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262 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS The Reshaping of the US Armed Forces: Present and Future Implications for Northeast Asia Brian R. Sullivan Over the past decade, the size of the US armed forces and of the US defense budget has declined significantly. While these reductions seem to indicate a loss of US military power, the opposite is true. Great improvement in the US strategic position after the Cold War and the new technology now available to the American military actually has resulted in increased US strength. This favorable situation is likely to endure for a generation. One reason for the difference between military appearance and reality is that new American weapons platforms will have smaller crews but far greater capabilities. This trend will continue as developing systems are incorporated into the operating forces. Furthermore, the US military may be poised on the brink of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). Centered on information and information-based warfare, this development could allow American forces to anticipate enemy operations, while blinding hostile forces to US maneuvers. The US possesses the necessary educated manpower in sufficient quantities to operate such weap- ons and equipment. Despite likely new cuts in the size and funding of the US military, the $4 trillion the US will spend on defense over the next two decades will provide it with extremely strong forces. US forces will be concentrated heavily in Northeast Asia, a region of increasing importance to the US. Even with the rise of several Asian states as major economic powers, the US is certain to maintain armed forces materially far superior to theirs for twenty years, perhaps longer. But the US armed forces still face a number of problems in defending American and allied interests in Northeast Asia. Historically, the US has endured defeats at the ABSTRACTS 263 hands of technologically inferior Asian foes. Also, Americans often have failed to understand Asian strategic and military thinking, suffering some disastrous intelligence failures as a result. An American RMA based on information technologies may be vulnerable to deception, a technique stressed in East Asian warfare. Americans have an arrogant faith in technology, but material superiority does not necessarily lead to victory in war. The defeat in Vietnam demonstrated this. Furthermore, the US armed forces may not be embarking on an RMA at all, but only a less profound “military technical revolution” (MTR). An MTR involves major changes in military technology but not the revolutionary advances in the cultural, political and strategic approaches to war fundamental to an RMA. Also, the frequency of RMAs and MTRs has been increasing. Even if the American military is about to experience one or the other, its potential enemies may be developing their own. Given its various demonstrated weaknesses, the US military would benefit from closer collaboration with its East Asian allies and learning from Korean military history in particular. Most of all, given their western mentality the American armed forces need better understanding of how they appear to East Asians and about Chinese, Japanese and Korean approaches to war, a knowledge concentrated in the South Korean military. Thus, US and ROK forces are now able to strengthen each other. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 129 The Reshaping of the US Armed Forces: Present and Future Implications for Northeast Asia Brian R. Sullivan The appearance and reality of American military power present a number of paradoxes. At one and the same time, the strength of the US armed forces seems to be both contracting and expanding. Certainly, the introduction of new military technologies over the past decade have granted the American military striking new capabilities. In fact, some military analysts believe the US forces may soon acquire even more advanced equipment and develop the means to employ it so as to introduce revolutionary changes in warfare. Others are skeptical about such possibilities. Still others warn that unforeseen liabilities may accompany such advances in American fighting power. These developments are of particular relevance for the security interests of the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia. That region appears certain to be the major focus of the concerns of the US armed forces over the next generation. Radical improvements in American military power could help grant Northeast Asia a long period of stability. At the same time, the US armed forces have long exhibited distinct The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the United States National Defense University, the United States Department of Defense nor the United States government. The author expresses his thanks to his friend, Robert Dujarric of the Hudson Institute, for his suggestions to improve this article. 130 KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS weaknesses in war against Asian opponents. Ironically, these deficien- cies might be exacerbated by the proposed improvements in US military technological prowess. America's Asian allies, however, may be able to blend their military traditions and their approaches to war with the overwhelming material power of the US armed forces. The South Korean military may be in a particularly advantageous position to help carry out such a marriage of power, thought and action. But such questions can only be answered after an examination of the various elements of this puzzle. The Reshaping of the US Armed Forces In 1987-88, at the height of the Reagan-era expansion of the United States armed forces, the American military counted some 2,174,000 personnel on active duty. They were supported by an additional 1,15 1,000 in the selected reserve. Today, there are only about 1,500,000 in the active-duty armed forces, with another 940,000 reserves. By early 1998, American force levels are slated to drop even lower, to about 1,460,000 active and 900,000 reserve personnel. In other words, over a ten-year period, active forces will have shrunk to about two-thirds of their former size; the total force will have gone down from 3,325,000 to 2,360,000, a thirty-percent reduction.' This decline also can be measured in numbers of combat units and weapons platforms. In 1988, the US Army had 18 divisions, 4 indepen- dent brigades and 3 armored cavalry regiments. Today, it contains 12 divisions and 2 armored cavalry regiments. Over the same period, the US Navy has declined from 137 submarines and 239 principal surface combatants to 100 and 137 respectively. In 1988, it had 14 carriers in commission; today only 12. Meanwhile, the US Air Force has declined from 20 bomber and 79 fighter squadrons to 12 bomber and 52 fighter squadrons. Cuts in the strength of the US Marine Corps have been less severe. Today, as in 1988, it is made up of 3 divisions and 3 air wings. 1 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. C-1. BRIAN R. SULLIVAN 131 However, Over the past decade, the Corps has fallen from 198,000 to 172,000 personneL2 Yet another way to consider the drop in American defense levels from the Reagan to Clinton presidencies is monetary. In 1985, Department of Defense outlays reached 6.2 percent of US gross domestic product (GDP); a decade later they had fallen to 3.7 percent. Defense outlays will almost certainly continue to decline as a percentage of American GDP. In its highest single year for expenditures on national defense functions, 1988-89, the Reagan administration (and its successor) spent some $304 billion. This fiscal year, the Clinton administration will spend about $271 billion. For 1997-98, it has proposed outlays of $257 billi~n.~ At first glance, these figures seem to describe a severe weakening of US defense capabilities. In fact, even these numbers alone indicate a quite different reality. When placed within the context of the present international situation, ongoing Department of Defense acquisitions, military technological developments and the evolution of US national security policy, the numbers actually indicate a relative increase in American military strength since the mid-1980s. In fact, the total picture suggests an even greater improvement over the next two decades, particularly in regard to the defense of American interests and those of its allies in East Asia. To begin, there has been a considerable disproportion between the decline in US active and reserve forces and the drop in national defense function expenditures. Over the same period, 1988-89, active forces will have fallen by about 33 percent and overall forces by about 30 percent. But even factoring in likely inflation, defense function spending will have decreased only by about 20 percent. When the budgets of the intelligence agencies are estimated as part of national defense spending, the percentage of decline probably will be even less.4 2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996-1996 (London: Oxford University press, 1995), pp. 23-28; The Military Balance 1988-1989 (Reading: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 19-25. 3 Annual Report, pp. B-2 - B-3; Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 23. 4 Annual Report, pp. B-2 - B-3. 132 KOREANJOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS One could argue that the cost of weapons and equipment is increasing at a geometric rate, so that defense dollars are buying less and less defense. But the contrary appears to be true. First, consider military manpower and weapons performance in relation to combat strength. One of the most striking changes in American weapons platforms over the past generation is the simultaneous declines in crew size and increases in fighting power.

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