Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013
important to participate in the building of new ideas, to criticize the established order and Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013
Volume 21: September 2013
Academic year 2013-2014
Editor in Chief Rodrigo Vaz Catholic University of Portugal Portugal Editorial Board
Caitlin Bagby, USA King’s College, London, United Kingdom Péter Király, Hungary Central European University, Budapest, Hungary Andrijana Nikic, Montenegro University of Montenegro, Montenegro Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, The Netherlands University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Vit Simral, Czech Republic IMT, Lucca, Italy / Charles University, Prague / Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Advisory Board Manuel Garreton, Chile,
João Carlos Espada, Portugal,
Carole Pateman, England,
Leonardo Morlino, Italy,
Phillippe Schmitter, USA Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013
Content
Editorial Message…...………………………………………………….4 Rodrigo Vaz
When nationalism meets electoral schemes: the intricate situation of the Aromanian minority from Romania……………………………………5 Sergiu Delcea
American policy on the Balkans: Sucessful story or a diplomatic failure?.……………………………………………………………...... 12 Frosina Doninovska
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East……….20 Andrzej Guzowski
From Yeltsin to Putin: Moscow’s Perception of the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula……………………………………………………..30 Wonhee Lee Politikon:IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013
Editorial Message
Dear Reader,
Let me start by welcoming you to yet another issue of POLITIKON. In this issue we publish the papers selected from the submissions we received to our call for papers.
Very soon, in November, we will celebrate the first anniversary of the re-publishing of POLITIKON, which undoubtedly fills all IAPSS members with joy, particularly the ones directly contributing to the success of the journal. November also promises to be a celebrating moment to IAPSS as in this month our organization turns 15 years old. This marking moment will be integrant part of the program of our upcoming Academic Conference and General Assembly in Bucharest, Romania, from the 19th to the 24th of November. More information on the Conference Website. Feel very much invited to join us!
I am also very happy to inform you that observing the challenges that Political Science students and young scholars may face while submitting an article, the Editorial Board is currently working in the preparation of some guidelines on how and what to submit – and how and what not. Those guidelines will be published soon in the POLITIKON page of IAPSS website. Together with, the call for papers for the next issue will also be issued.
For now, I will leave you with the selected articles. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me directly at [email protected].
Enjoy!
Best wishes,
Rodrigo Vaz
POLITIKON, Editor in Chief
Head of Academic Department
International Association for Political Science Students
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013
When nationalism meets electoral schemes: the intricate situation of the Aromanian minority from Romania
Sergiu DELCEA1, Central European University, Budapest
Abstract
he resurgence of ethno-centered, exclusionary types of nationalisms in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes in 1989 represents a multi-layered phenomenon with complex ramifications. The aim of this paper is to delve into an extremely complicated case surrounding a very peculiar T minority - the Aromanians living in Romania. This analysis aims to show that although Romania's approach to minority representation is a non-essentialist one on paper, the reserved seat system is sometimes still laced with nationalistic overtones. As a minority with a highly debated historical legacy, the Aromanians lack legal recognition and are subjected to an assimilation process that is not always as soft as it might seem. If Romania is to continue its already protracted democratic transition solving the puzzle surrounding the Aromanians seems to be a key stepping stone.
1 Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests that revolve around linking nation-building processes and welfare-regime construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe).
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Sergiu DELCEA When nationalism meets electoral schemes
espite a rather tumultuous start in secure any kind of legal recognition for the the early 90s Romania has been Aromanians. slowly improving its institutional The contentious stake here is that Dapproach to minority protection vocal Aromanian grass-roots organizations (Bernd Rechel(ed), 2009: Ch. 13 M. Ram), are striving for recognition as a "national owing in no small part to its growing minority" (Kymlicka&Opalski,2001:13-107) international commitments. However, there arguing that under the blurry Romanian are still rather blurry lines when it comes to legislation only this legal status will ensure defining who gets to be declared a minority cultural and linguistic protection (which is and gain political representation. the aim of Romania's minority legislation Furthermore, language rights packages projects5). Romania's monolithic approach is represent a very contentious issue that are grounded in a historicist discourse claiming generally transcribed into public debate as that the Aromanians are an integral part of threats to national integrity (as they are an organically defined nation hence making generally show-cased around the Hungarian their claim illegitimate for a number of minority). What seems to emerge is a rather reasons: Parliamentary representation is fuzzy picture, that leaves room for done through the regular channels (since potentially problematic case around they are equated to the bulk of the nation), minorities with very intricate backgrounds. language rights are not necessary since This paper will provide a case-study Aromanian is a dialect of Romanian and for of a rather small minority that stands at a the groups of Aromanians that are claiming crossroads between multiple discourses and descent from other nations representation is competing claims: the Aromanians2 living in done indirectly via minority representations Romania. There is an interesting paradox at of those respective states. In addition, the play surrounding the recognition of this Romanian politicians' second core argument minority3: recognized as a cultural minority is that since mass migration towards by the Council of Europe in 1997 (which Romania in the interwar era was voluntary, Romania has ratified in 2007), the the second/third/fourth generation Aromanians are subject to a soft assimilation Aromanians today cannot claim national process via an indigenization discourse, minority status. without being recognized as a minority of My main argument is that the any sort by the Romanian state. Despite Aromanian minority stands at a very having sued the Romanian state as early as dangerous crossroads between a circular 2005, grass-roots organizations (mostly legislation that aims to preserve the status uniting around CAR - Council of quo of reserved seats system and the Aromanians from Romania4) have failed to political value of nationalist rhetoric. Despite creating an over-representation of minorities (with the exception of the Roma, see 2 Methodologically, throughout this paper I Protsyk&Matichescu, 2010), the Romanian have used "Aromanians" as an umbrella electoral system disenfranchises minorities term. However, it must be clearly stated that from pursuing own agendas. On the other a wide body of literature shows a very high side of the spectrum, although Romania's degree of cultural and linguistic stance towards minorities is in not an fragmentation within this community 3 According to Romanian sources about 5 26.000 individuals in 2006 http://www.dri.gov.ro/documents/lege_mi 4 Throughout this paper I will mostly use noritati_forma_finala_guvern.pdf Last CAR as a reference point as it is not only the Accessed: 3rd April 2013 - Art 3-5 enshrined most vocal grass-roots organization, but also that any individual has the right to self- well-connected in an international network identification, and the state-mandated of Aromanian bodies. protection of identity
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essentializing one, there is a very blurry identity and the objective requirements for legislation as to which groups gets to be a considering the group as completely minority and enter into either direct electoral distinctive (K. Henrard (ed),2013- competition or the reserved seats system. forthcoming: ch. by Andras Pap). Although in post-socialist Romania, To begin with, I will first present the nationalist rhetoric is not an outward force historicist arguments claiming that in electoral competitions, it still seems to be Aromanians are part and parcel of the at least a latent hot potato: the 1999 history Romanian nation. For the sake of space I textbook scandal that lead ultimately to the will not present here this entire narrative, fall of the Government on grounds of "Anti- but focus on a few key issues that come up Romanian feelings" (TRENCSENYI& in the debates surrounding this minority: PETRESCU& KANTOR Latin ancestry, voluntary migration in the IORDACHI&Petrescu,2001:Part 1, Ch. interwar (quasi-democratic meeting of Razvan Paraianu) seems to point to an representatives at Varia, Greece in 1923), extremely complicated picture. In this ethnic identification. Even the most equation the Aromanians seem to be torn nationalistic Romanian researchers between multiple stances: accepting ultimately conclude that this minority is of assimilation and identifying with the clear Latin descent, though not part of the Romanian nation, or pushing forward an North-Danubian core that constituted the agenda of recognition as a minority of some perceived background of the Romanian sort. nation, but rather of a South-Danubian origin - latinized Greeks, Illyrians and Balkan Competing stances - Are Aromanians in Thracians. In a political sense, this historical Romania nationals or minority? More reality has always been exploited as a kind of importantly, whose nationals and/or blood-tie specific for kin-minorities, a minority? discourse which entered main-stream Romanian political debates in the late 19th- Broadly speaking, there are two early 20th century. There is one important individual threads to be pursued here: the element to be noted here: in the interwar, direct consequences of the electoral system despite no legal recognition, the Aromanians itself and the impact of the nationalist- were granted language rights and offered oriented rhetoric on an already circular state-financed minority language education legislation6. What stands out is that in the (Iosif, 2011:136-137). Although such rights case of the Aromanians both seem were clearly absent during communism, this interwoven in a very distinct fashion: legacy, coupled with a the known essentialization not directly via state- endogamous character of most Aromanian definition of minorities, but by excluding communities(Djuvara (ed.), 2012:165-170 Aromanians as a separate ethnic category in ch. M. Demeter-Peyfuss), ensured that, in no the census, and putting them under the small part, the Romanian groups maintained over-arching category of some of their linguistic and cultural "Romanians"(Tircomnicoiu,2011). This individuality. On the other side of the creates a very blurry classification that the spectrum, this has given rise to a very Aromanians are a kind of a minority of the intricate backlash effect: scholars are "homeland itself" due to particular historical claiming that beyond the Latin origin of the contexts, a narrative that could adequately be dialect, its systematization as a language was labeled as a paradox between free choice of done under the influence and standards of Romanian (Djuvara(ed.), 2012:207-214, ch. M. Caragiu-Marioteanu) thus enhancing the 6 As of 2008, minorities that have a reserved seat are those represented in the National Council for essentializing view that Aromanians are part Minorities. However, the minorities that are of an organically defined nation. represented in this body are those who get Parliamentary representation in the elections! 47
Sergiu DELCEA When nationalism meets electoral schemes
