, agreed to pay tribute – phoros – following her defeat in 229: Pol. 2.12.3, while in 217 the Romans sent envoys to the current king, Pineus, with a demand for the stipendium he owed, which was at that point overdue: Liv. 22.33.5. As Walbank 1957-89: 1.165 notes, the latter was probably not identical with the former but a new levy imposed following the Roman expedition against the Illyrians in 219. Further, characterizing it as stipendium suggests that it was a one- time payment similar to the stipendium Livy claims was demanded of the Faliscans in 293: 10.46.12, and cf. supra n. 26. Pineus had likely delayed paying what was owed while he awaited the outcome of Rome’s conflict with Hannibal. The tribute demanded of Teuta is likely to have been similar to the cash extorted from various cities in Asia Minor by Manlius Vulso in 189: Liv. 38.13.11-15.11.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 122 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 123

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 123 18/04/16 14:37 124 nathan rosenstein

triumphs: Lucius Scipio’s over Antiochus, Fulvius Nobilior’s and Manlius Vulso’s over the Aetolians and Gauls of Asia, and of course most spectacularly Aemil- ius Paullus’ over Perseus. Of those victories over non-eastern enemies, only the spoils that L. Postumius Albinus and Ap. Claudius Centho brought home in 178 and in 174, both from Spain, exceeded the Republic’s outlay for stipendium in these two years. In other words, a few spectacularly rich victories in the East account for the positive balance between income and expenditure for stipen dium in the first third of the second century, through both the spoils returned to the treasury and the annual indemnity payments they produced. Take them away, and Roman imperialism ran at a loss, at least as far as the public fisc was concerned. This conclusion is important for a several reasons, most immediately for the broader question of how Rome financed the conquests that laid the foundation for its Mediterranean-wide empire through the subjugation of Italy in the later fourth and third centuries. Between 337 and 218 Roman armies celebrated some 89 triumphs, and one might ask whether these victories produced enough wealth to pay not only for the expenses of winning them but also for all of the other military outlays the Republic made in these years. We have no way of arriving at an answer of course, but the evidence from the early second century is highly suggestive. Not only did the spoils won in most years not match or exceed the total cost of the year’s stipendium. More significantly, as Chart 3 indicates, about half of all triumphs celebrated during these thirty-three years did not even return enough money to the treasury to offset the pay of the legions that celebrated them. 34 No Gallic victory is certain to have paid for the stipendium of the legions that won it. 35 The same is true for triumphs celebrated over the Ligurians. 36 And while the carry-forward from the great eastern victories cer-

34 Rosenstein 2011: 133-58: Table 1. It is important to note in this context that several years of campaigning might have preceded a decisive battle. Flamininus’ legions, for example, fought for three years in Greece before they won their victory at Cynocephalae in 197. Any estimate of the cost of a specific conquest therefore must reckon an army’s stipendium from the time it first took the field. 35 possibly P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica’s Gallic triumph in 191 forms an exception, since the weight and hence the value of the 1,471 gold torques he won is unknown: Liv. 36.40.12. If each on average weighed somewhat more than half a Roman pound, his victory will have paid the stipendium of his army: Rosenstein 2011: Table 1 with note f. 36 Again, the triumph of L. Aemilius Paullus in 180 may form an exception, since the weight of the 25 gold crowns he displayed in his triumph is unknown: Liv. 40.34.8. Although some spectacularly heavy ‘crowns’ are recorded, e.g. Pol. 21.30.10: 150 talents (over 12,000 Roman pounds, and so probably in this case simply a ‘gift’ of silver, cf. Walbank 1957-89: 3.130 ad loc., 3.86 ad 20.12.5; Liv. 38.9.13 mistakenly changes the figure to 150 (Roman) pounds; Liv. 38.14.5: 15 talents (about 1,200 Roman pounds, and so again probably a ‘gift’ of silver). Each of Paullus’ crowns would have had to weigh on average almost 135 pounds to equal the stipendium for his legions, something very difficult to believe of a notoriously poor region such as Liguria, cf. Liv. 39.1.6-7.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 124 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 125

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 125 18/04/16 14:37 126 nathan rosenstein

tainly paid for many subsequent years in which Rome’s wars failed to show a profit, the same cannot be said of many others. Spain alone forms an exception. Eight victories there resulted in money returned to the aerarium beyond the expense of the stipendium for the legions that had won them. Taking only the seven victories won through 178, when the settlement imposed by Tiberius Gracchus made the Spanish provinces largely self-supporting as far as Rome’s military presence was concerned, the profit from these was large enough to pay the annual stipendium of about 20 legions in addition to the stipendia of the 11 victorious legions themselves for a total of 31 annual stipendia. 37 However, the Roman military effort in Spain cost the treasury 62 annual stipendia over this same period, meaning that even here, Rome’s conquest and pacification of its Spanish prouinciae came at a net loss, at least as far as army pay was concerned. 38 Spain, of course, abounded in silver, gold, and other minerals. 39 Polybius reports that in his day the yield of the silver mines around New Carthage amounted to 25,000 denarii daily or 9 million annually. 40 So it is hardly surprising that the Spanish possessed plenty of accumulated wealth for Roman armies to plunder. Yet even so rich a victim did not fully pay for what it cost the Republic in sti pendium to pacify it. Italy was not similarly blessed with stocks of precious metals, as reflected in the absence of victories there after 200 that returned booty to the treasury equal to the stipendium it had expended to win them. That fact should caution against the easy assumption that many of the wars between 337 and 218 paid for themselves much less that they resulted in a substantial profit for Rome. To be sure, some of these conquests must have been rich. Apart from the evidence of the Duilius inscription cited above, Livy reports that in 306 the consul Q. Mar- cius Tremulus forced the Samnites to provide the year’s stipendium for his

37 The victories and the additional stipendia they funded are: 1. L. Cornelius Lentulus in 200: + 3 stipendia (counting only the cost of his legions for 200) 2. Cn. Cornelius Blasio in 196: + 1.2 stipendia 3. L. Stertinius in 196: + 2.98 stipendia 4. M. Helvius in 196: + 1.95 stipendia 5. Q. Minucius Thermus in 196: + 4.6 stipendia 6. M. Porcius Cato in 194: + 5.6 stipendia 7. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 178: + .78 stipendia 8. Ap. Claudius Centho in 174: + 6.18 stipendia. Note that the 20 stipendia surplus over stipendia for the legions that won these victories is inflated owing to the fact that Helvius and Thermus commanded no legions, only contingents of socii. 38 Possibly L. Manlius Acadinus’ victory turned a profit if the 52 gold crowns he displayed in his triumph weighed on average above 10 pounds each: Liv. 39.29.6-7. If so, then the shortfall is reduced to 27 or somewhat fewer stipendia. 39 E.g. Wilson 2007: 109-25. 40 Pol. 34.9.8-9 = Strab. 3.2.10, assuming once again that Polybius’ drachmas are the equivalent of Roman denarii.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 126 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 127

troops. 41 In 293, the same historian claims that the spoils of the consul L. Papirius Cursor would have paid the tributum collected from the citizens for the coming year while his colleague Sp. Carvilius Maximus deposited 380,000 pounds of bronze into the aerarium as well as forced the enemy to pay his legions’ stipen dium for that year (Liv. 10.46.5-6, 10.12-14). Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports that the consul of 282, C. Fabricius Luscinus, declared during a speech that he returned the tributum to the citizens and brought 400 talents into the treasury after his victories over the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians (19.16.3). Fabius Pictor asserted that the Romans first knew wealth when they conquered the Sabines (ca. 290; F 20 Peter = F 26 Beck and Walter = Strab. 5.3.1), and Florus claims the spoils from Pyrrhus and Tarentum were like nothing the Romans had ever seen before (1.13.25-28). However, such achievements were something to boast about precisely because they were exceptional. They rarely appear in our sources. Of the eighty-nine triumphs or ovations celebrated between 337 and 218, one may legit- imately question whether very many produced enough wealth to equal the stipen dium of the legions that marched in them much less furnished pay for the legions that won no victories. Over that 119-year period an annual deployment of four legions will have required 476 annual stipendia. If each triumph produced enough money to compensate for the cost of two legions’ annual pay, the Republic will still have needed funds to cover the remaining 298 stipendia. If that sum were to come from the additional wealth the 89 triumphs had produced, each triumph will on average have had to pay for 3.35 annual stipendia above the cost of the stipen dia of the pair of legions that triumphed. 42 Rome’s Spanish victories in the period 200-167 by comparison each funded on average only 3.29 additional stipendia. 43 It is difficult to believe therefore that the victories Rome won in Italy between 338 and 218 were on average as rich or richer than those in Spain during the early second century. Not even the First Punic War forms an exception in this regard. Rome’s victory produced an indemnity of 3,200 talents with an additional 1,200 talents extorted from the Carthaginians in 238 (Pol. 1.62.9-63.3, 88.12). In addition, Roman armies won a number of significant victories during the conflict. To get a sense of what at least some of the costs might have been, we can assume, as argued above, that the value of a legionary’s stipendium in the third century was

41 Liv. 9.43.21, cf. Plin., Nat. 34.23, and note that he also made the Hernici surrender two month’s stipendium: Liv. 9.43.8. 42 476 stipendia – 178 stipendia = 298 stipendia / 89 = 3.35. The Romans began fielding four legions sometime before 311, but the date is uncertain: Oakley 1997-2005: 3.390-91. This calculation assumes they did so after the extension of citizenship to the Latins. The number of triumphs includes Calvinius’ in 283 but not Decius’ in 312, Calvus’ in 222, or the two alleged triumphs of Caudex in 264 and 263. Cf. the catalogue in Itgenshorst 2005 under the appropriate years. 43 Supra n. 37. This calculation includes the triumph and spoils of Ap. Claudius Centho in 174: 26.29 stipendia / 8 triumphs = 3.29.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 127 18/04/16 14:37 128 nathan rosenstein

about equivalent to what his second century counterpart earned: even though he was paid fewer asses, they were five times heavier. 44 On that assumption, a rough calculation of the cost of the legions’ annual stipendium can be offered, expressed in post-211 denarii. If over the 23 years of the war Rome mobilized four legions annually, the cost of 92 annual stipendia would have been 50.6 million denarii. 45 4,400 talents on the other hand were equal to 29,660,000 denarii, leaving a shortfall of over 25 million denarii. Even adding in the 100 talent indemnity Hiero paid in 263 (Pol. 1.16.9, a portion of which was forgiven in 248: Zonar. 8.16), Duilius’ booty, the spoils taken after the fall of Agrigentum in 263 (Pol. 1.19.15), in the capture of Panormus in 254 (Diod. 23.18.5), and during the raid on Africa in the preceding year (Pol. 1.29.6-10) along with the gains from a number of other, lesser victories (e.g. Pol. 1.24.10-13), it is difficult to imagine that all this wealth matched the sums Rome expended on stipendium. Moreover, this reckoning takes no account of the hundreds of ships and crews that Rome employed during the war, the cost of which in materials, food, and pay is likely to have been enormous. 46 The treasury was empty in 242 when the senate sought funds to construct and man the fleet that would finally end the war with its victory off the Aegates islands. The patres were forced to turn instead to loans from private citizens (Pol. 1.59.6-7). The Carthaginian indemnity may have repaid those loans, but the other costs of the war are not likely to have been fully reimbursed. That shortfall may have been at least part of what impelled the senate to demand an additional 1,200 talents from the Carthaginians in 238. If stipendium only rarely exceeded spoils between the late fourth and the first half of the second century, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Republic’s wars in this era almost never paid for themselves when all the other costs – food, equipment, transport, support personnel, ships and crews – are brought into the reckoning. It is very difficult therefore to believe that greed ever motivated the senate to embark upon a war during the middle Republic. To be sure, some hoped that conquest would make them rich. Voters in the comitia centuriata readily approved a proposal to aid the Mamertines in 264 once the consuls pointed out to them the great plunder they could expect; volunteers in 172

44 Crawford 1985: 22-3. 45 At an annual stipendium of 549,540 denarii per legion since each legion contained only 4,140 legionaries at this date. 46 On the numbers: Pol. 1.63.8-9; analysis of Polybius’ figures: Tarn 1907: 48-60; Thiel 1954: 83-94; Walbank 1957-89: 1.128. Again, we have no way to estimate the cost. Pay for the crew of a trireme at Athens during the early phases of the Peloponnesian war could be a talent per month: Rawlings 2007: 114-5, who also notes that rates of pay could be significantly higher. Assuming for the sake of illustration that pay for the crew of a quinquireme was a talent per month during the First Punic War, keeping a fleet of 100 ships at sea for six months would have meant an expenditure of just over 4 million denarii for pay, nearly double the annual cost of stipendium for four legions.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 128 18/04/16 14:37 bellVm se ipsVm Alet? financing mid-republican imperialism 129

flocked to the levy for the Third Macedonian War because they had seen those who had fought earlier wars in the East come back wealthy. 47 And some of the generals who led these and other campaigns may have enriched themselves, although they had probably done so illicitly. 48 But most of the patres will not have expected to win command or even serve in a prospective war, nor could they anticipate that any of their male relations would do so either. They cannot have anticipated therefore that voting for war would result in any personal financial gain. Moreover, they will have been well aware as they pondered going to war that in all likelihood the profits of victory would not match what the Republic would spend to win it. And yet they never hesitated to open hostilities out of concern for the financial burdens this would impose. The senators simply assumed that the assidui, the Republic’s tax-paying citizens, would keep on paying tributum year after year for the stipendium and the other costs of waging war, despite having little prospect of ever seeing these loans repaid. 49 And the patres were right; voters in the comitia centuriata only once displayed any reluctance to approve a declaration of war, in 200 when they refused to renew the war against Macedon. Here though, the issues involved not who would pay but who would serve and the severity of the threat Philip posed. Once the consul, at the senators’ prompting, had reintroduced the bill and argued that Rome could either fight Macedon in Greece or in Italy and, it appears, promised that no one who had served in Scipio’s African army would be sent to Greece involuntarily, the centuries readily voted for war. 50 Indeed, the patres insisted on undertaking this new conflict despite the fact that the treasury lacked the funds to repay the large debts the Republic had incurred during the war with Hannibal (Liv. 31.13.1-9). Roman military power in the middle Republic rested squarely on the financial shoulders of the assidui. But what did the Romans get out of it? Of course when an existential threat like Hannibal presented itself, their willingness to pay and pay and pay some more as they did between 218 and 201 is understandable. Yet how much of a danger would the Brutti – or the Ligurians, Lucanians, or Illyrians – have posed in the minds of ordinary Romans? Did the rhetoric of protecting amici and allies and punishing those who challenged Roman might really weigh more heavily among the citizens than the damage a war would inflict upon their purses? To be sure, expansion of the ager publicus added immeasurably to the wealth of the Roman state. But unless we assume a huge, unorganized influx of settlers into newly won lands, the primary way the majority

47 Mamertines: Pol. 1.11.2 with Walbank 1957-89: ad loc. On this episode, cf. Hoyos 1984: 88-93. Third Macedonian War: Liv. 42.32.6. 48 On generals’ ability to help themselves to a share of the spoils, cf. Churchill 1999 refuting Shatzman 1972b. 49 On tributum as a forced loan that could be repaid: Nicolet 1976c. 50 Liv. 31.6.3-8.1, 6, cf. 32.3.4. Eckstein 2006: 257-88 for discussion of the decision; on the promises to the soldiers, cf. Briscoe 1973: 71.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 129 18/04/16 14:37 130 nathan rosenstein

of Romans could have hoped to benefit was through participation in a colony. Yet only 4,000-6,000 colonists were sent out every few years, not all of whom were Romans. It seems difficult to believe that the slim chance of being included among them would have reconciled two hundred thousand or even three hundred thousand assidui to parting with the money it would cost to conquer the lands that the colony would occupy. 51 Most assidui already owned farms, and the wealthiest among them, whose votes predominated in the comitia centuriata and who bore the heaviest burden of tributum, would seem the least likely to want to participate in a colony. No assiduus can have relished paying tributum that stood little chance of being refunded. For that reason, returning money from his spoils to the citizens was something for a general to celebrate. 52 In 187 Manlius Vulso’s friends urged the senate to use the booty from his triumph and to pay off the arrears still owing in tributum in the belief that doing so would boost his popularity (Liv. 39.7.4-5). Even Megadorus’ lament in Plautus’ Aulu laria over having to provide a soldier’s pay indicates that the playwright and his audience were well aware of the grumbling that levying tributum could occasion (508-31). Exploring these questions would take us well beyond the scope of this paper, but by now it should be clear that the economic health of the Republic’s assidui was vital to its ability to project military power across Italy and the Mediter ranean in its middle years. That fact ought to have made the prosperity of the citizenry a matter of serious concern to the senators, a conclusion that raises a number of further questions, none more intriguing than this: how – if at all – did the relationship between the patres and the assidui change after 167, when the tributum was indefinitely suspended and the Republic no longer depended on its citizens to finance its wars? 53

51 Colonies: Cornell 1995: 380 Table 1; Rosenstein 2004: 60 n. 195-6 for further discussion. Population size: Afzelius 1942. 52 Rosenstein 2011: 137-8 for examples. 53 I would like to thank Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John Serrati for organizing the 2011 conference where the talk out of which this chapter developed was first presented and for their lengthy efforts to bring it into print. Versions of the talk were presented at the Universities of Michigan, Canterbury, and Auckland, and at the annual meetings of the Celtic Conference in Classics in Edinburgh and the Society for Classical Studies in San Francisco, and I thank the audiences at each venue for helpful comments and criticisms. Needless to say, any errors that remain are mine. I completed the chapter in 2012, prior to the publication of P. Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, and so have been unable to take any account of this important work in it.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 130 18/04/16 14:37 Wealth, Power, and Class Coherence. The ambitus Legislation of the 180s B.C.

Hans Beck

In 182 B.C. the Roman senate readjusted the financial administration of public games. The decree was stipulated in response to an immediate incident: the aedile Ti. Sempronius Gracchus had spent so much money on his lavish games that the event became a financial burden not only on Italy and the socii, but also on the overseas provinces. 1 In his attempt to entertain and impress – and, it should be added, recommend himself to – the Roman people, Sempronius evidently went too far; he practically forced the senate to intervene. Beyond the particular case in question, during the course of the 180s the financial administration of games had generally started to come under the scrutiny of the senate. For the greater part of the 3rd century B.C., the impensae ludorum (expenses for annual games) were usually covered by public funds that were allocated by the censors or the aediles. If the games in question were ludi uotiui (“votive games”), held by commanders to honor a vow they had made in battle, then the standard procedure was that the senate granted them the right to use some of the war spoils that were accumulated during the previous campaign. 2 In 200, this funding practice enabled the curule aediles to throw magnificent games and even repeat the performances of one day (31.50.1-2). 3 Only three years later, in 197, the plebeian aediles held games that were repeated for a total of seven times in a row, while the curule aediles threw jaw-dropping

1 Liv. 40.44.11-12. – Thanks are due to the workshop participants and to Karl-J. Höl- keskamp for thoughtful comments and suggestions for further improvement. 2 Mommsen 1887/1888: 295-6. 517-22 (aediles). 1128-9; Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 507-8; cf. Sabbatucci 1954: 262-93; Baltrusch 1989: 106-111 with note 447; see also Bernstein 1998: 67-76, 143-7, who discusses the piecemeal evidence. In Livy (24.18.10- 11) the censors commission public contracts to furnish supplies for the games, which cast some light on the process. For ludi uotiui, the allocation of funds depended on whether the commander had deposited the spoils in the treasury before his request was made; see also below on the issue of ownership of war spoils. 3 Sex. Aelius Paetus (cos. 198) and M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 196), cf. MRR I: 323; Beck 2005a: 325-6, 357. The Plebeian Games of that year were thrice repeated by L. Terentius Massiliota (pr. 187) and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus (cos. 182).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 131 18/04/16 14:37 132 hans beck

ludi Romani that were said to be more magnificent than anything the city had witnessed before. 4 Yet, the spiral of spectacular performance and rising expenses had its limitations, at least when state funds were concerned. In 191, the senate advised the consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (who happened to be one of the curule aediles of 197) to fund the games he had vowed as propraetor a few years earlier either from previous war spoils or sua ipse impensa (“from his own money”: 36.36.1-3). Whichever it was, Scipio went on to celebrate magnificent ludi uotiui for a full ten days, most likely paid out of his own pocket. 5 Such a use of private funds once again complicated the matter; for if magistrates were allowed to resort to their family wealth when equipping games in the name of the republic, then the accumulation of monetary assets itself would become a powerful tool in politics. The connection was obvious. It took the senate only four years to contain the development. When, in 187, the propraetor M. Fulvius Nobilior (cos. 189) requested to hold ludi magni in accordance with a vow to Jupiter, he suggested that when his spoils went to the treasury, the funds for those games were to be encumbered and thus retrievable at a later date. The senate agreed to this in principle, but, in addition, stipulated that there should be an overall funding ceiling for Nobilior’s games: HS 80,000 in total. 6

1. Aristocratic Competition, Public Performances, and Money

By the time of Sempronius’ aedileship in 182, the issue of funds and financing of public games was not new, and his actions came as no surprise. Indeed, over the past decade magistrates and imperium-holders sought to set ever new prec- edents in the staging of games, accelerating the spiral of pomp, pageantry and pay. This evidently impacted the performance culture of the Roman republic. As games grew more lavish, so did the expectations of those who attended them. The post-Hannibalic War years mark a watershed in the festival culture of the republic in this regard, with ever increasing splendor in the choreography of games and staggering additions to, and repetitions of, the program. 7 But, in the political culture of republican Rome, the performative dimension of civic

4 Liv. 33.25.1-3. Curule aediles, P. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 191) and Cn. Manlius Vulso (cos. 189); aediles of the plebs, M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191) and C. Laelius (cos. 190), cf. MRR I: 333. 5 Cf. Bernstein 1998: 272-4. 6 Liv. 39.5.7-10. 7 Livy’s record attests to the dramatically accellerated extension or repetition (in part or entirely) of the ludi Romani and/or Plebeian Games in the decade after 201 B.C. (in 7 out of 11 years from 201 to 191). In 197, the super-year of games, the Roman Games were repeated thrice and the Plebeian ludi for a total of seven times. Cf. 31.4.5-7 (201); 31.50.2-5 (200); 32.7.13-15 (199); 32.27.8 (198); 33.25.1-3 (197); 33.42.9-11 (196); 36.35.2 (191).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 132 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 133

rituals and games was only one aspect in a wider canon of political and social practices. 8 The interconnectedness between public performance and the exercise of political power was in itself complex and highly malleable, with many ties that cut through the most basic principles of Roman society. As was demonstrated by Karl-J. Hölkeskamp in a series of studies, in the face-to-face communication that was so characteristic of the conduct of politics at Rome – in elections and public speeches, during festivals and processions, or at religious ceremonies – the interaction between the noble elite and common people was neither casual nor free-floating, but encoded in the shape of civic rituals. Those rituals rendered the situation in which they were performed meaningful and legitimate, and, effectively, they “structure[d] and channel[ed] the interaction between rulers or ruling classes … and the ruled as co-present audience and addressees”. 9 The thrust towards higher spending and a thriving increase in expenses for games and celebrations, therefore, not only affected the actual entertainment of public performances. Along with these new developments, the inherent governance of the relation between the various status groups of Roman society at a key moment of their social interaction was exposed to adaptation and change. At the same time, a plain observation can be made. In the aftermath of the Second Punic War, the role of economic assets became increasingly important in the political arena. This does not necessarily point to a crude monetization model, with associated patterns of decadence and declining morale in politics. Notoriously little is known about Rome’s public finances prior to the Hanni- balic War; 10 and in the early decades after 200, the situation was yet vastly different from the days of the late republic, when the competition for distinc- tions and commands was as much determined by symbolic capital as it was by real money. It is a truism, however, that the outcome of the Second Hanni- balic and the Second Macedonian Wars did alter the economic realities of Rome. 11 The persistent influx of monetary resources from abroad changed the

8 The realm of public performance has been widely examined in recent years, cf. Flower 2004 for an overview. Individual civic rituals, the triumph: Itgenshorst 2005; Hölkeskamp 2006; Beard 2009; the various pompae: Beck 2005b; Hölkeskamp 2006 and 2008; games and spectacles: Bernstein 1998; Bell 2004; Beacham 1999; aristocratic houses: Beck 2009. For a survey of concepts and related key themes see also Beck/Wiemer 2009. 9 Hölkeskamp 2011: 166 and passim; cf. also the titles listed in the previous note. 10 See the survey of the evidence by Frank 1933, which is still fundamental; cf. also Erdkamp 1998; Rosenstein 2004; Andreau 2010; von Reden 2010, on the monetary aspect. 11 This was demonstrated by Toynbee’s magisterial study (1965) on the effects of the Hannibalic War on Roman society. Rosenstein 2004 now offers of course a much more nuanced picture. Cf. also Scheidel 2007, who operates on the assumption of a war-related alteration of the Italian economy.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 133 18/04/16 14:37 134 hans beck

basis of the treasury. And, no matter who actually owned the manubiae, 12 it is safe to assert that this income also widened the economic abilities of the ruling elite. As the state budget and private wealth skyrocketed, the exercise of political influence at Rome became increasingly intertwined with issues of monetary assets. The senate responded to this development in a timely manner, if not swiftly. For the greater part of the 3rd century B.C., the financing of games did not appear to have been controversial. If there was a moment of crisis, it was most likely resolved by ad-hoc measures of the censors that were effective enough to contain the issue and find an immediate solution that cooled down the tensions between magistrates and the senate. 13 Under the impact of ever-increasing budgets, however, the situation became more entangled. After 200, the demand for ad-hoc solutions arose on almost an annual basis. In some sense, the action taken against Fulvius Nobilior was ad-hoc, as well; the stipulated funding ceiling of HS 80,000 for his games was, when decreed in 187, a regulation that applied only to Nobilior. The stipulation appeared to be an easy and effective strategy to settle the issue that had arisen over the use of private funds. To top the state funds that were earmarked for the event when the manubiae (“war spoils”) were transferred to the treasury, Nobilior was allowed to draw on his personal funds and run his games on a mixed budget, yet only up to a fixed amount. At the same time, the senatorial decree had a loophole. The ceiling of HS 80,000 applied to the total of expenses from public and private funds, but it disregarded other financial sources such as contributions from socii or ‘voluntary’ installments from the provinces. Sempronius seems to have creatively exploited this loophole in 182 B.C. when he evaded Nobilior’s decree by collecting donations from abroad – according to Livy, this entailed extracting funds from the provinces – and thus securing the necessary funds for his extrav- agant games. In its reaction to this, the senate moved away from ad-hoc conflict resolution to a more comprehensive regulation, stipulating that future organizers of games “should not invite, compel, or accept contributions” (Liv. 40.44.11) for their event. In 179, only three years later, the sponsor of votive games in honor of Jupiter was reminded to observe both the decree for Fulvius Nobilior and the

12 The issue is notoriously hard to assess. In similar vein, it is difficult to see if the great victories of the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. were actually won at an economic profit or loss, cf. N. Rosenstein’s contribution to this volume. But the precarious balance between military expenses that were permanently high and the influx of spoils that were even higher but also more contingent and volatile made it almost certainly necessary that the manubiae went to the state treasury. This did not include the praeda, which was whatever the soldiers looted and which belonged to them. Against Shatzman 1972b, it was argued persuasively by Churchill 1999 and Rosenstein 2011 that the generals did not own the war spoils. 13 Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 399. 412-4. Cf. also Suolahti 1963: 20-79, who discusses the few attested instances; Baltrusch 1989: 5-29, 106-111.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 134 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 135

one issued in response to Tiberius Semprionius actions. 14 Within less than two decades after the Hannibal War, then, the financial administration of games underwent an increasing regularization. In short, the trajectory went from traditional management to ad-hoc regulation to the explicit spelling out of the most basic governing principles. At the (temporary) end of this process, the traditional procedure was replaced with a new piece of quasi-legislation. In the year of Sempronius’ aedileship, in 182 B.C., another law related to public performances was stipulated. By decree of the senate, the tribune of the plebs C. Orchius carried a law to limit the number of guests at private banquets. The details of this lex Orchia de cenis are lost, but it is usually thought to endorse exemplary lifestyles. 15 In light of similar prescriptions, for instance the leges Oppiae of 215 which targeted the display of luxury items in the public sphere of the city, such an interpretation of the lex Orchia appears plausible. 16 But the leges Oppiae were already abrogated at the time of the lex Orchia (in 195), and the spirit in the later 180s differed significantly from that of 215, the year following the military disaster on the battlefield at Cannae. A more nuanced understanding of the lex Orchia is possible. For the stipulation of ceilings for guest-lists and, hence, the attempt to regulate both the expenses and the pomp of conuiuia again points to the performative realm of public life at Rome. As with the celebration of lavish games, the holding of at-large banquets spoke to, and in turn exuberated, the social distinction of their hosts. On a minimalist interpretation, then, the lex Orchia of 182 illustrates that public banquets, too, had become an arena of aristocratic competition, that the attempts made by patrons to excel in that competition had increased significantly, and that ever-increasing sums of money were spent in order to facilitate that goal. 17 Since the conclusion of the Second Punic War, the role of wealth and money played a growing part in Roman politics, and due to new sources of income secured by victory over Carthage and Macedon, it did so to new heights. From the record of senatorial decrees in the first two decades after 200, it is obvious that the members of the ruling elite quickly embraced the idea of exploiting the opportunities that came with the unprecedented influx of financial resources. In light of an omnipresent climate of competition for public office and distinction,

14 Liv. 40.44.11-12: neue quid ad eos ludos arcesseret cogeret acciperet faceret aduersus id senatus consultum, quod L. Aemilio Cn. Baebio consulibus de ludis factum esset. (12) decreuerat id senatus propter effusos sumptus, factos in ludos Ti. Semproni aedilis, qui graues nonmodo Italiae ac sociis Latini nominis, sed etiam prouinciis externis fuerant. 15 Macr., Sat. 3.17.2-4; Festus s.v. percunctatum p.280-2 Lindsay = Elster 2003: # 160 (bibliography); cf. Bleicken 1955: 67; Baltrusch 1989: 77-81. 16 Liv. 34.1.2-3; Val. Max. 9.3.1; Oros. 4.20 = Elster 2003: # 98. 17 Cf. also Lintott 1990: 5-6; Harris 1979: 89, who highlights the seperate thrusts of the lex Orchia and the leges Oppiae.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 135 18/04/16 14:37 136 hans beck

it is not surprising that the noble families in Rome picked up on this trend and employed creative strategies to increase their stakes by, literally as well as metaphorically, capitalizing on rising monetary resources – public, private, or from third parties. 18

2. New Heights in the Competition for Public Office-Holding

In a celebrated passage, Cicero declares that the fierce political competition in those years, notably the rivalry between candidates at elections, precipitated yet another response of the senate, i.e., the first-time stipulation of laws that governed the career path of public offices. In the same passage, Cicero claims that such laws did not exist “among the old ancestors of a past age”. 19 The hazy reference to old ancestors might point to the 4th or 3rd centuries B.C. However, despite Cicero’s notorious over-glorification of those ages and their exemplary heroes, the general observation holds true. It is reasonably clear that in the 150 years after the implementation of the consular constitution, traditionally (and for good reasons) dated to 367/6 B.C., very few so-called cursus laws, or leges annales, existed that governed the holding of office, let alone the rivalry between candidates who competed for public office. The holding of magistracies was governed by traditional practices, not by laws. There were some prescriptions in place, such as the 10-year interval for the holding of a second magistracy with the same imperium, iterations of the consulship were regulated by law in one way or the other since 342, 20 iterations of the censorship were excluded as of 265, 21 and the accumulation of offices was deemed illegal. 22

18 In Livy (39.5.7-10), Fulvius Nobilior backs his request for the encumbering of funds upon submission to the treasury with the explicit reference to the fact that part of the spoils had come from such a third party. Allegedly, 100 pounds of gold were collected by the cities of Greece and donated to him for the purpose to celebrate games that were vowed on the day he captured Ambracia. 19 Cic., Phil. 5.47: Legibus enim annalibus cum grandiorem aetatem ad consulatum constituebant, adulescentiae temeritatem uerebantur: … Itaque maiores nostri ueteres illi admodum antiqui leges annalis non habebant, quas multis post annis attulit ambitio, ut gradus essent petitionis inter aequalis. (“For when by age-requirement laws men were appointed to the consulship at a later age, they feared the rashness of youth: … Accordingly our ancestors, among the old ancestors of a past age, had no age-requirement laws. It was the rivalry between candidates that many years later introduced these laws so that the subsequent candidatures were between men of the same age.”) 20 Through the so-called leges Genuciae: Liv. 7.42.1-3 = Elster 2003: # 20. Both the details of the legislation and the conceptual issue of normative legislation in the 4th century B.C. is of course much debated: cf. Hölkeskamp 1987: 92-95; Cornell 1995: 333-44; Beck 2005a: 46-51. 101-5. Further references are also listed by Elster 2003: # 19. 21 Val. Max. 4.1.3; Plu., Cor. 1 = Elster 2003: # 65; cf. Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 617; Beck 2005a: 76-85. 104. 22 The leges Genuciae included the corresponding piece of legislation, cf. two notes earlier.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 136 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 137

Other prescriptions regulated the numerically equal access of plebeians and patricians to the public honores and priesthoods. 23 But there was no formalized career path, nor was there a set of laws that governed the financial, or any other, bearings of candidates. There was no cursus honorum, in the strict sense of the term. 24 The earliest cursus law appears to have been stipulated in 196 B.C., or so many scholars believe. Although a law is not actually attested in the sources, the fasti consulares betray a striking development. Before 196, the individual career paths of men who held the maximus honos indicate that, on their way to the consulate, many had sidestepped the praetorship, and that means that the praetorship was not compulsory for the consuls. 25 Even after the Hannibalic War, from 199 to 196, four of the eight consuls took a shortcut on the way to the consulship, bypassing the office of praetor. 26 As of 195, however, all men held the praetorship before serving as consuls. This development was most likely more than just mere coincidence. It was argued by some that the praetorship became a compulsory step on the way to the consulate in 196, and that this step was enforced by a corresponding legislation. 27 This might have been the case, yet it is not entirely clear if the new trend in the fasti was necessarily effected by law. Alternatively, this might have been due to the factual pressure put on candidates who canvassed for the highest office. In 197, it was decreed that the number of praetors was raised from four to six positions. 28 Arithmeti- cally, the bottleneck between the praetorship and the consulate had always been tight, at least since the creation of provincial praetorian commands in Sicily and Sardinia. After that year, in 227, only 50% of all praetors could become consuls. 29 In 197, the bottleneck tightened even further. With the addition of two Spanish praetorships, the relation shifted to 1:3, i.e., only 30% of all praetors were able to become consuls. This new ratio added drastically to the fierceness of the competition between candidates for the maximus honos. In the new climate, it is likely that candidates without praetorian experience simply were not strong enough to prevail over those who did have expertise in that area. Hence,

