The Reshaping of the US Armed Forces: Present and Future Implications for Northeast Asia

262 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Brian R. Sullivan

Over the past decade, the size of the US armed forces and of the US defense budget has declined significantly. While these reductions seem to indicate a loss of US military power, the opposite is true. Great improvement in the US strategic position after the Cold War and the new technology now available to the American military actually has resulted in increased US strength. This favorable situation is likely to endure for a generation. One reason for the difference between military appearance and reality is that new American weapons platforms will have smaller crews but far greater capabilities. This trend will continue as developing systems are incorporated into the operating forces. Furthermore, the US military may be poised on the brink of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). Centered on information and information-based warfare, this development could allow American forces to anticipate enemy operations, while blinding hostile forces to US maneuvers. The US possesses the necessary educated manpower in sufficient quantities to operate such weapons and equipment. Despite likely new cuts in the size and funding of the US military, the $4 trillion the US will spend on defense over the next two decades will provide it with extremely strong forces. US forces will be concentrated heavily in Northeast Asia, a region of increasing importance to the US. Even with the rise of several Asian states as major economic powers, the US is certain to maintain armed forces materially far superior to theirs for twenty years, perhaps longer. But the US armed forces still face a number of problems in defending American and allied interests in Northeast Asia. Historically, the US has endured defeats at the ABSTRACTS 263 hands of technologically inferior Asian foes. Also, Americans often have failed to understand Asian strategic and military thinking, suffering some disastrous intelligence failures as a result. An American RMA based on information technologies may be vulnerable to deception, a technique stressed in East Asian warfare. Americans have an arrogant faith in technology, but material superiority does not necessarily lead to victory in war. The defeat in Vietnam demonstrated this. Furthermore, the US armed forces may not be embarking on an RMA at all, but only a less profound “military technical revolution” (MTR). An MTR involves major changes in military technology but not the revolutionary advances in the cultural, political and strategic approaches to war fundamental to an RMA. Also, the frequency of RMAs and MTRs has been increasing. Even if the American military is about to experience one or the other, its potential enemies may be developing their own. Given its various demonstrated weaknesses, the US military would benefit from closer collaboration with its East Asian allies and learning from Korean military history in particular. Most of all, given their western mentality the American armed forces need better understanding of how they appear to East Asians and about Chinese, Japanese and Korean approaches to war, a knowledge concentrated in the South Korean military. Thus, US and ROK forces are now able to strengthen each other. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 129

The Reshaping of the US Armed Forces: Present and Future Implications for Northeast Asia

Brian R. Sullivan

The appearance and reality of American military power present a number of paradoxes. At one and the same time, the strength of the US armed forces seems to be both contracting and expanding. Certainly, the introduction of new military technologies over the past decade have granted the American military striking new capabilities. In fact, some military analysts believe the US forces may soon acquire even more advanced equipment and develop the means to employ it so as to introduce revolutionary changes in warfare. Others are skeptical about such possibilities. Still others warn that unforeseen liabilities may accompany such advances in American fighting power. These developments are of particular relevance for the security interests of the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia. That region appears certain to be the major focus of the concerns of the US armed forces over the next generation. Radical improvements in American military power could help grant Northeast Asia a long period of stability. At the same time, the US armed forces have long exhibited distinct

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the United States National Defense University, the United States Department of Defense nor the United States government. The author expresses his thanks to his friend, Robert Dujarric of the Hudson Institute, for his suggestions to improve this article. 130 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS weaknesses in war against Asian opponents. Ironically, these deficien- cies might be exacerbated by the proposed improvements in US military technological prowess. America's Asian allies, however, may be able to blend their military traditions and their approaches to war with the overwhelming material power of the US armed forces. The South Korean military may be in a particularly advantageous position to help carry out such a marriage of power, thought and action. But such questions can only be answered after an examination of the various elements of this puzzle.

The Reshaping of the US Armed Forces

In 1987-88, at the height of the Reagan-era expansion of the United States armed forces, the American military counted some 2,174,000 personnel on active duty. They were supported by an additional 1,15 1,000 in the selected reserve. Today, there are only about 1,500,000 in the active-duty armed forces, with another 940,000 reserves. By early 1998, American force levels are slated to drop even lower, to about 1,460,000 active and 900,000 reserve personnel. In other words, over a ten-year period, active forces will have shrunk to about two-thirds of their former size; the total force will have gone down from 3,325,000 to 2,360,000, a thirty-percent reduction.' This decline also can be measured in numbers of combat units and weapons platforms. In 1988, the US Army had 18 divisions, 4 indepen- dent brigades and 3 armored cavalry regiments. Today, it contains 12 divisions and 2 armored cavalry regiments. Over the same period, the US Navy has declined from 137 submarines and 239 principal surface combatants to 100 and 137 respectively. In 1988, it had 14 carriers in commission; today only 12. Meanwhile, the US Air Force has declined from 20 bomber and 79 fighter squadrons to 12 bomber and 52 fighter squadrons. Cuts in the strength of the US Marine Corps have been less severe. Today, as in 1988, it is made up of 3 divisions and 3 air wings.

