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Spartans in Darkness -- Additional Pages Released on Appeal Case No. 52331/Appeal No. 3300 You may consider this final Agency decision to be a denial of your appeal. You are hereby advised that under the MDR process, you may appeal a final agency decision in writing, within 60 days from the date ofthis letter, to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) at the following address: Executive Secretary Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel ATTN: Classification Challenge Appeals c/o Information Security Oversight Office National Archives and Records Administration 7th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 500 Washington, DC 20408 Additional information regarding the ISCAP's appeal process can be found at: http://W\vw.archives.gov by typing "ISCAP" in the search field. Please be advised that we are still waiting on a releasability determination from one OGA regarding their information. We will respond separately when the consultation with that other agency has been completed. Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975 is a product of the National Security Agency history program. As set forth in the attached disclaimer, the contents and conclusions of this publication are those of the author, based on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views ofthe National Security Agency. "..--'~'---"' .. " . tJ5ft ' JOHN C. INGLIS Mandatory Declassification Review sW Appeals Authority 2 Encls: als This publication is a product of the National Security Agency history program. Its contents and conclusions are those ofthe author, based on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views of the National Security Agency. Please address divergent opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History (EC). 16119EeRElwe8UINlMEi Table ofContents Page (U) F01'e'\'ord xi (U) Preface xiii (U) Aclatowled.grnents :\;x (U) Prelude: Indochina Before 1950 I (U) The French .-\rri\'e :l (U) Threats to thl' French: Nationali~1s and Ho Chi Minh .:1 (lJ) .Japanese Expan~ion t> (L) U.S. Policy 8 (L) Resist.1nce to .Japanese Occupation 9 (D) TIle French Counter Ho 10 (V) The Arllerican Vie\\" 12 (U) Bao Dai Returns I~i (U) Operation Lea 14 (L) Thl' l3C'ginning of the End for the Frt'nch 14 Chapter 1- (U) Le Grand Nombre Des Rues Sans Joie: American COMINT and the Franco-Vietnamese War, 1950-1954 17 tSffSI) America's Postwar COl\llNT Pn'llicament 17 (L) 1be F..arly COMI~T E.ffort against Viet :\1inh Communications. 1945-1<.)50 18 f~I/SI) The Asian Cnlcible: American COi\lINT Commits to the Indochina War. 1950 21 (SltSI) Vncertain Relations: COi\-lINT Partnerships \o\it~ I 26 (8//BI) The Stale ofth<.' Viet Minh COMINT Problem, 1950-1954 ~ ~il (SitSI) Eavesdropping On Hell: COl\oflNT and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu .. ~ :i5 (If) The Battle Begins 38 (S/fSl) TIll' ~SA Emergency Plan for Southeast Asia i •••••••• 42 (If) -We arl' blowing up C'\·e~1hing.Adieu." 