23 The leges Ogulniae: Liv. 10.6-9 = Elster 2003: # 46; Hölkeskamp 1988; Cornell 1995: 340-1; Rüpke 2007: 58-60. 24 The broader context of this is fleshed out in Beck 2003. 25 Cf. the fasti praetorii as compiled by Brennan 2000: 2.725-33; Beck 2005a: 63-70 with note 11; 2011: 82-6; Bergk 2011. 26 L. Cornelius Lentulus, aed. cur. 205, procos. 205-200, cos. 199. Sex. Aelius Paetus, aed. cur. 200, cos. 198 (cf. above note 3). T. Quinctius Flamininus, propr. 205-202 (?), cos. 198. C. Cornelius Cethegus, aed. cur. 199, cos. 197. Cf. MRR I under the respective years. 27 Cf. Brennan 2000: 1.168-9. 28 Cf. Liv. 32.27.6-1 with Elster 2003: # 137; Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 297-8; Brennan 2000: 1.163-6. 29 Solin. 5.1; cf. Liv., Per. 20; cf. Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 297-8; Lintott 1999: 107; Brennan 2000: 1.91-9; Beck 2011: 85.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 137 18/04/16 14:37 138 hans beck

the competition was apparently so heated that the praetorship had become a factual obligation. With it, a candidate’s chances for the consulate were numerically 1 out of 3. Without it, they didn’t stand a chance at all. 30 The fasti further betray the increase in the competition for public office. Beginning in 205 B.C. and more visibly after 200, the fasti consulares document a rising percentage of men from a non-consular family background (25% of all plebeian consuls between 200 and 180). Only one-third of all plebeian consuls of this period were the sons and/or grandsons of consuls. 31 By means of comparison, in the two decades from 220 to 200 only 8% of all plebeian consuls were men from a non-consular family, while more than half of their cohort was staffed with men who were themselves the sons and/or grandsons of past consuls. 32 The development of the patrician segment of holders of the maximus honos mirrors this tendency, albeit under the particular premises that apply to the group. 33 The trend towards a broader recruitment pool of aristocratic families for the staffing of the consulate was in itself the result of the disastrous consequences of the Hannibalic War. At the lectio senatus of 216 alone, after the Battle of Cannae, 177 men were enrolled in the senate to compensate for the losses of the house on the battlefield (Liv. 23.23.7). In subsequent years, the aristocracy lost hundreds of its members in open battle and in the war of attrition. Naturally, the resulting need for human compensation broadened the family pool of the Roman aristocracy. At the same time, the exceptional careers of some of the leading figureheads in the Second Punic War fueled the intention to return to a less monopolized recruitment practice of high-office holders. As much as, for instance, the careers of Q. Fabius Maximus (cos. V 209), M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. IV 208), Q. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. IV 209), and P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus appeared to be desirable under the circumstances of war with Hannibal, they were hardly considered as tolerable after 201. In the aftermath of Rome’s victory, the senate fostered the rigid return to recruitment patterns as they were in place earlier, including the nulli- fication of suspense laws that were issued throughout the war. 34 Yet, in light of the recent shift in the social and political composition of the elite, the call for

30 For a more comprehensive discussion, cf. Beck 2005a: 54-5. 69-70. 31 The numbers provided in this section are based on the prosopographical analyis of the fasti consulares in Beck 2005a. In section II.3, the successrates of consular families is studied for the period from 290 to 180 B.C., with breakdowns of c. 20 years each: 290 to 265, 264 to 241, 240 to 219, 218 to 201, 200 to 180; cf. 114-6 for the governing methodology of the analysis. A similar approach to the fasti was forstered by Hopkins/ Burton 1983 and for the period after 180 B.C. by Badian 1990. For the figures in concretu, Beck 2005a: 141-7. 148. 151. 32 Beck 2005a: 136-41. 148. 151. 33 Beck 2005a: 136-41. 150. 152-3. 34 After 201 B.C., there were no more early iterations of the consulship, i.e., before the 10-year period of restriction. The last early iteration was that of M. Claudius Mar- cellus in 208, who had served as cos. III in 210; cf. Beck 2005a: 302-27. In c. 151 B.C.,

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 138 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 139

aristocratic plurality also meant a higher degree of competition between candidates with – in theory – equal chances for obtaining an office with imperi um. 35

3. Ambitus in Context: the Governance of Competition, Canvassing, and Careers

The dramatic rise in the competition for public office-holding had a deep impact on the political life at Rome. The implications for the political culture of the republic were immediate, and they were severe. Holding high office was and remained the key prerequisite for the perpetuation of aristocratic status, and access to the top magistracies was a concern that was shared by all aristocratic families. The plebeian segment of the nobility was hit the hardest by the new development. The many young aristocratic families that had climbed the social ladder and entered the lower ranks of the senatorial elite in the years after 216 – at the ranks of quaestors, aediles, and maybe praetors – had to be accommodated; hence, the pressure of social positioning was felt particularly within the plebeian segment of the aristocracy. The patricians were more or less free from the tensions that were provoked by the arrival of new families and the re-positioning this required, but the shift in the traditional parameters that steered the political competition no doubt affected them as well. 36 In short, the aristocracy was faced with the triple challenge of a political rivalry exacerbated by dynamic social change, the deterioration of the numerical success rates, and the thrust towards a new commodity – vast amounts of financial assets – that allowed competitors to climb to all-new heights in their attempt to recommend themselves to the people of Rome and propel their ambitions. The situation was so grave that it called for senatorial intervention. In 181 B.C., the consul M. Baebius Tamphilus instituted a law that stipulated a decrease in praetorships from 6 to 4 on alternate years. 37 The obvious intention of the lex Baebia de praetoribus was to contain the competition between praetorian candidates for the consulship. In the present situation, there were simply too many praetors for whom there were too few consular posts available. This created a certain discontent among the ruling elite. 38 However, the measure was somewhat complicated in practical terms, if not downright awkward. Among

a law seems to have been issued that generally prohibited the iteration of the consulship: Liv., Per. 56 = Elster 2003: # 195. 35 The fasti praetorii, too, indicate a slightly accelerated degree of social mobility in the praetorian rank of the aristocracy in the two decades after 200 B.C., cf. Brennan 2000: 2.758-63 and also 1.170-1 on the impact of increased competition on the prolonged wait-time between the praetorship and the consulate in the 180s B.C. in particular. 36 Cf. Beck 2005a: 142-4, with further differentiation between patricians and gentes maiores in particular. 37 Liv. 40.44.2 = Elster 2003: # 162; Rotondi 277-8. 38 Cf. Evans/Kleijwegt 1992: 181; Stolle 1999: 63-66; Beck 2005a: 55-6.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 139 18/04/16 14:37 140 hans beck

other things, it entailed that on alternate years there were not enough praetorian imperium-holders to cover the administration of six provinces. This, in turn, created distortions within the board of praetors. 39 For 179, indeed only four praetors were chosen, but for 177, the next alternate year, Livy attests six praetors again (and the same for the subsequent years), so the lex Baebia must have been abrogated only a few years after its original inception. The law was simply too quirky. 40 Another of Baebius’ motions was more successful. Both consuls of 181, Baebius and his colleague P. Cornelius Cethegus, initiated an ambitus law, which became known to be the first ambitus law of the republic (that is, the nebulous plebiscitum Poetilium of 358 notwithstanding 41). Livy, the main source, says nothing about its actual content; all he reports is that a law de ambitu was decreed ex auctoritate senatus and approved by the people. 42 The notion of ambitus is usually referenced as electoral bribery, 43 but it is doubtful whether the connotation of bribery, or corruption, fully captures the issue at stake. Senatorial status advancement drew on a variety of practices and recip- rocal relations, including the mutual obligations between the city’s ruling elite and the ordinary people. As part of this relation, senatorial patrons were expected, and called up, to offer support and assistance to their clients, who, in turn, would render their loyalty and show their allegiance during public festivals or at elections. There was nothing reprehensible about this. For example, at some point in the later 3rd century B.C. (most likely in 209), it was stipulated that clients should express gratitude to their patrons during the festival of the Saturnalia only through the giving out of wax lights; in previous years, certain aristocratic patrons had evidently asked for higher obligatory donations (munera) from their clients which, effectively, burdened them with expenses that were hard to shoulder. The lex Publicia de cereis was designed to put an end to this. How- ever, the law also betrays acceptance of the more general practice of mutual obligations between patrons and clients, including the exchange of commodities and material goods, which was essentially untouched by the law. 44 In a similar

39 Cf. Brennan 2000: 1.169-72, who concludes that under the provisions of the lex Baebia, Hispania Citerior and Ulterior were to be allotted to praetors only in even-numbered years. 40 Liv. 41.8.1.; cf. MRR I: 398. 41 Liv. 7.15.12-13 = Elster 2003: # 6; Hölkeskamp 1987: 83-5; Lintott 1990: 4; Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 611. 42 Liv. 40.19.11: legem de ambitu consules ex auctoritate senatus ad populum tule runt. Cf. Elster 2003: # 161; Rotondi 277; Lintott 1990: 5-6. 43 More general discussions of the topic include the collection by Schuller 1982 (which received less scholarly response than it deserves); Fascione 1984 (with rev. Hölkeskamp, ZRG 104 [1987], 791-6); Lintott 1990: 1-2. 11-6; Jehne 1995; Nadig 1997; Stolle 1999; Rosillo-López 2010a; Walter 2010. 44 Elster 2003: # 112; Rotondi 258. Cf. Bleicken 1955: 65; Baltrusch 1989: 61-3.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 140 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 141

vein, the influencing of elections, for instance the demand for loyalty towards a patron by means of personal interception at the ballot, was not necessarily considered an act of corruption, but again an integral part of the mutual patron- client relation. 45 The term ambitus (from ambio, ambitio) indicates that the corresponding laws related to the way in which election campaigns were conducted; therefore it, apparently, targeted the issue of canvassing in a broad sense. 46 From that perspective, the contents of the earliest ambitus legislation of the 180s should not be reduced to the idea of corruption and bribery. Rather, for the earliest enactment of ambitus laws a broader understanding should be applied. When Baebius and Cornelius Cethegus initiated a lex de ambitu, they most likely targeted the conduct of canvassing and the behavior of candidates during election campaigns. This might have entailed the stipulation of funding ceilings for specific events or entertainment. Also, the law might have regulated the handing out of financial gifts and other donations; in this sense, its inherent logic followed that of the lex Publicia de cereis from 209 (see above). Indeed, in light of the prevailing discourse of the day, it is not unlikely that the employment of financial assets was regulated in one way or the other. But this did not necessarily place the motion in the realm of an anti-corruption legislation, in a more common sense of the word. 47 Many details of the problem remain obscure, but the general thrust should be clear. Like the regulations governing games and other aspects of public entertainment, the ambitus law of 181 moved the subject matter in question from traditional procedure to the area of legislation. Before 200, the canvassing arena was overseen by the censors. Their authority to exercise control over the public moral (regimen morum) almost certainly included the capacity to oversee election campaigns and scold candidates for their canvassing practices if necessary. 48 The lex Baebia de ambitu was the first attempt to provide a more general, legislative approach towards the problem. As in the case of the public

45 Cf. Lintott 1990: 10-11; also Walter 2010, who discusses the relevant legislation and the public discourse in the late republic. 46 Cf. Jehne 1995: 51-2, highlighting the breadth of violations that were covered by various ambitus laws. 47 Schuller 1982 and Grüne / Slanička 2010 offer an excellent survey of historical corruption-studies on multiple ancient and modern societies. As Schuller demonstrates, the most basic assumptions of the notion are problematic and require social contextual- ization: “Was als Korruption zu bezeichnen ist, hängt – von gewissen transkulturellen Kernbereichen abgesehen – wesentlich von den vorherrschenden gesellschaftlichen Organisationsformen und Verhaltensnormen und dem Ausmaß ihrer Akzeptierung ab.” (‘What qualifies as corruption depends on – certain transcultural key notions notwithstanding – the prevalent patterns in the organization of society, the norms of behavior, and the degree of its acceptability.’)” (1982: 11). 48 Cf. Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 399. 405-419 on the censors’ magisterial prestige after the lex Ouinia; see also Baltrusch 1989: 120-31.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 141 18/04/16 14:37 142 hans beck

funding of games, the transformation from tradition to law was most likely triggered by a concrete cause; indeed, the preceding decade witnessed a whole array of incidents that had forced the senate to intervene (see also below). But despite its ad-hoc character, the law that resulted from the situation both embraced and promoted a new sense of normativity. Once again, the conduct of politics at Rome was formalized through the implementation of a new legal norm that superseded previous practices. In the overall spirit of the late 180s, it is not surprising to see that the access to offices itself was soon regulated. Around the same time as Baebius’ ambitus law, most likely in the same year, M. Pinarius Rusca drafted a law called a lex annalis by Cicero, an office qualification law, or, better, an age requirement law that targeted admission to the public magistracies. 49 The contents of the rogatio Pinaria are lost; it is not even clear whether or not the bill passed the senate and was brought before the people. The reason why Cicero references it is not its actual subject matter, but rather to highlight the brisk language with which Pinarius responded to the opponents of his bill. In other words, the rogatio Pinaria was remembered for the heated debate it provoked among the aristocracy, rather than for its actual content – which might imply that the rogatio as such was unsuccessful. 50 Be that as it may, no matter how fierce the debate was or how well both sides presented their arguments, in the following year (180 B.C.) those in favor of such a motion evidently prevailed over their opponents. The tribune of the plebs L. Villius carried a law that regulated the legal age of candidacy and entrance into public office. This is, of course, the famous lex Villia annalis which is usually referenced as the first cursus honorum law at Rome. 51 The brevity with which Livy refers to the lex Villia annalis, in conjunction with Theodor Mommsen’s verdict that the bill was a most comprehensive motion that systematically structured the cursus honorum, 52 almost naturally

49 Cic., de Orat. 2.261 (Rotondi 278): Ex immutatione, ut olim, Rusca cum legem ferret annalem, dissuasor M. Seruilius: ‘Dic mihi,’ inquit, ‘M. Pinari, num, si contra te dixero, mihi male dicturus es, ut ceteris fecisti?’ ‘Vt sementem feceris, ita metes,’ inquit. (“Allegory as a rhetorical figure is attested by Rusca, in moving his age requirement law, when his opponent M. Servilius said: ‘Tell me, Marcus Pinarius, if I speak up against you, will you revile me as you have done the others?’ He responded: ‘You shall reap your sowing.’”). Cf. Evans / Kleiijwegt 1992: 181; Stolle 1999: 63; Brennan 2000: 1.170; Beck 2005a: 53-4, also on the involved individuals M. Pinarius and M. Servilius (Geminus, cos. 202?). 50 On his account of the lex Villia annalis (cf. the following note), Livy says that this was the first time that age requirements were stipulated, which might imply that the roga tio Pinaria fell through. 51 Liv. 40.44.1 = Elster 2003: # 164; Rotondi 278-9; cf. Evans and Kleijwegt 1992; Kunkel / Wittmann 1995: 46-7; Stolle 1999: 65-6; Brennan 200: 169-72; Beck 2005a: 51-60; Timmer 2008: 82-95. 52 Mommsen 1887/1888: 536-563.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 142 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 143

triggered an endless debate on the actual contents of the law. In particular, it is debated how detailed its prescriptions were with regards to a compulsory course of offices, age qualifications, and indirect time prescriptions (such as a bien nium, for instance, between two offices). Livy plainly says (40.44.1): eo anno [180 B.C.] rogatio primum lata est ab L. Villio tribuno plebis quot annos nati quemque magistratum peterent caperentque. 53 The primum relates to the stated content of fixing the ages at which magistracies might be sought and held, which makes earlier age prescriptions unlikely. The aspect is so predominant in Livy’s characterization that it is difficult to dismiss the idea of explicit age regulations. 54 Most likely the law laid down the minimum age for each of the curule magistracies: maybe 33 or 35 for the aedileship, 39 for the praetorship, and 42 for the consulate. 55 On the other hand, with such a regulation in place, it is puzzling to see what other regulations it would have required, if any, to meet the declared objective of making the competition for office more equal in terms of ages. 56 Despite the plain, almost minimalistic nature, the motion to set minimum ages had a tremendous normative force. First, the prescription was an effective tool to curb potential arguments over loopholes and exceptions: there was nothing to argue about the age of a specific candidate. Second, the stipulation of further time rules were for the most part redundant, although a biennium regulation that prohibited office holding in two consecutive years is very likely. 57 Associated with this was, third, the implicit governance of the course of offices, with no need for the explicit stipulation. Since age requirements forced even the most ambitious men to wait for a good deal of their careers until they reached the prescribed minimum age, the law effectively structured the competition for public office-holding, from the lower magistracies to the very top of the cursus. 58 The lex Villia annalis thus set out to standardize aristocratic careers and regulate the competition for public office-holding through the simple

53 “In this year for the first time a motion was proposed by the tribune of the people L. Villius, stipulating the ages at which each magistracy might be sought and held.” 54 Livy continues to report that Villius’ family was given the cognomen Annalis in recognition of the law, which once again highlights the novelty of the regulation. 55 Cf. Astin 1958: 31-45; Develin 1979: 88. 56 This was the inherent logic of leges annales according to Cicero, cf. above note 19. 57 One loop hole remained, however, if candidates did not obtain the applicable office suo anno. If a man was elected praetor at the age of 41 or 42, he would have met the age requirement for the consulate in the very year after his praetorship. In the 180s B.C., such a ‘retarded’ career path was by no means unusual, due to the high competition for offices with imperium; cf. Brennan 2000: 1.170-1, with several relevant examples. The lex Villia might have included a biennium blackout-prescription to prevent candidates to jump from one office to the next in two consecutive years. 58 The structuring of the cursus was thus achieved implicitly and indirectly, rather than through explicit regulation. In many ways, the structure was the result of inherent self-governance. For instance, with more praetor posts than aediles (as of 196), the aedileship cannot have been compulsory for offices with imperium.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 143 18/04/16 14:37 144 hans beck

governance of the ages of candidates. Once again, the road to regulation by law followed the basic scheme that applied to the increasing formalization of other areas of aristocratic competition as well. After the many career exceptions in the decades after 220 B.C. that were sanctioned by ad-hoc consulta of the senate or circumstantial prescriptions (which in themselves were issued in response to highly contingent circumstances of the day), Villius’ motion transferred the matter of careers from piecemeal regulation to the legislative assemblies.

4. Shifting Parameters in the Competition for High Office

The intention of the lex Villia was to govern, and effectively equalize, the point of departure from where candidates would enter the arena of competition for high office. But other inequalities persisted, and it was hard to contain them by law. As mentioned above, the prosopography of imperium-holders after 200 B.C. indicates that, in the aftermath of the Hannibalic War, the nobility opened up again, and it did so significantly. About a quarter of all plebeian consuls from 200 to 180 came from a family background outside the inner core of the nobility, with no consular ancestor whatsoever. At the same time, the figure of consuls with either a consular father or grandfather dropped to a very low level (see above). Once again, those figures illustrate a broader trend, namely the decreas- ing value of so-called symbolic capital in the competition for public office-holding after 200 B.C. Candidates of the old gentes continued to dominate the voting assemblies, with a striking success rate. In the patrician segment of the nobility, this success was almost unbroken. However, at the same time, the dominance of the old gentes was not unrivalled, and the face of the nobility was gradually altered, with a rising prominence of families with lower, if any, symbolic capital at their disposal. The censorship elections in 189 fully capture the spirit of social mobility within the Roman elite. Recounting the events, Livy (37.57.9-58.2) says that the elections were particularly contested because so many esteemed candidates had entered the competition. He provides a list of six illustrious candidates (37.57.10) – all men of consular rank – and then continues with the observation that M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191) appeared to be the most promising of them. The reason for Glabrio’s popularity was that “he had distributed many largesses by which he had placed a large part of the voters under obligation” (multa congia ria distribuerat quibus magnam partem hominum obligarat: 37.57.11). To this, the majority of nobiles objected that a “new man” (nouus homo: 37.57.12) should not be preferred over them. Glabrio’s opponents, therefore, launched a lawsuit against him, accusing him of misappropriation of war spoils from his campaign against King Antiochos two years earlier. Rather than handing the funds over to the treasury in full, Glabrio was charged with holding back a significant chunk which was used to support his candidacy through congiaria to the voters (although Livy does not say this explicitly). The subsequent trial

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 144 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 145

was both fierce and nasty. Before the final verdict was reached, Glabrio with- drew his candidacy, which ultimately saved him from an impending conviction and the payment of a high fine (37.58.1-2). 59 As ever, Livy’s account is fraught with internal inconsistencies and anachronistic concept attribution. At an earlier instance, Livy implies that the with- holding of portions of the war spoil was sanctioned by the senate and indeed regarded as common practice. 60 Therefore, if anything, the charges brought forth against Glabrio must have been more nuanced – unless one is willing to see the entire affair as a political smoke screen put in place to ruin Glabrio. Also, the charged characterization of Glabrio as a nouus homo obfuscates the social realities of the Roman aristocracy in the Middle republic. Glabrio’s family background matched that of many other young aristocratic families that had entered the highest stratum in society only recently, in the course of the Hannibalic War. So, to be sure, the Acilii were social climbers and Glabrio was the first family member to reach the office of consul, but that did not make them homines noui in the later and stricter sense of the word. 61 This said, and due to their particular social profile, families like the Acilii must have operated differently from the rest of the nobility. In particular, they resorted to different approaches in their preservation of social distinction. To them, it was futile to attempt to match the symbolic capitals of the old nobility, its social prestige, and its means to mobilize support. Instead, in their competition with gentes such as the Cornelii, Fabii, Servilii, or Valerii, more recent aristocratic families no doubt will have preferred to see normative regulations and legal prescriptions in place that governed, formalized, and standardized, as it were, the contest for public office. Rather than leaving it to the discretion of the senate to make ad-hoc decisions when and if it deemed them necessary, the younger aristocracy almost certainly will have been among the most vocal advocates for regulation by law. With regards to real capital – financial assets and wealth –, the division lines that separated the strands of the nobility were more complicated. The obvious caveat here is that very little is known about the distribution of wealth across the ruling elite, and individual families in particular, in those decades. The data sets are too scattered to present a clear picture. 62 Yet, it might be plausible to assert that the families who had stood at the very pinnacle of the republic for the past 200 years, who had manned the highest magistracies for many generations, and who owned ever-expanding estates in Italy, were also the ones who

59 Cf. Briscoe 1981: 392; Suolahti 1963: 341-8; Stolle 1999: 48-51. 60 Cf. 36.36.2. 61 Cf. Beck 2005a: 119-21 on the problem of anachronistic concept attribution of the term homo nouus in a mid-republican context. The social background of the Acilii Gla- briones is fleshed out by Dondin-Payre 1993. 62 The most comprehensive collection of data continues to be Shatzman 1975.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 145 18/04/16 14:37 146 hans beck

had accumulated the greatest wealth. 63 In fact, it occurs that they were also among those who sought to extend their social distinction by ever-growing financial transactions. The prosopographical data presented earlier suggests as much. In the incidents discussed above which provoked senatorial action with regards to election campaigns and canvassing practices, the ‘culprits’ behind each one of them came from the highest echelons of the ruling class: P. Cor- nelius Scipio Nasica, M. Fulvius Nobilior, and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, the son-in-law of Scipio Africanus maior. In other words, it was not the fancy ambitions of certain nouveaux riches to showcase their newly acquired status that shot through the roof, but rather the behavior of Rome’s most traditional ruling elite. At the same time, Glabrio’s case indicates that the changing economic realities in the decades after 200 somehow distorted the traditional pattern of wealth distribution among the nobility. Although the member of a relatively young and moderately wealthy aristocratic gens, Glabrio, through his successful military campaign, had access to funds that could be easily used to bolster his personal esteem, and that of his family. Glabrio had already displayed this intention earlier in his career: he was among the plebeian aediles of 197 who repeated their games for a total of seven times (see above). In his consulate, before the battle of Thermophylai, he vowed a Temple to Pietas which was completed by his son in 181. 64 His triumph of 190 was celebrated with particular exuberance; according to Livy, it was commemorated both for its extraordinary spectacles and the exploits it set on display. 65 In a similar vein, he made lavish gifts to the Sanctuary of Apollo in Delphi and the city of Delphi for which he was, in turn, rewarded with an equestrian statue which was set up in his honor there. 66 Successful commanders always had, of course, the opportunity to coin their military record on the battlefield into a more lasting currency of honor and prestige, but in the wars against Carthage and the Hellenistic monarchies the quantity of war spoils reached new, unprecedented heights that toppled the basic relation between military success and the financial assets that came with it for victorious commanders. Glabrio’s campaign against Antiochos allowed him – overnight, as it were – to unlock financial resources that matched those of any other aristocratic family, including the wealthiest members of the nobility. 67 Consequently,

63 Cf. Shatzman 1975: 99-109. See also Rosenstein 2004: 6-11, 167 and passim, who discusses Cato’s views on potential roads to the accumulation of riches (through agriculture, livestock grazing, etc). The picture that emerges reinforces the idea that large-scale land owners profited the most from these economic activities. 64 Liv. 40.34.4-6. 65 Liv. 37.46.2-6; cf. Briscoe 1983: 362-3; Itgenshorst 2005: # 176. 66 Syll.3 607; cf. also 608-611. 67 Cf. Shatzman 1975: 241; Rosenstein 2004: 9, who singles out Glabrio as one of the few men of the ruling elite whose comprehensive appropriation of war spoils fostered the readiness to fetter the commanders’ prerogatives in this regard. Dondin-Payre 1993:

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 146 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 147

in Glabrio’s case, the value of familial fame and glory as commodities in the competition for high office, the force of the commendatio maiorum as time- honored claim for leadership, and, in short, the grand total of the symbolic capital of an aristocratic family were all threatened, if not altogether out- weighed, by the financial assets he had won in one single campaign. If the basic scheme of Livy’s account is correct and Glabrio, initially, had the edge over the other candidates because of his creative use of war spoils, then the censorship election of 189 reveals a deep shift in the parameters of competition for public office-holding. In a nutshell, although Roman aristocratic families were of course also among the richest stratum of society, the competition for the higher magistracies was mostly determined by symbolic capital rather than financial assets. After the Hannibalic War, the tide began to turn towards real capital.

5. Cato’s Voice

No other Roman nobleman is associated more closely with the political discourse at Rome in the 180s B.C. than M. Porcius Cato. In the historiographic tradition of the later 2nd and 1st centuries B.C., Cato was idealized as an exem plum maiorum: a man who embodied true Roman values through a frugal lifestyle in a small farmstead and who sought to steer his fellow citizens, with a stubborn kind of persistence, towards the glory days of their ancestors when all the gold in the world was spurned over a bowl of honest broth. 68 As much as might be unearthed from the forceful stereotype of the exemplary tradition, Cato’s orations and actions speak volumes as to the changing climate of Roman politics and society. The overall picture is well known, so it might be in order to recall some of the decisive moments only summarily and with regards to the legislation that was mentioned earlier. In his consulship in 195 B.C., Cato submitted the lex Porcia de sumptu prouinciali. The law is only known from a passing reference in the later lex Anto nia de Termessibus (71 B.C.), but there seems to have been a connection with Livy’s reference that, as praetor, Cato reduced the expenses which provincials

124-6, describes the Acilii of those days as a generally wealthy family, yet sees the almost erratic income of funds from the M’. Acilius Glabrio’s consulate as necessary prerequisite for the family’s excessive spending at Rome and in Greece in the decade after 191 B.C. – The Temple of Pietas which was inaugurated in 181 contained a gilded statue of M’. Acilius Glabrio, which was later remembered as the first gilded statue in Rome and Italy (Liv. 40.34.5; cf. Val. Max. 2.5.1 who says it was even an equestrian statue). The dedication speaks to the wealth of the Acilii in the 180s. 68 Cic., Cat. Mai. 55-6, with exemplary reference to M’. Curius Dentatus; cf. also Cic., Cat. Mai. 24 and 46; Rep. 3.40; Plu., Cato Mai. 2.1. Cato as an exemplum maiorum: Astin 1978:1; Jehne 1999; Blösel 2000: 59; cf. also Gruen 1992: 52-83.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 147 18/04/16 14:37 148 hans beck

were expected to incur for the comfort of praetors. 69 Most likely, the sumptuary law of 195 stipulated a ceiling for the extraction of funds by praetors from their provinces. 70 Six years later, in the censorship campaign of 189, Cato was one of the most outspoken opponents to Acilius Glabrio’s candidacy. 71 His own censorship (184 B.C.), famous for its personal invectives, witnessed a whole array of related measures that were remembered for the moralistic tone, severity, and determination with which they were pursued. 72 In the following years, as leading senator of censorial rank, Cato remained faithful to the agenda of his years in office and delivered a series of public speeches in support of the lex Orchia de cenis and the lex Baebia de ambitu (see above). 73 Again, the literary sources place Cato’s actions in the context of stark opposition between a nouus homo and the combined regime of the nobilitas that sought to fight both the man and his measures. To Livy, for instance, it appeared difficult to decide “whether the nobility worked harder to suppress him or he to irritate the nobility”. 74 At the same time, Livy realized that Cato’s intentions were not necessarily those associated with a typical social climber, and certainly not directed against the rule of the nobility as such. On the contrary, Cato was believed to attempt to “chastise the new vices and revive the ancient ways of life” (castigare … noua flagitia et priscos reuocare mores: 39.41.4). The problem of anachronistic concept attribution has already been addressed above; there is no need to dwell on this any further here. Beneath Livy’s deceptive narrative lie the remnants of a political constellation that was much more nuanced. In the heated discourse of the 180s, Cato became the leading voice of those parts of the senate that called for a more rigid implementation of status coherence and measures that safeguarded the competition for public office-holding. Curiously enough, the proponents of this view aimed at the full spread of aristocratic action in the public arena, from canvassing and campaign issues to the question of funding of performances and games, to patron-client relations, and to the organization of the cursus honorum. The few fragments that survive from Cato’s speeches make it clear that he painted a striking picture of societal

69 Cf. Liv. 32.27.3, with Bauman 1983: 170-1. 70 Lex Antonia de Termessibus: CIL I22 589, col.2, lines 13-17 = Elster 2003: # 143. In this sense, the law anticipated magisterial misdemeanors such as the one of Ti. Sem- pronius Gracchus in 182 who had overburdened the provinces with his expenses for games (alas as aedile, see above). 71 Liv. 37.57.9-58.2; Cato ORF4 fr. 66; cf. Suolahti 1963: 340-1; Astin 1978: 59-60; Dondin-Payre 1993: 226. 72 Liv. 39.40-41; Suolahti 1963: 351-8; Baltrusch 1989: 78-81, 120-6 and passim; Astin 1978: 78-103. 73 In 195, during his consulate, he had already spoken against the abrogation of the leges Oppiae from 215, see below. Speeches in support of the lex Orchia and lex Baebia: ORF4 fr. 136-142; cf. Astin 1978: 329-31. 74 39.40.9.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 148 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 149

decrepitude and decay. Other fragments, although very truncated, leave no doubt that he was not shy to employ personal attacks and disparagements to damage the reputation of his opponents. 75 Yet the thematic coherence of his actions, and the persistence with which this was applied to all relevant fields of the public arena, indicate that there was more at stake than ad-hoc rivalry or personal enmity; and, the notion of clear-cut opposition between Cato and the nobility does not do justice to the constellation either. The changing social and economic reality of the Roman aristocracy had created new division lines. Most notably, it separated the traditional and esteemed gentes from younger aristocratic families, with little or even minimal symbolic capitals at their disposal. Naturally, those families were drawn towards a higher degree of regulation and legal prescription, yet Glabrio’s case shows that they, too, were not immune to the opportunities for status advancement that came with large quantities of money. Cato’s approach accounted for both developments. On the one hand, his legislation responded to the new social mobility within the aristocracy by safeguarding the idea of political competition between – principally – equal candidates; i.e., the symbolic capital of the old nobility were, in part, curbed by law. On the other hand, Cato contained the use of monetary assets and financial capital that increasingly impacted the chances of candidates from all segments of the aristocracy, both old and new. The inherent idea was, again, the call for class coherence and equal opportunities amongst candidates. It is easy to see how the later exemplary tradition conflated both these threads and presented Cato as enemy to the nobility and advocate for a simple lifestyle. Yet, in their days, both were inspired by, and in turn geared towards, political, social, and economic realities that were more complicated than the exemplary tradition suggests.