The state's secondary core argument of this approach to the Aromanian minority, revolves around the fact that voluntary in the context of Romanian electoral migration makes it illegitimate to request legislation. Although the Romanian electoral minority status. Although not framed as a system was not enshrined as an essentialist nationalistic type of argument, this narrative one with regards to minorities points to a clear direction: while first/second (King&Marian, 2012), the Aromanians were generation immigrants might be acceptable simply taken as an integral part of the as non-integrated, third/fourth generation Romanian Kulturnation, a view that was not ones, particularly those with a loose challenged by any competing organizations. common descent, are forcefully assimilated. This approach seemed to have some sort of There are two important issues though at popular legitimacy within the Aromanian play within this secondary argument: firstly, community itself, as one of the few existing the very nationalistic argument that common large-scale surveys point towards a strong Latin descent, which implies a perceived majority that self-identified with the facilitation towards assimilation, is taken to Romanian nation (Kahl, 2006). However, mean automatic desire for assimilation; some consideration must be given to the secondly, in the case of the Hungarian broader issue of self-identification in the minority non-integration is tolerated because particular case of the Aromanians. Although this particular group has concrete political the legislation enshrines a purely value as a show-case example for Romanian individualistic approach to ethnic affiliation, towards fulfilling its policy goals towards the Aromanian organizations that could provide EU and other international bodies. This type sufficient data in order to register a minority of argument, backed up by the historicist party are faced with a daunting challenge: discourse of the Romanian Academy, seems legally, they can only be ethnic-Romanian to have gotten some firm ground with grass- minorities. If an individual declares himself roots Aromanian organizations that espouse to be Aromanian, the census counts the following view: if the Aromanians are a him/her automatically as a Romanian, minority in their Romanian "home-land", making it impossible to claim Aromanian- hence non-assimilated, they would become Macedonian or Aromanian-Greek descent. "wanderers", which is normatively This legal reality translates not as an inconceivable!7 This line of thought clearly essentialist approach to minority definition, reveals the nationalistic rhetoric: nationhood but creates a salience of Romanian and national affiliation taken as salient is the nationhood: by the proxy of common Latin only normatively desirable legal existence. descent, Aromanian identification cannot The striking paradox at play here is that this exist in the framework of any other national indigenization discourse revolves around the identity (taken also as salient), than the Aromanians as part of the ancestral core of Romanian one. the nation, which would, at least a The paradox at play is the following: theoretical level, make them somewhat although Romanian legislation enables self- suitable for indigenous people status! identification, it creates clear delineations However, as they were not settled on the between the minority and the organizations territory of Romania that line of thinking (King&Marian, 2012:567). Consequently, seems to be completely futile and not at all even if grass-roots organizations, such as pursued not even by the most radical grass- CAR, bring to the Central Electoral Bureau roots organizations. sufficient data to back up their registration Moving on, I will now briefly outline as an NGO or party with representative some of the legal and political consequences claims, they are not allowed into intra- minority electoral competition for reserved seats, since an alternative (i.e. outside the 7 Declaration of Aromanian NGO, umbrella of "Romanian minority") legal http://www.scribd.com/doc/49694825/Problema- category does not exist. What follows aromanilor, Last Accessed: 23rd April 2013
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logically is that such a grass-roots electoral legislation. One interesting parallel organization is stuck between Scylla and can be drawn that shows the very specific Charybdis: registration as an Aromanian nature of the Aromanian case: when the representative body means going into main- Tartar minority representatives separated stream electoral competition, registration as from the Turkish ones in the early 90s, they a minority unit within existing recognized were granted reserved seats. Outwardly, the ethnic groups is technically impossible, or Tartars seem to be in a comparable position: would imply the fragmentation of the a regional identity without a kin-state, but a NGO/Party itself into small factions clearly delineated language, inhabiting a molded on some intra-minority ethnic plurality of states with existing minority boundaries. There is one more contentious representation in Romania (such as Russia point to be noted here about the Romanian and Ukraine). However, this group was electoral system: it seems to rest on the acknowledged as being different from the assumption that minorities are Russian minority and granted its own homogeneous and will always be represented channels of representation. This points by one political group (King&Marian, clearly towards the direction that in the case 2012:568). This mechanism transfers of the Aromanians there are more important electoral thresholds on a proportional basis factors outside the voting system itself (for within minority groups creating the perverse in-depth analysis Reynolds, 2006) - i.e. some effect that in the case of sharp intra-minority sort of assimilation. competition representation might be Last but not least, some attention completely lost (King&Marian, 2012:565- must be given to the issue of political 570). Consequently, the aforementioned entrepreneurship. King and Marian argue fragmentation of a hypothetical Aromanian that one of the key perverse effects of the NGO/Party in small-scale ethnic units Romanian minority representation legislation would not gain much ground with minority is that it allows great maneuvering room for constituencies that would fear losing crafty, well-connected politicians aiming to representation at all. To further complicate secure a comfortable seat in Parliament the problem, national minorities such as the (King&Marian, 575). Although Greek one might not even recognize the acknowledging the validity of this argument, existence of an internal Aromanian in the case of the Aromanians I argue that it community, as this identity does not legally holds no bearing: the singular case of the exist at all in Greece! PD-L member Costica Canacheu (which has This legal reality greatly hinders the proven Aromanian descent!) does not make Aromanian cause as the state has the CAR's case an instance of political straight-forward argument of indirect entrepreneurship. For instance, the representation. What CAR and other documented case of George Becali who did organizations are striving for is recognition indeed pursue minority-politics of the Aromanians as a "minority of a (King&Marian, 2012:581), but via the Italian Balkan regional people"8, by arguing that minority rather than the Aromanian minority migration towards Romania was done more (which he proudly claims descent from) on economic grounds, rather than some inside which he would probably have nationalist ethos. It is exactly here that the enjoyed even more popularity and gained Romanian arguments blend become very more support, clearly indicates that CAR is blurry: although acknowledging that the not pursuing some entrepreneurial agenda. Aromanians are clearly distinct from the Furthermore, since the Romanian law Balkan nationalities, they are not granted any permits any citizen to cast a vote for any special status, but rather forcefully political organization, if CAR were indeed assimilated into Romanian main-stream just an instance of minority- entrepreneurship it could just go into main- 8 http://www.scribd.com/doc/49694825/Problema- stream politics and by using some prominent aromanilor, Last Accessed: 23rd April 2013 49
Sergiu DELCEA When nationalism meets electoral schemes personalities gain representation through the recognition such as cultural-linguistic main-stream national channels. However, minority, the Romanian state's argument such a project seems to be completely absent seems even more fraught with nationalism - from the agenda of Aromanian grass-roots the Aromanian dialects are purportedly organizations. systematized under the templates used for the Romanian language hence cannot be Conclusions granted distinct rights. The common Latin descent seems to be a catch-phrase used to The situation of the Aromanian legitimized almost every kind of minority in Romania seems to be at a discrimination. crossroads between a plethora of issues: All things considered, breaking out internal division of the community itself, of this intricate equation seems a daunting nationalist rhetoric pervading Romanian challenge for Aromanian grass-roots politics, unclear scientific conclusions on the organizations. Political lobby seems to be history of the minority and unclear places insufficient, and needs to be joined with a within other minorities. Competing stances growing body of scholarly studies in order to towards this minority seem to be the stand any chance of success. common denominator, prompting various legal statuses throughout the plethora of Short personal description states the Aromanians inhabit: forceful Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the assimilation in Greece hence barred identity, Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European soft assimilation in Romania, partial University, Budapest, with a previous background in recognition in Albania, national minority Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) status in FYROM and so on. from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a Despite the fact that the Council of member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Europe recognized the Aromanians as a Different View, where he is exploring his current cultural and linguistic minority, the research interests that revolve around linking nation- vagueness of this document with regards to building processes and welfare-regime defining "national minorities" put this construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe). particular group in a problematic position. In the case of Romania there seem to be two Bibliography intertwining arguments: a nationalistic • Djuvara, N. (ed.) (2012), Aromanii. argument, grounded in a historicist Istorie. Limba. Destin [The discourse, claiming assimilation into the Aromanians. History. Language. Romanian nation, which has been legally enshrined in the census by denying the Destiny. - own translation], possibility of self-affiliation to alternative Humanitas: Bucharest groups such as Macedonian-Aromanian, o M. Caragiu-Marioteanu, Albanian-Aromanian etc. Although Un dodecalog al aromanilor [A boundaries of the minority are not directly 12-point Decalogue of the drawn by the abusers themselves in the case Aromanians - own of Romania, the Aromanians seem to have translation], less of a freedom of choice when it comes to self-ascribed identity (K. Henrard (ed), 2013- o Max Demeter Peyfuss, forthcoming: ch. by Andras Pap). This case Aromanii in era nationalismelor seems to be less a direct consequence of the balcanice [The Aromanians in the electoral system, as is the case of some age of Balkan nationalisms - small-scale Hungarian organizations, but own translation] more linked with a soft assimilation process • Iosif, C. (2011) The Aromanians made by a particular way of conceptualizing the census. When it comes to an in-between between nationality and ethnicity: the
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history of an identity building, published http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid in Transylvanian Review, Vol. 20 =1075, Last Accessed 25th July 2013 • Tircomnicoiu, E. (2011), The
• Kahl, T. (2006) Istoria Aromanilor Aromanians in Contemporary Romania, [History of the Aromanians - own published in Romanian Sociology translation], Edit. Tritonic: Bucharest Review, Issue 1 • King, R., Marian, C. (2012) Minority Representation and Reserved Legislative Seats in Romania, published in East European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, • Kymlicka, W., Opalski, M (eds) (2001), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Oxford University Press: Oxford • K. Henrard (ed.), (2013, forthcoming, Brill), in use the chapter by Pap, A., Murphy's Law on free choice of identity? Legal and Political difficulties in defining minority communities and membership boundaries • TRENCSENYI, B., PETRESCU, D. , PETRESCU, C., IORDACHI, C. , KANTOR, Z. (2001) Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies, Regio Books, Budapest), in use the chapter by Paraianu, R. , National Prejudices, Mass Media and History Textbooks: The Mitu Controversy • Protsyk, O., Matichescu, M. L. (2010) Electoral rules and minority representation in Romania, published in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 43, Issue 1, • Rechel, B. (2009) Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge:London, chapter in use Ram, M. Romania. From laggard to leader? • Reynolds, A. (2006) Electoral systems and the protection and participation of minorities, Minority Rights Group International available online
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American policy on the Balkans: Successful story or a diplomatic failure?
Frosina DONINOVSKA1, National Democratic Institute, Skopje
Abstract
he United States of America is a country which left a significant mark and still has a strong influence on the world political scene and the changes in the international relations especially in building the strategy of worldwide foreign policy. T The paper will try to give an overview of the events that marked the 1990’s of the last century, with an accent on the breakup of Yugoslavia and the role of U.S. foreign policy in this period. The paper will especially focus on the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia as well as the role of the United States in the Dayton Agreement and the ways of implementing the peace through the assets of diplomacy. Dayton differed from the traditional methods of negotiation in a way that included the U.S. leadership and its implementation depended on the will of the international community, especially the United States who led the efforts.