4:i ~81l81} First Interlude: The Geneva Settlement and SIGINT Drawdown, 1954-1955 49 Chapter 2 - (U) The Struggle for Heaven's Mandate: SIGINT and the Internal Crisis in South Vietnam, 1956-1962 S:i (V) Ngo Dinh Oiem: The Embattled President , 54 (U) Diem's War Against Internal OiSS<.'llt 58 EO 1. 4. (c) EO 1. 4. (d) 16P SEeRETII68MINlfRH Page v EO 1. 4. (c) Page (V) ··It is lime for the struggle": Hanoi andtheSouthel'n Insurrel'tion 62 (sttSl) SIGINT and the Attl'mpted C'Qups Against Diem. 1960-1Q62 66 ell) The Formation of the Natiorml Liheration Front. Dect'mbel' 1960 70 (ll) America Plans the :Vlainland SIGINT Buildup. 19SQ-1961 n (S!lSI) ~T~chhl'ud in Asia: Establishing the SIGINr Sitl' inL--JThailand.1959-1961 74 Chapter 3 - (U) "To Die in the South": SIGINT, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem, 1959-1968 H:~ (t") .-\n Emhattl<.'d Kingdom: Group 959 and Hanoi's Role in tht' Struggll' for 1..10S. 1959-1962 H7 (C) :\Iilitary Group 559, the Construl'tion of thl' Ho Chi :\linhTI;a1. and the Southern Infiltration. 1959-1962 lJ4 (l~) Group 759 and Maritime Infiltration 1959-1963 101 (S/lSI) The Rest of the Story, Pm11: SIGINT and Infiltration. 1963-1967 lO:i (U) 'l1Il' Rest of thl' Story, Part 2: The Yinh Window and the Breakthrough on tlll' Infiltration Problem, 1967-1968 110 Chapter 4 - (U) The Burden's First Fanfare: American SIGINT Arrives in the Republic ofVietnam, 1961-1964 1J<) (t") Defining the Struggle: The Counterinsur~en('yPlan. 1960-19bl 120 (SlISH The SIGINT Plan for Southeast Asia, 1961 12~ (l") The An;val orthe :~rd RRlT in Saigon, 1961 12:i (l~) The Beginnings of the AS.-\ Airborne Radio Din'dion Finding :\1ission, 1961-1963 129 (t:) Tadical SIGINT Support to ARVN Operations 1:34 (S,'/SI) '111l' l\·farilU's. Air Forct'. and NSA Establish 'l11eir SOlltheast .-\sia Mainland :\Iissions I:P lfi//SI) The Communists' Big Communications Change. ApJiI 1962 146 (l.') Phu Rai: The First American-onl\" Bas(' 150 (~/,'Sl) Au Revoir <Ill 1<.'0 The D<.:parture of the French. 1962 I.=)::I (l') "Aprl's MoL I.e Deluge: SIGINT and tht' Fall of Prl'sident Diem. 19b:l 155 Second Interlude: (U) The Center Does Not H{)ld: Post-Diem South Vietnam, 1964 ~ 171 EO 1.4. (c) EO 1.4. (d) Pagevj lep 9EeREl'h'69MIN1::K1 ---------------------------------- leP 6E6REliyeeMINf}R(1 EO 1,4. (c) EO 1.4. (d) (U) Third Interlude: "Who'll Slop the Rain?" America Enters the Ground War, 1965-1967 2H~~ (l~) Propping Up the Domino: American Cryptology Entefl) a Wider War ~H5 (U) The Army Security A"ency , 2H5 (V) 10e Na"'al Security Group 29~ (l) 'Ioe Air Force Secuntv Senic<.' 294 ~_:_~----~--I ~9n i-­ , (U) Centmli7.ation ofSIGIl\ij': 'IlIe Missing Ingredient :!l)b Chapter 7 - (U) A Springtime ofTrumpets: SIGINT and the Tet Offensive , 30 I (SI/SI) 'The Ground War and the Development of SIGINf Indicators, 1965-1967 .. , 30-t. (ll) Hanoi and Washington Plan for Victory ' :W9 (0) L' .S. Intdligenc.'e and the Start ofthe Willt<.'r/Spring Offensive ,.:31;') (IT) The Fulcrum of Om Vision: The Siege of Khe Sanhand Its Efr<.'l'ls on American IntelJig<.'Dl'<" , :~2{) (l') CountdO\\11 to Tet: SIGINT R<.'porling f)urin~ .January 1968 , :~~6 (V) The Mystl'l'y oft)1<' ~iO .January "Prl'lllature~ Altcwks , .. 3:~4 en The Storm Breaks: Tet and the American Rem'lioll , :tF (n Aft<.'" 