6. Conclusion

Shortly after the lex Villia annalis, most likely in 179 B.C., the first lex de trium pho was motioned at Rome. The law was stipulated in response to the splaying desire of commanders to be awarded with a triumph for their achievements on the battlefield, although their exploits were at times actually far less impressive than they had claimed. The new triumphal law set a minimum ceiling for military success by quantifying enemy casualties. Henceforth, it was required to have killed at least 5,000 enemies in battle to qualify for consideration for the award of a triumph. 76 As indicated on the preceding pages, the political climate

75 The speeches against Glabrio clearly damaged the reputation of the later, cf. Tatum 2013: 139. Cf. also the verbal punch in ORF4 fr. 138: pecuniam inlargibo tibi (“I will reward you richly with money” scil.?, “if you support my candidacy”). 76 Val. Max. 2.8.1 = Elster 2003: # 167; Richardson 1975: 60-2; Pelikan Pittenger 2008: 104-14.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 149 18/04/16 14:37 150 hans beck

in which the law was rogated is unusually well documented in the sources. From the period after 200 B.C., many laws and senatorial decrees survive preserved in the broader context of contemporary debates. No other section of Livy’s work contains so many detailed canvassing campaigns and lists of also- rans. Other pieces of evidence add to the picture, most eminently the prosopographical record of imperium-holders both at the consular and praetorian rank. The fasti document a substantial degree of social mobility within the senatorial aristocracy in the final years of the Hannibalic War and then, in a more accelerated manner, in the two decades past 200 B.C. In particular, prosopography of imperium-holders outlines a shift towards families that had never before manned the highest magistracies and had only recently entered the front benches of the senate. At the same time, the fasti reveal the general thrust towards a more even representation of aristocratic families. Unlike in the days of the Punic War, when the leading magistracies were shared only by a very small pool of families, the post-war period witnessed a more balanced access to the maximus honos. The resulting social change set the stage for the discourse of the day. The one topic that kept the senate busy after 200 – warfare notwithstanding – was the problem of status coherence between families that, realistically, did not have all that much in common. 77 The symbolic capital of the old gentes had always been an immense asset in the competition for public office, and it certainly continued to be so. Yet, from the many laws that governed this rivalry after 200, and from what can be inferred more generally about the developing economy of the republic in those years, it becomes obvious that money became a driving factor in the political arena. In his speech against the abrogation of the lex Baebia de ambitu, Cato forcefully condemned the use of excessive funds in the competition for high offices. 78 The link between ambitus- and cursus laws, encapsulate here in the rising prominence and importance of money, provides a better understanding of the societal development at Rome in those years. What was misapprehended by later sources as political battles over corruption and, by extension, true romani tas was, in fact, a complex negotiation of the aristocracy’s most basic ethos as ruling elite: a negotiation that clustered around the question of the elite’s most fundamental assets, and its defining traits as a status group, including the notion of the accumulation, and actual use, of symbolic and of actual capital in the pursuit of its most basic goals. The rising prominence of cursus and canvassing laws should therefore be placed precisely in the context of a changing economy at Rome after the victories of Carthage and Macedon. Vice versa, financial regulations of public performances and of other areas of interaction between the

77 Cf. now the recent study by Märtin 2012 (with rev. Hölkeskamp, BMCR 2013.09.63), who points to the internal stratification of the nobility after 200. 78 ORF4 fr. 137-138 (cited above).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 150 18/04/16 14:37 wealth, power, and class coherence 151

ruling elite and the common people were intertwined with the changing success rates of candidates in the race for public office. In its response to overzealous attempts of self-promotion and the excessive use of financial assets in its pursuit, the senate relied mostly on a uniform pattern: it set a ceiling for monetary expenses and, subsequently, declared the stipulated ceiling the new norm. Yet, such a practice, although deceptively easy, had tremendous ramifications for the conduct of politics. Although each of those ceiling regulations originated from ad-hoc situations, the upgrade from ad-hoc measure to law also meant that the conduct of politics became increasingly formalized. Effectively, the political order lost its elasticity. Moreover, the road to formalization was in itself one full of obstacles. Throughout the 190s and 180s, there were many attempts to abrogate those prescriptions, and sometimes they were indeed nullified or suspended, which means that not only the immediate subject matter in question, but also the overall thrust towards regulation by law as such were contested. The strife over the abrogation of the leges Oppiae in Cato’s consulate provides a perfect example. Twenty years after the stipulation of the Oppian laws in 215, the tribunes of the plebs M. Fundanius and L. Valerius rogated their abolition because they felt that the laws had become untimely. Livy reports a fierce political battle over the issue, with Cato delivering a forceful intervention against the motion to abrogate. Once again, the literary tradition is charged with stereotypical devices that evoke a discourse of decadence and decline. In their response, however, the tribunes also addressed the more general question of the governance of law, paying particular attention to the suspense of laws that appeared necessary in times of war, yet were of no use in times of peace. In essence, the tribunes argued against not only the Oppian legislation as it was in place, but also the idea that the public appearance of aristocratic women was governed as such by law. 79 In 195 B.C., Cato lost the battle over the abrogation of the Oppian laws, although he fought the issue with all his auctoritas as consul. 80 Over the course of the next decade or so, the high frequency of decrees and laws that fostered a spirit similar to the one of the Oppian laws indicates that Cato’s position had become capable of winning a majority in the senate. By the 180s, the pendulum seems to have swung in the direction of those who were in support of a higher level of regulation and a broader degree of application of it to all areas of aristocratic competition. In this sense, the 180s B.C. mark a unique development in the history of political traditions at Rome, with an increasing attempt to regulate, formalize, and positively define the status of the ruling elite. The negotiations of those years document the ability to reconcile the inherent forces of rivalry and, effectively, disintegration within the nobility by means of legal prescriptions. It is, of course, questionable to see how promising such an approach

79 Cato’s speech in Livy: 34.2.1-4.19; Astin 1978: 25-7. 80 A point made by in the speech by Cato’s opponents: Liv. 34.5.2.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 151 18/04/16 14:37 152 hans beck

might have been. For within a matter of a few years, almost all of the laws mentioned above were either suspended or simply broken in order to make way for exceptions for certain individuals. It comes as no surprise that in all of those instances of revision, the quest for honos, fama, and gloria played a vital role. What is less obvious is that they were also all geared to the quest for more concrete capital: the accumulation of money, and its employment in politics.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 152 18/04/16 14:37 Property Classes, Elite Wealth, and Income Distribution in the Late Republic

Elio Lo Cascio

My aim is, first of all, to offer some tentative answers to questions relating to the process of economic and social differentiation in Roman society over the middle and late Republican periods. In the first part of my paper, I will examine the evidence we have on the property qualifications of the classes. This evidence seems to offer important clues for estimating the extent to which the distance between poorer and wealthier sectors of Roman society increased over time. Moreover, this same evidence also suggests that by the end of the third century at the latest, the very rich among the Roman citizens were still few in number. Building on these conclusions, the second part of my paper will explore the extent to which the commonly held view that the immense wealth of the late Republican elite was mainly derived from the exploitation of their agricultural estates remains tenable, despite some recent studies arguing against it. 1 I will argue that the transformations of the rural economy of Italy that followed the conquest of the Mediterranean, massively affected not only the elite, whose enrichment can still be ascribed to agricultural profit, but also the population at large. The distribution of income across Roman society was certainly more unequal than in the era before, yet the lower sectors of the Roman population benefited not only from its general growth, but also from the redistribution of financial resources from the elite and from subject peoples to a greater proportion of the ‘Italian commoner population.’ 2 As is well known, one passage in Cicero’s De Re Publica (2.39-40) and two in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ Roman Antiquities (4.18.2, cf. 7.59.6) suggest that with the introduction of the ‘Servian’ reforms, the Roman citizen body was composed of a substantial number of proletarii. Cicero maintains that in just one of the lower ranking centuries of the comitia centuriata there were nearly as many citizens as there were in the entirety of the first class (... illarum autem sex et nonaginta centuriarum in una centuria tum quidem plures censebantur quam paene in prima classe tota). It seems clear from the context that he is referring specifically to the century of proletarii. Dionysius seems to go so far

1 All dates BC unless otherwise indicated. Rosenstein 2008; id. 2009. 2 Scheidel 2007: 322, 332, 333, 341.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 153 18/04/16 14:37 154 elio lo cascio

as to affirm that the century of proletarii included more citizens than the five higher classes altogether. These statements raise two problems. Firstly, there is a question of credibility. Secondly, can they be taken as representative of the ‘Servian’ age, or do they refer to the time of Cicero and of Dionysius or, perhaps more likely, to the times of their respective sources? The crucial passage in which Cicero presents the Servian discriptio and explains its ratio has been interpreted in two radically different ways. Some maintain that Cicero is referring to the original ‘Servian’ political system, rather than the ‘reformed’ one from the late third century. 3 As I have argued elsewhere, it seems clear that Cicero’s passage can only be describing the ‘Servian’ system, not the reformed one. 4 And in any case, there is no reason to believe that this specific observation about the number of proletarii would refer to the years around 129, the dramatic date of the de re publica. As to the remark of Dionysius, it is on the whole probable that he will have found this in an annalistic source, which we are unfortunately in no position to identify. More importantly, the three passages do not suggest a trend, and there is nothing to suggest that the number of proletarii were either increased or decreased during the middle and late Republic. Contrasting views have been expressed in recent times. According to a widely accepted reconstruction pioneered by Emilio Gabba, the gradual ‘prole- tarianization’ of the Roman citizen body suggested the lowering of the census rating for the fifth class with the intention of artificially increasing the pool of potential recruits for the military. 5 Although this is unquestionably a plausible reconstruction, several objections have been raised in recent years. 6 More importantly, the very idea that the proletarii would have constituted the majority or at least a large part of the citizen body at the end of the third and into the second century has been contested with powerful arguments by Rosenstein and de Ligt, even if the latter argues that the lowering of the census rating for the fifth class did happen, during the Gracchan period, thus explaining the jump in the number of the ciuium capita registered at the census of 125. 7 Rosenstein has disputed the interpretation given by Brunt on a passage from Livy that describes the census of 214; from this, Brunt infers that on the eve of the Hannibalic War, the assidui made up slightly less than half the adult male citizen population. 8 I believe that a rough indication of the proportion of proletarii in the citizen body can be drawn from comparing, on the one hand, Polybius’ number of men

3 The literature is vast, even if the theme of the reform has not been recently re-examined: cf. esp. Letta 1971; Di Gennaro 1993; in general Nicolet 1976b. 4 Lo Cascio 1988. 5 Gabba 1973: 1-45. 6 Cf. in particular Rich 1983; Lo Cascio 1988. 7 Rosenstein 2002; id. 2004; de Ligt 2004b; id. 2007; for a more nuanced position, cf. id. 2012: 174-6. 8 Liv. 24.18.7-8; Rosenstein 2002; id. 2004: 185-8 (App. 5); Brunt 1971: 64-6, 417-20.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 154 18/04/16 14:37 property classes, elite wealth, and income distribution 155

available for recruiting in 225 (iuniores: hoi en tais helikiais, hoi dynamenoi hopla bastazein), 9 and, on the other hand, the number of Roman citizens resulting from a more or less contemporary census (241/0 or 234/3). 10 As I have argued elsewhere, Polybius’ number must include the ciues sine suffragio as well as the proletarii, since in an emergency levy (tumultus) they too would have been recruited. The census numbers of Livy exclude, in my view, the ciues sine suffragio and a fairly large proportion of proletarii, namely those who did not register themselves. However, they do include the seniores. 11 All in all, one can calculate the total number of adult males in 225 (including the ciues sine suffragio) as less than half a million people, whereas the number of adult males registered at the nearest census was 270,000. 12 Since the number of the ciues sine suffragio – which would have included the arguably numerous Campani – must have been substantial, the proportion of non-registered prole tarii need not have been particularly high. 13 In any case, they would have certainly formed less – and I would say much less – than half of the citizen body. But what happened afterwards with regards to the number of the proletarii? Did their number decrease or increase in the second century? There appears to be a clearly discernible trend towards a greater differentiation of wealth, which corresponds to a larger structural differentiation within Roman society. 14 The greater contrast in individual fortunes is shown, as we will see, by the comparison between the census ratings of the first and the fifth classes given by Livy and Dionysius for the ‘Servian’ period, and the ratings for the same classes provided by Polybius, which refer to his own age. 15 However, this comparison is fraught with difficulties. The final decades of the third century experienced significant changes in the economic situation at Rome, with the collapse of the city’s first monetary system, built around the libral as. 16 The weight standard of the as was reduced from a pound or, more specifically, ten ounces of bronze (the standard adopted by the mint for most of the issues of the so-called aes graue), to a sixth of a pound. This reduction – which in my view was already

9 Pol. 2.23.9; 24.16; that these men are all iuniores seems to me certain, notwithstanding de Ligt 2012: ch. 2. Cf. also Hin 2008: esp. 190-8; id. 2013: 279 n. 56. 10 270,713 and 260,000 (or 250,000) respectively: Liv., Per. 20; Jer., Chron. 134.1; Euseb., Chron. 134.3. 11 Lo Cascio 1999; id. 1991-4. 12 Lo Cascio 1999: 169. 13 It is therefore incorrect to say that my interpretation ‘suggests that the censors succeeded in registering only 55 per cent of the adult male citizen population’ (so de Ligt 2012: 177). This is to neglect that the ciues sine suffragio were not included among the ciuium capita. 14 Hopkins 1978, ch. 1. 15 Liv. 1.43.7; D.H. 4.17.2; Pol. 6.19.2; 23.15 (note that Polybius’ figures do not refer to the Hannibalic war, as commonly maintained). 16 The literature concerning this issue is vast: cf. i.a. Thomsen 1957-61; Crawford 1974; Marchetti 1978; Coarelli 2013.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 155 18/04/16 14:37 156 elio lo cascio

under way during the First Punic War, 17 and accelerated significantly during the central years of the Hannibalic War - had an obvious impact on the census, which can be glimpsed through the narrative of Livy. A considerable amount of modern scholarship has already been devoted to this issue. Suffice to say that we seem to be in a position to understand at least the outline of the general development. The decrease in the intrinsic value of the as which was brought about by the aforementioned reduction in its weight must have in turn engen- dered an adjustment in the evaluation of individual fortunes at the census. The census ratings themselves must have been readjusted as well, and this readjustment would have been different for each class. I have argued elsewhere that the ratings of the five classes given by Livy and Dionysius (100,000, 75,000, 50,000, 25,000 asses for the first four classes; 11,000, according to Livy, and 12,500 according to Dionysius for the fifth class) must have been a ‘translation’ of the original ratings expressed in terms of libral or sub-libral asses (that is, asses of ten ounces), into the values of the asses circulating in the Late Republic. 18 The property qualifications of the five classes must have therefore originally been 10,000 sub-libral asses for the first class, 7,500 for the second, 5,000 for the third, 2,500 for the fourth, and 1,100 (or 1,250 according to Dionysius) for the fifth. The census ratings were thus raised with the reduction of the weight standard of the as. However, it is on the whole probable that the rise was not proportionally equal for all the classes, with the property qualification of the first class seeing a greater increase than the others. According to Polybius (6.19.2, 23.15), in his time the census rating of the first class was 10,000 drachmas, and the census rating of the fifth 400 drachmas. And since we can be fairly certain, as argued by Marchetti, 19 that the Polybian drachma was equivalent to three quarters of a denarius, the census ratings in terms of denarii were respectively 7,500 and 300, that is 75,000 and 3,000 asses during the first period of the denarius coinage, before the ‘retariffing’ of the denarius to sixteen asses from its original ten. 20 One can thus maintain that, whereas the census thresholds of the first class would have been nominally raised 7.5 times (from 10,000 to 75,000 asses), the census thresholds of the fifth class would have been raised just 2.72 or 2.4 times (from 1,100 or 1,250 to 3,000 asses); to put this in real terms, while the rating of the first class was presumably raised, the rating of the fifth was actually lowered. There is no need to underline the highly conjectural character of this reconstruction. But even those who are not prepared to accept it should agree on the crucial point: that the economic gap between the census ratings of the first and

17 Lo Cascio 1980/81; id. 1998; cf. Coarelli 2013. 18 Lo Cascio 1988; followed by Rathbone 1993. 19 Marchetti 1978: 197-98 and passim; 1978b: 196-97; Lo Cascio 1982. 20 After this adjustment (to be dated around 140: Crawford 1974: 612-4), the two ratings will have been 120,000 and 4,800 asses.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 156 18/04/16 14:37 property classes, elite wealth, and income distribution 157

the fifth class had substantially widened. The census rating of the first class, which used to be eight or nine times the rating of the fifth class, was now twenty-five times greater. As a result, we are faced with two parallel but opposing developments that are consistent with the increasing stratification of Roman society during the age of overseas conquest. How these parallel but opposing developments affected the distribution in quantitative terms of the sui iuris among the classes is difficult to say. We simply do not know whether the sui iuris belonging to the first class increased at the expense of the sui iuris belonging to the other classes, or whether the number of proletarii fell, as seems probable, in consequence of the reduction in real terms of the rating for the fifth class. 21 But do we have other signs of further differentiation of wealth within the citizen body in this time? Moreover, do we have some clue for estimating the distribution of the better-off among the classes? Some scholars, particularly Nicolet, Brunt, and more recently Rosenstein and Roselaar, have to this end used a famous passage of Livy which refers to the contribution of slave nautae required in 214 from the richest citizens for manning a new fleet. 22 Livy says

21 It should be noted that this possible increase in the number of the assidui did not translate immediately into an increase in the number of registered ciuium capita, which was very low in 209 (137, 108: Liv. 27.36; Per. 27). According to de Ligt 2012: pas sim, the increase in the number of assidui and the corresponding decrease of the number of proletarii as a result of the reduction of the rating of the fifth class (posited in 212, at the supposed date of the introduction of the sextantal as and the denarius of four scruples), and as a result of the large-scale viritane assignations and of the foundation of a number of coloniae ciuium Romanorum, would have had important consequences. Pri- marily, it would have been more difficult to find rowers, who were recruited to a large extent from the proletarii (de Ligt uses this to explain the ‘enigmatic’ observation of Polybius 1.64.1-2, that in around 160 the Romans were no longer in a position to man as many ships as they did during the First Punic War). As well, the number of rural proletarians would have been so low as to explain the rapid expansion of rural slavery: ‘The setting up of slave-based estates for the production of wine, olive oil and grain can be seen as a rational economic strategy in a period during which free labourers were relatively scarce and therefore expensive’ (de Ligt 2012: 105). 22 Liv. 24.11.5-9: Eas primo quoque tempore consules scribere iussi et classem parare, ut cum eis nauibus quae pro Calabriae litoribus in statione essent, centum quin quaginta longarum classis nauium eo anno expleretur. dilectu habito et centum nauibus nouis deductis Q. Fabius comitia censoribus creandis habuit; creati M. Atilius Regulus et P. Furius Philus. cum increbresceret rumor bellum in Sicilia esse, T. Otacilius eo cum classe proficisci iussus est. cum deessent nautae, consules ex senatus consulto edixerunt ut, qui L. Aemilio C. Flaminio censoribus milibus aeris quinquaginta ipse aut pater eius census fuisset usque ad centum milia aut cui postea tanta res esset facta, nautam unum cum sex mensum stipendio daret; qui supra centum milia usque ad trecenta milia, tres nautas cum stipendio annuo; qui supra trecenta milia usque ad deciens aeris, quinque nautas; qui supra deciens, septem; senatores octo nautas cum annuo stipendio darent. ex hoc edicto dati nautae, armati instructique ab dominis, cum triginta dierum coctis cibariis naues conscenderunt. tum primum est factum ut classis Romana sociis nauali

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 157 18/04/16 14:37 158 elio lo cascio

that the consuls were ordered by the senate ‘to furnish a fleet so that, including the ships at anchor defending the coast of Calabria, the fleet should amount that year to 150 warships (longae naues)’ (trans. Moore 1940). The new ships that were built amounted to 100. Livy adds that since sailors were lacking (evidently for the new naues longae), the consuls ex senatus consulto issued an edict which required men (or their fathers), who in the census of Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Flaminius (220) had been assessed at 50,000 to 100,000 asses, or who had subsequently reached that level, to provide one sailor and six months of pay. Men who had been rated between 100,000 and 300,000 had to provide three nautae and a year’s pay. Those between 300,000 and 1 million had to furnish five sailors, and those assessed at more than 1 million had to deliver seven sailors. Senators were to provide eight sailors and one year’s pay. The situation seems to be straightforward: the contribution requested is a liturgy of sorts, evidently imposed on the better-off among the citizens. But who were these citizens and how many were they? How do these evaluations relate to the ‘Servian’ census thresholds? And what is the weight standard of the as in which they are expressed? That this is the period in which there is the fastest reduction of the weight standard of the as is shown by the provision that property ratings were not simply taken from the census of 220, but included those who reached certain thresholds afterwards. But how could this rating have been established if there had been no census since 220? The only way to solve the difficulty is to consider that the provision was intended to take into account precisely the change in the evaluation of the properties following the reduction of the weight standard of the as. 23 In other words, the property evaluation of a sui iuris from the previous census must have been automatically readjusted according to the new weight of the as. Thus a property assessed at 10,000 sub-libral asses (of ten ounces) would have been rated twenty thousand sub-semi-libral asses (of five ounces) or 50,000 sextantal asses (of two ounces). If this is so, one can conjecture that these ratings are expressed precisely in terms of the new sextantal asses, introduced around 214 along with the new denarius of four scruples of silver. 24 This would be the most economical hypothesis, since it holds that the contribution would have been limited to the sui iuris of the first class. 25 But even if we are not prepared to accept this last suggestion, what is in any case

bus priuata impensa paratis compleretur. Cf. Nicolet 1966: 1.63; Brunt 1971: 700; Nicolet 1978: 257-9; Rosenstein 2008: 5-7, 24-6; Roselaar 2010: 182. 23 Lo Cascio 1988: 300-2. 24 Support for this date is growing in the scholarly community: cf. Coarelli 2013: 135-6, following Marchetti 1978a: 299-301. It is not clear to me, however, how Coarelli interprets the Livian passage on the thresholds for the contribution of slave rowers for the fleet, as well as its connection with the introduction of the sextantal as and the denarius of four scruples. 25 And not of the first three classes as supposed by Rosenstein 2008: 5-7, followed by de Ligt 2012: 75.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 158 18/04/16 14:37 property classes, elite wealth, and income distribution 159

incontrovertible is the further articulation of wealth among the richest of the citizens: the highest rating is twenty times the lowest. Still, is there any possibility of estimating the proportion of the citizen body to which the liturgy applies? How numerous are these apparently wealthy people? It seems to me that we have an indisputable indication of this in what Livy says about the number of naues longae for which it was necessary to furnish the nautae. These 100 ships, and they were certainly quinqueremes, required 340 remiges each. 26 The required number of nautae is therefore 34,000. Of these, 2,400 are the nautae provided by the senators (eight each). But how are the remaining 31,600 distributed among the different categories? Nicolet has advanced the hypothesis that the highest rating of 1 million asses, equivalent to 400,000 sesterces, would have been the property qualification of the equites, which now appears for the first time. 27 This suggestion was, however, rejected by Brunt, Crawford, and Marchetti. 28 Recently, Rosenstein has revived the idea of using the passage as evidence for the census rating of the equites, but he believes that this rating was 300,000 asses. 29 Following many other scholars, he estimates their number on the basis of the Polybian passage about the events of 225 (2.24), where the equites amount to 23,000. However, it is debatable that this number would refer to the sui iuris who were equites equo publico and equo priuato, unless we are prepared to suppose, with Beloch and Brunt against Mommsen, that Polybius (or more likely his source, Fabius Pictor) made a crass error by calculating the Romans under arms twice. 30 The number of Polybius includes those who were not yet serving, 31 as well as the equites Campani, who were ciues sine suffragio in 225. But above all, this number represents the iuniores who could serve, not the sui iuris. 32 Even if we accept, however, that there was already a specific property qualification for the equites so early on, and if we assume that the equites sui iuris were just half of 23,000, the number of nautae (five for those rated at 300,000 asses) to be furnished by them would have been much too high. In order to overcome this difficulty, Rosenstein has argued that the senatus consultum would have envis- aged the provision of ‘a large pool of eligible slaves from whom the magistrates could pick the most suitable rowers. Otherwise, slave-owners would have been tempted to send only their oldest, sickest, or most unsuitable slaves.’ 33 This solution is not entirely satisfying. On the other hand, Rosenstein is right in advocating the credibility of what Livy reports. The only possible

26 Brunt 1971: 65; Rosenstein 2008: 24. 27 Nicolet 1966: 1.63; id. 1978, 257-9. 28 Brunt 1971: 700; Crawford 1974: 623; Marchetti 1978a: 213-5. 29 Rosenstein 2008: 6-7. 30 Mommsen 1876; Beloch 1886: 355-7; Brunt 1971: 44-6. 31 Lo Cascio 1999: 166-9, followed by de Ligt 2012: 49-50. 32 Notwithstanding de Ligt 2012; supra n. 9. 33 Rosenstein 2008: 26.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 159 18/04/16 14:37 160 elio lo cascio

way of overcoming the difficulty is to suggest that the property qualification for the equites was still the same as that of the first class, and that those belonging to the centuries of the equites must have been distributed also among the sui iuris, who would have been assessed for less than 300,000 asses. To clarify: if we assume that those assessed at 1 million or more numbered 1,000, they therefore furnished 7,000 nautae; if those assessed 300,000 or more were also 1,000, they had to provide 5,000 nautae; if those assessed 100,000 were 2,000, they had to provide 6,000 nautae; the other sui iuris, with a census rating between 50,000 and 100,000 asses, who had to provide one nauta each, would have been, therefore, no more than 13,600 (that is, 18,000 subtracted from 31,600). I do not want to play a numbers game, but I think it legitimate to draw two conclusions: that it is on the whole more plausible that the contribution of the slave nautae was limited to the citizens of the first class, 34 and that the very wealthy, at least in the central years of the Hannibalic War, must have represented a tiny minority of the citizen body. If the contribution extended to the sui iuris of the third class, then the distribution of the citizens among the classes would have been very uneven, perhaps too uneven, with a large majority being confined to the fourth and fifth class. If the contribution was limited to the first class and to the equites, the distribution of citizens among the classes, while still greatly uneven, would have been less imbalanced. There is another relevant point; by accepting that the episode narrated by Livy is even quantitatively credible, one is not obliged to conclude that the ownership of slaves was widespread among the Roman citizens. Slave-owners must have represented a minority of the citizen body, at least by the end of the third century. If the very rich were so few during the Hannibalic War, their number must have increased during the second century as a consequence of the imperial conquest. Further, their wealth was initially the direct result of the conquest. But how was this new wealth consolidated and how did it further increase? Rosenstein has advanced recently what purports to be a powerful argument against the prevailing view according to which, the economic backbone of the Roman aristocracy would have been agricultural land. This prevailing view is perfectly consistent with the picture of the general demographic, social, and economic transformations of the Italian peninsula following the conquest of the Mediterranean during the second and first centuries, found in its most elegant presentation in Hopkins’ Conquerors and Slaves. 35 According to this line of argument, the enrichment of the Roman aristocracy brought about by the conquest of the Mediterranean would have provoked the creation of larger and more market-oriented agricultural units, both on private and public land. These units would have been more rationally and more deeply exploited by gangs of slaves and therefore would have been more productive. The establishment of

34 Supra: 156. 35 Toynbee 1965; Brunt 1971; Hopkins 1978.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 160 18/04/16 14:37 property classes, elite wealth, and income distribution 161

the so-called villa system in many regions of the peninsula would have caused the displacement of small-holding farmers from their plots, to be replaced by an ever-increasing number of imported slaves. These former small-holders, who had traditionally formed the backbone of the Roman army as well as Roman society itself, would have moved to Rome and to the other expanding urban centres, thus in turn contributing to the demand for the goods produced by the slave-run agricultural units. In the countryside, the small peasant farmer would have almost disappeared and there would have been an overall decline of the free population, attested by the results of the censuses of the second and first centuries. This general reconstruction has been under fire for some time. No scholar doubts the demographic growth of the city of Rome as well as of other urban centres in Italy, but many have disputed the disappearance of the free peasants from the countryside as being a product of the emergence of the villa system. 36 A more general controversy, rooted in fundamentally different interpretations of the Augustan census figures, concerns the demographic development of the last two centuries of the Republic. This pits the so-called ‘high-counters’ against the ‘low-counters’, the former positing a moderate growth of the population, the latter considering it stationary or in decline over the period. 37 But even some of the low-counters challenge the notion of the disappearance of the free peasants and suggest, at least for the first half of the second century, that the population was instead increasing. 38 They emphasize, following a very clever argument from Jongman, 39 that the specialized crops associated with the establishment of the villas required a very limited extension of Italian agricultural land; this limited extension could produce all the wine and olive oil required to satisfy the Italian demand. Building on this argument, Rosenstein has attacked another aspect of the traditional account: the notion that the increasing wealth of the aristocracy and in particular of the senatorial elite during the last two centuries of the Republic would have been linked to the expansion of commercial agriculture, with units based on slave labour producing food for burgeoning urban populations. According to Rosenstein, the demand for food from urban populations would have been on the whole limited, and could have been satisfied with only a small expansion of Italian agricultural land. Moreover, it must be emphasised that the senatorial aristocracy would have had to compete with other groups of rich landowners, most notably the equites as well as with the local elites. The con-

36 Cf. Frederiksen 1970-1, on the basis of the archaeological evidence; then many of the contributions in Lo Cascio / Storchi Marino 2001; in de Ligt / Northwood 2008; in Carlsen / Lo Cascio 2009. 37 Beloch 1886; Toynbee 1965; Brunt 1971; Hopkins 1978; contra Lo Cascio 1994; id. 1999; Kron 2005; Launaro 2011. On the controversy cf. esp. Scheidel 2008. 38 Esp. de Ligt 2012. 39 Jongman 2003.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 161 18/04/16 14:37 162 elio lo cascio

clusion is that the enormous wealth of the late Republican aristocracy could not have been derived to a great extent from the landed property, but must have come from other activities or assets: trade through the intermediation of freedmen and slaves; the exploitation of urban property; and above all, moneylending. 40 Rosenstein’s thesis is ingenious and appealing. Shatzman had already expressed reservations about the time-honoured notion that income from land was the basis of wealth for the senatorial aristocracy. 41 And the idea that the assets of a senator and his investment strategies went well beyond land is at first sight persuasive. However, I am not entirely convinced by the main argument, namely the limitedness of the demand. Rosenstein rather mechanically considers just the demand of the urban population of Italy. At the outset, the size of the demographic must be determined. Assuming the low-count scenario for the population of Italy, Rosenstein estimates the population of the urban centres (including Rome) at 180,000-1,000,000 in the second century, and at 2,325,000 in the late Republic. Rosenstein himself, in another contribution, has explored the consequences of accepting the high-count scenario; 42 the urban population of Italy would have been between two and three times the urban population implied by the low-count scenario. Moreover, the demand for the products from commercial agriculture was not limited to urban centres within Italy, as a substantial amount of these products, especially wine and oil, seems to have found large markets in the provinces. Italian wines were heavily exported both towards the western and the eastern regions of the Mediterranean. The lines of this export trade have been clearly identified in a recent contribution by Panella. 43 There was not only the wine which went to Gaul, but already in the third century with the so-called Greco-Italic amphorae, towards many other regions of the Mediterranean, as attested by an increasing number of shipwrecks from southern Gaul to Spain, from Corsica to Egypt and Carthage. The more substantial Dressel 1 amphorae follow the same pattern. Less well known are the amphorae of the Adriatic region, from the Po Delta to Picenum; their diffusion is mainly in the eastern Mediterranean, from Istria to the areas beyond the Roman dominion, from Greece to Egypt and Asia Minor, but also to Spain. Panella proposes a periodization of the export trade on the basis of black-glazed pottery, often associated with amphorae in the shipwrecks, whose Italian production from the area of Rome and southern Etruria replaced the Attic model This dates back to the end of the fourth century and to the ‘Atelier des petites estampilles’, which is more or less contemporary with the diffusion of the Gre- co-Italic amphorae carrying wine from the central regions of the peninsula.

40 Rosenstein 2008. 41 Shatzman 1975: 47-74, passim. 42 Rosenstein 2009. 43 Panella 2010.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 162 18/04/16 14:37 property classes, elite wealth, and income distribution 163

Above all, throughout Italy, the total demand must have been much larger than the urban demand. The transformations brought about by conquest produced an expansion of market relations at the expense of self-sufficiency along the entire social spectrum. It is therefore over-schematic to postulate a clear divide between the countryside, where there was only self-consumption, and the urban, more advanced scenario, which was dominated by the market. The notion of a ‘dual economy’ ought to be nuanced, as producers of the wine or oil sold in the market were not only owners of big estates, but also their tenants, who had to sell at least part of their crop to obtain the means to pay rent. Equally, consumers were not only urban residents and inhabitants of the small settlements in the countryside not engaged in food production, but also the farmers who did not produce these goods for themselves. On the other hand, the model of the slave-staffed villa, as described by Cato and especially Varro, cannot be considered universal in Roman Italy and was certainly not the only agricultural option available to the aristocracy. Tenancy was certainly a viable alternative. 44 The testimony of Pliny the Younger, despite referring to a different time, can be considered relevant in many ways; the estates of Pliny at Tifernum Tiberinum and Comum were exploited through a variety of systems. 45 The crucial point is the concentration of property, which by no means implies the enlargement of the individual units of management and exploitation, nor that these conformed to a single model. Provided that Roman aristocrats were able to accrue estates, their cumulative income would have been high enough to finance their spectacular expenses. In conclusion, the fundamental observation of Jongman does demonstrate that the carrying capacity of Italy was much higher than is commonly thought, but this cannot be used, in my view, to argue that the products of commercial agriculture had to compete in the market, given the limitedness of the demand. The increase in productivity of Italian agriculture in the last two centuries of the Republic was the result of two apparently contrasting processes: regional spe- cialization and intensification, which itself is not a novelty of this age. 46 The former process had, among other outcomes, the effect of raising the demand for certain agricultural products among the rural population, while the latter process increased the output of the land, albeit at the expense of a decrease in the productivity of labour. For all these reasons, I would be reluctant to conclude that the investment strategies of the aristocracy could not consider the exploitation of the agricultural land as such to allow high incomes, or that landed property was exploited to a large extent in order to satisfy conspicuous consumption. Autarky is a

44 De Ligt 2004b; id. 2012: passim; Lo Cascio 2009, 43-5, passim. 45 Lo Cascio 2009: 115-35. 46 Kron 2000; id. 2008; Spurr 1986; on regional specialisation cf. Roselaar 2010: 166-72.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 163 18/04/16 14:37 164 elio lo cascio

myth. The axiom of Cato (Agr. 2.7), according to which the paterfamilias must be uendax and not emax, is the expression of an ideological stance, and does not correspond to reality. As Max Weber already noticed, Cato is deeply involved in the market as both a buyer and a seller. 47 His treatise reveals the extent to which the owner of a fundus depended on the market to procure the means of production as well as to sell his products. Certainly, nobody will contest that there were other more or less legal means of enrichment, which were more directly linked with the acquisition and exploitation of empire; these were the means that allowed the accumulation of wealth and the enlargement of landed property by the aristocracy in the first place. However, that the great fortunes employed in the political struggle of the late Republic derived to a large extent from the exploitation of agricultural land seems to me still credible. After all, the basis of the wealth for the aristocracy in the late Republic was not so different from the basis of the wealth of the senatorial elite in the early Impe- rial period. Sum... prope totus in praediis, says the Younger Pliny (Ep. 3.19), and the same could be said by many a late Republican senator. A final question: who benefited from the Empire? We have seen that the census ratings of the classes testify to a widening of the gap between the wealthiest and the poorest among the Roman citizens. But it must be underlined that this occurred when Rome and Italy became immensely richer. One can confi- dently say that it is largely the elite who became more affluent and not the poorest sectors of society who became more destitute. 48 The notion of widespread impoverishment among the free peasant farmers must be abandoned. Their migration to Rome does not necessarily mean that they had no other means to eke out their living other than relying on the generosity of aristocrats, therefore becoming instruments of political competition. This is a cliché which assumes that free hired labour in antiquity was ‘spasmodic, casual, marginal’, to quote Sir Moses Finley. 49 In fact, neither Rome nor the other cities of late Republican Italy were inhabited by fainéants, who depended on the subsidies from the aristocracy and the res publica (through the frumentationes) to survive. 50 Looking at the economic primacy of Italy during the last two centuries of the Republic, the notion of a general impoverishment of the lower sectors of the Roman citizenry is counterintuitive. These sectors would have benefitted not only from conquest, namely through a massive redistribution of financial resources from the élite and from subject peoples, but also from the economic expansion that resulted from the conquest itself.