1 Frosina Doninovska, 25 is a graduate who received her Bachelor degree in Political Science at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in 2010. In 2013 she obtained her MA degree in Diplomacy and International Relations at the faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at the department od International relations. At the moment she works at the office of the National Democratic Institute office in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia as a program assistant in the field of elections. Her interests include rule of law, integrity of the electoral and political process, democratic governance, citizen participation, etc. 45
Frosina DONINOVSKA American policy on the Balkans
he end of the Cold War marked the superpower, to describe the American status beginning of a new chapter in the without precedent (Safire 2003). T world politics that the previous Within a short period in the early 90 - es, stable and predictable system of peace and world order seemed achievable. international relations replaced by a insecure The end of the Cold War and the sudden international framework which was defeat of the Soviet Union eliminated the characterized by fragmentation in the major reasons for national tensions and international relations and the emergence of reduce the threat of nuclear disaster. strong nationalist tendencies within the President George Bush proclaimed a new states. The end of the Cold War was world order led by the United States. manifested through certain events that Fukuyama welcomed the "end of history", prevailed on the international political scene the absolute triumph of capitalism and at that time. The defeat of Communism, democracy over fascism and communism ( manifested by the fall of the Berlin Wall and Fukuyama 1992). Despite all these event, the collapse of the Soviet Union imposed from today's perspective, it is important to the need for redefining the relations on a note that the end of the Cold War caused an global level. explosion of ethnic regional conflicts in the The United States from the Second World South Eastern Europe. War emerged as one of the strongest At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia countries. Characteristic of the United States emerged as it was conceived in Jajce. By in the period after the Second World War 1948 Yugoslavia was the best student of the was the opposition of the relations with the Soviet Union (Dokmanovic 2005). However, Soviet Union, a period known as the Cold during the time the relations between War. Yugoslavia and the USSR were deteriorated In the years that followed the Second World as a result of the desire of the USSR to War, the US foreign policy relied on the dominate with the communist countries by power of the nuclear weapon. The nuclear underestimating them economically (Dedier weapon was a helpful way to ensure that the 1953). It is important to note that Stalin Western Europe will rely on the United systematically and cold prepared the States as a guarantee of their own security subordination of Yugoslavia, as the central rather than looking for external adjustment point in South Eastern Europe. He with the the Soviet Union (Office of the profusely used the fact that Yugoslavia was Historian. US Department of State). under threat from the other great powers in The beginning of the Cold War was an the early years of the war and USSR were expression of the failure to implement the trying to complicate those relations in order principles agreed on the conferences in Yalta Yugoslavia to become their prey (Dedier and Potsdam (Scott 2007). Soon, The United 1953). These were the immediate causes of States started again to confront with the conflict between these two countries. Soviet Union militarily, economically and politically. After the Cold War, the United States The interests of the United States in the enjoyed a degree of world hegemony. The Balkans French often critically disposed towards the United States, invented a new word -
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During the Cold War, the American - against the Serbs / Yugoslavs, which Yugoslav relations were defined within the hampered the real development of the broader context of relations East - West. Croatian people. The Croats communist The United States supported Yugoslavia in system interpreted as something that is its independent course since decided to go imposed from the outside - by Serbia in this to the way of self-governing socialism, particular case, not by the Soviet Union. separated from the USSR with the Resolution from the Inform bureau in 1948. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Relations between Yugoslavia and the administration of the President George United States basically remained good over Bush the years due to the fact that the United States respected Tito in order to prevent any George Bush was the 41th President of the association of Yugoslavia to the Soviet United States. The function President he Union. In other words, the United States performed from 1989 to 1993, when needed an ally in the region in order to inherited Ronald Reagan. The period in prevent penetration of the USSR to the which the president George Bush led the heart of Europe. United States signifies quite turbulent chapter in the world history. Precisely in his Nationalism as a destiny of the Yugoslav time, major changes have occurred on the Peoples international political arena. In these years, the world was facing with the collapse of the Besides the fall of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, which in some way signified United States faced new problems in the the end of the policy of balance between the region of South Eastern Europe, especially two superpowers – the United States and the in the Balkans (Cox; Stokes 2008). With the Soviet Union. end of the Cold War, the ethnic hatreds George Bush took the office in a time when reached the boiling point and the state began the Soviet Union was disintegrating and to fall apart. Among the other factors, the when Moscow was looking for a new disintegration of Yugoslavia was caused framework of understanding with the West. primarily by nationalist tensions among the The question is: "What was the position of the two biggest nations, Serbian and Croatian. United States in the new world order?" Given the Serbian nationalism was embodied through fact that the future of the Soviet Union was Milosevic's efforts to create a Greater Serbia, clear, even clearer was the role of the United and the thesis of supporters of Milosevic States in the new world order. After the that they were the last line of defense and Cold War the United States were the most rescue of Yugoslavia as an equal union of all powerful country on the world’s political Yugoslav nations in which the Serbian scene militarily as well as economically and people should get an equal position. The politically. Croatian nationalism unlike Serbian was In the period between 1989 - 1990, the focus dedicated to the creation of a new of the Bush's policies were aimed at finding independent state that was largely distinct a way to deal with the collapse of the Soviet from those of the other Yugoslav peoples. Union in Eastern Europe and consequently, The supporters of Tudjman developed how to deal with the effects that were discourse in which Croatian nationalism caused by the collapse (Smith 1994). Along constituted contrary to the others, especially 47
Frosina DONINOVSKA American policy on the Balkans to this, the Bush administration was engaged the Middle East. Through the launch of in war with Iraq known as the Gulf War. "Operation Desert Storm", U.S. foreign policy The administration of the President George was focused on events related to the Gulf Bush supported the promotion of War ( (Office of the Historian. US democratic - liberal values around the world, Department of State). especially in the countries that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the new states in Eastern and Central The Relations Between the United States Europe. Perhaps the greatest triumph of the and Yugoslavia during the dissolution Bush administration aimed at spreading democracy worldwide, was the moment of This section will cover the views of U.S. spreading democracy in Latin America, diplomats and officials about the question of especially with the election of Violeta dissolution of Yugoslavia. Chamorro as president of Nicaragua, which During the whole period since the start of marked the end of the eleven years of the crisis until the final outcome, the governance of the regime of Sandinista. position of the United States regarding the The winter 1990 -1991, the Bush question of dissolution was unchanging. The administration was concerned about the United States advocated for united resistance to changes in the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia. The situation became especially alarming Since the start of fueling the crisis, the when Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from United States condemned the use of force as the position of Foreign Affairs Minister, a tool for achieving political goals and accusing Gorbachev that he was moving too undermining the democratic process of much to the right and its approach to the peaceful dialogue. right could result in reforming the The events that marked the crisis in the Communist Party, or worse with preparing a Yugoslav presidency with the non election military coup. In such a situation, of Stipe Mesic for president of the Federal Washington had to recognize that its impact Presidency in June 1991, caused reactions by on Moscow was limited, given the fact that American side. The United States called for certain events on the domestic political unimpeded transfer of the constitutional scene in the USSR, might have a negative power. The United States expressed support outcome for U.S. policy in the region. for progress towards a democratic and Perhaps the biggest failure of the Bush unified Yugoslavia. According to them, the administration was the failure to comply unhindered constitutional transfer of power with the European Union on the issue of the in accordance with the accepted practice was dissolution of Yugoslavia, since they were a very important step in that direction. engaged with the events in the Middle East, For the United States the dissolution of or the development of the situation that Yugoslavia was unacceptable but also culminated with the attack of United States unacceptable was the violent preservation of on Iraq as a result of the Iraq's invasion of the unity of Yugoslavia because in this way Kuwait. Where the American interests were democracy would be stifled, considered the threatened, the ultimate asset of diplomacy U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren was used. Thus, the United States used force Zimmerman. He also mention that the script to deal with the problems that emerged in for the peaceful dissolution could not be
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imagined. Zimmerman said that democracy Bosnia and Herzegovina with which two and unity were inseparable principles upon entities were established: the Federation of which the American foreign policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Yugoslavia was based (Zimmerman 1999). Srpska. One of the most important events in this Several years after the Dayton agreement, period was the visit to Yugoslavia of the Kosovo was the flash point of a new Secretary of State James Baker. James Baker conflict. The situation once again required a visited Belgrade on 21 June 1991. The visit long standing political, financial and even was aimed to confirm the position of the military assistance from the Western United States in order to support the united countries. The reason for such set of and democratic Yugoslavia. According to circumstances, inevitably leads to the him, this should be achieved through question about the quality of the policy of dialogue, without violence and bloodshed. the Western countries in this region (Meier Baker believed that opportunities for 1999). dialogue aimed at resolving the crisis have not been exhausted yet. In other words the Dayton republics still could agree on a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In the period between 1991-1995, Bosnia represented the chaos that many feared after Dissolution of Yugoslavia the Cold War. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in Bosnia as ethnic composed In 1991, Yugoslavia amid fierce ethnic state the violence reached a shocking degree fighting faced with the collapse of the long- of brutality. Thousands of people, mainly standing common state. The conditions for Muslims were kidnapped from their homes collapse of the political regime of "self- to be subjected to violence and terror. governing socialism" and the conditions for Influential at that time was the comment of failure of his model "real socialism", among Robert Kaplan who noted that: "Such other factors, should be sought in the bloodshed can only be explained as the release of old immanent weakness of this regime, which ethnic hatreds between Serbs, Muslims and Croats among other things also belonged: that Cold War pushed in the shadow“ (Kaplan institutionalized political monopoly of the 1993). Communist Party (SKJ), permanent In May 1993, President Clinton sent the inferiority of the "self-governing social Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher to economy" compared to the market economy Bosnia in order to find a solution for the in terms of meeting the material needs of conflict. Europe hoped that finally will find members of society, the growing deficit, as out how America plans to intervene, but well as the legitimacy of the regime ( Goati Christopher was sent to Bosnia as an 1996). observer. The European Allies were not so The dissolution of Yugoslavia was the final happy about this because they expected a outcome of the open hostilities between the strong leadership from the President Clinton member states of the Yugoslav federation. regarding this issue. The war in Bosnia had What all feared, yet there was to happen. In taken a larger scale. This situation stressed less than four years the Dayton Peace the American foreign policy. Some of the Agreement was signed as a result of the officials such as Madeleine Albright, Lake three year exhaustive war on the territory of and Holbrooke advocated for stronger 49
Frosina DONINOVSKA American policy on the Balkans intervention. Others, including Christopher, wondered whether it is worth their effort Dayton and the future of the Balkans and believed that the United States only retained the problems rather than solving The Dayton Agreement introduced a them. different way of resolving violent conflicts. In the summer 1995, the number of victims In the past, the success or failure of peace in Bosnia reached 300,000 and more than a negotiations depended on whether a conflict million people have fled. As the conflict was ready for resolving. The maturity of the took a larger scale, Islamic extremists from negotiation process depended on a number the Middle East arrived in Bosnia in order to of factors including the common perception help the endangered Muslim population of the parties that an agreement through (Chollet 2005). bargaining is desirable. (Haass 1990). Dayton In July 1995, Serb forces flooded the small differed from the traditional methods of town of Srebrenica and thousands of negotiation in a way that included the U.S. Muslim men and boys were massacred. This leadership as well as pushing the opposing genocide was one of the greatest horrors in sides to negotiate. This approach not only the history since the Second World War. had a profound impact on the stability of the This situation has strengthened the position agreement that was reached, but the of America towards intervention. implementation depended on the will of the Clinton's new policy was aimed at international community, especially the implementing the strategy of NATO United States who led the efforts (Daalder airstrike over Bosnian Serbs if they continue 2000). to attack the Croatian and Muslim population. In this way, the UN officials had Conclusion first to identify the targets before any air attack. The bombing by NATO coincided The fact that in Yugoslavia there was an with sending new diplomatic support in opportunity for a different political outcome order to conclude a peace treaty. A key is an indisputable. Only if the political elites figure in this diplomatic support was took a different position in terms of the Richard Holbrooke, tireless negotiator who common good, not in order to satisfy their understood the connection between military own appetites and desires the chaos could be force and diplomacy. In November 1995, a prevented. Until the outbreak of the civil delegation of Holbrooke managed to bring war in Slovenia in June 1991, the position of the warring parties to negotiate in Dayton, the international community was to preserve Ohio. Twenty-one day the representatives of Yugoslavia. After the outbreak of the war, the international community and the the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia representatives of the warring sides in became inevitable, and the international Bosnia, negotiated to reach an agreement in community played a less important role than order to stop the war. At the end of 1995, internal factors. sixty thousands NATO troops, including The secondary role of international twenty thousands Americans were present community and the untimely response from on the territory of Bosnia in order to begin the same lead to a major disaster in the the process of implementation of the Balkans, which undoubtedly could have agreement (Warren 1998). been avoided.