'lH: CI)lltologic Postmortem ' ;{40 (lJ) Trappl."<.l in the Looking Glass: Tht' Post -T(~t R<.'ality llits \\"nshin~t()n :{47 (U) Fourth Interlude: Grasping at the Straws ofVietol"}', 1968-1970 , :~57 (81181) Hunting the Elusive COS\';\;: A CclSC Study of the Limits of SIGI~·T. 1970 ...........•................. :~hO Chapter 8 - (BI/SI) In Our Own Image: NSA, Vietnamization. and the Expansion ofSouth Vietnamese SIGINT. 1969-1973 .. , :~6CJ (TS/fSI) Early Days ofVietnames<.' CO:\UNT :{70 (8/1SI) ~SA Looks for a New SIGl~'" Parln('r in Southeast Asia. 19.:;H-19nl :l7:l (3//81) American :\1o\'l's in: Thl' Sabl'rlooth Training Program and Vietnamese Expansion, 1961-19b:~ ;~7b (flIISI) A Matter of Distant Trust: 111l' Persistent Prohlem of Sel'urity in the Vietnamesl' SIGI~'" Organization , :lHO Page viii 'FeP 9EeRETll'eeMINf}R(1 leP SEe~E~leeMIN1W)(1 . EO 1.40 (d) (S/l81) South \'il:'lnanws(' SI(al'T dul"ing lhe Anwriean .ExlxlIlsion, 196.'>-196<:> .00 •• :~H4 (,OM[~T. ('1'5/151) Countell10int: \'il'tnmnes(' Communist 1954-1970 O •••••••••• 0• :\R7 (SiiSI) OUl' Man in saigon~ ISouth \'iclnaml'S<.' SIGINT. 196:J-1969 •• 0•• 00' .•••••••..••••••••.. 0•••. 0•••••••• 0•••• 00...... 0• :~94 Cr~11Iolo~il' ll)i(l-IY7:~ :~97 (S/l61) The Grt'at -Bugout." 0 ••••••••• (SffSI) Last Chanel' to :\Iake Gooo: South Vit'tnaml:"se SlGI:\T and tht' VD1P. 197()-197:~ 0•••.•••••.••• 0•••• 00••• 0.••• 00••. 0•••••• 0.400 (Sl/Gl) No",hl'rl' to Go Rut Down: Thp nanan~ Prol'l'ssing Centl'r. Octoher IlJ72-Fl'bl'llary 197:{ 0••••• 0•.. 0•••..•••• 0••••• 0•.•• 0.•• 0• 0.• 0404 Chapter 9 - (U) The Last Ramparts ofOur Conceits: The DGTS, American SIGINT, and the Fall ofSouth Vietnam, 1973-1975 . 000••..• 41;') (SIIRI) Going It Alone: The DliTS aft('r lhl:" Paris PC'ace Agn't'ment to thl' Fall of Saigon. 197:H97.~ ••• , •• 0•••••••••• 0••••..••••.•••••••• 0420 (L) Enugame: 'l1w Collapse of South VietnamOs Dl'tl'nsiw StratC'gy 0• 0••••.. 42R 4:~fl (ll) Prl'1udt.· to the Killing Fil'1ds: TIll' Fall of Phnom Pt.·nh 0 •••••••• " 0 ••••• (L) "Nolhin~ 1.A.'lllo (;in~ l:p": Thl' Fall of Saigon. April 1975 0•••••• 0•••••..• 00•• 4:n~ (U) The Still, Small Voice: Aftermath and Conclusions. 1975 and Hel'ond 0 ••••••••• 0 •••• -l:i1 (C) Aftermnth. 197:')-1979 ..•••• 0•.•• 0o••• 000•• 0• 0••••••• 0.••••. 0••.••••••• o4S1 (L) Condusions , 0••••••.• 00• 0•• 00•• 0••••••••• 0• 0•••.••••.• 0•• 0.•• 4o~9 (U) Glo.~sary 0.•.• 000•••...• , 000• 0.••.•• 0•••••.• 0••••.•••. 0, 0••••..••. 004bY (U) Sources 00••• 0• 0•• 00••• 00•••••.••..••• 00•••••••••• 0•• 0••• o. 00, •• 475 (U) Index 00••.•. 0•.••••••.•••• 0•••• 0••.•••••.•••• 0•••. 00••••••••..• 0••..•• 4H:~ Tep 6EGRETJ:69MIN'f»K1 Pageix leP 9EeRE"f(/e9MINTME1 (U) Preface ·And C\'l'lI 1 (',m 1'~'m('ml)(,I' a dLly Whl'" url'd in the paucity of hislOl;l'S, studies, and m1i­ hil>1orians (l,n hlcmks in th<'ir writin~...: I llw,m des about the war. How could such a war, whkh for thinKS thl'y didn"t knl/w. SIGINT had cowred sinee 19S0. that. al its peak. BUllhat linlt' S('C'ms tn h<' passin~." in\'olwd as many as len thou~md cryptolu~isls ('anlo XIII.
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