47 Weber 1976; cf. Lo Cascio 1982a: 129. 48 Saying this is not to deny that there may have been a problem of rural poverty, which is at the root of Tiberius Gracchus’ political activities. But one cannot deny, either, that in the long-term Roman society as a whole was becoming wealthier. 49 Finley 1980: 68. 50 Cf. most recently Courrier 2010.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 164 18/04/16 14:37 Cupiditas Pecuniae: Wealth and Power in Cicero

Francisco Pina Polo

We know of several aspects of Cicero’s life thanks to the preservation of many of his writings: letters, speeches, treatises on rhetoric and politics, philosophical essays, and so forth. The diverse information available allows us to contrast his thought, conveyed in his theoretical works, with the implementation of his ideas throughout his lifetime within the context of Roman society and, above all, during his political career. One of the issues Cicero dealt with on several occasions was the question of the correct attitude of human beings towards wealth and money from an ethical point of view. Yet, beyond theory and philosophy, his praxis in the economic field was always that of an aristocrat living in Rome in the late Republic. As a philosopher, Cicero held that the richest person was not he who had the most property but he who was wisest. 1 As a matter of fact, philosophers in general, regardless of their school, always have despised any desire for wealth. 2 A rich person is one who feels content with what he possesses, leads a decent life, and does not yearn for more. Consequently, neither public image nor general opinion can determine whether an individual is rich or not. It is one’s own personal perception that defines wealth. Cicero himself scorned greed for money (auiditas pecuniae). As examples of this, he provided a series of gener- ically reprehensible behaviours such as the habit of cheating or defrauding. He also alluded to specific types of reprehensible conduct such as the plundering of allies (socii spoliare) or the looting of the treasury (aerarium expilare). He criticized those who anxiously awaited something from their friends’ wills and condemned even more harshly those who manipulated their position in order to acquire the wealth of those who have died. He concluded that it was a man’s soul and not his coffers which made him rich: Animus hominis diues, non arca, quae appellari solet. 3 In line with this declaration of principles, Cicero often derided what he called cupiditas pecuniae, a sort of greed which he believed to be a disease of the soul close to insanity and which ought to be cured in the same manner as

1 Cic., Parad. 6.42-3. 2 Cic., Tusc. 5.89-92. 3 Cic., Parad. 44.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 165 18/04/16 14:37 166 francisco pina polo

any other bodily ailment. 4 Otherwise, the longing for wealth became an incur- able disease called avarice (auaritia). 5 Cicero found the spurious use of public office as a means to obtain personal gain particularly despicable; he branded it as not only shameful (turpis), but also impious and infamous (sceleratus et nefarius). 6 Thus, cupiditas pecuniae had to be avoided because covetousness denoted a miserly soul. In contrast, contempt towards wealth, if one owned it, and generous management of it were signs of a great and noble soul, 7 for the most admired person was he who was unmoved by wealth. 8 Indifference towards money also facilitated the success of personal relations. Nothing jeopardized a long friendship more than unbridled longing for wealth: 9 Friendship was a much more secure and permanent asset than money. 10 Hence, we must seek the friendship of those who respect the duties true amicitia involves and avoid betraying a friend in order to procure riches. 11 Cicero’s thought was simple with regard to the socio-economic sphere. From a moral point of view, all human beings shared in principle an equal condition, but in practice Cicero defended the existence of a natural inequality between the rich and the poor. 12 In Cicero’s opinion, equality was limited to the legal field, for all citizens ought to be equal before the law. However, just as not all human beings share the same level of intelligence, their fortunes cannot be the same. Likewise, each individual has a place in society depending on his economic situation and seeking total equality within society is a great injustice. 13 Social stability was precisely based on the acceptance by all of this natural inequality, or rather of the ‘balanced equality’ which involved conferring different rights and duties within the community. Society ought to be divided depending on the different dignitas of its citizens, and inferior citizens must obey the superior. 14 Based on these general considerations, Cicero’s guideline was, above all, the relentless defence of private property, 15 a principle which obviously did not apply when appropriating the riches of the territories conquered by Rome. The state had actually been created in order to preserve the assets that individuals

4 Cic., Tusc. 3.4. 5 Cic., Tusc. 4.24. Cf. Cic., Tusc. 4.26; 4.60; off. 2.75; Rep. 1.27. 6 Cic., Off. 2.77. 7 Cic., Off. 1.68. 8 Cic., Off. 2.38: Maximeque admirantur eum, qui pecunia non mouetur. 9 Cic., Amic. 34: pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecu niae cupiditatem. 10 Cic., Amic. 55. 11 Cic., Amic. 63. 12 Cic., Rep. 1.49. 13 Cic., Rep. 1.53. 14 Cic., Rep. 1.43; Leg. 3.25. Cf. Pagnotta 2007: esp. 84-102. 15 Wood 1988: 105: ‘… he is the first major thinker to give such emphasis to the notion of private property and to make it a central component of his structure of social and political ideas.’ Cf. Garnsey 2009: 157-66, esp.157; 163-5; Annas 1989: 151-73.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 166 18/04/16 14:37 cvpiditas pecvniae: wealth and power in cicero 167

might accumulate and this was the foundation for personal freedom: ‘states and cities were founded precisely for each person to keep what they own’. 16 In agreement with these basic precepts, any redistribution of wealth was to Cicero a flagrant violation not only of the rules of living together within society, but above all, of the ‘natural law’. 17 Consequently, he always opposed any political initiative to mitigate inequality, such as the free or subsidised distribution of grain amongst the plebs of Rome, because it involved unnecessary public interventionism and vast expenditure for the state. He was very particular about any attempt to introduce and implement agrarian reform that could mean, to a greater or lesser extent, taking land from their owners and delivering it to dispossessed farmers. He also opposed any proposal to cancel debts (tabulae nouae) that could be detrimental to the creditors who had lent their money and would not receive in exchange the agreed interest rates. 18 He believed both cases to be an intolerable attack on private property which undermined both justice and social harmony. The two measures were a threat to the very foundation of the state because, as Cicero claimed, ‘concord may not exist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another, and justice vanishes if a person may not possess what he owns’. 19 Cicero ended his criticism as follows: ‘What justice is there in a proceeding by which a man who never had any property should take possession of lands that had been occupied for many years, or even centuries, while he who had them before should lose possession of them?’ 20 Cicero’s actions were consistent with these ideas, and he was always aware that his political allies were the wealthy landlords. His endeavours should always benefit them and, in return, they would also work to his advantage. In the year 60, the tribune of the plebs Flavius sponsored an agrarian law with

16 Cic., Off. 2.73: Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae ciuitatesque constituae sunt. Cf. Off. 1.21; Fin. 3.67. De Ste. Croix 1981: 426: Cicero is “the earliest known to me in a long line of thinkers, extending into modern times, who have seen the protection of private property rights as the prime function of the state.” Cf. Wood 1988: 129-30. 17 Wood 1988:112: ‘The primacy of private property is underwritten by the law of nature and institutionalized by civil law.’ 18 Cic., Off. 2.84. 19 Cic., Off. 2.78. Cf. Cic., Off. 1.43: one of the most reprehensible actions carried out by Sulla and Caesar was for Cicero the confiscation of assets from their owners in order to give them to others. Cf. Garnsey 2009: 160: ‘Justice in his hands became: the preservation of existing property arrangements; and that is the main responsibility of the governing class.’ 20 Cic., Off. 2.79. At the beginning of the civil war between Ceasarians and Pom- peians, one of Cicero’s greatest concerns was that the fortunes of the rich, the locupletes, would not be respected: Cic., Att. 9.7.4. Later, in a letter written at the beginning of May of the year 49, when he was expectantly witnessing the events in Hispania, Cicero told Atticus that he feared that if Caesar finally won there might be confiscations of private properties and cancellation of debts (Cic., Att. 10.8.2).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 167 18/04/16 14:37 168 francisco pina polo

Pompey’s support. As had been the usual case, most senators opposed the reform and the consular Cicero was one of its leading opponents. In a letter to Atticus informing his friend of the events in the city, Cicero claimed that his main concern was the defence of the private property of individuals because, he said, that is ‘our army’ (noster exercitus), the army of the locupletes, that is, of the rich people, especially those who own land. 21 In the letter written a few months later to his brother Quintus on how he should govern the province of Asia, Cicero alluded again to the rich as grateful allies because those landlords believed that they had maintained their fortunes thanks to his consulship of the year 63, when he had saved them from the dangers posed by the conspiracy of Catiline. 22 For the enemies of the res publica were above all the enemies of landlords: Catiline was and so was Clodius. 23 In Cicero’s opinion Tiberius Gracchus also put at risk the foundations of the Republic with his agrarian reform. The optimates opposed this reform because it altered traditional property relations and caused social unrest. The locupletes would have been unjustly deprived of the properties they had possessed for so long and the Republic would have lost its best defenders. 24 Hence Cicero positioned himself, without any hesitation, with the rich 25, who were also the main core of the so-called optimates, amongst whom he found himself, and naturally the only ones who could defend and preserve the Roman Republic.

As we have seen earlier, Cicero contended that to be content with what one owns is the greatest and most certain wealth. 26 In the aforementioned letter to his brother Quintus on how to rule his province, Marcus Cicero considered that it was a great virtue to be able to resist money. 27 These claims can be seen as fine philosophical assertions from a man who enjoyed extensive properties and a high standard of life. But they are also cynical because they are in contra diction to Cicero’s habitual behaviour in his own life, ceaselessly seeking to increase his wealth. In short, being rich was logically not a fault to Cicero, although the haughtiness sometimes attached to wealth was. 28 On the other hand, his mentality becomes apparent when he linked poverty (paupertas) to

21 Cic., Att. 1.19.4. On the original difference of the terms pecuniosi, farmers, and locupletes, land owners, see Cic., Rep. 2.16. Cf. Raskolnikoff 1977: 357-72: Cicero uses the term locupletes mainly to refer to land owners, but also to owners of houses, slaves and other assets. This term denotes wider wealth than the concept diues, which conveys possession of money. 22 Cic., Q. Fr. 1.1.6. 23 Cic., Dom. 47; 60. 24 Cic., Sest. 103. 25 Cic., Att. 6.1.16; 6.2.5. 26 Cic., Parad. 51. 27 Cic., Q. Fr. 1.1.7. 28 Cic., Fam. 7.13.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 168 18/04/16 14:37 cvpiditas pecvniae: wealth and power in cicero 169

dishonour (ignominia) and disgrace (infamia), 29 or to a dark and humble background (ignobilitas, humilitas), 30 and when he implicitly identified the poor (egentes) with the wicked and the criminal (improbi, perditi, facinerosi). 31 In conclusion, poverty is abject by nature, whereas amassing personal property cannot be criticized and it is natural and inseparable from the human condition. But certainly the accumulation of wealth must always avoid injustice and harm to others. 32 Owning a great fortune was seen as positive in Roman society and in particular within its ruling class. This had already been made clear in the funeral eulogy for L. Caecilius Metellus, who had been consul twice in 251 and 247, as well as pontifex maximus from 243 until his death in 221. In the laudatio for the deceased, his son Q. Metellus praised his father for having been a fine war- rior, an excellent orator, a brave general and for having held the highest offices and the highest rank in the senate, as well as having gained the recognition of his fellow citizens. And he added, as one of his achievements, that he had amassed in his lifetime great wealth in an honourable manner: ‘pecuniam magnam bono modo invenire’. 33 In the late third century, therefore, being a good orator, a good soldier, a successful senator and being rich were qualities that added to the reputation of a public man. The Roman authors of the first century B.C. sometimes idealized their ancestors and presented them as austere individuals. Perhaps they were in comparison with the great fortunes and luxury in the period of the late Republic, but it is nonsensical to presume that they were not interested in gaining personal wealth. On the contrary, Metellus’ eulogy demonstrates that gathering riches was highly regarded within society, it was a sign of prestige. 34 And it is clear that acquiring and owning extensive assets was naturally linked to a fulfilling political career. The social and political scenario in Rome was not the same in the third century as in the late Republic, yet the factors of social repute remained unchanged in their essence. Amongst these was the status of the rich man. In his funerary speech, Quintus Metellus talked about honourably acquired wealth but he did not specify which means were considered honest when amassing a fortune.

29 Cic., Tusc. 5.15. 30 Cic., Tusc. 5.29; Fin. 3.51 (yet, in the same passage wealth, diuitiae, was linked to glory, gloria). 31 Cic., Agr. 1.22; Dom. 58; 89. This made Brunt 1971: 128, exclaim: ‘Cicero tended to associate the “egentes” (needy) with the “perditi“ (almost “criminals”); he came near regarding poverty as a crime.’ 32 Cic., Off. 1.25. Cf. Cic., Off. 1.20; 1.92; 2.64; 2.87. Cf. Wood 1988: 113-4. 33 Plin., Nat.. 7.139-40. 34 Cf. Harris 1971: 1371-85, now published in C.B. Champion (ed.), Roman Imperial ism. Reading and sources, Oxford, 2004, 17-30, esp. 24-5; Harris 1985: 56-8; 65-7; 86-93; Gruen 1984: I 307-8: ‘Senatorial aristocrats might affect scorn for petty trades- men and abhor business dealings as an occupation, but they had no disdain, in practice or principle, for the acquisition of capital.’

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 169 18/04/16 14:37 170 francisco pina polo

Polybius, who had a good grasp of the mentality of Roman aristocracy, said that Romans disapproved of illicitly gained wealth but commended it when legiti- mately acquired. 35 One century later, Sallust praised the Romans of previous ages because they sought glory and honour above all and faced all sorts of dangers before their enemies. But he also stated that they did not disdain honourably gained riches (diuitias honestas). 36 Nonetheless, Sallust presented love of money (studium pecuniae, cupido diuitiarum) as one of the great cancers of his time which ought to be removed or, at least, mitigated in order to recover the good governance of the res publica. 37 Likewise, Cicero claimed that it was legitimate to increase one’s patrimony (res familiaris) as long as this was done in an honest manner. 38 Inevitably amongst members of the social elite, it was unanimously accepted that owning as much wealth as possible was totally acceptable. This refered not only to inherited fortunes. It was considered a praiseworthy aspiration to increase one’s patrimony as much as possible as long as honourable means were used. But what were these honourable means? In his De officiis, Cicero made a list of acceptable occupations. 39 Of course, any manual trade involving working for another person for a wage was discarded. Any uncongenial occupations such as collecting taxes (portitores) and usury (feneratores) were improper. He also rejected the business of those working in entertainment such as dancers or actors. Medicine, architecture and teaching demanded specialized knowledge and were respectable jobs but only for persons of a certain social status, obviously not for the aristocracy. Small scale trade (mercatura) was degrading (sor dida), but not when conducted on a large scale, especially if the returns obtained were used to acquire land, since the most honourable occupation for free men in the eyes of Roman aristocracy continued to be farming. Cicero always showed a considerable preoccupation with his patrimony. His family was totally unknown in Rome but had a prominent position in the society of Arpinum, where his father owned several estates. They were comfortably well off and could afford to send both Marcus and Quintus to Rome, when they were still teenagers, to live in a house owned by the family in the Carinae so they could be introduced into Roman aristocratic circles. Marcus Cicero lived in the house in the Carinae until the year 62, when he ceded it to his brother. They distributed amongst themselves the properties in Arpinum when their father died during that decade. This was the basis for his fortune along with the dowry he received upon marrying his wife Terentia. According to Plutarch, 40

35 Pol. 6.56.3. Cf. Plu., Cato 21.8. 36 Sall., Cat. 7. 37 Sall., Ep. ad Caes. 1.7. Cf. 2.5; 2.7. 38 Cic., Off. 2.87. Cf. Off. 1.92. 39 Cic., Off. 1.150-151. Cf. Valencia 1989-90. 40 Plu., Cic. 8.2.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 170 18/04/16 14:37 cvpiditas pecvniae: wealth and power in cicero 171

Terentia contributed a large amount in cash, along with pasture land, woodland somewhere in Italy and insulae in two of the most popular quarters in Rome, the Aventine and the Argiletum, from which Cicero received the regular payment of rent. 41 This financial situation was still relatively modest compared to the large fortunes at the time, but Cicero managed it superbly and he considerably mul- tiplied both his land and his money. 42 Outside Rome, he acquired a series of plots of farming land both in the Latium and in Campania, specifically in Tus- culum, Formiae, Alba, Antium, Astura, Frusino, Cumae, Pompeii and Puteoli. Cicero often used these properties as a haven to avoid public life in Rome and to write some of his works. He fitted them with amenities, spared no expense in decorating them with statues and artworks and even built libraries in some of them for his own personal use. 43 But above all the uillae were operating farms which yielded rich harvests for Cicero every year due to their location in some of the most fertile and populated areas of Italy. To Cicero, a uilla was not about a lifestyle but obviously an investment. 44 In order to ease access to his estates, he bought a series of inns (deuersoria) on the main roads linking Rome with the Latium and Campania, creating a genuine network of private lodgings. Those located in Lanuvium, Minturnae and Sinuessa, on the via Appia, could serve as stopovers on his trips to his properties in Campania. His quarters in Anagnia were placed between Rome and Arpinum, and his residence in Aquinum was between this city and the Thyrrenian coast. In total, Cicero became the owner of at least fifteen properties outside Rome. In the Vrbs, Cicero in the year 62 bought a luxurious house on the Palatine. His new property had been formerly owned by Crassus. Thanks to a letter sent to Sestius we know that he paid the large sum of three and a half million sestertii for it and that he incurred considerable debt to this end. 45 As a philosopher, Cicero recommended not to boast about one’s wealth but it is obvious that the main reason behind the purchase of this new property was to show off, not only the amount of money involved in this transaction, but above all his new consular status. The Palatine was the most elegant quarter where many of the most prominent families in Rome lived, and they became his new neighbours. Placed above the Forum, the most significant aspect was not only that his new

41 Ioannatou 2006: 115; 224. In his second marriage with the young Publilia, Cicero received a dowry of more than four hundred thousand sestertii (Cic., Att. 16.2.1). See also Treggiari 2007. 42 It is not my intention here to make a detailed account of Cicero’s properties. The most relevant details can be found in Shatzman 1975: 403-25. Cf. Lafon 2001, esp.189- 190. 43 Cic., Att. 4.4a.1; 4.8.2. 44 See the nostalgic and rhetorical praise of farming and country life made by Cicero in De Senectute 51-60. 45 Cic., Fam. 5.6.2; Att., 1.12.1. Cf. Ioannatou 2006: 315.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 171 18/04/16 14:37 172 francisco pina polo

abode commanded fine views over the social and political centre of the city, but the fact that it could be seen from there. Thus, the house was in itself a symbol of the inclusion of Cicero, the homo nouus, within Roman nobilitas. Besides the house on the Palatine and the insulae which were part of Terentia’s dowry, Cicero owned one part of another insula in Rome next to the temple of Strenia, mentioned in a letter of the year 44, as well as some insulae inherited from his friend Cluvius in the year 45. 46 One of the forms in which Cicero increased his wealth was through bequests from his friends, clients and probably freedmen, amongst them philosopher Diodotus, his friend Fufidius from Arpinum, the physician Alexio and the banker Cluvius. 47 In his correspondence, Cicero mentioned at least fifteen of these legacies. In one of the Philippicae, already in the year 44, he claimed to have inherited in his lifetime over twenty million sestertii, 48 a remarkable figure almost six times the value of his house on the Palatine. 49 The fact that he made this allusion in a speech to be given in the senate – though it was never delivered but only published –, indicates that both Cicero and his audience did not see this form of acquiring wealth as unusual or reprehensible. On the contrary, one could pride oneself in having made such a large sum. Holding political office in the provinces was one of the most habitual sources of wealth for Roman aristocracy. While posted to the appropriate province, it was not infrequent for the governor to exploit the inhabitants there for his own benefit by means of taxation. On the other hand, wars could render sizeable spoils to triumphant generals. After holding the consulship in the year 63, Cicero relinquished his role as governor in Gaul, the province finally allotted to him after exchanging the province originally given to him, Macedonia, with his colleague Antonius. In the year 62 complaints started to reach Rome about the excessive fiscal extortion Antonius was implementing on the provincial population of Macedonia. Antonius defended himself rather cynically by accusing Cicero, claiming that he had been forced to raise taxes because he had agreed to share with Cicero the rewards he might obtain in the province. Cicero himself alluded to this matter in some of his letters and he mentioned one of his freedmen, Hilarus, who allegedly might have been sent to Macedonia to watch over Antonius and to protect the interests of his patron. 50 When the possibility of dismissing Antonius from office was discussed in the senate, Cicero was one of his greatest champions, and he also defended Antonius in the trial against him on his return in the year 59, in which Antonius was tried for extortion and

46 Cic., Att. 15.26.4; Att., 14.9.1. Cf. Shatzman 1975: 404. 47 Shatzman 1975: 409-12; Ioannatou 2006: 151-7. 48 Cic., Phil. 2.40. 49 we probably only know about some of the donations he received. Cf. Shatzman 1975: 411. 50 Cic., Att. 1.12.2

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 172 18/04/16 14:37 cvpiditas pecvniae: wealth and power in cicero 173

sentenced to exile. 51 The secret nature of the deal prevents us from establishing with certainty whether the unlawful pact did actually exist, but Cicero might have derived financial benefit from the actions of his colleague in the consulship as the governor of the province without even leaving Rome. 52 Eventually, Cicero could not avoid being appointed governor of a province and he was put in charge of Cilicia in the year 51. He made substantial earnings there, but apparently not through abusive tax burdens on the provincials, who apparently held him in high esteem, but through the spoils of war. During his stay, Cicero conducted a brief but victorious campaign against local populations in the area of Mount Amanus, on the border between Syria and Cilicia, as well as against the inhabitants of Pindenissus, a town which he took after a fifty-six day siege. 53 Cicero magnanimously gave the entirity of the spoils to his soldiers, but he kept the money obtained from the sale of the prisoners as slaves, several million sestertii, most of which may have gone directly to him. 54 In a letter to Atticus early in the year 48, Cicero claimed to have placed in the hands of the publicans of Ephesus two million two hundred thousand sestertii in cistophori, quite probably the money he managed to amass during his stay in Cilicia. 55

As can be seen, on the basis of a modest family fortune increased by the huge dowry brought by his wife Terentia, Cicero managed to build a solid patrimony in his lifetime. The methods he used to obtain his diuitias honestas were similar to those unquestionably put into practice by many other senators at the time: rents from farms in Latium and Campania; legacies of money and real estate from friends, clients and freedmen; profits made in the provinces, definitely through the spoils of war in Cilicia and perhaps also indirectly by exploiting the inhabitants of Macedonia through taxes implemented by his colleague in the consulship, Antonius; possibly loans with repayment including interest. These resources could obviously be fed back into themselves: the legacies received could be used to invest in more real estate and these in turn provided further income. Nonetheless, Cicero’s financial situation did undergo some troubled moments. The first crisis was caused by his exile, during which some of his properties were damaged by Clodius’ supporters. When Cicero returned from exile he contrived to receive compensation from the senate: two million sestertii for rebuilding his house on the Palatine, five hundred thousand and two hundred and fifty thousand respectively to rebuild his properties in Tusculum and Formiae. The second economic crisis arose after his failed support of Pompey’s

51 Cic., Fam. 5.5. 52 Shatzman 1975: 413. 53 Cic., Att. 5.20. 54 Cic., Att. 5.20.5. Cf. Shatzman 1975: 413. 55 Cic., Att. 11.1.2. Cf. Att. 11.2.2; 11.3.3. Cf. Cic., Fam. 5.20.9. Ioannatou 2006: 128.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 173 18/04/16 14:37 174 francisco pina polo

partisans during the civil war which resulted in the loss of all the money he had lent them. 56 Yet Caesar’s clemency allowed him to keep his properties and even increase them in the final years of his life. His divorce from Terentia after thirty years of marriage also brought Cicero in difficulties, because this fact obliged him to return the dowry. To meet his obligation, Cicero was forced to get into debt asking L. Cornelius Balbus for a loan. 57 Seldom do we know the exact date when Cicero purchased a property or received a bequest. Despite these limitations, one thing is clear: Cicero increased his patrimony enormously after his consulship. Until the year 63, there is only evidence of his owning the house in the Carinae in Rome inherited from his father and the insulae from Terentia’s dowry. Outside Rome he owned the property inherited from his father in Arpinum, a estate in Tusculum that he probably bought around the year 68 and another property in Formiae, near the coast, which is mentioned for the first time in the year 66. 58 By that time he had not yet purchased any deuersorium, or received any external bequests. How- ever, in the two decades between the year 62 and his death, Cicero received the aforementioned legacies, he purchased the five deuersoria we know he owned and at least nine uillae with the corresponding buildings, as well as his house on the Palatine, the jewel in the crown. To this should be added all the money he must have acquired, for example the aforementioned amount he had deposited in Ephesus after his stay in Cilicia, as well as the scores of slaves who worked in his houses in Rome and on his estates. Any estimate of Cicero’s accumulated wealth in those years must be hypothetical and approximate, because we can only use partial facts about the value of the land and we have no details as to the yield from his estates. As we have seen earlier, Cicero estimated the amount he acquired by inheritance to be around twenty million sestertii. Shatzman calculated that the value of the real estate owned by Cicero in the last years of his life could be around thirteen million sestertii. 59 In his opinion this was not exceptional because, according to Pliny, Scaurus’ house on the Palatine alone was worth almost fifteen million sestertii. 60 Cicero’s was obviously not one of the greatest fortunes at the time in Rome, 61 amongst other reasons, because his family background was much more modest than that of the traditional families of the nobilitas. However, without a doubt, in relative terms, the increase in Cicero’s fortune over the last twenty

56 Cic., Att. 11.13.4. Cf. Ioannatou 2006: 261; 293-4. 57 Cic., Att. 12.12.1. Shortly after he also had to return the dowry received from Publilia (Cic., Att. 16.2.2). Cf. Ioannatou 2006: 225-6. 58 Shatzman 1975: 404-5. 59 Shatzman 1975: 407. 60 Plin., Nat. 36.103. 61 but we cannot accept Plutarch’s claim, unless we apply very relative terms, that Cicero had a limited though sufficient fortune to meet his expenses (Plu., Cic. 8.3).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 174 18/04/16 14:37 cvpiditas pecvniae: wealth and power in cicero 175

years of his life was astronomical and probably increased tenfold the properties he owned before the consulship. Cicero’s case is logically not an exception; quite the opposite. In any event, it is striking that his sources of income were different in part from those of the great imperatores, for instance Pompey and Caesar. Cicero only obtained money directly from the provinces during his stay in Cilicia, when his fortune was already fully consolidated. The spoils of war he received were substantial in absolute terms but meagre compared to those received by Pompey, Caesar and other prominent generals. It is clear that Caesar, whose debts and public expenses were also much higher than those met by Cicero, made his fortune mainly out of the spoils obtained in the provinces, both in Hispania Ulterior during his praetorship and, above all, in Gaul in the decade of the 50’s. 62 The booty Pompey received in his wars against the pirates and against Mithridates in the East was spectacular, so much so that he was able to distribute a substantial reward amongst his legates. According to Pliny, his legates and quaestors shared out one hundred million sestertii, which means that each of them made at least four million sestertii. 63 Evidently the profit Pompey made was much greater. War was a respectable form of obtaining wealth in the eyes of the Roman aristocracy and nobody questioned this. Yet Cicero’s endeavours were not dedicated to war but to the courts, and they indirectly became his main source of wealth, along with the income yielded by his uillae. The lex Cincia of the year 204 banned any payment made by clients to their lawyers after pleading their case. Consequently, neither Cicero nor any lawyer at court received any official compensation. On the other hand, being paid for services rendered was against the aristocratic moral code, which despised the payment of wages. But this does not mean that lawyers did not eventually receive financial reward. Clients contracted a moral obligation towards their lawyers, and at least some of the bequests Cicero received in his lifetime must be seen as the deferred payment of tacit invoices. 64 Thus the work conducted before the courts was ultimately a type of investment. Receiving a bequest, however, was not the only method of recieving payment for a lawyer. The reward could take the shape of other types of favours, either political or monetary, such as receiving a loan of money at a low interest rate. In the year 62, when Cicero had already become consul, he successfully defended in trial Publius Cornelius Sulla, the nephew of the dictator. Sulla had been accused of corruption and rumour had it that he had been

62 Shatzman 1975: 346-50. According to Appian (B.C. 2.151), Caesar had hardly no economic means when he began his political career. Without a doubt this is an exagger- ation, but it is unquestionable that his wealth increased in parallel with his political ascent. 63 Plin., Nat. 37.16. Shatzman 1975: 333. 64 Ioannatou 2006: 120.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 175 18/04/16 14:37 176 francisco pina polo

involved in the conspiracy of Catiline. Cicero had refused to defend other people allegedly involved in the plot but he made an exception for Sulla. After his acquittal, Sulla lent Cicero two million sestertii, a sum Cicero used to purchase his new house on the Palatine that same year. The loan could have been the compensation Cicero received for his work. We do not know if it was ever paid back. 65 For a lawyer to be requested often in court depended of course on his orato- rial skills, but it also depended to a great extent on his political and social status. The weight carried by someone just beginning their political career could not equal that of a lawyer with consular status. On some occasions Cicero agreed to defend somebody for personal or ideological reasons, but there is no doubt that in some cases financial considerations prevailed.

In conclusion, in the economic field the contrast between Cicero as a philosopher, whose writings expressed disdain for money, and Cicero as a man of his time, who accumulated wealth, is quite remarkable. While in absolute terms his fortune was smaller than that of many of his contemporaries, his eagerness to become rich rivaled that of other members of the Roman aristocracy. In fact it could be stated that one of his main objectives in life was to become rich, and he certainly succeeded thanks to his public life. Cicero had reason to feel as proud of his financial progress as of his social and political rise. Despite being a homo nouus he had reached the consulship and become a man of distinction in the senate. Likewise, starting from a relatively modest patrimony, by the end of his life he had become a rich landowner who also had many other assets. He had succeeded as a politician and as a businessman and both facets were closely linked: they were in reality inseparable. The information available to us about Cicero allows us to follow chronologically in some detail the process of acquisition of his properties. Yet in the case of other prominent politicians of the time, we merely know general facts about their wealth and, in some particular cases, the land they owned in different regions in Italy. Depending on the profile each politician developed, either towards the military or towards the field of law in Rome, their sources of income could vary. However, there is a constant feature in each case: wealth and power went hand in hand in Roman public life; gathering riches was intimately linked with holding magistracies and being a member of the senate. Obviously, this does not mean that those who were not involved in politics or held a place in the senate could not become rich through their businesses, as demonstrated by the clear example of Cicero’s great friend, Atticus.

65 Ioannatou 2006: 305: ‘Profitant de la dépendance de son client, qui risquait de se voir condamné à l’exil et à l’amende, Cicéron fit incontestablement preuve d’un comportement de pirate. Non seulement il s’était laissé acheter au moyen d’un prêt déguisé, mail il avait simultanément profité d’un homme désespéré.’

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 176 18/04/16 14:37 cvpiditas pecvniae: wealth and power in cicero 177

Wealth involved social prestige and in a society such as that of the Roman Republic, where keeping up appearances was at times as important as reality, it was fundamental to display one’s status. Cicero complained at times about the excessive debts he incurred, but this does not mean that he reduced his expenses or that he restrained his way of life. He protested, for instance, about the debts he must incur to purchase his house on the Palatine, but did not hesitate to borrow in order to show off his wealth and social position, which corresponded to a senator of consular status. Finally, wealth opened up the path to power, and power, in turn, involved the creation of a network of influence and personal relations which were a source of affluence. Wealth and power mutually supported each other in the context of politics and society in republican Rome.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 177 18/04/16 14:37 The Money and Power of Friends and Clients: Successful Aediles in Rome

Elizabeth Deniaux

The extent to which aediles in the late Roman Republic had freedom of action when it came to the elections for the upper magistracies, in particular the praetorship and the consulate, is a very important question. Did one’s election to an aedileship translate into a subsequent electoral victory in regards to the upper magistracies? Men who had ambitions of the praetorship or the consulate had to devote nearly all of their energy to this cause during the buildup to an election. For many, being from a well-known, elite family and/or having engaged in successful military actions would have been as important as the expenditures linked to their aedileship. An election campaign for an upper magistracy had to be prepared well in advance through previous acts, and a successful aedileship could very well pave the way. 1 Therefore, an aedileship represents a kind of symbolic capital, to be used just before an election. For Roman elections were themselves highly personal affairs, establishing and furthering a relationship between a candidate and the citizens. 2 Plutarch’s description of Caesar’s aedilship (Caes. 5.9) is a good example of the exchange between a magistrate and the people as well as the importance of an aedileship towards a lengthy political career. His aedileship was present in the citizens’ memories when Caesar was a candidate for the praetorship and then for the consulate. 3 Suetonius tells us that Caesar ‘won the goodwill of the masses’ (conciliato populi fauore) and that ‘When aedile, Caesar decorated not only the Comitium and the Forum with its adjacent basilicas, but the Capitol as well, building temporary colonnades for display. He staged wild beasts shows and stage-plays too, both with his colleague and independently’ (Jul. 10-1). The result was that Caesar alone took all the credit even for what was spent in common, and his colleague Marcus Bibulus openly said that his was the fate of Pollux: ‘For, said he, just as the temple erected in the Forum to the twin breth- ren bears only the name of Castor, so the joint generosity of Caesar and myself

1 All dates BC unless otherwise indicated. Cic., Off. 2, 56: Quamquam intelligo in nostra ciuitate inueterasse iam bonis temporibus, ut splendor aedilitatem ab optimis uiris postuletur. 2 Elections: Nicolet 1976b; Yakobson 1999; campaigns: Deniaux 1987: 279-304. 3 Caesar was aedilis curulis in 65.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 178 18/04/16 14:37 the money and power of friends and clients 179

is credited to Caesar alone.’ In addition, Plutarch mentions that ‘during his aedileship, he furnished 320 pairs of gladiators, and by lavish provision for theatrical performances, processions, and public banquets, he washed away all the memory of the ambitious efforts of his predecessors in the office.’ Plutarch also states that the people were ready to give him future votes as thanks for his generosity (Caes. 5.9). Successful consulships were often preceded by noteworthy aedileships with sumptuous money outlays, demonstrating an aedile’s liberalitas. In a letter of 56, Cicero writes about the electoral success of his friend L. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther; concerning the latter’s consulship of 57, he uses the expression of commendatio liberalitatis to describe the generosity and the popularity of his friend, who had spent a lot of money both during his aedileship and his praetorship. 4 We may also observe how Cicero described to his friend Atticus the qualities of the different candidates for the consulship of 54. For both of them, the memory of the organization of ludi and munera was important. Concerning the patrician M. Aemilius Scaurus, ‘his aedileship recalls no unpleasant memory’, and on L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, one of the two plebeian candidates, although he had many powerful friends, he was nevertheless helped by his ‘very popular gladiatorial exhibition.’ 5 We know that the aedileship was not compulsory in the cursus honorum during the late Republic. However, it was better to have occupied this office when pursuing a prominent political career. Some candidates were reluctant to take on this magistracy due to its heavy costs. However, only those from very well known families could escape the necessity of holding the aedileship. Cicero provides a humorous anecdote about the patrician Appius Claudius Pulcher, who chose to split his aedileship into two parts, ‘putting one in his own treasury, the second in his gardens’, because he was sure of winning the praetorship with the help of friends in higher office (Dom. 111-2). Organization of the ludi as well as access to plentiful grain markets was very important for gaining the support of public opinion. For these two important tasks, the aediles used their own money to complement what was supplied by the state. Money given by their friends and clients also contributed to an aedile’s generosity. We shall explore this kind of help through Verboven’s ‘economy of friends’ theory. 6 Afterwards, we shall investigate how the memory of successful aedileships, gained from expenditures on ludi, munera, and the grain supply,

4 Cic., Fam. 1.7.9. Spinther was aedile in 63 and praetor in 60. On his sumptous magistracies, cf. Cic., Off. 2.57; Plin., Nat. 19.23. On the organization of the ludi Apolli nares during his praetorship, cf. Val. Max. 2.4.6. 5 Cic., Att. 4.16.4: Si quaeris, nulla est magnopere commota sumpatheia sed tamen habet (Scaurus) aedilitatis eius memoriam non ingratam et pondus apud rusticos in patris memoria. Reliqui duo plebei sic exaequantur [ut] Domitius ut ualeat amicis, adiuuetur tamen non gratissimo munere. 6 Verboven 2002.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 179 18/04/16 14:37 180 elizabeth deniaux

influenced future elections. 7 My prosopographical research is based upon Gruen’s studies in The Last Generation of the Roman Republic. 8 I have also made use of Ryan’s works on aediles and the aedileship. These have brought forth many new ideas about the office. 9 Gruen has shown that statistics are not very convenient for this period because we possess very few names for magistrates. We know of only 48 aediles out of 120 elected for a 30 year period (4 aediles were elected every year). Of these, 4 reached the praetorship and 12 the consulship. 10 The aedileship was very costly indeed: aediles had to organize ludi, during which civic cohesion was reinforced. When Cicero was elected as aedile, he claimed that the most important task, with the procuratio aedium sacrarum, was to organize religious feasts for the ludi: nunc sum designatus aedilis; habeo rationem quid a populo Romano acceperim; mihi ludos sanctissimos maxima cum cura et caerimonia Cereri, Libero, Liberaeque faciundos, mihi Floram matrem populo plebique Romanae ludorum celebritate placandam, mihi ludos antiquissimos qui primi Romani appellati sunt, cum dig nitate maxima et religione Ioui, Iunoni, Mineruaeque esse faciundos.’ 11 Our sources show how the ludi are important for the Romans. Cicero says: ‘men find pleasure in games, not only those who admit it, but those as well who pretend they do not.’ 12 Cicero likewise had experience in giving public games. The magistrate who organized the ludi had to make use not only of his own resources, but also those of his amici, familiares, and clientelae for the construction and decoration of the theater, for the staging of the plays, and for the gifts to the people. To organize theatrical plays, the Romans built temporary wooden theatres which they then decorated. 13 We know also that the Forum could be used for the ludi. Different sources contain allusions to the construction and the decoration of wooden theatres. For decorations, the magistrate needed columns, especially those of marble, as well as statues to adorn them. Appius Claudius Pulcher, the elder brother of Publius Clodius, was in Greece in 61, collecting works of art and searching for columns and statuary. He sought to outdo all others in his magistracy by plundering sanctuaries and public places ‘in order’ Cicero says ironically, ‘to honor the Roman people.’ 14 In terms of

7 Deniaux 2006: 401-20. 8 Gruen 1974. 9 Ryan 1996: 68-86; id. 1998a; id. 1998b. 10 Gruen 1974: 177-80. 11 Cic., Verr. 2.5.36. He added that he also had to protect the city: Mihi totam urbem tuendam esse commissam. 12 Cic., Mur. 40. Cf. also Mur. 38: ‘The people and the ignorant crowd take a great delight in games.’ 13 The first stone theater was erected by Pompey in the Campus Martius and inaugurated in 55. 14 Cic., Dom. 111. The Libertas statue which Pulcher gave to his brother, the tribune Clodius, to adorn his house, had been stolen from on a tomb in the city of Tanagra. On Clodius, cf. Tatum 1999.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 180 18/04/16 14:37 the money and power of friends and clients 181

how he was able to obtain these in a province and bring them to the city of Rome, Cicero tells us that in the past, friends, hosts, and allies would loan these items to their Roman patrons, safe in the knowledge that they would be returned quickly. Not very long ago, very recently indeed, we have seen men decorate the Forum and the colonnades not with the plunder of provinces, but with the treasures of their friends, with what their hosts had lent them, and not with what their guilty hands had stolen, and they returned these statues and art treasures to their owners. They did not carry them off from the cities of our friends and allies, pretending, as aediles, to be borrowing them for their own mansions and country houses. An example of this is C. Claudius Pulcher. In 99, he was aedile and adorned his temporary theater with statues that he had borrowed from his clients in Messana. In particular, Praxiteles’ Cupidon was lent by Pulcher’s guest-friend Heius of Messana. This as well as the other pieces were returned afterwards. 15 Also during his aedileship, Pulcher exhibited a series of still-life paintings. Pliny comments that these were so vivid, birds tried to land on the ones that depicted the roof of a theater (Nat. 35.23). Also facilitating this lending service were men in Rome who had the ability to obtain pieces of art, and were thus in a strong position to aid friends. Verres was known for the art collections which adorned his home, his country houses, and even the houses of companions (Cic., Verr. 2.4.36). He was thus in a position to help when those close to him sought to organize ludi at Rome 16 When his friend Hortensius became aedile in 75, Verres lent him statues which were displayed in the Forum and the Comitium during the ludi that he held. The most famous statue presented here was the one that Verres had taken from the island of Tenedus off the coast of Asia Minor. This was a statue of the god Tenes, stolen by Verres ‘amid the loud lamentations of the citizens.’ 17 In the end, the aedileship of Hortensius proved highly successful, and he invoked the

15 Cic., Verr. 2.4.6: C. Claudius, cuius aedilitatem magnificentiissimum scimus fuisse, usus est hoc Cupidine tam diu dum forum dis immortalibus populoque romano habuit ornatum, et cum hospes esset Heiorum, Mamertini autem populi patronus, ut illis benignis usus est ad commodandum, sic ipse diligens fuit ad reportandum . On this successful aedileship, cf. also Cic., Off. 2.57; Val. Max. 2.4.6. 16 Robert 2007: 15-34. On the collection of Verres cf. Coarelli 1996: 85-101. 17 Cic., Verr. 2.1.49: ‘Tenes … who is said to have founded the city and after whom Tenedus is named – this very Tenes himself, I say, a beautiful work of art, which you have, on one occasion, seen in the Comitium. This was carried off amid the loud lamentations of the citizens.’ Elsewhere, Cicero speaks about the plundering of Rome’s allies, Verr. 2.1.58: ‘You will plead that your statues and pictures, like this, have adorned the city and the Forum of the people of Rome. Yes, I remember standing among the people of Rome and looking at the decorated Forum and Comitium, a decoration splendid to the eye, but painful and melancholy to the heart and mind; I looked at the brilliant show that was made by your theives, by the robbing of our provinces, by the plundering of our friends and allies.’