1 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. C-1. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 131

However, Over the past decade, the Corps has fallen from 198,000 to 172,000 personneL2 Yet another way to consider the drop in American defense levels from the Reagan to Clinton presidencies is monetary. In 1985, Department of Defense outlays reached 6.2 percent of US gross domestic product (GDP); a decade later they had fallen to 3.7 percent. Defense outlays will almost certainly continue to decline as a percentage of American GDP. In its highest single year for expenditures on national defense functions, 1988-89, the Reagan administration (and its successor) spent some $304 billion. This fiscal year, the Clinton administration will spend about $271 billion. For 1997-98, it has proposed outlays of $257 billi~n.~ At first glance, these figures seem to describe a severe weakening of US defense capabilities. In fact, even these numbers alone indicate a quite different reality. When placed within the context of the present international situation, ongoing Department of Defense acquisitions, military technological developments and the evolution of US national security policy, the numbers actually indicate a relative increase in American military strength since the mid-1980s. In fact, the total picture suggests an even greater improvement over the next two decades, particularly in regard to the defense of American interests and those of its allies in East Asia. To begin, there has been a considerable disproportion between the decline in US active and reserve forces and the drop in national defense function expenditures. Over the same period, 1988-89, active forces will have fallen by about 33 percent and overall forces by about 30 percent. But even factoring in likely inflation, defense function spending will have decreased only by about 20 percent. When the budgets of the intelligence agencies are estimated as part of national defense spending, the percentage of decline probably will be even less.4

2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996-1996 (London: Oxford University press, 1995), pp. 23-28; The Military Balance 1988-1989 (Reading: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 19-25.

3 Annual Report, pp. B-2 - B-3; Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 23. 4 Annual Report, pp. B-2 - B-3. 132 KOREANJOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS One could argue that the cost of weapons and equipment is increasing at a geometric rate, so that defense dollars are buying less and less defense. But the contrary appears to be true. First, consider military manpower and weapons performance in relation to combat strength. One of the most striking changes in American weapons platforms over the past generation is the simultaneous declines in crew size and increases in fighting power. Examples are numerous, so I will cite only a few. But while striking, these cases are typical. Consider the US Navy: the Adams-class destroyers, commissioned in the 1960s, displaced 4500 tons and carried a crew of 354. The Burke- class destroyers, which have been coming into service for the last few years, displace 9000 tons and are manned by only 303 men. But any one Burke with its electronics, missiles and survivability features is easily the equivalent of half a dozen Adams-class destroyers. The California class guided missile cruisers built in the 1970s displace 9600 tons and carry 603 men. The Ticonderoga-class cruisers, presently the US Navy’s newest, displace about the same tonnage and have a crew of only 358. But the increase in fighting power, both offensively and defensively, from the California- to the Ticonderoga- class is phenomenal. The Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines of 6100 tons and a 133-man crew carry 26 torpedoes or missiles. Slightly larger at 7500 tons, the Seawolf nuclear attack subs will have the same size crew but twice the number of torpedoes or missiles. Moreover, in terms of overall capability, the Seawolf represents a huge advance over the Los Angeles class. In 1988, when the US Navy had fourteen carriers in service, only four were of the modern nuclear-powered Nimitz class. The US Navy has seven now. Eight Nirnitz-class carriers will be in commission by mid-1998; the ninth and last of the class, the USS Ronald Reagan, will join the fleet in 200Z5

5 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1987-88, edited by Capt. John Moore (London: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1987), p. 744; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1995-96, edited by Capt. Richard Sharpe (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995), pp. 796, 798, 802, 810, 812, 814. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 133

Some critics have argued that aircraft carriers are approaching ob- solescence. Such arguments may have merit. But be that as it may, the US Navy has already begun development of what may prove the successor to the aircraft carrier: the so-called “arsenal ship,” a warship of perhaps 75,000 tons armed with hundreds of missiles of all types, yet manned by a crew of fifty or less. When one considers that a Nimitz class carrier holds a total ship’s and air crew of nearly 6,000, this represents an enormous increase in fighting power per crew member.6 The US Air Force has made even greater strides away from the notion that manpower equals fighting power. The 600-mile-per-hour B-52H strategic bomber carries a six-man crew. The 800-mile-per-hour B- 1B carries a four-man crew, The stealthy B-2 is manned by two men. Each bomber has about the same unrefueled range. But just as the B-52H offers huge advantages in fighting power over its B-52 predecessors, so does the B-1B over it and the B-2 over the B-lB.7 As its performance in the Gulf War shows, the F-15 is a magnificent fighter, clearly the best flying. But its successor over the next decade, the F-22, will bring a weapon of almost unbelievable capabilities to the US Air Force. With their first-generation 300-megabyte common integrated processors, their engines capable of mach 1.5 speeds without use of afterburners and the array of weapons they will carry, a standard four-plane formation of F-22s will be able to engage and destroy an entire squadron of any fighter flying today or in the planning stage. The first F-22 squadrons will be ready for active service in 2002-2003. When later F-22s are fitted with second-generation 650-megabyte common integrated processors, their performance will make the new US fighters seem like something out of the pages of science fiction.’