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Unfortunately, the administration of the Bosnia and in the next few years that President George Bush did not deal with the followed the Dayton Agreement, American problem. Moreover, this condition was soldiers were present on a Bosnian soil. The inherited by the next President of the United only question was: Why would United States States Wiliam Jefferson Clinton. accept engagement for such period of time? The fact that the administration of the The answer would be: to ensure that President Clinton used force aimed at violence will not be repeated, and in order to ending the war in former Yugoslavia, raises build a multiethnic, democratic and the question of the quality of the American prosperous Bosnia. Second, the U.S. policy foreign policy in the Balkans and the fact toward Bosnia in 1995 had a major impact that if they reacted on time, the disaster on how the Clinton administration and might be prevented. Transferring the others saw the connection between the responsibility from one to another, the diplomacy and the power. Finally, the war in European Union and the United States Bosnia has proved essential for the return of failed to deal with the problem in the former the United States foreign policy towards Yugoslavia respectively. Europe on the right track. Within a few This entails another question: If we make a years after Dayton, the vision of Clinton for comparison between the approach of the Europe is that of a undivided, peaceful, Bush administration and that of Bill Clinton, democratic was on the right direction to we can not say which of them was become a reality. successful. We can not claim that the The crisis in Bosnia was of great importance approach of the Bush administration was for the United States because they helped to wrong, nor to claim that Clinton was continue the process of integration into successful only because he put an end to the NATO, a policy that continued into the next war in Yugoslavia. The approach of the administration. Providing security, NATO administration of the President Clinton has given support through the necessary aimed at using force to deal with the reforms that have been allowed to enter the situation caused by the civil war, is marked Warsaw Pact countries into NATO. The as a failure of this administration, and thus policy of expanding NATO, promoted by for the President himself. The fact that the Clinton, was a significant factor in creating a United States used military force to achieve peaceful, undivided and democratic world. results is a clear indication of the The end of the war in Bosnia represented a inconsistency of the foreign policy of the turning point for the American foreign United States in the region, if you take into policy. The experience with the war in account the commitments of the United Bosnia had an impact long after the finishing States for a peaceful resolving of the of the war. This experience has shown that Yugoslav crisis. America used military force to achieve The success of the U.S. administration in results. Dayton had a great influence on the American foreign policy. Three areas were References particularly emphasized: First, the way in which the Dayton Agreement was reached Office of the Historian. “Atomic retreated primary responsibility of United Diplomacy”. Office of the Historian – Milestones States for the future of Bosnia. As a result of 1945 – 1952. November 5, 2006. this the United States were engaged in 51
Frosina DONINOVSKA American policy on the Balkans http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945- 1952/Atomic (accessed December 8, 2012). Chollet, Derek. The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft New Scott, Leon. International History 1945 – York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005. 1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Warren, Christopher. In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era. Bringing Safire, William. “On Language”. New York Peace to Bosnia. Stanford: Stanford University Times Magazine, 2003. Press, 1998.
Fukuyama, Francis. The end of History and the Haass, Richard N. Conflicts unending: The Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. United States and Regional Disputes. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1990. Dokmanovic, Miso. Independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Skopje: Faculty of Law Daalder, Ivo H. Getting Dayton: The Making of Iustinianus Primus, 2005. America’s Bosnia Policy. Washington DC: Brookings institution press, 2000. Dedier, Vladimir. Josip Broz Tito. Skopje: Misla, 1953.
Cox, Michael and Stokes, Douglas. US Foreign Policy in the Post- Cold War Era Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Smith, Tony. America’s Mission: The United States and the World Wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Office of the Historian. “1990 – 2000: The Post Cold War Era”. Office of the Historian – Milestones. May 21, 2002. http://history.state.gov/milestones/1990- 2000. (Accessed: December 24, 2012)
Goati, Vladimir. “Politicke Elite, Gradjanski Rat I Raspad SFRJ”. Republika, 1996: 2-5.
Meier, Victor. Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise. London: Routledge, 1999.
Robert, Kaplan D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Trough History. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
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Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East
Andrzej GUZOWSKI, University of Warsaw
Abstract
any Middle Eastern countries, especially the ones in Arabian Peninsula, are well-known for being rich with oil and gas. While it could be considered a blessing by many, it is becoming more and more apparent that the abundance of natural resources in the region is a double-edged sword and a form of Ma natural resource trap. Many countries have become so-called “rentier states”, funding their operations and their very structures by renting their resources to external actors. While it may seem like a profitable political move at first, said overreliance conserved the structure of economies in the Middle Eastern, never forcing the countries to develop effectively, thus making most of the produced goods, other than oil and gas, uncompetitive on the international market. Long term, it may prove disastrous for the Middle East as eventually the resources are going to get exhausted and said countries will be left with nothing but an economic structure unadjusted to the 21st century.
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Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East
il has long been called “the black contribution, the governments could embark gold”. Along with natural gas it has on large-scale public expenditure been one of the most important programmes without the need to tax their Oenergy sources in the world in the own people; they also would not suffer from last decades and has served as a necessary imbalance of payments or high inflation2. tool to economic growth in many countries. The rentier state theory was later expanded With the oil prices having long been on the upon by many other analysts and scholars, rise, it might seem like the abundance of oil including Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo (and, to a lesser extent, gas) should be Luciani3. It must be noted that former considered a blessing. Countries rich with created a definition of a rentier state that is these natural resources have the opportunity more precise than Mahdavy`s and as such it to sell them to external actors and fund their will be applied to this paper. Beblawi argues own development from the profits. While that 4 characteristics are required for a this might seem like a perfect scenario country to be called “a rentier state”: rent without any downsides, the reality proves situations predominate the economy; the that this is not always the case. This paper economy relies on substantial external rent; aims to present how natural resources in only a small percentage of the population is some Middle Eastern countries might involved in the generation of the rent; the actually be a trap and how in long term they government is the principal recipient of the might actually pose a serious threat to their external rent4. Although many points of the economic growth and stability. rentier state theory are still being debated to this day, most of the theorists seem to agree What is a “rentier state”? that the rentier state (or “rentier economy” as some prefer) poses several risks. Firstly, The theory of the “rentier state” was the citizens of such countries are virtually first presented by Hossein Mahdavy, an dependant on the government and the economist, in a 1970 article “The Patterns public structures as they hold all the keys to and Problems of Economic Development in prosperity. This in turn creates proper Rentier States: the Case of Iran”. Therein, conditions for the rise and preservation of taking Iran as a model, he identifies rentier authoritarianism. Secondly, the reliance on states as “those countries that receive on external rents does not force the countries to regular basis substantial mounts of external undergo significant economic changes and rent … [which can be defined as] rentals industrialization. This lack of innovation and paid by foreign individuals, concerns or initiative may cause trouble for future governments to individuals, concerns and generations. governments of a given country”1. It is obvious that in the case of Middle Eastern Oil, gas and state in contemporary countries most rents come from oil sales. Middle East Later in the article the economist argues that the period 1950-1956 constitutes a turning Over 40 years after the rentier state point in the economic history of the Middle theory was first presented, it still holds a East – during that period the political great significance for the Middle East and its changes enabled the governments of many people. The region remains home to some countries in the region to capture a larger share of the rents which previously accrued 2 Ibidem, p. 431-432. to the oil companies. With such 3 See: The Rentier State: Nation, State and the Integration of the Arab World, H. Beblawi, G. 1 H. Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Luciani (eds), Croom Holm, London 1987. Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case 4 H. Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, of Iran, [in:] Studies in the Economic History of the [in:] The Arab State, G. Luciani (ed.), University Middle East, M. A. Cook (ed.), Oxford University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles Press, Oxford 1970, p. 428. 1990, p. 87-88.
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of the world`s biggest oil (and natural gas) as producers, as presented in the tables below. a wh Co Pro Perc Dail Perc Da Perc ole un ven enta y enta ily enta try oil ge pro ge ex ge [source: BP Statistical Review of rese of duct of po of World Energy rves glob ion glob rts glob June 2013, (tho al – al (2 al http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf usa oil tho oil 01 oil /statistical- nd rese usa dail 2) exp review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ mill rves nd y orts 2013.pdf] ion barr pro barr els duct els) (201 ion Co Pr Perc Pro Perc Ex Perc 2) un ov enta duct enta po enta Ira 157. 9.4 3680 4.2 - - try en ge ion ge rts ge n 0 % % ga of – of – of Ira 150. 9.0 3115 3.7 - - s glob billi glob bill glob q 0 % % res al on al ion al Ku 101. 6.1 3127 3.7 - - erv gas cubi gas cu gas wai 5 % % es rese c pro bic exp t (tri rves met duct me orts O 5.5 0.3 922 1.1 - - llio res ion tre ma % % n (201 s n cu 2) (20 Qa 23.9 1.4 1966 2.0 - - bic 12) tar % % me Sau 265. 15.9 1153 13.3 - - tre di 9 % 0 % s) Ar Ba 0.2 0.1 14.2 0.4 - - abi hra % % a in Syr 2.5 0.1 164 0.2 - - Ira 33. 18.0 160. 4.8 - - ia % % n 6 % 5 % U. 97.8 5.9 3380 3.7 - - Ira 3.6 1.9 0.8 <0.1 - - A. % % q % % E Ku 1.8 1.0 14.5 0.4 - - Ye 3.0 0.2 180 0.2 - - wai % % me % % t n O 0.9 0.5 29.0 0.9 - - Ot 0.6 <0.1 206 0.2 - - ma % % her % % n s Qa 25. 13.4 157. 4.7 12 12.1 Th 807. 48.4 2827 32.5 19 35.6 tar 1 % 0 % 4.6 % e 7 % 0 % 69 % Sau 8.2 4.4 102. 3.0 - - Mi 9 di % 8 % ddl Ar e abi Ea a st Syr 0.3 0.2 7.6 0.2 - - 47
Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East ia % % economic situation of those countries as well U. 6.1 3.3 51.7 1.5 - - as their attachment to the production of oil A. % % and gas, one must also take into E consideration the prices of these resources. Ye 0.5 0.3 7.6 0.2 - - The graphs below present the fluctuation of me % % both of those values in the last 20 years. n Ot 0.2 0.1 2.7 0.1 - - Oil prices (Brent crude, $/barrel) her % % s Th 80. 43.0 548. 16.3 15 15.4 Oil prices (Brent Oil prices e 5 % 4 % 8.9 % (Brent Mi crude, $/ barrel), crude, $/ ddl 2008, barrel), e Oil prices 97,26 2009, Ea (Brent 61,67 st crude, $/ as barrel), a 1993, wh 16,97 ole [source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, [source: BP Statistical Review of World http://www.bp.com/content/dambbp/pdf Energy June 2013, /statistical- http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/stati review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ stical- 2013.pdf] review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013 .pdf] As one can clearly notice, countries located in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Natural gas Natural gas prices (average German importprices Kuwait, U.A.E., Qatar and Oman) benefit price, $/million Btu) (average greatly, at least in financial terms, from the German abundance of oil (together they produce as import much as 31.7% of all the oil in the world). price, $/ One must remember however, that even million though the ratio of production-to- consumption of oil in the Middle Eastern countries is 3.56:1, in the case of natural gas it is only 1.42:1. This means that most of the oil produced in the Middle East is exported to other regions, while most of the gas is consumed by the countries themselves. The only notable exception to this rule is Qatar, who is one of the biggest exporters of gas in [source: BP Statistical Review of World the world5. To fully understand the Energy June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf /statistical-
5 In 2012 Qatar produced 157 billion cubic metres of gas. Only 26.2 billion (less than 17%) were consumed by Qataris themselves, while including Japan (21.3 billion), India (16.1 billion) 130.8 billion were exported to other countries, and South Korea (14.2 billion).