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 181 18/04/16 14:37 182 elizabeth deniaux

memory of his year in office when he successfully ran for the praetorship of 72 and the consulship of 69. While we do not know many things about the friends and the clients who helped M. Aemilius Scaurus, his aedileship was certainly great and left a lasting impression on our sources. His family was patrician. He was the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115) and Caecilia Metella; thus at a young age he inherited enormous wealth, and it is possible that he acquired more when he was Pompey’s quaestor during the Third Mithridatic War. Regardless, with a mind to winning upper level magistracies, Scaurus spent nearly his entire fortune during his aedileship. As aedile, he constructed the greatest of all the works ever made by man, a work that surpassed not merely those erected for a temporary period, but even those intended to last forever. This was his theater, which had a stage arranged in three stories with 360 columns; the lowest story of the stage was of marble, and the middle of glass, while the top story was made of gilded planks. 18 Columns on the lowest story were 11.5 meters high, and a total of 3000 bronze statues adorned the spaces in between. The columns may have come from Africa and Asia. Scaurus’ father served as princeps senatus in 112, and was in the same year sent as an ambassador investigate the activities of Jugurtha in Numidia. The ambassadorial party were later accused of accepting money from Jugurtha. A board of inquiry was formed at Rome, of which Scaurus himself was a member (Sall., Jug. 25.11, 28-9, 40-4). Collusion between the ambassadors and Jugurtha was never proven, but nevertheless the ambassadorial mission perhaps afforded the senior Scaurus the possibility of creating connections with influential persons in Africa. 19 We also know the junior Scaurus served for a time in Syria as Pompey’s quaestor and then proquaestor, allowing for the possibility that he later obtained pieces of art from here as well. The assistance of friends was also useful for the giving of gifts to actors. Cato the Younger ‘managed’ spectacles in the theater for the ludi of his friend Favonius, who served as aedile in 52. Cato also gave gifts to the actors. Plutarch likely relates the story because, supposedly, Cato presented the actors not with crowns of gold, as was common practice, but with crowns of wild olive, as was the custom at Olympia. He also gave inexpensive gifts to the Greek performers: beets, lettuce, radishes, and pears. While the Roman actors received jars of wine, pork, figs, melons, and faggots of wood. ‘Some laughed at the practical simplicity of these gifts, but others respected Cato when they saw his severe and solemn manner gradually relaxing in pleasant good-humor.’ Favonius himself

18 Plin., Nat. 16.24; some of these columns later adorned his house, cf. Plin., Nat. 36.6. Cf. Medri 1997: 83-110. 19 These connections were also likely of help in the wild beast shows of Scaurus, where he staged fights between 150 panthers (Plin., Nat. 8.64). On obtaining and transporting such animals, infra,

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 182 18/04/16 14:37 the money and power of friends and clients 183

‘plunged into the crowd and took a seat among the spectators, all the while applauding Cato’ (Cat. Mi. 46.2). Organization of the uenationes was often associated with the ludi. The names of aediles linked with popular uenationes remained memorable. Conversely, not organizing lavish uenationes during an aedileship could have negative consequences for one’s prospects in future elections. This was especially true if the aedile had well known relations in foreign lands where wild beasts lived. That such relations could become well known to common Romans is itself highly noteworthy. Plutarch relates how Sulla believed that his military exploits alone would carry his election to the praetorship, and thus he felt no need to run for aedile beforehand. However, he was met with hostility from the Roman people during his electoral campaign. Some accused him of not exploiting his friendship with Bocchus, the king of Mauritania, in order to obtain beasts for the uenationes. Sulla now thought that the reputation which he had won in war was sufficient to justify political activities, and therefore at once exchanged military service for public life, offered himself as a candidate for the city praetorship, and was defeated. The responsibility for his defeat, however, lay with the Roman citizens. They knew about Sulla’s friendship with Bocchus, and expected that if he should be made aedile before praetor, he would treat them to splendid hunting scenes and combats of Libyan wild beasts. They therefore appointed others to the praetorship, in order to force Sulla to become aedile… In the following year, he obtained the praetorship, partly because he was subservient to the people and partly because he used money to win their support. 20 During his praetorship in 93, Sulla felt the need to organize the ludi Apol linares, and held a wild beast show featuring 100 lions who were hunted down by Mauritanians with javelins (Plin., Nat. 8.53). We know that a very large and successful uenatio was organized by M. Ful- vius Nobilior in 186 after his triumph over Aetolians and King Antiochus. Livy writes, ‘A hunt of lions and panthers was presented, and the games, in number and in variety, were celebrated in a manner almost like those of present times’ (39.22.2). After this event, a senatus consultum of unknown date forbade the importation of African animals for games. But a tribunus plebis, Cn. Aufidius, overturned this through the passage of a law, very likely in 170, that allowed

20 Plu., Sull (transl. B. Perrin): ῾Ο δὲ Σύλλας οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμικῶν δόξαν ἐπὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις διαρκεῖν, καὶ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατείας εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ δήμου πρᾶξιν, ἐπὶ στρατηγίαν πολιτικὴν ἀπεγράψατο καὶ διεψεύσθη· τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἀνατίθησι. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὴν πρὸς Βόκχον εἰδότας φιλίαν, καὶ προσδεχομένους, εἰ πρὸ τῆς στρατηγίας ἀγορανομοίη, κυνηγέσια λαμπρὰ καὶ Λιβυκῶν θηρίων ἀγῶνας, ἑτέρους ἀποδεῖξαι στρατηγοὺς ὡς αὐτὸν ἀγορανομεῖν ἀναγκάσοντας. ἔοικε δὲ τὴν ἀληθῆ τῆς ἀποτεύξεως αἰτίαν οὐχ ὁμολογῶν ὁ Σύλλας ἐλέγχεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. ἐνιαυτῷ γὰρ κατόπιν ἔτυχε τῆς στρατηγίας, τοῦ δήμου τὸ μέν τι θεραπείᾳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ χρήμασι προσαγαγόμενος. 5. On the aid provided by Bocchus to Sulla during the war of Jugurtha, cf. Sall., Jug. 113. On the uenationes, cf. Ville 1981.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 183 18/04/16 14:37 184 elizabeth deniaux

imported animals to feature in games of the Circus (Plin., Nat. 8.46). The very next year saw a uenatio with 63 panthers, 40 bears, and 40 elephants from Africa (Liv. 44.18.8). The name of the aedile responsible was P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, who went on to hold the consulship in 162 and 155, as well as the office of censor in 159. The son of Scipio Africanus, he very likely parlayed his father’s strong ties to the house of Massinissa in Numidia into a means of obtaining exotic animals for shows intended to further his political career. 21 Capturing and transporting lions was a difficult task, one nearly impossible for a Roman to orchestrate without the help of important friends in the provinces. 22 Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, aedile in 61, praetor in 58, and consul in 54, organized a fight between 100 Numidian bears and 100 Ethiopian hunters. Of this Pliny writes, ‘I am surprised at the description of the bears as Numidian, since it is known that the bear is not native to Africa.’ 23 A member of this family, Gnaeus, was governor of Africa at the time of Sulla’s dictatorship. He opposed Sulla and rallied many Marians around him in 82 before being defeated by Pompey (Liv., Per. 89; Plu., Pomp. 10-1). Presumably, Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus acquired clientelae during his stay in Africa, and his family were able to use these men as a means of obtain and transporting animals. Africa was not the only supplier of beasts for the uenationes. When Cicero became governor of Cilicia in 51, his friend M. Caelius Rufus (aedile of 50), sent him several letters asking for Cicero to obtain panthers for the ludi he planned to stage the following year. While the request was not unusual, that it was made to a governor and not to clients is unorthodox. Specifically, he wanted Cicero to ask the inhabitants of Cibyra to hunt and capture the panthers, and then for the Roman administration in Cilicia to organize transport to Rome (Fam. 8.4.5). Cicero humorously remarked that the task was made difficult by the panthers crossing over the border into the neighboring province of Caria. He also wrote that ‘the business is being carefully attended to according to my orders and with the aid of those who regularly hunt [panthers]’ (Fam. 2.11.2). The animals were transported by Patiscus, a man well known for trafficking animals from Cilicia. Patiscus had his own ships and his services were not inexpensive. 24 Cicero’s acquaintance with this man would have been a useful connection to many Romans with ambitions for a successful aedileship.

21 On links between clientelae and uenationes, cf. Deniaux 2000: 1299-1307. 22 Plin., Nat. 8.21: Capere eos ardui erat quondam operis foueisque maxime. 23 Plin., Nat. 8.131. On the trade in animals from Africa, cf. Bertrandy 1987: 211-41. 24 In a letter to Cicero (Fam. 8.9.3), Caelius notes that Patiscus had also transported ten panthers for Curio. These may have been a gift, as Caelius wrote to Cicero: quas ipsas Curio mihi et alias Africanas decem donauit. Curio was aedile in 51, the year before Caelius. On the transport of the animals for Caelius, cf. Cic., Fam. 8.4.5; on the career of Patiscus, who made his ships available to the Roman navy, P. Lentulus (proquaestor in Asia), and C. Cassius Longinus, cf. Cic., Fam. 12.15.2. Cf. Deniaux 2002: 121-2.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 184 18/04/16 14:37 the money and power of friends and clients 185

The activities of the aediles in Rome were very important for the cura annonae and especially for the grain supply, which itself was highly dependent on external markets. At times, aediles would spend their own money, that of their friends, or that of their clients for grain distribution during times of scarcity. Several of these shortages occurred between 79 and 69. 25 Thus a means to obtain grain could also provide one with a successful and memorable aedileship. Plutarch says that Cicero, who was aedile in 69, succeeded in reducing the price of grain in Rome on account of his Sicilian connections, obtained because of his successful prosecution of Verres in the previous year. The help given to Cicero in the form of this grain is portrayed as conscious on the part of the Sicilians, since they ‘were grateful to him, and when he was aedile, brought him from their island all sorts of livestock and produce. From these he derived no personal profit, but used the generosity of the islanders to lower the price of provisions in Rome’ (Plu., Cic. 8.2). This instance is paralleled by two others. In 196, the aedile C. Flaminius distributed 1 million measures of grain at two asses per measure to the Roman people. Flaminius shared credit for this with his colleague C. Fulvius Nobilior. This grain had been brought to Rome as a mark of respect for Gaius Flaminius himself as well as for his father. 26 C. Fla- minius was praetor in 193 and consul in 187. His father had been the first praetor assigned to Sicily in 227, and Sicilians all over the island remembered his administration favorably. 27 Then in 74 during another food shortage, M. Seius organized the sale of grain at the very low price of one as per modius. 28 He also furnished the Roman people with oil at a rate of one as for ten pounds (Plin., Nat. 18.16, cf. 15.2). Seius was a member of a family who had business interests in Delos going back to the second century. A total of 17 members of the family are known from the island. A seal with an inscription bearing their name has also been found in a Delian house. 29 These interests may very well have involved grain and oil. 30 The family was also one of the wealthiest in Campania,

25 Cf. Garnsey 1988; Virlouvet 1985. 26 Liv. 33.42.8: Eo anno aediles curules M. Fuluius Nobilior et C. Flaminius tritici deciens centena milia binis aeris populo discripserunt … Flaminius gratiam eius com municauerat cum collega. 27 Liv. 33.42.8: Id C. Flamini honoris causa ipsius patrisque aduexerunt Siculi Romam. Hieron II of Syracuse himself showed great sadness upon the death of the senior Flaminius at Lake Trasimene in 217, and offered to send grain for the Roman army (Liv. 22.37). 28 Cic., Off. 2.58: Ne Marco quidem Seio uitio datum est quod in caritate asse modium populo dedit; magna enim se et inueterata inuidia nec turpis iactura, quando erat aedilis, nec maxima liberauit. 29 Boussac, 1988: 325. Cf. Müller / Hasenohr 2002: 213-4. We know of one Ti. Seius, freedman of Marcus, who made a dedication to Hercules as a member of the college of Hermaïstes, Apolloniastes, and Posidoniastes (ID 1753 = ILLRP 759). 30 Deniaux 2002: 29-39.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 185 18/04/16 14:37 186 elizabeth deniaux

once helping to rebuild and decorate the temple of Diana Tifatina in Capua. 31 His fortune allowed him to be elected to the aedileship over the famous M. Pupius Piso. His memorable distributions and aedileship would explain the respect and sympathy expressed during his funeral. Pliny says that ‘he had two statues erected of himself on the Capitoline and the Palatine, and at the end of his life was carried to cremation on the shoulders of the populace’ (Nat. 18.16). To conclude, the use of liberalitas during an aedileship was necessary in order to obtain the popularity one needed to be elected to an upper magistracy. Such generosities, however, themselves required the use of various intermedi- aries: clients, friends, art collectors, traders, and shippers. All of these were as important as one’s own wealth, and all contributed to the success of an aedileship. In certain circumstances, prosopography may be employed to discover the likely source of an aedile’s wealth and connections. In 43, Cicero wrote a letter to Decimus Brutus in which he recommended his friend Lucius Aelius Lamia, a nouus homo, as a candidate for the praetorship. 32 Cicero spoke of his friend’s gratia, implying that Lamia was very wealthy and powerful. Yet he mentioned only one good reason to support this the candidature: the magnificentia of Lamia’s aedileship. Cicero claimed that the people had never forgotten the splendid munus offered by Lamia: magnificentissimus munus aedilitatis. 33 Cicero’s correspondence also allows us to know the sources of this aedile’s wealth and gratia. In a letter to Q. Cornificius, the governor of Africa in 44-43, Cicero speaks of Lamia’s properties and of his liberti who worked for him in Africa. 34 We may suppose that these lands were producing grain for the Roman people and that the liberti of his familia were helping Lamia when he required animals for his munera.

31 ILLRP 721, found on the pavement of the temple, cf. Pohjoy 1997: 59-88. A new reading of the inscription (id.: 78) identifies one A. Seius M. f.. This may alter the dating to 108 (with the names of the consuls Servius Sulpicius Galba and Marcus Aemilius Scaurus) from 74. It is possible that this Aulus Seius could have been the father of the aedile of 74. 32 Cic., Fam. 11.17. L. Aelius Lamia was similarly recommended to M. Iunius Bru- tus: Fam. 11.16: Velim igitur, mi Brute, me petere praeturam … ego suscepi totum negotium. 33 Cic., Fam. 11.17: Is (L. Aelius Lamia) magnificentissimo munere aedilitatis per functus petit praeturam, omnesque intelligunt nec dignitatem ei deesse nec gratiam; sed is ambitus excitari uidetur ut ego omnia pertimescam totamque petitionem Lamiae mihi sustinendam putem. 34 Cic., Fam. 12.29; Lamia’s negotia, procuratores, liberti, and familia are strongly recommended to Cornificius. On the family of Lamia, who came from Formia, cf. Nicolet 1974: 762-5, n. 10; Deniaux 1993: 439-41, n. 1. We know of a L. Aelius Lamia, proconsul of Africa from AD 15-16. A saltus Lamianus is mentioned twice in African imperial inscriptions, at Aïn el Djemala (CIL 8.25943: 2.13, 3.7) and at Aïn Ouassel (CIL 8.26416: 2.4, 3.5), where there are possible traces for some of Aelius Lamia’s ancient properties.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 186 18/04/16 14:37 the money and power of friends and clients 187

Standing in opposition to all of the above is Marcus Oppius, a man who became aedile without spending money. This was during a period of crisis in 37, in between civil wars. This man and his father had been proscribed and thus lost their properties. 35 Their plight was well known in Rome and therefore aroused sympathies. Appian says that ‘Oppius, because of his age, was unwilling to flee, but his son carried him on his shoulders till he had brought him outside the gates. In like manner they say that Aeneas was respected even by his enemies when carrying his father’ (B.C. 4.41). In admiration of his piety, the people later elected the young man aedile. At first he sought to resign his aedileship because of poverty, but ‘since his property had been confiscated and he could not defray the expenses of the office, the artisans performed their work without pay, and each spectator tossed such money as he could afford into the orchestra, so that [Oppius again] became a rich man.’ 36 In this last case, collective memory and political popularity were the most important factors. The admiration of the multitude formed for Oppius a kind of symbolic capital which could then be used in future elections. 37

35 Dio 48.53.4. He took refuge in Sicily with Sextus Pompey. On the proscription of M. Oppius, cf. Hinard 1985: 501, n. 98. 36 App., B. C. 4.41. He presumably had a restitutio bonorum after the treatise of Mise- num. It is difficult to identify him with the other Oppii known in this period. 37 were it not for his death. ‘Thus was this man was loved by the multitude in life, and at his death not much later he was carried to the Campus Martius, and there burned and buried’ (Dio 48.53.3).

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 187 18/04/16 14:37 The Senatorial Economics of Status in the Late Republic

Martin Jehne

M. Licinius Crassus, the rich and powerful partner of Pompey and Caesar in the so-called first triumvirate, is said to have uttered for many to hear that nobody had enough money to aspire to the rank of a princeps in the res publica if he was not able to feed an army from his income. 1 Now this famous dictum of Crassus is mentioned in different sources in slightly different ways, 2 and I opted here for the version found in Cicero’s de officiis which is the only one with an explicit connection to the status of a princeps in re publica. However, even if Crassus himself did not relate this remark about real wealth with the group of the most important people in the Roman republic, it would still be telling that Cicero added this relation without feeling obliged to explain it to his readers. Evidently, for Cicero and his contemporaries it was perfectly clear that Crassus’ idea of measuring personal wealth by relating it to army costs was only relevant for men whose ambition was to rise to a leading position. In an earlier mentioning of Crassus’ dictum, in the paradoxa stoicorum, Cicero specifies what he means by “the army”: six legions and a lot of auxiliary horse and foot. 3 From there Cicero goes on to say that Crassus would not be able to fund such a big army from his own, and, therefore, he could not claim to be rich according to his own scale. 4 However, Cicero arrives at this conclusion in the paradoxa, a text which is openly described as playful. 5 Nevertheless it is not reasonable to guess that Crassus

1 Cic., Off. 1.25: … ut nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps uellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non posset. The emphasis on fructus (see also Cic., Parad. 45 in n. 3) makes sufficiently clear that Crassus meant the army to be funded from the rewards of property, not from the selling of it; cf. Whitehead 1986: 71-3. 2 Cic., Parad. 45 (cf. n. 3); Plin., Nat. 33.134; Plu., Crass. 2.9; Dio 40.27.3. 3 Cic., Parad. 45: Multi ex te audierunt, cum diceres neminem esse diuitem, nisi qui exercitum alere posset suis fructibus, quod populus Romanus tantis uectigalibus iam pridem uix potest. Ergo hoc proposito numquam eris diues ante, quam tibi ex tuis possessionibus tantum reficietur, ut eo tueri sex legions et magna equitum ac peditum auxilia possis. 4 Cic., Parad. 45 (following the text above n. 3): Iam fateris igitur non esse te diuitem, cui tantum desit, ut expleas id, quod exoptas. 5 Cic., Parad. Prooem. 3: ludens. Cf. Whitehead 1986: 74. In his commentary to this passage, Ronnick 1991: 105 feels obliged to emphasize that Cicero did not qualify his text

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 188 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 189

made this famous remark as a joke in order to illustrate that he was in fact a poor man. 6 As is well-known, his wealth was considerable, 7 and in modern scholarship he was often named the richest man of Rome; in reality, this was most likely Pompey. 8 Nonetheless, two points are interesting in Crassus’ statement. First, the connection of wealth and funding of an army puts some emphasis on a state of disintegration, when the republic is no longer able to raise and feed an army from its own funds or when conflicts escalate into civil war. Secondly, and more importantly in the present context: the background of Crassus’ dictum is the fact that high income was an asset which helped to pave the way for a career at the top. This is not really surprising for us, of course, and the Roman Republic is not the only political system which, as a matter of course, does not allow for political leadership without a considerable fortune. Yet in Rome, the ideology connecting virtue and frugality was especially strong. Republican exempla, told and retold with a strong recommendation to imitate the ancestors, were filled with stories about heroes who lived in humble surroundings but who were always available for service to the fatherland. Cincinnatus is the prime example, M’. Curius Dentatus is another one, but even the elder Cato still constructed an image of himself as a farmer willing to work with his own hands. 9 Later on, when no senator could claim that he was only a small landowner doing the plowing all by himself, the opinion prevailed that the decadence of the republic was directly connected to the importance of wealth for political careers and public reputation instead of dignitas earned by achievement for the res publi ca. 10 So it is to be assumed that Crassus’ statement was scandalous not only for the first point, emphasizing the failure of the res publica to fulfill its obligations and impede civil war, but also for the second point, accepting the importance of wealth for a political career without even a spark of critical distance.

as a joke, but rather wanted to claim that he was only an amateur in stoic philosophy and not bound to the usual stoic attitude of seriousness. This interpretation seems to me a little bit strained. Moreover, the contrast between the playful attitude of the author and some distance to stoic strictness and lack of humor does not really exist. By disassociating himself from stoic style, Cicero signalizes that his discussion of stoic paradoxa will not be as severe as in a text written by a stoic – in other words: the text is playful. 6 yet, in de officiis (n. 1) as in the paradoxa (n. 3), Cicero explicitly declares that Crassus mentioned the feeding of an army (exercitum alere) as a measurement for real wealth, but it seems to be reasonable to assume that Crassus meant only the raising of an army and the maintenance for a shorter period up to the point when the army started to live off of plunder. 7 Plu., Crass. 11.2: 7100 talents (= 174 Mill. sesterces) before he left for Syria in 55; Plin., Nat. 33.134: 200 Mill. sesterces, but no date. Cf. Shatzman 1975: 376-7; Ferrill 1978: 172-3. Cicero’s remarks on Crassus’ fortune are collected by Weggen 2011: 133-5. 8 Cf. Badian ²1968: 81-2; Ferrill 1978: 172-3; Rosenstein 2011: 133. 9 Cf. already Jehne 2011: 211-5. See Beck 2005a: 188-203 on the life and career of Dentatus. 10 Cf. Sall., Cat. 10.2-11.3; Jug. 41.1-10.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 189 18/04/16 14:37 190 martin jehne

Here, we are in the middle of the economics of status. Some rough definition of my pivotal terms is essential at this point. By “economics”, consciously distinguished from economy, I mean the art of deploying scarce resources in an effective way to pursue certain objectives. In the total of resources to be managed, economic assets are only one component among others. Status is a complex concept in sociology which I ruthlessly reduce to the points which are important for my research. 11 As is well known, Roman society was character- ized by the formal status groups of senators and knights, with the remainder of the citizenry featuring no legal classification. Nevertheless, being a citizen in a world which was ruled by Rome was likely considered an elevated status in comparison to the many peregrine peoples. Although Roman senators were perhaps not yet defined as an ordo by law, 12 they were nevertheless a clear-cut group: there could be no doubt who was a member of the senate and who was not. 13 Not only in the vast citizen body of the plebs, but also within the upper classes, there existed additional criteria to create social hierarchies and so members were not equal at all. In their struggle for improvement or against deterioration of personal status competitors had to deal cautiously with their resources which are always scarce. Economic capital was to be used in the best way possible, however, other forms of capital were also important. 14 The legal status of a senator was connected to high social status since, at the top level, the hierarchy of republican status was steep and clear. My paper is focused on the social status of the senatorial class, which is a relative category and depends on assessment in relation to other categories. Status differences according to rank, authority, power and prestige played a major role for senators not only among themselves, but also in their relations to knights and plebeians. Status dissonances, defined as different hierarchies of status in different zones and situations of contact which prevent clear status assessments, were often impossible to avoid and increased social stress. In republican Rome, the standard tension of this type was conceptualized as a conflict of wealth and dignitas. 15

11 The classical definition is Weber 51980: 179: “Ständische Lage soll heißen eine typisch wirksam in Anspruch genommene positive oder negative Privilegierung in der sozialen Schätzung” (“ständische Lage” is translated into English as “status”). For an elucidating analysis of the status concept, emphasizing the qualities of status as ascription and performance which helps to conciliate status with social change, cf. Morley forthcoming. See also Verboven 2007: 861-9 for an equally splendid presentation of social status in Rome and the transformation into symbolic/social capital. 12 For the Augustan creation of the ordo senatorius, cf. for instance, Nicolet 1976a: 32-38; id. 1984: 90-96. 13 Sons of senators were, in certain contexts, already treated like actual senators (cf. the lex (Acilia?) repetundarum of 123/2 B.C., Crawford 1996: I, no. 1 line 2), nevertheless, the legal status of senators was evident to everybody. 14 That status difference is not identical with economic difference was emphasized by Weber 51980: 180. Cf. also Morley forthcoming. 15 Cf. above n. 10.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 190 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 191

In contrast to legal status, social status is not something which you simply have and keep like big feet or blue eyes. Status has to be acknowledged by others again and again, 16 and for that, it has to be demonstrated, proven, performed, confirmed, and so on. 17 If a senator was ambitious and wanted to advance his career in order to become a leading princeps in re publica he had to cope with the ever increasing competition and had to seek opportunities of status enhancement. Since economic assets are only one factor in the game the handling of economic capital in status struggles is often uneconomic: no homo oeconomicus in the idealized form of former economic theory who exclusively focused on material profit would have succeeded in Roman status struggles. To put it bluntly: the economics of status is not focused on economic gain, but on gain in status. Even if economic fortune and income was the foundation of status in Rome, there was always a symbolic or cultural surplus which had to be earned in arenas other than business. Money was helpful but not enough to ensure political success. Therefore, economics of status do not simply involve acquiring money and converting it into political advancement and influence, but also include the management of many assets like family fame, personal talent and charm, knowledge and skills, personal relations and connections, efficient communication according to the rules, and so on. Nevertheless, since money seems to be a somewhat neglected topic in recent analysis of republican politics, I will focus here on the relevance of economic wealth and income for a career in politics culminating in the rise to the level of a princeps in re publica. For that, I will discuss the following questions: Where and when did an ambitious upper class Roman use his wealth and money with the aim to enhance his status? Where did he get the money and how did he plan to pay up if he accumulated significant debts? And did he get his money’s worth, or more precisely: how sure could he be that he got an adequate return in the form of political status for his economic investments? Then, I will try to calculate the senatorial balance sheet and end with a short epilogue.

1. Spending Money for Status Enhancement

When a member of the Roman upper-class had succeeded in obtaining senatorial status, he could rely on the permanence of this status because censorial evictions from the senate were rare and usually for a cause which could be avoided. 18 However, to play a significant role in the group of senators, which

16 Cf. Verboven 2007: 863: “Like beauty, status lies in the eyes of the beholder and is socially and politically effective only when it is recognized and acknowledged”. 17 Cf. Morley forthcoming; Jehne forthcoming. 18 Usually, the number of senators ejected by censors was not great, cf. the table of recorded numbers with percentages of the total in Astin 1988: 28. For the nota censoria and its official reasons, cf. Astin 19-26; Baltrusch 1989: 9-22.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 191 18/04/16 14:37 192 martin jehne

had been expanded by the reforms of Sulla to a number of eventually nearly 600, 19 he had to advance his career and try to get elected into higher office. In fact, higher rank was the most important consequence of winning elections and holding office. Even during his term in office a consul often got little opportunity to make himself a name, and this applies even more so for the lower positions. Yet, spending a year with boring routine business was not a loss of time because afterwards, when his term expired, a consul became a consular for the rest of his life. Since the ranking of office had then been transferred into the senate as a speaking order, 20 a former consul would in effect become one of the leading men with many senators behind him. We can safely assume that this regular manifestation of status meant a lot to the successful politician, perhaps even producing a feeling that all the investments of time, energy, and money had been profitable in the end. My survey of the opportunities to invest money in status enhancement will be short because the important activities in pursuit of personal advancement are analyzed with great care in this volume. 21 The most prominent of these activities is the election campaign; when candidates tried to improve their prospects by funding games and public meals for the plebs and by providing handouts for voters while trying to avoid an accusation for ambitus. Not every candidate did the same things, but for the late Republic our sources give us the impression that spending generously from their own wealth to stage impressive games was the usual practice for aediles and praetors to whom those tasks were assigned. Furthermore, delaying funeral games in honor of deceased relatives for years only to hold them during an election campaign was widespread enough to be forbidden by the lex Tullia de ambitu in 63. 22 Actually, the desperate passage of one law after the other to cope with ambitus, especially incriminating handouts and other forms of squandering money to impress voters, 23 make sufficiently clear that it was the norm for candidates to invest money to improve their prospects. In the ancient Mediterranean world, we often find another activity involving private money with the goal of status enhancement: the funding of public buildings like theatres, aqueducts, temples, roads, and so on. Now these activities were not as prominent as we would expect from looking at the example of Greek or Italian cities. Paul Veyne assumed that this deviance from the pattern

19 This common opinion was criticized by Santangelo 2006: 7-22 who reasonably argued for only about 450 senators after Sulla’s appointments. Yet, Sulla increased the number of quaestors to 20 and installed automatic promotion for ex-quaestors into the senate, so there is good reason to suggest that the number would approach 600 over the years, cf. Jehne forthcoming: n. 7. 20 This seems to have happened in the later 3rd century BC, cf. Beck 2005a: 63-70; Bergk 2011: 61-74; Jehne 2011, 222-3. 21 Cf. Beck for ambitus, Deniaux for aedileships. 22 Cic., Sest. 133; Vat. 37; Schol. Bob. 140 St. Cf. Nadig 1997: 53 with nn. 168-9. 23 Cf. for the laws Nadig 1997: 17-71; Ferrary 2002.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 192 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 193

was a consequence of the Roman priority for political advancement, not for social esteem, and that building was not as attractive as generous spending for games or handouts to voters. 24 But these differentiations of social and political status, Roman and Italian mentality, great and small effects of generosity according to the means chosen, cannot be proven and are not plausible. 25 Catherine Virlouvet who analyzed euergetism in Rome in the Republican era proposed a hypothesis which seems to be far more convincing. 26 To put it in a nutshell: Roman real estate was too expensive. If you wanted to make yourself a name by funding an impressive building, you had to acquire some space in the fairly small city center where politics happened, because nobody cared very much for constructions on the outskirts of Rome. 27 Not surprisingly, the land was incredibly expensive in the city center. By chance, we have some figures to give us an idea of just how expensive it might have been. Pliny tells us that Caesar spent 25 Million denarii for the site of his new forum, 28 and evidently, the costs for the actual buildings must be added to this sum. The Caesarian example shows us how euergetic building functioned in Rome: it was only possible for successful generals and triumphators to amass enough wealth to build monumental structures, no private citizen seeking status enhancement was able to compete with the sums a victorious general could invest from the spoils of war and so it was futile to even try. 29 Notably, this demonstrates a special effect of the economics of empires: since there was so much more to gain from the spoils of war compared to market exchange, the drive to wage war was hard to stop, 30 and it was only the happy few who were able to obtain a large portion of the plunder who were in a position to compete in a contest for euergetic building in the city of Rome. So Rome is an exception from the general Mediterranean pattern even in the respect that wealthy citizens usually did not contribute to public construction in Rome from their own money. 31 This does not mean that senators were not able

24 Veyne 1976: 412; cf. 409. 411. 25 Cf. also the criticism of Holleran 2003: 49. 26 Virlouvet 1997: 232; 236; 242. 27 Sometimes temples were built outside the city gates, but usually at the edge of important roads, cf. Pietilä-Castrén 1987: 157-8. 28 Plin., Nat. 36.102; Suet., Iul. 26.2; cf. Cic., Att. 4.16.8 who mentions only 15 Mil- lion denarii which may be only a preliminary result. 29 Cf. Virlouvet 1997: 236. 30 For an application of the coercion-extraction-cycle on the process of Roman Empire building, cf. Eich and Eich 2005. 31 In a rather cursory search I did not find a clear-cut example for a public building in the city of Rome sponsored by a private citizen which is not connected to a successful military campaign and the corresponding plunder or was at least started as censor or aedile, the magistrates traditionally responsible for public building activities. Even the famous case of L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50 B.C.) is not easy to assess. Paullus felt obliged to reconstruct the basilica Aemilia on the forum, initially built and restored by

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 193 18/04/16 14:37 194 martin jehne

to profit from these public activities which were held in high esteem by the city population, but these profits in image and status were closely connected to the prerogatives of high office. The victorious commander was usually permitted to use a considerable part of booty which technically belonged to the treasury 32 for a building of his own choice which was subsequently connected with his name forever. Moreover, Roman censors and consuls organized public projects which were named after the instigator, but funded from the aerarium. 33 We have only to think of the uia Appia which was certainly built without Appius Claudius contributing a single didrachma from his private fortune. 34 Therefore, evidently some Romans were able to increase their personal glory and enhance status by spending public riches. As citizens of modern democracies, we may note this with some relief: Roman politicians were not so different after all. Another field of sumptuous competition was banquets and private houses which could be costly for location, size, and decoration. Here, I cannot go into detail, but must constrain myself to some general remarks. 35 An ambitious senator would require a house in the expensive quarters near the forum to give people a chance to regularly attend the salutatio in the morning 36 and the differences in style and décor were no doubt acutely perceived by visitors. 37 The splendor of houses was not legally restricted, 38 but the conuiuia held within were. From the 2nd century onwards, private banquets were strictly regulated by leges sump tuariae 39 as was electioneering by leges de ambitu. The investment of private money in status enhancement was more or less forbidden where it counted

his ancestors (for the complicated and still unclear building history, cf., for instance, Steinby ²1993: 167-8). Yet, Aemilius Paullus started his reconstruction probably as an aedile in 56 or 55 (cf. Broughton 1986: 9; in 54, the roof was nearly finished, cf. Cic., Att. 4.16.8). There is no doubt that he contributed greatly from his own wealth to the project which lead to grave financial difficulties later on (cf. Shatzman 1975: 289; see below, nn. 96-7), but perhaps he started with some public money initially. 32 Cf. for this view, Churchill 1999; see also Rosenstein 2011: 133-6. That all the attempts to detect the rules for the awarding of triumphs in Republican Rome in the often contradictory evidence did not produce a convincing system, is perhaps inherent in the matter itself and can be better understood with the differentiation of norms into rules and principles developed by Lundgreen 2011: 29-50; cf. for triumphs ibid. 178-253. 33 For some censorial building activities, cf. Astin 1990: 22-4. 34 This was the first censorial road and perhaps the first occasion when a censor organized an extensive building project using state money. Cf. Humm 1996: 731-4. 35 For senatorial housing see Beck 2009 (quoting lots of previous research). 36 Cf. Goldbeck 2010: 96-7. 37 For the difficult task of impressing the people with a splendid house while avoiding the bad reputation for leading a life of luxury, cf. Cic., Off. 1.138-9. 38 That houses as such did not fall under the scrutiny of luxury laws in Rome is surprising. Zanda 2011: 18 assumes that the reason lies in the mixture of private and public functions of the houses of the Roman elite. 39 Cf. Coudry 2004; ead. 2012; Zanda 2011: 49-71.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 194 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 195

most. 40 The senatorial class as a whole discouraged competition employing wealth, but to no avail: the individual members engaged in such competitive practices nonetheless.