6 Jacques J. Bally, “The Shape of Ships to Come 11,” Armada International, Feb.- March 1996, pp. 11, 14-15; Barbara Starr, “US Navy to seek funding for radical arsenal ship,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 6, 1996, p. 3. 7 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1994-1995, editor-in-chief, Mark Lambert (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1994), pp. 611-12; Jane’s All the WorEd’s Aircraft 1991-1992, editor-in-chief, Mark Lambert (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1991), p. 371; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1989-1990, editor-in-chief, John W. R. Taylor (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1989), pp. 492-94. 8 Jane’s All the World’s Aircra3 1994-95, pp. 531-33, 584-86; Mark Lorell et al., 134 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS But the F-22 is very unlikely to be followed by another, vastly superior, manned fighter. The performance envisioned by Air Force planners for the post-F-22 fighter would create gravitational forces that no human being could possibly withstand. Almost certainly, the US Air Force fighter that flies for the first time in the second or third decade of the twenty-first century will be an unmanned aircraft piloted by remote control. This may seem like fantasy to some, but the air force already has formed its first unmanned aircraft squadron and many others will be created over the next decade or two.’ The US Army also is reducing manpower while enhancing combat power. Another veteran of the Gulf War, the Abrams main battle tank (MBT), is appearing in its M1A2 configuration. It is more than a match for the Chinese Type 85-111 and Type 90-11 MBTs. It would even outclass the Russian T-95, if that tank ever appears. But the final Abrams variant with its four-man crew will be replaced in the early twenty-first century by the US Army’s two-man main battle tank, now in the early stages of development. Likely to be armed with a revolutionary electrothermal gun and a wide array of unprecedented offensive and defensive features, just one these new American MBTs would be able to engage successfully an entire platoon-perhaps a company-of enemy tanks. The US Army’s Crusader Advanced Field Artillery System will bring a long-needed modernization to the branch that was once the Army’s glory but has suffered neglect over recent decades. The system will consist of a self-propelled 155mm howitzer and an armored resupply vehicle, manned by a total of six men. The Crusader will be equipping field artillery units by 2006. Its great range, liquid-propelled shells of extraordinary lethality, its mobility and survivability features will make

“The Gray Threat,” Air Force Magazine, Feb. 1996; David A. Fulghum, “Elint, SEAD Roles Seen for Stealthy F-22,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 10, 1996. 9 David A. Fulghum, “Boeing Plans Unmanned Fighter,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 4, 1996; “Firm Bids on Tactical UAV,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 1, 1996; Author’s interviews and observations at Nellis Air Force Base, Feb. 19, 1996. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 135 a single Crusader system easily the equal of an entire battery of the M-109 self-propelled howitzers currently equipping the us Amy.’’ But similar improvements are taking place in the American military to support and service the combat forces. The logistics branches of the US armed forces are receiving and will continue to receive capabilities to allow an ever-smaller number of personnel to carry out tasks far beyond what was accomplished in Desert Shield. The military leadership noted the huge amount of supplies and equipment necessary to sustain the forces sent to Saudi Arabia in 1990-91. Furthermore, it was well aware that the US buildup took place with the unusual advantages conferred by the modern Saudi infrastructure and without enemy attacks on Saudi ports, warehouses, airfields, roads and communications. Such happy circumstances are unlikely to reoccur.” As a result of lessons learned in the Gulf War, the US military has been hard at work to reduce the weight and volume of supplies and equipment necessary to sustain forces in the field. In the future, Amer- ican forces will be able to project power with a far smaller logistics “tail” than in the past. In addition, the logistics train will be far more capable than before of surviving the rigors of forced entry and enemy attempts at interdiction. There are numerous examples of the US armed forces logistics reduction and modernization programs. Prominent among them is an army project. The US Army is developing what it calls “focused logistics.” This integrates emerging information, logistics and transportation technologies into one coherent system. It will allow extremely rapid response to crises, by providing greatly improved tracking and shifting of supplies and forces enroute to the engagement. Most important, it will deliver precisely tailored packages of supplies to each level of military operations. The infamous “feast or famine” aspects of army supply may

10 Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1995-96, Christopher F. Foss, ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1995). pp. 137-41, 591-98. 11 Lt. Gen. William G. Pagonis with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains. Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 63-1 58, 203-10; Joel H. Nadel, “Logistics Lessons” in Bruce W. Watson et al., Military Lessons of the Gulf War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), pp, 167-73. 136 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS become only a bad memory. Certainly, instances Of such extmlles Will be greatly reduced.’* But an even more important improvement in American fighting power may spring from the emerging system to link forces in the field and the rear with intelligence systems and with military commands and the national command authority in the US. This network of satellites, manned orbiters, unmanned aircraft, sensors, computers, electronic communications, jammers and precision guided munitions will create what recently-retired Vice Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, Admiral William Owens, has called a “system of systems” and others refer to as the “metasystem.” This system forms the basis of what some defense analysts envision as a coming “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) based on technological advances in information and information-based warfare. Such an RMA would introduce a completely new form of war.13 But as some critics have pointed out, instead of an RMA, the system of systems may only presage a “military technical revolution” (MTR). More limited in scope than an RMA, an MTR introduces radically new forms of military technology and operations, but without the changes in society, culture, politics and strategy associated with an RMA. Obvi- ously, the true nature of the changes brought by the metasystem remain for the future to reveal. But even an American-led MTR would grant the United States significant military advantages for decades to come.14