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review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ surface, it may seem like oil- and gas- 2013.pdf] exporting countries in the Middle East do not have anything to worry about, as far as While in the 1990s, both prices were mostly economic indicators are concerned, the real steady, since the beginning of the new picture is far from perfect, due to the nature millennium, they have been on a sharp rise, of the rentirer state itself. with a small exception in 2009 (and 2010 in case of natural gas), which was one of the effects of the global economic crisis. The opportunity to sell natural resources at very high prices has been of great benefit to the countries in the Persian Gulf and has been the biggest contributing factor to their The problems prosperity. In fact, most of them have a high GDP per capita, especially when compared The biggest problem for the rentier to the poorest countries in the region, like states in the Middle East (which we could Afghanistan or Syria. now narrow down to the countries located GDP per capita (US$) [Middle East] Rank (in the world, either 2010, 2011 Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 or 2012) Arab World (average) 6105,42 5162,56 5867,56 7017,67 - - Afghanistan 376,98 450,66 561,20 619,59 - 172. Bahrain 19625,58 16213,34 18334,17 - - 43. Egypt 2156,76 2461,53 2803,53 2972,58 3187,31 123. Iran 4899,31 4931,28 5674,92 6815,57 - 80. Iraq 4472,06 3701,86 4375,91 5686,61 6454,62 89. Israel 27591,62 26032,16 28522,41 31281,47 - 30. Jordan 3797,41 4027,05 4370,72 4665,94 4945,13 100. Kuwait 54548,62 37160,54 41566,10 56514,16 - 9. Lebanon 7185,61 8159,02 8551,85 9148,13 9705,39 68. Oman 23353,17 17597,49 20640,01 23731,21 - 34. Qatar 84628,50 62390,28 72773,31 90523,53 - 5. Saudi Arabia 18064,87 14057,62 16537,74 20777,67 - 40. Syrian Arab Republic 2584,38 2564,46 2746,85 - 3289,06 122. United Arab Emirates 46309,98 35025,10 35259,99 40363,16 - 25. Yemen 1238,00 1105,82 1400,67 1361,33 1494,43 144. in the Persian Gulf), as mentioned before, is [source: World Bank, their utter dependence on oil exports as their http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.G major source of revenue. Let us look at DP.PCAP.CD] some examples. In Saudi Arabia, oil and oil- based products constitute approximately It should be noted that out of 7 Arab states 94% of all exported goods (or 85% of all that are above the “Arab World average” exports, including services), 92.5% of only Lebanon is not a major oil/natural gas government revenue6 and 50% of the GDP7. exporter. Moreover, in case of GDP per
capita, Qatar and Kuwait are among the top 6 48. Annual Report. The Latest Economic 10 countries in the world. While on the Developments, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, p. 49
Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East
In Iran oil exports make up about 80% of constitutes only 2.2% of the GDP and in the country`s total export earnings, 60% of Kuwait barely 0.7% of the GDP (to put its government revenue8 and 25% of its these numbers in context, in the US it is GDP9. Lastly, in Qatar, the export of oil and 10.1%, in France – 21.3% and in the UK – gas constitutes 85% of all its export 27.4%)13. As Terry Lynn Karl rightly points earnings, 60% of its GDP and 50% of out, this means that the governments have government revenue10. This has several no need to build the institutional capacities important consequences. that have historically been required in Firstly, the elites and rulers in the resource-scarce countries due to harsher Middle Eastern rentier states have grown conditions. Moreover, dependence on high accustomed to the fact that they can rely on oil revenues allows the states to enter and the external demand for oil (and gas) and maintain control over many areas of civil life that the money gained from the export of while at the same weakening opportunities these resources is enough to ensure their to strengthen administrative capacities, endurance and control over the country. To merit-based civil services and the rule of law this end, many of them have provided — all of which are indispensable in building welfare and wealth to their citizens, efficient state structures and prosperous demanding little to nothing in return, other economy14. While authoritarianism in itself is than that they agree to a non-explicit “social not necessarily harmful to a country`s contract”, which stipulates that they give up economic performance (which has been their political ambitions and rights11. The proved by many historic examples, such as notion of “no taxation, hence no China or South Korea), it has to be representation”12 is not an exaggeration. In supported by adequate, stable and reliable fact, in Oman the revenue from taxes administrative structures. These are seldom developed in rentier states. Secondly, oil dependence has a great 24, impact on the citizens. Although the http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Reports aforementioned welfare and state-controlled Statistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_Annual_ distribution of wealth in the Middle Eastern En_48_2013_02_19.pdf. 7 Saudi Arabia – National Accounts Indicators 2012, rentier states do sound promising, it must be http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/pdf/GDP2012report.p remembered that major inequalities do df. persist. Unfortunately, due to lack of 8 Sanctions reduced Iran`s oil exports and revenues in sufficient data it is not possible to come up 2012, with the Gini coefficient, which http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?i demonstrates how the income distribution d=11011. among the citizens deviates from perfect 9 Iran Investment Monthly, April and May 2012, p. equality (results above 0.35 should be 8, considered a significant inequality), for all of http://www.turquoisepartners.com/iraninvestm these countries. It can be measured, ent/IIM-AprMay12.pdf. however, for at least some of them: Iraq – 10 Qatar facts and figures, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/ 30.9 (2007), Iran – 38.3 (2005) and Qatar – 168.htm. 11 One needs to remember that the situation in Iraq is slightly different - since the 2003 war the country has been trying to become more democratic, with results leaving much to be 13 Tax revenue (% of GDP), World Bank, desired. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX. 12 R. Schwarz, The political economy of state-formation TOTL.GD.ZS. in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, economic 14 T. L. Karl, Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, reform, and democratization, “Review of and Economic Consequences, [in:] Encyclopedia of International Political Economy” 15, No. 4, Energy, Volume 4, C. J. Cleveland, R. U. Ayres October 2008, p. 607. (eds), Elsevier Academic Press 2004, p. 666.
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41.1 (2007)15. While it should be noted that of its nationals, while a huge majority of the these results are not up-to-date and cannot foreigners find jobs in the private sector, be treated as definitive, it is nonetheless safe usually in services. This causes severe social to assume that they are representative of the tensions and problems. It must also be Persian Gulf region. It is especially noted that due to the state-provided noteworthy that the country with the highest employment and welfare, the nationals often GDP per capita (Qatar) also has the highest lack incentive to develop skills necessary for level of inequality and the one with the “less lucrative” jobs. lowest GDP per capita (Iraq) has got the Thirdly, dependence on oil and gas lowest level of inequality. While these results exports makes the rentier states even more pale in comparison with the results in vulnerable to drastic changes in the global countries like Rwanda (Gini coefficient of economy. When the oil price dropped from 50.8 in 2011) or Zambia (57.5 in 2010), they 97.26 USD/barrel in 2008 to 61.67 do prove that a Middle Eastern rentier state USD/barrel in 2009, the countries in the is not an economically equal state. This Persian Gulf were severely affected. In just should come as no surprise, considering that one year the Omani GDP per capita fell by one sector predominates its entire economy. 25%, the Qatari GDP per capita went down Moreover, oil-dependence harms the by 26% and the Kuwaiti GDP per capita structure of the economy. As more and suffered a decrease of 32%. Even though more people from rural areas move to the the prices soared again soon afterwards, it cities in hopes of becoming a part of the oil was a drastic and sudden shift. Moreover, business (not unlike the Dutch disease), the even though oil is well known to be a agricultural sector becomes underdeveloped. political weapon (as was first proven by In fact, the states located in the Persian Gulf OPEC in 1973), it is sometimes forgotten are not self-dependent when it comes to that it can be used by both sides of a food and must import most of it from dispute. In 2012 the European Union put an abroad16. It should also be noted that these embargo on Iranian oil because of the hopes also attract a lot of foreign workers, country`s nuclear program. This resulted in who upon arrival not only do not get their diminished exports and a steep drop in dream jobs, but are often mistreated and Iranian oil revenue – it fell from 95 billion underpaid. This creates a very bizarre social USD (in 2011) to 69 billion USD (in 2012)19 structure. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the – which caused a series of problems for the foreigners constitute about 80% of its total country`s economy. As one can clearly see, workforce17, while in Qatar an astonishing even though oil and gas are usually 94%18! With the government being the dependable sources of revenue, over-reliance prime recipient of external rents, it can on these resources can be extremely harmful afford to artificially broaden the public and dangerous. This lack of what one could sector and administration and employ most call “self-dependence” and the economic issues it may generate, should be regarded 15 Gini Index, World Bank, with caution by the ruling elites of oil- http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.G exporting countries, especially considering INI?page=1. the events of the so-called Arab Spring. 16 Z. Babar, Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the While its effects for the states located in the Middle East, Persian Gulf were not as serious as for some http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/grants/11 other countries in the region, it did lead to 6115.html. protests, some governmental changes in 17 Saudi Arabia – Economy, http://www.saudiarabia.com/Page/Economy/5 Oman and Kuwait and a military 9. intervention of the Gulf Cooperation 18 J. O. Dennie, Modern Slavery: The Plight of Council in Bahrain. Even though the Foreign Workers in Qatar, http://digitaljournal.com/article/303006#ixzz2 djrWV9jl. 19 Sanctions…, op.cit. 51
Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East protests in these countries were mostly oil and gas are definitely not going to last motivated by politics and less so by forever and even if we remain optimistic, it economy (unlike in some other Middle is safe to assume that these resources will get Eastern countries), they proved that the exhausted either by the end of this century people are unsatisfied with the current or by the beginning of the next one23. situation and way of living. The unrests may Considering that non-oil (non-gas) sectors of be slowly dying off, but possible economic the economies of the Middle Eastern rentier problems, caused by over-dependence on oil states are hugely underdeveloped and that exports and the instability of world the majority of their products and services economy, could bring them back to life in are rather uncompetitive on the global the future. market, the economic future of these Fourthly, as Hazem Beblawi points countries could be bleak. out, the politics of the rentier state has affected not only the oil/gas-exporting Towards a post-rentier state in countries themselves, but other countries in the Middle East? the region as well, turning them into “semi- rentiers without oil”. As much of their own It is obvious by now that economic GDP is comprised of external rent-like growth should not be regarded in purely revenues (royalties, workers` remittances, financial terms, just as a measurement of foreign aid etc.), they also adopted some of GDP or GDP per capita rise. The real the rentier state`s behavior and elements, progress demands serious changes in the such as overblown bureaucracy (“a new structure of the economy itself, self- rentier class”), which serves to guarantee reliability and the development of human that the people employed by the state do not capital. Instead, the rentier state promotes turn against their own employer and remain economic immobility and lack of innovation. loyal20. Dependence on oil and gas sales may be Finally, and perhaps most convenient for the ruling elites and many importantly, one has to wonder about the citizens in these countries, but it is becoming long-term future of Middle Eastern rentier more and more apparent that the rentier states. While for now they can rely on oil state practices are a serious obstacle to real and gas as their primary source of revenue, development. these resources are eventually going to run Fortunately, the decision-makers in out. The only question remains, when? Some the Middle Eastern rentier states have not scientists believe that at present rates of been oblivious to these problems and have consumption, the current reserves will be been trying to modify their economic sufficient for the next 40 years in case of oil policies for some time. The results of these and 60 years in case of natural gas21. These actions vary from country to country. claims are of course purely estimative and do Matthew Gray argues that the model not take into consideration the emergence of currently represented by the Arab states of new technologies or the discovery of new the Gulf should be referred to as “late reservoirs. One must also remember that rentier”. In said model, “the state is more many of past predictions regarding that entrepreneurial, supportive of development, subject have been proven wrong22. However,
20 Beblawi, op. cit., p. 95-98. 21 Are We Running Out of Oil and Gas?, running out of oil? Policy Backgrounder No. 159, http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_Cente http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/bg159.pdf. r/are_we_running_out_of_oil_and_gas.htm. 23 It is interesting to note that the Middle East as 22 For example, in 1950 geologists estimated the a region has the second highest oil-reserves-to- world’s total oil endowment at around 600 production ratio in the world (behind South and billion barrels. Current estimates put that Central America) and the highest gas-reserves- number at almost 1.7 trillion barrels. See: Are we to-production ratio.