2. The Political Economy of a Roman Senator

As Jean Andreau convincingly emphasized in a recent paper, efforts to amass revenue from landed property, which Roman writers who report on agriculture describe in detail, were only the background of the landowner’s political activities, which occupied the majority of his time. 41 Moreover, the nobles’ striving for profit was restrained by their desire to behave in a way appropriate to their rank. 42 Therefore, the economy of a Roman senator was always political, or to describe it more precisely: his economic considerations and actions were intimately connected if not subordinated to his status in the res publica. The willingness to invest money into a career was an obvious consequence of this fact. However, as we know, spending money for the enhancement of personal status and for winning votes was becoming increasingly prohibited by law during the late Republic. Nevertheless, Roman senators invested huge sums, often more than they could afford, from their own patrimony and income. Evidently, the balance of spending and return was not easy to calculate for a late Republican politician, and many must have been at least temporarily in an awkward state of financial affairs. 43 Of course, there were discrepancies in individuals’ abilities to invest in political careers. Some senators were richer than others, and a wealthy man could give more from his own coffers than a man of modest means. But since it became a more or less normal senatorial habit to incur unrestrained debts, differences in private wealth did not automatically produce differences in generosity. How much a senator was willing to give away during electioneering was more a question of his readiness to borrow money than of the level of his private funds. As we know, Julius Caesar’s patrimony was rather small, but he acquired huge loans, at his own risk, which he invested in splendid games, in generous donations during his election campaigns and in an expensive lifestyle. 44 After spending lavishly while he competed for the high pontificate in 63 B.C., he said to his mother on the morning of the elections: “I will come back as pontifex maximus or not at all”. 45 Realistically, he anticipated that in

40 Cf. already Jehne forthcoming. 41 Cf. Andreau 2004: 79-80. 42 Cf. Andreau 2004: 76; 79. 43 For the following reflections, cf. Jehne forthcoming. 44 For Caesar’s private fortune, cf. Shatzman 1972a; Ferrill 1977. Cf. also Rollinger 2009: 49-62. 45 Suet., Iul. 13: … domi se nisi pontificem non reuersurum …; cf. Plu., Caes. 7.3; Mor. 206 A. For this episode as an example for Roman career investment, cf. Jehne forthcoming.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 195 18/04/16 14:37 196 martin jehne

case of defeat, his creditors would push him into bankruptcy while trying to recover at least part of the outstanding debts. 46 Fortunately for Caesar’s mother, if not for the republic, the son was successful, and by that he restored some confidence in his ability to obtain the money to pay his debts. 47 Nevertheless, when he wanted to leave Rome for his praetorian province in Spain at the beginning of 61 B.C., only Crassus’ guaranty assured his creditors enough for them to allow him set forth to Spain. 48 That Caesar spent huge sums for his campaigns was not at all exceptional, but what was exceptional was the magnitude of the debt he was willing to incur. Compared to his fellow peers, the deviance of Caesar was not so much one of action but one of scale. He seems to have crossed a line which others probably respected. The fact that he had to fear creditors who were willing to drive him into bankruptcy seems to prove that it had not been enough for him to rely only on the economic assets of his family and friends. 49 These people would not really have let him fall into poverty, especially after such a stunning success. Caesar seems to have also borrowed from the professional faeneratores 50 who provided money in short-term loans at high interest 51 and would not hesitate to damage Caesar’s reputation in order to collect their due. Admittedly, there can be little doubt that Caesar was an exceptionally bold character, 52 as he demonstrated during the campaign for the high pontificate as already mentioned; although he obviously knew that he was in danger of bankruptcy, Caesar nevertheless refused to accept the offer of his competitor

46 In Plu., Caes. 7.3 (cf. Mor. 206 A), the alternative is explicitly laid open. 47 For the risky campaign in 63 and its background, cf. Jehne 2009b: 496-8. 48 Plu., Caes. 11.1-2; Crass. 7.6; Suet., Iul. 18.1; cf. App., B.C. 2.8 (26-7). Rollinger 2009: 52 assumes that Caesar’s creditors wanted to confiscate his allowance from the aerarium for his governorship. He seems to interpret τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπιλαμβανομένων (in Plu. Crass.) in this way. 49 For the role of friends and family in providing gifts and loans, cf. Verboven 2002: 71-182; Wiedemann 2003: 16-20; Ioannatou 2006: 229-307. 50 Cf. Verboven 2002: 153 who does not think that the resort to faeneratores proves that the support of family, friends and allies was insufficient; instead, he considers the wish to remain independent of great and wealthy political figures as the motivation to prefer professional loan sharks. See also Rollinger 2009: 187. Yet, financial help from relatives and existing friends should not have been such a strong deviation in an unwanted direction, so the argument seems to be relevant only for accepting money from political magnates and brokers when there was no relation beforehand. In Caesar’s case, we can be fairly sure that it was not the fear of obligation alone that lead him to go to the faeneratores for money: if his credit with his kin had not been already exhausted, they certainly would have provided the necessary sureties to calm down the creditors after his success at the polls and there would have been no need to rely on Crassus. 51 For faeneratores, cf. Andreau 2001: 39-42; Ioannatou 2004: 90-1; Ead. 2006: 309-14. 52 Cf. Jehne 2009a for Caesar’s decisions which often seemed unusual, declining the obvious option for a more far-fetched one.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 196 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 197

Lutatius Catulus to give him a huge sum of cash in return for the withdrawal of his candidacy. 53 Yet, other members of the senatorial class were equally willing to contract large debts, and the consequences for the res publica could be awkward, if not dangerous. The famous Catilinarian conspiracy, even if it was exaggerated by the consul Cicero to scale up his achievement, was no doubt deeply rooted in a desperate situation of some ambitious senators heavily indebted and threatened by loss of status. 54 In this context, the example of Milo is especially striking. The ambitious new man T. Annius Milo who had fought with his armed bands of gladiators against Cicero’s most hated enemy Clodius and his supporters in the 50s and had subsequently been driven into exile in 52, is said to have piled up debts amounting to 17.5 Million denarii – a huge sum according to Pliny the Elder. 55 We do not know if Milo was once, like Caesar, at a point of no return when bankruptcy was imminent and only victory could save him from ruin. However, we know that, in the lead-up to the consular elections in which Milo wanted to stand, he was attacked by Clodius in the senate. Clodius argued that someone that heavily indebted could not be trusted because he would trade the res pub lica in return for war spoils. 56 That this was part of the political hostilities is not in doubt; but the argument would not have worked if there did not exist a basic understanding within the senate that bankruptcies of officials in high positions were potentially dangerous for the res publica, since those people might be forced to make money on the job. 57 As usual, we have no statistical data, but it seems to be safe to say that contracting large debts was not a rare event for politicians. 58 Not always but likely very often, the regular income of an ambitious Roman politician was not sufficient to fund a career. Where then did he get the additional money? There were

53 Plu., Caes. 7.2. 54 For the nature of the economic crisis of 63 B.C., cf. especially the paper of Giovannini 1995: 24-32; see also Rosillo-López 2010a: 216-23. 55 Plin., Nat. 36.104. According to the scholiast of Bobbio (in his preface to the commentary to Cicero’s speech De aere alieno Milonis), Milo declared, while running for the consulship, the level of his debts as 1.5 Million denarii, but Clodius accused him of lying (Schol. Bob. p. 169 St.). 56 Schol. Bob. p. 169 St.: Cum igitur obnixe contenderit Clodius non oportere qui magno aere alieno defaeneratus praedae uideretur habiturus esse rem p., … For context, cf. Kumaniecki 1977: 383-4. 57 Cf. Jehne 1995: 71-2 with nn. 113-4. In Schol. Bob. p. 169 St. we find the interesting fact that Milo made the declaration on his level of debt according to an old custom (secundum ueterem consuetudinem). If we accept this, we have an even clearer indication that some precaution against heavily indebted magistrates existed in the Roman res publica. 58 This is the conventional assessment of the career structure in the late Republic. Cf., for instance, Giovannini 1995: 31; Ioannatou 2006: 176-206; Rollinger 2009: 101-16. For a list of senators known for their large debts, cf. Ioannatou 2006: 23 n. 22.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 197 18/04/16 14:37 198 martin jehne

moneylenders who were willing to make a profit from interest but, as we have seen in the case of Caesar, they seem to have functioned more as a last resort for the extremely desperate or for gamblers than as the usual source for funding an electoral campaign. 59 Probably most important was the “economy of friends” as Koenraad Verboven termed it. 60 A career was a family affair, and family must be understood in the widest possible way since freedmen and clients were also involved in getting the patron or the patron’s son to the top of the political ladder. Moreover, amicitia was the glue of a society relying on personal relations as the dominant system for the acquisition of power and the distribution of goods and services. Amici were active supporters of an ambitious senator and since there was no clear-cut gap between political and economic interests, as it exists in contemporary societies at least as a norm, the support of an amicus did not stop where his own wealth was concerned. Transfers motivated by personal relations could be gifts, but they were often loans with no or little interest. 61 Additionally, even credit from a professional loan shark had to be procured and secured by some sort of guarantee. No doubt, a senator’s life and career proved to be a heavy burden for the budgets of his relatives and friends. From the early 2nd century onwards our sources give us clear indications of fierce competition for office and the increasing costs of political careers 62. Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that senators must have tried to increase their fortunes by the acquisition of additional farmlands. From this point of view, a decline of the economy of smallholders was perfectly comprehensible as a result of the land hunger of the wealthy. Even the stubborn resistance against the agrarian bill of Ti. Gracchus made sense to the landed gentry who felt dependent on the occupied public land for the preservation of their inherited status in an atmosphere of rising costs and threatening competition. Yet this overall scenario was called into question in light of new research. Even if the use of archaeological surveys of traces of settlements as a tool for calculating demographic growth or decline has lost credibility for convincing methodological reasons, 63 the data collected in Central Italy seems to suggest that in this region there was in fact a general trend of displacement of smallholders by

59 Possibly, faeneratores could be important as providers of cash which was necessary for the distributions to voters in electoral contests. The fortunes of Roman senators were notoriously dominated by real estate while cash was in short supply. In this situation, when a candidate’s financial state was satisfactory and he only borrowed from faenera tores to avoid selling property for less than fair value, he was not in greater danger to be pushed into bankruptcy. Evidently, this was not the case for Caesar in 63 B.C. 60 Verboven 2002; see also the article of Wiedemann 2003 and Ioannatou 2006: 229-307. 61 Cf. Ioannatou 2004: 90; ead. 2006: 249-307. 62 For competition in consular elections, cf. the study of Evans 1991. 63 Cf. de Ligt 2012: 179-82.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 198 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 199

larger estates in the farming business. 64 For our topic of concern, the financing of senatorial careers, Nate Rosenstein drew the crucial conclusions and destroyed a cornerstone of the popular explanation by demonstrating convincingly that the extension of landed estates was not even profitable if the new land was not situated in the hinterland of Rome. 65 Perhaps we would like to ignore the problem of the Gracchan crisis and look at another part of the standard explanation for the financing of expensive political careers, that is to say the theory of delayed reimbursement which runs as follows. A Roman politician would be willing to contract huge debts on his way on the cursus honorum and as a praetor and as a consul he would get his opportunities to govern provinces, perhaps even to wage war, giving him the prospect for making enough money to pay his debts and even to win a new fortune of his own if his patrimony had been completely spent during his rise to the top. 66 Yet, Wolfgang Blösel has demonstrated that this will not do as a general explanation because too many former praetors and consuls declined a province after their term of office in the post-Sullan Republic. 67 If they had been dependent on making money in the provinces former consuls and praetors would never have declined a provincial command. So we return once again to the “economy of friends”. The economic side of personal relations did not only help make a career possible but also aided in the settlement of debts and in the rebuilding of the family fortune. A successful man could, as a consular, expect gifts and, most importantly, inheritances in return for his commendations or other sorts of favorable actions. 68 As Elizabeth Deniaux demonstrated in her well-known book on clientelae, Cicero’s network was like a Roman world wide web, 69 and there is no reason to doubt that other consulars were comparably well-connected.

64 Cf., for instance, Roselaar 2010: 219-20. 65 Rosenstein 2008: 15-24. 66 For this manner of interpreting the career economics of senators, cf. for instance Jehne 42008: 32-4. In Caesar’s case, this is not wrong because he seems to have brought enough money home from his Spanish campaigns to balance his personal funds again (Suet., Iul. 54.1; Plu., Caes. 12.1-4; cf. Rosenstein 2011: 151). The notorious example for this sort of behavior as a governor is Verres who – according to Cic., Verr. I 40 – collected three fortunes in his three years in Sicily: the first one for him personally, the second one for his noble supporters in a foreseeable lawsuit for illegal exploitation of his province, and the third one for the jury members to be sure to get acquitted. Making money in the province did happen, no doubt, but as a general explanation for coping with debts accumulated during a senatorial career, it is no longer valid. For a good survey on the chances for governors to enrich themselves, cf. Schulz 2012. 67 Blösel 2011; id. forthcoming: chapter V. See also Blösel’s paper in this volume. 68 For legacies as an important part of a senator’s budget, cf. Shatzman 1975: 51-2; Verboven 2002: 183-223; Rollinger 2009: 69-71. 69 Deniaux 1993. Cicero’s network was now formalized by Rollinger 2009: 191- 216; 225-238 (with tables about Cicero’s partners in financial transactions), using the methods of network plotting with the help of a special computer program. As Rollinger

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 199 18/04/16 14:37 200 martin jehne

One last point must, at least, be mentioned: this system of funding careers as I have briefly outlined it here was clearly a system for winners and not for losers. The opportunities to generate obligations by networking which would be reciprocated by large shares in legacies, for instance, were not very frequent for competitors who had suffered defeat at the polls. It is a pity that we know almost nothing about losers 70 and are more or less reduced to guesswork. That many defeated candidates were often enough willing to run for election again is perhaps a testament to the fact that losing once or even twice did not mean that there was no real chance in the future. Possibly, the first campaign was so expensive that some losers were nearly forced to run for election again because they could only avoid bankruptcy by becoming well-connected consulars. Admittedly, this is speculation, but Catiline’s desperate attempt to compensate his defeat may be a case in point. Economically, he was perhaps already ruined after his first defeat, so he stood for election again. When he did not succeed in the next attempt, his financial situation was desperate and without the consulate there was no chance for him to settle his huge debts. 71 Even if we must allow for different kinds of exceptions, the following pattern seems to emerge. For enhancement or at least preservation of family status, a young Roman had to climb the career ladder. Often, he had to accumulate debts on his way, and the gradual restoration of the family fortune depended on his success. Perhaps this is the reason for the strange fact that, in the last decades of the Republic, the number of candidates who stood for the consulship until election day was rather small. 72 Admittedly, our evidence is never so brilliant that we do not have to reckon with lacunae, but nevertheless, in the best known period of Roman history when the evidence is dominated by a politically active and interested source like Cicero, the fairly small number of known candidates should not be too far away from reality. Moreover, Cicero’s own candidature is a perfect case which demonstrates what might have often happened

has to admit (cf. 214; 215) the results do not add much to the facts already known: Cicero was well connected, not only to fellow senators, Caesar, Pompey, and Atticus were also important, lack of evidence makes assessments of contact frequency hazard- ous, and in his network, Cicero himself is the lonely star, of course, which means he is the only man who is related to everybody else. Nevertheless, Rollinger believes that network analysis could be useful when applied to a larger corpus of data which means that the database should contained not only with the financially relevant acts of communication which is what Rollinger did, but with all the Ciceronian relations of exchange documented in his letters. 70 The losers in election campaigns are compiled by Broughton 1991, cf. for additions Konrad 1996 and Farney 2004. For losers during the Republic, cf. now Pina Polo 2012 (with a chronological table on losers [65-8] and an alphabetical one [69-72]); for the imperial period, cf. Heil 2005; Klingenberg 2011. 71 For the problem of debt in the Catilinarian conflict, cf. Giovannini 1995: 29-32. 72 For a chronological list on the consular elections in the post-Sullan Republic with all the competitors known, cf. Neuendorff 1913; see also Evans 1991: 134-6.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 200 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 201

during political campaigns. When Cicero started to prepare his campaign, the gossip suggested that 12 candidates would run, Cicero included. 73 Some of them Cicero did not consider real competition. 74 However serious their ambitions may have been, most of them backed out during canvassing, and in the end there were only three of the candidates left. 75 The avoidance of certain defeat is always comprehensible in a status system where you could easily lose face, however, you could also likely spare a lot of money if you halted electioneering at the point where feasting the tribules and providing handouts for voters could no longer be delayed. The economic risks of a failed career were possibly a prime reason for competitors not to push their luck too far.

3. The Impact of Money on Status: Predictability and Results

That politically ambitious Romans invested heavily in their careers during the late Republic is not doubted. I have already tried to assess, in a general way, the effects of these expenses on private fortunes and the possible methods of reimbursement after a period of severe debt. Now another set of consequences must be examined, namely the effects of the invested money on the career. It is perhaps a little surprising that this needs special treatment, for the primary objective behind the investment of private money was a successful career, as this was the method by which the individual and his family could gain status. Nevertheless, we should not be too quick to take the desired effects for granted. The electoral setting in the late Republic was not favorable to the candidates. In spite of all their efforts, electoral results were mostly unpredictable. 76 One of

73 Cic., Att. 1.1.1-2 provides the following ten names for the middle of 65 B.C.: Cicero, P. Galba, C. Antonius, Q. Cornificius, Caesonius, Aquillius, Catilina, Aufidius, Palicanus and Thermus. In 64, four of them had already backed out (Caesonius, Aquillius, Aufidius, and Palicanus), but two others joined the competition, Cassius Longinus and Licinius Sacerdos (cf. Asc. p. 82 C. who mentions only seven candidates in the opening to his commentary on Cicero’s In toga candida: Cicero, Galba, Catilina, Antonius, Cornificius, and the two new ones Cassius Longinus and Sacerdos; in Q. Cic., comm. pet. 7-8, there are only five left: Cicero, Antonius, Catilina, Galba, Cassius Longinus). Thermus was elected for 64, so he was not a possible candidate for 63. Cf. Neuendorff 1913: 27-34; Gruen 1974: 136-40. 74 Cf. Cic., Att. 1.1.2: Cicero was afraid of Thermus and hoped for his success in the previous elections (which actually happened, see above n. 73), but he did not fear the others listed in his letter, cf. ibid.: cetera spero prolixa esse his dumtaxat urbanis compe titoribus. 75 Cicero, Catiline, and C. Antonius. That all the others dropped out before election day is not explicitly recorded. Yet, the fact that Asconius (p. 94 C.) mentions only Anto- nius and Catilina in the voting for the consulships alongside Cicero is a hint that there were only three left. Cf. Taylor 1966: 155 n. 37. 76 For my picture of Roman elections, which is only shortly summarized in the text, cf. the more detailed arguments in Jehne 2000; id. 2009b; see also Pina Polo 2012: 80-1.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 201 18/04/16 14:37 202 martin jehne

the reasons for this was the fact that a lot of the people participating in the voting ritual simply did not care very much who won in the end. The results of the elections were of real importance only to the candidates, not, however, to the community or to most of the voters because the social background and the earlier performances of the candidates were usually highly similar. Political programs which could make a difference were only rarely put forward, office in general did not require any special talent or knowledge, and a one-year period quickly expired anyway. In consequence, many voters showed up on election day whose main interest was not who eventually succeeded in being elected but to enjoy a non-everyday event and to feel important, and therefore their decisions were at least in part fortuitous. In a structure dominated by the uniformity of candidates and little chance to impress larger crowds by promising future profits, the display of generosity was an obvious alternative. 77 Splendid entertainment events and distributions, even in the form of hand-outs to voters for their suffrage, became standard procedure in late republican campaigns and elections. These hand-outs were fought by leges de ambitu in a similar way as private luxury were by leges sumptuariae, and the results were analogue: the laws were not respected. Since money has the inherent quality that everybody can discern a larger amount from a lower one, 78 this seemed to be a way to surpass the competitors in the eyes of the public and to get into the comfortable situation of being sure to win. However, even this did not work very well. Sometimes the people did not stick to the highest bidder but continued to support someone else who did not offer as much as others. 79 Popularity was not necessarily synonymous with the largest handouts to voters. The Roman people were not completely for sale – or at least not for such a price. We have several remarks of Cicero on the lack of reliability and gratefulness of the Roman people. They are easily swayed in another direction and often abandon their former candidate in favor of another. 80 He gives a list of candidates who were defeated contrary to general expectations. 81 Altogether, the list of candidates, which includes members of leading families, who got beaten at the polls is impressive. 82 Now defeat was a setback, but not a grave disgrace, so losers could easily stand for a second time. Perhaps the next campaign was less expensive because people still remembered the efforts of the first one, but we do not know and cannot really guess. However, the decision of Catilina to

77 See also Jehne forthcoming. 78 As Arist., E.N. 5.5.15 (1133b22-3) already observed: money makes things meas- urable. 79 See below, n. 86. 80 Cf. Cic., Mur. 35-6; Planc. 10-11; 14-5; Mil. 5; Dom. 4. See Yakobson 1999: 92-3; 213-5 on this point. 81 Cic., Planc. 51-2. 82 Cf. Broughton 1991; Evans 1991; Pina Polo 2012.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 202 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 203

spend lavishly again in his second attempt, does not seem incomprehensible in this climate of incalculability that dominated Roman elections. Altogether, the impact of investing money in a career was not at all like a clear-cut business transfer where you could see what you would get beforehand and decide if it was worth the cost. This is not surprising. That this sort of investment is more like a risky speculation at the stock market where you can win or lose a lot, is evident. The conversion of economic capital into another sort of capital is always like that: you know what you lose, but you cannot precisely calculate what you might gain. But the situation of Roman senators seems to have been even more difficult.

4. The Senatorial Balance Sheet in the Late Republic

My rather rough sketch of economic activities of senators focused on status enhancement or preservation is based in part on generalizations from few examples and perhaps even speculation. Nevertheless, I will now try to draw the balance sheet for senators to give an impression of what could have been their range of options in the economics of status. For the male members of senatorial and also of ambitious equestrian families, holding office was indispensable for the promotion of status. On their way, they had to compete with others and competition grew fiercer with every step up the ladder of the cursus honorum. To improve their prospects candidates had to invest a lot of time and money. The funding of a political career was only possible through the social and economic help of friends and relatives, nevertheless, most of the competitors had to contract great debts on their way to the top. The refunding for the economic investments did not depend primarily on the exploitation of a province as a governor, even if this sometimes happened, but more on the long-term return for services which an influential senator could and did provide for many of his colleagues, businessmen, clients, provincials, and so on. Therefore, the economy of friends was pivotal for the funding of a career as well as for the reestablish- ment of the family fortune when the career had been successful. At face value, this seems to be a structure with a reasonable balance of investment and return for senators striving for status enhancement. In fact, it was not. From the point of view of the competitors, the late Republican system of advancement was seriously defective. They had to compete fiercely, invest a lot of economic capital and take on the risks associated with large amounts of debt and with all their efforts they could not even be sure of their ability to influence the decisions in their favor. They went to the forum and pressed the flesh – as did their competitors. They were escorted by a large retinue – as were their competitors. They produced splendid games – as did their competitors. They gave money to the voters – as did their competitors. 83 I do not want to

83 For Roman electioneering activities, cf. Yakobson 1999.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 203 18/04/16 14:37 204 martin jehne

suggest that there were no differences at all between candidates. Family names and histories, former records, communicative behavior, personal attire, the support of famous friends; all this could make a relevant difference but all too often it did not. Altogether, the impression of Roman canvassing, which usually did not produce electoral speeches 84 and programmatic proposals which would be put into effect when in office, is that of a desperate struggle of highly similar competitors for some small distinction. 85 As I already mentioned, spending money was the only way to allow for an easy comparison between candidates’ efforts, one surpassing the other as a matter of fact. But since the biggest handout did not guarantee success at the polls, 86 not even this rendered electoral results foreseeable. Why did the competitors not stop their investments if these efforts did not produce a relevantly better prospect of success? The answer is not hard to find. That Roman senators continued to spend is enough to prove that there was no reasonable alternative. 87 Although the candidates’ display of wealth in acts of generosity did not at all ensure victory in elections the refusal to give to the people did guarantee defeat. 88 Additionally, the situation got even worse as, inevitably, the trend in spending was inflationary because of a strong pull to outdo one’s predecessors and rivals. 89 Therefore, for Roman senators of the late Republic, the balance sheet of investing in a career and getting a reasonable return was not balanced at all. They spent more and more money but for a number of reasons voting assemblies still produced erratic results. 90 Erich Gruen once scrutinized the evidence

84 For the rare event of speeches which were in some way related to actual elections, see Steel 2011; Tatum 2013. 85 Cf. Jehne 2009b: 510-2. 86 Cf. Cic., Att. 4.17.4 (on the perspectives of Aemilius Scaurus in his campaign in 54): tamen, etsi uberior liberalitas huius, gratior esse uidebatur eorum, qui occuparant. 87 There is sometimes a tendency to assume that a strongly established habit of behavior like Roman hand-outs for voters proves this habit to have been reasonable in a rationally calculated way, cf. Yakobson 1999: 22-26. To me, this seems to be a mistake in principle, for humans do not necessarily change their traditional ways of behavior even if the prospect of adequate benefit becomes blurred. If there is no reasonable alternative at hand, if hope for deliverance from all these problems is still there, if individuals are in a competitive situation with others who do the same, then there is a good chance that they try to succeed by going on or even intensifying their usual activities. This sort of behavior can be termed as involution, cf. for this concept from anthropology and a preliminary application on senatorial habits at the very end of the republic, Winterling 2008: 236-8. 88 That the younger Cato failed in his campaign for the consulship of 51 was therefore a logical consequence not only of his successful initiative in the senate to forbid any payment to the people, but also of his ban on the usual activities of friends to support their candidate (Plu., Cat. Min. 49.1-6; cf. Dio 40.58.1-3). 89 Plin., Nat. 36.109-10; 113-20. 90 Cf. my analysis of Roman elections: Jehne 2009b.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 204 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 205

for the consular elections of the decade between 59 and 49 B.C. which has often been identified as a period when Roman politics was heavily influenced by the so-called first triumvirate. However, Gruen could not find evidence of a strong influence on elections by the triumvirs and concluded that they were not as powerful as sometimes assumed. 91 I perfectly agree with Gruen’s findings and conclusions but I would further add that the system of elections, dominated by voters who were not well acquainted with the candidates and likely did not care much about the actual result of the election, was not easily manipulated by anyone into a foreseeable outcome. The rare cases when one candidate was evidently outstanding, as Scipio Africanus had been, or competition was suspended at the level of the number of candidates or on the level of recommen- dations to the people were likely exceptional. 92 In the end, when Pompey and Crassus stood for their second consulship in 55, the triumvirs demonstrated what was necessary to secure a desired result: the rival L. Domitius Ahenobar- bus had to be physically prevented from attending the elections. 93 Caesar drew the necessary conclusion; in 50 B.C., when he needed some friends in office again, he still tried to push through a candidate of his own for the consulship who was unsuccessful. 94 However, Caesar bought the consul Aemilius Paullus and the tribune Scribonius Curio, the latter known as his foe, 95 the former at least not a friend. 96 Yet, both were so much indebted as a consequence of senatorial struggle for prominence that they could not resist the generous offers of the rich conqueror of Gaul. 97 In the consular and tribunician elections for 49,

91 Cf. Gruen 1974: 141-61. 92 This seems to have been the result of the Augustan procedure of destinatio, cf. Jehne 2013: 145-8. 93 Plu., Cat. Min. 41.1- 42.1; Pomp. 52.1-2; Crass. 15.6-7; Dio 39.31.1-2; App., B.C. 2.17 (64). For the violent intimidation of competitors and their supporters, Caesar sent soldiers on furlough to Rome, Dio 39.31.2; Plu. Pomp. 51.5; Crass. 14.7 (in comp. Nic. et Crass. 2.2, Plutarch mentions that Crassus hired the men for the strong-arm business himself). 94 The unsuccessful candidate was M. Calidius (Cic., Fam. 8.4.1), cf. Neuendorff 1913: 76; Broughton 1991: 10. 95 App., B. C. 2.26 (101); Dio 40.59.4. 96 In App., B. C. 2.26 (100-01), Paullus is mentioned as a foe of Caesar, and Caesar only succeeded to buy his neutrality. Cf. for his political affiliations before his consulship, Weigel 1979: 637-42. 97 Both: Plu., Caes. 29.3; Pomp. 58.2; Ant. 5.2; App., B. C. 2.26 (101); Suet., Iul. 29.1 (without a certain sum). Cf. Dio 40.60.2-3 (only Curio). According to Plu., Caes. 29.3; Pomp. 58.2, Caesar paid Curio’s debts which are recorded as adding up to 60 Mill. HS (cf. also Val. Max. 9.1.6; Vell. 2.48.4 has only 10 Mill.), and Aemilius Paullus received 1500 talents (36 Mill. HS). In May, Cicero had received the news that they both had changed sides, but he does not write anything about bribery (Cic., Att. 6.3.4). That we have no contemporary evidence for Caesar’s generous gifts gave rise to the assumption that the story of the bribes was only later gossip and Curio and Paullus were independent politicians who were helpful to Caesar of their own free wills (cf. Lacey 1961: 318-29;

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 205 18/04/16 14:37 206 martin jehne

Caesar relied on friendly candidates once again, but his supporters were only successful for the tribunate and not for the consulate. 98 Perhaps civil war would have been avoided if, at this moment, one of the consuls had prevented the strictly anti-Caesarian course in the senate at the beginning of 49. Nevertheless, Caesar seems to have experienced the fortuitous tendencies of electoral assemblies even in his years of dominance in Rome. As a result, he took a lot of trouble to make sure that elections were nearly always held under his personal command. 99

5. Epilogue

When M. Crassus as a governor of Syria started his campaign against the Par- thians he was motivated, according to the sources and to modern scholarship, by his desire to measure up to Pompey and Caesar 100 in military glory and to increase his private wealth. 101 If we look at his position in Rome in the middle of the 50s this is perfectly comprehensible. Pompey had won eternal fame through his military success in the East which was made permanently visible to the Romans by the splendid theatre and temple of Venus on the Field of Mars which were funded by the spoils of war. 102 Caesar had conquered the Gauls and was on his way to immortalizing his name in the very center of Rome by building

Gruen 1974: 473-4; 477-8). To my mind, accepting money and feeling independent is not mutually exclusive. Roman politicians could easily reconcile a certain degree of independent action and allegiance to a man like Caesar in some points. I still think it probable that the fact that Curio became such a coherent supporter of Caesar’s cause was facilitated by a lavish gift from Caesar. 98 Cassius and Antonius were duly elected as tribunes. From the candidates for the consulship, Ser. Sulpicius Galba could be expected to support Caesar (Hirt., B.G. 8.50.3; Suet., Galba 3.2). The idea that M. Calidius stood again in 50 B.C. (Neuendorff 1913: 78; Broughton 1991: 10) is convincingly refuted by Gruen 1974: 157 n. 152. Perhaps the successful Lentulus Crus was also a Caesarian candidate – at least this is what Cicero reported in October 50, but he did not put much trust into this piece of information (Att. 6,8,2). If Caesar really believed that Lentulus would be a reliable adherent, he was disillusioned immediately. Hayne 1996: 72-6 names this as one of the reasons why Lentulus is portrayed so negatively in Caesar’s Bellum Ciuile. 99 Cf. Jehne 2010: 198-203. 100 The notion that Caesar was a driving motive for Crassus is explicitly mentioned in Plu., Crass. 14.5; comp. Nic. et Crass. 4.1-3. 101 Cic., Fin. 3.75; Vell. 2.46.2; Sen., quaest. nat. 5.18.10; Flor. 1.46.2; 10; Plu., Crass. 14.5; App., B. C. 2.18 (65); Dio 40.12.1. Cf. Marshall 1976: 146-8; Ward 1977: 281-2; Keaveney 1982: 417; Rawson 1982: 541-2; Mattern-Parkes 2003: 387; 390; Lerouge 2007: 70-1. 102 For the building complex, cf. Gros 1999: 35-6. We have no information about the costs but there can be no doubt that a huge amount of money was necessary for this vast construction (the theatre was built for 40.000 spectators according to Plin., Nat. 36.115) and that it was financed from the spoils from the East.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 206 18/04/16 14:37 The senatorial economics of status in the late republic 207

a new forum. 103 That Crassus was not able to keep up with his rivals was not only a consequence of the fact that his record of military achievement was not comparable and had already faded from memory. 104 The new reality was that the Nabob Crassus had become a man of modest means in comparison to Pompey and Caesar. He was a Roman consular who was no longer able to compete at the highest level in the hierarchy of status. Crassus with his private fortune of more than 50 million denarii 105 could not afford what Pompey and Caesar could. 106 So for Crassus – and for other ambitious Romans – there were only two other avenues left to consider. He could win glory and considerable booty in war which he could then invest in a big Roman building project, or he could lean back and be content that for all his efforts spent in getting to, what was formerly, the top level in society he was now only second-rate. In the last years of the Republic, the gains of military success and the funding of building projects had become relevant again in the Roman struggles for status enhancement which had been centered on the capital for some time. Crassus experienced the consequences of these changes for himself and, as a result, failed in an ominous way.