12 Gen. William W. Hartzog and Susan Canedy, “Synergy for the Next Century,” Army, May 1996, p. 22. 13 Adm. William A. Owens, “The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems,” Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum, number 63 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); “Major-Power Strategy” in Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, forthcoming). 14 Col. Richard Szafranski, “Peer Competitors, the RMA and New Concepts: Some Questions,” Naval War College Review, Spring 1996; Colin S. Gray, “The Changing Nature of Warfare?’ Naval War College Review, Spring 1996. For the origins of the concept of a “military revolution,” an idea first promulgated in the mid- 1950s by scholars studying early modern European military history, see: Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 137

The initial goal for the system-of-systems network is to allow Amer- ican commanders to enjoy “dominant battlefield awareness” Or “dominant battlespace knowledge” over a battle area 200 miles Square. Within that 40,000 square miles, the network will provide US commanders virtually complete knowledge of enemy dispositions and movements, while denying the enemy such knowledge of American forces inside and outside the area. Such capability alone will result in a huge force multiplier for the US military. But that power will be enhanced even more by the ability to see, target, hit and destroy hostile units and weapons platforms with what will closely approach one-shot-kill precision strike. When the system of systems is in place sometime in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the actual personnel levels of the US armed forces will no longer provide much indication of their ability to safeguard American interests. Indeed, when the unmanned combat aircraft of the US Air Force are joined by the unmanned armored fighting vehicles of the US Army and the unmanned submarines and surface ships of the US Navy, the numbers of men and women in American uniform will bear little relation to the awesome power under their contr~l.’~ A number of objections can be raised to this vision of the American military in the near-term and longer-term future. First of all, the armed forces described would require hundreds of thousands of men and women with very considerable technological capability. Can American society provide them? It is true that the American birthrate is declining. In 1988, for example, there were 62.3 miIlion Americans between the ages of 18 and 32. At present, there are 58 million, a rather steep drop in only eight years. However, if the US armed forces number 1.5 million or less on active duty, even a pool of 50 million native-born men and women of military age easily could sustain it. But the US population is increasing not only from births but from immigration. Unlike other technologically advanced societies, the American population is increasing at a healthy rate. Consider this: in 1914, the population of the United Kingdom was about 46 million, Japan was about 52 million and the US

15 Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, eds., Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, revised edition (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996). 138 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS about 98 million. In 1991, the UK had a population Of 57.5 million, Japan had nearly 124 million and the US about 253 million. In the Year 2025, it is estimated, the population of the UK will have crept up to 61 million, that of Japan advanced to about 135 million but that of the US will have risen to about 334 million. In other words, over a period of little more than a century, the population of the UK will have risen by 33 percent, that of Japan by 160 percent, compared to an American population increase of 341 percent.16 More important in regard to the forces I have described, is the high educational level of Americans. At present, about 24 percent of the American population between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four has at least two years of education beyond high school level; 27 per cent of those between twenty-five and twenty-nine years old have four-year college degrees. These percentages will rise in coming years. About 60 percent of all American high school graduates now go on to college. In 1992, the latest year for which complete statistics are available, over 1.1 million Americans received bachelor’s degrees. .Of course, the requirements for immigration to the US are such that most adults receiving American immigrant visas today already have four-year college degrees.” Another objection to the idea that the US armed forces can reconfig- ure themselves as described is the high cost. Certainly the weapons and equipment required would be fabulously expensive. Furthermore, the need to reduce the federal debt, balance the federal budget over the next seven years or so and to avoid socially destabilizing cuts in welfare and entitlement programs means an almost inevitable reduction in US defense spending from presently projected levels. It would not be

16 Military Balance 1988-89, p. 18; Military Balance 1995-96, p. 23; Carl Haub, Mary Mederios Kent and Machiko Yanagishita, 1991 World Population Data Sheet (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 1991); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 243. 17 National Center for Education Statistics, The Condition of Education 1995 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 194-95, 245-46, 249, 329-30. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 139 surprising if total defense outlays were to fall to the level of around $220 billion in current dollars by the year 2001 and perhaps mmer. Additional military personnel reductions probably will occur to help offset these cuts. Some defense analysts are suggesting a ten percent drop in defense outlays, accompanied by a fifteen-to-twenty percent decrease in the size of the US armed forces. In other words, early in the twenty-first century, active American forces might number only about 1.2 million. This could mean an army of 9 or 10 divisions, a Marine Corps of 2 divisions and 2 air wings, a navy of 200 combat ships and an air force of 50 combat squadrons. In fact, at present, a group of defense experts, led by former assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle and retired Admiral Owens, is attempting to create a bipartisan consensus to carry out such cuts. Their rationale is that in order to maintain present American military superiority well into the future, modernization is far more important than retaining force structure.'*

Present and Future Implications for Northeast Asia

Such projections about possible future reductions in US active-duty forces may worry those concerned about the security of Northeast Asia. While the future is unknowable and undoubtedly is going to present many surprises, some basic guesses about the shape of international relations over the next twenty years seem reasonable. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power probably will make Europe and the Middle East less subject to crises and the danger of war. But likely increases in the power of China, combined with unresolved problems related to the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, off-shore rights and even the Kuriles, may bring a greater degree of tension and instability to Northeast Asia. This makes the question of future American military strength in the region a matter of considerable import. Before pondering the future, however, consider the recent past and the present. There should be no mistaking what high value the US government places on the peace and prosperity of East Asia, especially for its allies in the region. In 1988 the US had 96,000 military personnel