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and responsive than it was previously”24. The abundance of oil and gas in the Saudi Arabia, for instance, has been trying to countries located in the Persian Gulf is both develop its private sector and has invested in a blessing and a curse. While the export of infrastructure and education25. It is estimated these resources plays a substantial role in that the growing private sector is now their nominal economic growth, it also paves generating over 40% of the country`s GDP. the way for negative practices of a rentier Other examples can be given. Qatar tries to state, which include over-reliance on said diversify its economy into a more sustainable resources, static economy, inflated model, including global financial bureaucracy and preservation of investments, the creation of tourism and authoritarianism. Since excessive attachment sporting event destinations, a world-class to this model might prove disastrous in the carrier in Qatar Airways, and the creation of future, many states have initiated new a global financial hub26. These new positive policies aiming to diversify their economic changes are less visible in Iran and Iraq, two structures, strengthen the private sector and Middle Eastern rentier states who have been attract foreign non-oil/gas related dealing with serious international problems investments. These reforms, though for quite some time. necessary, are still far too conservative. If But even these developments are still the policy-makers in the countries located in insufficient and too slow – the very nature the Persian Gulf really wish to secure their of rentierism in said countries persists. states` future, they will have to take bolder Strengthening the private sector and and more radical actions. diversifying the economy may also lead to consequences that could be considered References “unwanted” by the ruling autocratic elites – namely, the development of a civil society 48. Annual Report. The Latest Economic that is fully aware of the political rights it is Developments, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, entitled to. The growing calls for http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Rep democratization could pose a threat to the ortsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_ current rulers` grip over their countries. Annual_En_48_2013_02_19.pdf. That, in turn, may discourage them from entirely abandoning the rentier state Are we running out of oil? Policy practices. Backgrounder No. 159, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/bg159.pdf.
Are We Running Out of Oil and Gas?, Conclusion http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_C enter/are_we_running_out_of_oil_and_gas. htm.
Babar Z., Food Security and Food 24 M. Gray, A Theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Sovereignty in the Middle East, Arab States of the Gulf, Occasional Paper No. 7, http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/grants Center for International and Regional Studies, /116115.html. Doha 2011, p. 23. 25 IMF: Private sector may not keep pace with Saudi Beblawi H., The Rentier State in the youth bulge, Arab World, [in:] The Arab State, Luciani G. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/319 059/economy/business/imf-private-sector-may- (ed.), University of California Press, Berkeley not-keep-pace-with-saudi-youth-bulge. and Los Angeles 1990, p. 85-98. 26 Qatar looks to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon export reliance, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, http://www.ameinfo.com/qatar-looks-diversify- June 2013, economy-hydrocarbon-export-318995. 53
Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cf /statistical- m?id=11011. review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf Saudi Arabia – Economy, http://www.saudiarabia.com/Page/Econo Dennie J. O., Modern Slavery: The my/59. Plight of Foreign Workers in Qatar, http://digitaljournal.com/article/303006#ix Saudi Arabia – National Accounts zz2djrWV9jl. Indicators 2012, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/pdf/GDP2012repo Gray M., A Theory of “Late Rentierism” rt.pdf. in the Arab States of the Gulf, Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for International and Regional Schwarz R., The political economy of Studies, Doha 2011. state-formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, economic reform, and democratization, IMF: Private sector may not keep pace “Review of International Political with Saudi youth bulge, Economy” 15, No. 4, October 2008, p. 599- http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 621. 319059/economy/business/imf-private- sector-may-not-keep-pace-with-saudi-youth- World Bank, bulge. http://data.worldbank.org.
Iran Investment Monthly, April and May 2012, http://www.turquoisepartners.com/iraninve stment/IIM-AprMay12.pdf.
Karl T. L., Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences, [in:] Encyclopedia of Energy, Volume 4, Cleveland C. J., Ayres R. U. (eds), Elsevier Academic Press 2004, p. 661-672.
Mahdavy H., The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran, [in:] Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, Cook M. A. (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 1970, p. 428-467.
Qatar facts and figures, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about _us/168.htm.
Qatar looks to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon export reliance, http://www.ameinfo.com/qatar-looks- diversify-economy-hydrocarbon-export- 318995. Sanctions reduced Iran`s oil exports and revenues in 2012,
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From Yeltsin to Putin: Moscow’s Perception of the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula
Wonhee LEE1, John Hopkins University, Washington D.C.
Abstract
ussia has developed multipolar paradigm in its effort to reobtain the position of the Great Power since it realized that it could not exert influence strong enough to stake its claim in the world politics. The advocacy of a multipolar world order, referred to as the “Primakov Doctrine,” shifted Moscow’s R attitude toward the two Koreas as well. In its pursuit of multipolarity in East Asia, Russia has designed its strategy toward Korea’s nuclear crisis and unification to best suit its national interest. Considering the competition among the Great Powers in East Asia, Russia’s Korea policy can better be understood under such a multilateral framework.
1 Wonhee Lee, 29, born and raised in Seoul, is a candidate for M.A. in International Relations with concentration in China Studies, Korea Studies and International Economics at The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies (SAIS). He is currently working as a research assistant at the U.S.- Korea Institute at SAIS (USKI). His academic interests lie in diplomatic history of East Asia, Sino-Taiwanese relations and inter-Korean relations. Wonhee Lee co-authored “The Uneasiness of Big Brother-Little Brother Relationships-China’s Relations with Neighboring Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Myanmar,” a chapter in Chinas Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries Strategies toward China, edited by Jung-Ho Bae and Jae H. Ku, published by Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), with Jae H. Ku. He is also a recipient of Starr Excellence in China Studies Fellowship conferred by SAIS China Studies. He obtained B.A. in Chinese and B.B.A. in International Economics and Law at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) in 2011. 45
Wonhee LEE From Yeltsin to Putin
ecognizing and accepting limitations and why Moscow made such a fundamental can be an importance step to move shift in 1996 deserves attention. forward to the future. To Russia, In terms of global geopolitics, soured R that moment came in 1996 just five Russo-American relations in the mid 1990s years after the Soviet Union collapsed. After reaffirmed that the time was not yet ripe for its transition to a democratic nation, Russia a new democratic condominium between anticipated that the West in the global Washington and Moscow. Former U.S. community would regard it as an equal National Security Adviser Zbigniew partner. In 1996, facing domestic instability Brzezinski points out that Moscow’s hope and international marginalization, Post- for enhanced scope and power through Soviet Russia opted to promote a concept of “mature strategic partnership” was devoid of multipolarity to regain its position as a either international or domestic realism.2 “Great Power.” Therefore, 1996 marked a Simply put, post-Soviet Russia was too weak turning point of Moscow’s diplomacy, which to become America’s coequal partner in a eliminated reminiscence of the Cold War new global order. In addition, Washington bilateral framework or mere hope for the and Moscow took different approaches on strategic partnership with the United States. some of the critical geostrategic issues in This paper aims to document how Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.3 and why Moscow made such a dramatic shift The most instructive example would be the and what impacts it has produced on the mounting tension between the two over the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The expansion of NATO to Central Europe second section covers the emergence of the where Moscow was willing to maintain its “Primakov Doctrine” and Moscow’s effort influence. Additionally, the erosion of the to create a multipolar global order in 1996. political base of these reformists was The following section briefly describes accelerated as the Russian economy was in Moscow’s foreign policy from the Yeltsin distress due to the adverse consequences of era to Putin’s presidency. How Russia views a rapid economic transition. the nuclear crisis involving North Korea and Now let us take a close look at the the Korean unification from the perspective chessmen in the East Asian segment. of multilateralism is examined in the forth Moscow was worried if it might be section. Finally, this paper suggests that internationally marginalized in this region. Russia’s Korea policy should not be assessed After the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, Russia in exclusively peninsular terms, but also in a proposed a “multilateral conference on wider context of Russia’s relations with the security and nuclear-weapon-free status of world’s “centers of power.” the Korean Peninsula” based on a “2+6 “mechanism—with the participation of North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the U.S., Ⅱ. Moscow’s Dramatic Foreign Policy China, Japan, the United Nations, and Shift in 1996 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, against their (ⅰ) America’s Coequal Partner? expectations, Moscow was not perceived 1996 marked a turning point of either as a key partner or an America’s equal Moscow’s diplomacy. Since the “Primakov partner, while the importance of doctrine” was adopted, the Kremlin has Washington’s role dramatically increased. As shown consistency in its main diplomatic a result, a “2+2” formula—the negotiation strategy regardless of leadership changes— among North Korea, South Korea, the U.S. from Yeltsin to Putin, from Putin to Medvedev, and again, Medvedev to Putin. 2 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand This key concept of a multipolar world order Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic has remained a pillar of Moscow’s Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. diplomacy. In this regard, examining how 3 Ibid.