103 Cf. above, n. 28. 104 Sampson 2008: 77 believes that Pompey had the same problem as Crassus concerning recent military laurels, but I think that even if Pompey’s glory was not as fresh as Caesar’s, his public stance as a general was much stronger than that of Crassus. 105 Cf. above n. 7. 106 Correctly emphasized by Ward 1977: 282.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 207 18/04/16 14:37 Bibliography

Afzelius, A., Die römische Eroberung Italiens (340 – 264 v. Chr.), Aarhus, Munksgaard, 1942. —, Die römische Kriegsmacht während der Auseinandersetzung mit den hellenistischen Großmächten, Aarhus, Munksgaard, 1944. Alexander, M.C., Trials in the Late Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC., Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1990. Ameling, W., Karthago: Studien zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft, Munich, Beck, 1993. Andreau, J., Financiers de l’aristocratie à la fin de la République, in H. Zehnacker (ed.), Le dernier siècle de la République romaine et l’époque augustéenne, Stras- bourg, Association pour l’étude de la civilisation romaine, 1978, 47–62. —, La vie financière dans le monde romain: les métiers de manieurs d’argent (IVe siècle av. J.–C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.–C.), Rome, École Française de Rome, 1987. —, Intérêts non agricoles des chevaliers romains (IIe siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.), in S. Demougin et al. (eds.), L’ordre équestre. Histoire d’une aristocratie (IIe siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.), Rome, École française de Rome, 1999a, 271–290. —, Banking and Business in the Roman World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999b. —, Banque et affaires dans le monde romain. IVe siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.-C., Paris, Seuil, 2001. —, Sur les choix économiques des notables romains, in J. Andreau / J. France / S. Pit- tia (eds.), Mentalité et choix économiques des Romains, Bordeaux, Ausonius, 2004, 71–85. —, Le prix du blé en Sicile et à Antioche de Pisidie (AÉ 19325.126b), in J. Dubouloz / S. Pittia (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19–20 mai 2006 organisé par l’UMR 8585 Centre Gustave Glotz. Besançon, Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007, 111–125. —, L’économie du monde romain, Paris, Edition Ellipses, 2010. Antonetti, C., Sigle epigrafiche greche di Tauromenio, Venice, Palazzo Loredan, 1985. Arangio-Ruiz, V. / Olivieri, A., Inscriptiones Graecae Siciliae et Infimae Italiae ad Ius Pertinentes, Milan, Udalrici Hoepli, 1925. Astin, A.E., The Lex Annalis before Sulla, Brussels, Latomus, 1958. —, Cato the Censor, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978. —, regimen morum, in JRS 78, 1988, 14–34. —, The Role of Censors in Roman Economic Life, in Latomus 49, 1990, 20–36. Aubert, J.-J., Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200 BC–AD 250, Leiden, Brill, 1994. Badian, E., Foreign Clientelae 264–70 B.C., Oxford, Clarendon, 1958. —, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968. —, Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1970. —, Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republic, Oxford, Blackwell, 1972.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 208 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 209

—, Zöllner und Sünder. Unternehmer im Dienst der römischen Republik, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997. Balbi de Caro, S. Roma e la moneta, Milan, Electa Italia, 1993. Balsdon, J.P.V.D., Roman History, 65–50 BC: Five Problems, in JRS 52, 1962, 134– 141. Baltrusch, E., Auf dem Weg zum Prinzipat: Die Entwicklung der republikanischen Herrschaftspolitik von Sulla bis Pompeius (88–62 v.Chr.), in J. Spielvogel (ed.), Res publica reperta: Zur Verfassung und Gesellschaft der römischen Republik und des frühen Prinzipats. Festschrift für Jochen Bleicken zum 75. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2002, 245–262. —, Die Verstaatlichung der Gladiatorenspiele (Zu Ennod. Pan. CSEL VI, p. 284 Hartel), in Hermes 116, 1988, 324–337. —, Regimen morum: Die Reglementierung des Privatlebens der Senatoren und Ritter in der römischen Republik und frühen Kaiserzeit, Munich, Beck, 1989. Baronowski, D.W., Roman Military Forces in 225 BC (Polybius 2.23–4), in Historia 42, 1993, 181–202. Barrandon, N. / Kirbihler, F. (eds.), Administrer les provinces de la République romaine, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010. Bastien, J-L., Le triomphe romain et son utilisation politique à Rome aux trois derniers siècles de la République, Paris, École Française de Rome, 2007. Bates, R.L., ‘Rex in Senatu’: A Political Biography of M. Aemilius Scaurus, in PAPhS 130, 1986, 251–288. Bauman, R.A., The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1967. —, Lawyers in Roman Republican Politics. A Study of the Roman Jurists in the political Setting, 316–82 BC, Munich, C.H. Beck, 1983. Beacham, R., Spectacle Entertainments of Early Imperial Rome, New Haven, Yale Uni- versity Press, 1999. Beard, M., The Roman Triumph, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2009. Beck, H., Karriere und Hierarchie. Die römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des cur sus honorum in der mittleren Republik, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005a. —, Züge in die Ewigkeit. Prozessionen durch das republikanische Rom, in GFA 8, 2005b, 73–104. —, Die Rollen des Adligen: Prominenz und aristokratische Herrschaft in der römischen Republik, in H. Beck / P. Scholz / U. Walter (eds.), Die Macht der Wenigen: Aristokratische Herrschaftspraxis, Kommunikation und ‘edler’ Lebensstil in Antike und Früher Neuzeit, Munich, Oldenbourg 2008, 101–123. —, From Poplicola to Augustus: Senatorial Houses in Roman Political Culture, in Phoenix 63, 2009, 361–387. Beck, H. / Wiemer, U. (eds.), Feiern und Erinnern. Geschichtsbilder im Spiegel antiker Feste, Berlin, Verlag Antike, 2009. Bell, A., Spectacular Power in the Greek and Roman City, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. Beloch, K.J., Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt, Leipzig, Ulan, 1886. Bergk, A., The Development of the Praetorship in the Third Century BC, in H. Beck et al. (eds.), Consuls and res publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 61–74. Bernstein, F., Ludi publici: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der öffent lichen Spiele im republikanischen Rom, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1998.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 209 18/04/16 14:37 210 bibliography

Bertrandy, F., Remarques sur le commerce des bêtes sauvages entre l’Afrique du Nord et l’Italie, IIe siècle av. J.-C.– IVe siècle ap. J.-C., in MÉFRA 99, 1987, 211–241. Berry, D.H., Equester ordo tvvs est: Did Cicero Win His Cases because of His Support for the Equites?, in CQ 53, 2003, 222–234. Bispham, E., From Asculum to Actium: The Municipalization of Italy from the Social War to Augustus, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. Blänsdorf, J., Populäre Opposition und historische Deutung in der Rede des Volks tribunen Licinius Macer in Sallusts Historien. Zur Ideologie Sallusts und seiner Interpreten, in AU, 21, 1978, 54–69. Bleicken, J., Das Volkstribunat der römischen Republik, Munich, C.H. Beck, 1955. —, Gedanken zum Untergang der Römischen Republik, in Id., Gesammelte Schriften 2, 1998, 683–6704. Bleckmann, B., Die römische Nobilität im Ersten Punischen Krieg. Untersuchungen zur aristokratischen Konkurrenz in der Republik, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2002. Bloch, M. / Parry, J., Money and the Morality of Exchange, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Blösel, W., Imperia extraordinaria liberae rei publicae: Studien zur Demilitarisierung der römischen Nobilität, Habilitationsschrift Universität Köln (forthcoming). —, Die Geschichte des Begriffes mos maiorum von den Anfängen bis Cicero, in B. Linke / M. Stemmler (eds.), Mos maiorum. Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identi tätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2000, 25–98. —, Die ‘Wahl’ des P. Cornelius Scipio zum Prokonsul in Spanien im Jahr 210 v. Chr., in Hermes 136, 2008, 326–347. Blösel, W. / Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (eds.), Von der militia equestris zur militia urbana: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im antiken Rom, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2011. Blösel, W., Die Demilitarisierung der römischen Nobilität von Sulla bis Caesar, in W. Blösel / K.-J. Hölkeskamp (eds.), Von der militia equestris zur militia urbana: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im antiken Rom, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2011, 55–80. Boren, H.C., Studies Relating to the Stipendium Militum, in Historia 32, 1983, 427–460. Boussac, M.F., Sceaux déliens, in RA 1988, 307–340. Bradley, K.R., Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World: 140–70 BC., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989. Braun, M. / Haltenhoff, A. / Mutschler, F.-H. (eds.), Moribus antiquis res stat Romana: Römische Werte und römische Literatur im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr., Munich, de Gruyter, 2000. Brennan, T.C., The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 2 vols. Oxford, Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2000. Briscoe, J., A Commentary on Livy Books XXXI–XXXIII, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973. —, A Commentary on Livy Books XXXIV–XXXVII, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981. —, A Commentary on Livy Books 38–40, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Brizzi, G., Eloquentia militarique re aut aequavit praestantissimorum gloriam aut excessit (Suet. Caes. 55). Cesare Soldato: Strategia e Immagine, in G. Urso (ed.), Cesare: Precursore O Visionario?, Pisa, Edizione ETS, 2010, 85–103. Broughton, T.R.S., The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 3 vols., New York, Amer- ican Philological Association, 1950–1986.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 210 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 211

—, Candidates Defeated in Roman Elections: Some Ancient Roman ‘Also-Rans’, in TAPhS 81, 1991, 1–64. Brunt, P.A., The Equites in the Late Republic, in R. Seager (ed.), The Crisis of the Roman Republic: Studies in Political and Social History, Cambridge, Heffer, 1969, 83–115. —, Italian Manpower: 225 BC–AD 14., Oxford, Clarendon, 1971. —, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays, Oxford, Clarendon, 1988. Buraselis, K., ‘Vix aerarium sufficeret’: Roman Finances and the Outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, in GRBS 37, 1996, 149–172. Cadiou, F., Hibera in terra miles: les armées romaines et la conquête de l’Hispanie sous la république (218–45 av. J.C.), Madrid, Velázquez, 2008. Callatay, F. de, Quantifying Monetary Production in Greco-Roman Times: A General Frame, in F. de Callatay (ed.), Quantifying Monetary Supplies in Greco-Roman Times, Bari, Edipuglia, 2011, 7–29. Carlsen, J. / Lo Cascio, E. (eds.), Agricoltura e scambi nell’Italia tardo-repubblicana Pragmateiai 16, Bari, Edipuglia, 2009. Carroccio, B., Moneta locale nella Sicilia romana, in M. Caccamo Caltabiano / L. Campagna / A. Pinzone (eds.), Nuove prospettive della ricerca sulla Sicilia del III sec. a.C.: archeologia, Numismatica, Storia. Atti dell’Incontro di Studio (Messina 4–5 Iuglio 2002), Messina, Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Antichità dell’Università degli Studi di Messina, 2004, 277–291. Carter, M.J., The Roman Spectacles of Antiochus IV Epiphanes at Daphne, 166 BC, in Nikephoros 14, 2001, 45–62. Cébeillac-Gervasoni, M. (ed.), Les élites municipales de l’Italie péninsulaire des Gracques à Néron, Naples, Centre Jean Bérard, 1996. Chamberland, G., A Gladiatorial Show Produced in sordidam mercedem (Tacitus Ann. 4.62), in Phoenix 61, 2007, 136–149. Chandler, D.C., Quaestor Ostiensis, in Historia 27, 1978, 328–335. Christ, K., Der Untergang der römischen Republik in moderner Sicht, in K. Christ (ed.), Römische Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, vol. 1: Römische Republik und Augusteischer Prinzipat, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1982, 134–167. Churchill, J.B., Ex qua quod vellent facerent: Roman Magistrates Authority over praeda and manubiae, in TAPhA 129, 1999, 85–116. Cimma, R.M., Richerche sulle società di publicani, Milan, Giuffrè, 1981. Clemente, G., Sicily and Rome: The Impact of Empire on a Roman Province, in T. Yuge / M. Doi (eds.), Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity, Leiden, Brill, 1988, 105–120. Cloud, J.D., Sulla and the Praetorship, in LCM 13.5, 1988, 69–72. Coarelli, F., Il commercio delle opere d’arte in età tardo-repubblicana, in Revixit Ars, Arte e ideologia a Roma: dai modelli ellenistici alla tradizione repubblicana, Rome, Quasar Edizione, 1996, 85–101. —, Saturnino, Ostia e l’annona: il controllo e l’organizzazione del commercia del grano tra II e I a.C., in Le ravitaillement en blé de Rome et des centres urbains des débuts de la République jusqu’au Haut-Empire: actes du colloque organisé par le Centre Jean-Bérard et l’URA 994 du CNRS (Naples, 14–16 février 1991), Rome, École française de Rome, 1994, 35–46. —, Argentum signatum: le origini della moneta d’argento a Roma, Rome, Istituto Ital- iano di Numismatica, 2013.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 211 18/04/16 14:37 212 bibliography

Coleman, K.M., Ptolemy Philadephus and the Roman Amphitheater, in W.J. Slater (ed.), Roman Theater and Society, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, 49–68. Corbier, M., The Lex Portorii Asiae and Financial Administration, in M. Cottier et al. (eds.), The Customs Law of Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 202–235. Cornell, T.J., The End of Roman Imperial Expansion, in J. Rich / G. Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the Roman World, New York, Routledge, 1993, 139–170. —, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), London, Routledge, 1995. —, Hannibal’s Legacy: the Effects of the Hannabalic War on Italy, in T.J. Cornell / B. Rankov / B. Sabin (eds.), The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, London, Insti- tute of Classical Studies, 1996, 97–117. Cottier, M. et al. (eds.), The Customs Law of Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Covino, R., Verres, Gaius, in R. Bagnall et al. (eds.), EAH, Oxford, Blackwell, 2012, 6968–6969. Coudry, M., Loi et société: la singularité des lois somptuaires de Rome, in CCGG 15, 2004, 135–171. —, Partage et gestion du butin dans la Rome républicaine: procédures et enjeux, in M. Coudry / M. Humm (eds.), Praeda: butin de guerre et société dans la Rome républicaine = Kriegsbeute und Gesellschaft im republikanischen Rom, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2009, 21–79. —, Lois somptuaires et regimen morum, in J.-L. Ferrary (ed.), Leges publicae: la legge nell’esperienza giuridica romana, Pavia, Iuss, 2012, 489–513. Courrier, C., La plèbe et sa culture: histoire d’un ‘antimonde’ des Gracques à Domi tien, Dissertation. Lyon, École Normale Supérieure de Lyon, 2010. —, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture, fin du IIe siècle av. JC – fin du Ier siècle ap. J.C., Rome, École française de Rome (forthcoming). Crawford, M.H., Money and Exchange in the Roman World, in JRS 60, 1970, 40–48. —, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974. —, Rome and the Greek World: Economic Relationships, in Economic History Review 30, 1977, 42–52. —, Coinage and Money Under the Roman Republic, London, Methuen, 1985. —, Origini e sviluppi del sistema provinciale romano, in G. Clemente / F. Coarelli / E. Gabba (eds.), Storia di Roma, 2.1., Torino, Einaudi 1990, 91–121. —, Roman Statutes, 2 vols. London, University of London Institute of Classical Studies, 1996. —, States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic, in L. de Ligt / S. Northwood (eds.), People, Land, and Politics: Demo graphic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC–AD 14, Leiden, Brill, 2008, 631–643. Crook, J. / Lintott, A. / Rawson, E. (eds.), The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. IX: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 BC, second edn., Cambridge, Cam- bridge University Press, 1994. Damon, C., Sex. Cloelius, Scriba, in HSPh 94, 1992, 227–250. David, J.M., Le Patronat judiciaire au dernier siècle de la République romaine, Rome, École française de Rome, 1992. —, Rhetoric and Public Life, in N. Rosenstein / R. Morstein-Marx (eds.), A Companion to the Roman Republic, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, 421–438.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 212 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 213

Deininger, J., Der Wandel von der Republik zum Prinzipat in Rom: ein Ausnahmefall der antiken Verfassungsentwicklung?, in E.G. Schmidt et al. (eds.), Griechenland und Rom. Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Entwicklungstendenzen und -höhepunk ten der antiken Geschichte, Kunst und Literatur, Tbilisi, Universitätsverlag Tbilisi, 1996, 81–94. Del Monaco, L., Le istituzioni di Tauromenio ellenisticoromana, in M.L. Lazzarini / P. Lombardi (eds.), L’Italia centro meridionale tra repubblica e primo impero: alcuni aspetti culturali e istituzionali. Giornata di studio, Roma, 13 dicembre 2002, Rome, Università degli studi di Roma – La Sapienza, 2003, 33–48. Deniaux, E., De l’ambitio à l’ambitus: les lieux de la propagande et de la corruption électorales à la fin de la République, in L’Urbs: espace urbain et histoire (Ier siècle av. J.-C.–IIIe siècle ap. J.-C., Rome, École française de Rome, 1987, 279–304. —, Clientèles et pouvoir à l’époque de Cicéron, Rome, École Française de Rome, 1993 [1994]. —, Le patronage de Cicéron et l’arrivée des blés de Sicile à Rome, in Le ravitaillement en blé de Rome et des centres urbains des débuts de la République jusqu’au Haut Empire, Rome, École française de Rome, 1996, 243–253. —, Les gentes de Délos et la mobilité sociale à Rome au Ier siècle av. J.-C.: l’exemple de Marcus Seius et des Seii, in Les Italiens dans le monde grec, IIe siècle av. J.-C.– Ier siècle ap. J.-C., Actes table ronde 1998, Paris, De Boccard, 2002, 29–39. —, L’importation d’animaux d’Afrique à l’époque républicaine et les relations de clien tèle, in L’Africa romana: Atti del XIII convegno di studio, Djerba, 10–13 dicembre 1998, Rome, Carocci, 2000, 1299–1307. —, Recherches sur le transport maritime dans la Méditerranée orientale: les affaires de Patiscus (51–43 av. J.-C.), in L. Rivet / M. Sciallano (eds.), Vivre, produire et échanger: reflets méditerranéens, Mélanges offerts à B. Liou, Montagnac, Mergoil, 2002, 121–122. —, Patronage. The Exchange of Favors and Social Harmony, in R. Morstein-Marx / N. Rosenstein (eds.), A Companion to the Roman Republic, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, 401–420. Develin, R., Patterns in Office-Holding 366–49 B.C., Brussels, Latomus, 1979. Di Gennaro, G., I comizi centuriati di Cic. De re p. II, 22, 39–40: attribuzione, strut tura, giudizio politico, in Athenaeum 81, 1993, 545–567. Diliberto, O., Ricerche sull’auctoramentum e sulla condizione degli auctorati, Milan, Giuffrè, 1981. Dondin-Payre, M., Exercice du pouvoir et continuité gentilice. Les Acilii Glabriones, Rome, Collection de l’École française de Rome, 1993. Dreher, M., Das Monumentum Ephesenum und das Römische Zollwesen, in MBAH 16, 1997, 79–96. Dubouloz, J., Autorité romaine, fermiers de l’impôt et contribuables en Sicile dans les années 70 av. J.-C., in J. Dubouloz / S. Pittia (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19–20 mai 2006 organisé par l’UMR 8585 Centre Gustave Glotz, Besançon, Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007, 147–168. Dubouloz, J. / Pittia, S. (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19–20 mai 2006 organisé par l’UMR 8585 Centre Gustave Glotz, Besançon, Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007. Duby, G., Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West, C. Postan (trans.). London, Arnold, 1968.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 213 18/04/16 14:37 214 bibliography

—, The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century, H.B. Clarke (trans). London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974. Duncan-Jones, R.P., Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. Dzino, D., Illyricum in Roman Politics: 229 BC–AD 68., Cambridge, Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2010. Ebel, C., Transalpine Gaul: The Emergence of a Roman Province., Leiden, Brill, 1976. Eck, W., Cn. Calpurnius Piso, cos. ord. 7 v. Chr. und die lex portorii provinciae Asiae, in EA 15, 1990, 139–145. Eckstein, A.M., Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006. —, Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Medi terranean, 230–170 BC, Oxford, Blackwell, 2008. —, Hegemony and Annexation Beyond the Adriatic: 230–146 BC, in D. Hoyos (ed.), A Companion to Roman Imperialism, Leiden, Brill, 2013, 79–97. Edmondson, J., Instrumenta Imperii: Law and Imperialism in Republican Rome, in B. Halpern / D.W. Hobson (eds.), Law, Politics and Society in the Ancient Medi terranean World, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic, 1993, 156–192. —, The Cultural Politics of Public Spectacle in Rome and the Greek East, 167–166 BC, in B. Bergmann / C. Kondoleon (eds.), The Art of Ancient Spectacle, Washington, National Gallery, 1999, 77–95. Edwards, C., trans., Suetonius: Lives of the Caerars, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. Edwell, P., War abroad: Spain, Sicily, Macedonia, Africa, in D. Hoyos (ed.), A Com panion to the Punic Wars, Oxford, Blackwell, 2011, 320–338. Eich, A. / Eich, P., War and State-Building in Roman Republican Times, in SCI 24, 2005, 1–33. Eilers, C., Roman Patrons of Greek Cities, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Elster, M., Die Gesetze der mittleren römischen Republik. Text und Kommentar, Darm stadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003. Engelmann, H. / D. Knibbe, Das Zollgesetz der Provinz Asia: Eine neue Inschrift aus Ephesos, in EA 14, 1989, 1–195. Epstein, D.E., Personal Enmity in Roman Politics: 218–43 BC., London, Croom Helm, 1987. Erdkamp, P., The Corn Supply of the Roman Armies During the Third and Second Cen turies BC, in Historia 44, 1995, 168–191. —, Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in the Roman Republican Wars (264–30 BC), Amsterdam, Gieben, 1998. —, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. —, War and State Formation in the Roman Republic, in P. Erdkamp (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Army, Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, 96–113. Evans, J.K., Wheat Production and its Social Consequences in the Roman World, in CQ 31, 1981, 428–442. Evans, R.J., Candidates and Competition in Consular Elections at Rome between 218 and 49 BC, in AClass 34, 1991, 111–136. Evans, R.J. / Kleijwegt, M., Did the Romans Like Young Men? A Study of the lex Villia annalis: Causes and Effects, in ZPE 92, 1992, 181–195.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 214 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 215

Evola Marino, R., Aspetti della politica interna di Silla, Palermo, Accademia, 1974. Farney, G.D., Some More Roman “Also-Rans”’, in Historia 53, 2004, 246–250. —, Ethnic Identity and Aristocratic Competition in Republican Rome, Cambridge, Cam- bridge University Press, 2007. Fascione, L., Crimen e quaestio ambitus nell’età repubblicana, Milan, Giuffré Editore, 1984. Fernoux, H.-L. / Stein, C. (eds.), Aristocratie antique: modèles et exemplarité sociale, Dijon, Editions universitaires de Dijon, 2007. Ferrary, J.-L., Cicéron et la loi judiciare de Cotta (70 av. J.–C.), in MÉFRA 87, 1975, 321–348. —, À propos des pouvoirs d’Auguste, in CCG 12, 2001, 101–154. —, La legislation ‘de ambitu’, de Sylla à Auguste, in Iuris vincula: Studi in onore di Mario Talamanca, Naples, Jovene, 2002, 159–198. —, Conclusions, in J. Dubouloz / S. Pittia (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19–20 mai 2006 organisé par l’UMR 8585 Centre Gustave Glotz, Besançon, Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007, 281–284. —, La législation comitiale en matière de création, d’assignation et de gouvernement des provinces, in N. Barrandon / Kirbihler, F. (eds.), Administrer les provinces de la République romaine, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010, 33–44. Ferrill, A., Caesar’s Private Fortune: Wealth and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, in Indiana Social Studies Quarterly 30, 1977, 101–111. —, The Wealth of Crassus and the Origins of the ‘First Triumvirate’, in AncW 1, 1978, 169–177. Finley, M.I., Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, London, Wiener, 1980. Flambard, J.-M., Nouvel examen d’un dossier prosopographique: le cas de Sex. Clodius/ Cloelius, in MÉFRA 90, 1978, 235–245. Flaig, E., Die Pompa Funebris: Adlige Konkurrenz und annalistische Erinnerung in der Römischen Republik, in O.G. Oexle (ed.), Memoria als Kultur, Göttingen, Vanden hoeck and Ruprecht, 1995, 115–148. —, Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2003. Flower, H.I., Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture, Oxford, Clar- endon, 1996. —, Spectacle and Political Culture in the Roman Republic, in H.I. Flower (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 322–346. Flower, H., Roman Republics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010a. —, Rome’s First Civil War and the Fragility of Republican Political Culture, in B. Breed / C. Damon / A. Ross (eds.), Citizens of Discord, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010b, 73–86. France, J., Deux questions sur la fiscalité provinciale d’après Cicéron Verr. 3.12, in J. Dubouloz / S. Pittia (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19–20 mai 2006 organisé par l’UMR 8585 Centre Gustave Glotz, Besançon, Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007, 169–184. Frank, T., An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933. Frazel, T. D., The Rhetoric of Cicero’s ‘In Verrem’, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2009.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 215 18/04/16 14:37 216 bibliography

Frederiksen, M.W., The Contribution of Archaeology to the Agrarian Problem in the Gracchan Period, in DArch 4–5, 1970–71, 330–357. Gabba, E., Esercito e società nella tarda repubblica romana, Florence, Nuova Italia, 1973. Gabrielsen, V., Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. Ganter, A., Was die römische Welt zusammenhält: Patron-Klient-Verhältnisse zwischen Cicero und Cyprian, Habilitationsschrift Goethe Universität Frankfurt (forthcoming). Gargola, D.J., Mediterranean Empire (264–134), in N. Rosenstein / R. Morstein- Marx (eds.), A Companion to the Roman Republic, Oxford, Blackwell, 2010, 147– 166. Garnsey, P., Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. —, L’approvisionnement des armées et la ville de Rome, in Le ravitaillement en blé de Rome et des centres urbains des débuts de la République jusqu’au Haut-Empire: actes du colloque organisé par le Centre Jean-Bérard et l’URA 994 du CNRS (Naples, 14–16 février 1991), Rome, École française de Rome, 1994, 31–34. Garnsey, P. / Gallant, T.W. / Rathbone, D., Thessaly and the Grain Supply of Rome During the Second Century BC, in JRS 74, 1984, 30–44. Garnsey, P. / Rathbone, D., The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus, in JRS 75, 1985, 20–25. Giovannini, A., Consulare imperium, Basel, Reinhardt, 1983. —, Catilina et le problème des dettes, in I. Malkin / Z.W. Rubinsohn (eds.), Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz, Leiden, Brill, 1995, 15–32. Girardet, K.M., Die lex Iulia de provinciis: Vorgeschichte-Inhalt-Wirkungen, in RhM 130, 1987, 291–329. Goldbeck, F., Salutationes. Die Morgenbegrüßungen in Rom in der Republik und der frühen Kaiserzeit, Berlin, Oldenbourg Akademieverlag 2010. Graeber, D., Debt: The First 5000 Years, New York, Melville, 2011. Gregori, G.L., Gladiatori e spettacoli anfiteatrali nell’epigrafia cisalpina, in Spettacolo in Aquileia e nella Cisalpina romana, Udine, Arti Grafiche Friulane, 1994, 53–67. —, Ludi e munera: 25 anni di ricerche sugli spettacoli d’età romana, Milan, Edizioni Universitarie di Lettere, Economia, Diritto, 2011. Griffin, M., The Tribune C. Cornelius, in JRS 63, 1973, 196–213. Gros, P., Theatrum Pompei, in E.M. Steinby (ed.), LTUR 5, Rome, Quasar 1999, 35–38. Gruen, E., Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts: 149–78 B.C., Cambridge, Har- vard University Press, 1968. —, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974. —, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. —, The Exercise of Power in the Roman Republic, in A. Molho / K. Raaflaub, / J. Emlen (eds.), City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1991, 251–267. —, The “Fall” of the Scipios, in I. Malkin / Z. W. Rubinsonhn (eds.), Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Ziv Yavetz, Leiden, Brill, 1995, 59–90.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 216 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 217

Grüne, N. / Slanička, S. (eds.), Korruption. Historischen Annäherungen an eine Grund figur politischer Kommunikation, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2010. Guarino, A., I gladiatores e l’auctoramentum, in Labeo 29, 1983, 7–24. —, Il leasing dei gladiatori, in Index 13, 1985, 461–465. Hantos, T., Res publica constituta: Die Verfassung des Dictators Sulla, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1988. Hallward, B.L., Scipio and Victory, in S.A. Cook / F.E. Adcock / M.P. Charlesworth (eds.), CAH 8. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1930, 83–115. Harris, W.V., The Development of the Quaestorship: 267–81 BC, in CQ 26, 1976, 92– 106. —, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979. —, A Revisionist Study of Roman Money, in JRS 96, 2006, 1–24. —, The Late Republic, in W. Scheidel / I. Morris / R. P. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 511–539. —, The Nature of Roman Money, in W. V. Harris (ed.), The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and the Romans, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 174–207. —, Power, in A. Barchiesi / W. Scheidel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Studies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 564–578. Harrison, G., The Joining of Cyrenaica to Crete, in G. Barker / J. Lloyd / J. Reynolds (eds.), Cyrenaica in Antiquity, Oxford, BAR, 1985, 363–371. Hawthorn, J.R., The Senate after Sulla, in G&R 9, 1962, 53–60. Hayne, L., The Politics of M. Glabrio, Cos. 67, in CPh 69, 1974, 280–282. —, Caesar and Lentulus Crus, in AClass 39, 1996, 72–76. Heil, M., Einige Bemerkungen zum Zollgesetz aus Ephesos, in EA 17, 1991, 9–18. —, Sozialer Abstieg: Beredtes Schweigen?, in W. Eck / M. Heil (eds.), Senatores populi Romani. Realität und mediale Repräsentation einer Führungsschicht, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2005, 295–312. Heuss, A., Der Untergang der römischen Republik und das Problem der Revolution, in HZ 182, 1956, 1–28. Hiebel, D., Rôles institutionnel et politique de la contio sous la République romaine (287–49 av. J.-C.), Paris, De Boccard, 2009. Hill, G.F., Coins of Ancient Sicily, Westminster, Constable, 1903. Hill, H., The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period, Oxford, Blackwell, 1952. Hin, S., Counting Romans, in L. de Ligt / S.J. Northwood (eds.), People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, 300 BC–AD 14, Leiden, Brill, 2008, 187–238. —, The Demography of Roman Italy: Population Dynamics in an Ancient Conquest Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. Hinard, F., Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine, Rome, École française de Rome, 1985. Hölkeskamp, K.-J., Die Entstehung der Nobilität. Studien zur sozialen und politischen Geschichte der Römischen Republik im 4. Jhdt. v.Chr., Stuttgart, Steiner, 1987. —, Das Plebiscitum Ogulnium de sacerdotibus. Überlegungen zur Authentizität und Inter pretation der livianischen Überlieferung, in RhM 131, 1988, 51–67. —, Senatus populusque Romanus. Die politische Kultur der Republik. Dimensionen und Deutungen, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2004.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 217 18/04/16 14:37 218 bibliography

—, Pomp und Prozessionen. Rituale und Zeremonien in der politischen Kultur der römischen Republik, in Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs 2006, 35–72. —, Hierarchie und Konsens: Pompae in der politischen Kultur der römischen Republik, in A. Arweiler / B. Gauly (eds.), Machtfragen: Zur kulturellen Repräsentation und Konstruktion von Macht in Antike, Mittelalter und Neuzeit, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2008, 79–126. —, Reconstructing the Roman Republic. An Ancient Political Culture and Modern Research, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2010. —, The Roman Republic as Theatre of Power: the Consuls as Leading Actors, in H. Beck et al. (eds.), Consuls and Res Publica: Holding Office in the Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 161–181. Hollander, D.B., Veterans, Agriculture and Monetization in the Late Roman Republic, in J.J. Aubert (ed.), A Tall Order Writing the Social History of the Ancient World, Munich, Saur, 2005, 229–240. —, Money in the Late Roman Republic, Leiden, Brill, 2007. —, The Demand for Money in the Late Republic, in W.V. Harris (ed.), The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 112– 136. Holleran, C., The Development of Public Entertainment Venues in Rome and Italy, in K. Lomas / T. Cornell (eds.), ‘Bread and Circuses’: Euergetism and Municipal Patronage in Roman Italy, London, Routledge, 2003, 46–60. Hölscher, T., Römische Siegesdenkmäler der späten Republik, in H.A. Cahn / E. Simon (eds.), Tainia: Festschrift R. Hampe, Mainz, Zabern, 1980, 351–371. Hopkins, K., Conquerors and Slaves, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. —, Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire 200 BC to AD 300, in JRS 70, 1980, 109–111. —, Rome, Taxes, Rents and Trade, in W. Scheidel / S. Von Reden (eds.), The Ancient Economy, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2002, 253–267. Hopkins, K. / Burton, G., Political Succession in the Late Republic (249–50 BC), in K. Hop kins, Death and Renewal, Cambridge, Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1983, 31–119. Hoy, L.P., Political Influence in Roman Prosecutions, 78 to 60 BC., Dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1952. Hoyos, D., Polybius’ Roman οἴ πολλοί in 264 BC, in LCM 9, 1984, 88–93. Howgego, C., The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World, in JRS 82, 1992, 1–31. —, Ancient History from Coins, London, Routledge, 1995. Humm, M., Appius Claudius Caecus et la construction de la via Appia, in MÉFRA 108, 1996, 693–746. Hurlet, F., Recherches sur la profectio de la dictature de Sylla à la lex Pompeia (82–52): les cas des gouverneurs de rang prétorien, in Barrandon, N. / Kirbihler, F. (eds.), Administrer les provinces de la République romaine, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010, 45–75. Ioannatou, M., Le code de l’honneur des paiements: créanciers et débiteurs à la fin de la République romaine, in J. Andreau / J. France / S. Pittia (eds.), Mentalité et choix économiques des Romains, Paris, Ausonius, 2004, 87–107. —, Affaires d’argent dans la correspondance de Cicéron: l’aristocratie sénatoriale face à ses dettes, Paris, De Boccard, 2006. Itgenshorst, T., Tota illa pompa: Der Triumph in der römischen Republik, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2005. Jashemski, W.F., The Origins and History of the Proconsular and Propraetorian Impe rium to 27 BC., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 218 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 219

Jehne, M., Die Beeinflussung von Entscheidungen durch “Bestechung”: Zur Funktion des ambitus in der römischen Republik, in M. Jehne (ed.), Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römischen Republik, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1995, 51–76. —, Cato und die Bewahrung der traditionellen res publica. Zum Spannungsverhältnis zwischen mos maiorum und griechischer Kultur im zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr., in G. Vogt-Spira et al. (eds.) Rezeption und Identität. Die kulturelle Auseinandersetzung Roms mit Griechenland als europäisches Paradigma, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1999, 115–134. —, Wirkungsweise und Bedeutung der centuria praerogativa, in Chiron 30, 2000, 661– 678. —, Integrationsrituale in der römischen Republik. Zur einbindenden Wirkung der Volksversammlungen, in K.-J. Hölkeskamp et al. (eds.), Sinn (in) der Antike: Orien tierungssysteme, Leitbilder und Wertkonzepte im Altertum. Mainz, Von Zabern, 2003, 279–297. —, Methods, Models, and Historiography, in N. Rosenstein / R. Morstein-Marx (eds.), A Companion to the Roman Republic. Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, 3–28. —, Caesar, Munich, Beck, 2008. —, Der große Trend, der kleine Sachzwang und das handelnde Individuum: Caesars Entscheidungen, Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch, 2009a. —, Le système électoral des Romains et le désespoir des candidats, in RD 87, 2009b [2010]) , 495–513. —, Der Dictator und die Republik. Wurzeln, Formen und Perspektiven von Caesars Monarchie, in B. Linke / M. Meier/ M. Strothmann (eds.), Zwischen Monarchie und Republik. Gesellschaftliche Stabilisierungsleistungen und politische Transfor mationspotentiale in den antiken Stadtstaaten, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2010, 187–211. —, The Rise of the Consular as a Social Type in the Third and Second Centuries BC, in H. Beck et al. (eds.), Consuls and Res Publica: Holding Office in the Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 211–231. —, Konsensfiktionen in römischen Volksversammlungen. Überlegungen zur frührepubli kanischen Curienversammlung und zu den kaiserzeitlichen Destinationscenturien, in E. Flaig (ed.), Genesis und Dynamiken der Mehrheitsentscheidung, Munich, Oldenbourg Wissensch, 2013a, 129–152. —, Politische Partizipation in der römischen Republik, in H. Reinau / J. v. Ungern-Stern- berg (eds.), Politische Partizipation: Idee und Wirklichkeit von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart (Colloquium Rauricum 13), Berlin, de Gruyter, 2013b, 103–44. Jehne, M. / B. Linke / J. Rüpke (eds.), Religiöse Vielfalt und soziale Integration: Die Bedeutung der Religion für die kulturelle Identität und politische Stabilität im repu blikanischen Italien, Heidelberg, Antike, 2013c. Jehne, M., Performing Senatorial Status in the Roman Republic: The Limits of Display ing Wealth in S. Knippschild / M. García (eds.), Just for Show? Displaying Wealth and Performing Status in the Ancient World (forthcoming). Jennison, G., Animals for Show and Pleasure in Ancient Rome, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1937. Jolliffe, R.O., Phases of Corruption in Roman Administration in the last Half-Century of the Roman Republic, Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1919. Jongman W., Slavery and the Growth of Rome: The Transformation of Italy in the Second and First Centuries BCE, in C. Edwards / G. Woolf (eds.), Rome the Cosmopolis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 100–122. Keaveney, A., The King and the War-Lords: Romano-Parthian Relations circa 64–53 BC, in AJPh 103, 1982, 412–428.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 219 18/04/16 14:37 220 bibliography