18 Author's private conversations, May 1996. 140 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS in Korea and Japan. That same year, US forces in Europe numbered 353,000. At present, the US has forces amounting to 75,000 in Korea and Japan. But US forces in Europe have dropped to 118,000. In other words, Over the past eight years, US forces in Europe have been cut by nearly two-thirds. Overali, US active forces have declined during the same period by one-third. But those in Korea and Japan have been reduced only by about one-fifth. Put another way, US forces in Korea and Japan numbered about eighteen percent of all US forces overseas in 1988. At present, American forces in the region represent about thirty-two percent of those overseas. These figures speak eloquently about American commitment to the region. But the confluence of interests of the US and its East Asian allies provides an even greater indication of American dedication to the defense of Japan and Korea.’’ Nor should one underestimate what US defense spending- even reduced to $200 billion annually-could buy in capabilities over the next generation. Given the reductions in the defense spending of American allies but the collapse of Russian economic and military power and the backward nature of Chinese military technology, the US could not only preserve its relative military might by spending $200 billion per year, but actually increase it over the next twenty years. It would be foolish to deprecate the technological ability of the Japanese or the Western Europeans. China may develop into a mighty economic and military power by the middle of the twenty-first century. One should not dismiss the chances for Russia to reverse its present decIine and return to great-power status in a generation or two, However, the US enjoys a great lead in military technologies and is spending almost as much on its armed forces as the rest of the world combined does on theirs. In addition, all of potential enemies of the US face enormous social, political and economic problems as serious distractions from military spending. Under these circumstances, the outlay of $4 trillion dollars or more on defense over the next twenty years, particularly with

19 Annual Report, p. C-2: Patrick M. Cronin, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined,” Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum, number 75 (Washington, DC: National Defense University press, 1996). BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 141 a large fraction channelled into modernization, should bring the US unrivalled military power in return.20 Eventually, other states will acquire the kinds of advanced arms and equipment previously described, providing they have iiccess to the necessary wealth and are willing to spend the huge sums required. Several Asian states eventually may undertake such massive and costly rearmament. After all, the world balance of economic power is shifting at a historically unprecedented rate away from Europe and North America and in favor of East Asia. In fact, this provides one major reason why the US will remain firmly committed to the region. By the middle of the twenty-first century, Asia may have one or two powers roughly equal to the United States. By then, a united Korea is almost certain to enjoy a level of relative power equivalent to what France or Germany possess today. It may very well be that by 2050, the US will rely heavily on Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand-to name only a few of the possibilities-to maintain the peace and prosperity of the Western Pacific region. But this article focuses on the next twenty years, during which time the US probably will not only maintain but seems likely to increase its relative military power. Beyond that, it would be foolish to suggest the outIines of so distant a times2’ Despite these optimistic forecasts of the immediate future from the American point of view, there are potential weaknesses in the contem- porary American approach to force restructuring and modernization. Above all, the US military remains wedded to technology as the primary means to win war. This is the American Way of War and nothing short of a catastrophic defeat is going. to change the basic nature of US military culture. Nor would the US armed forces benefit from engaging in war from a position of technological inferiority. But such superiority alone will not win wars.22

20 Annual Report, pp. 83-86, 135-41, 235-49, B-1; The Military Balance 1995-96, pp. 264-75; Ron Montaperto, “China as a Military Power,” Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum, number 56 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995). 21 Gray, “The Changing Nature of Warfare?’ pp. 19-20.

22 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 142 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS In fact, the American stress on a technological approach to war has been far more successful against Western opponents than against Asians. Despite its technological inferiority, including a lack of radar, the Japanese navy inflicted defeat after defeat on the US Navy off Guadal- canal in 1942-43. Toward the end of World War I1 in the Pacific, the Japanese defense of Iwo Jima and Okinawa demonstrated how American military technological superiority could be neutralized by tactical and operational ingenuity, courage and a willingness to endure terrible casualties. Five years later, its great technological advantages over the Chinese army did not prevent the US Army from suffering stunning defeat in the Korean winter of 1950-51. Enormous technological advantages, including overwhelming air superiority, did not bring the US victory in the Vietnam War.2’ Particularly in an Asian context, another troubling aspect of the modernization of the US armed forces lies in their heavy reliance on information technologies. Obviously, such technologies can bring enormous advantages. The American victory over the Iraqis in 1991- particularly its air warfare aspects-demonstrated some of the early phases of information and information-based warfare and gave a fore- taste of the military miracles it could ac~omplish.~~As indicated previously, far more sophisticated information technologies will soon bring the American military extraordinary new capabilities. However, information is not knowledge; knowledge is not understanding. Unfortu-

Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973). 23 Samuel Eliot Morrison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), pp. 17-3 15; United States Army in the Korean War, Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951 (Washington, DC: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1990), pp. 105-227; W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York, Crane, Russak, 1977), pp. 39-46; Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 42-126; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 13 1-275; Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power. The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989). 24 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 188-226. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 143 nately, while us forces have long demonstrated their superb skills at gathering information, they do not always understand the intelligence acquired. Americans have shown particular blindness and confusion when dealing with Asian adversaries. Despite the information available to them, US forces were surprised by the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in December 194 1. After three years’ experience of war, the us Navy was still psychologically unprepared for the Japanese navy’s operations at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, as well as by the use of kamikaze aircraft. The US Army was caught unaware when the North Korean forces stormed across the 38th Parallel in June 1950. Five months later, despite considerable information available to him, General MacArthur was totally surprised by the effectiveness of Chinese intervention in the Korean War. While the US forces possessed volumes of intelligence in advance regarding the Tet Offensive of early 1968, they did not interpret it correctly. As a result, they were caught badly off guard by the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong attacks.2s A common thread connects these examples of US forces suffering strategic and operational surprise: Americans place a very high value on the lives of their military and find it quite difficult to anticipate enemy actions in which casualties are a secondary factor. This is not to regurgitate the American cliche notion that Asians place a low value on life. Rather, Asians (as well as others) sometimes consider severe losses acceptable in pursuit of victory. Furthermore, Americans and their opponents often have had a different concept of what constitutes victory. For example, some societies place great importance on “dying well,” a value largely absent from Western thinking since the decline of the aristocratic order. As a result of such contrasting values and perceptions, it would appear that “dominant battlefield awareness” might not necessarily ensure the US armed forces even operational victory against some future opponents.26 Certainly, it will not guarantee strategic victory. AS

25 James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press, 1991).

26 Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 396-504, 591; Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte, June 144 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS the Vietnam War demonstrated, it is quite possible to win battles but to lose the war.27 Finally, their technological mastery contributes to American gance. Such arrogance can lead to unpleasant surprises in war, such as the unexpected discovery that despite their technological inferiority one’s foes can prove equal or even superior in armed conflict. This American blindness led to many defeats in the Indian Wars, contributed greatly to US difficulties in the campaigns to suppress Filipino independence in 1899-1902 and helps explain the previously-mentioned problems the American military encountered in their other wars in Asia. The US also has imposed its technological concept of war on its Asian allies, often with highly negative results. For example, a case can be made that the US military’s attempt to build the South Vietnamese forces in the American technological image and likeness contributed to the fall of the Republic of Vietnam. Perhaps a more “low tech” South Vietnamese approach to war would have served them better on the battlefield.28 In the mid-I990s, many in the US armed forces leadership have begun to take it for granted that an American-dominated revolution in military affairs is underway and that this will bring the United States decisive advantages in war for the foreseeable future. This may be true insofar as information and information-based warfare are concerned. But if the recent past is any guide to the near-term future, it seems doubtful that only one RMA or MTR will unfold in the next few decades. A glance at the military history of the past six hundred years indicates that the ever-increasing rate of socio-political change, techno-

1944-January 1945, vol. 13 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War11 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958). pp. 160,242-96,300-03; Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean Wac South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 17-21; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 19-22, 45-104; Dave Richard Palmer, Summons ofthe Trumpet: U.S.- Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 178-87; Gen. Bruce W. Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), pp. 77-80. 27 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meir, 1979). 28 Tran Van Don, Our Endless Wal: Inside Vietnam (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 147-50, 160, 230-31. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 145 logical progress and cross-cultural fertilization has greatly increased the frequency of RMAs and MTRs. In the West, between the end of the European Middle Ages and the beginning of the twentieth century, there Seem to have been eight RMAs or MTRS. Between 1905 and the present, twelve. (See the appendix.) No doubt, some military historians would argue with these numbers or definitions. But the general point appears valid: while the US military may indeed possess a commanding lead in the development of an RMA/MTR based on information technologies, there may well be other RMNMTRs that will be developed by enemies of the US and its allies. Furthermore, not all RMAs depend on technology. The French army pioneered an RMA in the 1790s that involved no new technologies but, instead, the application of the ideology of the French Revolution to warfare. Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh (Zhu De) did something quite similar when they thought through and developed the RMA known as “People’s War” in the 1930s. If the US keeps track of its potential opponents only in terms of their technological capabilities, it may be overlooking the advent of powerful new types of ~arfare.’~ So, does this article contradict itself? It begins by arguing that the US will remain the world’s paramount military power for the foreseeable future and concludes by suggesting it could suffer major military defeats in Asia over the next twenty years. If there does seem an inconsistency, it is because one other factor in the equation has been left out: the evolving relationship between the US and its Asian allies. On the surface, it may appear that America’s Asian allies are more dependent on the US than vice versa. Perhaps that was so until recently. For example, some have gone so far as to characterize the American- Korean relationship as that of a big brother to a little brother. Even if that were true, it is also true that relations between brothers change as time passes. At one point in their lives, a big brother can be much more knowledgeable than his younger sibling. But after both grow to man-