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and China) was adopted, leaving Moscow’s enhancing Moscow’s.7 One year later, in position as an observer. Moscow changed 1997, Russia’s growing need for creating a the polarity of its approach and joined the multipolar order was codified in the “Russo- anti-North Korean coalition in de-facto Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar terms in the early 1990s, but Russia lost its World and the Establishment of a New influence in the North without any gains in International Order” signed by Yeltsin and the South.4 Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China. Though the U.S. was not (ⅱ) Pursuit of the Multipolar Word obviously mentioned in the declaration, the Order two parties agreed that “any country should Russia’s cornered position in the not aspire to hegemony, pursue a policy international community led to post-Soviet from a position of force and monopolize the advocacy of multipolarity. The unfavorable international affairs.”8 This event signaled a condition of Russia’s relationship with and remarkable transformation of Moscow’s strategy toward two Koreas did not satisfy foreign policy, which had titled toward the the pragmatic wing of the Kremlin and US-led Western community during the first resulted in efforts to change its approach.5 half of the Yeltsin years. In the latter half of the Yeltsin In dealing with the Korean administration, Yevgeni Primakov, who problem, the Yeltsin administration began to replaced Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s foreign take a more balanced, pragmatic approach minister, presented three principles: (1) from the balance-of-power perspective. integrating Russia into the world economy; When Andrei Kozyrev proposed a (2) establishing a multipolar world; and (3) multilaternal framework with the “2+6” counteracting key United States–led formula to solve the first nuclear crisis, initiatives including North Atlantic Treaty Russia still remained in the pro-Western, or Organization (NATO) enlargement, the anti-North Korean coalition. However, Iraqi economic embargo, and military Yeltsin and Russian diplomats realized that intervention in Kosovo.6 Thus, the advocacy the bilateral relationship between Moscow of a multipolar world order, referred to as and Pyongyang had to be improved in order the “Primakov Doctrine,” can be construed to achieve a balanced position on the as Moscow’s effort to counterbalance a Korean Peninsula.9 Actually, without the growing U.S. influence in world politics. influence over Pyongyang, Moscow was an Indeed, Primakovian multipolarity unattractive option to Seoul. Russia was reflected the view that Moscow intended to surprised to hear later from the South remain one of the Great Powers but at the Korean representatives that Russia’s lack of same time it could not wield its influence as leverage over North Korea had caused strongly as the U.S. in the international Seoul’s interest in cooperation with Moscow community. A multipolar world was thus to decrease correspondingly.10 By considered as the best international structure maintaining the influence over both Koreas, for restraining Washington’s influence while
7 Rangsimaporn, Paradon. 2009. “Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin.” International 4 Toloraya, Georgy. 2009 “Russian policy in Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9: 213. Korea in a time of change.” The Korean 8 The Russo-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Journal of Defense Analysis 21: 73. Multipolar World and the Establishment of 5 Vorontsov. a New International Order. http://the- 6 “Primakov Doctrine.” Historical Dictionary of books.biz/policy-peace-foreign/the-russian- the Russian Federation. Accessed April 7, 2013. chinese-joint-declaration-the-60993.html. http://russian_federation.enacademic.com/ 9 Vorontsov. 458/Primakov_Doctrine. 10 Ibid. 47
Wonhee LEE From Yeltsin to Putin
Russia sought to obtain its status as one of Unit: the “poles” in the multipolar order of East USD Asia. Registered Registered Investment Year Number Capital Amount
Ⅲ. Overview of Moscow’s Foreign 1992 21 7,386,432 3,247,004 Policy since the 1990’s (ⅰ) Democratic Romanticism (The First 1993 30 5,550,228 3,647,722 Half the Yeltsin Years) In 1992-1995, Russia’s foreign policy 1994 42 54,321,981 13,871,446 was “pro-Western.” In consideration that it could maximize political and economic 1995 31 52,713,605 31,901,980 benefits, Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev advocated West- 1996 49 74,814,068 44,132,794 centric policy. This period has recently been labeled “democratic romanticism.”11 1997 26 33,641,538 8,422,992 Upgrading partnership with South Korea Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea was one of these West-centric policy agendas. Accordingly, Russia actively At the same time, Moscow’s policy reached out to South Korea, anticipating put its relations with Pyongyang into the tremendous potential for cooperation with freezer. The ruling elite in Pyongyang, who Seoul in the political and economic arena. openly supported the anti-Gorbachev coup, Yeltsin’s three-day official visit to South now had to deal with Moscow’s “pro- Korea from November 18 to 20, 1992 Westerners.”13 Above all things, Moscow’s would be an illustrative example that shows declaration to cut off military aid was a their improved bilateral relations. Issuing a serious blow to Pyongyang’s nuclear joint statement, South Korean President aspirations. Speaking at a news conference Roh Tae-woo pledged more vigorous during his visit to Seoul in November 1992, participation in Russia’s economic 12 Yeltsin mentioned that Russia had already development to Yeltsin. The rapid pace of stopped providing nuclear technology and diplomatic and political cooperation laid the materials to North Korea.14 Earlier in spring groundwork for South Korea’s brisk 1992, then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev investment in Russia. In particular, the announced plans to suspend all military invested amount increased more than 13- cooperation with North Korea in order to fold, continuously going up from 1992 to pressure it into giving up its nuclear 1996 until the Asia Economic Crisis hit both weapons development plan.15 When the of them (See Table 1). From the perspective global community was at loggerheads over of Moscow, such a developed relationship the Clinton administration’s proposal to with Seoul seemed beneficial to drawing impose sanctions against North Korea in political and economic support for its reform drive. 13 Wishnick, Elizabeth. 2002. “Russian— North Korean Relations: A New Era?” in Table 1: South Korea's Investment in North Korea and Northeast Asia. ed. Samuel S. Russia Kim and Tai Hwan Lee. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 11 Vorontsov. 14 Pollack, Andrew. “Yeltsin Vows Curb on 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of North Koreans.” The New York Times, Nov. Korea. “Korean-Russian Joint Statement.” 21, 1992. http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboa 15 Koh, Jae-nam. 1999. “The Rising Role of rd/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID Russia in Settling a Peace on the Korean =12&boardid=660&seqno=304702 Peninsula.” East Asian Review 11.
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1994, Kozyrev expressed its readiness to P accept them as a last resort.16
Source: Tradingeconomic.com & World Bank (ⅱ) Primakov Doctrine (The Latter Half http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/ the Yeltsin Years) gdp As Brzezinski pointed out in the
previous section, Russia suffered several
internal and external problems in the middle
of the 1990’s. In terms of economic growth, The key principle that shifted Russia’s GDP fell for five years in a row Moscow’s approach in the latter half the from 1991 to 1996, which was directly Yeltsin years was the “Primakov Doctine.” opposed to its hope (see Table 2). With Yeltsin and Primakov aimed to establish a regard to the problems on the Korean multipolar world order, moving away not Peninsula, a series of major events took only from the bipolar framework during the place and weakened the position of “pro- Cold War era but also from its mere hope to Westerners” in 1996. Russia was excluded be treated as an equal partner by the U.S. from the “2+2” mechanism (North Korea, Russian foreign policy had to be balanced in South Korea, the U.S. and China) to deal order to ensure the necessary environment with the nuclear crisis in North Korea, for domestic development and avoid the which broke out in early 1990s. international marginalization. Under this Furthermore, it was also excluded from the framework, Russia sought to maintain a Korean Peninsula Energy Development balanced attitude between North Korea and Organization (KEDO). Moscow’s South Korea, avoiding unnecessary marginalization reflects a grim situation confrontation with the West. Accordingly, where Russia was losing leverage over North Moscow implemented separate strategies Korea at the expense of economic gains toward Pyongyang and Seoul: Russia tried to from improved relations with South Korea. secure its interests regarding both South and Frustrated with the limited benefits from the North Korea, but did not connect them with West-centric foreign policy, in July 1996, each other.17 This logic behind the Kremlin’s Yeltsin appointed Yevgeni Primakov as a calculation explains why Russia accelerated new foreign minister and began to pursue its effort to improve the bilateral more balanced and pragmatic diplomatic relationship with North Korea in the latter strategies. half of Yeltsin’s presidency.
(ⅲ) Pragmatism (The Putin and Table 2: GDP of the Russian Federation Medvedev Administrations) (1991-2000) “Primakov Doctine” has been inherited to the current Putin’s diplomatic Unit: Billion USD principles in the form of the “Putin Yea199 199 199 199 199 199 199 19 199 200 Doctrine,” but Putin’s view on multipolarity r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 98 9 0 is different from that of Primakov’s. This difference originates from Putin’s realization 509 406 435 395 395 391 404 27 195 259 that Russia can only encourage the GD.4 .2 .1 .1 .5 .7 .9 1 .9 .7 establishment of a multipolar world when Russia itself is politically stable and 16 Los Angeles Times. “Cooling Off a Hot economically vibrant. Therefore, the Russian Head : Administration's phased-in approach government’s Korean strategy evolved toward North Korea gains backing.” Jun. 16, toward a concept asserting national interest 1994. http://articles.latimes.com/1994-06- 16/local/me-4585_1_north-korea. 17 Ibid. 49
Wonhee LEE From Yeltsin to Putin in the Putin administration. The essence of symbolic sign that shows Putin’s orientation Putin’s foreign policy concept is to promote to pragmatic thinking.21 the construction of a fair democratic order in the world, to broaden the range of friends and partners of Russia, and—most Ⅳ. Moscow’s View on the Peace on the importantly—to firmly and consistently Korean Peninsula protect the national interest of Russia.18 This (ⅰ) Nuclear Crisis is why Putin vigorously cultivated ties with There are three main points that Pyongyang to gain the leverage on the Moscow stresses to deal with North Korea’s Korean Peninsula while at the same time nuclear ambitions, all of which are in line trying to maintain cooperative relations with with the key principles mentioned above. the Great Powers, especially the U.S. First, Moscow prefers to solve the nuclear Like his predecessor, Medvedev impasse under a multilateral framework. succeeded Primakovian mulipolairty as Resuming six-party talks remains Moscow’s described in the Concept of Foreign Policy highest priority among its policy agendas adopted in July 2008. The second principle regarding Pyongyang’s denuclearization. of Medvedev’s doctrine says that “The world This stance is affirmed by a recent official must be multipolar … Russia cannot accept comment made by Russian Foreign Ministry a world order with only one decision maker, spokesman Alexander Lukashevich about even one as serious as the U.S.A.”19 two months after North Korea’s third Furthermore, Medvedev also put the effort nuclear test. On April 19, 2013, he said, to protect Russia’s national interest based on “Russia hopes that the six-party talks on the pragmatism. In his doctrine, Medvedev denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula pleaded for a modernization strategy that will remain the priority one and help resume would use technological know-how and negotiations to resolve all issues.”22 Then, innovation to boost efficiency in how does Moscow perceive the threats from consideration that Russia could join the Pyongyang’s nuclear potential? Georgy ranks of the most advanced economies Toloraya’s analysis provides a clue to through modernization.20 Putin has interpreting Mocow’s strategy toward the maintained his consistent approach toward current nuclear impasse. According to his the two Koreas since he took office again assessment, Pyongyang’s use of nuclear after the end of Dmitri Medvedev's term in weapons is highly improbable, but turmoil, 2012. His stress on multilateral frameworks, resulting from loss of nuclear materials friendly relations with its neighboring control or technical accidents, does powers and favorable market conditions is a constitute possible dangers.23 All in all, one can conclude that Russia holds firm to the six-party talks while not taking the actual 18 threats seriously. Afanasiev, Evgeny. 2000. “Vladimir Second, Russia is keenly interested Putin’s New Foreign Policy and Russian in playing a “balancing role” rather than a Views of the Situation on the Korean “leading role” in resolving the nuclear crisis Peninsula.” The Korean Journal of involving North Korea. In other words, Defense Analysis 12: 8. Moscow seeks to balance tensions, especially 19 Chugrov, Sergei 2010. “Russia’s between Washington and Pyongyang, in Foreign and Security Strategy in the 21st Century.” In Russian National Strategy 21 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia. and ROK-Russian Strategic Partnership “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.” in the 21st Century. ed. Jung-Ho Bae and 22 “Russia hopes 6-party format on Korea Alexander N. Fedorovskiy. Seoul: Korea remains priority.” Itar-Tass, April 19, 2013. Institute for National Unification. 23 Toloraya, Georgy. “Russia and the North 20 Ibid. Korean knot.” Asia Times Online, Apr. 23, 2010.