—, Studies in “Dominatio Sullae”, in Klio 65, 1983, 185–208. —, Lucullus: A Life, London, Routledge, 1992. Kiser, E. / Kane, D.C., The Perils of Privatization: How the Characteristics of Princi pals Affected Tax Farming in the Roman Republic and Empire, in Social Science History 31, 2007, 191–212. Klingenberg, A., Sozialer Abstieg in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Risiken der Oberschicht in der Zeit von Augustus bis zum Ende der Severer, Paderborn, Schöningh, 2011. Kondratieff, E., The Column and Coinage of C. Duilius: Innovations in Iconography in Large and Small Media in the Middle Republic, in SCI 23, 2004, 1–39. Konrad, C.F., Notes on Roman Also-Rans, in J. Linderski (ed.), Imperium sine fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1996, 103–143. Krasilnikoff, J.A., Mercenary Soldiering in the West and the Development of the Army of Rome, in ARID 13, 1996, 7–20. Kron, G., Roman Ley-Farming, in JRA 13, 2000, 277–287. —, The Augustan Census Figures and the Population of Italy, in Athenaeum 93, 2005, 441–495. —, The much Maligned Peasant: Comparative Perspectives on the Productivity of the Small Farmer in Classical Antiquity, in L. de Ligt / S.J. Northwood (eds.), People, Land, and Politics. Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, 300 BC–AD 14, Leiden, Brill, 2008, 71–119. Kunkel, W., Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen Republik, vol. 2: Die Magis tratur, In Zusammenarbeit mit R. Wittmann. Munich, Beck, 1995. Kumaniecki, K., Ciceros Rede De aere alieno Milonis, in Klio 59, 1977, 381–401. Lacey, W.K., The Tribunate of Curio, in Historia 10, 1961, 318–329. Lafon, X., Villa maritima: recherches sur les villas littorales de l’Italie romaine, Rome, École Française de Rome, 2001. Laronde, A., La Cyrénaïque romaine, des origines à la fin des Sévères (96 av. J-C. – 235 ap. J.–C.), in H. Temporini / W. Haase (eds.), ANRW 2.10.1., Berlin, de Gruyter, 1988, 1006–1064. Laser, G., Populo et scaenae serviendum est: Die Bedeutung der städtischen Masse in der Späten Römischen Republik, Trier, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1997. Latta, B., Die Rede des Volkstribunen C. Licinius Macer in den Historien des Sallust (III 48), in Maia 51, 1999, 205–241. Launaro, A., Peasants and Slaves: The Rural Population of Roman Italy (200 BC to AD 100), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011. Lerouge, C., L’image des Parthes dans le monde gréco-romain: du début du Ier siècle av. J.-C. jusqu’à la fin du Haut-Empire romain, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2007. Letta, C., Cic. de re p., II, 22 e l’ordinamento centuriato, in SCO 27, 1977, 193–282. Levick, B., The Senatus Consultum from Larinum, in JRS 73, 1983, 97–115. Ligt, L. de, Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire, Amsterdam, Gieben, 1993. —, Direct Taxation in Western Asia Minor Under the Early Empire, in E.A. Hemelrijk / H.W. Singo / L. de Ligt (eds.), Roman Rule and Civic Life: Local and Regional Perspectives, Amsterdam, Gieben, 2004a, 77–93. —, Poverty and Demography. The Case of the Gracchan Land Reform, in Mnemosyne 57, 2004b, 725–757. Ligt, L. de / Northwood, S.J. (eds.), People, Land, and Politics. Demographic Develop ments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, 300 BC–AD 14, Leiden, Brill, 2008. Ligt, L. de, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers: Studies in Demographic History of Roman Italy 225 BC to AD 100, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 220 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 221

Lintott, A., Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, 1968. —, The leges de repetundis and Associate Measures under the Republic, in ZRG 98, 1981, 162–212. —, Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic, in JRS 80, 1990, 1–16. —, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration, London, Routledge, 1993. —, Cicero as Evidence: A Historian’s Companion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Lo Cascio, E., Il primo denarius, in AIIN 27–28, 1980–81, 335–358. —, State and Coinage in the Late Republic and Early Empire, in JRS 71, 1981, 76–86. —, Appunti su Weber “teorico” dell’economia greco-romana, in Fenomenologia e società 5, 1982a, 123–144. —, Spesa militare, spesa dello stato e volume delle emissioni nella tarda repubblica, in AIIN 29, 1982b, 75–97. —, Ancora sui censi minimi delle cinque classi “serviane”, in Athenaeum 76, 1988, 273–302. —, Ancora sullo stipendium legionario dall’età polibiana a Domiziano, in AIIN 36, 1989, 101–120. —, I togati della formula togatorum, in AISS 12, 1991/94, 309–328. —, The Size of the Roman Population: Beloch and the Meaning of the Augustan Census Figures, in JRS 84, 1994, 23–40. —, Intervento’, in La monetazione romano-campana. Atti del Convegno, Centro Inter nazionale di studi numismatici, Napoli 18–19 giugno 1993, Rome, Instituto Italiano di Numismatica, 1998, 179–191. —, The Population of Roman Italy in Town and Country, in J. L. Bintliff / K. Sbonias (eds.), Reconstructing Past Population Trends in Mediterranean Europe (3000 BC– AD 1800), Oxford, Oxbow, 1999, 161–171. — (ed.), Credito e moneta nel mondo romano. Atti degli Incontri capresi di storia dell’economia antica (Capri, 12–14 ottobre 2000), Bari, Edipuglia, 2003. —, Cycles and Stability: Italian Population before the Demographic Transition (225 BC– AD 1900), in Riv. Stor. Econ. 21, 2005, 197–232. —, Crescita e decline: studi di storia dell’economia romana, Rome, Bretschneider, 2009. —, La quantificazione dell’offerta di moneta a Roma i il ruolo del credito, in F. de Callataÿ (ed.), Quantifying Monetary Supplies in Greco-Roman Times, Bari, Edi- puglia, 2011, 31–42. Lo Cascio, E. / Storchi Marino A. (eds.), Modalità insediative e strutture agrarie nell’Ita lia meridionale in età romana, Bari, Edipuglia, 2001. López Castro, J.L., The Spains, 205–72 BC, in D. Hoyos (ed.), A Companion to Roman Imperialism, Leiden, Brill, 2013, 67–78. Lovano, M., The Age of Cinna: Crucible of Late Republican Rome, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2002. Lundgreen, C., Regelkonflikte in der römischen Republik. Geltung und Gewichtung von Normen in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2011. MacKinnon, M., Supplying Exotic Animals for the Roman Amphitheatre Games: New Reconstructions Combining Archaeological, Ancient Textual, Historical and Ethno graphic Data, in Mouseion, ser. 3, 6, 2006, 137–161. MacMullen, R., Personal Power in the Roman Empire, in AJP 107, 1986, 512–524. Märtin, S., Die politische Führungsschicht der römischen Republik im 2. Jh. v. Chr. zwischen Konformitätsstreben und struktureller Differenzierung, Trier, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2012.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 221 18/04/16 14:37 222 bibliography

Magie, D., Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ, 2 vols., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950. Malmendier, U., Societas Publicanorum: Staatliche Wirtschaftsaktivitäten in den Händen Privater Unternehmer, Cologne, Böhlau, 2002. —, Law and Finance “at the Origin”, in JEL 47, 2009, 1076–1108. Manganaro, G., Tauromenitana, in ArchClass 15, 1963, 13–31. —, Iscrizioni latine e greche dal nuovo edificio termale di Taormina, in CronASA 3, 1964, 38–68. —, Le tavole finanziare di Tauromenion, in D. Kneopfler / N. Quellet (eds.), Comptes et inventaires dans la cité grecque: actes du colloque international d’épigraphie tenu à Neuchâtel du 23 au 26 septembre 1986 en l’honneur de Jacques Tréheux, Neuchâtel, Université de Neuchâtel, faculté des lettres, 1988, 155–190. Mann, C., Um keinen Kranz, um das Leben kämpfen wir!’ Gladiatoren im Osten des römischen Reiches und die Frage der Romanisierung, Berlin, Antike, 2011. Mann, M., The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986. Marchetti, P., Histoire économique et monétaire de la deuxième guerre punique, Brussels, Académie royale de Belgique, 1978a. —, Paie des troupes et dévaluations monétaires au cours de la deuxième guerre punique, in Les ‘dévaluations’ à Rome: époque républicaine et impériale, Rome, École française de Rome, 1978b, 195–216. Marshall, A. J., The Lex Pompeia de provinciis (52 B.C.) and Cicero’s Imperium in 51–50 BC: Constitutional Aspects, in H. Temporini / W. Haase (eds.), ANRW 1.1., Berlin, de Gruyter, 1972, 887–921. Marshall, B., Q. Cicero, Hortensius and the Lex Aurelia, in RhM 118, 1975, 136–152. Marshall, B.A., Crassus: A Political Biography, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1976. Martin, T.R., Why Did the Greek “Polis” Originally Need Coins?, in Historia 45, 1996, 258–261. Mattern-Parkes, S.P., The Defeat of Crassus and the Just War, in CW 96, 2003, 387– 396. Mattingly, H.B., The Management of the Roman Republican Mint, in AIIN, 1982, 9–46. Maurer, B., The Anthropology of Money, in Annual Review of Anthropolgy 35, 2006, 15–36. Mayhew, N.J., Money Supply and the Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300–1700, in EcHR 48, 1995, 238–257. McCall, J.B., The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputa tion in the Middle and Late Republic, London, Routledge, 2002. McDermott, W.C., Q. Cicero, in Historia 20, 1971, 702–717. McDonald, W., The Tribunate of Cornelius, in CQ 23, 1929, 196–208. McDonnell, M., Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cam- bridge University Press, 2006. McGing, B.C., The Ephesian Customs Law and the Third Mithradatic War, in ZPE 109, 1995, 283–288. Medri, M., Fonti letterarie e fonti archaelogiche: un confronto possibile su M. Aemilio Scauro il Giovane, la sua domus magnifica e il theatrum ‘opus maximum omnium’, in MÉFRA 109, 1997, 83–110. Meiggs, R., Roman Ostia, Second edn. Oxford, Clarendon, 1973.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 222 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 223

Merola, G.D., Il Monumentum Ephesenum e l’organizzazione terretoriale delle regioni asiane, in MÉFRA 108, 1996, 263–297. Meyer-Zwiffelhoffer, E., Imperium Romanum: Geschichte der Römischen Provinzen, Munich, Beck, 2009. Middleton, P., The Roman Army and Long Distance Trade, in P. Garnsey / C.R. Whitaker (eds.), Trade and Famine in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge, Cambridge Philological Society, 1983, 75–83. Milazzo, F., La realizzazione delle opere pubbliche in Roma arcaica e repubblicana: munera e ultro tributa, Naples, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza di Catanzaro, Università degli Studi di Reggio Calabria, 1993. Millar, F., The Political Character of the Roman Republic, 200–151 BC, in JRS 74, 1984, 1–19. —, The Crowd in Rome in the late Republic, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press, 1998. —, Rome, the Greek World, and the East, 3 vols., Chapel Hill, University of North Caro- lina Press, 2002. Mitchell, S., Geography, Politics, and Imperialism in the Asian Customs Law, in M. Cot- tier et al. (eds.), The Customs Law of Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 165–201. Moatti, C., Experts, mémoire et pouvoir à Rome, à la fin de la République, in RH 305, 2003, 303–325. Molthagen, J., Rückwirkungen der römischen Expansion, in I. Geiss / R. Tamchina (eds.), Ansichten einer künftigen Geschichtswissenschaft, vol. 2, Munich, Hanser, 1974, 34–53. Mommsen, Th., Die Verzeichnisse der italischen Wehrfähigen aus dem Jahre 529 der Stadt, in Hermes 11, 1876, 49–60. —, Römisches Staatsrecht, I–III. 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1887–1888. Morley, N., Status as Performance, in S. Knippschild / M. García (eds.), Just for Show? Displaying Wealth and Performing Status in the Ancient World (forthcoming). Morstein Kallet-Marx, R.M., Hegemony to Empire: The Development of Roman Imperium in the East from 148–62 BC, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996. Morstein-Marx, R., Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Mosci Sassi, M.G., Il linguaggio gladiatorio, Bologna, Patròn, 1992. Mouritsen, H., Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. Müller, C. / Hasenohr, C., Les Italiens dans le monde grec, IIe siècle av. J.-C.– Ier siècle ap. J.-C., Actes table ronde 1998, Paris, De Boccard, 2002. Ñaco del Hoyo, T. et al., The Civilian Impact of the Roman Intervention in Greece and Asia Minor (88–63 BC), in B. Antela-Bernárdez / T. Ñaco del Hoyo (eds.), Transforming Historical Landscapes in the Ancient Empires. (Area of Research in Studies from Antiquity, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: Proceedings of the First Workshop – December 16–19th 2007), Oxford, Hedges, 2009, 33–51. Ñaco del Hoyo, T., Roman Economy, Finance, and Politics in the Second Punic War, in D. Hoyos (ed.), A Companion to the Punic Wars, Oxford, Blackwell, 2011, 376– 390. Nadig, P., Ardet ambitus: Untersuchungen zum Phänomen der Wahlbestechungen in der römischen Republik, Frankfurt, Lang, 1997.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 223 18/04/16 14:37 224 bibliography

Neuendorff, A., Die römischen Konsulwahlen von 78–49 v.Chr., Dissertation, Univer- sität Breslau, 1913. Nicolet C., Les Gracques, crise agraire et révolution à Rome, Paris, Gallimard, 1967. —, L’ordre équestre à l’époque républicaine, 2 vols. Rome, École française de Rome, 1966–1974. —, Les variations des prix et la “théorie quantitative de la monnaie” à Rome, de Cicéron à Pline l’Ancien, in Annales (ESC) 26, 1971, 1203–1227. —, Le cens sénatorial sous la République et sous Auguste, in JRS 66, 1976a, 20–38. —, Le métier de citoyen dans la Rome républicaine, Paris, Gallimard, 1976b. —, Tributum: recherches sur la fiscalité directe sous la république romaine, Bonn, Habelt, 1976c. —, Mutations monétaires et organisation censitaire sous la République, in Les ‘dévalua tions’ à Rome: époque républicaine et impériale, Rome, École française de Rome, 1978, 249–269. —, Augustus, Government, and the Propertied Classes, in F. Millar / E. Segal (eds.), Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, 89–128. —, À propos du règlement douanier d’Asie: demosionia et les prétendus quinque publica Asiae, in CRAI, 1990, 675–698. —, Le Monumentum Ephesenum et les dîmes d’Asie, in BCH 115, 1991, 465–480. —, Autour de l’Imperium, in CCG 3, 1992, 163–166. —, Le Monumentum Ephesenum et la délimitation du portorium d’Asie, in MÉFRA 105, 1993, 929–959. —, Economy and Society, 133–43 BC, in J.A Crook / A. Lintott / E. Rawson (eds.), CAH² 9, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 599–643. O’Neill, P., Going Round in Circles: Popular Speech in Ancient Rome, in ClAnt 22, 2003, 135–176. Oakley, S., A Commentary on Livy, Books VI–X, 4 vols., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997–2005. Östenberg, I. Staging the World: Spoils, Captives, and Representations in the Roman Triumphal Procession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. Panella, C., Roma, il suburbio e l’Italia in età medio- e tardo-repubblicana: cultura materiale, territori, economie, in Facta 4, 2010, 11–123. Pareti, L., Storia di Roma e del mondo Romano II: la Repubblica dalla guerra con Pirro ai prodromi di quella con Persea, 280–170 av. Cr., Turin, Torinese, 1953. Pavis d’Escurac, H., La préfecture de l’annone, service administratif impérial d’Au guste à Constantin, Rome, École française de Rome, 1976. Pelham, H., On some Disputed Points Connected with the “imperium” of Augustus and his Successors, in Journal of Philology 17, 1888, 27–52. Pelikan Pittenger, M., Contested Triumphs: Politics, Pageantry, and Performance in Livy’s Republican Rome, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008. Perl, G., Die römischen Provinzbeamten in Cyrene und Creta zur Zeit der Republik, in Klio 52, 1970, 319–354. Pflaum, H.G., Les procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain, Paris, Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, 1950. —, Les carrières procuratoriennes équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain, Paris, Geuthner, 1960. Pietilä-Castrén, L., Magnificentia publica: The Victory Monuments of the Roman Gen erals in the Era of the Punic Wars, Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1987.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 224 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 225

Pina Polo, F., Las contiones civiles y militares en Roma, Zaragoza, Departamento de Ciencias de la Antiguedad, Universidad de Zaragoza, 1989. —, Contra arma verbis: Der Redner vor dem Volk in der späten römischen Republik, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1996. —, Consuls at Rome: The Civil Functions of the Consuls in the Roman Republic, Cam- bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011. —, Veteres candidati: Losers in the Elections of Republican Rome, in F. Marco Simón / F. Pina Polo / J. Remesal Rodriguez (eds.), Vae victis! Perdedores en el mundo antiguo, Barcelona, Universitat De Barcelona, 2012, 63–82. Pina Polo, F. / M. Jehne (eds.), Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsi deration (forthcoming). Pinzone, A., Cicerone e l’iniquitas novorum edictorum di Verre, in J. Dubouloz / S. Pittia (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19–20 mai 2006 organisé par l’UMR 8585 Centre Gustave Glotz, Besançon, Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007, 91–109. Pohjoy, M., Mosaic Inscriptions of the Temple of Diana Tifatina, in PBSR 65, 1997, 59–88. Polanyi, K., The Economy as Instituted Process, in K. Polanyi / C.M. Arensberg / H.W. Pearson (eds.), Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory, New York, Free Press, 1957, 243–270. —, The Livelihood of Man, H.W. Pearson (ed.), New York, Academic, 1977. Prag, J.R.W., Auxilia and Gymnasia: A Sicilian Model of Roman Imperialism, in JRS 97, 2007, 68–100. —, Sicilian Identity in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods: Epigraphic Considerations, in P. Martzavou / N. Papazarkadas (eds.), Epigraphical Approaches to the Post- Classical Polis: Fourth Century BC to Second Century AD, Oxford, Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2013a, 37–53. —, Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica: The First Provinces, in D. Hoyos (ed.), A Companion to Roman Imperialism, Leiden, Brill, 2013b, 53–65. Prichard, R.T., Cicero and the Lex Hieronica, in Historia 19, 1970, 352–368. Puglisi, M., La Sicilia da Dionisio I a Sesto Pompeo: circolazione e funzione della moneta, Messina, Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Antichità dell’Università degli Studi di Messina, 2009. Purcell, N., The Apparitores: A Study in Social Mobility, in PBSR 51, 1983, 125–173. Purser, L.C., The Correspondance of M. Tullius Cicero, vol. 1, Third edn., London, Long- mans, 1904. Ramsey, J. T., Mark Antony’s Judiciary Reform and Its Revival under the Triumvirs, in JRS 95, 2005, 20–37. Rankov, B., A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264–241, in D. Hoyos (ed.), A Companion to the Punic Wars. Oxford, Blackwell, 2011, 149–166. Rathbone, D., The Census Qualification of the assidui and the prima classis, in H. Sancisi- Weerdenburg et al. (eds.), De agricultura: In memoriam P.W. de Neeve, Amster- dam, Brill, 1993, 121–152. Rauh, N.K., Cicero’s Business Friendships: Economics and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, in Aevum 60, 1989, 330. Rawlings, L., The Ancient Greeks at War, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007. Rawson, E., Crassorum funera, in Latomus 41, 1982, 540–549. Rich, J., The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage in the Later Second Century BC, in Historia 32, 1983, 287–331.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 225 18/04/16 14:37 226 bibliography

Richardson, J.S., The Administration of the Empire, in A.J Crook / A. Lintott / E. Rawson (eds.), CAH² 9, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 564–598. —, The Spanish Mines and the Development of Provincial Taxation in the Second Century BC, in JRS 66, 1976, 139–152. —, Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218–82 BC, Cam- bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986. —, The Administration of the Empire, in J.A. Crook / A. Lintott / E. Rawson (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 564–598. Rickman, G., The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, 1980a. —, The Grain Trade under the Roman Empire, in J.H. D’Arms / E.C. Kopff (eds.), The Seaborne Commerce of Ancient Rome: Studies in Archaeology and History, Rome, American Academy in Rome, 1980b, 261–275. —, Problems of Transport and the Development of Ports, in A. Giovannini (ed.), Nourrir la plèbe: actes du colloque tenu a Genève les 28 et 29 IX, 1989 en hommage à Denis van Berchem, Geneva, Reinhardt, 1991, 103–118. Rober, R., Ambiguïté du collectionisme de Verrès, in J. Dubouloz / S. Pittia (eds.), La Sicile de Cicéron: lectures des Verrines, Franche Comté, Presse Universitaires Franche Comté, 2007, 15–34. Rollinger, C., Solvendi sunt nummi: Die Schuldenkultur der späten römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros, Berlin, Antike, 2009. —, Amicitia sanctissime colenda: Freundschaft und soziale Netzwerke in der späten Republik, Heidelberg, Antike, 2014. Ronnick, M.V., Cicero’s ‘Paradoxa Stoicorum’: A Commentary, an Interpretation and a Study of its Influence, Frankfurt, Lang, 1991. Roselaar, S.T., Public Land in the Roman Republic: A Social and Economic History of ager publicus in Italy, 396–89 BC., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. Rosenstein, N., Rome at War: Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004. —, Aristocrats and Agriculture in the Middle and Late Republic, in JRS 98, 2008, 1–26. —, Aristocrats and Agriculture in the Late Republic: the “High Count”, in J. Carlsen / E. Lo Cascio (eds.), Agricoltura e scambi nell’Italia tardo-repubblicana, Bari, Edi- puglia, 2009, 243–257. —, War, Wealth and Consuls, in H. Beck et al. (eds.), Consuls and res publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 133–158. Rosillo-López, C., El funcionamiento de un pulso político: discurso, endeudamiento y política en el “de aere alieno, de vi et de ambitu” de Clodio, in Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie II, Historia antigua 19–20, 2007, 161–175. —, La corruption à la fin de la République romaine (IIe–Ier s. av. J.-C.), Stuttgart, Steiner, 2010a. —, La gestion des profits illégaux par les magistrats pendant la République romaine (IIe – Ier siècles av. J.–C.), in Latomus 69, 2010b, 981–999. Roth, J.P., The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235), Leiden, Brill, 1999. Rowe, G.D., The Elaboration and Diffusion of the Text of the Monumentum Ephesenum, in M. Cottier et al. (eds.), The Customs Law of Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 236–250. Rüpke, J., Kalendar und Öffentlichkeit: Die Geschichte der Repräsentation und Reli giösen Qualifikation von Zeit in Rom, Berlin, Gruyter, 1995.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 226 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 227

—, Die Religion der Römer: Eine Einführung, Second edn., Munich, Beck, 2006. —, Religion of the Romans, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007. Ryan, F.X., Ten Ill-Stared Aediles, in Klio 78, 1996, 68–86. —, The Biennium and the Curule Aedileship in the Late Republic, in Latomus 57, 1998a, 3–14. —, Rank and Participation in the Republican Senate, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1998b. Sabbatini Tumolesi, P., Gladiatorum Paria: Annunci di spettacoli gladiatorii a Pompei, Rome, Storia e Letterature, 1980. Sabbatucci, D., L’edilita romana: magistratura e sacerdozio, Rome, Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1954. Salerno, F., Collegia adversus rem publicam, in V. Giuffrè (ed.), Sodalitas: scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino, vol. 2. Naples, Jovene, 1984, 615–631. Sampson, G.C., The Defeat of Rome in the East: Crassus, the Parthians, and the Disas trous Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC, Philadelphia, Pen & Sword, 2008. Sandberg, K., Magistrates and Assemblies: A Study of Legislative Practice in Republican Rome, Rome, Instituti Romani Finlandiae, 2001. Sanfilippo, C., Gli “auctorati”, in F. Pastori (ed.), Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi. Milan, Goliardica, 1982, 181–192. Santangelo, F., Sulla and the Senate: a Reconsideration, in CCGG 17, 2006, 7–22. Sartori, F., Appunti di storia siceliota: la costituzione di Tauromenio, in Athenaeum 32, 1954, 356–383. Schäfer, C. Spitzenmanagement in Republik und Kaiserzeit: Die Prokuratoren von Privat personen im Imperium Romanum vom 2. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum 3. Jh. n. Chr., St. Katha rinen, Scripta Mercaturae, 1998. Scheid, J., Religion et piété à Rome, Second edn. Paris, Michel, 2001. Scheidel, W. (ed.), Debating Roman Demography. Leiden, Brill, 2001. —, A Model of Real Income Growth in Roman Italy, in Historia 56, 2007, 322–346. Scheidel, W., Roman Population Size: the Logic of the Debate, in L. de Ligt / S.J. North- wood (eds.), People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, 300 BC–AD 14, Leiden, Brill, 2008, 17–70. —. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012. —, Roman Real Wages in Context, in F. de Callataÿ (ed.), Quantifying the Greco- Roman Economy and Beyond, Bari, Edipuglia, 2014, 209–218. Scheidel, W. / Morris, I. / Saller, R.P. (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Graeco-Roman World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Schneider, H., Wirtschaft und Politik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der späten römischen Republik, Erlangen, Palm und Enke, 1974. —, Atque nos omnia plura habere volumus – Die Senatoren im Wirtschaftsleben der späten römischen Republik, in W. Blösel / K.-J. Hölkeskamp (eds.), Von der ‘mili tia equestris’ zur ‘militia urbana’: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im antiken Rom. Stuttgart, Steiner, 2011, 113–135. Schuller, W. (ed), Korruption im Altertum, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1982. Schulz, R., Herrschaft und Regierung: Roms Regiment in den Provinzen in der Zeit der Republik, Paderborn, Schöningh, 1997. —, rapaces magistratus – die Möglichkeiten der Statthalter zur Ausbeutung der Provin zen in der späten römischen Republik, in W. Blösel / K.-J. Hölkeskamp (eds.), Von der ‘militia equestris’ zur ‘militia urbana’: Prominenzrollen und Karriere felder im antiken Rom, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2011, 93–111.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 227 18/04/16 14:37 228 bibliography

Scramuzza, V.M., Roman Sicily, in T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, vol. 3, Paterson, Pageant, 1959, 225–377. Scullard, H.H., Roman Politics 222–150 BC, Second edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973. Seager, R., Sulla, in J.A. Crook / A. Lintott / E. Rawson (eds.), CAH² 9, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 165–207. Serletis, A., The Demand for Money: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches, Boston, Kluwer, 2001. Serrati, J., Garrisons and Grain: Sicily between the Punic Wars, in C.J. Smith / J. Serrati (eds.), Sicily from Aeneas to Augustus: New Approaches in History and Archaeology, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, 115–133. —, Warfare and the State, in P. Sabin / H. van Wees / L.M. Whitby (eds.), The Cam bridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 461–497. —, Government and Warfare, in H. Beck (ed.), A Companion to Ancient Greek Govern ment, Oxford, Blackwell, 2013, 317–331. Shackleton-Bailey, D. R., Sex. Clodius – Sex. Cloelius, in CQ 10, 1960, 41–42. —, Ecce iterum Cloelius, in Historia 30, 1981, 383. Shatzman, I., Caesar: an Economic Biography and its Political Significance, in ScrHier 23, 1972a, 28–51. —, The Roman General’s Authority over Booty, in Historia 21, 1972b, 177–205. —, Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics, Brussels, Latomus, 1975. Shaw, B.D., Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, Boston, Bedford, 2001. Sherk, R.K., The Eponymous Officials of Greek Cities I, in ZPE 83, 1990, 249–288. —, The Eponymous Officials of Greek Cities V, in ZPE 96, 1993, 267–295. Sherwin-White, A., The Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 BC–AD 1, London, Duck- worth, 1984. Sion-Jenkis, K., Von der Republik zum Prinzipat: Ursachen für den Verfassungswechsel in Rom im historischen Denken der Antike, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2000. Sklenář, R., La République des signes: Caesar, Cato and the Language of Sallustian morality, in TAPhA 128, 1998, 205–220. Southern, P., Pompey the Great, Stroud, Tempus, 2002. Spielvogel, J. (ed.), Res publica reperta: Zur Verfassung und Gesellschaft der römi schen Republik und des frühen Prinzipats, Festschrift J. Bleicken, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2002. —, Die institutionelle Entwicklung der ständigen Legatur im Übergang von der Republik zum Prinzipat, in J. Spielvogel (ed.), Res publica reperta: Zur Verfassung und Gesellschaft der römischen Republik und des frühen Prinzipats, Festschrift J. Bleicken, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2002, 97–112. Spurr, S., Arable Cultivation in Roman Italy, London, Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies, 1986. Steel, C., Cicero’s Oratory of Praise and Blame and the Practice of Elections in the Late Roman Republic, in C. Smith / R. Covino (eds.), Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric, Swansea, Classical Press of Wales, 2011, 35–47. —, The lex Pompeia de provinciis of the Year 52 BC – a Reconsideration, in Historia 51, 2012, 83–93. Steel, C. / H. van der Blom (eds.), Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 228 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 229

Steinby, E.M., Basilica Aemilia, in E.M. Steinby (ed.), LTUR 1.2, Rome, Quasar, 1993, 167–168. Stockton, D., The First Consulship of Pompey, in Historia 22, 1973, 205–218. Stolle, R., Ambitus et invidia. Römische Politiker im Spannungsfeld zwischen persön lichem Ehrgeiz und Forderungen der Standesloyalität 200–133 v. Chr., Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 1999. Storch, R.H., Relative Deprivation and the Ides of March: Motive for Murder, in AHB 9, 1995, 45–52. Suolahti, J., The Roman Censors, Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1963. Sumi, G.S., Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics between Republic and Empire, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2005. Syme, R., Sallust, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964. Tan, J., Contiones in the Age of Cicero, in ClAnt 27, 2008, 163–201. Tanner, J., Portraits, Power, and Patronage in the Late Roman Republic, in JRS 90, 2000, 18–50. Tarn, W.W., The Fleets of the First Punic War, in JHS 27, 1907, 48–60. Tatum, W. J., Cicero’s Opposition to the Lex Clodia de Collegii, in CQ 40, 1990, 187–194. —, The Patrician Tribune, Publius Clodius Pulcher, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1999. —, Campaign Rhetoric, in C. Steel / H. van der Blom (eds.), Community and Com munication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 133–150. Taylor, L.R., Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966. Thiel, J.H., Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1946. —, A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1954. Thomsen, R., Early Roman Coinage: A Study of the Chronology, 3 vols., Copenhagen, Nationalmuseet, 1957–1961. Tiersch, C., Politische Öffentlichkeit statt Mitbestimmung? Zur Bedeutung der contiones in der mittleren und späten Republik, in Klio 91, 2009, 40–68. Timmer, J., Altersgrenzen politischer Partizipation in antiken Gesellschaften, Berlin, Ver- lag Antike, 2008. Toynbee, A.J., Hannibal’s Legacy: The Hannibalic War’s Effect on Roman Life, 2 vols. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965. Tusa, S. / Royal, S., The Landscape of the Naval Battle at the Egadi Islands (241 BC), in JRA 25, 2012, 7–48. Vanderbroeck, P. J. J., Popular Leadership and Collective Behaviour in the Late Roman Republic (80–50 BC), Amsterdam, Gieben, 1987. Valgiglio E., Silla e la crisi repubblicana, Florence, Nuova Italia, 1956. Verboven, K., Caritas Nummorum. Deflation in the Late Roman Republic?, in MBAH 16, 1997, 40–78. —, The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Roman Republic, Brussels, Latomus, 2002. —, 55–44 BC: Financial or monetary crisis?, in E. Lo Cascio (ed.), Credito e moneta nel mondo romano, Bari, Edipuglia, 2003, 49–68. —, The Associative Order: Status and Ethos among Roman Businessmen in Late Republic and Early Empire, in Athenaeum 95, 2007, 861–893.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 229 18/04/16 14:37 230 bibliography

—, Currency, Bullion and Accounts. Monetary Modes in the Roman World, in RBN 155, 2009, 91–124. Veyne, P., Le Pain et le Cirque, Paris, Seuil, 1976. Ville, G., Les jeux de gladiateurs dans l’empire chrétien, in MÉFRA 72, 1960, 273–335. —, La gladiature en Occident des origines à la mort de Domitien, Rome, École française de Rome, 1981. Virlouvet, C., Famines et émeutes à Rome des origines de la République à la mort de Néron, Rome, École française de Rome, 1985. Virlouvet, C., L’apport des sources littéraires à l’étude de l’évergétisme à Rome et dans les cités d’Italie à la fin de la République, in M. Christol / O. Masson (eds.), Actes du Xe Congrès International d’Épigraphie Grecque et Latine, Nîmes, 4–9 octo bre 1992, Paris, Sorbonne, 1997, 227–248. von Reden, S., Money, Law, and Exchange: Coinage in the Greek polis, in JHS 117, 1992, 154–176. —, Money in the Ancient Economy: A Survey of Recent Research, in Klio 84, 2002, 141–174. —, Money in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010. von Ungern-Sternberg, J., Weltreich und Krise: Äußere Bedingungen für den Nieder gang der römischen Republik, in MH 39, 1982, 254–271. Walbank, F.W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 3 vols., Oxford, Clarendon, 1957–1979. Wallace-Hadrill, A. (ed.), Patronage in Ancient Society, London, Routledge, 1989a. —, Patronage in Roman Society: from Republic to Empire, in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.) Patronage in Ancient Society, London, Routledge, 1989b, 63–88. —, Rome Cultural Revolution, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Walter, U., Memoria und res publica: Zur Geschichtskultur im republikanischen Rom, Frankfurt, Antike, 2004. —, Patronale Wohltaten oder kriminelle Mobilisierung? Sanktionen gegen unerlaubte Wahlwerbung im spätrepublikanischen Rom, in Grüne / Slanička 2010, 145–166. Ward, A.M., Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1977. Weber, M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie, Tübingen, Siebeck, 1980. Weggen, K., Der lange Schatten von Carrhae: Studien zu M. Licinius Crassus, Hamburg, Kovac, 2011. Weigel, R.D., The Career of L. Paullus, Cos. 50, in Latomus 38, 1979, 637–646. Welch, K.E., The Roman Amphitheatre: From its Origins to the Colosseum, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Wendt, C., Sine fine: Die Entwicklung der römischen Außenpolitik von der späten Republik bis in den frühen Prinzipat, Berlin, Antike, 2008. White, K.D., Wheat Farming in Roman Times, in Antiquity 37, 1963, 207–212. Whitehead, D., The Measure of a Millionaire: What Crassus Really Said, in LCM 11, 1986, 71–74. Wiedemann, T., The Patron as Banker, in K. Lomas / T. Cornell (eds.), Bread and Circuses: Euergetism and Municipal Patronage in Roman Italy, London, Routledge, 2003, 12–27. Willers, H., Ein neuer Kämmereibericht aus Tauromenion, in RhM 60, 1905, 321–360. Williamson, C., The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2005.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 230 18/04/16 14:37 bibliography 231

Wilson, A., Metal Supply of the Roman Empire, in E. Papi (ed.), Supplying Rome and the Empire, Providence, JRA, 2007, 109–125. Winterling, A., Krise ohne Alternative im alten Rom, in M. Bernett / W. Nippel / A. Winterling (eds.), Christian Meier zur Diskussion: Autorenkolloquium am Zen trum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung der Universität Bielefeld, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2008, 219–239. Wiseman, T.P., The Census in the First Century BC, in JRS 59, 1969, 59–75. —, New Men in the Roman Senate 139 BC–AD 14, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971. Yakobson, A., Petitio et largitio: Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic, in JRS 82, 1992, 32–52. —, Secret Ballot and its Effects in the Late Roman Republic, in Hermes 123, 1995, 426– 442. —, Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1999. —, Traditional Political Culture and the People’s Role in the Roman Republic, in His toria 59, 2010, 282–302. Yavetz, Z., Living Conditions of the Urban plebs, in Latomus 17, 1958, 500–517. Zack, A., Studien zum ‘Römischen Völkerrecht’: Kriegserklärung, Kriegsbeschluß, Beeidung und Ratifikation zwischen staatlicher Verträge, internationale Freundschaft und Feindschaft während der römischen Republik bis zum Beginn des Prinzipats, Göttingen, Dührkohp und Radicke, 2001. Zambon, E., Tradition and Innovation: Sicily between Hellenism and Rome, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2008. Zanda, E., Fighting Hydra-Like Luxury: Sumptuary Regulation in the Roman Republic, London, Bristol Classical Press, 2011. Zehnacker H., Moneta: Recherches sur l’organisation et l’art des émissions monétaires de la République romaine (289 – 31 av. J.–C.), Rome, École française de Rome, 1973. Zimmermann, R., The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996.

001_98368_CollecLatomus_Beck.indb 231 18/04/16 14:37