29 Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army of the Revolution. From Citizen-Soldiers to Instru- ment of Power (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988), pp. 97-285; Mao- Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 75-263. 146 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS hood, they may be far closer to equality in education. Sometimes, a younger brother eventually can grow wiser than his older brother. It may be that the time is approaching when US forces will need Korean assistance almost as much as the Korean military needs Amer- ican help. That potential American dependency may continue to grow. The intersection of the security interests of seven states in Northeast Asia-those of South Korea, North Korea, Russia, China, Taiwan, Japan and the US-has become the single most important focus of American security, already surpassing the sum of American interests in Europe or the Middle East. Northeast Asia is almost certain to remain the primary security concern for the United States through the coming century. For economic, military, diplomatic, cultural and political reasons, the US has no choice but to remain deeply- wedded to the peace and prosperity of the area. As a result, the American alliances with South Korea and Japan are based on a wide and enduring community of interests. The US does bring a number of great strengths to its East Asian alliances. But, as suggested, the changes in US military force structure and in the strategic balance in Northeast Asia suggest possible American vulnera- bilities, as well. Americans need to acquire a far better understanding of East Asian cultures, politics and philosophies. Despite recent changes in US immigration policies and the changing ethnic composition of American society, the United States remains a country with a European culture. If the American future is going to be tied increasingly to East Asia, however, without a far greater knowledge of the history, geography, languages, religions and other factors that shape East Asian thinking, Americans will be handicapped. For its part, the US armed forces must understand the East Asian approach to war and the use of force far more thoroughly than they do presently. Heavily influenced by the European tradition, Americans think about war in Western cultural terms. Now it is true that war in the West and the East has many universal aspects. Clausewitz and Sun Tsu share many ideas in common, even if expressed differently. But they also differ in significant ways. The Chinese master of war places particular emphasis on deception, psychological operations and surprise, for example. This should present a loud warning to those Americans devoted to the concept of information and information-based warfare. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 147

Information can be used to deceive and confuse. The American military could avoid serious mistakes and misunderstandings by seeking greater knowledge of East Asian approaches to warfare. Their Korean allies could help to educate them, if Americans were willing to learn.” The United States has become accustomed to fighting from a position of material and technological superiority. Despite their defeat in Viet- nam and more recent humiliations in Lebanon and Somalia, Americans continue to believe that such superiority presents the key to victory. But Koreans have a different military tradition. They acquired a concept of war from their inescapable geography, wedged first between two, then three, great powers. As a result, Koreans discovered by necessity the art of fighting and winning from a position of apparent weakness. To avoid future Vietnams, Americans can learn much from Koreans about the art of waging war from a position of material and numerical inferiority. Such knowledge could prepare Americans to far better understand an Asian enemy’s strategy.” Americans are impatient. Their history is short. They worship speed and progress. This is especially so in regard to how Americans like to make war. Their impatience helps explain American difficulties in the last two years of the Korean War and American defeat in Vietnam. But the countries of East Asia are old. East Asians take a much longer view of the vast sweep of history than do Americans. Given the American sense of time, the seven years of struggle with the British to gain American independence seemed a very long time. But Korea was subjugated by the Japanese for forty years before Koreans regained their independence. The United States was divided and reunited in the space of four Years. If the Confederacy had been able to prolong its resistance

30 Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1995); Gen. Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War The Modern Chinese Inferpetation (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1990, p. 95 (“All warfare is based on deception.”). 31 Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea (Seoul: Eul-Yoo Publishing), 1986), pp. 270-73, 484-85, 497; Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Conti- nent, 2 vols. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1937 & 1940), vol. I, pp. 150-75: Lt. Col. Robert R. Leonard, “Force XXI and the Theory of Winning Outnumbered,” Army, June 1996. 148 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS to the Union even a year longer, it could very well have left the United States permanently split asunder. But Korea has been divided for Over fifty years. However painful, Koreans have learned to be patient With their national tragedies. If Americans wish success in war and diplomacy in East Asia, they have much to learn from Koreans about patience. Koreans can teach them about taking the long view in achieving national goals. Korean enduring patience seems likely to be soon rewarded with national reunification. But American insistence on speedy solutions to problems and quick returns on investments is often followed, first by frustration, and then frequently ends in a propensity to disengage in disgust. The history of American relations with China and economic competition with Japan can be so characterized, as can that of US involvement in Vietnam, Americans need to understand that perseverance is often the foundation of success in East Asia. Greater familiarity with Korean history and culture can teach them that lesson, There are many other important lessons that Americans can learn from Koreans about waging future wars in East Asia. Space is lacking to discuss them all in any detail. But they include the ways in which East Asians blend Eastern and Western approaches to warfare, how they perceive new American military technologies, effective methods of psychological warfare in an East Asian context, how best to exploit weaknesses in hostile East Asian coalitions, and the best ways to employ new American military technology against opponents with an East Asian strategic culture. In brief, the point is that Koreans are increasingly in a position to bring as many strengths to the US-ROK alliance as do Americans. Furthermore, because of their different virtues, the US and its East Asian allies in combination are more powerful together than the sum of their parts alone. The US does and will continue to bring great military power to the alliance. As has been argued, despite apparent reductions in American military strength, the US armed forces actually are growing stronger materially. But such material military superiority will be effective only if it is used properly. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, one must know oneself and know one’s enemy well in order to win not only battles but wars. It is the particular good fortune of the US armed forces that, based on a haIf-century of close cooperation, Koreans can help educate BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 149

Americans about both realties. By explaining how Americans appear to East Asians, Koreans can help Americans to know themselves. By educating Americans about East Asians, Koreans can help Americans to know their potential enemies. Americans and Koreans are thus in a position to strengthen and teach each other, forming an even more powerful alliance in future. May each have the wisdom to do so. Appendix. Revolutions in Military Affairs and Military Technical Revolutions, c. 1350-2000.

A. Fourteenth through nineteenth centuries, C. 7350-7900. 1. Mid-14th to early 15th centuries: English-Welsh, Swiss and Burgundian infantry used long bows, pikes and compact tactical formations to end the thousand-year dominance of armored cavalry. This helped cause the collapse of the European feudal system.