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maintaining the six-party talks. Russia often agency on his arrival in Beijing in 2003 to criticized the Bush administration’s get- join a preliminary meeting for the six-party tough policy toward North Korea and urged talks. “We consider that the presence of a the U.S. to solve North Korean conflicts nuclear weapon on the peninsula is of a through peaceful means.24 For example, destabilizing nature that does not meet the when the six-party process reached a interests of all the states that are located in deadlock in 2007 as North Korea’s funds in the region,” he was quoted as saying.28 On the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) was frozen for March 7, 2012, the UN Security Council two years, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister unanimously approved a resolution to Alexander Losyukov accused the U.S. of impose the fourth set of sanctions on North hindering progress of the multinational Korea. Speaking after the vote, Russia’s nuclear talks.25 Permanent Representative to the U.N. Vitaly Simultaneously, Moscow continues Churkin, who is also the current president of to make sincere efforts to resume the the council, described the resolution as an negotiation process when Pyongyang "appropriate measure".29 withdraws from the talks. Most recently, as the six-party talks had been suspended since (ⅱ) Unification 2009, a Russian delegation headed by Before examining the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin attitude toward Korea’s unification, it should paid a visit to Pyongyang in March, 2011, be noted that while various political forces in urging North Korea to return to the 6-party Russia have varying points of view on the talks. North Korea responded by saying that two Koreas. Alexander Lukin, a professor at it was willing to accept Russia’s proposal the Department of Political Science of without preconditions.26 All in all, within the Moscow State Institute of International six-party talks, Russia’s main role has been Relations, introduces these different to voice for the need for peaceful solutions approaches. According to Lukin, the and to prevent too much pressure on North political elite and specialists are divided into Korea.27 three groups.30 First, pro-Western politicians Finally, Russia takes a stand against and specialists, called rightists in Russia, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program argue that Russia should stimulate the based on the concept of the peaceful co- collapse of the “communist dictatorship,” or existence of the South and the North. at least should not prevent it from Political instability driven by nuclear issues collapsing. Then, there is a leftist group with on the Far East border is likely to harm a more traditional Soviet-style policy, which Russia’s interest, hampering its plan of sympathizes with North Korea, considering developing the Far East and producing a it as an ally in the ongoing struggle against massive inflow of refugees. Moscow’s stance the U.S.-led world politics. However, Lukin toward a non-nuclear status of the Korean points out that these two groups do not peninsula was confirmed by Losyukov when have a decisive influence on Moscow’s he was quoted by China’s Xinhua news foreign policy. Indeed, Moscow’s diplomatic circles 24 Joo. “Chapter 8. Russia and the Korean Peace have been occupied with a pragmatist or Process.” 25 Xinhua News Agency. “Russia criticizes U.S. 28 Xinhua News Agency. for delay in solving financial dispute with 29 BBC News. “UN adopts tough new North DPRK.” Mar. 16, 2007. Korea sanctions after nuclear test.” Mar. 7, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007- http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia- 04/16/content_5985102.htm. 21704862. 26 Kim, Hyung-jin. “North Korea 'not opposed' 30 Lukin, Alexander. 2009. “Russia’s to discussing uranium enrichment if 6-nation nuclear talks resume.” The Washington Post, Korea Policy in the 21st Century.” Mar. 15, 2011. International Journal of Korean 27 Blank, Stephen and Younkyoo, Kim. Unification Studies 18: 43-4. 51
Wonhee LEE From Yeltsin to Putin centrist group during the Putin and Korean system.34 In particular, considering Medvedev years. They promote the that the development of its Far Eastern pragmatic approach toward the two Koreas, region is one of the key agendas, a unified which treads a middle path between the two Korea would certainly be an attractive more radical views.31 In this regard, it would economic partner. Also, Russia anticipates be fair to consider this centrist approach geopolitical shifts after the unification. A Russian’s mainstream view on the decrease in the U.S. role in Korea may bring unification of the Korean Peninsula. Thus, about a relocation of the line of China’s this section covers the main points “deterrence” eastwards to Japan.35 In presented by this centrist view. Also, it is addition, a unified Korea friendly to Russia interesting to see that Russia’s view on would serve as counterbalance against Japan Korea’s unification reflects the concept of and China. While Russian leaders often say multipolarity. that only Russia supports Korean First of all, Moscow supports the unification, one should note that Russia idea of a democratic, gradual and peaceful would support a unified Korea only if it unification of Korea. Vasily Mikheev, would be willing to accommodate Russia’s Director of the China-Japan Centre at the interest.36 Institute of World Economy and Last, Moscow is convinced that it International Relations in Moscow, argues can perform a unique role in the process of that the best variant of the possible Korea’s unification. Russian experts believe scenarios will be co-existence of two Korean that its traditional ties with Pyongyang and states on the Korean Peninsula in the form its experience of democratic transition will of diplomatic relations while North Korea be beneficial to the reform in North Korea. learns how to live on market-democracy For example, Lukin claims that it is in principles before full unification with the Russian’s interest to demonstrate to the South.32 He further claims that the North Korean regime the advantages of the Permanent Five need to establish a special market economy, and to encourage fund to support North Korean market reformist tendencies within it.37 As transformation in order to make the process mentioned above, it should also be noted smoother.33 To sum up, it is clear that that it is hard to accept this claim as it is. Moscow is opposed to the abrupt collapse Considering Russia’s pursuit of pragmatism, of North Korea but prefers the gradual it is probable that Russia would assist the process assisted by neighboring powers. unification process in a way that it is Second, Moscow is willing to secure favorable to Russia’s interest. its economic and geostrategic interest on the Korean peninsula. Moscow’s aspiration can be construed as the attempt to pursue its Ⅴ. Conclusion national interest in an East Asian multipolar After a dramatic shift in its foreign world. In economic cooperation, Russia policy in 1996, the Kremlin has taken a expects a unified Korea to be a larger and balanced and pragmatic approach based on more active partner and investor provided mulipolarity in a bid to regain its status of a that it would more closely resemble the super power of the world. When the scope current South Korean model than the North of this study is confined to the Korean Peninsula, it is observed that Moscow’s 31 Ibid. 32 Mikheev, Vasily. “The Korean 34 Lukin. 57. Problem: The Vision and Philosophy.” 35 Toloraya, Georgy. 2008. “Russia’s East Presentation at the 1st JPI-FNF-KF Joint Asian Strategy: The Korean Challenge.” Workshop, Jeju, South Korea, October Russian in Global Affairs 6: 181-2. 15-16, 2010. 36 Joo. 33 Ibid. 37 Lukin. 45.
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strategy in this region can also be explained Bazhanov, Eugene and Bazhanov, Natasha. through its pursuit of multipolarity and 1994. “The Evolution of Russian-Korean diplomatic pragmatism. In this case, the Relations: External and Internal Factors.” Asian poles consist of the multipolar world in East Survey 34: 789-98. Asia would be Russia, the U.S., China and BBC News. “UN adopts tough new North Japan. It is also discovered that Moscow’s Korea sanctions after nuclear test.” Mar. 7, 2013. strategy toward Korea’s peace process is http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia- designed in a way that Russia could maintain 21704862. its influence and secure its national interest in a multipolar order of East Asia. As for the Bazhanov, Evgeny. 2005. The Russian Responses to nuclear issues, Moscow prefers multilateral the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. (Washington, D.C. mechanism, plays a “balancing role” and : National Council for Eurasian and East strongly opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear European Research) weapons program. With regard to the unification, it emphasizes a gradual process Blank, Stephen and Younkyoo, Kim. 2012: assisted by neighboring powers, its expected “Restarting the Six-Party Talks: Russia’s Dilemmas and Current Perspectives.” Korea economic and geostrategic interest, and its Observer 43: 253-77. unique role that could contribute to the unification process. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand This paper suggests that Russia’s Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Korea policy is a byproduct of its effort to Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. create a multipolar order in East Asia. In fact, the Korean Peninsula is one of the Buszynski, Leszek. 2009. “Russia and North venues where the Great Powers vie for the Korea: Dilemmas and Interests.” Asian Survey 49: hegemony in Asia-Pacific. As Georgy 809-30. Toloraya suggests, “Russia’s Korea policy should not be evaluated in exclusively Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Why China and Russia Balk at Sanctions against North Korea and peninsular terms, but also in a wider context Iran.” Cato Institue. March, 2010. of Russia’s relations with the world’s centers 38 http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/ of power.” Therefore, in examining pdf/npu_march2010.pdf. Russia’s view on the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, competition among the Chugrov, Sergei. 2010. “Russia’s Foreign and Great Powers deserves equal importance as Security Strategy in the 21st Century.” In Russian Russo-Korean relations. National Strategy and ROK-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century. ed. Jung-Ho Bae and Alexander N. Fedorovskiy. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification. Bibliography Ellison, Herbert J. 2006. Boris Yeltsin and Russia’s
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