2. Mid- 15th to mid-16th centuries: European sail-powered warships with broadside artillery, deployed in line-ahead formations, ended the two thousand-year dominance of galleys. As a result, European explorers and conquerors came to dominate the world's coastal regions. 3. Early to mid-16th century: Introduction of the arquebus, field and siege artillery, regimental infantry formation, close order drill and the artillery fortress began the age of gunpowder warfare. So armed, Europeans could defeat non-European armies in almost every case. 4. Early to late 17th century: Linear infantry formations, lighter field artillery, the socket bayonet, Vauban fortresses and the ability of European monarchs to pay for them led to far larger, modern armies under bureaucratic control, and helped create and sustain the modern sovereign state. 5. Mid- 17th to mid- 18th centuries: Improved navigation, ship build- ing, naval ordnance and food preservation allowed world-ranging naval fleets and mercantile commerce, and the creation of modem capitalist colonial empires. 6. Late 18th century: Mass politics, the concept of the citizen-soldier, the Zeve'e en masse, mobile and night operations, skirmisher and 150 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

column tactics, and the development of the army corps all combined to create modern land war and introduce political ideology into war. Clausewitz observed this and conceived of war as the continuation of politics by violent means. Modern war was born. 7. Mid- to late 19th century: Rifled repeating shoulder arms and artillery, shells, machine guns, railroads, telegraph systems, improved explosives, barbed wire and food preservation, all based on industrial mass production, allowed armies of unprecedented size and staying power, and created total war. The civilian economy became an acceptable target of warfare. The defense gained the upper hand in land warfare. 8. Mid- to late 19th century: Coal-driven, steam-powered, all-steel armored warships, armed with turret-mounted shell-firing rifled cannon; torpedoes and torpedo boats; reciprocating engines, screw propellers and telegraphy were developed. These led to “the Mahan- ian revolution” in naval warfare. European-culture-based states acquired world dominance as a result.

B. The twentieth century, 1905-1996. 1. 1905-13: The all-big-gun dreadnought battleship was developed. These warships employed indirect fire, hence the need for greatly improved gunnery control and ranging optics; enjoyed a great increase in main battery range, wireless communications and oil- burning turbine engines. These developments set off a worldwide naval armaments race and greatly enhanced national rivalries to make a general European war on a global scale highly likely. 2. 1910-1 8, 1935-45: Ocean-going submersibles reintroduced the possibility of effective guerre de course. Island states like Britain and Japan became highly vulnerable to such weapons. Commerce raid- ing came to rival naval battles as the means to dominate the seas. 3. 1917-1 8: Indirect artillery fire, field telephones, wireless radio, tanks, motor vehicles, poison gas, submachine guns, hand grenades, trench mortars, combined with infiltration tactics, new concepts of BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 151

artillery operations and new training techniques returned the advan- tage to the offensive in land warfare.

4. 1935-1944: The development of long-range, heavy-load-bearing bomber aircraft, incendiary and high explosive bombs, advanced navigation and aiming devices, aerial radar and electronic warfare, combined with the ideas of Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell, led to effective strategic bombing. Attacks on civilian population cen- ters become routine. Economically developed states become vulnerable to strikes against industrial, transport and communications targets . 5. 1924-44: Carrier-based naval aviation, supported by modern industry and technology, transformed warfare at sea. The US was able to dominate both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. 6. 1920-43: Effective amphibious warfare and assault techniques developed to allow massive invasions from the sea. This proved essential in the defeat of the Axis powers and the rise of the US to preeminent world military and economic power. 7. 1933-43: The Blitzkrieg was developed by the Germans, based on their World War I infantry tactical and operational methods but supplemented by tanks, motor vehicles, close air support and wireless radio. These methods were adopted and improved by Soviets and Americans, who added modern artillery operations and based the system on massive industrial production. After the defeat of Germany, US-Soviet confrontation in Europe resulted in part from the two sides’ possession of such means of warfare. 8. 1930s-1970s: The successful application of “people’s war” or “wars of national liberation” allowed colonial subjects and revolutionary forces with a mass base to overthrow European rule or to defeat conventional armies through guerrilla warfare. Most of the Third World regained its independence, ending four hundred years of European dominance; the US was defeated in Vietnam.

9. 1941-49: Nuclear weapons delivered by long range bombers were created by the US and USSR. The idea of nuclear deterrence was 152 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

created and took a central place in the policies and strategies of the Cold War. 10. 1940s-1960s: Strategic land-based ballistic missiles, tipped by nuclear warheads; high-performance jet aircraft; powerful modern computers; satellite reconnaissance; space-based global communications; manned space missions led to the concept of mutual assured destruction. Total war between the superpowers was ren- dered virtually impossible. 11. 1950s-1980s: Nuclear powered attack submarines, then nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarines, transformed naval warfare and further inhibited total war. 12. 1970s-c. 2000: Precision guided munitions; improved space systems; improved communications and navigation techniques; highly effective helicopters; improved artillery and support systems; improved air-ground cooperation; computers of great power and reduced size; silicone chips; new sensor systems; new operational ground warfare concepts presaged an MTR and suggested the possibility of a coming information and information-based RMA or additional MTRs. The US achieved dominance in conventional and nuclear warfare, gaining world semi-hegemony.